THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A001800060003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2001
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 15, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET
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Copy No. ~' fry
.~.1.U
WEEKLY REPORT
DIA, DOS Declassification/Release Instructions on File
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
15 December 1965
INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERAGENCY
VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE
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GROUP 1
E,doded from ooromonc
downgradlny and ded assi fication
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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OCI No. 0650/65
Published by the Directorate of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(9 December - 15 December 1965)
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
Map, South Vietnam, facing page
1. THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
A. POLITICAL SITUATION
Buddhist elements demonstrate against
alleged US desecration of pagoda (p. 1);
Officials cooperate to ward off further
outbreaks as investigation is launched
(p. 1); Early reports on Saigon Buddhist
conference (p. 1); Military Directorate
discusses rural construction, internal
weaknesses, and long-range plans (p. 2);
Exchange rate rises on black market
(p. 3); Retail food prices ease but pork
shortage threatens (p. 3); Hanh-Dunkerly
economic report contains dire warnings
Page
for 1966, is refuted by US Mission (p. 4).
B. MILITARY SITUATION 6
Significant allied initiatives bring
strong Communist reactions (p. 6);
Weekly statistics reflect high activity
rate (p. 6); Large-unit contacts in three
CTZs (p. 6); Michelin plantation again
scene of major action (p. 6); Both sides
sustain heavy casualties in northern
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Page
coastal area (p. 7); Other signifi-
cant allied actions (p. 7); Commu-
nist activity is noted in all areas
(p. 8); Current status of major trans-
portation routes (p. 9).
Map, Transportation Routes, facing page 9
C. RURAL CONSTRUCTION 10
Minister Thang surveys rural construc-
tion picture at joint GVN-US meeting,
expresses confidence in success (p. 10);
Plans for 1966 envision increase in GVN
control of Hop Tac area (p. 11); New
pacification teams to be utilized (p. 11);
Increase noted in Chieu Hoi ralliers
(p. 11); Viet Cong defection rate may be
rising (p. 12); Latest refugee figures
are given (p. 12).
Map, Monsoon Effects, facing page 13
II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC 13
US air operations hampered by sea-
sonal monsoon (p. 13); :Hanoi's pro-
paganda takes issue with possibility
of second pause in air strikes (p. 13);
DRV may fear a negative response will
tarnish its "reasonable" image (p. 12);
Peking reiterates promise of support to
DRV (p. 14).
III. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS 15
Khmer Serei leader reportedly received
assurances of support from Premier Ky
(p. 15); Cambodia agrees to sell rice
to Viet Cong (p. 15); ICC asked to
establish watch over Sihanoukville
(p. 15); GVN ambassadorial appoint-
ments (p. 16); GVN seeks representation
in Switzerland (p. 16); Increasing num-
ber of free world nations offer medical
assistance (p. 16).
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ANNEX: South Vietnam Battle Statistics (Weekly)
US Combat Casualties in Vietnam (Weekly)
(The Weekly Report on the Situation in South Vietnam
is based on contributions from CIA, DIA, and INR; it
is edited and published by CIA without final coordina-
tion'.)
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THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
Significant combat activity occurred during the past
week, with major engagements in the delta, to the north-
west of Saigon, and in the northern coastal area. Most of
the fighting resulted from allied initiatives, but Commu-
nist resistance has been strong. The Viet Cong, although
mounting fewer attacks than the previous week., struck in
greater force while sustaining a high rate of guerrilla ac-
tivity and antiaircraft firings.
Noteworthy political activity during the week cen-
tered on the Unified Buddhist Association conference in
Saigon, and on charges by certain Buddhist elements in
northern South Vietnam that US troops had desecrated a
pagoda near Da Nang. Serious anti-American disturb-
ances have been avoided for the present but the issue is
still simmering. The government in Saigon, meanwhile,
has been turning its attention. to an improved pacification
effort in the coming year, as well as to certain internal
weaknesses in its administration and to planning for long-
range governmental institutions.
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N
..~ VIETNAM
`DEM4I?CAIIVN IINF
CURRENT SITUATION
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I. THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
A. POLITICAL SITUATION
1., A threat of anti-American disturbances was
raised last week by Buddhist elements, particularly
in the northern part of South Vietnam. Younger
monks in the Da Nang and Hue areas charged that US
Marines had been involved in the desecration of a
Buddhist pagoda near Da Nang which had allegedly
been entered once in a search for Viet Cong guer-
rillas and subsequently had been deliberately damaged.
On 8 May, a group of some 500 Buddhists in Da Nang
demonstrated in protest, and a ranking bonze from
the pagoda was reported threatening suicide in order
to force a US apology and promise of restitution.
2. An investigation into the incident is under-
way by US authorities, but it has not yet been es-
tablished that US troops were responsible. In the
meantime, tempers have been calmed by prompt expres-
sions of concern from the US Ambassador, the con=
sulate in Da Nang, and the deputy US Marine com-
mander. The US military are also providing assis-
tance in efforts to repair the pagoda, and South
Vietnam's I Corps commander, General Thi, has
deputized the mayor of Da Nang to work with US
authorities to resolve the matter. Particularly
encouraging was the cooperation of officials of
the Unified Buddhist Association (UBA) in Saigon--
including Thich Tri Quang, whose base of influence
is in I Corps--in seeking to ward off further dis-
turbances in Hue and Da Nang while the facts in
the case were investigated.
3. Although Quang and other leaders have ex-
pressed satisfaction with the gestures made by US
officials, there are indications that the pagoda
matter was a subject of heated discussion at the
biennial internal conference of the UBA, which con-
vened in Saigon on 12 December. Younger monks from
Quang Nam reportedly were urging the UBA to demand
a formal apology from the US Embassy, and were citing
recent military actions around other pagodas. One
press item on the meeting stated that the UBA would
send a letter to the embassy deploring the pagoda
desecration.
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4. Reporting on the UBA conference is still
fragmentary, but information. on the opening session
indicates that speeches made by aged supreme bonze
Thich Tinh Khiet and Buddhist Institute chairman
Tam Chau both called for efforts to end the fighting
in South Vietnam. Khi.et's speech apparently was ex-
tremely brief, and omitted many of
dthe rafted for in-
cluded in an original peace appeal
by Tri Quang, a circumstance that could have had
embarrassing repercussions. Chau's speech, although
a warning that Vietnam should not become a "testing
ground" for a conflict of foreign ideologies, in-
cluded along with the call for a peaceful solution,
a statement of loyalty to the "nationalist ideology"
and a rejection of foreign :ideologies--presumably
intended to disassociate the Buddhists from the
Communist side in the conflict. The UBA conference
is expected to result in the reelection of Chau as
Buddhist Institute chairman, although efforts may
be made by the rival Tri Quang faction to limit
Chau's power.
5. Tri Quang, in a recent conversation with an
embassy officer, also expressed his disapproval of
the plans of the military Directorate--made public
during the week--to establish an advisory council
of civilians to draft a constitution. He declared
that such a council, would merely be a "rubber
stamp" of the Directorate, and that it would be
preferable either to delay the draft constitution
until a national assembly could be elected, or to
appoint a provisional assembly, possibly from mem-
bers of the current elected provincial and municipal
councils.
6. Information on recent discussions within the
Directorate indicates that the generals have been
concerned with ways of improving the rural construc-
tion effort, with possible personnel changes in the
cabinet and certain military commands, and with the
creation of either some type of "national political
front" embracing responsible civilian political
parties or the establishment of some form of mili-
tary political party. Meanwhile, one member of the
Directorate has claimed that there is a considerable
morale problem among field grade and junior officers
in the armed forces, stemming in large part from poor
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administration. This general claimed that important
reforms were needed but that Premier Ky so far had
little time or inclination to tackle the problem,
and that certain corps commanders were proving to
be bottlenecks.
7. According to another source, Ky himself has
criticized the deteriorating performance of the Spe-
cial Police branch of the National Police in regard
to the flow of intelligence both on the Viet Cong
and on important political developments. Causes of
the situation are alleged to be the political in-
stability of the past two years,, a recent reorgani-
zation in the Special Branch itself, and National
Police director Colonel Lieu's apparent concen-
tration on building his own loyal machinery. Ky
reportedly has also complained to Lieu, who is a
close associate of I Corps Commander Thi, about Thi's
apparent willingness to permit radical students in
his area to attack the government. According to a
source in Hue, Thi intends to permit the recently
suspended anti-American, anti-government student
journal, Sinh Vien Hue, to publish clandestinely.
8. The efforts of the cabinet minister for
youth and sports, Nguyen Tan Hong, to establish a
National Youth Council have reportedly encountered
widespread resistance among Saigon students, in-
cluding both Catholic and Buddhist organizations.
These groups reportedly feel that Hong's proposals
for establishing the council. represent blatant ef-
forts at government control.
9. After several weeks' stability, the black
market rate for gold and currency rose: dollars
and MPCs (scrip). each up 3 piasters to 167 and 126
respectively, and gold up 1 piaster to 216. The
Hong Kong rate also increased from 150 to 156.
10. Retail food prices generally eased. How-
ever, wholesale and retail price ceilings on pork
were instituted, apparently because of pressure
for the regulation of hog prices from areas out-
side Saigon where prices had risen significantly
in recent weeks. One result; of the price control
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has been the virtual cessation of pork deliveries
to Saigon, with indications that a black market is
developing, The pork shortage reportedly was the
cause of an armed threat by the Saigon prefect
against Nguyen Hoang Cuong, assistant to the minis-
ter of economy and finance. (As reported earlier
this month, Cuong has submitted his resignation.)
Minister of National Economy and Finance Ton is
insisting on an audience with Premier Ky to demand
action against the Saigon prefect. Ton has
threatened to resign if he does not receive satis-
faction
11. At recent sessions conducted at III Corps
headquarters to review the 1966 rural construction
budgets for the Hop Tac provinces around Saigon,
it was emphasized that the budgets cover only proj-
ects in new hamlets or in hamlets to be consoli-
dated. In areas already pacified, the rural con-
struction program must be supported by central
funds from other than Ministry of Reconstruction,
or by local funds. USOM and GVN officials have
signed the Hop Tac provincial budgets, and have
announced that funds will be made available as of
1 January 1965.
12. Looking at general economic developments
in 1966, dire warnings have been sounded by Gover-
nor Hanh of the National Bank and by Mr. Harold
Dunkerly, a British economist who has been con-
sulting with Hanh on measures to cope with the
inflation. Citing an increase in the Saigon price
index of 50 percent over the last year and an in-
crease in the money supply of 55 percent, Hanh
attributed the causes of inflation--on the supply
side--to transportation bottlenecks, decreased
agricultural output, and a shortage of import com-
modities, and--on the demand side--to the increased
GVN budget deficit and increased foreign troop
spending. Hanh believes that the prospects are
worse for 1966 and forecasts that little surplus
production capacity will remain in the economy,
that the GVN budget deficit will increase to 25
billion piasters, and that US and other foreign
spending will rise to 25-30 billion piasters.
The combined effect will be an increase in net
purchasing power by an amount equal to one third
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of Vietnam's gross national product. Hanh and
Dunkerly have raised the specter of China's eco-
nomic and political collapse in the 1940s, and have
called for several US-GVN emergency steps. The US
Mission comments that the Dunkerly-Hanh view is
unduly pessimistic in view of the magnitude of ex-
ternal resources that will be available to Vietnam
in 1966 and of the efforts already under way to
combat the causes of inflation. The mission will
comment further on the prospects for 1966, but
notes that should the report become public, it
would generate a sharply adverse reaction in the
business community.
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Be MILITARY SITUATION
1. Significant military activity this week re-
sulted from allied initiatives, but Communist reactions
have been strong. Although there were fewer Viet Cong
attacks than last week, more were mounted by battalion-
size forces, Major engagements took place in areas
controlled by the Viet Cong; PAVN regiments were not
engaged in the major battles last week and may be in a
regroupment and resupply phase in preparation for re-
newed efforts,
2. Statistically, Viet Cong activity increased
during the period 5 to 11, December with 975 incidents
reported, the second highest weekly total of the year.
Although this was a sharp rise from last week's 757,
the increase was largely due to the highest weekly
total of antiaircraft fire incidents. As usual, most
Viet Cong activity consisted of terrorist acts against
the populations The period. was more costly to the Viet
Cong, who lost at least 976 killed and 106 captured,
compared to 640 and 58 for the previous week. GVN
casualty totals--minus those suffered in the prolonged
operation in Quang Tin Province--show 196 killed, 456
wounded, and 193 missing, a seeming improvement over
the previous week's 345, 574, and 367. The US casualty
total of 66 killed, 216 wounded, and 7 missing com-
pares unfavorably with the previous week's figures of
26, 170, and 2. One ROK soldier was killed and one
Australian wounded this week. The weapons-loss ratio
favored the Viet Cong again this week, with 395 weapons
lost and only 230 captured,
3. Large-unit contacts were more frequent during
the week of 5 to 11 December, and major ground actions
took place over the weekend in I, III, and IV corps
tactical zones (CTZ). Of 22,003 small-unit actions
(including 2,438 US), 262 resulted in contact, and 180
of these contacts were made by US elements. Significant
reactions occurred, when friendly forces entered several
Viet Cong - controlled areas,
4. Early in the week, during a brigade-size op-
eration near the Michelin rubber plantation in Binh
Duong Province, a US battalion moving along a jungle
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trail was struck by a Viet Cong battalion. The enemy
opened fire through narrow apertures cut out of the
underbrush and detectable only from the prone position.
The Viet Cong in this action were healthy, well-armed
and -equipped, and apparently well trained. Five tear-
gas grenades of US manufacture were used against Ameri-
can troops. Results of this engagement favored the US:
the Viet Cong lost 236 killed, while US casualties were
35 killed, 96 wounded, and 3 missing.
5. A major ARVN - US Marine operation in the Viet
Cong - dominated Quang Nam - Quang Tin border area has
resulted in heavy casualties on both sides. One ARVN
Ranger battalion was left marginally combat effective,
and an ARVN infantry battalion was reduced to fighting
in small, scattered elements. Cumulative casualties
are: Viet Cong, 213 killed (including 28 confirmed
killed by air action) and 82 captured; ARVN, 120 killed
(6 US advisers), 139 wounded (2 US, one Australian),
180 missing, and 250 weapons lost; and US Marines, 33
killed, 106 wounded, and 1 missing.
6. In other significant actions, an ARVN division
in Vinh Long Province killed 52 members of a Viet Cong
battalion while losing only 3 killed and 22 wounded.
Another ARVN division operation in Dinh Tuong Province
concentrated more than six battalions against a Viet
Cong battalion, killing 148 and capturing 10 while
suffering only 15 killed and 63 wounded (3 US). In Go
Cong Province of the IV CTZ, an ARVN multibattalion
force surrounded an estimated Viet Cong battalion. Re-
sults of this battle were 181 Viet Cong killed and 10
captured, against friendly casualties of 16 killed and
66 wounded (3 US). A ROK Capital Division operation
killed 28 Viet Cong and captured 8, with no friendly
casualties.
7. Sea, river, and coastal force units searched
3,490 junks and 13,717 persons, with coastal force ele-
ments performing the majority of these operations. No
detainees were confirmed as Viet Cong. Interrogations
of fishermen reveal that the Viet Cong are placing
greater reliance on overland transport of materiel be-
cause of the effectiveness of coastal patrols. The
presence of large numbers of US and GVN troops in
coastal enclaves probably contributes to this situation.
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Increased Viet Cong river-mining activity has been
noted, however,
8. Nine B-52 Stratofortress strikes were flown
during the week in Pleiku, Tay Ninh, Binh Duong, and
Quang Tin provinces, bringing the total number of
such missions to 114.
Communist Activities
9. The major Viet Cong reaction this week
occurred in C)uang Tin Province, I CTZ, where on 8
and 9 December an ARVN Ranger battalion and a battal-
ion of the 5th Regiment (ARVN) were engaged by a multi-
battalion Viet Cong force. The ARVN Ranger battalion
was hit first by the Viet Cong on the afternoon of 8
December, and was quickly overrun. The following day,
the Viet Cong attacked the battalion of the 5th Regi-
ment (ARVN), which then retreated to the south and
broke into several smaller groups that were subse-
quently defeated on a piecemeal basis. US Marines
entered the area to reinforce the ARVN units. The
enemy units encountered in this operation remain un-
identified. Elsewhere in the I CTZ, there was a
moderate increase in Viet Cong activity but a decline
in its intensity.
10. One major attack was mounted in the II CTZ
during the past week, an assault by an estimated bat-
talion on 4 December against an outpost in Phu Yen
Province. In eastern Binh Dinh Province on 7 and 8
December, anti-American demonstrations, probably Viet
Cong inspired, were conducted in protest against air
strikes, artillery fire, and the American presence in
South Vietnam. In the western highland regions, Com-
munist forces may be resupplying and regrouping. For
the sixth consecutive week, the II CTZ incident total
(138) was remarkably low, and only ten percent (59)
of all terroristic incidents occurred there.
11. In the III CTZ, Viet Cong - initiated activity
remained at the same high level as during the previous
week. Major actions occurred on 8 and 11 December when
an estimated Viet Cong battalion mounted two attacks on
a post in southern Bien Hoa Province. The post was
overrun during the 11 December attack. An outpost in
Long Khanh Province was also attacked, but without
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CURRENT OPERATIONAL STATUS OF MAJOR TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND COASTAL RAILROAD
r Section of operable railroad
Section of inoperable road
Note: Routes are inoperable primarily
because of Viet Cong sabotage/
interdiction efforts.
Information as of i i December 1965
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significant results. In Hau Nghia Province, a bat-
talion of the ARVN 49th Regiment was ambushed on 5
December by an unknown Viet Cong force, and suffered
14 killed, 21 wounded, and:2 missing; 19 weapons
were also lost.
12. Terrorist activities in the Saigon area
continued during the week. A female Viet Cong threw
a grenade into a police station, causing the wounding
of two civilians; the woman was killed. Two police
stations in Cholon, the predominantly Chinese section
of the capitals and an outpost near the petroleum
storage area south of the city were also attacked.
13. In the IV CTZ, there was an over-all increase
in Viet Cong incidents, and harassment continued against
lightly defended, isolated posts. In Vinh Binh Prov-
ince, an estimated Viet Cong battalion attacked a post
defended by one regional force company. In Kien Giang
Province, a Communist force estimated at two companies
struck a regional. forces post. An estimated two
platoons of Viet Cong attacked a Buddhist temple in
Binh Tuong Province, where 50 laborers from a canal
project were sleeping. Twenty-three workers were killed
and eight were wounded in the attack.
14. National Route 1 is reported closed in Quang
Ngai, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Binh Thuan, Binh Tuy, and
Hau Nghia provinces. Route 9 is closed in Quang Tri
Province. Route 14 is closed in Kontum, Pleiku, Quang
Duc, Phuoc Long, and Binh Long provinces. Route 19 is
closed west of Pleiku city. Route 7 is closed east of
Cheo Reo, Phu Bon Province, Route 11 is closed in
Tuyen Duc Province.
15. The national railroad is closed between Xuan
Loc in Long Khanh Province and Song La Song in Binh
Thuan Province, and between Ninh Hoa in Thanh Hoa Prov-
ince and Da Nang,
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C. RURAL CONSTRUCTION
1. At the 10 December joint South Vietnam/US
Mission Council Meeting, General Nguyen Due Thang, min-
ister of rural construction, presented his views on
rural construction, representing the consensus arrived
at in an 8 December meeting of the Vietnamese Rural
Construction Council that was chaired by Premier Ky and
attended by all four corps commanders. Thang's presenta-
tion included a discussion of the concept of rural con-
struction, the problems of administrative support for
rural construction cadre,.and the 1966 rural construction
plans.
2. As presented by Minister Thang, the concept of
rural construction includes 'three phases: military
clearing, pacification, and development. The objective
of Phase One is to destroy or drive out local and main
force Viet Cong military units, and is the primary
responsibility of the Ministry of Defense. Phase Two--
destroying the Viet Cong political and military infra-
structure and building up a GVN infrastructure to
replace it--is the primary responsibility of the minis-
tries of Interior and Rural Construction. Phase Three
covers the implementation of GVN rural policy to meet
the economic, political, and social aspirations of the
rural population, and is the responsibility of every
ministry.
3. Thang stated that contrary to views often
expressed by both Vietnamese and Americans that "paci-
fication is impossible"--because village manpower pools
are exhausted and because people are war weary and lack
confidence in the GVN--he remains personally convinced
that pacification is indeed feasible, and that now is
the time to go ahead, For the first time, according to
Thang, the GVN has well-trained pacification cadres,
sympathetic and "correct" toward the people, and willing
to stay in the villages long enough to get the job done.
Thang is confident that the GVN now has the means to
follow up and destroy Viet Cong village infrastructures,
and to remove and replace corrupt local GVN officials.
4. Concerning the question of administrative
support for rural construction cadre, the Rural Con-
struction Council, according to Thang, has proposed that
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relevant US agencies--specifically those supporting
PAT, APA, and Census Grievance Cadre programs--extend
their support to other rural construction cadres, which
the Ministry of Rural Construction will, in turn, screen
and then use. The GVN currently has 20,000 rural con-
struction cadre, with 30,000 to 36,000 expected by the
end of 1966.
5, With respect to provincial rural construction
plans for. 1966, Thang indicated that a just-completed
survey of six provinces in the Hop Tac area has revealed
that one million people, or 47 percent, of the Hop Tac
area population are GVN controlled (excluding Saigon).
The GVN has allocated $VN 238,000,000 to these provinces
for 1966, with the objective of bringing 1.5 million
people, or 71 percent, of the Hop Tac population under
GVN control by year's end. All province chiefs have
been required to pledge that they would achieve at
least 75 percent of their 1966 rural construction pro-
grams.
6. In addition, the GVN will employ 338 pacifica-
tion cadre teams (80 men each) to pacify 134'new hamlets
and to consolidate 204 existing hamlets in the Hop Tac
area. A 40-man Peoples Action Team (PAT) will form the
core of the 80-man pacification cadre team, which will
also include a 12-man civil affairs group (responsible
for interim leadership of the area, representing GVN
administration), a 12-man security force (responsible
for screening the villagers, rooting out Viet Cong infra-
structures, and discovering the aspirations of the popu-
lation), and a 12-man development unit (responsible for
bringing government services to the people). The remain-
ing four men constitute the command group, and will be
either experienced cadre or military officers. The
cadre teams will be reinforced by 39 companies of
regional forces troops.
7. Official GVN statistics indicate that 562
Chieu Hoi ralliers returned to government control during
the past 'week compared to the previous week's total of
429. Increases were noted in the number of military
returnees and civil refugees--376 and 129 respectively,
in contrast to the previous week's totals of 311 and 37.
Communist political cadre :ralliers again declined, 55
this week against 78 last week. The number of draft
dodger/deserter returnees continued at a low level, two
this week following last week's total of three.
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8. has
forwarded a report alleging ttiat ie n s in
Khanh Hoa Province are becoming disheartened by the
prospect of increased pressure from government and US
forces. Viet Cong desertions in the province have
increased since October, according to South Vietnamese
reports.
9. While the alleged rise in desertions cannot be
confirmed, the over-all rate of defection from the Viet
Cong to the government seems to be staying at roughly
the level it reached in November, about 7.5 per thousand.
In the first 11 days of December some 550 Viet Cong
returned to the government, a rate--if it continues for
the rest of the month--of eight per thousand. This com-
pares to the rate of about 2.5 per thousand in the first
three months of this year, and of about five per thou-
sand from June through October.
10. The latest refugee statistics released by the
US Embassy in Saigon show an over-all rise to 730,000,
but indicate a decline to 453,000 of those in temporary
camps. Among the new refugees are 3,000.former settlers
in the Vo Dat valley, a result of the joint US-ARVN rice-
harvesting operation in Binh Tuy Province, and 750 refugees
in Binh Long Province. The cumulative total for 1965 is
now considered unlikely to exceed 850,000.
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60048
FAIR -Operations restricted
30 - 60% of the season
EFFECTS OF THE NORTHEAST MONSOON ON U S AIR OPERATIONS OVER
NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM AND LAOS
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II, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC
1. US air operations over North Vietnam during
the past week were hampered by poor flying weather
resulting from the Northeast Monsoon. This seasonal
phenomenon will prevail over all of North Vietnam
and the northern portion of South Vietnam from now
until February, restricting air operations for more
than 60 percent of the time. During this period,
extensive low cloudiness and showers will dominate
the weather of the eastern lowlands and the wind-
ward slopes of northern and central Vietnam.
2. The poor flying weather has been responsible
for a recent increase in the number of armed recon-
naissance missions being flown over the DRV. Strike
aircraft diverted from their primary target because
of weather are given the secondary mission of armed
reconnaissance.
3. Asian Communist propaganda was highlighted
this week by reactions to recent statements in
Washington about the situation in Vietnam. In a
broadcast on 10 December, Hanoi took sharp issue
with the suggestion made by Secretary of State
Rusk on 1 December that a second pause in the air
strikes against North Vietnam could be possible.
In the broadcast, Hanoi laid the propaganda ground-
work for discrediting any such US action, terming
the possibility of a second pause part of a US
effort designed only to "hoodwink" world public
opinion. Hanoi declared the first pause had been
"shameful. trickery" that had "failed miserably,"
and asserted in regard to a second pause that'.the
US could not harbor any hope of the Vietnamese
people being taken in by such a "shopworn trick."
4. The North Vietnamese criticism of this
possible US course of action probably stems from
a fear that a negative response on their part to
a suspension might undercut the carefully nurtured
image of "reasonableness" toward ending the war
that Hanoi has been fostering for several months.
The broadcast concluded by insisting that the US
must not only recognize the DRV's "reasonable"
position as outlined in the "four-points," but must
prove by concrete deeds that it accepts them.
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5. Communist China's response to alleged US
"propaganda" for Vietnam peace talks came in the
form of a People's Daily editorial on 14 December
which reiterated Peking's promise to give the DRV
whatever was "required" to carry on the war. This
editorial--the first major Chinese pronouncement
on assistance to North Vietnam since early October--
also appeared as a reply to various recent state-
ments of US determination to push ahead with plans
to increase military pressure on the Communists.
Alleging that Secretary Rusk had said on 9 December
that Peking "must face the problem of confrontation
with the US," People's Daily asserted that the Chi-
nese people "were not fr gi htened" by this and would
support the Vietnamese "as much and as long" as was
necessary.
6. The editorial made no repetition of earlier
promises to send "volunteers" to Vietnam if they
are called for, and skirted the entire question
of direct Chinese involvement in the hostilities.
The editorial did take note of the possibility of
another pause in the US air attacks on North Viet-
nam, however, declaring that such a move would be
nothing more than a scheme to facilitate further
US escalation of the war. It concluded by re-
stating the standard Chinese position on negotia-
tions.
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III. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS
A. CAMBODIA
1. Khmer Serei
leader Son Ngoc Thanh met with Premier Ky and Minis-
ter of Defense Co in early December to discuss the
transportation of Khmer Serei troops to Thailand.:`
Ky reportedly told Thanh that the GVN's support of
the Khmer Serei remains firm, and agreed to finance
and arm eight Khmer Serei battalions. 25X1C
, it was agreed after subsequent meet-
ings between Thanh and the GVN's Central Intelligence
Organization (CIO) that a Vietnamese Navy ship would
be at the disposal of the Khmer Serei, and that this
ship would leave Saigon on 20 December to transport
a 300-man force to Bangkok. Fifty additional person-
nel, trained in espionage and sabotage by the CIO,
will accompany the force and participate in an attack
into northwest Cambodia before the end of this year.
There have been other reports indicating that the
Khmer Serei was planning some action in the near
future. The report of Ky's assistance is at variance
with his assurances to the US Embassy in Saigon that
the GVN would stop supporting the Khmer Serei.
2. who obtain-
ed the information from an RKu o i i ., Cambodian
Government has agreed to sell to the Viet Cong 5,000
tons of rice from the coming harvest. The rice is
to be paid for by Communist China in US dollars.
The Viet Cong also wish to purchase salt and addi-
tional rice. The Cambodians will reportedly make
another donation of medicines to the Viet Cong.
3. On 7 December Cambodian Premier Kantol asked
the International Control Commission (ICC) at Phnom
Penh "to consider the possibility of conducting a
strict control over the port of Sihanoukville," osten-
sibly to counter Western press accusations that the
port was being used to supply arms to the Viet Cong.
In a public speech on 13 December, Prince Sihanouk
expanded the scope of the invitation by stating that
in addition to the port, the ICC could also "control...
the transportation of arms received for our military
camps, the camps themselves, our general staffs, our
logistics centers, our account books, and so forth."
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4. Representatives of the three ICC nations--
India, Canada, and Poland--made a preliminary inves-
tigation in Sihanoukville on 8 December.and were
invited to inspect manifests of ships calling at the
port since October.
B. AMBASSADORIAL APPOINTMENTS
1. On 8 December, the Directorate apparently
approved the appointment of Bui Diem, presently
special assistant in the premier's office, as Ambas-
sador to Japan to replace Nguyen Duy Quang. Elements
within the GVN military, including I Corps Commander
Thi, have been seeking to remove Diem from the premier's
office. However, there are indications that Premier
Ky is reluctant to release Diem until a replacement
can be found.
2. At the 8 December meeting, the Directorate
also appears to have approved appointment of Tran
Van Tuyen, deputy prime minister in the Quat govern-
ment, to replace Vu Van Mau as Vietnamese ambasssador
to London. Mau recently resigned.
C. SWITZERLAND
The GVN Foreign Ministry supplied the US Embassy
with a copy of an aide-memoire'to the Swiss reopening
the question of GVN representation in Switzerland.
The aide-memoire reviewed the past history of Swiss-
GVN discussions on this subject, and attributed the
GVN's failure to establish a legation solely to a
shortage of personnel. Secretary-General Thinh of
the Foreign Ministry asked that the US attempt to
facilitate Swiss agreement, but Ambassador Porter
suggested that the Swiss be given more time in which
to respond to the aide-memoire.
D., FREE WORLD ASSISTANCE
1. An increasing number of Free World nations
have indicated interest in providing medical and
public health assistance to the GVN. Countries in-
volved in developments in this area during the past
week included Spain, Canada, Iran, and Great Britain.
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2. SPAIN. The Spanish Army has indicated inter-
est in sending a 12-man medical team to Go Cong Prov-
ince in the delta.
3. CANADA. The Canadian Government is making
arrangements for establishing a rehabilitation center
staffed by 22 physicians and nurses, the physicians
to be rotated on a six-month basis.
4. IRAN. The head of the Iranian Red Lion and
Sun SocieTy-stated that its medical team was now ready
to go to Vietnam.
5. GREAT BRITAIN. Prime Minister Wilson told
Parliament that a medical representative was now
in Vietnam studying the possibility of sending an
ambulance unit to aid refugees.
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SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS, 1965
It /000 PERSONNEL LOSSES (KILLED IN ACTION,, MISSING IN ACTION, q 1PTURE?D)
Viet Cong/PAVN
0
I Jan I Feb I Mar I Apr I May I Junel July I Aug I Sept I Oct I Nov I Dec I
Wounded not included Such figures unavailable on Viet Cong.
WEAPONS LOSSES
I Jan ; Feb I 'Mar I Apr I May I June I July
17
4-11 DECEMBER
Aug I Sept I Oct I Nov I ec 975
214
57
NKN
Jan Feb I Mar I Apr I May I June I July I Aug I Septl Oct I Nov I Dec I
Attacks ::"Terrorism 5~Sabotage Propaganda Antiaircraft Fire
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US COMBAT CASUALTIES IN VIETNAM
INCLUDING NORTH VIETNAM
I I
7
7
7
-
N?^'
tal
Non- fa
tal
Wound
s
Fatalitie
s
Wounds
Cumulative, 1961 1964 255 7524
_
Fatalit
ies
Cumulative, 1965 to date 1177 4972
natal 1432 6496
(Figures do not include 120 carried as missing
or 25 carried as captured.)
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AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC
Company and battalion-sized attacks
-- Battalion-sized (and larger)aqucks only
T ro
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D ce
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