COMMENTS ON INR RESEARCH MEMORANDUM RSB-121: 'MOSCOW'S EVOLVING DOCTRINE FOR LATIN AMERICA'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A000600040021-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 6, 2001
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: November 3, 1965
• Content Type: IM

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OCI No. 2393/83
WT9,AL IN=JJ41NCX AGENCY'
Office of Current Intelligence
3 November 1385
Intelligence Memorandum
Comments on lU Research Memorandum BB-131:
scows Evolving r - ne for Latin err ca"
1. U. find quarrel with the memo's primary theme-..
the current Soviet emphasis on the use of "united front"
tactics in Latin America. Sower, the smote chief draw-
back is that it tends to oversimplify Moscow's approach to
the diffuse and varied conditions under which various Cow-
munist parties operate in Latin America. The conclusion
oae Is tempted to draw is that Soviet policymak+mrs have
napped out a farsighted, long-range program to deal with
the : quest ion n In essence, however, Moscow's approach is
quite pragmatic and highly opportunistic. It is also largely
a responsive one. That is to say, far from exercising a.
major initiative in regard to Latin American Communist par-
ties, the Soviets are essentially reacting to a tactical
situation. In sun, prevalent political conditions in Latin
America are such that the "united front" tactic simply holds
out the promise of more success in more countries than any
other course.
M. Another, and perhaps even more important, considera-
tion is that the memo tends to minimize the possibilities
jet support for "partisan guerrilla insurgency." 9o-
viet leaders have long recognized--especially since October,
1663--that to embark upon an openly aggressive course such
as direct support for rebellion invites a response from the
lib as moll as from the military power structure in Latin
America. At the same time, because the USSR's political and
economic stake in the continent is relatively small, it
stands to lose little by aiding insurgents as long an it
does not risk a confrontation with the US. Moscow's aim is
to work toward the achievement of significant control over
the Latin American left. When Soviet interests are not
directly at stake, the USSR may reader some support to
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