LEADERSHIP PROSPECTS IN INDONESIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A000600050017-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 2, 2004
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: December 2, 1965
• Content Type: IM

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OCI No. 3096/65
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
2 December 1965
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Leadership Prospects in Indonesia
Summary
1. President Sukarno is likely to remain the
Indonesian chief of state for the duration of his
life. In current maneuvering with tarmy aher, The
seeking to reassert himself as paramount army, however, under Generals Suharto aid Nas(iti.on,
probably will retain a strong national political role
for the foreseeable future? Although army leaders
oppose many of Sukarno's policies, they show little
indication of any intention to remove him.
2, Both Sukarno and the army will turn to
civilian political leaders for assistance. Sukarno
will look for individuals and groups that he can use
as a balance against the army, while the army will
turn to them primarily for help in running the country,
The extent to which the civilian leaders can assert
themselves as government officials will depend on the
development of Sukarno-army maneuvering and on Sukarno's
health. The identity of these civilian leaders is still
largely speculative.
Background
3. Major concerns of both Sukarno and the army
are national unity and national progress. Neither
Sukarno nor the army trusts the average Indonesian
political leader. Both feel that non-Communist parties
thoroughly discredited themselves during Indonesia's
period of parliamentary government (1949-1957) when the
average life of a cabinet was a single year and each
cabinet was an uneasy, unwieldy, unproductive coalition
of eight or ten parties.
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4. From 1957 through 1960, the army supported
Sukarno's phased imposition of "guided democracy,"
which instituted a presidential rather than a parlia-
mentary cabinet, greatly strengthened the executive,
and downgraded the role of the political parties, In
return for this support and as a substitute for the
parties, Sukarno assigned the army a substantial po-
litical role during those years. Since 1960, however,
and particularly since 1963, Sukarno had moved to re-
duce the army's political role and to make it an in-
strument of the executive.
5. The abortive leftist coup on 1 October,
which perhaps was precipitated by the Indonesian
Communist Party (PKI), had as its immediate objective
the elimination of top army leaders, The army crushed
it promptly and is still investigating those who were
involved. Sukarno himself appears to have been at
least w prosecute those
was, , and the President is reluctant to pros
who participated in it,
6. As the result of the coup and its aftermath,
there are now two centers of power in in a
Sukarno and the army leaders. They are
struggle over Indonesia's future political orientation,
the disposition of the PKI, and the involvement of the
military in government leadership.
Army Attitude
7. One of the army's major political dilemmas
today is that in addition to distrusting most political
leaders, it now also distrusts Sukarno, the nation's
dominant and unifying figure. At the same time, no
army leaders--either individually or collectively--
have yet indicated any marked desire to establish a
military dictatorship. They have alluded privately
to the repeated leadership crises in Vietnam precipi-
tated by an overzealous and overambitious military.
8. The army still seems predisposed to the
"middle way" propounded in 1958 by General Nasution,
then commander of the army. In a speech to the Na-
tional Military Academy, Nasution declared that the
Indonesian Army would emulate neither the politically
active military leaders of South America nor the
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s
"passive instrument" armies of Western Europe. Army
explained somewhat ingenuously by Nasution,
as an organization would not be politically active
but individual officers would participate at all
levels in determining and implementing state policy.
9. Such a concept presupposes an established
national leadership and political studturedehichher
and gua
the army could support, infiltrate,
than a government wheandarmy misgivangslaboutd lead.
Thus, despite its distrust
Sukarno, the army leadership continues to indicate
nthePPresident oandiits hope of
its desire to work with
converting him to its
Military Leadership
10. Little change soe:-s likely in army leader-
ship during the next year or two, Intra-army tet ainf
surely will develop, but they are not likely
suffic1,.ent strength ef Shs~odgoe MAnneweslateDofestaff
Nasution or army chief head-
quarters, has recently been installed at Djakarta
quarters, and new assignments are being made in the
17 territorial army commands. Aside from filling the
vacancies left when six top generals in Djakarta and
to the
intended murdered
several changes officers are were
coup, , territorial or at least place
abortive out
themcw where of h they yscannbeleffectively watched and do
them
no harm.
11, The new headquarters officers appear to have
been chosen largely for their qualities of political sense, anti-PKI orientation, military reputation, and
loyalty to Nasution and Suharto., The same is generally
true of the territorial officers.
12. Generals Suharto and Nasution are individuals
high caliber and
reputed professional
to n be incorruptible, and
live modestly, , are
are deeply respected within the army.
13. Suharto was scarcely known outside Indonesia
ever,
prior to 1 October. His varied assignments, however,
have given him wide experience. They h ded Jav those of territorial NewaGuinea
gander of the camp g
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from the Netherlands, and head of the Army Strategic
Command. His reputation within Indonesia as a highly
competent officer and an anti-Communist was amply
verified by his prompt and decisive action na11 sOctober
to rally the army and crush the coup, is
puted to be strong willed and dogmatic, qualities i
which for the time being appear to assist the army in
its continuing resistance to Sukarno.
14. General Nasution was commander of the army
from 1949 to 1952 and again from 1955 to 1962. He is
largely responsible for the professionalism and co-
hesiveness which the army has thus far achieved. From
1952-55 Nasution was in retirement as the result of
opposition to a nationalist-Communist parliamentary
coalition and indirectly to Sukarno, Froml1957 toon,
political
1960, when the army held a strong
Nasution was easily the second most powerful official
in the country. In 1962, apparently to deprive him
of troop command, Sukarno appointed him chief of staff
of the armed forces. Nasution has a strong sense of
political mission and moral responsibility and is
alarmed over the venal tendencies which have grown
within the army as its administrative authority has
broadened, but he is no match for Sukarno in political
maneuver. In the post-Sukarno era, Nasution probably
would be the army's major candidate for national leader-
ship.
15. Fifteen army officers, including Suharto
and Nasution, hold posts in the 100-man cabinet. One
who is currently active in his cabinet capacity and
likely to continue in this role regar minister future
te of sta
developments is General Ibnu Sutowo,
for gas and oil since last March, Sutowo had one tour
the
as a territorial commander in South Sumatra in
he
mid-50s, and served in Djakarta as army deputy t
administration, deputy for territorial affairs, and
chief of logistics during Nasution's second tour as
army commander. In 1959, when he and several other
Sutowo app
officers were accused of corruption,
to have accepted the major blame. Hesplaced
cediinnt
a nonactive army status, but was Since appointed
then re ds
of a small domestic oil company.
been continuously active in oil matters and since 1961
his responsibilities have gradually increased. For
several years he has been involved in political maneu-
vering against Chaerul Saleh, who holds the actual
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portfolio for oil. Sutowo has a reputation as a
good organizer, and Western businessmen regard him
as both intelligent and shrewd.
16. Instead of working through the cabinet
where Sukarno is paramount, the army is utilizing
the Supreme Operations Command (KOTI). Since KOTI
is an accepted mutual area of operations for both
Sukarno and the army leaders, it has already become
a super-cabinet and may remain so for some months.
General Suharto has announced that KOTI will concern
itself with political, economic, and social matters
as well as military. Sukarno is KOTI Supreme Com-
mander; Suharto is its chief of staff.
17. Army officers who participated in the
provincial rebellion of 1957-58 are quite unlikely
to be returned to responsible posts either in the
immediate future or in the post-Sukarno era. Al-
though that revolt was in part an anti-Sukarno,
anti-Communist effort, the officers who participated
in it remain discredited. Moreover, time has passed
them by, and to make a place for them now--even if
there were a disposition to do so--would be an act
of favoritism. In an atmosphere of continuing maneu-
ver--and careful maneuvering will go on as long as
Sukarno remains reasonably vigorous--this could be
for the army a serious, if not fatal, political
blunder.
Civilian Prospects
18. Both Sul1arno and the army are likely to
turn to civilians both to exploit them as political
leaders and to call on their expertise in administra-
tive or substantive posts. Both the President and
the army will try to control the politicians and will
continue a regime which calls for a strong executive.
A return to parliamentary government is most unlikely.
19. Should Sukarno die in the near future,
civilian prospects for an assertive role in the gov-
ernment might improve, If Sukarno remains reasonably
vigorous, however, civilians may be largely pawns in
the Sukarno-army maneuvering. The army probably will
support relatively few civilians during Sukarno's life-
time; these civilians will be competing for political
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osts not only with military per-
and managerial P persons from Sukarno's camp.
sonnel but also with p
Army-Supported Civilian Leadership
. The identi ty of civilians
hly whspeculative.
20.
orted by the army remains highly
T he army does not appear to have approached
The with any firm offers of
ill engaged in entrenching it-
litical litd is s st et
jobs. As such approaches now of
self vis-a-vis Sukarno, The army has,
would be highly premature. with political lead-
course, had some dealings but chiefly for the
ers since the abortive coup s lat an in
purpose of encouraging them to articulate ant -
P p
PKI sentiment and to use their or
and
action against Communists Communist assets.
action
phase is now largely over.
21. A number of civilians, on the other
approached the army with offers of
hand, have approa in conversations with
advice. Some of theiy to create the impres-
Western officials,
on that they have c es b areifollowingwthe
si Many civilian
army leaders. with intense interest and
Sukarno-army maneuvering
are trying to keep a foot in both camps.
both among Indonesians and
22. Speculation, to civilians whom
Western observers, as ersons as
among the army would trust touches on
Sultan of Jog-
lik, Mohammed Hatta,
Adam Ma Nah-
and several persons in the National
~ata, and the large Moslem party,
Party (PNI) l
datul Ulama (NU).
bablyto be be aa strong
to
23. Adam Malik doe~oseem
cceptablg
d the woolp and already holds a
possibility. He
both Sukarno an
albeit they largely meaningless one
cabinet post, implementation of guided econ~-
of minister for the imp
m . Malik is a member cf sohcalledbnationalrC m-
mo Y
Partyp Categorized as an
monist ist party rty of ers the 1950s,
treme leftist by Western observin tof a
Malik increasingly took on the appearance
tt Bible moderate" in the 60s as Sukarno moved
Ben
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the government into foreign and domestic policies
favorable to PKI interests. Long the head of
the semiofficial (later official) Antara news
agency, Malik was appointed ambassador to the So-
viet Union in 1959. From 1963 to early 1965 he
held the post of trade minister in the cabinet.
In late 1964 he played a leading role in an anti-
PKI effort, the Movement for the Promotion of Su-
karnoism. The organization was banned in December
1964, and Malik became a major target of the Com-
munist Party. Despite PKI demands for his removal,
Sukarno kept him in the cabinet but transferred
him to his present high-sounding but empty post.
24. Mohammed Hatta may be headed for a
figurehead post or a role as elder statesman but
little more. Co-author of Indonesian independ-
ence in 1945 with Sukarno, Hatta served as national
vice president from 1945 to 1956. In that year,
no longer able to subscribe to Sukarno's gradual
move to the left, he resigned and has since lived
in relative seclusion. He is a trained economist
and presumably could be of assistance to a gov-
ernment sincerely interested in tackling Indo-
nesia's long-standing economic problems. Hatta's
health is reported to be poor and it seems un-
likely that he would take on a major substantive
responsibility.
25. The Sultan of Jogjakarta, Buwono IX, is
widely mentioned for office and with his past army con-
nections is a possibility for either a substantive
or administrative post some months hence. The
Sultan played a distinguished role as a nationalist
leader during the revolution against the Dutch and
served as minister of defense for several years
after formal independence was achieved. He re-
signed in early 1953 after army leaders attempted
and failed to coerce Sukarno into blocking the ac-
tivities of a nationalist-Communist parliamentary
coalition. He has played no major role since then
and currently holds the apparently empty title of
chairman of the Financial Supervisory Board. Al-
though his sultanate has become a strongly Communist
area, the sultan himself is believed to be anti-
Communist. Since 1953 he is said to have insisted
that only fate would propel him into the national
arena again.
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26. Among members of the National Party who
might be acceptable to the army are Hardi and Wilopo
among the older members and Hadisubeno and Osa Maliki
among the younger ones. All are identified with the
moderate wing of the National Party which resisted
cooperation with the Communist Party.
27. With the exception ofWilopo (prime minister
in 1952-53 but relatively inactive in recent years),
all were purged from the party in mid-1965. Hardi
was first deputy party chairman and leader of the
moderate wing prior to the purge. He. participated
in but later withdrew from the anti-PKI Movement for
the Promotion of Sukarnoism last year. Osa Maliki,
second deputy chairman before the purge, appears
be leader of the reconstituted moderate wing now
that the army has legalized it again. Hadisubeno
is the top provincial party leader in Central Java
and has been outspokenly anti-Communist since 1959.
28. Possibilities from the Nahdatul Ulama (NU)
are Dachlan, Aminudin Azis, and Subchan. All three
are members of the NU's national executive board.
Dachlan is a vice party chairman; Azis is currently
the NU secretary general and is a cabinet minister
of state assigned to the cabinet "presidium." Sub-
chan is third vice chairman of the party and a
leader of the Joint Action Command formed among
political parties since 1 October and principally
directed against the PKI. The three belong to the
wing of the NU which is less opportunistic and less
favorably disposed to Sukarno.
29. The army may also consider Kasimo, an as-
sistant chairman of the Catholic Party who briefly
supported the Sukarnoist movement last year, and
Tambunan, chairman of the Christian (Protestant)
Party.
30. As with army officers who participated in
the 1957-58 provincial rebellion, civilian leaders
who were involved--chiefly from the banned Masjumi
and Socialist (PSI) parties--are unlikely to be
tapped for responsible government posts. The vili-
fication to which these individuals and their parties
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have been subjected has taken its toll, and the army
is fearful of being tainted by collaboration with them.
31. Since 1 October, however, individuals
from these two parties have emerged from political
isolation and are again at least privy to many de-
velopments within the government. The Socialists'
primary channel for information seems to be through
army officers while the Masjumi deals with NU mem-
bers. These persons eventually may play an informal
advisory role. If the parties can be reconstituted
under new names, some of the members, particularly
the younger ones, should certainly play a more ac-
tive role in the post-Sukarno era. Top Masjumi and "ra-
cialist leaders, now in prison, presumably will be re-
leased in time and will assume an advisory function
within their own parties.
The Sukarno Camp
32. Faced with the army's insistence on de-
stroying the PKI, Sukarno apparently wishes to re-
constitute the party in some other form. In the
meantime he will retain in the government as many
personal followers, leftists, and even Communists,
as possible.
33. Sukarno has so far--after two months of
maneuvering with the army--personally made only one
change in his motley and enormous cabinet. This is
the expulsion under army pressure of the leftist
Air Marshal Omar Dani as minister for the air force
--a post which is concurrent with the position of
air force chief of staff. Dani was formally re-
placed as air force chief on 27 November by his
former deputy, Muijono Herlambang, an officer of
similar political persuasion who is not trusted by
the army.
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34. Sukarno's chief and most trusted lieutenant
is Subandrio, first deputy prime minister and for-
eign minister. Sukarno has so far resisted army de-
mands to displace Subandrio. Sukarno, however, is
quick to recognize political realities and if he de-
cides that Subandrio is a major detriment to his own
position, he will concede to army demands. Subandrio,
who the army believes was involved in the coup and
who had feverishly curried favor with the PKI, is now
making proper anti-PKI statements. He told an Ameri-
can official on 22 November that he had been naive,
that he could not forgive the PKI its attempt to seize
power, and that he would never trust the PKI again.
35. The status of the three Communists and eight
pro- or crypto-Communists in the cabinet is in some
doubt. Although theoretically they still hold their
posts, some of them are said to have been placed un-
der house arrest about mid-November. Lukman and
Njoto, the first and second PKI deputy chairmen--the
former a titular cabinet member by virtue of a legis-
lative post, the latter a minister of state assigned
to the presidium--may be under army detention. It
seems certain that PKI chairman Aidit, titular mem-
ber of the cabinet, is dead.
36. Sukarno will continue to exploit Ali Sastro-
amidjojo, the opportunistic chairman of the PNI, and
Idham Chalid, chairman of the NU, and individuals in
the respective wings of their parties. Sukarno will
not carry maneuvering to the point of encouraging
further national disruption. Although he will try
to protect leftist elements, at the same time he will
swing toward the army when he deems it politically
necessary.
37. A man with a foot in both camps is Chaerul
Saleh, third deputy prime minister and concurrently
coordinating minister for development and minister
for oil. Saleh has had a checkered career; his po-
litical associations have been leftist, but he has
never been a member of the PKI and from time to time
he has actively opposed the party. Like Adam Malik,
he has been affiliated with the Murba party and in
1964 was deeply involved in the anti-PKI Movement to
Support Sukarnoism. He is extremely ambitious and
while continuing to work closely with Sukarno is also
making overtures to the army. He seems likely to re-
main in the government at least during Sukarno's life-
time and probably afterwards as well.
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38. For the time being, the army holds the po-
litical initiative and seems certain to retain a
strong role in the government. It will continue to
work with Sukarno when it feels this is either pos-
sible or necessary but will ignore him and act on
its own at other times. KOTI is likely to be the
main channel of army participation in the govern-
ment while Sukarno will work chiefly through the
cabinet. Although it seems likely that the army
will make progress in eliminating leftists from the
cabinet and insinuating its own candidates, it will
not be given a free hand in reorganizing the govern-
ment as long as Sukarno remains reasonably vigorous.
39. The army's major problems will be economic,
and Sukarno and leftist individuals and groups are
likely to exploit them. Indonesia is beset with dif-
ficulties resulting from overpopulation, underproduc-
tion, and inadequate transportation and communica-
tions facilities. Inflation has been mounting for
years and at present is at a new high. The govern-
ment lacks foreign exchange with which to make needed
purchases.
40. The army's clear-cut objective of destroying
the Communist Party as an effective, legal organiza-
tion is largely accomplished. It will now be increas-
ingly confronted by the country's baffling economic
problems, Sukarno's maneuvering, and probably by at-
tention-getting but otherwise meaningless and often
obstructive activities by the rejuvenated non-Commu-
nist parties. In this increasingly frustrating sit-
uation, it seems likely that a more aggressive mood
will develop within the officer corps and that Su-
harto and Nasution will be under growing pressure
from army elements, as yet unidentified, and from
civilian groups, to seize the government. Although
Suharto and Nasution probably will resist such pres-
sure, the addition of this theme will insert further
strains into an already complicated situation.
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 IN ELOI IIIEN, N"IM "?'R, QUTMII~ll
LEADERSHIP PR"OSPE"CTS NINDONE ~IA
,
DIRECTORATE CAF INTELLIGENCE
O f free : of , Current Intelligence
QC~I.'T o. 3o /65;
LSO
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