THE GROWTH OF CHINESE INFLUENCE IN THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A001300030021-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 2, 2002
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: May 8, 1963
• Content Type: IM

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OCI No. 1707/63
8 May 1963
MEMORANDUM: The Growth of Chinese influence in the
World Communist Movement.
1. Although the group which Communist China
now leads is still a distinct minority in the
international Communist movement, the Chinese party
has taken long strides out of a position where it
once stood its ground alone. Since the time of the
first significant open Chinese challenge to Soviet
policies, roughly the beginning of 1959, the Chinese
have gathered increasing strength in the movement.
Each turn of the dispute has brought them new sup-
porters, either whole parties or significant portions
of other parties. Each new attempt by Khrushchev
to force the Chinese into isolation has alienated
more Communist leaders and more of the rank and file,
either by the abrupt unilateral methods he has used
or by forcing them to make a choice--a choice which
was not always to Khrushchev's liking.
2. The meeting of international Communist
leaders held in Moscow in late 1960 demonstrated
the difficulties which face Khrushchev in his at-
tempts to contain the challenge of intransigent
Chinese views. After three weeks of hard bargain-
ing, including persistent attempts by the Khrushchev
faction to browbeat the Chinese and others into ac-
ceptance of its way of looking at the world, the
statement which closed this round of the struggle
was one which could be used by either side to sup-
port its own views. The document was more than
something that the Chinese "could live with." It
was one which they could use to good advantage in
the future.
3. Up to 1960 the Chinese appear to have had
limited aims with regard to the international Com-
munist movement. They hoped to gain enough support
for their views to influence the foreign policies
of the Soviet Union, policies which they regarded
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as inimical to their own interests. They believed
that the Communist world should have a leader who
establishes overall policy, but who does so in
consultation with the other important members of
the Communist camp. They looked to the Soviet
Union to be that leader and visualized for them-
selves a role as principal adviser and co-formu-
lator of policies.
4. Since 1960, the Chinese have gradually given
up any hope that they could influence the policies
of the Soviet Union and thus the direction the
international Communist movement takes, without
themselves taking on the mantle of leadership.
They are therefore now engaged in a deep and unre-
mitting contest for doctrinal leadership--a con-
flict which they expect will be a long and drawn-
out battle whose present may appear uncertain but
whose future is assured. This is the rationale
behind their insistence that they are only "tem-
porarily a minority" as Lenin was only temporarily
a minority in the Second International. The suc-
cesses they have scored in the past four years in
gaining adherents to their doctrinal programs must
serve to strengthen their resolve while at the
same time it creates new disquietude in Moscow.
This success is examined briefly on a regional
basis below.
5. The Chinese have made their greatest in-
road into formerly Soviet-influenced areas in
Asia. Part of their appeal is a racial one; de-
spite their profession of doctrinal purity, they
are not above using racist propaganda in their
search for supporters. The support given by the
New Zealand Communist Party, however, demonstrates
that Peiping's appeal can transcend racial lines.
Today the Chinese can be considered as the leaders
of a regional Communist sector embracing all the
important parties of Southeast Asia. From India
eastward, only the Australian and Indian parties
are committed to the Soviet camp.
6. The two most important parties in the
area are those now in power--the North Korean and
the North Vietnamese parties. ..The North Korean
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party'..is-now clearly and, deeply.,.c.ommitted to. Peiping.
In the early days of the dispute, the North Koreans
attempted to maintain an uneasy neutralism. Al-
though attracted to the Chinese views on a number
of issues either because of geographic and racial
affinities or joint opposition to a common enemy--
the US--the North Koreans were still tied to the
Soviets through residual psychological pressures
and economic and military aid programs. As the
opposing positions hardened, however, it was less
and less possible for the Korean leadership to avoid
a choice, and the choice they have made is to support
Peiping. Soviet recognition of this has been ap-
parent in the treatment accorded a North Korean
military delegation to Moscow last fall and subse-
quent developments which suggest.the Soviet Union
is applying economic pressure through a refusal to
supply new military aid.
7. The North Vietnamese party also moved
carefully through the beginning months of the Sino-
Soviet dispute in an attempt to maintain a deli-
cate balance between the two major parties. More
wary than the North Koreans of exchanging Soviet
patronage for Chinese direction, and more adroit
at picking a path down the middle, the North Viet-
namese have continued throughout the dispute to
display a cautious neutralism. Recently, however,
particularly in the last two months, Vietnamese
pronouncements have taken on a distinct Chinese
cast and have been prominently reprinted by the
Chinese. The speech by First Secretary Le Duan
on 13 March, a recent Nhan Dan editorial, and the
resolutions of a recently hTd Central Committee
meeting all suggest that the North Vietnamese may
be preparing to jump off their tightrope onto the
Chinese side. It is still too early to tell, how-
ever, and the Vietnamese may well balance these
statements with more pro-Soviet ones as they have
in the past. On Balance, nevertheless, it appears
most likely that if the necessity fo: choice is
made stark enough--through the formation of two
distinct internationals, for example--the Vietnamese
will finally join with the Chinese.
8. The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) is
the largest in the non-Communist world and as
such represents an important prize for each side.
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Before the 22nd Soviet Party Congress in late 1961,
the leadership of the party, represented mostly by
its General Secretary Aidit, had been able to fight
off the sentiment of the majority of the rank and
file and of a number of politburo members, and had
avoided giving clear support to Chinese views. With
Khrushchev's unilateral attack on Albania, however,
and his quickening rapprochement with Yugoslavia,
the pro-Peiping majority acquired better weapons
with which to impose its views. Aidit, in what ap-
pears to be a maneuver to maintain his leadership
rather cLan a conversion, has now bowed to the pro-
Chinese majority and the PKI has taken up a position
contrary to Moscow's on the issues of Albania,
Yugoslavia, the Sino-Indian border dispute, the
Cuban crisis, and the necessity for an international
Communist meeting., On domestic affairs, however,
the PKI continues to use tactics with which the
Soviet Union agrees. Despite the generalized Chinese
demands for more revolutionary militancy, there is
no indication that the realistic Chinese do not
also agree with the PKI's moderate domestic tactics.
9. The Japanese Communist Party likes to pre-
sent itself as neutral in the dispute between the
USSR and China and for some years was able to sup-
press discussion within the party and to avoid a
clear choice in public pronouncements. Within the
last year, however, while still giving the impression
that it wishes there were no dispute to add to its
own problems, it has swung into the Peiping camp.
It has republished Chinese attacks on Nehru, en-
dorsed the Chinese border claims, published Mao's
collected works, reprinted Chinese speeches, re-
fused to attack Albania, given no support for the
Soviet handling of the Cuban crisis, refused to
carry in the Japanese edition of the World Marxist
Review articles attacking the Chinese point-of view,
and attacked Yugoslav "revisionism." One of the
reasons for the leadership's pose of "neutralism"
is the existence within the party of a strong under-
current of pro-Soviet thought among a significant
number of the rank and file. Defections from the
party have occurred recently, with its stand on the
Chinese side cited as the reason. The leadership,
therefore, is moving slowly and seeks to present it-
self as a possible mediator of the dispute. The
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evidence suggests, however, that as a mediator it
would attempt to settle the dispute in Peiping's
favor.
10. The Indian Communist Party is another
deeply divided party, but in this case the majority
of the present leadership are moderate nationalists,
who have condemned the Chinese attitudes and sup-
port the Soviet Union. The party, however, has a
strong minority whose leftist sectarian views are
completely in line with those of Peiping. At the
moment, many of this faction are still in Indian
jails, put there by Nehru for opposing the govern-
ment's line on the border issue. They will be out
some day, however, and the prospect is that they
will create a great deal of difficulty for the pre-
sent leadership if it maintains its present course.
If they cannot move the party in the direction they
wish, they may possibly move out of the party and
form another which, within India, will mirror the
Chinese.
11. The Australian party reflects the shifting
nature of alliances and demonstrates that all changes
of one view for another have not been in Peiping's
favor. The leadership of the party, like that of
the neighboring New Zealand party, was strongly
pro-Chinese until late 1961. Since then, the domi-
nant sentiment shifted to the Soviet side, while
the New Zealand leadership has more firmly supported
the Chinese. In February 1962, an internal struggle
over the Sino-Soviet question was resolved in the
Australian party in favor of the USSR and led to the
resignation of the leader of the pro-Peiping faction.
The Soviet Union can count the outcome of the
factional struggle in the Australian party as its
only success in Southeast Asia.
Africa and the Middle East:
12. All important parties in the Arab world
are firmly pro-Soviet. The Black African Com-
munist parties are as yet weak and they play little
role in the international movement. Such parties
as there are appear to be Soviet motivated, but
there is significant sentiment for Chinese views
among left-wing radicals in Africa. The predominence
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of Chinese influence in the Afro-Asian Peoples
Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), for example,
reflects this sentiment.
13. Beginning about eight months ago, votes
taken in the secretariat of AAPSO suggested that
Chinese views had gained ground in this body, and
the direction taken by AAPSO's third conference
in Tanganyika in February 1963 indicated that they
now dominate it. This was driven home last week
when Soviet supporters at the Afro-Asian Journalists
Conference were blocked by the Indonesian chairman
in an attempt to seat the USSR as a working member
rather than an observer.
14. In Latin America, the majority of the
Communist parties are overtly in the Soviet camp.
Although the leadership remains pro-Soviet, how-
ever, there are clear-cut splits rising out of the
rank and file almost everywhere--splits between
the cautious and the impetuous, between those in
control and their younger critics. These divisions,
rooted in local intra-party strife, have been widened
by the Sino-Soviet dispute. Even the leadership
of the various parties are not identical in their
backing of Moscow. Support varies from very strong
in Guatemala, Columbia, Chile, Bolivia, Argentina,
and others, to more luke-warm in Ecuador, Venezuela,
Uruguay, Honduras, and Haiti. And finally there
are special cases, like that of the Brazilian
party, Here the leadership of the official and more
traditional Communist party is firmly pro-Soviet,
but it must tread carefully because of the existence
of a dissident Communist party whose policies of
leftist revolution are close to the Peiping line.
15. In Mexico, the Communist party (PCM)
has split over the Sino-Soviet question. In
February 1963, the Chinese Communist trade delega-
tion then visiting Mexico reportedly offered
financial aid to the party in exchange for PCM
support of Peiping's policies. Since then, internal
wrangling has continued within the PCM and the
differences do not appear near reconciliation. In
fact, the recent postponement of the 14th Extra-
ordinary Party Congress from July to October appears
to reflect a concern on the part of the party leader-
ship that a congress held now might break down over
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the Sino-Soviet issue. In addition, as is occurring
in many countries in Latin America, a Communist
splinter group in Mexico consistently maintains a
more militant outlook than the official PCM and is
probably being supported from Peiping. Recent
developments indicate that the controversy over the
Sino-Soviet dispute within the Mexican Communist
movement is probably growing more bitter rather than
ameliorating.
16. Cuba has always been a enigma in the Sino-
Soviet dispute. Within the Cuban regime there are
a number of important figures who view the world
much as the Chinese view it. Nevertheless, Cuba
is heavily dependent on the Soviet Union for economic
and political support. It suffered a serious blow
to its pride in October, however, and therefore has
a stake in attempting to appear independent of the
Soviet Union. The result has been a distinct shift
in the nature of Cuban discussions of the dispute
within the Communist world. The flavor of Cuban
leaders' speeches after the missile crisis--although
couched in what appears to be neutral language--was
deliberately favorable to the Chinese. A reflection
of the Soviet concern over this situation can be
seen in Castro's present visit to the USSR. The
Soviet leaders are clearly hoping to use this visit
not only to emphasize their determination to pro-
tect Cuba against US pressures but to strengthen
their position with Castro within the context of
the Sino-Soviet dispute.
Europe:
17. Within the Western European Communist
parties, as well as within the North American parties,
Moscow's writ generally continues to run. There is
pro-Chinese sentiment among some of the rank and file
of most of the parties, most markedly, in the British
and Belgian parties, but the leadership of the
Western European parties still fully supports Moscow
in its dispute with the Chinese. The Sino-Soviet
dispute, however, has another effect here, which,
while not disposing these parties to Chinese influence,
yet stores up'.future difficulties for the Soviet
Union. For, against the background of schism in the
international Communist movement and a concomitant
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weakening of Soviet authority, an opportunity has
arisen for various parties to assert their national
individuality if they wish. In addition, Moscow's
willingness to accept divergencies along the "road
to socialism" in order to envelop Yugoslavia in a
more loosely structured bloc allows strong parties
elsewhere to oppose Soviet insistence that what is
good for Moscow is also good for them.
18. The''Italian party:is the best example of
the early development of this tendency to disregard
Moscow on occasion, while yet supporting the Soviet
party fully in the dispute with China. On the ques-
tion of the Common Market, the Italian party has de-
veloped an approach which fits its needs better than
the outright Soviet rejection. The Italian theory
of "structural reform" is another deviation to fit
the Italian scene; in absolute terms, it is far more
revisionist a doctrine than anything the Yugoslavs
are doing. The Soviet Union is willing to permit
this type of experimentation within the national
parties, if these parties will fully support Soviet
foreign policy aims and tactics. As the national
parties become more and more accustomed to forming
their own ideas on some policies, however, Soviet
control is bound to become weaker and the structure
of the Communist world increasingly loose.
19. This willingness to defy Moscow on vital
issues of national interest while yet supporting
Soviet foreign policy guides and an anti-Chinese
line is not restricted to Communist parties out-
side the bloc. Rumania has recently stood up for
its own economic development plans in the face of
an attempt by the Soviet Union to promote joint
planning through CEMA. The Rumanian refusal to go
along with CEMA plans was indicated in its Central
Committee resolutions of early March. China, al-
though realizing that Rumania is far from ready to
give it overt support, nevertheless has reprinted
these resolutions in its party press, probably as
an indication to the Rumanians that it stands
ready to aid them if desired. Rumania has also ex-
pressed its dissatisfaction with the Soviet Union's
policies by returning its ambassador to Albania and
is the only satellite regime to raise the level of
its trade with China this year. Although we cannot
expect Rumania soon to shift its allegiance from
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Moscow to Peiping, it is the existence of the Sino-
Soviet dispute that allows room for'regimes such as
the Rumanian to exercise independent judgment in
the face of Soviet disapproval.
The Outlook:
20, Since this memorandum has concentrated on
the gains which the Chinese have made in the inter-
national Communist movement, it has presented a some-
what distorted picture. The Soviet Union still com-
mands the support of the large majority of the move-
ment. Only in Asia have the Chinese made significant
inroads and developed a position of influence which
could be translated into a following willing to form
a new international. In other areas, the Chinese
can boast of sentiment in their favor, of minority
factions in other-oriented Communist parties, and of
future prospects. In addition, we do not know of
any organizational ties that have developed between
China and the parties now supporting her. China's
appeal is based on its interpretation of the basic
doctrine; at some future date those parties now sup-
porting this interpretation might shift toiia position
of greater independence of both major centers or even
back to the Soviet Union.
21, On balance, however, Khrushchev must be
deeply concerned by the attraction of so many parties
to the Chinese positions. The development of new
Communist parties is only likely in underdeveloped
areas where Chinese influence is now greatest, and
the result will probably therefore be more Chinese-
oriented parties. In those areas where Soviet in-
fluence is greatest, the trend appears to be toward
the assertion of ever more independence of view and
action, It is with good reason that Khrushchev and
his colleagues appear today morecconcerned with the
.problems within the Communist world than with any
other single issue,
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