PMCD HISTORY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-00314R000600050002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 207
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 11, 2002
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 21, 1971
• Content Type: MF

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Historical Officer,
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SUBJECT PMCD History
1. The history of the Position Management and
Compensation Division has been approved for publication by the
CIA Historical Staff. The final copy is herewith returned to
you for correction of the indicated typographical errors.
2. After the corrections have been made, the report
should be forwarded for Mr. Fisher's signature on the enclosed
title page.
3. If Mr. Fisher a roves the report, it should then
be sent to Chairman, Support Services His-
torical Board, Room 7-D-02 Headquarters.
4. If he concurs, I will return the history
to this Staff for reproduction, binding, and numbering. As
usual, the history will be disseminated as follows: Ribbon
copy to OP, copy 2 to DDS, and copy 3 to the HS documents file.
5. Incidentally, this is an excellent typing job--
probably the best that I have seen on any final copy to-date.
Please say a kind word to the typist for me.
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Support Services Historical
Officer
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Distrib.
0&1 - Adse
1 -
1 - ChHS
1 - DChHS
1 - JBP
1 - Chrono
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PMCD History
Historical Officer/OP
626CofC
SSHO
203 Key Bi.
17 December 1971
Per our conversation 25X1 A
this is redo
of the FMCO History. If it
is OK'd by the Historical
Staff, I presume the next
step is approval by D/Pers.
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CIA Internal Use *OnZy
Access Controlled. by DDS
THE SUPPORT SERVICES HISTORICAL SERIES
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL G
THE POSITION MANAGEMENT AND COMPENSAT I ON D IV I S I ON
1946-67
by
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December 1971
Harry -B. Fisher
Director of Personnel
HISTORICAL STAFF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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The history of the Position Management and Compensation
Division of the Office of Personnel portrays the administration
of the Agency position classification program under two
different sets of circumstances:. (1) the early period --
1946 through mid-1949 --.when the US Civil Service Commission
(USCSC), the Federal central personnel agency, retained final
position classification allocation authority over CIG/CIA
positions; and (2) the period from mid-1949 through 1967 when
the CIA Director of Personnel directed an independent Agency
position classification program. Ift both instances, the
values of a sound position classification program -- even as
summarized by a leading specialist _/* in the field nearly
thirty years ago -- remain constant:
Position-classification is an administrative in-
strument of wide usefulness and value in personnel
administration. It groups individual positions into
classes of positions on the basis that has real meaning
in personnel administration. By emphasizing an impar-
tial scientific approach, it helps avoid a purely
personalized treatment of work and pay problems. It
aids recruiting and testing authorities by making it
possible-to hold tests for classes of positions instead
of a larger number of tests for individual positions
having immaterial differences and by furnishing for,
each class a picture of the work to be performed and
* For serially numbered source references, see Appendix J.
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a statement of qualification requirements. In its use
as a sound basis for a fairly administered pay plan,
it serves the interests of the people, the taxpayers,
the Operating Officials, and the employees. Its system
of class titles constitutes a uniform job language
defined in class specifications, which in itself pro-
vides a base for conBnon understanding among all those
.agencies and officials having to do with personnel
administration.. It facilitates the preparation of
informative budgets for personal services; clarifies
promotion and transfer transactions; aids in developing
service (performance) rating plans and training pro-
grams; aids in planning, clarifying and improving
organization; facilitates the development of good
employee-management relations; and makes it possible
to keep significant service records and compile mean-
ingful personnel statistics.
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In these and many other ways it serves as a
facilitating instrument for personnel management and
administrative operation, and as a specific tool for
conducting many types of transactions involving the
public, present and prospective employees, Operating
Officials, accounting, budgeting and appropriating
agencies, and the personnel agency of the jurisdiction.
It is this broad usefulness which makes a well prepared,
currently maintained classification,plan for positions
the keystone in a sound system of public personnel
administration.
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I. Position Classification Program (CIG/CIA),
1946-49 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
A. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
B. CIG/CIA Position Classification. Activities,
1946-49 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
II. The CIA Classification Program in the 1950's. . . 31
A. The Beginning . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . 31
B. Augmentation of the Classification Program. . 33
C. The CIA Position Standards Program. . . . . . 39
D. Classification Support to the New Direc-
torates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
E. Classification of Secretarial Positions . . . 50
F. Position Classification Surveys . . . . . 52
G. Classification Support for Project T/0 ,
Proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
H. Wage Administration and Pay Administration. . 64
III. Position Management of Agency Executive Positions 70
IV. Meeting Agency "Flexibility" Requirements . . . . 92
A. Manpower Control System . . .. . . . . 92
B. Administrative Constraints (1952-56) to
Agency Flexibility Demands. . . . . . . . . 105
C. Agency Compensation System. . . . . . . . 108
V. "The Name of the Game" . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
VI. Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
A. The Role of the Director of Personnel . . . . 128
B. The CIA Internal Grade Control System . . . 131
C. Impact of the Bureau of the Budget as a
Control Agency. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
D. Position Management as a Control. . . . . . . 146
VII. Retrospect. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
Appendixes
A. Chronology: CIA Position Classification Program,
1946-67 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
B. PMCD/OP Foreign Field Survey Report on OC Installa-
tions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
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C. 2 May 56 Memo for Chairman, Supergrade Review
Board, from D/Pers, transmitting (Proposed)
Supergrade Job Evaluation System. . . . . 169
D. Historical Statement -- Management of Specially
Qualified CIA Scientific Personnel. . . . . . . 175
E. PMCD/OP Report on Supergrade Positions, and
182
185
went s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201+
I. List of Key Personnel and'Organizational Changes
in CIA Position Classification Program. . s . . 220
J. Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 22L.
H. 19 March 58 Brief for-CIA Career Council on (Pro-
posed) Compensation System (with four attach-
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Personnel . . 178
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OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
THE POSITION MANAGEMENT AND COMPENSATION DIVISION
1946-67
I. The Beginning of the CIG/CIA Position Classification
Program, 1946-49
A. Background
The history of the Position Management and Compensa-
tion Division (PMCD) for the period 1946-67 presents a unique
panorama of public administration in action. The Division
program always supported management and expanded and adjusted
itself to meet changing internal requirements during these two
decades. Initially, PMCD was responsible for the administration
of the Agency position classification program and related com-
pensation activities; since 1965, however, it has been respon-
sible for the direction of both the Agency position management
and position classification programs. In addition, external
controls exercised by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were
removed by legislative action in 1949, thus affording program
administrators an unusual amount of independence and freedom
of action in determining program parameters.
Although top management's policy decision was "to
follow the Classification Act principles and policies" to the
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extent practicable, the Civil Service Commission completely
relinquished to CIA its position classification authority.
Thus the extent to which the Agency adhered to CSC classifica-
tion policies became solely an in-house administrative policy
matter. On the other hand, adherence to the Classification
Act's pay plan was never questioned, especially when the Con-
gress proposed and enacted legislation on pay increases.
Finally, these program administrators were indeed fortunate to
be operating in a new agency environment where administrative
authorities were such that research could be generated to meet
new requirements and full exploitation of new ideas could be
undertaken with freedom of action. Proposals involving new
classification and compensation systems, for example, were
developed in an.effort to meet specific challenges by operating
officials.
Although position management may sometimes sound like
position classification and some may think they are synonymous,
they are not. Although both deal with positions, position
management concerns itself with organizational structure, align-
ment of functions, number of positions at different skill levels,
occupational levels required to carry out missions, ratio of
professionals to clericals, number of supervisors to work force,
and overlapping of responsibilities. Position classification,
on the other hand, is concerned with how the position should
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be classified -- where it fits into the clagsificati on, plan
that applies to it and other positions like it and what its
title and pay level should be under that plan. Thus the posi-
tion classification process must be preceded by position manage-
ment decisions, which are a function of organization managers.
Several important concepts have been touched upon in
the preceding paragraph and should be discussed in another
administrative frame of reference. The Agency employee's posi-
tion classification grade information is almost immediately
.translated into a salary or pay determination and, later, into
relationship to the current classifications and pay levels of
his co-workers. Sound. pay practices are also integral to good
management. In addition to being interlaced with employment
considerations, they are also tied into organizational design
and Agency budget-financial planning and control. Therefore
the decision of more than twenty years ago (1949) to adopt the
principles and policies of the Classification Act (although the
Agency was legislatively exempt) and its salary schedule has
certainly enabled Agency management to relate more easily to
the Bureau of the Budget (BOB), to Congressional committees,
and to other Federal agencies in terms of being able to speak
the same position language in evaluating and justifying the
personnel costs of various national intelligence programs. More
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significantly, however, the Agency, under its own authorities,
has also been able to develop and administer additional "special"
classification plans and pay schedules independently as; Agency
programs demanded.
During the early part of the post-World-War-II period,
the CSC continued to retain its Government-wide classification
authority and responsibility for approving the classification
grades for all Federal agencies' headquarters positions subject
to the Classification Act of 1823, as amended. During World
War II, the Office of Strategic Services had been organiza-
tionally attached to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and on
headquarters positions encumbered by civilians received prompt
classification support from both the JCS and CSC classification
personnel. As was the practice, the OSS classification unit
evaluated and approved all civilian field position allocations
independently. Many OSS headquarters and field positions, of
course, were encumbered by military personnel. From January
1946 to June 1949 the CSC continued to operate essentially in
the same manner with CIG and CIA as it had during the war with
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OSS. The CSC exercised final classification authority over
headquarters position proposals. CIG/CIA, on the other hand,
had field position classification authority for its own;organ-
izational field elements.- The CSC's authority to classify
CIA headquarters positions naturally had a continuing and posi-
tive impact on the grades of subordinate field positions. It
is a truism that headquarters program director classification
grades have always served as "ceilings" for senior-level field
position allocations.
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The development of the Agency's position classification
program is intertwined with increasing and changing requirements
levied by Agency management in response to its assumption of
new national intelligence collection and production programs
and/or programs of common concern, the inter-agency transfer of
on-going intelligence production programs, and the recapturing
and expanding services of common concern previously assigned to
OSS and other organizations.
There were, in fact, a number of OSS administrative
and personnel specialists who were able to furnish CIG much
needed support during the spring and summer of 1946. Several
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position classification specialists were in this group, and were
immediately pressed into service. Before the end of that summer,
however, it was apparent that as funds became available; and
CIG would be granted authority to recruit for Agency positions,
additional personnel generalists and position classifiers would
be required. Gradually, then, the personnel staff expanded --
but pretty much on a one-by-one basis through the fall of 1950.
The CIG, however, was an "interim" organization, not
yet created (officially) by Congressional action, which was
beginning to develop form. This minor technicality notwith-
standing, the CIG faced a wide variety of position management
and position classification problems that needed timely reso-
lution. The Dulles Survey Report of CIA states that during the
first three years of operation, the directing Staff of CIA had
not demonstrated an adequate understanding of the mandate of
the organization or the ability to discharge that mandate ef-
fectively./ This criticism of Agency management was'not fully
supported by the NSC memb'er-s; they also knew about the modus
operandi of the ICAPS and IAB/IAC where the "majority" rule
was in effect on all intelligence programming decisions with
compromise being the order of the day rather than the exception.
Complicating this was the fact that during the first eighteen
months of CIG/CIA's existence, this embryonic organization had
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three directors -?- all effective military and naval commanders --
who each held unto himself representation responsibilities but
somehow defaulted in making program and position management de-
cisions.* The leadership ability of none can be questioned; all
three, however, had short-term exposure (prior to the passage
of the National Security Act of 1947) to programming, organiza-
tion, and staffing problems of this new US intelligence organ-
ization.
Both internal and external pressures further compli-
cated the decision-making process. Although these DCI's were
all "feeling their way" and approached the programming problems
in a cautious manner, most of their decisions appeared logical
to them. Position management decisions vacillated, however,
with a number of intelligence programs and, support activities
being grouped and regrouped from time to time.
In any event, CIG needed an experienced staff of posi-
tion classifiers as soon as the organization opened its doors.
This was true even in the early months when CIG had to resort
to "detailing" personnel in from State, War, and Navy. Manage-
ment needed technical assistance in defining the jobs to be
Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, 23 January 1946-l0 June 1946;
Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, 10 June 1946-1 May 1947;
Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, 1 May 1947-7 October 1950.
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done as well as in describing personnel requirements to be
levied on these three departments. Initially, CIG took ad-
vantage of the availability of "in-house" (SSU) positioA clas-
sification specialists, who worked closely with officials in
making reasonable position management decisions regarding those
programs approved by the NIA. These decisions resulted in the
preparation of organization charts and/or Tables of Organization
that were supported through the development of detailed posi-
tion descriptions prescribing both the levels and the parameters
.of proposed assignments. This latter phase -- the position
classification process -- was the final administrative step
before the classification officer would make the Agency pres-
entation to a CSC representative.
Face-to-face dealings with the CSC representative
usually required that the Agency classification officer make
a verbal presentation (sometimes written statements were also
required) on the importance of a new program's mission, the
detailing of the importance of legislative and/or administra-
tive authorities and the technical basis for administrative
recommendations for each newly proposed position. From time
to time the CSC representative would interview program officials
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for clarification and further justifications,
This penultimate step involved a detailed review and
analysis by the CSC representative of the classification pro-
posals in relation to pertinent CSC classification standards
and/or (when there were not any CSC written standards available)
comparison with other similar Federal position classifications.
The CSC representative always had three alternatives -- to ap-
prove the classifications as requested, to downgrade them, or
(rarely) to upgrade them. Finally, whatever the CSC decision,
the Agency had to be made aware of it; and it usually fell to
the lot of the classification officer to be both the recipient
? * Critics of the CIG and early CIA administration in terms of
their apparent lack of appreciation of program mandates might
give a moment's thought to external pressures and problems that
the President and the Executive Branch were facing in attempting
to convert the US economy from a wartime to a peacetime basis.
All defense agencies were being subjected to budget and ceiling
cuts in favor of expanding those agencies being geared to assist
in the reversion to a civilian economy and those trying to help
the returning servicemen find their niches in society. Thus the
NIA departmental representatives were not inclined to be too
liberal in making other than a minimum amount of funds available
to CIG to get new programs underway. Furthermore, the three
Secretaries (State, War, and Navy) required the DCI to agree
to prudent spending of such funds in the same, manner as he would
if they had been appropriated directly to CIG. The CIG Budget
Officer accepted these transferred funds from these sources as
well as SSU and other going programs and entered them into the
"CIG Working Fund." These allocations were administered in the
same manner as any Federal Agency budget. Having served in a
dual OSS/CIG capacity during this period,
Assistant Executive Officer, Office of Finance, in an interview
with the writer on 23 October 1970, explained the mechanics of
these CIG financial arrangements.
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Some of the news was good,. but much-was bad! Agency
management faced many trials and tribulations in assuming re-
sponsibility for.new and sometimes seemingly unrelated intel-
ligence collection, research, production, dissemination, and
covert action programs. Perhaps the Agency was in need of an
external scapegoat for its own "mismanagement," if it could be
so described. It must be remembered that the CSC was respon-
sible for a government-wide classification program, and every
new or unusual classification or reclassification could become
a new "benchmark"* to be used by other agencies to support. the
reclassifying of their own positions to higher grades. After
June of 1949, of course, the Agency assumed the responsibility
for classifying its own positions and, to a certain degree, a
"security" curtain was available to contain in-house information
concerning its on classification philosophy.**
* A position classification becomes a "benchmark" when it is
used as a standard or guide for the classification of similar
positions. This applies equally to weak and strong position
classifications.
** Information on CIA classifications was, however, made avail-
able to IAC exempted agencies upon request. Subsequent to its
establishment as an exempted Agency (in November 1952), NSA
sought CIA's advice about a reclassification proposal for their
"senior journeymen" security-officer positions. Based upon CIA's
approval of GS-13 grade for its own resident agent, independent
senior investigator, which in turn had been based upon the FBI's
resident agent position classification, NSA reclassified their
positions to GS-13 also.
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B. CIG/CIA Position Classification Activities, 1946-49
As in all new organizations, getting started pres-
ented many different kinds of classification problems that had
to be faced individually and day by day. Initially, the CIG
organizational structure was very simple, composed of only
three organizational components -- the Central Review Staff,
the Central Plans Staff, and the Personnel and Administrative
position classifiers worked closely with CIG officials in pre-
paring and clearing with the CSC these position descriptions
for encumbering by Federal "detailed" personnel. Early in
FY 1947, however, not only did Lt. General Hoyt Vandenberg
secure a more definitive CIG charter but he was also granted
authority for the independent hiring of personnel for CIG
programs (rather than rely on State, War, and Navy detailing
personnel, which after six months' experience could best be
termed "a dismal failure.") During this time CIG began to
accept the transfers-in of a variety of overt and covert*
* OSS covert intelligence activities were technically trans-
ferred to CIG, but such action was deliberately camouflaged by
an NIA directive which assigned the responsibility of adminis-
tration of the SSU unit to the DCI. This responsibility also
included the right to select OSS programs, operations, and
personnel to be retained in CIG's peacetime intelligence organ-
ization. Indeed, this maneuver circumvented a personnel
Reduction in Force (RIF) procedure.
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intelligence programs, activities, operations, and services of
common concern. As these programs increased?in number and the
Agency in size, administrative support activities also bad to
expand to meet new, constantly increasing in-house demands.
These too required classification reviewmso that support ac-
tivities could be augmented as rapidly as possible.
Other new Federal organizations have experienced top
management's failure in early recognition of an increasing need
for additional support personnel, and the CIG's management was
.also remiss. Throughout this period and during the first part
of the 1950's, the Classification Program was never really
staffed adequately. In a way, therefore, it was fortunate that
the funds made available for these initial programs of CIG were
not excessive. Consequently, program managers were apparently
willing to permit their organizations -- functions, positions,
and personnel -- to be transferred in toto (from service organ-
izations to a central agency) sans requests for upward position
reclassifications projected. on anticipated broader missions
and programs in serving the entire community. Functional trans-
fers, it was true, were thus expedited; but this approach may
have had a negative impact on subsequent Agency reclassification
requests to the CSC without strong program justifications.
Other factors, too, certainly had impacts on these
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position classification reviews. For example, a 19+7 classifi-
cation survey
-- all headquarters and field
positions -- certainly resulted in, if anything, increasing the
ill feeling of Agency management toward the CSC.
kad pro- 25X1
posed reclassifications for its editor positions from GS-09
to GS-11 in both headquarters and field stations, along with
grade increases for
and a two-grade increase
-- from GS-13 to GS-15.
Using its field position classification authority, the CIA
classification officers had approved the requested field up-
gradings* before the CSC classification representative had made
headquarters positions.
When the CSC official refused to approve the GS-11
reclassification for the
headquarters. editor positions,
the administrative justifications for all supervisory editorial
and program officer positions were somewhat weakened and the
headquarters reclassifications upward were also disapproved.
In addition, the two-grade reclassification request for the
0
resulted in a GS-l4 grade allocation instead of the
Although thel positions had been-upgraded, prorno-
tions were held in abeyance until the headquarters positions
could be reviewed by the CSC. To have done otherwise would
have complicated the rotation of field and headquarters editors.
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In early 1949- new position descriptions were,prepared
positions with strong emphasis on the increased
importance of its mission resulting from transfer to CIA.
Further, its own reorganization had resulted in additional
responsibilities being vested in many of the
positions. 25X1
This time the CSC approved a large number of the upward reclas-
25X1 sification requests for the
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editors, supervisory personnel,
This solution, long overdue, was only the
--J/ forerunner of the problems that the CIA classification program
In some cases, position management decisions on new
programs and organizations just were not forthcoming; yet per-
sonnel had to be recruited. Personnel qualifications had to be
developed, of course, before recruitment could be undertaken.
This problem faced ORE officials when the NSC directed the Agency
to undertake a comprehensive scientific intelligence production
program (incorporating the nuclear energy intelligence group
that had previously been transferred to the Agency from the
Manhattan Project). ORE management -- non-scientists -- just
The DAD/00, who had previously served was a
staunch defender of the requested reclassi ica ions and.had
periodically attempted to move the CSC review to as early a
date as possible.
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couldn't decide on an SI organizational structure. It was
obvious that position descriptions (which would include levels
of projected assignments and pertinent qualifications require-
ments) had-to be prepared and approved by the CSC representative,
and one of the newly recruited position classifiers* came to
management's rescue by suggesting that the classification offi-
cers write position descriptions for P-1 through P-8 levels
for all of the scientific disciplines and have the CSC approve
them for interim use.** This was done and the scientific intel-
ligence program became, initially, a branch of the rapidly ex-
panding ORE. Within a short period of time, the program began
to develop more fully; and the position classifiers were again
a former CSC classifier who came to CIG
in January 191I.6, in an interview September 1970 indicated that
this classification approach was "old hat" with CSC and opera-
tional classification officers who lived through the overnight
expansions of W II war agencies but it had not previously been
used in OSS/CIG/CIA.
Before 1949, P-1 was the entrance level and P-8 was the
senior level on the Professional Schedule under the Classifi-
cation Act of 1923 as amended. This Schedule was incorporated
into the General Schedule under the Classification Act of 1919.
Interestingly, this integration of the eight grade levels of
the professional schedule into the upper thirteen grades of the
General Schedule resulted in placing the first four profes-?
sional levels in GS-05, GS-07, GS-09, and GS-11. As various
administrative occupations became "professionalized," these
same levels were used with the result that the even-numbered
grades (GS-06, 08, and 10) fell into disuse.
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called in to assist in its transition to the Office of Scien-
tific Intelligence.
A different set of problems faced Agency position
classifiers in dealing with the Office of Special Operations
(OSO). This was the CIG/CIA mother organization that housed
branch functions serving under con-
tinuing OSS management, which wanted to -- and continued to --
operate under covert autonomy. The term "covert autonomy"
implied that the (OSS) official having operational responsi-
bility for a covert program should also have administrative
responsibility. This precept, condoned by the Dulles Survey
Team, plagued the implementation of support services to clan-
destine operations throughout most of the early period of CIA.
This was also true with the support effort of the position
classification program.
Because the record is somewhat hazy, it can be assumed
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branches were not subjected to
much classification review; these functions had been "trans-
ferred" to CIG for administration by an NIA directive in June
1946. Asimilar situation prevailed in-the fall of 1946 when
* OSO was established on 11. July 1946.
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define its CIA program responsibilities, however, the position
classification specialists had to be called in to help OSO
establish its world-wide program. With new OSO departmental
positions, of course, the CSC representative also had to approve
their classifications. For reasons of operational security,
OSO (and later OPC) position descriptions had to be sanitized
before being presented to the CSC representative for his ap-
proval. Further safeguards required that these documents remain
in CIA custody, thus inhibiting the CSC analytical review and.
comparison with other CSC classifications available only in the
CSC headquarters.** Interestingly enough, the CSC operated
under this less than satisfactory arrangement for three and
? one-half years. Eventually both organizations came to the
realization that such arrangements were not in the best interests
of either and "exempting" legislation was the answer.
Operational data had to be deleted from such documents, and
the residual data left for the position descriptions was almost
void of any significant classification factors -- i.e., size and
nature of the program, operation,.nurnber and level of personnel
supervised, etc. As substitutes in these "general" position
descriptions were well-worn classification terminology such as
"trainee" level tasks, "full professional level" assignments,
first line supervisor over a group of journeymen professional
IO's, etc.
This procedure might be likened to comparison shopping ex-
cept that the purchased items would never be permitted to leave
a seller's premises -- making detailed analyses almost impos-
sible.
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Internally, OSO-Personnel Office relations were strained.
It was clear that the OSO continued to operate under the prin-
ciple of covert autonomy as had been the practice in OS~. In
October 19+7 Mr. William Kelly, the Director of Personnel, asked
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a new senior CIA Personnel Officer recruit,
to survey the functions and staffing of the CIA Personnel
Office&
report on the Agency classification activ-
ities in support of the OSO was extremely negative. "One very
great deficiency in this program is the attitude of OSO toward
classification. No desk audits are permitted and certifications
from the OSO personnel office are accepted as to the proper
assignments and grades. As best as can be determined, there
is not an individual in the OSO personnel office who has had
any classification experience or training." (By this time, the
OSS position classifiers had been transferred to the central
Personnel Office.) ... I was shocked to find that the OSO
Promotion Board, chaired by ... , the Personnel Officer, not
only voted on the promotions of the individuals but voted on
the grade of the job at the same time ... the jobs were not
classified by a trained person, as a matter of fact, they are
not classified at all ... . Another thing which appears to
require some education is the policy of hiring people three or
four grades below the grade at which the job is established.
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It appears as though a one-grade differential is all that should
be permitted. `rX-
OSO was a recalcitrant client of the Agency classifi-
cation staff, restricting the number of classifiers who could
deal with its officials and furnishing only the minimum of
operational details in support of its classification requests.
As Mr. Kirkpatrick had pointed out in October 1950,5/ the OSO
program was the oldest (OSS/CIA) program; but it also had the
most difficult time in addressing itself to its postwar,
peacetime renaissance in an objective and "real time" fashion.
During this early growth of the Agency, the Classifi-
cation Division had to initiate. those support activities that
were required by Agency programs. For example, the Agency
"housekeeping" activities (eventually assigned to the Office
of Logistics) required the employment of blue collar -- crafts
and trades -- workers. Because the CIA Classification Division
had only a small staff and Agency projections revealed that
these blue collar positions would. be in a fairly limited number,
I imay be accused of using loose language here, but
he was referring to two personnel policy issues that took al-
most a decade to resolve -- high-graded job projections with
lower graded personnel incumbencies and the exercise of covert
autonomy as a means of handling personnel matters, such as a
classification review, for which the unit had neither the
authority nor the trained personnel.
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the question was raised: "How can CIA classification people
best handle this requirement?" One way was-'to establish a
CIA Wage Board plan or, alternatively, to "adopt" the Army
Wage Board standards and apply the results of the periodic
Army/Air Force surveys of prevailing local wage rates in the
several crafts.* Many Federal agencies had already recognized
that these DOD civilian personnel units were leaders in the
field of wage administration and had adopted pertinent segments
of their systems administratively.
CIA did likewise and found it a solid evaluation system
that permitted the classification of both "run-of-the-mill"
blue collar positions and those having unique duties required
for CIA operational support.**'
* The Army was the leader in the wage administration field
before the Air Force was even established as a separate service.
The Army wage administration personnel had forged ahead and
developed a multitude of job standards that were applicable to
Agency maintenance jobs. When the AF was established in 1947,
AF personnel developed those job standards that pertained to
aircraft repair and maintenance and also used those Army
standards that were applicable. However, both Army and Air
Force personnel joined together -- as principal employing agen-
cies of these blue collar workers -- to conduct wage surveys
and published their findings as a joint effort. In 1968 the
CSC was made the coordinating agency for the Federal Wage Board
system and assumed both of these responsibilities.
** Of course, the impact of an employee's performing unique
tasks for Agency operational activities upon his job classifica-
tion remained an in-house secret.
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Wage administration is a tricky business, and, some
solutions just never worked out. For example, CIG decided in
1946 to classify the positions of printers assigned to security
documents work (TSD function) under the white collar (CAF)
schedule. Initially, the solution appeared satisfactory as the
pay levels on that schedule were close to the going rates in
the industry. Rapid wage increases in the printing trades,
however, soon put the Agency in an untenable situation for both
retention and recruitment of printers. After study, the Agency
decided to adopt the rating patterns and wage schedules of the
Bureau of Engraving and the Government Printing Office, which
were keyed to rates in 25 US cities and were approved by the
? Joint Congressional Conmiittee on Printing.
In another early case (1949) the Agency classification
personnel were not surprised when
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?
tinuous reclassifications were in order, and controls moved
from state-controlled employment situations
local workers were available to the US Government units through
assignment
to an "open market"
necessary to band together to act as a single Federal employer,
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all US Government agencies in a given overseas area found it
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25X1 C
?
setting local wage schedules based upon prevailing wages for
various skills in a particular area.
officers. Considerable liaison on overseas classification and
.pay matters with position classifiers and wage analysts in
State, Army, Navy, and Air Force became a requirement. Staff
research into both Federal and industrial pay practices and
fringe benefits was necessary, but many of the problems had
to be resolved independently in the form of Agency classifica-
tion and pay schedules that would insure that
25X1A
cruit and retain the required types of professionals. Sometime
later, when Clandestine Service case officers for major overseas
found themselves harassed by similar classifica-
tion, pay, and fringe benefit problems, they were able to call
on the experts in the Office of Personnel for assistance.*
Because of security problems, however, the C/CWD found that
he had to contract these requirements out to a top-flight US
management consulting firm. Survey reports and recommendations
were reviewed and seconded by the Office of Personnel before
implementation by these organizations. This was "another im-
portaA t ' first,."
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The term "services of common concern" is most often
reserved for those CIA services in support of the intelligence
programs of the USIB community, and it rarely involved the
Agency's Office of Personnel. When the NSC was established in
1947, however, Mr. James Lay, the Executive Secretary, requested
that the CIA Personnel Office provide the council with necessary
personnel support. This arrangement continued until 30 June
1961. Although this high-level inter-agency staff secretariat
continued under CSC classification control, Agency position
classifiers remained available to prepare position descriptions
and recommend appropriate classification actions on such posi-
tions as were designated by the Executive Secretary of the NSC.
This support was in addition to personnel recruitment and. per-
sonnel processing responsibilities.
Other tasks of the Classification Division involved
the monitoring of all personnel actions promoting, assigning,
or reassigning employees into Agency positions that were cur-
rent, correctly identified, and located in on-going programs.
The Classification Division was also responsible for maintaining
up-to-date organizational charts and tables of organization for
all Agency components. As a large number of organizations were
established and then reorganized during this period, these
chores seemed endless.
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Although the National Security Act 'of 1947 gave CIA
status and mission, it was PL 110 of 20 June 1949 that provided
administrative authorities consistent with the Agency's;statu-
tory responsibilities. Less than a fortnight after the passage
of PL 110, the DCI acted upon a recommendation* that he seek
an opinion from.the CSC regarding the applicability of the
Classification Act of 1923 (as amended) to CIA.W The official
judgment of the Commission, based upon sections 7 and 10(b)
of the CIA Act of 1949, was that the Agency was not required by
.law to follow the Classification Act, and that the Commission
* Both Mr. William Kelly and Mr. Dorsey Delavaigne recently
(1970) recollected that the initiative for "the Agency severing
the classification cord with the CSC" was taken by Mr. Delavaigne,
the CSC Classification Officer. The story went that he had
felt that. the CSC role with CIA was sadly deteriorating and the
authorities in PL 110 seemed sufficiently broad so that the
Agency could be exempted from the Classification Act. With con-
siderable personal confidence he "sold the idea to the Director
of Personnel, CIA." Mr. Delavaignne then voluntarily drafted
the letter, for the DCI's signature,'to the CSC requesting its
interpretation of this matter.
With the letter's successful movement up the CIA adminis-
trative hierarchy, Mr. Delavaigne -- in his CSC capacity --
prepared an affirmative response.
It is interesting to note that CIA Personnel did not
attempt to clarify its personnel appointment authority under
PL 110 until 1953, several years later. The prime reason that
it came about then was that the CIA "career service" concept
had come into vogue, and it was decided that it was high time
to find out whether the Agency could in fact make appointments
under its enabling act rather than use the Schedule A authority
that the CSC continued to renew automatically annually.
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therefore was not required by law to enforce that Act within
CIA.-xZ1
Apropos of this, Mr. William Kelly, the CIA Director
of Personnel, had held discussions. with
his Chief of Classification, and Mr. Dorsey Delavaigne, the
CSC classification representative. Discussions included an
exploration of the status of the Agency's position classifica-
tion program as well as Agency relations with the CSC. As to
the latter, it was the consensus that CIA/CSC classification/
management relations, during the three-year period then ending,
had not improved one iota, principally because security re-
strictions limited the information on Agency programs to such
a degree that the CSC could not fully evaluate Agency position
descriptions. On 1 September 19)48 the Office of Policy Coor-
dination (OPC) was established in CIA with covert-action program
responsibilities. With its singular, sensitive missions, it
was not long before OPC joined OSO in withholding highly sen-
sitive program data from the CSC representative thus compounding
Agency/CSC classification problems several fold because both
OSO and OPC were rapidly expanding. The three-year period
* This administrative interpretation was "legalized" when the
CIA was exempted in the Classification Act of 19)49, passed a
few months later.
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1946-49 did provide the CSC an opportunity to recognize the
uniqueness of specialized occupational areas-in CIA.* Although
the problem was discussed, the Director of Personnel never
determined specifically what course of action the Agency should
take in establishing and administering its own classification
program.** As it turned out, this decision was made by the
DCI himself during the summer of 1949. With the position clas-
sification authority issue resolved in this way, it was not
surprising to find that the same approach was used shortly
thereafter in seeking clarification from the General Accounting
Office on the Agency's authority in'another important area --
pay.
Certainly other important administrative considerations of the
CSC were the growing awareness that the "full" CSC representation
job could never be accomplished under Agency security requirements
that made impossible CSC research on comparable Federal jobs;,
placed extra travel requirements on the CSC classification "group"
leader -- for a number of Federal departments -- who was also
required to travel to CIA to allocate the higher grade classifi-
cation proposals (as the Agency began to expand, this problem
could only become more accentuated), and -- of probably the great-
est bureaucratic significance -- CIA was the only Agency that had
been able to retain its official CSC classification documents,
registers, and the like. If continued, the latter arrangement
would eventually end up as a "CIA-controlled CSC classification
At this time the exempted Atomic Energy Convnission, the Navy
Department, and Veterans Administration (both of the latter two
agencies were either fully or partially under the Classification
Act jurisdiction) were busily engaged in developing point rating
classification systems for several categories of their positions.
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On 28 October 1949 while the Classification Act of
1949 was awaiting the signature of the President, Mr. Walter
Pforzheimer, the CIA Assistant General Counsel, presented his
analysis of this Act to the DCI. This was very prudent in view
of the fact that the DCI on 10 August 1949 had decided that the
Agency would follow the policy and principles of the Classifi-
cation Act of 1923, as amended, even though it was exempt.]
This analysis J then was in terms of legal and administrative
problems that the Agency might have in continuing to follow
this policy under the pending revision of the Classification
Act. The new legislation established a single General Schedule
to which Federal employees under the Professional, CAF, and CPC
schedules of the previous act were to be transferred. Under-
scoring the act's provisions, the AGC did not anticipate any
administrative or legal problems in transferring Agency employees
in grades l through 15 from the three previous schedules into
the General Schedule. His analysis concerned, rather, the
administrative problems that might be associated with the DCI's
approving and enctunbering Agency executive positions at the
newly authorized "supergrade" (GS-1618) levels. There again,
he did not question the DCI's authority to classify such posi-
tions under PL 110 authorities. His major concern was that
Agency certifying officers and GAO auditors might have questions
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as to what the Comptroller General's interpretations of the
provisions of the Classification Act and PL-110 would be. If
so, they would find it necessary to suspend payment of pay
vouchers for Agency supergrade personnel until such questions
were officially answered. (In Federal financial matters, it
was the Comptroller General of the United States who always
had the last word.)
Because even CIA executives like to be paid promptly,
it was recommended that this question be formally submitted to
the Comptroller General for immediate interpretation rather
than after payroll suspensions had occurred. This was done.10
The CG responded promptly and affirmatively, indicating that
the DCI did have authority under PL 110 to allocate Agency
positions to the three supergrade levels without numerical
limitations (except for not more than three professional and
scientific positions as limited by PL 110); and furthermore,
under Section 10, the DCI had the authority to pay for personal
services without regard to limitations on types of persons to
be employed ... .11
The official recognition of the Agency's broad author-
ities in PL 110 by two competent, cognizant Federal authorities
was to bring to a close the CIA "operating agency" classifica-
tion program which according to some had been dominated too
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long by a bureaucratic CSC. In all fairness to the CSC repre-
sentative, Mr. Delavaigne, he was trying to"do an effective
classification job in accordance with the CSCTs standards.
Unfortunately he found himself the CIA scapegoat -- largely
because some program managers were seeking freedom of action
from all but the most flexible of internal and external admin-
istrative controls. This philosophy did, unfortunately,
permeate a large segment of the organization and was eventually
contained several years later only through external controls
levied on the Agency by the Bureau of the Budget.
Agency management faced the initiation of an Agency
classification program with mixed emotions, but to the profes-
sional cadre it was clear that in the position classification
area, program administrators should seek:
a clear-cut Agency classification policy;
b. a strong but flexible Agency position
classification program oriented toward the intel-
ligence profession and centrally administered in
such a fashion that it would be responsive to a
,,Tide variety of activities yet remain an Agency-wide
program;
c. full support of Agency management; and
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d. As program requirements dictated, an
enlargement of technical competency of the
position classification staff so that it could
be fully responsive to increasing Agency needs.*
* The remainder of this history of the CIA Position Classifica-
tion Program has been organized on a topical-chronological
basis. Thus, in order to integrate and make these several
program segments more meaningful to the reader, the historian
has included a chronology of internal and external events of
program significance (see Appendix A).
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II. The CIA Classification Program in the 1950's
A. The Beginning
In the summer of 19+9 the Agency found on the one hand
that it was suddenly free from the classification authority of
the CSC (and its so-called bureaucratic control of Agency clas-
sification activities) and on the other hand that the DCI had
made a profound personnel policy announcement that the Agency
would continue to follow "the basic philosophy and principles
of the Classification Act, the CSC allocation standards, the
pay scales and ... pay rules ... in substantially the same-manner
provided for in other Agencies`'-' in the administration of the CIA
classification program.12
This policy issuance, of course, reduced the urgency
for the Agency to establish immediately a fully structured clas-
sification-program.- As a matter of fact -- although
the senior Agency classification officer, had held a
number of "brain-storming" sessions with staff members and other
cognizant personnel officers on the parameters of what might be
An interim solution was found for about 1E months (September
19)49-November 1950) by the establishment of a two-man Position
Classification Review Staff in the OD/Pers. A central review
provided for uniformity within the Agency of the classifications
proposed by the two operating classification units.
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needed in an independent CIA classification program -- the
actual formal program planning and' its implementation were to
be postponed until 1951-52.
As the Agency expanded from 194+9 through 1953, every
effort was made to recruit experienced position classifiers in
order to meet the heavy and increasing demand for reviewing and
approving literally thousands of newly proposed positions to
keep abreast of and reasonably current with the many routine
personnel actions. The Agency found, however, that it was to
have limited success in recruiting (or proselyting) experienced
classification personnel. As a matter of fact, it was not until
1951-53 that the Agency was able to recruit a large number of
classifiers. This was accomplished as a direct result of the
anticipated termination of a number of position classifiers
from TTcontrol" agencies -- the National Production Authority,
the Wage Stabilization Board, and others -- established during
the Korean War.
In addition to the general post-World War II shortage
of qualified classification personnel, there were other factors
that complicated the furnishing of necessary classification
support to Agency components. Foremost among these were:
1. The highly classified and sensitive nature
of programs, operations, and projects of many of
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the Agency's missions, which did ndt remain fixed
from year to year but varied in response to changing,
unpredictable intelligence requirements.
2. The rapid expansion of Agency strength that
dictated expeditious approval of proposed Tables of
Organization so that early recruitment of personnel
could begin and detailed position classification
could be accomplished after the fact.
3. The specialized nature of many Agency in-
telligence production, collection, and operational
positions for which there were no direct counterparts
or existing allocation standards either elsewhere in
the Federal government or in US industry.
4. General lack of familiarity of Agency officials
with -- and lack of concern about -- the mechanics
of Federal position classification procedures and.
practices to which the Agency was administratively
committed.
B. Augmentation of the Classification Program
It was not until after General Walter B. Smith became
DCI (7 October 1950) and General Order #38 had been promoted
(1 December 1950) 13 that the classification activities of the
Office of Personnel began to be taken seriously. This Order
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provided, among other things, for the establishment ofa DD
(Administration) position the incumbent of which would coor-
dinate the several administrative programs of the Agency.
Because these functions had been scattered throughout the
Agency, in order to implement this Order the DDA asked his
newly appointed-Office Heads to take those steps necessary to
centralize their assigned functional programs as quickly as
possible. On iL February 1951 the Director of Personnel 14+
formally. advised him that the Office of Personnel had been
.reorganized completely by combining previously split operations
into centralized functional programs. The Director of Personnel
pointed out that the classification and wage administration
program, of course, was one of the Personnel programs fully
centralized at this time; that for the first time in two years,
the Office of Personnel Table of Organization had been increased --
Even with this
long overdue Office of Personnel staff increase, the Agency
ceiling had risen by 25X1
September 1951.
This T/O increase did provide twelve additional positions
for the classification program and., as mentioned earlier, these
positions were filled by senior level position classification
officers recruited from various agencies undergoing program
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curtailments. Fortunately, these highly experienced position
classifiers were capable of dealing with Agency management on
T/0 proposals involving 50, 100, 200, and even 500 positions
for offices or major components.* In order to avoid "hang-ups"
in the T/0 process, it became an administrative-personnel policy
that on questionable (not fully supported) position classifica-
tion requests CWD would "slash-grade" the position classifications
in dispute. The lower grade*(shown on the T/0) would represent
the CWD's tentative appraisal of the worth of the position and
the upper grade would represent that which the program manager
had requested. Ultimate resolutions of "slash-grades" were
In order to cope with the classification processing workload
generated by these newly established directorates, a modus
operandi evolved within the Agency that was to expedite the
management and classification approvals for staffing patterns
and organizational structures for these components seeking imme-
diate resolutions of these kinds of problems. The mechanism
that seemed to fit these needs of the Agency was the Table of
Organization concept. The T/0's were used as planning documents
(sans supportive detailed position descriptions) as well as a
vehicle for coordinating organizational-and staffing changes.
T/0 processing was accomplished informally by position classi-
fiers and management analysts discussing with program officials
those changes that were being proposed in missions and position
staffing patterns. Because of the lack of time,.very few
position descriptions were developed during the T/0 process
that culminated with the DDS "approving" those T/0 requests.
This way of life, while expeditious, could never have gotten
underway if the C.SC had retained its classification authority
over CIA since every Agency position proposal would have had
to have been documented prior to CSC action.
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achieved later by desk audits and detailed position analysis.-
The T/O process became a way of life in CIA, and without that
process the Agency would have been unable to undertake as heavy
a recruitment drive as it did in the 1951-53 years. Although
the sense of urgency and pressures of the early 1950's eventually
diminished, the T/O process became the heart of the Agency's
annual "planning papers" as,well as basic to the "flexible T/O
concept." These were CWD proposals that were ultimately devel-
oped in response to a maturing Agency's needs. They will be.
discussed later in this chronicle.
Delving into OP historical documents one finds that
the Historical Statement for the Personnel Office during the
1947-52 period 15 summarized the Agency Classification and
.Wage Administration Program in the following fashion:
* The other side of the coin: On 5 March 1971, Colonel L. K.
White in an OP oral taped historical interview indicated that
" ., in many cases, he Lthe ADDA and later the DDJ approved
T/0's'subject to classification review' ... fan this action,
in hindsight, put the classification people behind the eight
ball before they had a chance to play ... . They had a hard
time ... the organization was big ... changing rapidly ...
although they played a secondary role, in the final analysis,
they were the SOB's ... everybody else had signed off ...
components had recruited personnel. ... certain grades or'
salaries had been promised ... . Then classification came
along and said, No, it won't stand up to that' so, it was a
built-in conflict and the classification people got blamed a
lot more than they deserved ... ."
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The Classification and Wage Division is responsible
for allocating Lclassifyin7 Agency and NSC positions
parenthetically it may be noted that-all personnel
services
Office7; developing Agency classification and qualifi-
cations standards; conducting wage administration
activities for ungraded positions and for indigenous
and foreign nationals employed at-foreign stations;
providing job evaluation services.and guidance per-
taining to salaries of agent personnel; directing,
coordinating and conducting job analyses, position sur- .
veys and the development of position descriptions; advising
and consulting with operating officials on classification
activities and problems; and collaborating with the Organ-
ization and Methods Service in connection with the estab-
lisbment of Tables of Organization. In brief, the Classi-
fication and Wage Division (CWD) is primarily responsible
for assuring that CIA wage sand salary policies remain in
general alignment with the general Federal structure and
that there is similar pay for similar work.
Actually, the service provided by CWD is basic to
much of the personnel program. To illustrate, how can
job qualifications be determined without a knowledge of
what is to be done? How can training programs be set up
for particular groups of jobs if there is insufficient
information as to the nature, difficulty and responsi-
bilities of the positions affected? Thus, it is obvious
that the CWD, in addition to pricing positions, provides
services which are fundamental to the entire personnel
structure.
The Central Intelligence Agency has been excepted from
the requirements of the Classification Act of 1949 which
prescribes position classification and salary administra-
tion requirements for most Federal agencies.
From the outset, it had been apparent that certain
unique functions or combinations of functions not normally
performed made it difficult, if not impossible, to allocate
all CIA positions in accordance with the established
structure of position classes. The only alternative to
arbitrarily placing positions in an established class
most nearly approximating the CIA position was to set up
specifications for unique positions. At the risk, of
repeating too often the story of too few people to do
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the job required, it should be noted here that the orig-
inal staffing allotted to the task of position classifi-
cation did not permit approaching this program in the
most efficient manner. Because it has not been feasible
previously to adapt available standards against which
individual jobs could be measured, classification has of
necessity been accomplished against a number of standards,
including existing Commission standards for all jobs of
a similar nature. and surveys made within the Agency on
an individual basis. The current program of the Division
includes setting up the necessary criteria.
Obviously, the position information required to serve
the needs of the Division and other personnel activities
must be recorded; for this reason, the Division prepares
written descriptions of the duties performed in each job
and periodically reviews these descriptions to keep them
on a current basis.
Touching very lightly on the topic because of the
security consideration involved, it is simply noted that
the organization of certain missions requires advice on
salary structure outside.the Federal system. The CWD
is charged with Personnel Office responsibility in this
regard.
Finally, this Division, because o.f its knowledge of
the particular duties performed and the kinds and nu bers
of personnel required to do them, is responsible for
assisting the Organization and Methods Service in estab-
lishing Tables of Organization for various Agency com-
ponents.
As the Agency classification program gradually became more
25X1 A ' fully staffed,
Chief of the Classification
and Wage Division, exerted concentrated effort toward improving
the organization of the division as well as-the administration
of the program. Divisional and related Office of Personnel
procedures were standardized, thereby cutting some red tape
and providing better services in order to increase acceptance
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of the program by Agency operating officials. Obviously, the
major objective was to establish a consistent and effective
in-house classification program geared to meet management
needs.
C. The CIA Position Standards Program
In an attempt to develop position classification and
?
qualifications standards for various occupational fields unique
to CIA, in 1952 the C/CWD officially established the Standards
and Survey Branch on his T/O. The major mission of this Branch
was to develop comprehensive standards on a number of occupa-
tional fields -- allied to all Agency programs -- that would
provide reasonable guides in stabilizing the grade structure
of the Agency. One of the chief reasons for instituting this
standards program was to secure some relief from the continuous
pressure for position upgradings throughout the Agency. Dra-
matically involved was the need to gain the understanding and
acceptance of Agency officials as to what professional duties
and responsibilities actually constituted the several GS grade
levels. Unfortunately this program got Underway during a
period of time when the Agency was expanding rapidly and Tables
of Organization were often the "dreams" of interested operating
officials who preferred to dream in an unshackled world.
Under this program the initial effort was, in a given
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series or occupation, to collate the data on existing position
descriptions quickly and to develop characteristics for each
grade level. Once they were defined, it was the plan to coor-
dinate them with officials in Agency operating components.
This was where the major conflicts occurred because the oper-
ating officials had little interest in restricting themselves
by developing any type of "bureaucratic" standards. Compounding
this was the feeling on the part of a number of officials that
the existing T/0 grade structures were not really adequate for
the unique requirements of. Agency programs. Therefore the
standards coordination process became involved, lengthy, and
ultimately frustrating. In defense of the operating officials,
however, these initial standards were often superficial and
heavily tied into organizational position. locations (Branch,
Section, Division Chiefs) rather than reflecting a full summa-
tion of the characteristics and complexities of duties and
responsibilities involved at various grade levels.
The CWD officials also recognized some of these inade-
quacies. In order to rectify them, they proposed a more
detailed job analysis program that would provide as an end
product job standards reflecting a systematic and easily com-
parable set of attributes or factors for each level of work.
To this end there was evolved a long and repetitive position
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description format that required not only a.laborious recita-
tion on duties to be performed but-also deE:-ailed information
on several additional factors over and above classification
requirements. It was assumed that such a position description
would serve as a multifaceted administrative document that
would meet the needs of classification., recruitment, placement,
training, and career development. At a high manpower cost,
this type of approach prevailed for several years; but the ex-
pectations for its multipurpose uses were never fulfilled. In
reality, once a position description was analyzed and classified,
probably no one but an individual classifier ever saw it again.
Another important phase of the Agency classification
standards program was the development of the Agency.Occupa-
tional Handbook.* The objective was to promulgate an occupa-
tional coding structure that could provide a realistic coding
scheme for Agency positions. For example, under the Civil
Service occupational structure many Agency positions. would have
been coded to a single code (0132) for Intelligence Research
* Some initial efforts were undertaken to develop a Handbook
uniquely CIA. Since much Federal occupational research had
been successfully completed by the CSC, however, it was admin-
istratively decided by the C/CWD that the Agency should "build"
its on occupational handbook retaining the CSC Schematic
Occupational Outline.
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that was so broadly defined as to include all intelligence activ-
ities under Civil Service. The problem to bue resolved was to
develop a coding outline that would be sufficiently flexible
to provide reasonable groupings of positions by educational
and skill requirements for all of the Agency's intelligence
specializations. In view of these Agency requirements, it was
determined that as a matter of policy the Agency would use the
Civil Service occupational groupings and retain the intelligence
research code (0132) for overt intelligence collection and
research fields. Also adopted was an "open" series 0136 for
covert intelligence collection and operational endeavors pri-
marily located in the Clandestine Service. Additionally,
intelligence officer positions requiring other more.orthodox
disciplines were coded to recognized disciplines -- for example,
1.0. (Electronics Engineer) to the GS-0855 (the CSC Code) as
a means of "crossing over" to discipline codings found in other'
Federal occupational plans. As of this writing (1971), this
flexible coding structure still exists as a framework of the
occupational breakdown for all Agency positions.
It is a truism that the development of realistic
position classification standards requires the full assistance
of knowledgeable professionals working in the occupational
area. In accord with this philosophy the C/C41D requested the
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25X1A
participation of Clandestine Service (CS) careerists in the
development of position classification standards for the opera-
tions officers. It was his idea to exploit the expertise and
knowledge of these Agency specialists who claimed to know all
there was to know about operations. Thus the development of
these particular standards might be described as a "frontal"
attack on the CS officials who repeatedly confronted the posi-
tion classifiers with "you fellows really know nothing about
what is important in a Case Officer or Psychological Warfare
Officer position ... we are really the only ones that know and
understand what is required for full performance of the job(s)."
In an all-out effort to gain the desired occupational
information, a detailed and comprehensive questionnaire that
covered all of the clandestine operations of the Plans Direc-
torate was developed. The questionnaire was focused on deter-
mining what duties (or tasks) were important and what degrees
(levels) of difficulty attended each and every one of the
functional areas
Mr. Harrison G. Reynolds, the Director of. Personnel,
fully supported this program; and he personally got the DDP
to approve the circulation of this questionnaire to all DDP
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25X1A
headquarters branch and staff chiefs as well as other senior
CS officials. Cooperation on this fact-finding phase was ex-
cellent, with the majority of these questionnaires completed
and returned to the C/CWD promptly. The next step involved an
analysis and collation of these data in an attempt to ascertain
the consensus of opinion on the levels of difficulty for various
duties or tasks. Unfortunately, it appeared that there was no
more agreement among the DDP officials than there had been
between those officials and the position classifiers.16 Each
officer appeared to be the victim of his own environment,
largely relating his own- work experience to the problem. So
in a subjective mood each officer classified as the most dif-
ficult those assignments or tasks that had presented him his
-greatest personal challenges. Because there was no uniformity
among DDP professionals, the experiment ended up as something
less than a complete success. The standards construction work
proceeded under difficult circumstances, of course. Utilizing
this information as best they could, the standards writers --
without coordination -- developed a CIA Operations Officer
(GS-136.00) standard that was published in 1955. Some time
then an Area Division Chief, had
cause to review this standard. His comment,-something less
than favorable, was this is an incredibly poor standard!"17
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On the more positive side, reasonably successful
standards were developed for various support and intelligence
research activities along both conventional and industrial
point-factor bases.* It should be noted that for a short while
placement officers were detailed to standards projects in an
effort to expedite standards production and also to assist in
the development of realistic qualifications requirements.
Although this use of placement officers was theoretically good,
in actual practice it merely presented additional personnel
and administrative problems that had to be resolved. For
example, a female placement officer refused such an assignment
when she found that she would need an SI clearance, stating
that she didn't look forward to working in a "locked door"
area. Another one (male) found that he really didn't have any
writing ability. A solution was found when several personnel
officer trainees (POT'S) became available for this type of work
and, in fact, performed exceptionally well. In retrospect,
although none of these "POT'S" knew the Agency well, they all
25X1A
* The writer, a former CWD Branch Chief with prior VA experi-
ence, has often been accused of installing the VA Public Work
Officer point-rating concept in the Agency expecially in evalu-
ating field supervisory positions -- i.e.,
Field Administration, and Finance support positions. Point factor
evaluation systems are particularly effective in quantitatively
discriminating between positions having similar responsibilities --
i.e., Chief, Finance Office in small, medium., and large field
station.
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were able to put to immediate use their university-developed
research skills in analyzing a multitude of--position data and
drafting CIA position standards. ,
Although the Standards Program remained as a separate
organizational entity in the CWD until 1957, standards produc-
tion vacillated as individual classifiers were detailed out to
assist in conducting position surveys. In May 1957 the Standards
Branch was abolished, and what few standards were developed were
accomplished by operating classifiers in the CWD branches. No
standards of any importance were produced after 1960.18 In
summary,' the standards program was started with considerable
enthusiasm, high hopes, and great expectations. Its success
was doomed, however, because its major mission was to attempt
to "brake" or stabilize the rapidly escalating grade structure
of the Agency. Agency management simply didn't want to accept
D. Classification Support to the New Directorates
All three of the Directorates needed immediate and
continuing classification support in order to define formally
their organizational structures and, more important, their
position classification patterns. Because each Directorate
had problems that were uniquely its own, even general classi-
fication support techniques and methods had to be tailored to
meet those demands.
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1. DDI Components
Many of the intelligence production program offi-
cials had had previous intelligence service, knew their fields
well (most often reinforced with brilliant academic backgrounds),
were verbal, and most of all -- were: reasonably familiar with
Federal acbninis'trative and personnel processes; and management
analysts and position classifiers found them easy to work with
in developing rational organizational structures and staffing
patterns in the early 1950's.*
In addition these intelligence research and production
activities were, by and large, located in the Washington, D. C.
area, and this made position classification support more readily
available. The Office of Operations
Division) were determined to be more overt than covert, however,
and on 1 March 1952 they were transferred from the Plans Direc-
torate to the Intelligence Directorate. In effect this changed
the DDI complex into a headquarters-field organization and in
The Deputy Director for Intelligence was established on
1 January 1952 with supervision over O/National Estimates,
O/Current Intelligence, O/Research & Reports, O/Scientific
Intelligence, O/Collection & Dissemination, O/Intelligence
Coordination, and (on 1 March 1952), O/Operations. It is
not intended to imply that upward recla,ssifi.cations were not
the order of the day as inter-agency representation respon-
sibilities increased in the Intelligence Directorate.
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25X1A
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so doing presented CHID classification problems that had to be
handled on a more overt basis.
Although most of the basic DDI office structuies
established in the early 1950fs have continued to this day,
some research programs developed sufficient status to warrant
independent status. The ORR, as it turned out, was the mother
organization for three such programs -- basic intelligence
became OBI, and the PI function exploded into a national center,
NPIC, and a CIA group, the Imagery Analysis Service. Classi-
fication support, of course, was required in connection with
all of these internal realignments and program expansions that
were geared to meet increasing requirements being levied by
the intelligence community.
Indeed, classification support ran the gamut in serv-
icing these offices. Overseas field surveys of staff, local
(native), and foreign national employees were undertaken; and
joint classification survey-position standards development
projects were accomplished, including many ventures that re-
quired SI and other exotic clearances for CBD staffers.
2. Plans Directorate
Although the merger of OSO and OPC into the DDP
was basically completed in mid-1951, it was not until the end
of 1952 that CWD personnel were able to put a "merged" Plans
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Directorate T/0 on the Agency books. As in'the other-direc-
torates, the basic organizational structure achieved during
those hectic days has survived and still prevails. This,
however, was not a true merger; perhaps it can best be described
as an amalgamation -- most area divisions insisted upon retaining
separate OSO and OPC functions. During these first several
years of program development, position classifiers were kept
busy handling both organizational changes and position upgrading
requests. Requests were extensive and came at a fast pace. For
example, from 1949 to 1955 the average position grade of the
DDP went from 8.7 to 9.9. In spite of this rise in average
grade, however, the DDP'ers were to become the Agency advocates
for a more flexible position classification and management
system than that provided by the Agency's independent classifi-
cation program -- which, unfortunately, continued to follow
somewhat inflexible CSC classification policies and procedures.
3. DDS Offices
In the early 1950's the major problem that Agency
position classification officers experienced with the DDA
offices revolved around the periodic grouping and regrouping
of functional responsibilities. Of course such activities
always involved new T/O submissions with realignments of ongoing
programs as well as the establishment of, or augmentation of
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others. By the mid.-fifties the DDS (name changed from,,DDA,
3 February 1955) offices had determined their formal organiza-
tional structures and, as it so happened, the next impt on
Support position classifications developed as the "covert"
operations began to levy their operational support requirements
on the DDS. Hardly anything remained quite the same after this
began -- payroll clerks began handling agent pay accounts,
25X1A
E. Classification of Secretarial Positions
An analysis of the work efforts of the personnel in
the CWD during the early 1950's revealed that there was a
great preoccupation with the audit and evaluation of secretarial
positions. Running a close second was the review of clerical
classifications. All told, approximately 60 percent of the
professional staff's time was spent on these activities. Ex-
perienced position classifiers found that the Agency secretarial
positions simply could not be evaluated against CSC standards*
nor could uniform in-house secretarial standards be developed..
The basic problem was that secretarial assignments varied
These emphasized several work elements not found in CIA --
types and levels of contacts with the public, preparation of
correspondence, and the like.
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considerably from career service to career service. There were
countless interviews and meetings concerned with secretarial
classifications. In fact certain Office Heads could be counted
upon to request periodically the upgrading of the secretarial
positions in their component-s -- especially those of their own
secretaries! The classification of positions occupied by the
"Gal Fridays" to Office Heads and Division Chiefs escalated to
GS-09 -- in some cases to GS-11 -- with others in hot pursuit.
In order to make some sense out of obvious chaos, the
Chief of the Position Evaluation Division (C/PED) proposed the
installation of the "grade attraction" theory for the allocation
of all Agency secretarial positions, a system that was approved
by the Deputy Directors in 1957.* This system related the grade
of the secretarial position to the grade and organizational
level of the position of the supervisor. For example, GS-15
officials warranted GS-07 secretaries and GS-18's were entitled
to GS-09 secretaries. The fallacies of this system are self-
evident and were bitterly assailed by many people. Admittedly
-x Interestingly enough, in 1964 the CSC was to partially accept
this grade attraction approach in its secretarial position
classification standards revision. The CSC, however, refined
its approach by including a variety of different levels of work
that could be performed by "Gal Fridays," which, upon evaluation,
meant that a GS-15's secretary position could be GS-05; GS-06,
or GS-07.
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it was not a fair system, but it was "a systematized way-of
distributing the inequities." On the other hand the former
approach was not any fairer either because it was the one who
cried longest and loudest who got his secretary's position
reclassified.
The installation of this secretarial classification
plan and the flexible Table of Organization concept, as dis-
cussed in Chapter IV, were probably the two elements that led.
in 1958 to the self-imposed reduction of the Position Evaluation
25X1 -Division's T/0 fro positions.
F. Position Classification Surveys
From time to'time Agency managers would request that
a complete position classification survey of their components
be undertaken. Usually the Director of Personnel and C/SLID
would agree; these survey results were most beneficial to both
management and personnel officers. In most cases earlier T/0
discussions resulted in "projected" position management as well
as position classification decisions that were subject to the
actual development of specific Agency programs and. operations..
Because most of these surveys took place a year or so after a
reorganization had taken place, the position classifiers were
able to note the impact of "organizational shake-dowms" on T/0
positions. Some positions exceeded expectations and others
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did not; but the surveys resulted in the defining and evaluating
of position management and position classification matters that
had been held in abeyance for lack of sufficient information
either about certain operations or about requirements. Not
only were the T/O.positions.completely documented and evaluated,
but also the position descriptions themselves were then avail-
able for other administrative and personnel processes such as
recruitment, assignment, career development, and so forth.
It should be noted that management was not. always
receptive to SWD survey findings -- especially those that
questioned the validity of the T/Q grades. In 1959, for ex-
ample, one of the most memorable position surveys took place.
This was the survey of the Records Integration Division of the
Clandestine Service. The RI Division had long been a source
of management anguish. In fact the DDS once referred to it as
a "sinkhole in which to put personnel ceiling."19
As in many organizations -- both industrial and
government -- the importance of records management responsi-
bilities was not recognized as early as it should have been.
This was also true in the Clandestine Service, which had inher-
ited all of the OSS foreign intelligence records and documents as
part of the CS records management responsibility. It was apparent
that there had been few, if any, clear-cut policy guidelines
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with respect to either CS or OSS records management. As a
matter of fact the RID operated pretty much on a day-to-day
operational basis under the aegis of a long-term supervisor.
Complicating the problem was the pressure exerted by many
officers in the several area divisions on the C/RID to retain
all records coming-into or originating in the CS.
Eventually, this records management dilemma was brought
to the attention of the DDP, who appointed
25X1A
to reorganize, systematize, and generally straighten out the
.RID mission and organizational structure. This he did. Under
his'direction%`-* the CS developed records management policies
for its foreign intelligence documents and also revised and
updated operating procedures. Of course the RID organization
also underwent internal realignment, and ultimately a new T/O
proposal was developed.
The key to the success of this reorganization, RID
claimed, was predicated upon Agency management's recognizing
the need for the professional analysis (rather than clerical)
of the wide variety of foreign intelligence documents being
accessed daily in RID. Stress was placed on the need for
* A senior Agency official who served successfully in several
capacities, not only in the CS but also in other directorates.
25X1A
** And later under that of a senior CS officer.
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professionals to do this analytical work, and to recruit them
RID would need higher grades for not only their analyst posi-
tions but also for their supervisory positions. Ultimately
these pleas bore fruit, and the RID positions were profession-
alized and placed on the RID T/0 subject to classification
review after these positions had been allowed to.function at
professional levels for a reasonable period.
When the RI Division was surveyed in the late fall
of 1959, a complete detailed comparison was made with similar
functions and positions in the FBI. By comparison with FBI
grade levels, it was found that the RID positions were severely
? overgraded, particularly the RI analyst positions. Of course
the SWD survey report itself contained a recommendation to
reduce the grades of the analyst positions-- a rather cata-
strophic proposal! This report was presented to Mr. Gordon M.
Stewart, the CIA Director of Personnel, for his review. His
first reaction was that SWD classifiers did not understand
clandestine intelligence operations and that comparisons with
FBI were unsound because the CS was vastly more complicated
and was unique. Mr. Stewart also took the position that there
was a definite need for college graduates to encumber the RI
analyst positions. To lower the grades would lower the quality
of the organization.
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The C/SVD advised Mr. Stewart that `the survey, findings
? 25X1A
did not indicate this nor did they indicate the need for college
graduates. Often wasted in such positions, many of them would
become disillusioned and would resign. The net result of this
exchange was that Mr. Stewart agreed to conduct personal inter-
views with the RI analysts. This he did; he spent a week,
half time, in interviewing RI personnel. His conclusion was
that many of these positions were not analytical nor did they
require college-trained individuals. With the D/Personnel`s
tacit backing, the report was, submitted to
25X1A
the Chief of Operational Services in.the DDP, and Mr. Mike
the Chief of RID.
]was decidedly unhappy
25X1A
with it (an understatement) and reached the conclusion that
.SWD staffers simply did not understand the-RI function. Be-
cause the survey results were so controversial -- they didn't
support the RI ideology -- the proposed downgradings were never
implemented.
Whether or not this survey caused it, through the
1960's there was a calm in the classification survey business
in headquarters. Although a few surveys, such as one for the
Office of Training, were attempted, the wide diversity of opinion
regarding the validity of classification surveys and the
disinclination of the Office of Personnel to insist on the
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implementation of the survey results made it " advisable _to dis-
continue the formal survey approach in Washington. Classifica-
tion changes were made through informal surveys or by individual
position classification actions.
By the early 1950fs it had become apparent that to have
an effective Agency position classification program it would be
necessary to conduct periodic reviews or surveys of not only
25X1A headquarters but also
?
field station posi-
tions. Apropos of this, the C/CWD discussed with the DDP the
-feasibility of position classifiers securing documentation of
representative CS field positions. Emphasis was placed upon
the desirability of surveying one of the larger of the CS field
25X1 A activities
amounted to a breakthrough in Personnel/Clandestine Service
25X1A relationships.came in 1952 with the DDP agreeing to a complete
classification survey of the
25X1A
posi-
tions. A team of three position classifiers surveyed not only
it turned out, the timing of this survey was providential in
view of the fact that it not only resulted in the securing of
complete position documentation (for the first time) of a major
CS field organization, but also, within a matter of a few months,
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such data were relied upon quite heavily when the DDP had to
sentatives of the classification program surveyed CS
This survey disclosed the benefits and constructive
assistance in position and personnel management that could be
gained without risk to cover or security. Access was subse-
quently granted to all Agency field operations and activities
for position classification surveying. From 1952 to 1967 repre-
Surveys are usually accomplished by TDY assignments
of classification officers, who are received and treated as
personnel experts by field officers. Being away from head-
quarters, these field officers are most appreciative of the
position management and position classification advice that is
available on the spot. Although position classification survey
techniques are alike for both departmental and field organi-
zations, the impact of the isolation factor (from staff spe-
cialists) on field personnel tends to make field surveys also
more rewarding to the position classifiers. Their advice is
sought not only on such items as position classification
patterns and problems but also on organizational structure,
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functional alignment, span of control, and organizational
nomenclature.
During this fifteen-year period (1952-67), survey
classifiers have found all types of problems, such as those
associated with establishing a new field organization, the
problems of integrating two or more "local" programs, the
redefining of geographical areas of responsibility and the
restructuring of the supportive organization, the relocating
of Agency facilities because of internal uprisings in a host
country, and others. Among the more important of the field
surveys, the following should be noted:
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In addition the highlights of an early 1970 survey of
several overseas activities of the Office of Communications
are summarized in a PMCD/OP position classification report in
Appendix B.
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G. Classification Support for Project T /O Proposals
Certainly an activity atypical of Federal position
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classification programs would be the staff support provided by
classifiers to Agency officials in the establishment of clan-
destine projects. Byway of explanation, some Agency operations
are established as "projects" (in contrast to continuing programs)
because they are usually of short duration -- "one-shot" opera-
tions required by the limited time available for the project's
source output or target area. O~ paramount importance are the
sensitivity and security surrounding such operations, particu-
larly where Agency association cannot be shown. For these
reasons nonofficial. cover arrangements must be developed so
that the project has a reasonably good chance of accomplishing
its primary objective.
Originally all project plans developed by Clandestine
Service components had to be submitted to the Agency Project
Review Committee*20 for administrative approval before any
operation could be undertaken. These sensitive proposals would
include detailed operational plans in support of primary and
secondary objectives and supportive administrative plans
25X1 A * the
revised procedure requires approval of the ExDir, the DDS,
and the DD concerned.
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requesting specific allocations of unvouchered funds andlist-
ings of types and employment categories of necessary manpower,
required position categories, equipment needs, and. so forth.
Although both types of plans were important, usually
the operational plan was submitted first for PRC approval.
Upon approval, the administrative plan, if not already developed,
would be developed in detail and submitted through administra-
tive channels to the DDS/SSA,-the Chief of the Management Staff,
and C/CWD/OP. C/C\A 's responsibility was to review the proposed
T/O in terms of the soundness of requested position structure
and grades (or salaries).* Frequently discussions would have
to be held with operating officials in order to clarify parameters
of unique position requirements. Upon completion of the classi-
fication and management review, the Project T/O would be approved
and issued to DDP and DDS components that had a "need to know."
In this regard the C/CWD had assigned the primary responsibility
for the review of T/O proposals to one of the classification
officers who also had the responsibility for maintaining all
project information in a restricted, secure area.- Although
under normal conditions this officer discussed his recommendations
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with, and secured the concurrences of,'his branch and division
chiefs, occasionally there were highly sensi-tive projects; and
in these cases the officer might be instructed to report, his
recommendations directly to the Director of Personnel.*
Some projects were extended or expanded. For those
the Project T/0 was renewed by being subjected to the same pro-
cessing as for new projects.
The importance of this classification review cannot be
overemphasized. The nature of nonofficial cover arrangements
certainly required that project positions and salaries be in
general alignment with those in the'industrial sector. Second,
not only was there the initial resolution of salaries for proj-
ect workers but also the control of project pay administration
could vacillate. between organizational hands and those of
"contract" project administrators. Poor project administration
certainly created additional administrative headaches for the
CWD project officer-** who might be called upon, for example,
to realign a project's pay structure that had gotten out of
whack through illadvised promotions and pay adjustments.
* The `need to know" security principle. could play havoc with
25X1 A standard administrative arrangements!
this pose ion.
has been the long-term incumbent of
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H. Wage Administration and Pay Administration
Another highly specialized field is Wage Administration.
Unlike the Federal position classification system, which relates
to positions in the professional, administrative, technical,
and clerical fields, wage administration is involved in the
classification and establishment of wage rates for "blue-collar'"
(crafts) positions in industry, business, and the government
throughout the United States and abroad. One major distinction
is the close association of "established" rates in a -given area
where craft work is performed. Other important evaluative
factors include the "effect of working conditions" and "nature
of items handled," both of which must be considered as part of
the analytical process in wage administration programs.
Wage administration also differs from Federal position
classification in that rates are adjusted periodically on the
basis of a combined wage study conducted by representatives of
those Federal agencies having the largest number of employees
under prevailing wage schedules. Thus in most instances, blue-
collar wage schedules are adjusted annually on a geographical
basis. Before 1970 the Congress approved pay legislation for
white-collar (Classification Act) workers sporadically. Because
of legislative delays, many pay increases were inadequate;
spiralling costs of living had continued to rise during,the
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time required to secure Congressional approval of such pay
measures. By transferring the pay-fixing authority to the
President, the 1970 Federal employees pay legislation altered
the political overtones of this Congressional control over the
classification act pay plan .for white-collar workers. Under
this legislation the President must respond annually as the
cost-of-living index goes up. Such pay determinations will
affect Federal workers located throughout the United States
and overseas.
Returning to the wage administration process, it in-
volves a very detailed analysis of not only all the job factors
but also specific training and experience requirements that are
most easily related to apprenticeship programs. In departments
having large blue-collar operations, the evaluative process
is lessened by the fact that a great many job requirements have
been "standardized" -- for example, journeyman printer, 3rd-year
electrician apprentice -- and thus become more easily evaluated.
Second, because the pay rates are also "pegged" at union-recog-
nized journeyman and apprentice levels, larger Federal organi-
zations have relatively fewer wage administration problems than
does the Agency.
It is true that the Agency has the authority to set
pay rates administratively for all of its employees.21 The
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DCI, however, determined that Agency policy-would be to adopt
and follow the pay plan of the Classification Act for its GS
employees. Equally -vr_'Lse was the policy decision to adapt
administratively those blue-collar.wage schedules developed by
larger Federal agencies, leaving -- in a residual sense -- the
responsibility to the Position Management and Compensation
Division (PMCD) to establish additional schedules that might
be required for special categories of personnel, such as
0
foreign nationals. Of course the degree of success that the
Agency had in using schedules rested entirely upon the PMCD
evaluation of Agency crafts positions -- a most complicated
matter.
Clandestine operations can, and do, levy unique re-
quirements upon support positions -- even the blue-collar ones.*
Second, at its peak the Agency itself could never be described
as more than a medium-size organization. Furthermore, although
there were often many unusual job requirements levied, when they
were sifted out and down to the worker levels there was a
"Duke's mixture" of sometimes unrelated requirements with only
* Although this section stresses the uniqueness of Agency wage
administration problems, in those cases where Agency blue-collar
positions are reasonably comparable to other-similar Federal
positions -- for example, bus driver or chauffeur -- thp- pay
rates follow those in the wage schedules.
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a very small number of artisans and craftsmen to meet them.
Thus over the years some jobs have just "grown like Topsy" in
order to furnish support to Agency operations. "Mixed,;` rather
than pure,-crafts jobs, therefore, are typical in the Agency.
Some mixed positions resulted from operational necessity -- an
inadequate number of overseas support positions, forcing the
incumbents to double-in-brass in two or three occupational
fields. If the Agency has a printer-engraver position, for
example, neither the printer nor the engraver rate alone will.
suffice. Instead, a combination rate that would be unique to
this Agency and possibly to a singleton position must be
established.
Other craft assignments might require individual per-
formance of unannounced (to either the craft union or public)
newly developed in-house techniques. Thus the wage adminis-
tration analyst must develop an evaluated rate in terms of
these particular Agency requirements. Again, this rate would
be unique to CIA. Another assignment might involve individual
exploitation of an artisan's skills without the benefit of
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In the Agency, wage administration activities were not
necessarily limited to blue-collar jobs.
Responsibility for Wage Administration wage schedule
development overseas usually rested with the Federal organiza-
tion that employed the largest number of natives in labor and
crafts jobs within a particular geographic area. Wage rates
were based upon the local "going" rates for such work, and
schedules were prepared by either Department of State or DOD
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rate" but rather on "the prevailing rate of the recruitment area."
How does this work out? An excellent example would be how the
It is interesting to note that
schedules are not based upon the "local prevailing
25X1 A become the
recruitment area for such personnel. Therefore
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With such a variety of wage administration activities,
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it is not unusual for the wage administration analysts to get
internal inquiries such as "What is the hourly rate for jour-
neymen tailors in
(USA)?" From this type of inquiry,
area?" What's up? Probably GSI (a quasi-public organization
that holds the Agency contract for operating the cafeterias at
I I
appropriate for their food servers there, and its pay adjustment
decision would be based upon PMCD survey findings.*
In summary, then, it cannot be overstressed that
because of the variety of Agency pay plans and employment
categories not found in other Federal agencies, the C/PMCD -- as
the Agency pay authority often'deals in many "gray" adminis-
trative areas in resolving wage or pay problems for the Agency.
senior wage administration analyst,
provided much of the technical detail reflected in this section.
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III. Position Management of Agency Executive Positions
There are two opposing but, in a sense, complementary
position classification theories. One is the "top-down" ap-
proach which involves "pegging" (evaluating) initially the
position levels of the top executives and then classifying
the balance of the organization's positions working down the
organizational structure. The other approach is sometimes
referred to as the "bottom-up" technique. Classification of
the lowest level of work is accomplished first, and the organi-
zational classification pattern is built upward grade level by
grade level. The systems work equally well, with the classifi-
cation approach largely determined by the sense of urgency of
management. In a new organization, for example, one might
wish to recruit and staff the top positions first; or, in the
case of an ongoing organization, to clarify and/or strengthen
worker-level positions initially, leaving the evaluation of
supervisory and program-director positions to the end.
As it happened, a. series of external factors culminated in
the passage of the Classification Act of 1949, which helped to
determine the position classification philosophy the new classi-
fication program administrators were to follow -- "top-down" or.
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"bottom-up." By way of background, Federal classification
experience both in World War II and the postwar period had
revealed that the Federal position classification system devel-
oped in 1923, with its fifteen grade levels for administrative
work, was inadequate for the-new nationwide Federal programs
and supporting organizations that had become phenomena of the
l91+0's. The CSC found itself approving several layers of
GS-15 "plus" positions in both wartime and economic readjustment
programs. Partially in recognition of this the Classification
Act of 1949 provided eighteen grade levels with the upper three
levels reserved for top Federal positions of outstanding program
and policy timber. Congressional limitations were set, however,
by the establishment of a 400 "super.grade" quota for the Execu-
tive Branch, with the CSC responsible for allocating and ap-
proving these executive or supergrade positions. Thus in the
fall of 19+9 all Federal organizations were busy developing
detailed position descriptions and supergrade justifications
for their key executive and program-director positions.
As mentioned earlier., the Agency had already sought and
received an affirmation from the CSC 22 to the effect that the
CIA Enabling Act (PL 110) had sufficiently broad authorities to
exempt the Agency from the jurisdiction of the Classification
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Act of 1923 as administered by the CSC.* Further, as of
28 October 1949, the day that President Truman signed the Clas-
sification Act of 19149, the Agency sought from the Comptroller
General of the United States a financial policy interpretation
of this new act in relationship to the DCI`s authority under
PL 110 to (1) classify its own executive positions to the
GS-16 through the GS-18 levels without regard to the numerical
limitations in the pending Classification Act, and (2) pay
Agency executives assigned to these positions similar salaries.
.When the Comptroller General advised 23 the DCI that he did
indeed have sufficient authority under PL 110 to do so, it
seemed only prudent that the CIA classification experts address
themselves to the classification evaluation of CIA executive
positions.
Although the Agency was specifically exempt, the impact
of the Classification Act was -- ironically -- to be felt
almost immediately. Probably the most important piece of new
business for the Classification and Wage Division in its new
unshackled role was to prepare for the DCI's approval the
Office of Personnel recommendations on the most important
* The Classification Act of 19149 specifically exempted CIA
in consonance with the earlier administrative decision of the
Commissioners.
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Agency executive positions worthy of supergi?a.de status. Pos-
sibly in a "feeling-one's-way" mood, the Classification and
Wage Division recommended, with the concurrence of the-Director
of Personnel, that 26 Agency positions be reclassified higher.*24
Unfortunately the record is not clear why Admiral Hillenkoetter
approved only nineteen supergrade position classifications to
become effective on 1 January 1950.25 Interestingly enough,
the incumbents of these supergrade positions -- mainly intel-
ligence production and support officers -- were unexpectedly
given Christmas presents when the DCI advanced the effective
date of their promotions from 1 January 1950 to 25 December
19-9.26
Although the initial number (19) of executive-positions
recognized may have been on'the conservative side, as the Agency
programs and organizational structure became more defined the
number of executive positions increased rapidly. Probably the
choice of the verb "increase" is poor; by 26 December 1951 --
two years later -- the number of Agency supergrades had skyrock-
25X9 eted to II (At the same time, the rest of the Executive
25X1
0
quota plus an additional 25X1
supergrades that Congress had approved for those agencies
x- In addition to three P-9 scientific positions authorized
under PL 110.
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supporting programs under the Defense Production Act of 1950.)
By 18 July 1952 the Agency had approved
[supergrade positions 25X1
and Bureau of the Budget officials had informally cautioned
the Agency that this number appeared to be "proportionally
excessive ... further,. the Agency should be cautious about
any over-grading."27
The administrative response to the BOB criticism, and
to possible future Congressional criticism, was the estab-
lishment of better internal controls and an administrative
mechanism for processing supergrade position requests. The
DDA proposed to the DCI that:28
a. the Agency establish a supergrade ceiling of F
positions (one percent of the total employee population)
in recognition of the importance of the Agency's missions;
b. a formal procedure be established for considering
supergrade requests which would involve the full documen-
tation and classification evaluation of supergrade re-
quests by the Classification and Wage Division;
c. a board (subsequently titled the Review Board) be
established to review justifications for supergrades
with membership to include the Assistant Director (Per-
sonnel) as Chairman, the Comptroller, and designated
representatives of the three Deputy Directors; and
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d. that the DCI review and approve all actions in-
volving the supergrade requests.
As soon as the DCI approved the DDA's memorandum on
standardizing the administration of Agency supergrades, this
newly established Review Board 29 attacked its responsibilities
with gusto and proceeded to implement a new "planning" concept
on Agency supergrade positions. The Review Board, in effect,
decided to consider new supergrade proposals as part of an
individual component's future expansion plans. Furthermore
.if specific supergrade proposals did not involve personnel
assignments to the executive level, the Chairman of the Review
Board would direct the Chief of the Classification and Wage
Division to place such positions on appropriate tables of
organization. Under this procedure, only supergrade actions
involving personnel movements were forwarded to the DCI. As
a result the C/C WD had to devise a complex record-keeping
system to reflect both DCI supergrade personnel apprdvals and
"interim" supergrade position approvals made by the Review
Board. Under this practice the number of Agency supergrade
positions reflected on the Agency tables of organization
0
by 15 November 1954 with incumbents totalling
Meanwhile the Agency began to settle down under a gener-
ally acceptable organizational form; and management realized
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that with the tremendous growth of the Agenoy it was time to
formalize further the "rules of the road" for better admin-
Supergrade Positions for the 1953-55 period 30 clearly delin-
eated changes in Agency policy, responsibilities, and procedures
for the assignment of employees to supergrades. In the final
analysis, however, the administrative procedure for handling
such actions was not formalized until about a year after the
establishment of the Supergrade Review Board in February 1954.
With the DDCI as Chairman and the several Deputy Directors and
the-Director of Personnel. as members, the following practices
were instituted:
a. The DCI would determine the number of Agency
supergrade positions.'
b. The Supergrade Review Board would recommend to
the DCI appropriate disposition of all actions affecting
employees in the supergrade classifications.
c. All newly appointed supergrade officers would
hold the rank and pay of their positions in a temporary
status for such time as the DCI might determine.
d. An annual review of the performance of all
supergraded officials in a temporary status would be
conducted by the Board, which would then recommend
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to the DCI whether or not permanent tenure should be
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granted.
Unfortunately the
to the Supergrade Review Board neither guidelines nor criteria
to assist that body in making position management decisions as
to the appropriateness of newly proposed Agency executive posi-
tions, the basis for recommending that the Agency supergrade
position and personnel ceilings be increased, or any systematized
approach for the internal distribution of such positions among
the Agency's various programs. Because of this the number of
executive positions and officers slowly increased without any
clear-cut, overall administrative frame of reference. In early
1955, however, the C/CWD prepared a staff study in which he
offered "guidelines of a sort" for the management of the Agency's
supergrade positions.31 This proposal recommended that an
Agency supergrade ceiling be based upon a composite supergrade
ratio (total number in the employee population compared with
the number and levels of-supergrade positions approved) of the
Department of State, Foreign Operations Administration, Atomic
Energy Commission, and the US Information Agency. This approach
would provide a sound and defensible basis for establishing and
periodically adjusting the CIA supergrade authorization. Sec-
ond, the Agency supergrade authorization would be distributed
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among Agency components in the light of personnel ceilings and
the number of GS-l3 through GS-15 positions authorized for each.
Under this philosophy the Agency supergrade ceiling would have
25X1 been set
with component ceilings adjusted in accordance
with the number of senior officer (GS-1315) positions as well
as total employee ceilings in each.
At its meeting of 2 June 1955 32 the Supergrade Review
Board bought this proposal and recommended that the DCI approve
it. The DCI later approved it, subject to the informal concur-
rence of the BOB -- standard practice by that time. Neither the
issuance of an Agency regulation nor the adoption of this policy
that set the Agency supergrade.ceiling on the basis of averaging
the supergrade ratios of several foreign affairs and security
organizations were to provide the solution to a major adminis-
trative problem.
Except for the initial 19 key positions selected for
supergrade recognition and established by Rear Admiral Hillen-
koetter, Agency supergrade positions had been considered on an
individual, one-at-a-time basis. As a result the Agency's
executive management structure had developed in a haphazard,
piecemeal fashion. Because of this, not enough attention had
been given to defining, at any period in time,-the total
supergrade requirements of the Agency. Furthermore, the
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Supergrade Review Board had rarely sought classification _ advice
and assistance on supergrade proposals; the result was that
there had not been sufficient classification evaluations to
assure that there was at least internal consistency in and
among the several directorates.*
Thus in the winter of 1955-56 the ball was thrown to
the Office of Personnel. to develop an Agency supergrade position
management plan that would be more in line with the approaches
being used elsewhere in the Executive Branch and would thereby
.also be more acceptable to the BOB. With the concurrence of
the'Director of Personnel, the Chief of the Position Evaluation
Division analyzed the Agency supergrade problem from the
standpoint of developing a systematic plan for the orderly
establishment and comparison of Agency executive positions.
By mid-1956 there had been developed a supergrade factor-
comparison plan that used industrial classification techniques
and stressed four factors -- executive skills, responsibilities,
decisions, and commitment authority.** Gradations of each of
In an October 1955 discussion between representatives of CIA
and the BOB, it was pointed out that the Agency should establish
its supergrades by classifying the positions rather than following
a ratio with other agencies, as had been the practice.33
For the reader unfamiliar with executive position classifi-
cation plans, a copy of the CIA Factor Comparison Job Evaluation
Plan for Supergrade Positions, 2 May 1956, has been included as
Appendix C.
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these factors was done numerically with "bcyachmark" (represent-
ative) positions identified by an Agency committee that was also
responsible.for assigning weights and values to each factor for
each benchmark position. Although the classical approach to
developing a job classification plan was undertaken by identi-
fying Agency benchmark positions, the task of assigning various
weights as measures of the relative importance of each factor
became a stumbling block.34 After considerable effort, however,
the committee did complete this chore; the benchmark positions
were scored, and appropriate cutoff points between each grade
were made. Because the committee had included GS-15 positions
in their evaluation -- to identify a breakoff point where
supergrade positions would begin -- these positions, along with
all of the supergrade positions, were subjected to a "trial
evaluation." Naturally it took several trial-and-error com-
mittee efforts before the final adjustments could be made to
the point values for each factor for each grade level. Once
accomplished, however, all of the supergrade and GS-15 positions
were evaluated and scored under this new system. All told, this
Office of Personnel study took eighteen months to complete. The
Supergrade Review Board not only approved this Agency-wide
supergrade study but also strongly recommended that General
Cabell, as Chairman of the SRB, submit the study (which also
supported the reclassification of a number of GS-l5 positions
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to mark the demise of the factor-evaluation=plan used to evaluate
and maintain internal consistency in Agencysupergrade position
classifications. Conservatism and consistency in the management
of executive positions were to become passe' as the Agency moved
into the 1960's.
In the early 1960's a great deal of pressure developed in.
all Agency components to expand the supergrade structure. The
Clandestine Service particularly pointed to the inflated per-
sonnel profile of the Foreign Service -- perhaps justly because
the Department had a large number of FSO l's and FSO 2's
(generally comparable to GS-17 and GS-16) as well as Career
'Minister and Ambassador positions at even higher salary levels.
Of course the CS clarion call also pointed out that-the CS
Chiefs-of-Station positions overseas were often more responsible
ones than many of the FSO positions that were pegged. at these
higher FS salary levels; and. the call came through loud and
clear.
Similarly, Support and Intelligence Directorate officials
appeared to question the appropriateness of the number and levels
of their supergrade quotas. As a result of this overwhelming
demand for additional supergrade positions throughout the
Agency, the numerical-point factor-evaluation system developed
in 1956 had to be abandoned.39 As more and more supergrade
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positions were approved, many of the "bench_marked" GS-15-
positions were swept into the supergrade levels, and the
supergrade structure itself was so markedly changed that it
was impossible to continue rationally the point-rating system
as originally developed. Position descriptions continued to
be written in a factor analysis style, but a general compara-
tive evaluation approach* was substituted for the point-rating
system.
According to the Director of Personnel's memorandum of
20 July 1962,x+0 the Agency supergrade authorization
approved by the DCI on l4 May 1959 would no longer meet new
supergrade position requirements. A comprehensive review in
the spring of 1962 had resulted in a recommendation for a very
substantial increase in the number of supergrade positions
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that would be "necessary to recognize more adequately
the unique and difficult responsibilities of key Agency officials
and to make the Agency's salary structure more competitive with
those of other Federal organizations such as the Foreign Service
of the Department of State, the Agency for International De-
velopment,.the Atomic Energy Commission and the United States
Information Agency."
Simply stated, positions were .ranked by order of responsi-
bility and difficulty within the concerned Directorate and, when
appropriate, comparisons were made across directorate lines.
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The Agency positions that the Deputy Directors and other
key Agency officials recommended for elevation to supergrade
Chiefs of major branches in, DDP Area Divisions.
Chiefs of Support in largest and most complex DDP
Area Divisions.
Newly established key positions under the DD/Research.
Key positions in the Office of.Communications.
Senior level positions in various DDI and DDS
components.
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As a new feature this proposal also provided for 30 reserve
allocations that would be available to meet special requirements
of the Offices of the DCI, DDI, and DDP. This reserve position
proposal was based upon these administrative considerations:
(Available for the creation of
such new positions as the DCI
might wish to establish.)
(To compensate for loss of per-
sonnel on rotation or home leave;
to permit recognition of the out-
standing contributions of some
senior case officers.)
(To assist in the recruitment and
retention of outstanding special-
ists in nonexecutive capacities by
raising the potential for their
career progression and enhancing
the Agency's competitive position
in the market for experts in the
various disciplines.)
This unique supergrade proposal was formally approved by
Lieutenant General Carter, who was Acting DCI, on 25 August 1962.
411 As was the custom, Mr. David E. Bell, the Director of the
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Bureau of the Budget, was advised of this aetion,L2 anal of
course "all hell broke out." In his letter`of 28 August 1962
to the DCI,43 Mr. Bell stated that "this 90% increase above
your existing total of supergrades.comes as a distinct shock,
particularly as it is unaccompanied by any supporting data or
analysis." Mr. Bell also indicated that. the Agency's timing
was extremely poor in view of the fact that the President was
endeavoring to secure Congressional acceptance of the Federal
Salary Reform Act of 1962.- Certainly within his prerogative,
Mr. Bell requested that the Agency defer further implementation
of this action until the Bureau had a chance to examine the
Agency's analysis in the light of whatever legislation would
be enacted by Congress in response to the President's pay
reform proposal. Because this was a request from the Presi-
dent's chief budget advisor, it was administratively unthinkable
for the DCI not to agree. And so the DCI concurred with an
interim moratorium. 4),
After several exchanges, however, Mr. Robert Amory, Chief
of the International Division of the Bureau of the Budget,**
Pay comparability of Federal executives (GS-1 and above)
with those in the industrial sector was one of its prime goals.
** Mr. Amory was DDI from 1 May 1953 to 15 April 1962: As
events turned out, it was providential- that the Agency had a
"friend in court."
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and Scientific Pa rX- categories.1~7 BOB officials had informally
advised the DCI, however, that the
limitation established
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in 1962 should be retained and must embrace all Executive Pay,
Supergrade, and Scientific Pay positions. A rapid calculation
showed that this left the Agency with headroom for only 27
promotions or appointments at these levels. What impact did
this BOB decision have? Naturally it became the impetus for
the Director of Personnel** to suggest, undertake, and direct
a survey of the Agency's outstanding requirements for supergrade
and scientific pay positions.
While this position classification survey was underway,
Agency officials put their heads together in an attempt to
develop a "reasoned" approach to the resolution of this
* Originally, Scientific Pay Schedule positions were author-
ized under PL 313 (dated 1 August 1947) for recruitment and
retention of scientific and engineering specialists in DOD
programs. In April 1963 CIA adopted a SPS following CSC and
Congressional Pay guidelines -- SPS 16's/18's could not be paid
less than the initial step of GS-16 or more than GS-18 pay or,
monetarily speaking, $16,000 to $20,000. Although some may have
had executive talents, their salary levels were.based upon what
their scientific or engineering talents could command elsewhere.
For a detailed historical statement on the CIA personnel manage-
ment and pay administration system for personnel assigned to
selected scientific positions, see Appendix D.
-X The Supergrade Review Board was abolished, and. the coordina-
tion responsibility for all supergrade actions.was transferred
to the. D/Pers I-- I 25X1 A
31 August l96 .
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be better justified by relating them to Agency programs de-
tailed in the CIA planning-programming-budgeting submission.
Following this approach, on 30 July 1969 the BOB approyed a
new supergrade ceiling of =and a scientific pay ceiling of
F-Ithrough FY 1973.5
In summary, the Chief of PMCD serves as a staff advisor
to the Director of Personnel on the appropriateness of the
classifications of Agency supergrade and senior scientific
positions and, from a position management standpoint, the
,number and distribution of the Agency's executive positions.
He 'also insures that administrative considerations include the
impact of proposed actions on the Agency ceiling for GS-l4
through GS-18 positions, the Agency average position grade,
and related personnel accountings.*
Appendix E is a position and personnel statistical summary
report reflecting approved Agency senior-level positions and
personnel during the period 1951-69. Variances in personnel
accountings in this report and personnel ceilings cited in this
narrative can be accounted for by acknowledging the Executive
Director-Comptroller's policy of approving supergrade promotions
for deserving individuals whether or not such actions would
exceed the Agency supergrade ceiling. Administrative justifi-
cations were based on several factors, such as pending retire-
ments, proposed ceiling increases under discussion with BOB
officials, and the like.
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IV. Meeting Agency "Flexibility" Requirements
A. Manpower Control System
From our own point of view our greatest single handi-
cap, apart from managerial inexperience which is slowly
being remedied, is the rigidity of the slotting system.
The Agency's principal concern with slotting in any single
component is the maintenance of the overall ceiling; it
cannot be with the precise, permanent job description,
grade, etc., of each individual slot, as might be possible
in a stable situation or in an agency whose job remains
fixed from year to year. In this Agency the nature and
size of the job change so rapidly that no-T/O can ever
be up-to-date.. Operating within a fixed but out-of-date
T/O we are forced into compromises w rhich overwork manpower
in one place and waste it in another and altogether do not
get the job done. What we need in the Clandestine Serv-
ices is flexibility within a total strength figure, so
that slots can be shifted as the need changes. Making
these shifts, which arise from operational necessity,
should be an operational function, not an administrative.
It should be within the power of this Office, not DDS,
Director of Personnel, or other officers, to control the
distribution of his manpower within the ceilings allotted
to him. If we could shift slots immediately according to
need we would not only-do our operational job better; we
would also improve our personnel management, in assign-
ments, in career development, even in initial recruitment.
So responded Mr. Frank G. Wisner,.DDP, to the ten-point
program for improving CIA personnel management that was advanced
by the Inspector General in 1955.5141The DDP's complaint was caused by a change in policy.on the
development of T/0`s within the Agency. In the early fifties --
probably because of the use of T/0`s as planning documents --
there were projections of Agency requirements for the Korean
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episode that far exceeded actual demands. For example, on
31 December 1952 there wereli'/0 positions while the
personnel ceiling wasL_____1for staff civilian employees and
assigned military personnel. This enormous disparity allowed
operating officials wide latitude for flexibility in obligating
(by recruitment or promotion) whatever positions, they wished.
If a person's promotion was desired and his specific
position would not accommodate an upgrading, the individual
was merely shifted to another position that would allow the
promotion and it would be made with "no questions asked." In
July 195+ the DCI requested the Assistant Director for Personnel
to prepare a Directive that would state a goal for reducing
T/0 positions to ceiling figures. This was done promptly 55
and, interestingly enough, this announcement set in concrete
an administrative policy that has been continued since.
This 195+ policy change caused a sizable reduction in
the actual number of T/0 positions and also removed much of
the flexibility heretofore enjoyed by operating personnel.
Unfortunately it was, in effect, a return to the Civil Service
approach. When an individual was to be shifted or promoted,
it often required a Tb0 change, which was always time-consuming.
Any delay was frustrating, of course, to operating personnel.
In an attempt to gain greater control over Agency positions,
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Chief of the Management Staff, came forth
in early 1955 with his Man-in-Motion concept. Under this
industrial manpower control system, productive workers ;were
isolated, in a personnel accounting sense, from the nonproduc-
tive ones. Productive people were those on the job or, stating
it another way, were gainfully employed. Nonproductive per-
sonnel were those in training, between assignments, in travel
status, and so forth. From this came the term "Staffing Com-
plement," which was to reflect the actual work or man-years
production requirements of the Agency. This complement would
reflect the assignment of productive workers, whereas the
",Development Complement" would be the vehicle into which
nonproductive personnel would be placed. Behind this whole
concept was an endeavor to not only determine the total ceiling
needed to actually perform the work requirements levied upon
the Agency but also to ascertain how much additional ceiling
was needed to accommodate the large number of personnel in
in-house and external training, in official travel status,
or in rotation between headquarters and field assignments
involving home and vacation leave periods.
As part. of this plan ttempted to introduce
an element of flexibility whereby operating officials could
administratively move positions from one organizational
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component to another in order to meet changing workload con-
ditions. On 28 March 1955 this plan was submitted to the DDS,
who approved it in principle and directed initial coordination
with the Office of Personnel and the Comptroller.56 When
plan was presented to the Director of Personnel
for his review, he immediately sought the technical assistance
and advice of the C/PED. The PED review, of course, was
designed to insure that not only the position classification
program would be operable but also that various legal and
administrative aspects of personnel administration were not
lost in a new sea of red tape. It soon became apparent that
the proposed authority for the operating officials to move
positions freely would cause an unwieldy and unmanageable OP
record-keeping problem.*57 Recognizing a need for some admin-
istrative flexibility and attempting to maintain a systematized
approach for T/O processing and personnel record-keeping, the
C/PED developed an alternate proposal -- the flexible T/O.
It had been amply demonstrated that in an intelligence organi-
zation workloads could, and did, shift overnight because of
the impact of international events. Even so, the flexible
* The flexibility part of the 0 plan was not a well-
thought-out concept, especially in its administrative feasibility
or its total effect on the Agency's position classification
program.
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T/0 proposal required Agency managers to make several kinds
of important position management decisions on the positions
under their control.
To be identified in the new system, were supervisory
and singleton worker positions and also those worker posi-
tions the numbers of which could increase to accommodate
increased workloads. Under the flexible T/0 concept the
Agency's T/0's were to be reflective of limited and flexible
(incumbency) positions. For example, in a branch the branch .
chief position would be limited and, except for "overlaps" --
of the incumbent and his replacement.-- would be restricted
to one incumbent. In the same manner, his secretarial slot
would be a limited position. The number of analysts or opera-
tions officer positions would be flexible,- however, so as to
accommodate expected workloads. Although each position would
be planned for a specific number, an asterisk would appear on
the T/0 indicating that at a given time it was possible to
rob Peter to pay Paul by slotting some people from one branch
into another branch. Although a position may have been basically'
planned for two individuals, at a given time -- within the
confines of ceiling -- four or five or any number could be
slotted against this position to meet emergency work situations
and/or accommodate unforeseen general increases in workload.
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In order to establish an orderly approach to T/0 reviews
and facilitate budgeting procedures, it was planned that before
the beginning of each fiscal year each component would come
forth with a planning paper that would depict its actual work
requirements for the coming.year. Positions would equal ceiling,
and both limited and flexible positions.would be indicated by
a planned number of incumbents within this ceiling. In the
case of the nonproductive workers in the Development Complement,
each Career Service Head (who was also an operating official)
could, if he wished, set aside `T' amount of his ceiling to
provide for personnel in his Development Complement. Thus
ceiling allowance for the Development Complement plus the number
of planned positions in the Staffing Complement would equal
ceiling. This system, then, would give the flexibility that
the DDP desired, would encompass
Man-in-Motion theory,
and would ostensibly require fewer T/O changes throughout the
year. It did not, however, establish an effective control on
the use of grades and promotion allowances. Because the concept
of the flexible T/O was so different from previous procedures,
it was deemed advisable to install a pilot operation.
Having been well briefed on the subject proposal,
I
member of the CIA Career Council, volunteered the Office of.
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the Director of Communications and.a long-time
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Communications as a guinea pig.>, Beginning,on 8 April 1956
a series of negotiations between representatives of the Posi-
tion Evaluation Division, the Management Staff, and the
administrative personnel in Commo took place in an attempt to
put into effect this new manpower system incorporating the
flexible T/O. One of the first reactions of Comoro representa-
tives was that this system could not work; there were not any
controls over the assignment and promotion of personnel, and
it would become a nightmare in a short time without effective
controls. This was both a valid and an extremely important
point. To this end C/PED then constructed a Career Service
Staffing Authorization.58 In its embryonic stage the Staffing
Authorization was merely a compilation by grade level of all
the grades in a career service. Related to these numbers, by
grade level., was the total number of the career service's
personnel. It soon became apparent that such a system would
require, if personnel and position grade levels were'up to full
strength, a domino promotion theory. In other words, it would
be necessary to promote a GS-14 to GS-15 before promoting a
GS-13 to GS-14. In view of the Agency's "underslotting" and
was happy to do this since the. Office of
Communications had probably the widest variety of manpower
control problems of any Agency component, and a more flexible
system was what Comoro needed.
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other assignment and promotion policies, this requirement ap-
peared to be unworkable. As a solution the idea of a "cumulative
headroom" was proposed. Simply stated, this would provide an
authorization for so many individuals at each grade level based
on vacancies at the grade level under review plus additional
headroom created by vacancies at higher position levels. The
computation involved (this is not yet fully understood in many
quarters of the Agency) the independent cumulation of the
number of positions and the number of personnel at each grade.
level as well as those above. Then the number of people had to
be subtracted from the number of positions. The result would
be the maximum position (promotion) headroom for each grade.*
For the moment this satisfied OC personnel, and a flexible
T/O was constructed, including a Career Service Staffing
Authorization. It also included a Development Complement of
25X1 approximately
is
to take care of Commo`s training needs and
those persons in travel status. It appeared to be a workable
system. The construction and workings of the flexible T/O and
* An example: A branch had 1 GS-15 branch chief position,
3 GS-14 positions, and 6 GS-13 positions. Personnel on board
included 1 GS-15, 1 GS-14, and 3 GS-13 officers. In this
situation the cumulative headroom would be: 0 at GS-l5, 2 at
GS-lit, and 5 at the GS-13 level. In other words, the positions
could be filled as T/Ord or the career service could promote
5 officers to the GS-l3 level as another possibility.
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the Career Service Staffing Authorization were then presented
to the Career Council* and the rest of the Agency in a series
of briefings. At that time the DDI stated that the CS3A was
unworkable and punitive to his Directorate because it did not
allow for career personnel who were assigned to positions of
other career services,
cope with this situation a rotational allowance was established.
Briefly, this gave a career service loaning a person to another
career service an allowance for the job occupied and conversely
would result in a "minus" in the allowance of the career service
in which the job was occupied. This arrangement was satisfactory
to the DDI and to all concerned.
Elated with the progress made, the Office of Personnel
attempted two more significant steps during the winter of 1957.
The first one was to make the Career Service Staffing Authori-
zation into a complete manpower planning instrument. Under this
concept each Head of a Career Service would, before the beginning
of the fiscal year. (preferably to be coordinated with the budget
process), plan the outer limits by grades and numbers of posi-
tion and personnel requirements of his career service. Of
At the 11-3rd meeting of the CIA Career Council, the members
voted unanimously for the implementation of this system. This
was on 23 May 1957, but it was to take over a year to refine
the system and issue the regulation and handbook.
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course, the Office of Personnel would be rewponsible for com-
piling pertinent personnel and position data for each career
service. The Career Service Head would, in turn, forecast at
what grade levels-his attrition would occur, plan for each
grade level the number of accessions required, and determine
the number of promotions he would effect. This fiscal-year
projection involved not only the consideration of the impact
of turnover on headroom but also a decision as to how much of
the available headroom would be used for promotions and how
much held in reserve. In effect, by this planning a Career
Service Head would have personally limited the number of per-
sonnel he could have in each grade level for the upcoming fiscal
year. He would also be held to the number of promotions he had
planned. With this the Office. of Personnel would have arrived
in Utopia, because each Career Service Head would have committed
himself for the year. As a result the Director of Personnel
would know exactly how many people would be on board; how many
promotions could be made, how many -- give or take a few -- OP
would have to recruit, and how many people the Agency would
lose, which was all the data that any personnel office needed
to run a well-managed system.
Still flushed with all the apparent success of these devel-
opments, the Office of Personnel proposed the second feature,
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which was career service ceiling instead of. organizational
ceiling. This was based on the fact that OP had set up a fine
plan for each Career Service Head to hire, fire, and promote;
but if he did not have control of his positions, and if he did
not have leeway for variations in his personnel requirements,
he would be severely limited in the flexibility of his own per-
sonnel management. Therefore it was suggested that the Agency
Manpower Control System be established on a career service
ceiling basis -- that is, all positions designated to the parent
career service. For example, Support positions assigned 25X1
to the DDP would be scrutinized individually and made part of
the ceiling of that Support career service to which the position
functionally belonged. All the Personnel positions in the DDP
and the DDS would become part of the Personnel Career Service
ceiling.* After considerable negotiations -- primarily with
* There were a few Support positions in the DDI; but through
a longstanding custom, the DD/I preferred to retain both posi-
tions and personnel. The DDCI resolved this "clinker" in the
Agency Career Service System when he signed a memo to the Deputy
Directors, dated 16 November 1964, directing that the Support
positions on their T/0`s be so identified. Positions and
ceilings were to be transferred to the cognizant Support career
services. The designated incumbents were given the prerogative
of remaining in the Career Service that they were in or trans-
ferring to one of the Support career services. Affected
employees had mixed feelings about this, and transferring or
staying with their parent career service usually depended on
where the best future opportunities lay.
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the DDP -- career service ceilings were finally set.
With the approval of the Deputy Directors, the change
from organizational to career service ceilings was accomplished,
and the manpower control system was almost ready for implemen-
tation. The only things left were the internal coordination
and issuance of an Agency regulation and handbook. They were
coordinated and approved on l4 November 1958 and issued as
(see Appendixes F and G). Although considerable planning had
1
gone into this project and the proposed system appeared to be
a reasonable solution to CIA's manpower control problems, the
implementation of the system was another matter. Administrative
obstacles appeared right and left. The first serious obstacle
was Mr. Edward Saunders, the CIA Comptroller, who went on
record that because the Agency budget had to be prepared on
an organization basis,/ 59 his accounting system must be main-
tained in support of that. Of course the identification of
positions by organizations could be easily obtained from career
service records, but the Comptroller and his staff were less
than enthusiastic about career service ceilings. With this
type of strong resistance the use of the CSSA went downhill
rapidly. On the career service planning side there was evidence
of a reluctance to put "projections" on a planning paper that
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would ultimately bind the career service with a fixed Career
Service Staffing Authorization. In actual practice many
requests for exceptions were submitted to the Office of Per-
sonnel. At first these requests were reviewed carefully, but
the number became so great that of necessity the review became
quite cursory. It was not long before the system became a
farce. Finally, in 1961, the C/S4D, convinced that the Agency
was not interested in such an advanced manpower control system,
proposed drastic changes in the system. The C/SWD proposed
that career service ceilings be eliminated. In consonance
with that, the CSSA was changed to the Career Service Grade
Authorization (CSGA), which was. merely an accounting of the
available headroom based upon a comparison of the status of
people against the position levels in a career service. These
modifications to the system were approved and have been in
effect since 1961.
The Office of Personnel and the Management Staff attempted
to develop an Agency Manpower Control System in response to
operating officials' pleas for greater flexibility, better
managerial control, and accountability of manpower. Vital
assets in the basic system could have fostered refinements to
manpower planning, improvement in the career -services' manage-
ment, and more orderly Agency-.wide development of its personnel.
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Should this effort be written off as an example of an
ambitious Office of Personnel planning effot going for "naught"
because the proposal was simply not in tune with the Agency's
management posture? Although the staff officers involved were
highly enthusiastic and initially received management support,
once installed the system floundered. In retrospect it would
appear that the flexibility that was built into this system was
not enough to compensate management for annually putting itself
on the "firing line." It simply did not want to be a party to
the development in the manpower area of planning documents that
could become constraints later. All that remains (1971) is the
flexible T/0 and the Career Service Grade Authorization, which
is still not well understood.'
B. Administrative Constraints (1952-56) to Agency
Flexibility Demands
As mentioned earlier, General Smith as the DCI encour-
aged his."specialized deputies" -- three by this time as he had
established the DDI in January 1952 -- to accept and plan on a
big scale to meet various intelligence and operational require-
ments that the intelligence community wanted to levy upon the
Agency. Follotiring this tack, Agency components' T/O's had been
planned to the maximum, and the personnel recruiters were
scouring the countryside looking for likely recruits. General
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Smith noted that although the Agency had submitted budget esti--
mates for FY 1953 for about F___]positions, the Agency "can't
get qualified people to fill that personnel ceiling. They
simply don't exist. We've gone about the limit ... so, my
intention is to keep our numbers down, to be more selective
instead of expansive, and look more and more to the juniors
to fill the senior posts."60
General Smith's philosophy was certainly in tune with
that of the new Eisenhower administration which was committed
to insuring a balanced budget and the elimination of any deficit.
On 3 February 1953, the Director of the BOB sent a letter* to
the DCI requesting him to review the Agency's programs and per-
sonnel requirements with the intent of eliminating unessential
programs, activities, and position vacancies for both the
remainder of FY 1953 and FY 1954. Possibly anticipating this,
General Smith had already ordered a 25 percent reduction in
the personnel requirements of the Agency's budget estimates
for FY 195) -- even before the BOB directive had been received
by CIA.61 Since General Smith was only days away from leaving
the Agency, he sought the concurrence of Mr. Allen W. Dulles,
* This BOB directive was sent to the Heads of all executive
departments and. agencies.
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his successor. Further, when Mr. Dulles became DCI he con-
tinued this Administration policy of trying>to reduce T/0's
to ceiling.
Later, in the spring of 1953, Mr. Dulles was to find
that General Smith's "}arbitrary" personnel reductions were
not enough. As a result of hearings before a subcommittee
of the House Appropriations Committee, Mr. Dulles agreed to
a staff ceiling
June 1953 on-duty civilian staff
strength plus a
ceiling to carry out increased
missions).62 Although the Agency's ceiling did increase
slightly during the mid-50's, the DCI attempted to follow the
Administration's line by encouraging the dropping of activities
of lesser priority in order to take.on new requirements.
What was the impact of tighter budget and ceiling controls
on Agency position management in these years? Certainly as
the personnel ceiling and number of T/O positions moved closer
together, the greater became the need for expert personnel
management and the louder became the clamor for greater flexi-
bility. In the final analysis it was up to the Office of
Personnel -- the Classification and Wage Division, primarily to respond in some fashion to these requests.
Even the Inspector General's staff got-involved in the
rationale of the Personnel Office.'s reluctance to develop more
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flexible programs to meet the unique requirements of CIA.
the Inspector General's 1953 Survey Report of the Office of
Personnel, the following statement was made 63/:
There is no question but that a classification
system is required. It is also agreed that the
Civil Service Wage Scale is acceptable. What is
required"is perhaps a classification system tailored
exclusively to the requirements of CIA.
On 15 January 1954+ Mr. George E. Meloon, the Director of
Personnel, responded to the Inspector General Survey findings
on the Agency's position classification program in this fashion:
The Agency's problem with respect to classification
has been due to a lack of understanding among operating
components concerning the purpose of classification
and their reluctance to accept the application of any
classification system. The experience of Government
and industry alike has demonstrated the need for system-
atic classification of positions. This is a highly
technical purpose which involves consideration of occu-
pational and qualifications information as well as pay.
Any proposal to revise the Agency's current classifica-
tion system should receive very careful consideration
in relation to the technical and administrative problems
involved. In this connection, the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion, which because of its security requirements was
also exempted from the Classification Act of 1949,
found itself in serious difficulty with the Congress
when it failed to administer its classification plan
in accordance with the basic principles stated in that
Act.64
C. Agency Compensation System
Through the early and mid-50Ts, officials in many
Agency components, particularly the DDP, became increasingly
disenchanted with both the Agency position classification
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programs and the Federal pay scales. Of course the 1949 policy
decision of Admiral Hillenkoetter 65 to anere to the Classi-
fication Act irked many who thought the system was ponderous,
inflexible, and not suitable for attracting and retaining the
best qualified applicants and employees in an expanding labor
market. As early as 1952 Mr. Lyman Kirkpatrick, then the
AD/SO, wrote to the DDA 66 that the Agency classification
system handicapped OSO personnel administration in that (1) it
mitigated against the exercise of flexibility in the assignment
and transfer of personnel, and (2) it prevented the rewarding
of personnel who might be required by operational necessity
to remain in their appointed assignments -- thus keeping them
from being promoted because of the classification of their
positions. The AD/SO strongly recommended that the Agency
classification system be abolished and a more sound program
of personnel administration be developed and. implemented; and
in recognizing the need for an extended lead time to develop
a new system, he suggested. that some of the OSO classification
or personnel problems could be resolved under the Agency system
if a greater degree of flexibility were to be introduced.
In 1952, in response to the OSO pressure for greater
flexibility in assignments and promotions, the Acting Assistant
Director of Personnel sent to the DDA a recommendation 67 to
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approve a modification to the Agency classification program
that would authorize the assignment or transfer of personnel
to meet operational requirements even though the position
classifications, in themselves, did not justify such movements.
In other words, the classification grade was not to be the
determinant for assignment. A control factor (5 percent of
Agency positions could be so encumbered) was also introduced
and was accepted by management.
This resolution of an important personnel issue resulted
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0 25X1A
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which incorporated
the OSO assignment and transfer of personnel recommendations.
It was to be two more years before the Agency approved
which authorized -- under prescribed
conditions and 'Within defined controls -- the promotion of
employees above the grade of their jobs. The suggestion to
abandon the Agency classification system was tabled, however,
by the DDA. In agreement with the Acting Director for Personnel,
he felt that Agency management would have to develop considerably
more evidence to support the contention that the Agency should
have a more suitable classification system.68
kas issued on. 9 October 195+.
was issued on 29 November 1956.
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Interestingly enough, both the incumbent Chief and
Deputy of the Salary and Wage Division shared many of these
feelings of the operating officials'about the inadequacies of
the Agency classification program, but for more technical
reasons. Because.of lagging Federal pay schedule revisions,
for example, "grade escalation"* had become the order of the
day throughout the Federal Government. Indeed, it had become
exceedingly difficult to rationalize grade differentials under
either accepted Federal position classification standards or
industrial evaluation techniques.
With the DDA`s approval of
regulation, the door was left open for operating officials to
stack the deck with further evidence of the negative aspects
of the Agency's position classification system. Under these
circumstances, the Director of Personnel did indeed find him-
self on the horns of a dilemma. Should he wait for the Agency
"operators" to exert more pressure, or should he take the
initiative and have his position classification staff begin
Grade escalation resulted from position management deci-
sions that inflated the duties and responsibilities of positions
sufficiently to warrant upward reclassifications and, of course,
salary increases. Unfortunately, many of these positions con-
tinued to function at the lower grade levels.
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to explore the parameter of this problem that was only bound
to get worse?
Having decided in early 1955 to take the initiative him-
self, the Director of Personnel found a likely candidate in
the Deputy Chief of the FED for chairman of the Agency Task
Force on a Revised Personnel System.69 By 7 March 1955 the
task force was organized* and ready to tackle the problems to
be faced by the Agency in developing a new personnel system.
Strictly speaking, the revised personnel system was to
.be largely concerned with the development of an up-to-date
classification and compensation system with strong consider-
ation of how such a system would affect personnel management
in the "operational side of the house." The question might
also be asked, "Did the Task Force members know the problems
they were to face?" Of course not! So for the reader the
following (long) summation is presented so that some of the
basic problems will be clearly understood.
Since its activation the classification and compensation
policy of the Agency for its professional, technical and
clerical positions had been to follow, insofar as possible,
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conventional government practices as prescribed in the Classi-
fication Act of 19119. By 1955 average-grade studies showed
that the Agency average T/0 grade was higher than that-in
comparable.. Federal agencies. Thus, in fact, the guiding Agency
principle used in administering the classification plan had
been one of liberality. Although there were eighteen grades
under the Act, for all practical purposes the Agency used only
thirteen. The three lowest clerical levels (GS-1, 2, and 3)
were hardly used, GS-08 and GS-10 levels were used principally
for subprofessional and technical work efforts and the three
uppermost grades (GS-16, 17, and 18) were reserved for and
handled by the Agency Supergrade Review Board. By process of
elimination this left ten grades that were used to identify
all levels of work from trainee through senior program managers.
In most lines of professional 'work it was not difficult to
identify the beginning trainee level (GS-07), the full jour-
neyman (GS-12), and the various levels of supervision. This
left only the intermediate levels -- that is, GS-09 and GS-11 to be used as incentives for trainees to develop into full
journeyman professionals. (In some cases, some positions
required exceptionally highly developed skills, unusual
hardships, or hazards which justified journeyman levels above
GS-12.)
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Most of the "overtTe functional areas of the Agency had
counterparts in the rest of the Government.' Thus external
job comparisons could be made or, when they were available,
position classification standards could be used. In these
areas the position classifiers could distinguish between most
of the various grade levels and had little trouble in fur-
nishing adequate classification support to these activities.
With regard to those fields of endeavor in the Clandestine
Service, however, there were many functional job patterns
that did not have counterparts elsewhere in either Government
or US industry. Few Agency job standards had been published
? to differentiate between various levels of work. As with more
orthodox professional fields, it was easy to identify entrance or beginning -- level of work, the full journeyman, and the
supervisory levels, and to classify them. At the intermediate
levels, however, many intelligence operations officer positions
were only distinguishable by the "degree of supervision re-
ceived from above" (and this frequently could be quite general)
as the nature and variety of work performed. remained basically
the same. Frankly, attempts to identify seven professional
levels of "operational work" usually resulted in delineating
distinctions that were artificial and unrealistic. On this
basis, then, the allegation that the "normal" classification
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approach resulted in minute and arbitrary fine grade distinc-
tions was considered to be true. Therefore the initial or
basic problem was to secure agreement as to how many levels
of professional and support work there really were in the
Clandestine Service (and in the rest of the Agency, if the
system were to be Agency-wide).
The second, and probably larger, problem, from a clas-
sification standpoint, was to insure that the system finally
established would provide a monetary means for recognizing
and rewarding superior performance without having to resort
to promotions that could not always be justified technically.
As a result of the rapid expansion of the Agency during
the 50's, most of the classification staffing patterns on
Agency T/0's reflected approved grades in support of "maximum
staffing." Unfortunately the Agency recruiters were simply
not able to find sufficient numbers of experienced or otherwise
qualified personnel to fill these requirements. In order to
secure sufficient staffers, however, the Agency adopted a
recruitment policy which concentrated on securing junior
officers and "training them up" for Agency long-term career
assignments. Because the T/0 exercises were looked upon as
"estimates" or "projections," and knowing full well that
there would be administrative objections from Agency program
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directors if their T/0's were to be adjuste;l downward, the
Agency "coasted" into a permissive underslotting philosophy.
Although other Federal agencies have utilized underslotting
from time to time, it has been used in a strict and restricted
fashion. With no administrative controls, CIA management was
condoning the practice of slotting personnel against T/O
positions that had been graded one to several grades higher
than the grades of the incumbents. In most cases an employee
could be promoted one or two grades upon the recommendation
of his supervisor simply by gaining sufficient experience on
the job. Most promotions were therefore acknowledgements of
the development (in some instances rather rapidly) of such
employees; some so-called promotion actions were, in essence,
the only discernible way for management to reward those em-
ployees whose performances were outstanding in their current
jobs. As a result the Agency promotion rate had so accelerated
that by 1955 80 percent of the CIA employees had been in grade
less than two years. As a consequence many officials felt
that the Agency was fast approaching its saturation point with
respect to promotion potential. As long as operating officials
had available a "cushion" of grades by which they could reward
employees with promotions upon demonstration, to perform either
duties of a higher level or perform in an outstanding manner
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in one's current job level, however, they did not complain
about the system's inadequacies. With Gene-:gal Smith's orders
to cut T/0's back, coupled with the fact that the employee's
grade would eventually approximate that of the T/O grade, it
soon became apparent that the Agency's promotion policy would
have to change. There was another constraint -- most T/O posi-
tions had been classified on the basis of projected duties, and
it seemed unlikely that any re-evaluations would justify higher
T/O grades. Under these circumstances operating officials -
would no longer have a means, other than promotion, of recognizing
outstanding performances. Because this category of employees
represented a considerable nucleus from which future Agency
supervisors and administrators would ultimately be selected, it
was soon rationalized that a revised personnel system should
include a means to identify.and reward such employees.
Between 1955 and 1958 several distinct CIA pay plans were
developed by PED staffers. As part of this effort, independent
studies of US industrial, commercial, and other government
compensation plans were undertaken.*70 The best features of
After two years of waiting, the Chief of Operations of the
DDP asked the IG to set up a Task Force to ascertain how the
CIA pay plan compared with that of other organizations. The
DDS managed to convince the IG that the OP people should do
this study, which was completed in June 1957.71
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each plan were considered and. sometimes adopted for one or more
of the proposed Agency systems.. Thus the pay plans, themselves-,
ran the gamut from using the basic Classification Act plan and
merely extending the pay range for each grade level (to provide
more merit step increases) to a plan that reduced the number
of grades from eighteen to sixteen, established increased pay
ranges, and provided three separate pay schedules.
Most of these drafted plans were circulated and prompted
mixed reactions from the operating officials, the Comptroller,
and the General Counsel.. In spite of these reactions,
Mr. Gordon M. Stewart, the Director of Personnel, had the C/PED
complete a plan that was presented to the CIA Career Council
on 27 March 1958.72 The 1958 proposal 73 was geared to
combat the major defic.i.encies of the Civil Service classifi-
cation and pay plans, which were:
a. too many professional grade levels requiring
fine and arbitrary distinctions between levels of work;
b. extremely small salary ranges for each grade
(particularly at the higher grades); and.
c. no provision for augmenting the salary of excel-
lent or. outstand.i_ng performers wi'tout promoting them.
Highlighting the 1958 CIA compensation' system were these
proposals:
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a. To apply to all positions above GS-07 (profes-
sionals in GS-08 through GS-18);
b. To reduce, through consolidation, nine grade
levels into five groups;
c. To provide extended salary ranges in each group --
up to a maximum of 48 percent of maximum of the base
rate; and
d. To provide two types of advancement: (1) compe-
titive promotion by Career Services, and (2) merit
increases (one to three at a time) based upon performance.
(Clericals through GS-?o6 would continue to receive
"automatic" step, increases.)
After the briefing of the Career Council, which gave its
blessing to the plan (see Appendix H), practically all senior
Agency officials were personally briefed on the parameters of
the compensation plan. In addition the Director of Personnel
discussed this pay proposal with Mr. Rocco Siciliano,-the
President's Personnel Advisor, on 22 April 1958.71V In fact
the concept so interested Mr. Siciliano that he hoped the Agency
would pursue it with BOB officials and with members of the
appropriate Congressional committees.- The administrative
* As a matter of record, the 1962 (next) Federal pay legislation
was to incorporate some of these concepts.
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realization that there would be requirements for high-level,
external approvals for such a plan, coupled with the strong
feeling that the Agency would have serious internal admin-
istrative problems if it could not effectively control the
increased costs,* eventually put a damper on its final ap-
proval.75
In fact the whole proposal was eventually put on the
shelf and forgotten. At .about this time the CSC and BOB
officials had become most concerned about the Federal "grade
escalation" -problem and had established a study group to look
into all of its pay ramifications. This group's research did
result in the development of a Federal Pay Proposal, which
was submitted by President Kennedy to the Congress and was
approved as the Federal Salary Reform Act of 1962. This Act
incorporated many of the concepts in the CIA plan, such as
better pay comparability with US industry), wider pay ranges
within grades, and provision for the awarding of quality step
increases for superior performance.
* Other than for basic pay rates, which were tied into the
then-current Federal pay schedule, the increments and pay
ranges far exceeded those of its Federal counterpart.
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V. "The Name of the Game"
The basic position classification program and its ftiinc-
tionally related responsibilities have not changed appreciably
during the first twenty years of the Agency's growth.* In the
development and refinement of its support role, however, admin-
istrative nuances have been reflected in the variety of organ-
izational titles attributed to this function.**
In July 1947, in the embryonic CIA, the Classification
Section in the Personnel Branch came into being. The program's
organizational location was indeed indicative of the smallness
of the Agency at that time. But by December 1948 -- despite
little change in either the classification program or staff --
it had become the Classification and"Salary Administration
Division of the Personnel Office.
By September 1949 this program, newly independent of the
CSC, faced with the assumption of an increasing amount of work
This thesis does not ignore the fact that during the closing
years of this history, potentially strong position management
staff responsibilities were assigned. With strong Agency line
managers, however, the program has had to be sold to each and
every one.
x* See Appendix I, List of Key Personnel and Organizational
Changes in CIA Position Classification Program.
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in the establishment of Agency Wage Board positions, changed
its name in order to reflect this additional work. During
this period the program was divided operationally to ftTrnish
better classification support to Agency clandestine prograns.
Thus the Agency had an Overt. Classification and Wage Adminis-
tration Branch in the Personnel Office and a Covert Classifi-
cation and Wage Administration Branch under the Chief of the
Special Support Staff.* One further variation occurred during
this period. In order to insure greater uniformity of clas-
sification actions proposed by these two branches, a two-man
Classification Review Staff was established in the Office of
the Director of Personnel.
General Walter B. Smith's order of 1 December 1950 76
established a DD/Administration, with responsibility for the
personnel program. At this juncture all Agency personnel
activities were formally centralized in the Office of Personnel.
Thus the overt and covert classification responsibilities
became the full responsibility of a single program director --
the Chief of the Classification and Wage Division.
The name changes were slight during this early period,
Policy guidance and technical responsibility for the Agency
position classification program, however, remained with the
Director of Personnel.
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and all of them followed Civil Service nomenclature. Indeed,
during the 1947-49 period CIA was under the Classification
Act administrated by the CSC. Then in 1949, after having been
exempted from the Classification Act, the DCI went on record
with his policy announcement that the Agency would follow the
Classification Act in principle. Thus the division's organi-
zational title was continued unchanged until July 1955.
Early in 1955 the Inspector General (Lyman B. Kirkpatrick),
in a famous memorandum to the DCI, set forth ten suggestions
for improving CIA's personnel management. His first recommenda-
tion was to affect the Classification and Wage Division activ-
ities and posture more than any of the others.* It was to
"make service the slogan of the Personnel Office, and see that
every individual in that office understands and acts accordingly.
The Personnel Office should be advised that its mission is to
do what CIA wants done in the personnel field even though it
does not coincide with Civil Service practices."77
Although never stated as such in writing, a significant
Other suggestions pertained to diverse personnel management
practices and procedures needing corrective 'action. Among-these
were the problem of overseas returnees finding that they did not
have headquarters. assignments upon their arrival, Agency super-
visors needing training in personnel management, strengthening
personnel procedures governing the handling of contract person-
nel, and so forth.
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and recu It ing type of complaint that precipitated point number
one was the alleged niggardliness of the Classification and
Wage Divi ,;ion in not giving the "operators" the classification
grades tiDy thought they needed. The Division was castigated
for writ:i,r_ig terse and abrupt memoranda turning down "valid"
requests of operating officials -- always comparing the Agency's
unique p:,.:,-)grams to routine programs and functions found in
Civil Service agencies! The degree of defensiveness of the
Director.of Personnel is illustrated by Mr. Harrison G. Reynolds'
.comment oh the IG's first recommendation: "Our contacts with
the civil, service system are extremely limited, being confined
to such things as participation in the government-wide retire-
ment system, observation of the requirements of the*Veterans'
Preferencc, Act in adverse actions on employees ... ."78
In ordex to remove the stigma of the Civil Service and
all it stood for, the Classification and Wage Division's name
was chant,.,-,.d in July 1955 to the Position Evaluation Division.
This name. change was further fortified by the adoption of the
""service" slogan by the Office of Personnel, and admonitions
were made to the C/PED to be more agreeable with the operating
officials in dealing with them on their unique classification
requests.
The Position Evaluation Division title had a life'span
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of about three years, lasting until mid-1958. At that time
several factors increased in importance sufficiently to cause
another name change. In 1958, with Mr. Gordon M. Stewart as
the CIA Director of Personnel, there evolved a philosophy of
overall monitoring and controlling career service actions in
the field of compensation and promotions rather than by the
review of individual personnel and classification actions.
Under the CIA Manpower Control System*
Service Staffing Authorization set the limits on the career
service promotion and recruitment actions. Second, in imple-
menting the "average grade control" concept*
? it was implied that the classification monitoring would be
minimal if the average grade were maintained or lowered. Under
these new concepts the control function was to be accomplished
in tote. Therefore, with these changes in effect, it was
decided to change the name from the Position Evaluation Division
to the Salary and Wage Division.
During the early 19601s the Bureau of the Budget had
unsuccessfully experimented with trying to control grade esca-
lation and ceiling increases in the departments and agencies
through-a "containment" approach -- expansion limited to those
See Chapter VI for details.
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actions that would not affect average grade=and average salary
ceilings. By 1965 the BOB (and CSC) had discovered that these
budgetary and statistical controls were not directive enough;
departmental managers had to recognize the importance of proper
position management.* Considerable stress was placed upon
the importance of the position. management responsibility of
the heads of departments and agencies. In order to discharge
this responsibility, the heads of many departments and agencies
assigned this function to the Management Staffs so as to insure
compliance if program directors did not "follow through them-
selves." The demise of the CIA Management Staff in May 1961
had, however, left a gap that had not been fully assumed by
the Agency program directors or by any central support staff.
Although the SWD had informally been trying to fill this role
partially, it was not until October 1965 that Agency management
formally assigned this staff responsibility to SWD. The DDS
also accepted the Director of Personnel's recommendation that
the name be changed to the Position Management and Compensation
* In an effort to reduce grade escalation in the civilian
work force of the Department of the-Army, the Civilian Personnel
Division, OSA, issued position management instructions and
guides to its installations in the early 1.960`s. Thus the
position management concept was admittedly plagiarized from
the Army by the CSC and. the BOB.
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Division so as to describe more adequately he augmentation
of the division's functions. Although the basic position
classification function has remained largely unaltered,- a.ch7Lin-
istrative events and program assignments through the years
have had an effect on the "n-ame of the game."
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VI. "Controls"
A. The Role of the Director of Personnel
In early 1957 Mr. Gordon M. Stewart, the incoming
Director of Personnel,* received a memorandum from the DDCI,
Lt. General Charles P. Cabell,79 transmitting a thoughtfully
researched paper prepared by Mr. Lyman Kirkpatrick, the Inspec-
tor General. The subject was the "Role of the Director of
Personnel" and the IG stated that, he thought the Career Council
should use this as a basis for clearly determining the specific
responsibilities of the Director of Personnel as well as those
of line supervisors in the area of personnel management.**
For many years various "strong" operating officials had chal-
lenged the incumbent Directors of Personnel whenever they felt
that operating prerogatives were being usurped in the slightest
manner. The IG analyzed various facets of these problems and
came out quite clearly in favor of a stronger role for the
* Stewart was D/Pers from 18 January 1957 to 6 June 1960.
*x Indeed; the members of the Career Council did, at their
42nd meeting (April 1957), discuss this paper. Although they
did, in essence, tend to support a balance between centrali-
zation and decentralization, they agreed that at least three
Personnel activities should remain centralized --- classifi-
cation, personnel recruitment, and personnel records.
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Director of Personnel. Some of his recommendations were:
On Personnel Policy:
The Director of Personnel ... should be the prin-
cipal source of personnel policy suggestions and his
role in this respect must be clarified ... (he)
should have the principal voice and his advice and
guidance on major issues must reach the Director
undiluted and undistorted ... . Sufficient authority
should be?delegated ... to make minor policy decisions
... its extent should be made perfectly clear ... .
This is definitely a function for which the Director
of Personnel should have sole responsibility ...
uniformity and consistency'throughout the Agency is
of vital importance and cannot be achieved by Operating
Officials.
25X1A
On Control:
After personnel policies are established and ...
regulations are published, one more element must be
added -- that of control the policing function
... to see that policies are carried out ... one
which must be backed by high authority ... by the
DCI when the situation warrants it.
into the role of CIA Director of Personnel created some unusual
administrative dilemmas.- On the one hand, Mr. Stewart had a
draft charter that would have headed the Agency toward a
stronger central Office of Personnel; yet he brought with him
a definite leaning toward the practice of covert autonomy.
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of Personnel, however, he found that he had.to address himself
on an Agency-wide basis to the problems at hand, the solutions
to which had to be reasonable for all concerned. As part of
his on broadening, Mr. Stewart reached out to the Federal
community and for the first time established liaison (a field
that he was expert in) with the Civil Service Coimnissioners,
officials of the BOB, and Mr. Rocco Siciliano, the Personnel
Advisor to the President,, and with his staff assistants.
One of the most critical problems to face Mr. Stewart
was that of grade escalation, which had also been developing
in Federal agencies under the Classification Act. This involved
the practice of making position management decisions that
"built up" the responsibilities of positions to justify higher
grades and, of course, higher salaries. (Congressional action
on Federal pay legislation was so notoriously slow that whenever
a pay bill was finally passed the increases were never in con-
sonance with most recent industrial wage adjustments:) Usually
such administrative actions were taken to provide better
comparability with industrial salaries. Frankly, such prac-
titioners believed that they would be in a more competitive
position to retain or recruit high-quality personnel.*
x Although this practice was mentioned in. Chapter III in the
discussion of supergrades, the wholesale nature of the Federal
problem was not emphasized.
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B. The CIA Internal Grade Control System
Naturally, as Agency programs expanded; the average
position grade increased, as most of these programs were staffed
by'professional personnel. Once the.Agency had reached a
"reasonable growth" -- time-framed by General Smith's departure
in February 1953 -- it might have been expected that the Agency
T/0 position structure would be stabilized. If it had stabi-
lized in 1953 the 9.2 average grade would have been considered
very high. Unfortunately operating officials continued to
submit request after request for upward position reclassifica-
tions* (relatively few requests involved downgradings) for the
next several years. In fact there was no real administrative
control over this phenomenon;'the Management Staff, which could
have exerted strong control, was never permitted to assume
that role.
Through organizational location of his position the C/PED
was not only the approving officer for these classification
requests but probably the most cognizant Support officer on
* PED studies reflect various Agency position management de-
cisions that were instrumental in upgrading blocks of various
types of Agency positions. Security was perhaps the most used --
elsewhere couriers were GS-01 and GS-02; in CIA they were GS-04
and GS-05. Clerical and typist positions were GS-04, contrasted
with GS-02 and GS-03. Not to be forgotten, of course, were the
"upgraded RI analyst" positions, etc.
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the impact of these classification approvals on the average
grade of the Agency.
the incumbent C/PED,
would periodically prepare reports and graphics reflecting this
upward trend both. in CIA and in selected other Federal agencies.
Frankly, these reports during the 1955-57 period could best be
labeled "FYI"; no Agency official took any steps .to do anything
to curb the trend. Finally in early 1957
himself more fully to the problem and convinced the new Direc-
tor of Personnel, Mr. Stewart, that some action should be
taken.* The C/PED prepared a memo 80 for the DDS recommending
that an Agency policy be established.that would designate the
? current average T/0 grade for each major component as the
maximum average grade for the subsequent year. Along with
0
this it was also proposed that existing ceiling controls be
continued. Some flexibility was to be provided by permitting
grade structures to be adjusted within the established Direc-
torate ceiling limits in order to meet operational requirements.
Basic to this proposal was the fact that during the 1953-56
period the average grade had been slowly increasing but at a
decreasing rate -- indicative of a leveling off of the Agency
* By that time CIA had the highest average position grade
(9.5) of any Federal agency of comparable mission and size.
See graph on page 133.
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 k' RAGE AQr~oWG)FzReIe1JJ FbbI ~I/2 IA.-`R~P83-0~3~14 b@6110 36002- U ~-? ?'~,` le-~ ~
m
LJ
0
GRADE! AND 5L U I t U faua.
1 I 1 1 I I I
1951 1952 19573 1954 1955 1955 1957 1955
rGs irclWWe Departmental * GS 'po : ions only. The 'overall
Dept. of State fin
Sin i E3 - nvor[ ri p i fc1 Corms i cd f of I9I-4 at GS - 8.4 b s conver?1nn- .all
Forelgli Service positions .(FSS FSRO FS( ;ores M. n'sstee s Ch~cofs of 1' ss nsc c.) to
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position structure. An analysis of the trend during the.
first half of FY 1957 revealed, however, a fairly sharp upward
increase. In addition,, the T/0 proposals for nine major
components, all with proposed increases, were in process.
Classification negotiations would not stem the tide; a control
mechanism would have to be introduced.
This proposal never got out of the Director of Personnel's
office. Although it is true that the D/Pers had some proposed
"control" responsibilities in his office charter, it was clear
to him that a "freeze" on personnel promotions would be unpal-
atable to the Deputy Directors. Another consideration could
have been that the Director of Personnel was still "feeling
his way" and preferred to proceed cautiously during his first
year in office.- A year or so later his reaction was to be
somewhat different.
During that intervening year CIA continued to remain
in the lead as the Agency with the highest average grade.
25X1A
Meanwhile, in late 1957,
the former deputy,
became C/PED. His approach to problem solving was much more
direct than those of his predecessors. He viewed the problem
as one that could only be overcome by Thstalling stronger
controls so that the average grade could not'continue to rise
without the approval of top management. The C/PED knew that
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the Agency T/0 structure would. never stabilize without strong
controls, and he was also well aware that as the employee
average grade got closer to the T/0 position average grade,
the greater the amount of resistance that would come from
operating officials. So he pulled out all the stops."
The C/STnTD* first approached the Director of Personnel
and convinced him that some administrative controls were in
order. Once this was done he followed up with a strong memo
81 for the signature of the D/Pers to the DDS recommending
that the average grade of each career service be frozen at
such time as the Agency Manpower Control System
O
as installed. Interestingly enough, the pilot installation
of this manpower system in Communications had by this time
already demonstrated the need for additional controls. Although
the CSSA was developed for this purpose, it still left too much
administrative discretion in the hands of the operating offi-
cials. In fact the CSSA was more a statistical tool `than a
control device.
The upshot of this was that while the Director of Per-
sonnel indeed did recognize the need for a greater degree of
centralized control over the career services, he left his own
* The Position Evaluation Division was redesignated Salary
and Wage Division in July 1958.
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personal imprint on the solution-* of how a Career Service head
could operate most flexibly within a controlled situation.
With reference to the maintenance of average grade, Mr' Stewart
personally wrote the following paragraph:
25X1A
25X1A
5. The Chief, Salary and Wage Division, Office of
Personnel, will apply the techniques prescribed in
to all changes in classification.
The extent of his survey will, however, be determined
by the extent to_which the changes proposed affect the
average grade of the Service or Services concerned .
Perhaps to the Director of Personnel this. solution con-
tinued the "covert autonomy" condept under broad administrative
controls. In any event Mr. Stewart was recognizing the fact
that central administration had an important role and that to
be effective management channels must be two-way streets -- with
some give and some take. It is apparent that he resolved
several central control issues himself by insuring that those
controls that were approved during his tenure were broad-gauged
ones that would permit the career services sufficient room to
maneuver.
In a sense the average grade control system was successful.
By 1961 CIA was no longer in the number one position as far as
* The SWD memorandum was never approved. Instead, Mr. Stewart
personally approached. each Deputy Director and got his concur-
rence in an Agency control. Implementation was accomplished
through
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average grade patterns in Federal agencies were concerned.*
It still remained among the top ten agencies but, generally
speaking, interagency comparisons of average grade trends were
No one system --,barring an all-out freeze -- could
keep a developing organization's average grade from rising;
and the Career Service Average Grade concept did not prohibit
classification submissions that would increase the average
grade, provided they were fully justified. What it did do
was to make top management focus more keenly on position manage-
ment decisions. Those proposals that did not raise the average
? grade of the career service could be resolved in relatively
short order through negotiations with C/SWD and the Head of
the concerned career service. But every proposal that would
cause the career service's average grade to rise would have to
be cleared with the Deputy Director concerned. In some cases
the Deputy Director could make satisfactory intra-directorate
adjustments sufficient to accommodate the proposed increase.
In situations where it was not possible to do that, the DCI
had to decide whether or not the proposal was critical enough
to warrant an increase in the Agency's average grade.
This was notwithstanding the fact that the Agency average grade
had risen from 9.5 to 9.8 during the 1957-61 period.
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In another way this exercise in self-discipline could
also be acclaimed a success. Program administrators were
able to hold moderately tight reins without creating a,paper
rebellion. This was a change-over; for many years Agency
supervisors fought classifiers independently for what they
thought their okm requirements should be, with minimal coor-
dination or control exercised by those in senior staff or
command positions.
But in a third way the system might not be labeled as
other than a stop-gap measure. This occurred, of course, in
1964 when the BOB began to take a closer look at what was
going on in CIA.
C. Impact of the Bureau of the Budget as a Control
Agency
In 1962 the Kennedy Administration had sought more
realistic Federal pay legislation that would elevate salary
levels of Federal executives so that they would be comparable
to salaries being paid their counterparts in US industry.*
It was assumed then that Federal program administrators would
be satisfied with these upward salary adjustnients for their
executives. This, unfortunately, wds not to be the case.
* Accomplished in October 1.962 by the passage of the Federal
Salary Reform Act of 1962 (PL 87-793).
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Within 18 months of the passage of this pay~legi_slation, the
CSC and the BOB became aware of and concerndd with the still
rising trend in Federal executive position classifications.
It was found that Federal agencies had continued to permit
their classification grades to escalate, especially at the
GS-13 and higher levels. For example, in CIA, as the supergrade
positions grew numerically, so did the grades of senior-level
supporting professional positions. Other program increases
and a few new ones managed to push the average grade of the
Agency from 9.6 in 1958 to 9.8 in 1963. Although this was a
relatively modest increase, the reason that it was not higher
was probably because the Career Service Average Grade Control
System had been introduced in 1959 and was working as a control.
As a result of these grade escalation practices in the
Federal structure, the BOB began an inquiry into the matter.
Even CIA came under the close scrutiny of the BOB. In April
1964 the.DCl received a letter 83 from Mr. Elmer Staats, the
Deputy Director of the BOB, in which he stated:
The almost continuous rise in the average grade
of Federal employees raises serious questions about
the adequacy of existing agency management controls.
While there are circumstances where changes in the
complexity of the work and work processes justify an
increase in the average grade, it is questionable
whether those changes account for annual regularity
of the increases in grade in most agencies.
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For several years the annual budget instructions
(BOB Circular No. A-il) have been extremely restrictive
on the provision of funds for the prospective upgrading
of positions.
This was the tone of the BOB letter,. which also requested
0
a report from the Agency as to the steps it proposed to take
to hold down the number and percentage of positions in grades
GS-13 and above and to keep from increasing the average grade
of the Agency. Quite revealing was the attachment to this
letter, which reflected the overall Federal government grade
distribution and average grade from 1958 to 1963. During that
time the departments and agencies under the Classification
Act had an increase in average grade from 6.4 to 7.2.*
During previous years the BOB had, to a considerable
extent, maintained a liberal policy with respect to the CIA
budget submission.** Under President Lyndon B. Johnson's
Administration, however, the BOB vigorously pursued the Presi-
dent's goal to reduce Federal expenditures -- even in CIA
programs.
The concern of the C/SWD in 1958 finally came to realization
with this BOB admonition.
** This is not to ignore the fact that on 28 August 1962 the
Director of the BOB did express some dismay at the DCI's pro-
posed 90 percent increase.in the number of Agency supergrade
positions. Ultimately the Agency was able to "convince" BOB
officials that the increase was justified (see Chapter III).
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Stating that Agency management was upset by this-turn
xi
of events would be putting it mildly. Perhaps it did recog-
nize that the Agency had an Achilles` heel -- the BOB budget
control -- and that a day of reckoning eventually had to come.
In any event the Executive Director administratively
reacted immediately to the BOB letter on grade escalation
with his own Action Memorandum, A-378 84/, in which he directed
the DDS to stem the increase in position average grade and to
instruct the Director of Personne,l to take necessary action
to reduce the headroom between position and incumbent grades
throughout the Agency so that the Agency average position
grade would be as low as (or lower than) the Agency average
as of 30 June 1963. Such steps were to be taken immediately
so that the Agency average position grade would be decreased
and so reported by 30 June 1964.
Because this involved the review of Agency position
classifications, the C/SWD became the action officer. Within
a few short weeks each Directorate had undergone a classifi-
cation review, and position classification grades were reduced
in a "reasonable" fashion. The major concern of each, it
appeared, was that it would have to give up more grades than
any other Directorate. Classification negotiations took into
consideration organizational and recruitment problems when
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appropriate. As a result the C/SWD was able to report to the
Director of Personnel that the Agency average position grade
had been reduced from 9.86 to 9.82 (the 1963 average w4s 9.83).
Although this Agency-wide classification review was a
fait accompli, the reaction of the Chief of the Programming,
Planning and Budget Staff was noteworthy.85 Mr. John Clarke,
the C/PPBS, advised the Director of Personnel that the C/S1,1D
had misinterpreted the Executive Director's Action Memorandum
A-378 and that the Agency-wide classification survey was
wreaking havoc within the Agency. The Chief of PPBS felt
that a component-by-component classification review was not
necessary; his approach -- somewhat impractical with the
various office chiefs -- would have been just to take the
excess headroom wherever he (C/SWD) found it, just as long
as the Agency average position grade was lowered.
In spite of this advice the Director of Personnel sent
to the Executive Director a memorandum 86 indicating that
the Agency average position grade had been reduced in accord-
ance with his instructions and that henceforth upward reclas-
sifications would have to be compensated for. Reflective,
perhaps, of top management philosophy were the DDS's comments
on his transmittal that "this approach, if properly implemented,
would ensure the Agency the properly controlled flexibility
it needs."
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Having put the Agency's administrative machinery in
motion, the Executive Director responded to the BOB letter-`
in a forthright but somewhat defensive manner.87 Fortunately
the Career Service Average Grade Control System (see B, above)
had been reasonably successful in holding the Agency average
grade down. Increases approved by the Executive Director had
limited the rise of the average grade to .2, or from 9.65 to
9.85 between 1959 and 1964.** Again the percentage of Agency
positions at GS-13 and above had increased only moderately
.from 27.11+ to 27.35 percent. In addition to these data the
Executive Director presented his contention that the Agency
had an effective control system, and he followed with his
arguments against the implementation of the BOB controls in
the Agency because they would severely restrict management's
ability to respond to changing intelligence requirements and,
finally, would create an undesirable vacuum between authority
and responsibility. His conclusion followed the earlier BOB
* The BOB letter also raised the question about the increase
in GS-13 and above positions and summarized three possible
BOB mandatory means available to control grade escalation,
suggesting that the BOB would be interested in the Agency's
reaction to each.
** The Government's average position grade had'risen .8 --
but, of course, from a lower base grade.
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philosophy that the primary responsibility for the control of
grade structure rested with the top managenidnt of the Agency.
In reality the battle to keep the BOB from exercising
greater control over the Agency had begun. It was not much of
a battle; the CIA was part of the "clean sweep"'accomplished
by the BOB's review of all the agencies in the Executive Branch.
Management could, if it had wished, have forecast that its
treatment would be similar to~that levied on the rest of the
government! Thus it should have been no surprise when on
25 August 1964 the BOB issued a revision to BOB Circular
No. A-11,88 which placed a ceiling on all Agency positions
in grades GS-14 and above. The control was set at the number
that had been actually filled in the Agency in fiscal year
1964.
BOB Circular No. A-11 also established the Administra-
tion's policy on personnel costs. Beginning with fiscal year
1966, allowances for personnel costs were to be based on the
average salary estimated for fiscal year 1965 in the President's
1965 budget, as modified. by the effects of statutory pay
increases. Funds for within-grade salary advancements were
to be allowed only on. clear demonstration that such costs were
not offset by turnover and other factors.
Things were getting tough within the Agency, and the
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Executive Director viewed the future as somewhat austere.
In his Action Memorandum A-436 89 he summed up these "changes
in the ground rules" as reflective of the Presidential-deter-
urination to stop escalation in the size and in the dollar
costs of Government agencies. These measures had been taken
against a backdrop of two recent pay raises for Federal
employees and the abundantly clear policies of this Adminis-
tration with respect to increased productivity and economy
in Government operations. Each Agency was charged with
keeping within the limits established and with taking imme-
diate steps to assure that controls were developed to meet
these objectives.
The BOB contends that ... the Agency average
salary over the past year has shown a sharp rise
... our promotion rate might be unduly high ...
there has been too great a margin between posi-
tion grade and the actual grade of the incumbent
... grade structure within organization compo-
nents may be richer than actual responsibilities
justify.
Recognizing that Agency management had to live within
these controls, the Executive Director pointed out that the
task involved the full scope of personnel management, from
job creation and position grading through recruitment, pay,-
promotion, and separation.
As Mr. Kirkpatrick pointed out, however, "average salary"
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in itself can be a very fluid. control device, responding to
the mix of personnel at any given time and. susceptible to
artificial rigging. Although the Agency did go through the
motions of establishing an average-salary cost-control system,
the BOB was to find that, as the Executive Director had indi-
cated., it was a very fluid control. Ultimately the BOB dropped
the average-salary cost-control concept but retained the
GS-14+ and above position control. This control required the
C/SWD (later the PMCD) to work very closely with OPPB in
monitoring the average position grade profile of the Agency,
which -- controls notwithstanding -- rose slowly to 10.039
? by 31 Deceiiiber 1967.- In summation, the Agency had learned
to live under controls although, from time to time, internal
pressures forced some "giving" by the Chief of PMCD and the
Executive Director.
D. Position Management as a Control
Even before the demise of the Management Staff (May
1961) and more so afterwards, SWD personnel found that their
advice was sought on problems of organizational structure as
it related to staffing patterns, division of work, and other
The zenith was reached on 31 December 1970 when the Agency
average position grade reached 10.324.
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f actors.* As a result little emphasis was placed by SWD on
the assumption of these additional staff chores -- perhaps it
could best be described as picking up residual responsibilities
that no other unit would assume.
Because CIA is largely a "service" organization, many
program changes occur only when an external catalyst (sometimes
a customer agency) proposes either new or revised requirements.
Within CIA the IG Survey results were often, in a sense,
external catalysts too and invoked changes. This was what
happened in 196+ when an IG team surveyed the Office of Per-
sonnel. In reporting on the Salary and Wage Division, the IG
stated that the Division had Agency-wide position classifica-
tion and wage administration program responsibilities. In
discharging these the Division had the most day-to-day access
to and information about workload, job requirements, job
qualifications, and personnel practices and problems of other
CIA offices. The report went on to indicate that the Division
There were many factors that contributed to this "arrange-
ment." The Management Staff had only a small number of organ-
ization and methods examiners and was thus limited to infrequent
and irregular contacts with operating officials, whereas the
SWD had a larger staff that worked very closely with Agency
activities. As a result the Management Staff looked at the
"big organizational picture," and SWD handled organizational
problems below the branch level.
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was the only Agency component that was'in a-position to review
the performances of the Career Services in any systematic way.
The IG recommendation was that SWD should be given a larger
staff and a broader charter, which. would include the responsi-
bility for exanuning all aspects of personnel management of
the Career Services and, in this fashion., discharge the review
and evaluation function of the Director of Personnel.90
This IG proposal had some merit and was certainly
well-intended, but the implementation of it would have required
not only additional staff but also more broadly trained per-
sonnel officers than the position classifiers. Thus, as a
counter-proposal, the Chief of the SV) suggested 9 that
recent trends in Government made it necessary for the Agency
to be seriously concerned with personnel ceiling, budgetary
expenditures, optimum use of personnel, and realistic require-
ments in the form of up-to-date staffing complements. The
C/SWD pointed out that the Division already had the responsi-
bility for the establishment and maintenance of staffing
complements and that these staffing complements established
the Agency's position average grade and the Career Service
Grade Authorizations that were the framework within which
hiring, firing, career development, promotions,.and personnel
planning were accomplished. This framework had a considerable
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effect upon the Agency, as salary costs amounted to approxi-
mately
of the Agency's budget.
In view of these administrative priorities the C/SWD
recommended that the divisional program areas be continued
in Agency-wide position classification and compensation
responsibilities and be augmented by the formal assignment
of the Agency position management staff responsibilities.
A well-executed program would include:
consistent and equitable evaluation of Agency positions;
ability to respond to requests to review organiza-
tional grade structure and specific positions;
ability to maintain position descriptions and organi-
zational changes on a current basis;
ability to conduct a program of periodic surveys both
in Headquarters and the field to insure reasonably current
and accurate staffing complements;
ability to assist offices in organization, Job engi-
neering, and grading problems;
ability to furnish top management with up-to-date
information concerning status, trends, and specific
compensation problems in the program; and
ability to maintain cognizance of salary and classifi-
cation trends in industry and government.
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These functional responsibilities were assigned to the
division; its T/0 was increased
staff positions;
and, to better reflect its increased functional responsibil-
ities, its name was changed to the.Position Management and
Compensation Division. The DDS' approval was secured on
6 October 1965.92 The assignment of the Agency position
management staff responsibility to the Position Management and
Compensation Division was a logical one. To a considerable
extent the Division was already involved in position manage-
ment -- in advising operating officials on organizational
structure, elimination of excess positions, realignment of
tasks among the remaining positions, and so forth.
Because position management is the continuous management
of the quality.and quantity of the work force, to be effective
not only line supervisors' but also all levels of management
must play an active role in it. This is excellent theory,
but in actual practice in CIA there has been a reluctance on
the part of management to acknowledge a strong interest in
position. management. This was understandable; the responsi-
bility for the initiation of T/0 changes has remained with
* Position classifiers usually report that of all Agency
groups field station personnel are possibly the most re6ep-
tive to seeking and applying position management advice.
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the operating officials, and they long'ago developed a reluc-
tance to give up any positions that they already had on their
T/0's -- especially for something less, -
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VII. Retrospect
A strong central classification program is essential
in an Agency such as CIA where the majority of the personnel
management functions have been decentralized to the operating
officials. The position classification program provides the
Agency with a framework within which to do the necessary per-
sonnel work in the performance of its mission.
The Agency classification program has steadily improved
from the early years; a vastly better understanding of Agency
operations and of formal procedures for the administering,
processing, and establishing of Staffing Complements and the
necessary approvals has developed. This history can hardly
conclude, however, without commenting on the inability of
management to*make the T/0 an up-to-date and useful adminis-
trative,document. This inability must be cited as a definite
shortcoming. The T/0 is the foundation upon which CIA bases
all of its personnel actions, and it should be meaningful.
Today operating officials and, even more unfortunately, per-
sonnel officers continue to regard the T/0 as something to
be used for any expediency, not as a viable current statement
of what personnel requirements are and how well they are met.
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Position management is probably one of the ihost important tools
of supervisors, but it must be used wisely and well.
In retrospect, the establishment of a flexible T/.0 in
the Agency manpower control system of 1958 may well have worked
against Agency management problems of the 1960's where more
control and better position management were desirable. For
example, flexible positions were established to permit quick
response to changing workloads. Many supervisors have used
this vehicle as a device to place personnel in positions that
would enhance their promotion possibilities regardless of the
level of duties performed. In addition many professional
Agency positions have had their important functions splintered
and dissipated so that routine clerical work makes up an inor-
dinate amount of the duties of the positions.
At this time management is beset with anxiety over the
real or imagined disenchantment of many employees, particularly
young professionals. In its concern with communications,
involvement, the generation gap, and so forth, management has
largely ignored the fundamental concept of the right job for
the right person. Properly structured professional positions,
offering challenge and denuded of excessive trivia, would go
a long way toward mending the generation gap'and enhancing top
management's image. Until management fully understands the
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need for respectable T/0's, the Agency personnel management
program will continue to suffer.
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Appendix A
Chronology: CIA Position Classification Program, 19+6-67
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Appendix A
Chronology: CIA Position Classification Program, 191+6-67
1946-1949 CIG/CIA position classification program operated
under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Com-
mission.
22 Jul 1947 National Security Act of 1947 signed; established
CIA as the US central intelligence organization.
18 Sep 1947 Administrative transfers of CIG employees to CIA
accomplished under NIA Directive No. 11; also
directed Agency to report to NSC.
20 Jun 1949 CIA Act of 1949 (PL 110) signed; provided the
DCI broad administrative authorities.
7 Jul 1949 NSC Directive No. 50 issued; directed CIA
reorganization.
8 Aug 1949 CSC acknowledged that, with passage of PL 110,
CIA had become "exempt" from CSC classification
jurisdiction.
10 Aug 1949 DCI (Hillenkoetter) announced Agency policy to
follow Classification Act, in'principle.
Fall 1949, CIA position classification program inaugurated
with review of Agency executive positions.
28 Oct 1949 Classification Act of 1949 signed; act specifi-
cally exempted CIA.
10 Nov 1949 Comptroller General's decision confirmed DCI's
administrative authority over Agency position
classification and pay activities.
7 Oct 1950 Lt. General Walter B. Smith, USA, sworn in as
DCI; selected because of his administrative
ability.
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14 Feb 1951 Director of Personnel advised-DDA that all
Agency Personnel programs had been centralized.
1950-1952 NSC Directive No. 50 implemented by DCI and new
Deputies (DDI position established 1 January 1952).
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Fall 1952 Position Classification standards program started.
Dec 1952 Classification approved T/0 for OSO-OPC merger
accomplished.
Jan 1953 DCI (Smith) makes policy decision to reduce number
of Agency "vacant" position slots.
30 Nov 1953 IG's survey recommendations on OP included the
need to develop a CIA tailored classification
plan.
28 Jul 1954 DCI (Dulles) directed further reduction of T/0
position ceiling.
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25 Feb 1955 IG's memo on "Ten ways to improve CIA's personnel
management."
7 Max 1955 OP task force organized to develop new CIA per-
sonnel system.
28 Mar 55 Chief, Management Staff secured DDA's approval,
in principle, for a "Man-in-Motion" manpower
control system. -
8 Apr 1956 Pilot installation of CIA manpower control system
begun in Office of Communications.
2 May 1956 CIA factor comparison job evaluation plan for
supergrade positions approved; executive position
survey undertaken.
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May 1957
23 May 1957 CIA Career Council unanimously approved imple-
mentation of CIA manpower control system.
13 Jun 1957 DDS formally approved Agency secretarial position
classification plan.
27 Mar 1958 CIA compensation system proposal approved in
principle by Career Council.
Standards Branch, PED, abolished; function and
personnel transferred to operating branches.
14 Nov 1958 Agency manpower control system formally imple-
mented with issuance of regulation and handbook.
May 1961
CIA Management Staff abolished.
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25 Aug 1962 DCI advised D/BOB of his approval of
executive positions (90 percent increase ; D /BOB
-strongly recommended judicious activation and
encumbering.
11 Oct 1962 Federal Salary Reform Act of 1962 signed; estab-
lished higher salary levels for Federal executives
more in consonance with US industrial executive
pay practices.
14 Apr 1964 D/BOB alerts DCI to Federal wholesale grade
escalation problem.
19 May 1964 Executive Director ordered the reduction of Agency
average grade to that of 30 June 1963; directed
that upgrading requests include compensating down-
gradings.
30 Jun 1964 SWD reduced Agency average grade slightly lower
than 30 June 1963 level.
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25 Aug 196+ BOB Circular A-11 (Revised) issued; placed ceiling
on Agency's positions in Grades GS-141- and above;
ceiling not to exceed total number of such posi-
tions filled in FY 1964.
23 Jan 1965 Executive Director advised Agency management that
the BOB would continue its controls over execu-
tive positions; would also monitor Agency requests
for funds to insure that CIA was being managed
efficiently and economically.
6 Oct 1965 DDS approved OP proposal to augment the Agency
position classification program with staff respon-
sibility over position management function; name
changed to Position Management and Compensation
Division.
5 Dec 1967 BOB and Agency officials agreed that Agency SG and
SPS position requirements be incorporated into
the five-year programming-budgeting process.
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Appendix B
PMCD/OP Foreign Field Survey Report
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PMCD/OP Foreign Field Survey Report on OC Installations
March - April 1970
Background Information
In accordance with requests from the Office'of Communications,
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and April, 1970:
conducted position
evaluation surveys of the following Agency installations during March
The survey procedures utilized included a comprehensive briefing
by the Chief and/or Senior Officer in charge of each facility on their
overall program plus a tour of the facility and explanation on systems/
equipment/procedural operations. This was followed by PMCD Team review
of the various types of positions, duty assignments, grade patterns,
identification*of special work situations and job evaluations to deter-
mine the proper position titles, occupational codes, and grade levels.
The*PMCD Team also provided guidance on organizational structure, func-
tional alignment, span of control, and standardization of organiza-
tional nomenclature.
Upon conclusion of each survey, a meeting was held with the Chief
and/or Senior Officer to discuss our findings, recommendations, and
.resolve questions concerning duty assignments, job patterns, grade
levels, organization and functions.
In all instances, the Chief and/or Senior Officers were advised
that the survey recommendations were tentative with particular refer-
ence to any increases in upper grade levels and average grade. No
proposals or components surveyed include requests for additional
ceiling at this time.
The survey covered approximately I __]Positions. 25X1A
The PMCD Team wishes to express its appreciation to all person-
nel at each facility surveyed for their assistance, cooperation and
general support.
Narrative summaries of each installation surveyed and.'staffing
complement (S/C) proposals where major changes occurred are attached:
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Survey Report
has been removed in view of
Security policy restrictions
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Appendix C
2 May 1956 Memorandum for Chairman, Supergrade, Review Board,
from D/Pers, transmitting (Proposed) Supergrade Job Evaluation
System.
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Appendix C . F r ti
t NORANDUMI ;' OR a Chairman, Supergrade Review Board
SUBJECT : Super grade Job Evaluation Synten-
1 o P OBLI1~:1:
To establish a systematic rmt lod of job analysis for Agency
Supergrade positions.
2. ASSUMPTIONS:
A uniform system of assigning grade levels to the Agency S%ur r-
grade positions and for determining which positions warra;:at
supergrade status will be of benefit, to the Sup:' a grac e Board
in discharging its responsibilities.
3. FACTS:
a. Agency Supergrade determinations in the past have. been based
to a great degree on organizational status of positions and
upon the caliber of the individual occupying oa? schedule:d to
occupy each position.
b. Executive job evaluation systems in use by other Federal Agen-
cies and by private industry provide a s~!tis 'sctory r ;bod for
objective appraisal of executive jobs. These s,1r:toirs axe
gerisraUy adirdxii