THE SITUATION IN CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A000300040019-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 23, 2000
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: January 31, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

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The Situation in Cuba
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Soviet On the basis of information from all our
soursee? we have concluded that since late Oetober the Soviets have withdrawn
42 strategic missiles and 42 jet bombers and their related equipments and
about 50000 military personnel probably associated with this equipment.
We believe that this reiresents all the strategic weapons placed in
Cuba by the Soviets Our program of aerial reconnaiseanoes
'hop efufly?reveal
Lr steps teloon to reintroduce strategic missiles or to reactivate strategic
weapons systems Nevertheless, we are carefully amtunteg studying all reports
for any information Which
might reveal a renewed Soviet offensive threat in Cuba, All such reports
which are sufficiently preciee to permit it are Checked oat regularly-with
the product of the aerial photography, We are Nay appreolative that
reporting last summer and fall gave us our first
clumps on the missile/buildup in Cuba.
Despite the withdrawals of Soviet military equipmeit and personnel since
last fall, there is still a substantial Soviet military- presenoe in Cuba.
We eetimate that some 17,000 Soviet pme military personnel remain in Oubas
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though this is at beet a very rough and there could be several thalsands more-
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or fewer. There is no good evidence that the Soviets intend to reduce their
military skomagikEts presence in Cuba to any significant degree in the near
futures although the possibility remains that some of the troops say be
replaced in a rotational program*
Soviet personnel are still manning the SAM sites and the cruise ile
installations. Soviet pilots are operating the advanced M10-232 and flying
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some of the other1IO aircraft in Cuba. Soviet naval personnel are probably
involved with the X KOMAR missile boats, and in numerous other functions.
In addition, some 5,000 Soviet troops are stationed in the Ibur armored group
encampments. We have noted in the photography that permanent barracks
building have been set up at some of these rheas enoamments.
What VAS probetaythe first Soviet military oargo to Cube since last
Octob arrived aboard the SimferoR4 which docked in Havana on 17TTJ8nuary.
These reports have confirmed our ButipieiODO
that the ship brought in a military cargo. They all agree that the oargo was
declared to lua contain "explosives" and two of than indicate it um contained
supplies and equipment form:military aircraft.
The Cuban Economics, Situation; The Cuban economy continues to deteriorate.
Inadequate supplies and poor distribution of food and other consumer gooda
are najor irritants among the Cuban ptiblic, Food rationing, begun formally
last March, has not ensured impartial diatribution or adequate supplies of
needed goods. While there is much grumbling among the public and occasional
open protests, car information suggeats that at present the shortagesiggia
-prisbirinaccasez probably do not repreaent an open inducement to revolt.
There are no aigna of an improvement in the economy in the forseeable
future. Evan with najor aid frmn the Soviet Union, the prospects are die.
Present indications are that this yowls sugar crop-..the mainstay of the
econony?will be lose than last year's poor crop of 4.8 million metric tone.
(This compares with an average annual crop in earlier years of close to
6 million tone.)
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Sugar prices on the free world market are now at a LNyear high. However,
Cuba mill benefit little- from this, A good portion of ita sugar exports will
Ito to the SinoftSoviet bloc as barter for goods Cuba must import. We have no
information on the !Byname given Cuban sugar in figuring the barter arrangements
but we doubt that Cuba is doing particularly well.
Negotiations were underway during mush of the last three months on
(gliding the level of Cuba's 1963 trade with the Soviet bloc. Preliminary
announcements on the negCtiations have been vague and have mentioned only that
trade will increase this year. If Cuban-bloc trade does in facts inorease,
this mIll mean that Cuba ie receivdng sizeable commodity credits from the bloc.
Cuba's need for imports is at the: same or higher le/vas as lent years bat its
ability to pay for themmith exports is at the lowest point in manY years.
Cuba's commerce with non-bloc countries continues to shrink. This, in
turns makes it even more expensive for the Soviets to keep Cuba afloat.
Non-bloo shipping to Cuba has fallen off sinoe the crisie to roughly a quarter
of what it used to be. The bloc has responded by initiating 4 new shipping serviesi
to Cuba in an effort to fill the gap,
Cuba is dependent on the 81.no4oviet bloc for nearly 80 percent of its
import* including all ite petroleum and an increasing proportion of ite
consumer goods.
Unless the bloc is milling to invest even more heavily in Cuba, soma of
the gandiome developmental plans lorked out wlier in the Cuban-Soviet
partnership will have to be deferred or scrapped in the interests of simply
keeping the country afloat.
Political Develoirmtst The most significant change in Cuban policies
since the miesile crisis ha e been the muoh increased emphasis given to
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the promtion of revolution in other Latin American countries. Indications
oontinue to multiply that this program--Always an element in Cuban poliorm-le
now a high priority Cuban program,
The reasons for the inereased emphasis on subveraion abroad are probably
viral, in the first placie,, it is one of the few means left to Castro to
whip up domestic enthusiasm for the revolution.* By telling Cubans that they
are in the vanguard of mart a worldwide revolution that will "inevitably
sweep imperialism away* he attempts to give them a sense of mission and purpose
and distract them from the increasingly diffionit problem at hone.
En the second plat*, it could well be a reaction against the Soviet Union
ald 'what Caetro apparently felt vas Soviet betrayal of Cuban interests when it
withdrew its missiles from Cube. The stemmata eoming cut ar Cuba now on
the importance of guerrilla warfare In the "liberation struggle" and an the
neceseity of violence in the anti-imperialist etruggle are much closer to
the Chinese Communist line than to the Soviet position. Also? there could
well be an element of competition between Omar? end IhruShohev for control of
the Latin American Communist and pro-Comumnist revolutionaries.
In the third place, a successful pro...Castro revolution in anotherALatin
American country would be a tremendoue boost for Castro at this time when be
probably feels a desperate need for much a boost. The fact that Venezuela is
clearly the leading Cuban target for subvereion at this time lends substance to
this speculation. Prior to mid-1960 Cuba received the bulk of ite petroleum
froniVenesuelan sourceeg now it is wholly dependent an the Soviet Union.
Blas Rocals abetment on 23 January 14as particulaay reveeling an this
aUbject. He declared that when the Venezuelan revolution takes place, than
all Latin America will be *blase." He added that victory In Venesuela
"give Cube a tremendous boost...we will have a nation on the continemt to back ue,
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Earlier in the epeech, Roanandered expressed Cuban arprecistion for the
acts of sabotage in the Venesuelan oil fields during the mieeile
He used this as an example of "proletarian internationalism" and stated
flataythet Nee shall continue to give our supports each day in greater
;awe:time, to the Venesuelan peoples in their struggle forPliberatien
from imperialial."
One of Cuba's oat affective means of eubversion in Latin America is the
training of thousands of students frpm other countries in the tactics of
guerrilla warfare and in the principles of Marxism-Leninism. We estimate
that at least 1,000 and probably as many as 1,500 individuals received
training in guerrilla warfare ln Cuba lest year.
On the domestic scenes one development of major tartance in the offing
is the formation of Cube's formal political party machine, the United Party
of the Socialist Revolution. The party, to be modeled generally after bloc
eommunist parties, has been in the process of formation for manymonthe and
regime leaders have implied that it will be formally established ammetime
early this year. The organisational structure of the party machinery and the
membership of the various party organs should tell us much about the
formal nature of Cuban Communism and about the changes which must have been
taking place during the past year in the relative importance of various
Cuban Isadore and faotions.
There has been a notable increase since early this year in the number of
Insurgent attacks and acts of sabotage in the Cuban canefields. However, we
do not believe that this activity constitutes a real threat to the regime.
The acts of resistance are accomplished by only a very small minority and
consist whitely of hit.and.run raids by small bands of guerrillas. The fires
in the canefields, assezsmfbaskimis a usual accurence this time of year when the
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harvest le getting underway, repreaent more of a harassrent than a loss to the
goverbralt. The fires burn off the dried leavea but the cane stalks an
be milled. Production acheduled are disrupted, howevw, since the oane must
then be ground very quickly-to prevent loss of sugar ocntent.
In general the potential for active resistanoe is high in Cuba, we believe.
But the regime pervasive and effective security apparatus Takes it seem
oblhardy to luny Cubans considering open action against the regime.
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