TRENDS IN AUTOMATION IN THE USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01093A001200100010-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 1, 1999
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: May 31, 1957
• Content Type: IR

orl~eTease 1999/09/2fi
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N? 81
PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
TREN'~S ~N AUT~1vIAT~ON IN THE USSR
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This material contains information a8'ecting
the Ne~tional Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 16, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission. or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
TRENAS IN AUTOi~TION IN THE USSR
CIA~RR PR-161
(ORR Project 30.1088)
NOTICE
The data and conclusions .contained in this report
do not necessarily represent the final position of
ORR and should be regarded as provisional only and
subject to revision. Comments and data which may
be available to the user are solicited.
Office of Research and Reports
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FOREWORD
The purpose of this report is to present the conceptual and organi-
zational framework of industrial automation in the USSR, with specific
reference to the machine building sector of Soviet industry.
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CONTENTS
A . General
B. Component?Production .
C. Continuous-Flow Production .
II. Current Program .
Summary .
. 1
I. Concepts of Automation .~ 3
Page
A. Former Limitations 7
B. Sixth Five Year Plan (1956-60) g
III. Policy Considerations 9
A. General Short-Term and Long-Term Gains 9
B. Specific Economic and Technological Advantages 10'
1. Increased Production 10
2. More Advanced Technological Processes 10
3. Improved ~,uality of Product 10
~+. Savings in Manpower 11
5. More Efficient Use of Plant Space 11
6. Other Economic Considerations 11
7. Limitations and Necessary Characteristics
of Automatic Transfer Lines 12
C. Ideological Overtones 13
D. Investment and Obsolescence 13
IV. Implementation of the Program 1l~
A. Organizational Measures to Encourage Mechanization
and Automation 15
1. Improvements in Central Technological
Administration 15
2. Improvements in Technological Management- 17
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Page
B. Organizational Measures to Expand Production
of Automation Equipment .
C . Economic Incentives
1. Credit Policy
2. Bonuses
3. Measures Under Consideration .
V. Trends in Component Production .
A. Stages of Automation
1. Mechanization and Partial Automation .
2. Complex Automation
3. Full Automation
B. Trends in Automation
1. History .
2. Research and Development Since World
War II
3. Computer and Feedback Control
Appendixes
18
20
20
22
22
23
24
25
27
32
Appendix A. Methodology 33
Appendix B. Gaps in Intelligence 35
Appendix C. Source References 37
USSR: Management of the Program for Industrial
Automation
Following Page
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CIA~RR PR-161 S-E-C-R-E-T
(ORR Project 30.1089)
Su~nnary
The Sixth Five Year Plan (1956-60) of the USSR calls for a signif-
icant expansion of mechanization and automation in the Soviet machine
building, metallurgical, and other basic industries.~~ Previously
automation had been directed primarily toward application to military
programs. The broadening of the program for automation indicates
' that Soviet leaders are confident that now they can give greater
' attention to problems of the long-term technological development of
industry as a whole without impairing military requirements.
Soviet leaders are relying on the program i'or automation to offer
tangible benefits, such as increased production, savings in manpower
and plant space, savings in .materials, improved quality of products,
and greater safety and convenience for workers. Moreover, automation
is one of several measures expected to contribute to the increase of
50 percent in industrial productivity anticipated under the current
Plan. If the goal is reached, Soviet leaders hope to achieve abase
for a large-scale application of automation and other advanced tech-
, nological processes which will enable the USSR to surpass the US in
production per. capita after 2 or 3 more Five Year Plans.
Soviet leaders have recognized the difficulties of implementing the
program for automation and have taken well-conceived steps to assure
:its eventual success. Administrative machinery has been created to
supervise and coordinate basic scientific research, technological de-
velopment, and the introduction of automation into specific industries
-~ The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent
the best judgment of ORR as of 15 March 1957.
~~ In Soviet usage the term mechanization in the broadest sense
refers simply to the use of machines to replace manual labor, whereas
automation denotes the use of mechanical or electronic devices to re-
place human control of the processes of production. See I, p. 3,
below, for a discussion of the distinction between mechanization and
automation made by Soviet scientists and technicians.
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and enterprises as well as the development and production of mechanisms
and devices used in automation. Moreover, economic incentives specifi-
cally designed to stimulate technological progress are offered to in-
dustrial managers and technical and production personnel. The current
policy in favor of replacing outdated equipment also tends to promote
the introduction of technological innovations, including automation.
The processes of mass production used in the USSR which apparently
have been considered most easily adaptable to automation include public
utilities; component production; and continuous-flow production of
solid materials, friable materials, and liquid and gaseous substances.~-
Soviet authorities on automation tend to base their plans for component
production on the installation of cyclic automatic machines and for
continuous-flow production on the use of. feedback control (self-correct-
ing mechanisms).
The program for automation gives emphasis to industries employing
component production, particularly machine building plants which manu-
facture motor vehicles and agricultural machinery. The individual
automatic machine tools represent the first stage of automation in these
industries, and the automatic transfer line epitomizes the more advanced
level. The truly automatic factory, in which automatic lines are inte-
grated by means of electronic computers and feedback control, probably
will not be achieved for many years either in the USSR or in the US.
Since World War II the USSR has developed a program for research
on the automation of manufacturing processes in the machine building
industries on a greater scale than has the US. The quality of Soviet
research and technology in this field of automation equals that of the
US, although the US leads the USSR in the range and the quantity of
industrial applications. In the motor vehicle industry, for example,
the USSR has perfected automatic lines for production of only a few
components, such as the engine block and piston, whereas most of
the major US automobile firms have perfected and installed lines for
making practically every component by such means. With enforced stand-
ardization-and centralized control of changes in the design of products,
the USSR would be justified in automating component production to a
greater extent than any US manufacturer would be.
~ A leading Soviet scientist made these classifications of industrial
processes according to common features and methods of production. See
I, p. 3, below, for a discussion of the distinctions in the automation
of these classifications.
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Factories of the Soviet motor vehicle and agricultural machinery
industries have 80 to g0 automatic and semiautomatic lines. Thes e
lines have increased production-and are being utilized extensively
for operational research,- thus serving two purposes of equal impor-
tance.
The limited application of automatic lines to actual production
is illustrated in the Soviet motor vehicle and tractor industries.
.Although almost every major motor vehicle plant is producing engine
blocks on automatic lines, engine heads are manufactured with indi-
vidual machine tools. In all major tractor plants, individual ma-
chine tools are still producing engine blocks, but automatic lines
are used to manufacture engine heads.
If the plan to introduce 220 new automatic and semiautomatic lines
into the machine building industry by 1960 is carried out, however,
the USSR will be able to achieve automatic production of such mass-
produced components as engine heads, blocks, and gear cases. In addi-
tion, the USSR should be able to introduce prototype lines for a
limited number of other components.
I. Concepts of Automation.
A. General.
Automation is not a single, easily identified development but
the result of industrial progress in .technology. The Soviet usage of
the term automation does not imply that automation is a new phenomenon
separate from. the broad advance of mechanization. -The frequent Soviet
references to automation as the highest degree of mechanization are
logical because automation does replace human labor by machinery, the
traditional definition of mechanization. The leading Soviet scientists
and engin2ers emphasize, however, that whereas mechanization is commonly
understood to mean the replacement of human labor by machinery, auto-
mation is understood to mean the next logical step, the replacement of
human control of technological process by mechanical control. The
Soviet concept of automation thus involves the use of any machine,
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device, or the like which replaces man. as the controlling mechanism
in the process of production.'
Soviet writers, like others, use the term automation loosely.
As a result, there is much confusion as to the exact meaning of auto-
mation as used in various popular publications, economic journals,
and technical publications in the USSR. The confusion arises because
the term automation has different meanings for different groups of
Soviet writers and because automation differs in definition from
industry to industry. For example, automation may refer to (1) any
equipment or method designed to reduce the labor required in an opera-
tion, (2) highly mechanized assembly lines that use automatic machines
and material-handling equipment, or (3) automatic process control that
uses advanced types of electronic circuits and computers.
A leading Soviet scientist has classified definitions of auto-
mation from an industrial point of view into five types of processes
according to common factors and methods of production, as follows:
(1) component production, such as pistons, antifriction bearings, and
cylinder blocks; (2) continuous-flow production of solid materials;
(3) continuous-flow production of friable materials; (~+) continuous-
flow production of liquid and gaseous substances; and (5) public utili-
ties. ~ The essential difference among these types of automation
is that they are based on two distinct principles. Automation of com-
ponent production is based on cyclic action of automatic machines,~~
-~ The Bol'shaya sovetska~s, entsiklopediya (Great Soviet Encyclopedia)
has defined automation of production as the application of instruments
( ribor ), devices (prisposobleniya), and machines (mashin ) which are
designed to carry out the processes of production without the direct
participation of the individual, but only under his supervision. The Com-
mittee of Technical Terminology of the Academy of Sciences, USSR, has
explained automation as "a branch of science and technology ... which
secures the freeing of individuals from direct participation in pro-
duction processes, combined, in particular, with the fulfillment of the
function of control and regulation, by means of establishing suitable
connections between mechanisms (ustroistva) which carry out the pro-
duction process." ~ (For serially numbered source references, see
Appendix C.)
~ Acyclic automatic machine is understood to mean any machine which
performs a preset cycle of operations repetitively with almost no human
intervention. The function of the worker is limited to manual pushbutton
starting and stopping, observing and adjusting the performance to correct
any malfunction, and repairing and maintaining the machine.
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whereas the other four types are guided by the principle of automation
based on the concept of feedback control.
Further confusion arises when Soviet writers, by introducing ad-
ditional concepts of automation, distinguish between complex mechaniza-
tion and automation. The three stages of .automation generally recog=
nixed by Soviet writers and technicians are as follows: (1) partial
automation, in which some or all of the individual operations in a pro-
cess are automatically controlled but in which the movement of the prod-
uct from one operation to the next is directed manually; (2) complex
automation, in which a number of automatic operations are linked to-
gether to form a series of integrated processes by means of material-
handling and transfer mechanisms; and (3) full automation, in which
integrated processes, departments, or even factories are made fully
automatic and self-correcting by means of computers and devices for
feedback control. These governing devices compare the operations
in progress with advanced programming instructions and make whatever
corrections are necessary to achieve the desired results.
B. Component Production.
The greatest emphasis on automation of component production
in Soviet industry has occurred in the machine building sector,
principally in production of motor vehicles and agricultural machinery.
,, Most of the many diverse processes of production that are peculiar to
the machine building industry -- because of the very large number of
different shapes, materials, and sizes of items produced by the in-
dustry -- lend themselves to the type of automation used in com-
ponent production. .The automatic fulfillment of a technological
process of this type depends primarily on the control of a great
variety of individual cyclic-action automatic machine tools which
have the function of driving a perishable cutting tool that performs
a distinct metal-cutting operation. At this crucial phase the feed-
back control necessary for full automation becomes difficult or im-
possible to achieve. Deviations of such parameters as temperature,
pressures, and rates of flow, which are the major agents in perform-
ing the desired operations in industries employing continuous-flow
production, lend themselves to correction through the application of
feedback control. Deviations caused by the wear of the cutting tool
in performing desired operations in component production, however,
can be corrected only through replacement of this tool. Eventually,
~ These stages of automation are discussed specifically with relation
to component production in V, A, p. 23, below.
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through the development and introduction of new and different methods
of metalforming, the principle of integrated feedback control and
computers may be applied effectively to component production, thus
achieving full automation. Although the USSR is engaged in research
toward this end, present emphasis is devoted to improving conventional
types of high-speed-steel, carbide-tipped, and ceramic-tipped cutting
tools by increasing their resistance to wear to a degree that permits
economical and statistical control of quality in production.
C. Continuous-Flow Production.
Automation of a technological process in those industries em-
ploying continuous-flow production is guided by the principle of auto-
mation based on the concept of feedback control. The automatic ful-
fillment of a technological process in continuous-flow production de-
pends primarily on the control of a great variety of parameters such
as temperatures, pressures, and rates of flow. Despite the diversity
of industrial processes employed in continuous-flow production, the
control apparatus required f'or their automation can be constructed to a
large extent on a single plain based on feedback control.
This uniformity results from the general nature, of the problems
of checking and control. TYie functions of a system of automation in
continuous-flow production, although not always apparent, are as follows:
(1) sensing and checking -- that is, measuring the parameter to be reg-
ulated (for example, temperature), comparing the result with a predeter-
mined value, and signaling in case of a discrepancy -- anal (2) trans-
forming the control signal into action on the process (for example,
varying the supply of fuel), thus reducing the deviation in the para-
meter.
The achievement of a completely automatically controlled plant
in the industries employing continuous-flow production is a goal for
the future. In both the US and the USSR, however, the prospect of
ultimately achieving such a plant is much better for those industries
employing continuous-flow production than for those employing component
production. Industries employing continuous-flow production, in fact,
could not exist as they do today without automatic control in the most
rudimentary sense of the phrase. The very nature of such industries
as the chemical and steel industries demands devices for accurate con-
trol of every step in their entire technological process. Not until
World War II, however, were great advances made, both in the US and in
the USSR, in research and development involving servomechanisms and
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electronic and communications instruments and devices capable of per-
forming a sequence of logical, self-correcting operations.
The USSR appears to have kept up with the US in this field
of research and development. In some special fields, such as that
of theoretical nonlinear mechanics, however, many US scientists be-
lieve that the USSR has surpassed the US. ~ A survey of Soviet
applications of automation in the various industries employing con-
tinuous-flow production indicates that although the US leads the
USSR in range and quantity of industrial applications, the quality
of Soviet automation is equal to that of the US.
II. .Current Program.
The increased emphasis on automation in the Sixth Five Year Plan
is a logical outgrowth of previous. Soviet policies and of the general
course of technological development in the USSR. Soviet leaders, who
traditionally have extolled the advantages of improved technology,
began in the late 193o's to promote advanced mechanization and auto-
mation in important sectors of industry.
A. Former Limitations.
The scale of early Soviet efforts to promote advanced mechani-
zation and automation was governed by rather severe economic and tech-
nical limitations. Before World War II there were general shortages
of manufactured goods in the USSR. The immediate concern of Soviet
planners, therefore, was a rapid increase in industrial production.
Because-labor and most raw materials were relatively abundant and capi-
tal equipment was scarce, the planners relied on conventional methods
of production and equipment that provided a quick return from available
resources. The planners were able to make only limited investments in
advanced technological equipment. The decision to favor investments
.providing a quick .increase in production stemmed also from the growing
Soviet belief that war was imminent.
Because, of these pressures, mechanization and automation were
.applied only to key sectors of industry and were carried out on a piece-
meal basis. Even in the favored sectors of industry, many plants con-
tinued to use equipment and methods that were backward by comparison
with the best practice in the USSR and elsewhere because the additional
production from these plants was badly needed.
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Similar pressures have influenced Soviet industrial policy
during much of the decade since World War II. During these years
the USSR had to rebuild war-damaged industry, at the same time main-
taining the military preparedness required by its cold war policies
and by its indirect role in the Korean war. Programs for military
production thus received priority. The primary emphasis in research
and development involving automation was on applications to the mili-
tary programs. Attention was focused on the research and development
of analogue and digital computers for use in solving scientific and
engineering problems arising in the design and development of a new
aircraft, missile, or atomic weapon.
Progress in industrial automation was restricted largely to
the machine building industries making items, such as bearings and
pistons, which are widely used in both military and civilian produc-
tion. ~ ,
B. Sixth Five Year Plan (1956-60).
Under the Sixth Five Year Plan (1956-60) the USSR is signifi-
cantly expanding its efforts to mechanize and automate the processes
of production. The Plan outlines a,program for introducing mechani-
zation and automation in the machine building, metallurgical, and other
basic industries "on a large scale." Soviet leaders expect this pro-
gram to contribute to a planned increase of 50 percent in industrial
productivity. The section of the Plan dealing with mechanization and
.automation provides for a general increase of approximately 350 percent
in production of instruments and means of automation, including an
increase of 400 percent in production of instruments for the automatic
control and regulation off' technological processes.
The Plan emphasizes partial and complex automation as the most
immediate and practical goals for Soviet industry. Complex automa-
tion is given a degree of priority in the machine building, electric
power, chemical, and petroleum industries, which have a state of tech-
nology sufficiently advanced to provide a basis for undertaking neces-
sary research and development under the Sixth Five Year Plan. The
Plan indicates, however, that full automation is extremely important
as an ultimate objective. Soviet science has done extensive research
in the theory of automatic control, data processing, and related
fields. Soviet science has been instructed in directives for imple-
menting the Plan to pay particular attention to the application of
these theoretical findings to industrial processes.
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Soviet planners realize that larger investments in capital
equipment are required to achieve significant increases in industrial
production. In working out the pattern of such investments, the
planners faced problems of a different character from those in pre-
vious Plans. Obsolescence, for example, was becoming a problem in
many industries, and the planners were beginning to realize that the
cost of continuing to operate existing equipment might exceed the
-cost of replacing this equipment. 10 F~zrthermore, the rate of annual
additions to the industrial labor force was expected to decline.
In considering these problems, the government had to decide
the proportions of investment which would be devoted to new conven-
tional equipment and to .automation. Automation would require high
initial investments in developmental research and in equipment.
On the other hand, conventional technology would require more new
plants and substantially more labor. Furthermore, in order to trans-
fer additional labor readily from agriculture to industry, larger in-
vestments in agricultural equipment would be required. Larger invest-
ments in urban housing services also would be needed to accommodate
these new workers in industrial centers.
Soviet planners apparently chose to invest substantially in
automation as well as in conventional technology ~ and to invest
more heavily in new equipment than in new plants.
III. Policy, Considerations.
A. General Short-Term and Long-Term Gains.
Automation generally requires a high initial investment and,
in some instances, yields widespread benefits only over a long period
of time. Soviet leaders seem to believe, however, that it will be
possible to overcome technical obstacles and to obtain some returns
under the present Five Year Plan.
The expected contribution of automation to long-range indus-
trial development, however, holds the greatest appeal for Soviet
leaders. Somewhat underrating the effect of automation on the pro-
ductivity of technically advanced Western nations, Soviet leaders
expect their program for automation and other technological improve-
ments to provide a basis for ultimately surpassing capitalistic coun-
tries in industrial production per capita, although they concede that
the attainment of this goal may require 2 or 3 Five Year Plans.
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Should the objectives of the present Soviet program be i'u11y
achieved, a number of basic industries would have made an appreciable
start in automation by 1960. The USSR also would acquire invaluable
experience in developing practical technology and equipment and in
standardizing production of automatic devices. Soviet leaders prob-
ably consider that the new capacity and technical knowledge to be de-
veloped by 1960 under the program for automation are as significant
as the additional production to be provided under the current Plan.
B. Specific Economic and Technological Advanta es.
Leading Soviet administrators and technicians have stressed
some of the specific economic benefits which they expect to derive
from automation. Soviet analysis of the economic effects of auto-
oration is based only in part on actual industrial experience and
rests to a large extent on theoretical estimates of future possibilities.
1. Increased Production.
Soviet studies comparing the output of production lines
before and after automation usually have shown that automated lines
bring a sharp increase in the number of units produced annually per
worker and per square meter of production area.* 1~+ Although the
number of such studies is small, these findings, in addition to
estimates of the technical capacity of innovations still in the
planning stage, have caused Soviet economic and technical spokes-
men to be optimistic. .
2. More Advanced Technological Processes.
Some new technological processes, such as those involving
atomic energy or certain chemical reactions, operate at high speeds,
temperatures, or pressures that make it physically impossible for the
human hand or eye to maintain direct control. ~ In such cases,
successful production requires electronic and telemechanical control.
3 . Improved Quality of Product .
Automatic control of temperature, pressure, and other
governing factors also is highly desirable to assure the necessary
quality of products in certain processes of such industrial sectors
For specific instances, see V, p. 23, below.
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as petroleum, chemicals, and food processing. 16 In other instances,
automation can provide significant savings by improving the quality
of production and reducing the rate of rejection. 17 In the Kharkov
Tractor Plant, for example, the rate of rejection for engine heads
allegedly declined by 75 percent after an automatic production line
was installed. 18
4.
Savings in Manpower.
Because of the increasing shortage of labor, the USSR
has shown considerable interest in the possibility that automation
might provide sizable savings in manpower in such categories as pro-
duction workers, 9uality-control staffs, and clerical employees. The
small number of production workers required by those automatic lines
for producing pistons and ball bearings, which are now in operation,.
has been highly publicized. Flzrthermore, there has been some discus-
sion of the passibility of reducing clerical staffs by applying auto-
matic techniques for processing data to payrolls, inventory records,
and other administrative operations.
5. More Efficient Use of Plant Space.
Automation also can result in economies in plant space.
The manufacturing cycle frequently can be carried out in a more com-
pact layout, for example, so that there are direct savings in space
and also in intraplant transportation of semifinished products and
components. ~ The most far-reaching gains of this kind, however,
usually require fundamental changes in technological processes and
in the designs of products.
6. Other Economic Considerations.
The principal motivation toward automation for both the
US and the USSR can be summarized as a reduction in the cost of pro-
duction by any one or any combination of the methods mentioned above.
There are, however, relative differences in the two economies which
also will influence the degree, scope, area, and~or necessity of in-
dustrial automation.- At present, for example, the USSR is, for the
first time, faced with an absolute shortage of manpower which threatens
to impede the desired direction and rate of its rapidly expanding
economy. In addition, the Soviet economy is faced with an inadequate
supply of industrial and structural material, particularly steel and
cement. Therefore, the economic criteria and motivations far automation
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in the USSR at any given time may not be same as those for the
US, because, among other differences, the relative scarcities of
labor and capital are different in the two economies. In the US
the present high cost of labor serves as an incentive to spur the
introduction of automation, although some concern is being expressed
about the adverse social and economic impacts of the technological
displacement of labor resulting from automation. In the USSR the
introduction of automation is viewed as a means of reducing the cost
of labor even though labor is cheap relative to the US. Automation
also is being relied upon by the USSR to release additional workers
to ease an absolute labor shortage. The USSR views such labor dis-
placement as an economic necessity and one of the important means
of solving its increasingly tigk~t labor supply. Furthermore, the
USSR even may consider its practices of planned labor training
and planned labor mobility as a panacea for some of the possible
adverse economic and social problems resulting from automation..
7. Limitations and Necessary Characteristics of Automatic
Transfer Lines.
From the point of view of the potential of industrial
automation, the degree and scope of automation possible in those
Soviet industries employing continuous-flow production is equal to
that of the US. Regardless of the differences in economic systems,
the technology of these 'industries in an3r industrially advanced
nation demands a high degree of automation. In those industries
employing component production, however, the USSR appears to be
striving toward a fuller degree of automation than the US, as illus-
trated by the much publicized Soviet "automatic" piston plant.
A few of the basic characteristics and demands necessary
for the economic utilization of an automatic transfer line are (a) mass
quantity of output, (b) stability of design of components, (G) adjust-
ment of both the tempo and the quality of the work of auxiliary shops
to the demands of the lines, and (d) adequate supply df trained labor
to operate and to service the lines.
After examining plans and reports on the Soviet "auto-
matic" piston plant, US manufacturers of pistons indicated that no US
firm could afford to invest so much in a plant that would become obso-
lete so soon, because the piston design is so diversified and so rapidly
changing in the US. With enforced standardization and centralized con-
trol of changes in components and models, the USSR would be ,justified
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economically in automating component production to a greater degree
than any US manufacturer would be. 20
There are two other limitations of automatic transfer
lines-that merit further comment. The first is the need to gear the
rest of the factory to the production rate and specifications of the
line. Consequently, the capacity of the automatic line represents,
with proper allowance for the manufacture of spare parts and a cer-
tain amount of "auxiliary production" (often consumer goods in
the USSR) the maximum capacity of the plant. Secondly, the machine
tools in automatic lines cannot be converted so easily to other uses
as can a "universal" machine tool. The USSR, however, is attempting
to overcome this limitation and also to build more flexibility into
.lines by adopting the use of the unit-type machine tool' in automatic
transfer lines.
C. Ideological Overtones".
In the USSR, as elsewhere, the phenomenon of automation has
a visionary appeal that cannot be explained solely in terms of eco-
nomic and technological considerations. The imagination of Soviet
leaders seems to have been"captured by the possibilities which auto-
mation offers for achieving the traditional ideological goals of
easing the tail of workers, eliminating the distinction between mental
and physical labor, and providing plenty for all. These ideological
considerations probably do not exert a decisive influence on Soviet
policy, but social betterment is regarded. as an important byproduct
of automation. In addition, the promise of a plentiful tomorrow --
to be achieved through automation -- is used to justify a continued
"emphasis on production of producer goods.
D. Investment and Obsolescence.
In the last few years, Soviet economists and industrial leaders
have. debated the proper criteria for appraising the economic effective-
ness of capital investment in technological improvements, including
automatic equipment and processes. In earlier discussions in the USSR
the short-term reduction in direct costs of production was an important
criterion. 21 Recently, more attention has been paid to the long-
term savings resulting from technological improvements, especially if
introduced at several plants, ~ and to other factors of cost, such as
~ See V, B, 2, p. 27, below.
- 13 -
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savings in plant space and improvement in quality. The problem of
working out a general formula of measurement still is receiving
much attention from the central agencies concerned with planning
and technological improvement. 23
The changing appraisal of the criteria for investment has
resulted in large part from a shift in the doctrinal approach toward
obsolescence. Traditional Marxist-Leninist doctrine held that the
obsolescence of capital equipment is peculiar to capitalist econo-
mies and cannot exist in a socialist society. This theory tended
to justify the continued use of outmoded and inefficient machinery
until it could no longer be kept in repair. Because it was held
that there could be no obsolescence of fixed capital, depreciation
could cover only the physical deterioration of fixed capital. 2~+
In the last few years, however, Soviet economists and leaders
generally have questioned critically this concept. In mid-1955
a
,
leading writer on the subject even advocated its abandonment.
He
f
charged that "the denial of the obsolescence of equipment ... justi-
fied the actions of those directors of enterprises who are not con-
cerned with whether or not the further use of a certain machine is
profitable or unprofitable and who are not concerned with the im-
provement of equipment. The lower depreciation rates employed in
several branches of industry do not stimulate. the introduction of
new technology." 25 Apparently, it is difficult to overcome the
inertia and caution of plant managers and other officials in handling
obsolescence as well as other matters related to technological in-
novations. 26
N. Implementation of the Program.
During the past decade, Soviet scientists have made impressive
progress in developing the theory of automatic control. Only since
early 195+, however, have essential steps been taken to encourage
widespread industrial automation. Soviet leaders have set up cen-
tral administrative machinery to formulate general policies and pro-
cedures for promoting the solution of scientific, technological, and
administrative problems involved in automating industrial operations.-
These leaders also have prepared to expand production of standard
instruments and equipment used in industrial automation.
~ See the accompanying chart, following p. 1~+.
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SECRET
USSR
MANAGEMENT OF THE PROGRAM FOR INDUSTRIAL AUTOMATION
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
USSR
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
AND APPLICATION
ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES
COMMITTEE FOR
INVENTIONS AND
DISCOVERIES
STATE
PLANNING
COMMITTEE
STATE
ECONOMIC
COMMISSION
STATE
COMMITTEE FOR
NEW TECHNIQUES
De
Automati
velopment and Production
c Control Instruments and E
o{
quipment
**
INSTITUTE OF PRE?
INSTITUTE OF
INSTITUTE OF
CISION MECHANICS
AUTOMECHANICS
MACHINE
AND COMPUTER
TECHNOLOGY
AND
TEIEMECHANICS
STUDIES
MINISTRY
MINISTRY O
f
MINISTRY OF
M
INISTRY O
F
M
INISTRY OF
INSTRUMEN
T
MACHINE TOOL
-
E RADIO
OF
T
HE ELECTR
O
TH
-
MACHINE
BUILDING A
ND
BUILDING AND
TECHNICA
L
TECHNICAL
BUILDING
AUTOMATIO
N
THE
INDUSTRY
INDUSTRY
EQUIPMENT
TOOL INDUSTRY
SCIENTIFIC
RESEARCH
*Not including ministries which have introduced some automation into their production but
INSTITUTE FOR
which do not hare a basic role in the manufacture o{automatic instrumentr and equipment.
METAL-GUTTING
*~Other ministries produce a small amount of specialized types.
MACHINE TOOLS
25835 5.57 SECRET
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A. Organizational Measures to Encourage Mechanization
and Automation.
Soviet leaders have recognized that the success of their pro-
gram for mechanization and automation under the Sixth Five Year Plan
depends on the proper timing and coordination of scientific and tech-
nical activities. Bulganin pointed out in July 1955 that the USSR
was failing to realize its full industrial potential largely because
of the poor cooperation between science and industry, the failure
to keep abreast of developments abroad, and the lack of initiative
of industrial managers in adopting new techniques.
A major shortcoming stressed by Bulganin and others was that
responsibility for the industrial application of scientific dis-
coveries-was not sufficiently centralized. Before May, 1955 the
Academy of Sciences directed and coordinated general scientific
research, 28 but the individual ministries, which controlled the.
development and introduction of technology within their areas of
responsibility for production, frequently showed considerable in-
ertia. 29 Nominally the State Planning Committee (Gosplan) was
responsible for coordinating the efforts of the. Academy and the
various ministries and for bridging the gap between pure and applied
science. The Scientific-Technical Council of Gosplan, which included
representatives of both science and industry, reviewed the plans of
both the Academy and the ministries.
Under this system, however, central coordination of industrial
research and development was inadequate. The Academy of Sciences fre-
quently failed to coordinate its research with the requirements of
industry and devoted insufficient attention to technological research
based on its scientific findings. ~ Similar charges have been made
against the universities .and their research establishments. 31
1. Improvements in Central Technological Administration.
On 25 May 1955 the State Planning Committee (Gosplan) was
divided into two agencies: the State Planning Commission (also called
Gosplan , to handle long-term planning; and a State Economic Commission
(Gosekonomkomissiya), to handle current planning. 32 This reorganiza-
tion-led to greater specialization in planing and was designed to
focus greater attention on major problems of long-range economic and
technological improvement, including problems relating to automation.
At that time, Khrushchev stressed the need for long-term plans, cover-
ing 10 to 15 years, for a number of industries.
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On 28 May 1955, Soviet leaders created the State Committee
of the Council of Ministers for New Techniques (Gostekhnika)~ under
V.A. Malyshev, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and former
Minister of Medium Machine Building. 34 The mission of Gostekhnika
is to promote tYie introduction of technological improvements in in-
dustry and to coordinate policies and activities in this field.
Gostekhnika was directed specifically (a) to plan the
complex mechanization and automation of the most important branches
of industry and to obtain the prompt use of important inventions
and discoveries; (b) to make recommendations on the general course
of scientific and technological development in all branches of the
economy and on "future work in the creation of new instruments,
equipment, materials, and physiological processes"; (c) to initiate
proposals for the cessation of production of outdated equipment;
and (d) to organize the systematic collection and dissemination of
information on both domestic and foreign developments in science and
industrial technology.~* 35 Gostekhnika also was directed to pro-
pose suitable incentives to encourage technological progress.
Gostekhnika was given requisite authority to enforce- its
policies, including the right to control the introduction into the
national economy of scientific discoveries, new technology, and im-
portant inventions and t;o inspect "ministries and departments" on
these matters. 36 The latter organizations, however, were not re-
lieved of the responsibility to adopt the most advanced techniques
of production on their own initiative. 37
~ A State Committee for Introduction of Advanced Techniques in the
National Economy -- also called Gostekhnika -- had existed from 1948
to 1951. That Committees tended, however, to concentrate on problems of
standards and specifications rather than on coordination of policy and
was abolished in February 1951. Responsibility for inventions and for
the introduction of technological improvements then reverted to the
various industrial ministries. Subsequently, Soviet writers repeatedly
criticized the ministries for lack of initiative in this field and
viewed the abolition of the former Gostekhnika as a mistake. 33
~ The State Committee for Questions of Labor and Wages, which was
created in May 1955, also reviews plans for the introduction of new
machinery and techniques of production. Such reviews, however, are
limited to the effects of these plans on requirements for labor.
Gostekhnika shares this responsibility with the Academy of Sciences
and the industrial ministries.
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Since its creation, Gostekhnika has been an administra-
tive focal point of the program of mechanization and automation,
directing ministerial research establishments to undertake certain
general tasks and specific projects required by the program for
automation. 38 Gostekhnika also has publicized Soviet and foreign
developments in industrial technology and equipments 40 and has in-
vestigated the advisability of ministerial programs to introduce au-
tomation in the different industries and to develop new equipment and
processes. In September 1956, Gostekhnika and the Institute of Machine
Studies of the Academy of Sciences jointly sponsored a conference on
"the integral mechanization and automation of technological processes
in machine building." This conference was. attended by 850 "scientists,
designers, engineers, and leading workers of machine building minis-
tries" who reportedly made "many valuable practical proposals." 41
Similar conferences have followed in other major industrial sectors.
2: Improvements in~Technological Management.
In attacking the basic problem of the lack of initiative
in the ministries, the Soviet leaders assigned definite responsibility
for the development and introduction of automation and other techno-
logical improvements to specific ministerial officials and departments.
The new post of Deputy Minister for New Techniques was established
within the industrial ministries. 42 In addition, scientific-tech-
nical councils at the ministerial and plant levels were revitalized.
These councils are taking an active role in solving technical problems
related to automation. ~+3 The industrial ministries have also set
up new research institutes, such as the Experimental Scientific Re-
search Institute of Press and Forging Machine Building (Eksperimental'nyy
~ The newspaper Promyshlenno-ekonomicheskaya gazeta is the organ of
Gostekhnika for the dissemination of technical information. The Com-
mittee for Inventions and Discoveries (attached to the Council of Minis-
ters) also publishes a monthly journal to disseminate information of
this type which covers a broader area than industrial technology.
~l'his Committee, which was reactivated and given enhanced status in
early 1956, is directed "to improve radically the leadership in the
introduction of inventions and discoveries ... and to insure control
over the fulfillment of the directives of the Party and Government
on the further development of the rationalizing and invention move-
ment." In October 1956 the Committee convened and participated in an
all-union conference of "rationalizers, inventors, and innovators of.
production." 39
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Nauchno-Issledovatel'skiy Institut Kuznechno-Pressovogo Mashinostro-
yeniya -- ENIIKMASh)~ at Voronezh ~+~+ and the All-Union Technological
Planning Institute for the Development of Technology and the Organiza-
tion of Production in the Electrical Engineering Industry (Vsesoyuznyy
Proyektno-Tekhnologicheskiy Institut po Razrabotke Tekhnologii i
Organizatsii Proizvodstva v Elektrotekhnicheskoy Promyshlennosti --
Orgelektroprom) at Kharkov. 45 Such institutes are charged with
studying general problems of technology, including problems of auto-
mation, that are related. to particular industrial branches or regions.-
Finally, special automation divisions, design bureaus, and laboratories
have been set up in many of the enterprises which are scheduled to
undertake automation under the Sixth Five Year Plan. 46
B. Organizational Measures to Expand Production of Automation
Equipment.
Soviet leaders have attempted also to standardize and improve
production of instruments and other devices used in automation. The
Ministry of Machine Tool. Building and the Tool Industry, although
not administratively responsible, pioneered the development and orga-
nized,production of such devices. The work of ENIMS has been par-
ticularly important.~--~-~ The ministries in charge of production, how-
ever, principally the Ministry of Machine and Instrument Building
and the Ministries of the Radiotechnical Yndustry and of the Electro-
technical Industry, neglected their responsibilities in this field.
Because these ministries, particularly the Ministry of Machine
and Instrument Building, failed to develop general-purpose devices
for control which could be used to automate a variety of industrial
processes, little progress was made in standardizing designs. ~+7
Industries which undertook automation usually designed and produced
their own equipment, and by 1955 more than 30 ministries thus were
~ This Institute is under the Ministry of Machine Tool Building
and the Tool Industry.
~ The well-established central research groups, such as the Experi-
mental Scientific Research Institute for Metal-Cutting Machine Tools
(Eksperimental'nyy Nauchno-Issledovatel'skiy Institut Metallorezhushchikh
Stankov -- ENIMS) of the Ministry of Machine Tool Building and the Tool
Industry, rather than the new regional institutes probably will continue
to bear primary responsibility for research and development.
The vital role of ENIMS is discussed in V, B, p. 25, below.
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producing automatic equipment, with little or no coordination of their
efforts. ~+8 This lack of coordination resulted in high cost and low
output because production was in small lots and frequently was carried
out by enterprises- which were not well equipped for the job. Soviet
leaders recognized that correction of this situation was essential to
the successful implementation of the program for automation. ~+9
In an attempt to organize the design and production of standard
devices for automatic control on a more specialized basis, the Ministry
of Machine and Instrument Building was divided, on 22 January 1956,
into an all-union Ministry of Machine Building and an all-union
Ministry of Instrument Building and Automation Equipment. 50
At least, for the time being, the Ministry of Instrument Build-
ing and Automation Equipment has jurisdiction only over instruments,.
computers, and other precision machinery formerly produced by the Main
Administration of Instruments and the Main Administration of Precision
Machinery of the old Ministry of Machine and Instrument Building. 51
The new Ministry apparently will be primarily responsible for pro-
viding the increases of from 350 to x+50 percent in production of in-
struments and precision machinery which are called for by the Sixth
Five?Year Plan. 52 The new Ministry will have jurisdiction over the
30 new instrument plants scheduled for construction, and statements
by the Minister suggest that already the number may have been increased
to ~+o . 53
The plants of the new Ministry will not produce all of the
devices used in automation. Electronic equipment, for example, is
still the responsibility of the Ministries of the Radiotechnical
Industry and of the Electrotechnical Industry. Under the Sixth Five
Year Plan these Ministries were directed to increase production of
electronic devices for automation and to expand their facilities for
research. 5~+ These Ministries are expected to coordinate their
efforts with the Ministry of. Instrument Building and Automation Equip-
ment, which is regarded as the principal producer of general-purpose
instruments and control devices. ~ What specific powers the new
Ministry has to enforce coordination is not clear as yet.
The new Ministry is expanding the research establishment taken
over from the former Ministry. In August 1956 the Minister announced
that several new research institutes and design bureaus are to be
established in order to expedite the development of the new types of
instruments and control components required by Soviet industry. 56
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Some of the new facilities for research are to be located in regional
centers of industrial development, such as Tbilisi, where there is to
be a scientific research institute for the construction of electric
calculating machines. This institute will have its own experimental
shops and design bureau. 57 At Kutaisi the new Ministry is setting
up a "specialized planning and construction bureau," 58 presumably
to assist enterprises in that area to plan the automation of their
processes of production.
The new Ministry also is working closely with other ministries
in solving the technical problems involved in automating specific types
of industrial production, such as production in the .petroleum, light,
and food industries. 59 Together with the Soviet-Hungarian Scientific
and Technical Cooperation Commission, the new Ministry also sponsored
a conference within the Sino-Soviet Bloc on problems of automation
and the manufacture of instruments for control. This conference was
attended by representatives of Bulgaria, Communist China, Czechoslovakia,
East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and the USSR. 60
The progress of the new Ministry in carrying out its respons-
bilities is rather difficult to assess as yet. The Ministry failed
to achieve the scheduled output of computing machines during the first
6 months of 1956 even though it did fulfill its-plan for gross out-
put. ~ The failure cited, however, related to production of only one
item, and the over-all fulfillment related to only a short period of
time.
C. Economic Incentives.
Soviet leaders also have attempted to overcome technological
inertia in industry by providing stronger economic incentives to
managers and workers. The economic rewards for innovation frequently
have not been commensurate with the risk of temporariYy not fulfilling
the goals of the Plan.
1. Credit Policy.
Until recently, Soviet enterprises experienced difficulty
in financing technological improvements undertaken on their own inia-
tive. Budgetary allocations to enterprises for planned capital develop-
ment tended to favor projects directly related to the fulfillment of
current goals for production rather than to technological innovation. 62
If, on the other hand, enterprises resorted to special loans from the
State Bank (Gosbank) to finance automation or other improvements, they
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faced very unfavorable credit terms. Special Gosbank loans for this
purpose could be obtained for only 1 year and had to be repaid from
savings realized from-the proposed improvement during that year.
Credit on such terms was of little help to enterprises in heavy in-
dustry, because innovations usually could not be completed and amor-
tized within a single year.
In August 1954, however, the Central Committee of the
Communist Party. and the Council of Ministers jointly ordered Gosbank
to undertake a broad re-examination of its policies. On 26 July 1955,
Gosbank adopted more liberal credit terms for technological improve-
ments initiated by individual enterprises. 64 Under the new policy,
enterprises in the metallurgical, coal, chemical, petroleum, and..,
machine building industries may obtain loans for 3 years for any of
the following purposes: (a) to ac-quire, manufacture, or install
new equipment; (b) to modernize or replace equipment; (c) to set up
automatic and continuous production' lines; (d) to introduce complex
mechanization; (e) to mechanize auxiliary operations; (f) to equip
and adapt work areas; or (g) to acquire specialized transportation
equipment. Repayment of such loans does not begin until projects are
completed and in operation, although repayment still must come from
savings in costs of production.
The principal restriction on the amount of credit to be
extended for any given project is the requirement that large loans
must be approved by central banking and ministerial officials. 65
The Gosbank Board of Directors must sanction loans for more than 1
million rubles, and responsible ministerial officials must endorse
estimates for improvements that cost more than a specified amount
(1 million rubles for most enterprises but 2 million rubles for a
special list of large-scale enterprises). Directors of enterprises
and appropriate local or regional Gflsbank officials, however, arrange
smaller loans on their own authority.
By providing more liberal credit, Soviet leaders hope to
encourage the introduction of automation and other progressive tech-
niques. There already has been some indication that enterprises are
taking advantage of the new loan policy, 66/ although perhaps not on
the scale anticipated. In some instances, however, there have been
complaints that ministries are not properly supporting projects
initiated by individual enterprises.
~ See V, A, 2, p. 24, below.
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Efforts also have been made to encourage technological
progress by stimulating the interest and initiative of personnel
engaged in design and production. In August 1956 the Soviet Council
of Ministers liberalized regulations governing payments of bonuses.
to employees who design or participate in the introduction of new
types of equipment. 68 Scientists, designers, or engineers who
design new or improved types of equipment or who develop new materials
are entitled to bonuses of 5 to 30 percent of the total annual savings
realized by using the innovations. Bonuses are provided also for
technicians and workers who directly participate in manufacturing
new equipment and putting it into operation.
3. Measures Under Consideration.
Malyshev, among others, has recognized that additional
incentives are needed to insure the maximum technological progress
in Soviet industry. He has pointed out that enterprises undertaking
innovations face a]most inevitable losses under existing policies,.
If an enterprise proposes improvements, anticipated reductions in the
cost of production are included in its plan as an obligatory goal. 70
Goals for production, however, usually are nat adjusted to accommodate
losses that may occur in the initial stages of introducing new equip-
ment and processes. Any profits that ultimately may develop tend to
accrue to the state rather than to the enterprise. The progressive
enterprise therefore runs the risk of penalties for not fulfilling
its goal but does not have the compensating prospect of a significant
reward for success in the new venture.
Recent Soviet discussions have emphasized the importance
of reducing the risks and increasing the rewards for enterprises that
undertake technological improvements. Among the specific proposals
suggested have been the following; (a) temporary losses incurred by
enterprises while introducing new equipment or methods should be
written off by the ministries 71 (b) the prices set for the products
of an enterprise should reflect its state of technological develop-
ment; and (c) planned costs of production should remain constant
for longer periods so that enterprises would share more liberally ire
~ The discussions of policy on pricing assume that the products of
the technically progressive plant will be more durable and of higher
quality than those of the more backward factories in the field. It
is proposed, therefore, that price differentials should reflect this
fact accurately. Presumably, however, price manipulation would be a
flexible, temporary expedient.
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profits derived from technological improvements. 72 Although no
measures have been announced as yet, it is quite possible that the
Soviet government may act to implement these suggestions as a part
of its efforts to promote more rapid technological development in
industry.
V. Trends in Component Production.
A. Stages of Automation.
1. Mechanization and Partial Automation.
Because the development of automation of component pro-
duction is based primarily on the principle of the cyclic automatic
machine, one of the principal indicators reflecting the progress
and degree of automation in the entire Soviet machine building .sector
is the technological development and production of the Soviet machine
tool building industry.
Since World War II the USSR has developed a technology
and a capacity for. production of machine tools which are approximately
equivalent to those of the US and is now carrying on research on a
greater scale than the US in various fields related to machine tool
building and its automation. ~ Furthermore, centralized control
of research institutes and plants in the USSR tends to produce results
that can be disseminated throughout the industry more quickly than
can the results of research by individual companies in the US.
The most important development that has facilitated auto-
mation in Soviet machine tool building since World War II has been
Soviet emphasis on producing the more efficient and productive de-
signs, such as automatic and semiautomatic, combination, unit-type,
and electrohydrocopying and contouring machine tools. Not only do
all of these tools increase productivity, but they are the types of
cyclic automatic machines needed for the development of automation..
The need for increasing the availability of these more
productive machine tools is constantly stressed by such Soviet
authorities on automation as engineers and plant directors. One
of the solutions has been to standardize ms,c,hine tools, their com-
ponents, and their accessories and thus profit by the savings of labor
and materials which result from mass production.
~ The three stages discussed here are those briefly outlined in I,
A, p. 3, above.
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In conjunction with the development and standardization
of the cyclic automatic machine tools, the Soviet efforts to bring
into effect the automation of component production are directed
simultaneously toward the development, standardization, and produc-
tion of new precision instruments and devices for measurement and
control. In the fields of measurement and control the USSR is pro-
ducing almost every basic type of instrument and device that is known
in the West. 7~-
The stage of automation known in strict Soviet terminology
as partial automation involves an integrated scheme comprising
(a) cyclic. automatic machine tools; (b) devices for measurement and
control; and (c) the automatic feeding, loading, and unloading of
the workpiece.at any individual operation of a technological process.
In this stage of production, only one or possibly a few of the opera-
tions of a technological process are performed and controlled auto-
matically, thus necessitating direct human intervention in other
operations and in the aver-all manual control of the entire techno-
logical sequence.
2. Complex Automation.
The second stage of automation of component production
in Soviet industry is known as complex automation. Whereas the term
partial automation is used in Soviet terminology to describe the prirl-
ciples of automation applied to separate or individual operations,
the term complex automation refers to the application of automation
to a connected series of required operations which comprise a definite
technological process. The distinguishing feature of this integrated.
system of automation is the reorganization of a technological process
into a scheme for automatic, continuous production that insures co-
ordinated functioning of all production and auxiliary operations.
More specifically, continuous production is characterized
by a fixed rhythmic rate of work in all operations and steps in the
manufacturing process in accordance with an integrated over-all plan
and a uniform but selected output of finished products. In order to
insure proper coordination of the various operations, the machinery
and equipment are arranged in accordance with the sequence of the
manufacturing procedures, and each work station is allocated specific
-~ In Soviet writings however, the word automation alone is often used
to indicate the concept described here as partial automation.
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operations. The various operations are adjusted so that the time re-
quired for performing each operation bears a definite relation to the
time needed for every other operation.
Such an over-all, automatically controlled system of pro-
duction, in which all the phases of a technological process are auto-
matically performed and controlled, frees manpower from direct partici-
pation in the process of production. The function of the worker is
reduced to adjusting and regulating machines, observing their function-
ing, and changing tools. When applied to component production, complex
automation forms the basis for the semiautomatic and automatic trans-
fer lines, automatic shops, and automatic factories, each of which repre-
sents a progressive degree of the automatic integration and control of
the processes needed to manufacture a finished product.
3. Full Automation.
The Soviet concept of full automation, the third and final
stage of automation, envisages an entire self-correcting technological
process which is controlled automatically by an integrated system of servo-
mechanism devices and digital computers. When applied to component pro-
duction, full automation implies not only control by integrated computers
of all the automatic production lines necessary in any one technological
process but also automatic lines featuring methods of metalworking suscep-
tible to integrated feedback control. Because the integration of complete
feedback control is difficult or impossible to achieve with present methods
of metalforming, however, the realization of a truly automatic factory for
component production is a goal for the distant future.
B. Trends in Automation.
1. History.
The foundations for the present progress toward automation
of component production in Soviet industry were laid in 1933 with the
creation of ENIMS,~ the centralized research institute for the machine
building industries. The aim of ENIMS was to undertake a program of
research and development involving techniques of production and types
of machine tools that would yield increased productivity and decreased
costs of production by maximizing the output of the machines and by
minimizing the expenditure of human and mechanical labor. The logi-
cal initial phase of the development of this program was to concentrate
~ See IV, B, p. 18, above.
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on research on the cycl~.c automatic and semiautomatic machine tools
that the West already was applying successfully to mass production.
Before World War II, therefore, one of the basic trends toward the
partial automation of machine building in the USSR -- as it had been
in the US -- was the policy of replacing the universal machine tool
by automatic, semiautomatic, and combination machine tools.
In addition, work in the field of automation of component
production was conducted in the direction of developing automatic and
semiautomatic transfer .lines, the first of which was installed between
1938 and 1940 for production of caterpillar tread rollers at the
Stalingrad 'T`ractor Plant. ~ This line, an example of complex auto-
mation, consisted of universal machine tools which were converted
(automatized) and arranged to carry out their operation of machining
in a technological sequence and which were connected by a conveyor
that moved the workpiece from one machine to another.
During the period 1941-44 the Soviet machine tool industry
concentrated on developing similar semiautomatic transfer lines for
the defense industry, and the application of these lines is reported
as having made possible the mass production of the KV and T-34 tanks. 76
During this same period the introduction of about 80 unit-type auto-
matic and semiautomatic machine tools into Soviet aircraft factories
is reported to have replaced approximately 900 universal machine tools
and freed approximately 1,600 workers.
This trend toward partial and complex automation of com-
ponent production continued after World War II with increased emphasis
on the development of automatic and semiautomatic transfer lines
featuring new and improved methods of machining, assembly, inspection,
and devices for measurement and control based on achievements in
research on electronic and communications equipment. The USSR has
introduced such lines, primarily into the motor vehicle and the agri-
cultural machinery industries, for mass production of the following
items: engine blocks, engine heads, piston rings, piston pins, gear
cases, bolts, nuts, bearings, plow shares, rake teeth, and hook-linked,.
drive chains for combines. Soviet sources suggest that, as of the be-
ginning of 1956, 80 to 90 automatic and semiautomatic transfer lines
had been introduced into the motor vehicle and agricultural machinery
industries. 78
A survey of the industrial applications of these lines
demonstrates that they are actually in operation in some factories
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under conditions of production and are responsible for substantial in-
creases in production. Equally important, these lines represent the
advanced stage of the systematic Soviet program of research and
development involving automation of component production and are
utilized extensively for operational research.
2. Research and Develo went Since World War II.
Perhaps one of the most important developments in the
automation of the Soviet machine tool industry, as characterized by
"the automatic transfer line, has been the concentration on research
and development in the standardization of machine-tool components since
World War II. Standardization was undertaken in an effort (a) to
decrease the time required for building an automatic machine tool,
(b) to increase the flexibility of the machine tool, and (c) to
profit from the savings in labor and materials which result from
mass production. Some of the basic components which became standardized
were power heads, spindle casings, mountings, beds, and transmissions.
In addition, the industry standardized auxiliary units such as control
panels; automatic feeding mechanisms; automatic transfer equipment;
hydraulic pumps; and mechanisms for the automatic loading, clamping,
positioning, and unloading of piece parts.
Machine tools, consisting of these individual standard
units, are assembled into various combinations, depending on the nature
of the machining operations to be performed. .Although such machine
tools are commonly referred to as unit-type machine tools (agregatnyye
stanki), they are either combination, automatic, orssemiautomatic machine
.tools or companents of automatic transfer lines.
When the specific machining operation, for which a unit-
type machine tool was assembled, is modified or changed completely,
the machine unit can be dismantled and reassembled into new combina-
tions in accordance with the specifications for the next application.
For this reason the unit-type machine tools have received wide applica-
tion in Soviet automatic. lines since World War II and have replaced the
more costly, less flexible, and less productive custom=built combination
machine tools used in earlier lines. The USSR claims that the practice
of assembling machine tools from standard .units has reduced by one-
third the time required to plan a modern machine tool.
The integration of a series of these unit-type machine
tools with automatic transfer equipment; with automatic auxiliary
- 27
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mechanisms; with automatic devices for inspection, sorting, measure-
ment, assembly., control, and regulation; and with a continuous method
of production results in an example of complex automation known as an
automatic transfer line. The piece part to be machined is placed in
the transfer equipment at the beginning of the line and emerges at
the other end machined to the required specifications. There is little
or no participation by the operators, whose functions are reduced to
changing cutting tools and monitoring the control panel which indi-
cates the progress and continued accuracy of the operations.
Since World War II the USSR has made great progress in
extending the scope of the automatic transfer lines to include a
variety of operations. The first lines were developed and built to
perform simultaneously the machining operations such as grinding,
drilling, reaming, and millings of all surfaces and holes in the pro-
duction of engine blocks and heads. Later lines that were developed
systematically by ENIMS include many of the other operations, such as
casting, thermal treatment, inspection, and assemb.]~y, involved in
component production.
One of the most striking examples of such research and
development by ENIMS was the creation in 1951 of a so-called. "automatic"
piston factory, which produces pistons, without any handling operations,
from the smelting of an aluminum ingot to the wrapping of the finished
product.- This plant is operated by less than one-quarter of the num-
ber of operators and tool setters required for nonautomatic production. 81
The "automatic" piston factory, antifriction bearing lines, and all the
other automatic transfer lines developed since World War II may be re-
garded as experimental and as prototypes of future developments in the
automation of component production. More than x+00 operational and
theoretical studies of the piston factory alone were made during the de-
signing and early operational stages. 82 Presumably, Soviet planners
chose the piston as the item to be produced in this model "automatic"
factory because (a) the piston is a standardized product used in vast
quantities and the automation of its production would indicate the de-
gree of automation possible under the Soviet policy of standardization
and because (b) the vast number of operations necessary for the com-
plete manufacture of the piston are common to most of the other items
manufactured by component production.
In addition to almost every type of machining operation in-
volved in component production, this piston factory also includes automatic
~- See 3, p. 32, below, for the qualifications of a truly automatic
factory.
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casting, thermal treatments, measurement, calibration, sorting, testing,
wrapping, and packaging, as well as mechanized bins for storing the
piece part while it is being processed.
On the basis of the operational and theoretical research
conducted in connection with the piston factory, the USSR has developed
the fundamentals necessary for a systematic and scientific approach to
building future automatic lines. The extensive research carried out
by ENIMS enabled the USSR to devise mathematical methods for deter-
mining the laws of probability governing the functioning of lines for
automatic machining and flow of production. Sufficiently simple and
reliable methods have been devised for the calculation of such factors
as the probability of an erratic failure of a line and its .components
and the time subsequently necessary for the re-establishment of nor-
mal operations. In addition, mathematical methods -- all of which
are calculated to obtain the optimum operating conditions of an auto-
matic line -- have been devised to determine the proper number of work
stations, sections of machining lines, and bunkers for in-process
storage of a piece part.
The method of introducing into Soviet industry the automatic
transfer lines for machining of engine blocks and heads also reflects
the integrated, systematic, and organized industrywide pattern of the
Soviet program for research and development involving automation.
The engine blocks and heads, which require many separate
machining operat~.ons, are basic, mass-produced, and highly standardized
products in both the motor vehicle and the tractor industries. It was
logical, therefore, that the USSR should have chosen the manufacture
of these two products for their first attempts after World War II to
develop methods for the automation of component production. Unlike
the US, where the automation of component production has been con-
ducted almost exclusively by individual firms competing in the auto-
motive field, the USSR appears to have divided the costs, risks,
operational research, and immediate benefits of such automation between
the automobile and the agricultural machinery industries. The research
and development involving the automatic machining of engine blocks is
conducted in the motor vehicle industry, and the development of improved
automatic processes for machining engine heads is carried out in the
tractor industry. 8s1
This approach has made possible a constant improvement in
the design and operation of the succeeding automatic transfer lines
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as they gradually are perfected and introduced into the various plants
of these industries. For example, the introduction in 1950 of a line
for the DT-54 diesel engine head at the Kharkov Tractor Plant resulted
in production of 10,790 units per worker per year. In 1955 at the
Krasnodar Plant "October" the introduction of a similar but .improved
line for the DT-54 engine head, attended by the same number of workers,
reportedly resulted in production of 18,000 units per worker per year.
Not only did the productivity of labor increase by 66 percent, but
the cost of production per engine head is reported to have decreased
by 22 percent.
The economic effectiveness of another automatic transfer
line, engaged in the manufacture of nuts 12 millimeters in diameter
at the Kirovograd Plant for Agricultural Machine Building, resulted
in. gains in productivity and savings in cost. Compared with nonauto-
matic installations, this automatic line has increased production by
67 percent, reduced the number of workers by 83 percent, increased
the productivity of labor nearly 1,100 percent, and reduced the cost
of production per item by 33 percent:
Soviet writers have repeatedly used the automatic transfer
line at the Kharkov Tractor Plant to illustrate the sizable increase
in production after automation. The installation of this line is
credited with increasing production of DT-54 tractor engine heads at
the plant from 24,000 to 65,000 units per year and with reducing the
number of production workers from 23 to 6.
Another example of economic benefits that the USSR expects
to derive from automation is illustrated in the following comparison
of factors before and after the installation of an automatic transfer
line for the machining of the DT-65 tractor engine head at the Kharkov
Tractor Plant ~;
Before Automation
After Automation
Annual production per worker
(units)
Annual production per production
825
7,190
worker (.units)
1,040
10,790
Annual production per square meter
of production area (units)
69
161
Production cost per item (rubles)
201
151
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On the basis of such expected and desired economic benefits,
the USSR, appears to have come to the conclusion that the high costs of
the program for automation should-not be a deterrent to the further
development and application of automatic lines. Responsible Soviet
authorities do. not expect to write off the costs of the first few lines
from the gains in production but realize that the initial high costs
of research and development are inevitable and can be recovered only
after a number of lines have been built on the basis of the knowledge
and experience gained from the original. experimental lines. 90 The
exact number of lines required to pay off the initial costs of research
and development, of course,-will vary with (a) the nature of the prod-
uct, (b) the scale of production, (c) the costs of development, and
(d) the net savings compared with alternative methods of production.
Although the quality of the automatic lines in the USSR
appears to be equal to that in the US, the USSR is still behind the
US in the quantity of lines in actual operation and in the range of
their application. In the motor vehicle field, for example, the USSR
has perfected lines for only a few components, such as the block and
piston lines, whereas most of the major US firms making automobiles
use lines for practically every component necessary to the complete
manufacture of the automobile.
The limited Soviet application of automatic transfer lines
is illustrated by the fact that only one plant, the Moscow Motor
Vehicle Plant imeni Likhachev, formerly Stalin (ZIS), has an automatic
line for production of gear cases. 91 Furthermore, a survey of the
industrial application of automatic transfer lines in Soviet industry
reveals that although the automatic lines are used to produce engine
blocks in every major motor vehicle plant, these same plants still
are producing truck and automobile engine heads on individual machine
tools. The reverse situation exists in the tractor industry. Although
all major. tractor plants still are producing engine blocks on indi-
vidual machine tools, these same plants are using automatic lines for
production of tractor engine heads.
It is logical to assume, therefore, that the greater por-
tion of the 220 new automatic and semiautomatic transfer lines which
are to be introduced into the Soviet machine building industry by
lg6o ~ will insure the completely automatic production of such com-
ponents as engine blocks, heads, and gear cases in the motor vehicle
and the agricultural machinery industries. The remaining portion of
this. planned figure probably will include newly developed lines for.
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the mass production of other components such as crankshafts, con-
necting rods, rear axle housings, tractor moldboards, and motor
vehic:~e springs .
3. Computer and Feedback Control.
The truly automatic factory, which features the integration
of computer and feedback control into the automation of component pro-
duction, as characterized by automatic lines, probably will not be
achieved for many years to come. Both the US and the USSR, however,
are advanced in the theory of limited control of machine tools by
electronic digital computer methods and have produced experimental
and prototype models that are intended to be used primarily for the
production of intricate piece parts. ~ None of these machine tools
is likely to be used for purposes of mass production, except in cases
of parts of very complicated and irregular shapes which must be pro-
duced within the limits of a repetitive accuracy that cannot. be
achieved by using conventional, manually controlled machine tools.
Apart from a few exceptions, there .is no need in mass production for
one universal machine tool that can make parts of any desired shape;
the need is for groups of specialized machine tools that can produce
thousands of identical components at a minimum cost. The electronically
controlled machine tools probably will be applied to production in
small quantities of such intricate parts as dies- and cams. The USSR
also intends to apply such machine tools in the aircraft and turbine
building industries to the manufacture of piece parts having intri-
cate, three-dimensional_ curves . 9~+
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' APPENDIX A
METHODOLOGY
The published directives for the implementation of the Sixth Five
Year Plan were taken as the focal point for the analysis of the broad
objectives of the Soviet program for industrial automation. The de-
tailed objectives and nature of the program were determined primarily
from a study of the published speeches of Soviet leaders and the writings
of Soviet scientists, technologists, and economists in journals and
monographs. Analogical analysis was made of similar discussions in
the US and the UK. Supplementary insight was provided by the observa-
tions of foreign scientists and industrial specialists who have visited
central institutes for research and development and key factories in
the USSR.
The central management of the entire program was examined broadly
from the top levels of plant management to the ministerial levels. A
general survey was made of the main types of automation as applied to
industrial categories, with special attention to component production
primarily as carried on in the machine building industry. A detailed
analysis of other industrial sectors was not included in this report.
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APPENDIX B
GAPS IN INTELLIGENCE
Although Soviet leaders and technical specialists have devoted
much discussion to the general concepts and objectives of automation,
they have not differentiated sharply between automation and other
forms of technological improvement in referring to-the role of auto-
mation in the Sixth Five Year Plan, nor have they indicated the pre-
cise role of automation in individual industrial sectors. Evidently
much of the Soviet work in the field of automation is experimental,
and Soviet technical specialists have not worked out exact criteria
for evaluating the economic effectiveness of automation and other
technological improvements. It is not now possible, therefore, to
measure precisely the quantitative .scope or effect of the program
within the Soviet economy.
Inforrr~a,tion is lacking on such points as the following:
1. The quantity of a specific item produced or the amount
of a specific type of work performed by means of automatic equip-
ment compared with the total number of such goods produced or such
work performed.
2. The amount spent on automation as a percentage of the
total capital expenditure, either throughout the entire Soviet
economy or within particular industries.
3. The period of time required for recovery of the amount
spent on automation.
~+. Reductions in the cost of production per unit achieved
through automation.
5. The total number of units produced per worker per man..
hour compared with existing methods of production.
Such information would provide the basis for an evaluation of
the extent and economic effectiveness of industrial automation in
the USSR.
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APPENDIX C
SOURCE REFERENCES
Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated
"Eval.," have the following significance:
Source of Information
Information
Doc. - Documentary
1
-Confirmed by other sources
A
- Completely reliable
2
- Probably true
B
- Usually reliable
3
- Possibly true
C
- Fairly reliable
4
- Doubtful
D - Not usually reliable
5
- Probably false
E - Not reliable
F -Cannot be judged
6
- Cannot be judged
'?'Documentary" refers to original documents of foreign governments
and organizations; copies or translations of such documents by a
staff officer; or information extracted from such documents by a
staff officer, all of which may carry .the field evaluation "Docu-
mentary."
Evaluations not otherwise designated are those appearing on the
cited document; those designated "RR" axe by the author of this re-
port. No "RR" evaluation is given when the author agrees with the
evaluation ,on the cited document.
1. USSR, Gosudarstvennyy Nauchnyy Institut. Bol'sha a Sovetskaya
entsiklopediya (Great Soviet Encyclopedia , 2d ed, Moscow,
vol 1, 1948, p. 207. iJ. Eval. Doc.
USSR, Akademiya Nauk SSR, Komitet Tekhnicheskoy Terminologii.
Terminology a osnovn kh onyati avtomatiki (Terminology of
the Basic Concepts of Automation , Moscow, 1954, p. 15.
U. Eval. Doc.
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25X1A
25X1X7
FOIAb3b1
2. Trapeznikov, V.A. "The Automation of Industry and the Tasks
"
of Science,
Vestnik akademii nauk SSR, no 1, 195+, p. 63.
CIA. FDD U-32+9, 8 Apr 53, Automatic Transfer Machine Lines,
Sh
ops, and Plants. R. Eval. RR 2. tr of Stanki i instru-
ment, no 11, Nov 52, p. 3-6. U)
A Survey of Soviet Automation, no 80,
asivskiy, S.P. Avtomatika i telemekhanika v narodnom
khozyaystve (Automation and Telemechanics in the National
Economy , Moscow, 1956
no 186,
7? IA RR 5 Postwar Investment in Industry in the USSR,
2~1~b 55, p? 9. s.
8.
CIA.. FDD Summary no 978, 28 Jun 56, p . 27-30 . OFF USE .
Eval. RR 2.
Derbisher, A. "On Two Trends in Automation," Pravda,
8 Feb 56. U. Eval. RR 2.~
FOIAb3b1 9? 17 Jan 56,
p. OFF USE. Eval. Doc.
10. Malyshev, V.A. "Speech at the 20th Party Congress," Pravda,
25 Feb 56, p. 7. U. Eval. RR 2.
CIA. FDD U-8130, 12 Apr 56, p. 1-10. OFF USE.
Eval. RR 2. (tr of article by S. Pervushin, Partiynaya
zhizn', no 11, 1955. U)
Pavlov, P. "Technical Progress and Obsolescence of Machinery
under Socialism," Voprosy ekonomiki, no 2,, 1956, p. 1~+-23.
U. Eval. RR 2.
FOIAb3b111.
12.
FOIAb3b1~3
25X1 A l~
p. CC 13-CC 19. OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
Ibid. CC 22-CC 2 OFF USE.
p. CC 20. OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
17 Jan 56,
12 Apr 56-,
(tr of article by A. Vladziyevskiy in Kommunist, no 3, 1956. U)
15. Ibid., p. 2. OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
- 38 -
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16. Trapeznikov, V.A. "The Automation of Industry and the Tasks
of Science," Vestnik akademii nauk SSR, no 1, 1954, p. 58.
U. Eval. RR 2.
25X1A
19. CIA. FDD Summary no 904, 30 Apr 56, p. 96. OFF USE.
25X1A Eval. RR 2. (quoting Pravda vostoka, Tashkent, 10 Dec 55. U)
on
21. CIA. FDD U-6302, 9 Aug. 54, p. 28. OFF USE. Eva
(tr of Results of the Discussion Concerning the Economic
Effectiveness of .Capital Investment in the Industry of the
25X1A UssR " Vo rosy ekonomiki, no 3, 1954. U)
22
23. "Standard Method for Determining the Economic a ue o ew
Technology," Planovoye khozyaystvo, no 5, 1956, p. 89.
U. Eval. Doc.
24. Pavlov, off. cit. (10, above).
25. CIA. FDD U-~13-0 (10, above).
25X1A 26. Pravda, 17 Feb 56. U. Eval. RR 2.
~ 20 Jul 55,
FOIAb3b1 27'
28. CIA. CIA~SI 80-54, The Academy of Sciences, USSR, 24 Mar 54,
p. 4-5. c.
CIA. FDD Summary no 828, 24 Feb 56, p. 1-2. C. Eval. RR 2.
29. "Problems of Automation and New Technology," Izvestiya,
14 May 55? U? Eval. Doc.
25X1 A 30 .
FOIAb3b1
25X1A
31.
25X1 A 32
33?
Pravda, 10 Oct 55. U.
p. CC 3. OFF USE. Eval. RR 2,'
8 May 56,
OFF USE.- Eval, RR 2.
tr of For a Bolder Reahza ion of the Automation of Pro-
duction,"- Mekhanizatsiya trudoyemkikh i tyazhelykh rabot,
vol 7, no 5, May 53, p. 3- U
CIA. FDD Summary no 828,- 24 Feb 56, p. 1-2. C. Eval. RR 2.
CIA.. FDD Summary no 703, 2 Nov 55, p. 62. OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
34. Izvesti a, 31 May 55, p. 2. U. Eval. Doc.
FOIAb3b1 35 ? p ? CC 5-CC OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
36. Ibid., p. CC 6. OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
6 Jul 55,
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FOIAb3b1
14 Jul 55, p. CC 5. OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
Ibid., 20 Jul 55, p. CC 20. OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
17 May 56, p. BB 12. OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
Promyshlenno-ekonomicheskaya gazeta, 23 May 56, p. ~+.
Ibid., 20 Jun 5 , p. U. Eval. RR 1.
39? Joint Committee on Slavic Studies. "All-Union Conference
on Rationalizer. s, Inventors, and Production Innovators,"
Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol 8, no 42, 28 Nov 56,
p. 25. U. tr of Pravda, 2 Nov 56, p. 2. U
FOIAb3b1
ltd Sep 56. OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
40. Kurakov, I. "Measuring the Effectiveness of the Introduction
FOIAb3b1 4i?
of Technology," Promyshlenno-ekonomicheskaya gazeta,
3 Feb 56, p. 1. U. Eval. RR 2.
2 Oct 56. OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
42. Malyshev, V. "For the Greatest Technical Progress in
Machine Building," Partiynaya zhizn', no 13, Jul 55, p? 25?
U. Eval. RR 2.
43. Ibid.
~+~+. CIA. FDD Summary no 1007, 25 Jul 56, p. 67. OFF USE.
Eval. RR 2.
CIA. CIA/RR CSM 394, New Research Institute for Metalforming,
16 Jul 56. S.
45. CIA.. FDD Summary no 904, 30 Apr 56, p. 81. OFF USE.
Eval. RR 2.
46. CIA.. FDD Summary no 561, 29 Jun 55, p? 37-39- OFF USE.
Eval. RR 2.
Air, 7050 AISW. IR-4748-55, 18 Oct 55. C. E`val. RR 2.
Izvestiya, 29 Jul 55, p. 1. U. Eval. RR 2.
CIA. FDD Summary no 479, 5 May 55, P? 24-25. OFF USE.
Eval. RR 2.
CIA. FDD Summary no 978, 28 Jun 56, p. 32. OFF USE.
Eval. RR 2.
F OIAb3 b1 conomic Item 147636, Moscow, 24 May 56. OFF USE.
Eval. RR 2.
F OIAb3 b1 Economic Item 63406, Moscow, 15 Aug 55. OFF USE.
Eval. RR 2.
CIA. FDD Summary no 978, 28 Jun 56, p. 86. OFF USE.
Eval. RR 3.
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47. Joint Committee on Slavic Studies. "What Is Holding Back
Automation," Current Di est of the Soviet Press, vol 8,
no 19, 22 Jun 55, P? 3? U. Eval. RR 2. tr of
V. Trapeznikov, Izvestiya, 14 May 55, p. 2. U)
CIA. FDD Summary no 739, 7 Dec- 55, p. 147. OFF USE.
Eval. RR 2.
FOIAb3b1
29 Jun 55, p. CCU. OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
CIA. FDD U-8331, 20 May 56, p. 3. OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
(tr of .A.Ye. Vyatkin, "For Technical Progress in Instrument
Building." U)
"Scientific and Technical Achievements in Production,"
Pravda, 20 Jan 55. U. Eval. RR 2.
CIA. FDD Summary no 828, 24 Feb 56, p. 31. OFF USE.
Eval. RR 2.
CIA. FDD Summary no 843, 6 Mar 56, p. 100-101. OFF USE.
Eval. RR 2.
48. Joint Committee on Slavic Studies. "What Is Holding Back
Automation" (47, above).
CIA.. FDD Summary no 945, 1 Jun 56, p. 13-14. OFF USE.
Eval. RR 2.
FOIAb3b1 ~;g'
20 Jul 55, p. CC 10-CC 11, CC 15-CC 17. OFF USE.
Eval. RR 2.
50. Ibid., 23 Jan 56, p. CC 25. OFF USE. Eval. Doc.
51. Ibid., 30 Aug 56, p. CC 1. OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
Ibid., 7 Jun 56, p. CC 5. OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
Ibid., 3 Aug 56, p. CC 9. OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
CIA.. FDD Summary no 974, 20 Jun 56, p. 27. OFF USE.
Eval. RR 2.
CIA. FDD Summary no 988, 10 Jul 56, p. 24. C. Eval. RR 2.
25X1X7 52. Intelligence Digest, no 206, 27 Mar 56,
p. 5. S. Eval. RR 2.
FOIAb3b1 17 Jan 56,
p~. CC 4-CC 5, CC 1 -CC 15. OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
FOIAb3b153 ? 17 Jan 56,
p. CC 16. OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
Ibid., 3o Aug 56, p. CC 1. OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
54. Ibid., 17 Jan 56, p. CC 15-CC 16. OFF- USE. Eval. Doc.
55. Ibid., 20 Jul 55, p. CC 1, CC 16. OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
CIA. FDD Summary no 1141, 29 Nov 56, p? 95, 96. OFF USE.
Eval. RR 2.
25X1X Intelligence Digest, no 213, 10 Jul 56,
p. 3. S. Eval. RR 3.
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CIA. FDD Summary no 978, 28 Jun 56, p. 80. OFF USE.
Eval. RR 2.
FOIAb3b156? 3o Aug 56,
p. CC 1. OFF USE. Eval. 2.
57. Ibid., p. DD 11. OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
58. Ibid.
FOIAb3b159? 24 Aug 56,
p. CC 13. OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
Ibid., 30 Aug 56, p. CC 1. OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
6U. Ibid., 5 Jul SEA, p. CC 16-CC 17. OFF USE. Eva1. RR 2.
61. Ibid., 30 Aug 56, p. CC 9. OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
62. CIA. FDD Summary no 947, Information on the Decree of
21 August 1954 on "The Role and Tasks o~ Gosbank USSR"
and Changes in the Soviet Banking and'Financial S stem,
1 Jun 5 , p. 2 OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid., p. 29-32. OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
FOIAb3b1 20 oct 5~,
p. CC 11. OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
CIA. FDD Summary no 801, 24 Jan 56, p. 5. OFF USE.
Eval. RR 2.
65. CIA. FDD Summary no 947(62, above), p. 29-33? OFF USE.
Eval. RR 2.
66. CIA. FDD Summery no 825, 17 Feb 56, p. 19. OFF USE.
Eval. RR 2.
CIA. FDD Summary no 801, 24 Jan 56, p. 4-5. OFF USE.
Eval. RR 2.
FOIAb3b1
20 Oct 55, p. CC 12. OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
Den'gi i kredit, no 2, 1956, p. 36-39. U. Eval. RR 2.
67. CIA. FDD Summary no 904, 20 Apr 56, p. 34. OFF USE.
Eval. RR 2.
FOIAb3b1 68. ,
21 Aug 56, p. C-C 6-CC 7. OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
69. Malyshev, off. cit. (42, above), p. 22. U. Eval. RR 2.
70. Davies, R.W. 'iThe Reappraisal of Industry," Soviet Studies,
vol 7, no 3, Jan 56, p. 322-323. U. Eval. RR 2.
71. Dozortsev, V.A. "The Legal Status of an Industrial Enter-
prise," Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo, no 18, 1955,
p. 47-48. U. Eval. RR 2.
72. Malyshev, off. eit. (42, above), p. 22. U. Eval. RR 2.
Davies, off. cit. (70, above), p. 323. U. Eval. RR 2.
73. CIA. CIA/RR IM-429, Implications of the Planned Expansion
in the Soviet Machine Tool and Metalforming Machinery
Industries, 1 May 5 , p. 1-2, 7. S.
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Bean, Nevin. Soviet Machine Age,-- Automation in Russia,
Dearborn, Michigan, 195 , p. 7, 9, 2,. U. Eval. RR 2.
25X1A 74?
CIA. FDD U-5443, 8 Feb 54, The Introduction of Constant
Flow Production at the Moscow Instruments Plant. OFF USE.
Eval. RR 2. tr of monograph by S.I. Sheppi, no 62,
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
25X1 C
77. Ibid.
78. CIA. FDD Summary no 1007, 25 Jul 56, Report on USSR
Production of Industrial Equipment (no 25 ,~ p. l~
OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
Nikitin, P. "Osnovnyye zadachi sovetskogo stankostroyeniya"
(Basic Problems of Soviet Machine Tool Construction),
Planovoye khozyaystvo, no 5, 1955, P? 4. U. Eval. RR 2.
Bloknot a~itatora, no 28, Moscow,-Oct 55, p. 12. U. Eval. RR 2.
7q. CIA.. FDD Summary no 1007 (78, above.), p. 2-3. OFF USE.
Eval. RR 2.
Dem'yanyuk, F.S. Tekhnicheski ro ress v mashinostro enii
(Technical Progress in Machine Building , Moscow, 195 ,
p. 22-27. U. Eval. RR 2.
CIA. FDD Summary no 1044, 25 Aug 56, Report on-USSR Produc-
tion of Industrial Equipment (no 26 ), p. 10. OFF USE.
Eval. RR 2.
80. CIA. FDD Summary no 320, 7 Jan 55, Current Problems of
Standardization in USSR Machine Building, p. g. OFF USE.
Eval. RR 2.
76.
81..
82.
83.
84. Shaumyan, G.A. Avtomaty Automatic Machines , Moscow, 1952,
p? 576-645. U. Eval. RR 2.
Avtomatizatsiya v mashinostroyenii (75, above), p. 12-22.
U. Eval. RR 2:
CIA. FDD U-3248 (3, above), p. 2-4. R. Eval. RR 2.
- 43 -
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25X1 C
25X1 C
85. Prokopovich, A.E. Avtomatizatsiya proizvodstvennykh
protsessov mashinostroyeniya v shestoy yatiletke
Automation of Production Processes in Machine Building
in the Sixth Five Year Plan), Moscow, 1956, p. 24. U.
Eval. RR 2.
86. Krasivskiy, off.. cit. 5, above p. 37. U. Eval. RR 2.
Prokopovich o cit. (85 above) 26. U. Eval. RR 2.
87. la.
CIA. FDD Summary no 1044 (79, above), p. 51. OFF USE.
Eval. RR 2.
88. Krasivskiy, off. cit. (5, above), p. 37. U. Eval. RR 2.
25X1 C 89
90
State, Moscow. Dsp 427, 23 Mar 56. OFF USE. Eval, RR 2.
. CIA.? FDD Summary no 1084, 2 Oct 56, Comments on an Article
"Measurin the Effectiveness of the Introduction of New
Technology Published in USSR, p. -3 OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
91. CIA. 00-w-31815, 3 Mar 56. OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
FOIAb3b1a2? ~ 5 Mar 56,
p. CC 13. OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
93? Dem'yanyuk, off. cit. (79, above), p. 19-21. U. Eval. RR 2.
Prokopovich, o cit. (85 above), p. 15-18. U. Eval. RR 2.
FOIAb3b1
19 Jan 5 , p. CC 7. OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
F OIAb3 b1 Economic Item 143886, Moscow, g Apr 56.
OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
94. Air, ATIC. Air Technical Intelli ence Center Bulletin,
vol 6, no 1, Jan 57. S. Eval. RR 2.
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 Approved Fflr-Release~9~9i~~~
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 .Approved-.For Release 1999 ~ IA-RQP79-01093A00120U100010-4
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SECRET
Approved FQr Release 1 9 9 910 912 6 :CIA-RDP79-01093A0012001.00010-4