STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN DCI, COLONEL GROGAN AND PAUL PALMER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R000900020010-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 25, 2003
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: January 15, 1958
• Content Type: NOTES

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STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN DCI, COLONEL GROGAN,
AND PAUL PALMER ON 15 JANUARY 1958 AT 1600 nous.
P- It goo was going good but, obviously, it can't be described
of how it is or why it is but I know that--."
G- "No, you can't tell how or why but you can point to a
couple of things, Mr. Dulles, particularly off-the-record
from that ... Take the Sputnik, for example--that's
public through the President's Committee. We never put
these things out but the President's Committee did put
out a statement there of Scoville's--Mr. Dulles let Pete
Scoville go over and talk to them October the 4th."
D- "Was that the day after or the day of?"
G- "The day of, that morning."
D-
41046 beforehand, of course."
G- "He said it's about to happen."
P- "Yes."
G- "It showed how good, remarkably good, intelligence was."
D- "I think one could say that it was not fair to estimate
that we have been over-all taken by surprise by the
developments in the Soviet Union. Certain things they
have done a bit sooner; certain things they're still a
little further behind than we expected, but the general
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emphasis of the Soviet effort and the general time periods
in which they would achieve certain results have not
surprised us. Now, when I say general time period, I
mean they might have been ahead a year or eighteen months
in some of these major fields, but that is not very long
In the life of a nation."
P- "No, certainly. Well, maybe some answer could be phrased to
that. I think it's of great public interest certainly.
Our experience always has been when we approach the subject
of intelligence, that if we get anything good, it can't
be printed."
D- "Yes. I've run into that, too. I've run this shop but
I just have to stick to it."
P- "Sure."
D- "If every time we learned a development about the Soviet
Union and told about it, that would be pretty disastrous."
"Yes, certainly."
D- "We're pretty much an open book as far as the United
States is concerned. They've made every effort to keep
themselves absolutely closed and, therefore, it takes
very special techniques and very special efforts and
we don't want them to know where we're successful."
P- "No, certainly not."
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D? "Because there are ways by which they can prevent ...
successes or make those successes more difficult."
P? "Certainly, yes. Well, then, the first question is
this: 'Is it not a fact that recent, much heralded,
Soviet achievements, which some people may say will make
the U.S. a second?rate power in two year's time, have
been primarily propaganda successes? Realistically
evaluated, do not U.S. Il?bombers, intermediate?range
missiles, atomic submarines, and other weapons now
operational equal or surpass a military effectiveness
whatever the Russians say they have?"
D? "I have felt right along that our present position, our
present military position is stronger than that of the
Russians and that, if it came to a showdown which everybody
hopes and expects it will not, we could reap more damage
on them than they could on us, and that unless they
achieved a major potential in such a ,.. weapon as the
ICBM well ahead of us or well ahead of our having that
ability with IRBMs and having the IRBMs in place, we
would be able to maintain that superiority."
P? "That's fine. There's another part to this: 'Do you
believe the Russians really have an operational ICBM
now?"
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D? "We believe they have test prototypes--."
P? "Test prototypes."
D? "We do not, cannot, discuss the qualifications of those
prototypes and that they have tested those prototypes."
P? "But that they probably don't have an operational--."
D? "Capability, at the present time."
P? "At the present time. Well, this question, perhaps, is
more for the Navy: 'It is said that the Soviet Union
has two or three times as many submarines as we have,
but how do the actual wartime capacities of these two
undersea forces compare?"
D? "Well, I don't deal in comparative figures myself because
I'm not an expert on our own capabilities, but we do
credit the Soviet with having in a range of five hundred
submarines of which about a half are modern submarines.
We have no information that they have yet operational
atomic submarines."
P? "If they had one, we would probably know about it. Wouldn't
they show it off? Isn't that the sort of thing--?"
D? "We believe they'd show it off."
P? "Yes."
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D? "Although, rev mustAremembenglthat when they come second
in time in things, they don't advertise it."
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P? "No, that's right."
D? "The same way as when they are first in time."
P? just as we won't be too proud of our Sputnik.
Are the Russians really ahead of us in these three
things--scientific accomplishment, technical knowhow,
and production capacity?"
D? "Well, I don't generally indulge in comparisons but I
would be inclined to answer those three no. Would you
read the three once again?"
P? "Scientific accomplishment, technical knowhow, and
production capacity."
D? "I'd answer those three no, they are not ahead of us."
P? "The reason for that question is that we find so many
people who are getting a sort of hopeless attitude--well,
they're way ahead of us and what's the use and how can
we catch up with them."
D? "We do feel that at the rate at which they are training
scientists, that there may be a time in the future and
not too far off where they might have a greater scientific
capability as far as manpower is concerned than we."
P? "Yes."
D? "Now, in science, it is sometimes more important to have
a half a dozen geniuses than to have a thousand mediocrities."
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"Yes."
D? "Now, I don't say that the Russians are mediocrities,
but numbers are sometimes misleading. It's the genius
who helps you make the breakthrough and if we're on our
toes, we ought to be able to produce in the free world.
I tnink you've got to consider not only American science,
but the science of the free world. If we're on our toes,
there is no reason why we should come out second?best in
the over?all scientific field, but I do think we've got
to beef up our secondary education so as to make sure
that more of the potential geniuses In science get
opportunity for the training which may produce the stars
of the future firmament of scientists."
P? "They're really scraping the barrel; they go after every
boy that's got any ability, don't they?"
D? "Oh, yes. They take them in the schools if they've got--
if they're good in their mathematics and good in things
that lead to science, they Lake them right along and
say, 'You're going to be a scientist,' and then they
carry them right on through."
P? "Yes, yes."
D? "There is no saying 'no,' but they don't want to say no
because it's a great honor."
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P? "Sure."
D? "They have given their scientists probably a position
of greater honor in the community than we have, relatively."
P? "Yes. The next question is: 'What is the military
significance of the space satellites?' I suppose the
answer to this part is restricted: 'How useful are
photographs or TV images of the U.S. or the Soviet Union
taken at five hundred miles altitude?"
D? "Well, let me take the first question. The first question
I think I can answer; the second quesGion is a little
bit beyond my--I can and I think probably toe answer
would be that no one knows absolutely at this time what
the answer to the last one is. We can have some ideas
but I don't think we'll have accurate knowledge. Give
me the first question once again."
P? "What is the military significance of tile space satellites?"
D? "Well, the military significance of the space satellite
lies in the fact that it shows what they have--it shows
they have the propulsion to put a mass into the outer
space and that that same propulsion directed to an ICBM?
type of missile would send it a very Iona ways. It does
not give us much clue as to guidance or accuracy."
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P? "And the other part of the question is: 'When man
satellites are sent aloft, can they be used for H?bomb
attacks and will there be any defense against such
attacks?"
D? "That I can't answer."
P? "The next question is: 'What precautions are being taken
to make sure that atomic war does not start accidentally?'
There are two parts to this: 'Jet?bombers armed with
H?bombs are now in the air day and night; missiles with
atomic warheads are being test?fired; submarines, aircraft
carriers, and cruisers, all armed with atomic weapons,
are maneuvering in ever ocean. Isn't there a chance
that, through misunderstanding of orders or the irresponsible
behavior of individuals, an atomic warhead may be propelled,
Into the Soviet Union or the U.S., and exploded with
great loss of life, thereby, setting off all?out war
before the error could be explained?' And the second
place: 'A considerable number of nations will eventually
have the capacity to manufacture H?bombs secretly. Has
any thought been given to the possibility that an
irresponsible dictator might H?bomb Moscow or Washington
or both from disguised airplanes; thus, setting off a
war to the death between the two major powers?"
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D- "That's quite a--."
P- "There's probably too much to that question but--."
D- "Well, on the first part of it about the accidental
triggering off of war, I would think the danger is not
nearly as great as the public generally conceives. It
takes the bombers quite a long while to get from their
starting point to their destination under any circumstances,
and that an error would endure for that time, it's almost
inconceivable. When you get to ICBMs, the time element
shifts, but I would think it unlikely that that kind of
human error would take place. That, again, that is
probably a question to be answered more by Defense than
by Intelligence."
P- "Yes."
D- "We would have to consider the intelligence, not our own
likelihood that we, by mistake, would trigger off a war,
but the question is to whether Russia, by mistake, would
trigger off a war. They have iron discipline with their
organization and I would very much doubt that that would
take place in the Soviet Union. You have, always, a
dictatorship--the danger that war can be started by one
man's decision, I mean, that's another thing and I think
the greater danger than the one that you indicate--."
P- "I see."
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D- "That's why we believe in democracy--because there is
a control. The accidental triggering off of war by a
subordinate, I think, is pretty unlikely."
P- "Yes, but when more countries have the capabilities of
manufacturing the atomic weapons, there is going to be
a more nervous situation, isn't it?"
D- "Yes. Of course, no country is ever going to have that
and have it in big secrecy. I think it is inconceivable
that a country would come up with any substantial atomic
capability without that fact being known. You have to
test and you have to go through certain procedures, and
it requires a tremendous industrial effort."
P- "Yes."
D- "Now, if twenty countries all had atomic weapons, obviously
the danger of an atomic war is increased. There's no
question about that."
P- "Yes. Wouldn't it be to the interest of Russia and the
United States to see that other nations didn't have that
or are we getting into the political end of things now?"
D- "We're getting into the political end there, but I think
it is in the interest that it should be as much limited
as possible. Of course, Great Britian is also an atomic
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power with growing atomic capabilities. If a great many
dictators around the world got hold of the atomic bomb,
that obviously would increase the danger."
"Yes. All right, the next is: 'One of the reasons why
the Soviet Union has made rapid strides in military
technology being that a very high percentage of its
total national resources has been devoted to armament,
does it follow that the United States will have to become
a modern Sparta, sacrificing much of the American way
of life, in order to keep up with the Russians in the
years to come?"
D? "No, I don't think that is necessary. As war becomes
more and more spectiized and more and more technical,
you're probably going to need fewer people in the over?all
war machine. Even the Soviet Union has been reducing in
numbers. Furthermore, while the modern weapons are highly--
are very expensive, on the other hand, you get more of a
bang for your dollar in the modern weapon than you do in
the weapons of World War II or World War I, so that while
there may be periods when great expenditures are required,
I should think that unless one invents an entirely new
family of weapons, you'd probably find a place where you
are on the downward scale of expenditures rathen than a
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continued upward scale of expenditures. When in World
War II we called for the immediate production of twenty
thousand aircraft, that was a tremendous expenditure in
the calling out of a tremendous number of men to man the
factories and to produce the twenty thousand aircraft in
a very short space of time. That kind of a situation is
not likely to arise except over a very short period and
then you might have a situation where if the Russians,
for example, got satisfied as to the prototype of weapons
that they wanted, they might be under a very great strain
themselves and we, comparably, in the same situation, in
getting those into production."
"Yes."
D? "Very largely in the good many fields of weapons, we are
still in the R and D stage and so are they. In the R and
D stage, it's expensive enough but it's not really as
expensive as the great manufacturing stage. Then, there
is A. question of how many of the modern weapons you use.
There is no use destroying a country twice."
P? "No, no. Well, that's quite hopeful. The next is: 'We
are told that so long as the Strategic Air Command and
the Navy's carrier bombers remain in an instant readiness
for retaliation, a Soviet attack on the United States is
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highly unlikely because the Russians know we can
annihilate their country. As of today, can St.:: and
the Navy destroy the Soviet Union and can the Russians
destroy SAC and the Naval air arm in any way, thus,
eliminating retaliation?"
D? "Well, that is mostly a question to be answered by Defense
but we have always estimated--over the last few years,
we have estimated that the Soviet was so worried by
our deterrent force that it would not wish to risk all?out
war or take an action which they thought might bring them
into war."
P? "And so far as we know, there is no way they can take
out SAC and the Naval air arms so that there wouldn't
be any retaliation as long as they're--."
D? "No, I assume they can%desome damage on us but even
if they inflict some damage on us, the resulting force
of SAC would presumably be adequate to inflict very great
damage on the Soviet Union."
P? "Well, that's seems to--it's funny how many peopie don't
realize that. I was speaking to some very well?informed
man the other day and he said, 'Well, if I knew that, I'd
feel much reassured.' It seems to me that that's been
printed often enough."
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D? "It has been, it has been Said. LeMay said it and others
have said it in the recent hearings."
"Yes, I guess you have to keep on saying it. This, of
course, is one of the most common questions in peoples'
mind, it's hard to answer: 'Do you believe that all?out
war with the Soviet Union is probable in the near future?"
D?
"That's the answer they want to hear. I suppose you might
say that it's not probable but it is always possible?"
D? "Miscalculations are always possible in periphery
situations. When you have a situation in the Middle
East as disturbed as it is and in certain parts of Mita,
one side could take a step which the other could mis?
calculate as being directed against its vital interests,
but I think the chances of that are relatively small, though
not absolute negligible."
P? "Yes. Would you consider that war is eventually inevitable?"
D? "No."
"Not ..."
D? "I think the mere fact that weapons are now so mutually
destructive that that will be a deterrent. No country
has ever gone to War in the past without having a feeling
that it was going to win and to win without terrible
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damage to itself. Now, there have been miscalculations.
Germany miscalculated twice on that, but it may be that
each time they had some reason to believe that it wouldn't
happen. Now, it would take pretty near 4 blind man not
to realize that. In World War I the Germans thought that
England wasn't coming into the war and that changed the
whole picture for them. If you go back to what Hitler
said in his ralitings just before Germany went to war,
?
he said/the British and the French are little worms, they
won't do anything at all: That was his language, just
about. It was easier in those days to miscalculate; now,
I think, no responsible person is likely to miscalculate.
The terrific damage the aggressor would bear."
P? "Yes, that's fine. In the light of the foregoing questions
and answers, do you feel that Americans are at present
unduly apprehensive about the Soviet threat?"
1)? "I think possibly it is difficult to be unduly apprehensive
about any threat that is very serious to our national
security. I think that when history is written--and I've
said this several times in informal talks--we will look
back upon the Russian miscalculation in Korea and the
timing of the Sputnik as, really, blessings in disguise.
A democracy like our own with our high standard of living,
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with the varied interest of the people, all the possibilities
in excercising their leisure and so forth and so on, it
is all too easy to forget the lurking dangers in the
world. It sometimes takes dramatic things. I don't
Lhink that anything that has happened in the last six
or eight months?which one can say has been a real
surprise to those who have been following event. But,
I think--looking back on it, it is pretty necessary that
these things take place in order to get people to appraise
the situation and to use the time you've got to meet the
dangers. If, looking back on it, if the Russians had
waited a bit, a year or so, to unloose their Sputniks
and their repeated testings of ballistic missiles and
had made their developments in secret, we might have found
ourselves in a rather difficult position in two years.
Because, I don't believe anything that the--any Administra?
tion could do is as dramatic as a pointing up of the
potential of the Soviet by their own actions."
11?
"That's mighty interesting. They might have
year ahead of us, in other words."
been
another
D?
"They might have been another year ahead of us if
they
had waited another year and that might have
been
hard to
catch up. I think probably now they have given us time."
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A
P? "Yes. I think there are just two more here: s there
a real possibility of a lasting peace between the Soviet
Union and the United States?"
D? "You'd better ask my brother that question. I hope so."
P? "And finally: 'What can the individual American--."
D? "May I say there, I'd just like to add there that I
think an evolution is going on in the Soviet Union.
I've preached that for two years, really, that with
education coming along the way it's coming along, opening
the eyes of the people, increased intercourse between
the two countries, I think there is a chance of an
evolution in Russia that will prevent a war."
P? "That is, certainly the relation of their scientists and
ours is encouraging when they meet, isn't it?"
D? "Yes."
"Well, this is the last one: 'Finally, what can the
individual American do in these-trying times to help
safeguard the security of this country?' That's what--
whenever we tell our readers anything, that's what they
ask, 'What can I do?"
D? "That question is easier to answer in time of war; it's
far more difficult to answer in time of peace. In time
of war you can join the Armed Forces or civilian agencies
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that are working and you do your particular task in
that way or in industry or in other ways. It is more
difficult, obviously, in time of peace. I think that
if we can get a measured appreciation of where we stand
and try really to help support those measures which are
proposed--obviously, one can't say one should blindly
following everything the Administration says, everything
is going to be examined, but when that examination is
taking place and when we've had our great debate, then
if we can sort of rally around the conclusions and try
to meke them effective. That goes to management, it goes
to labor, it goes to industry, and it goes to people in
Government. That's about the best answer I can give you."
P? "Well, I think that's a fine answer. Well, Mr. Dulles,
thank you very much. It was very kind of you to let me
borrow your time."
D? "It's a great pleasure. I don't generally talk for
publications, so, until I let you know, just for your
background guidance."
P? "Until you say it, it's from me."
D? "Right."
P? "Also--."
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D? "I've been getting letters from--oh, my good friend
up in Connecticut, used to come down lere all the time
for the Air Force--."
G? "Muller? Oh, no--."
P? "Francis Drake."
G? "Drake, yes."
D? "Francis Drake. You want me to write a piece and I've
got his letter, I haven't answered it."
P? "He told me the other day that he hoped you were going
to."
D? "Well, I almost did put something town on paper the other
day and I may still do it."
P? "I wish you would; we'd certainly like to have it."
D? "You've got to be free to reject it. It was somewhat
along these lines. We're not in a crises we can't meet;
there's nothing new--."
P? "Well, I thought the last answers that. People shouldn't
get panic; there are great assets that America has."
D? "Yes, we can beat it. It's good to see you."
P? "Thank you very much."
D? "It's a great publication that you have and I've got a
lot of friends on it."
P? "Thank you, Mr. Dulles."
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D? "You know that Polish gal, that American?polish gal is
quite a character."
P? "Oh,
D? "She came down to see me; she is a great friend of my
daughter's."
P? "She's a--that girl is going to be--she's a comer. She's
going to be a great writer some day, you know."
D? "Yes."
P? "She really is."
D? "Ed Muller is a great friend of mine."
P? "Thank you for taking an interest in her trip."
D? "Thank you very much indeed."
G? "Paul, I'll be right out in a second."
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