ACTIVITIES AND PLANS OF THE FRONT DEMOKRASI RAKJAT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R002100610004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 16, 2000
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 13, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

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Indonesia
Activities and. Flans
Rakjat
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REPORT NO.
Aglivities of the Front Demokrastlaklat
To begin with it must be clarified that the Front Demokrasi Rakjat (FOR) is
attennting to gain supremagy over the masses of uneducated peonle, Indonesian
workers, farmers, youth leaders, etc., in Renublican ares. This is attennted
through mass agitation under the leadership of Nr. Amir Sjarifoedin, Dr.
Maroeto Daroesman and Alinin. Their ideoloeical a:mansion is based on the
following:
a. Winning of supeort.
b. Influencing public opinion with the ultimate goal of gainine members in
the Konite Nasional Indonesia Poesat (En/p) and obtaining a majority of the
seats: toward the eventual control'of tae Renublican cabinets most
important portfolios as well as the earliament. During March the activities
of the FOR spread considerably with satisfactory results from their eoint
of view.
2. In a large number of cities in the Republican interior a considerable amount of
propaganda was spread by the FOR advocating ?Pen resistance to the present'
Hattn cabinet. This agressive attitude was nurtured in many weys, but primarily
by stressine that the Present officials did not rePrenent the Indonesian
"pro/etariat" (this resolution was reached by the FOR in Poerwoerdjo, Xebomen,
Solo, Eadioen and Kediri).
*
The FOR has its greatest influence among the'broad mass of Indonesian workers
(Tani), the Military, white collar workers and. the youth. The mass activities
under the leadershin of Sjarifoedin, Dr. Maroeto Daroesman and A/imin, swept
the masses to a fury.
4. Soekarne is not mentioned to any great extent, consequently both Hatta and
Soekarno organieed a propaganda tour during the months of May and June to
counteract the IMR's influence (Soekarnols going to Sumetra for instance).
5. The urgency program of the FOR consists of the following:
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a. Doing away with all remains of the feudal land laws; doing away with the
*imperialistic stamp* of ground parcelling: reducing the number of land
concessions; etc.
b. Organization of mass activities for obtaining the above mentioned objectives,
and, eliminating ground rental--which would be paid for from a percentage of
the production.
0. Granting credits to farmers.
d. Organization of an overall functioning distribution apparatus.
e. Reduction of heavy taxes in favor of the workers and members of the
Republican civil service.
f. Setting up a cooperative system between rice workers and rice exploiters.
g. Attempt to set up satisfactory irrigation water allotments.
h. Recognition of the right to strike, recognition of the existing rights of
trade unions to act as representatives of the workers and as protector of
their interests.
i. Encouraging the Republican government to give all working organizations a
voice in production.
j. Setting up a new cooperative system.
k4 Medical assistance for the neople at reduced costs.
1. Perfection of existing peoples' cooperatives: labor making plans to aid in
unstable productive systems, distribution of transportation and credit
control.
m. Opposition to the investment of foreign capital.
U ., Maintenance of relatione with, and the calling for assistance from, foreign
groups for the purpose of obtaining aid and guarantees of support in the
fight against capitalism in order that Indonesia shall not become a prize in
the coffers of the "Neo-Imperialists".
ca. Taking the leadership of a national revolution for the accomplishment of
the following objectives;
(1) An Indonesian people and government free of imperialistic influences.
(2) Reconstruction without the help of capitalistic investments, thus
preventing exploitation.
(3) Reconstruction based on the Principles of the cooperative system.
6. The preceding program contains the most important objectives of the group. The
national Program of the YDR in addition brings out the following points:
a. As soon as possible change the presidential cabinet into a par/iamentany
cabinet.
b. Set up a national economic program for improvement of the peoples? welfare
under the supervision of the government.
co Centralization of oroduction and distribution of textiles and foods for the
advantage of workers.
d. Set un an institution for controlling citizen work duty, for the state.
e. Taking legal actions favoring workers agreements, trade onions, and the like
for the eventual elimination of all differences between workers And
employers.
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f. Setting up a new wage scale in which there will be very little difference
between maximum and minimum.
g. Undertaking to inform the Indonesian masses so well on this progrAm that
they will be filled with a desire to bring 0(3'0 these changes. Ibis will
result in the SNIP being filled with persons chosen from the MR--vhich
stands as the leading opposition to the Partai Nasional Indonesia (21M)
and the NatjOOMi.
7. The latter organization, the Masjoemi, has been bolding mass demonstrations in
an effort to increase its influence.
8. In a recent report the FDR was opposed to the Republican export policy, the
Republican distribution system, the PRI and the Masjoami, with the result that
Republican labor organizations, for the time being, were opposed to these groups.
9. This has resulted in a macho:bearer definition of left and right. It is especially
noticeable in the break between 'Latta and Sentral Organisosie Doeroeh Seloeroeh
Indonesia (sou), which is closely affiliated with the 7DR. The controversy
grew out of the economic program set up by the Republican distribution apparatus.
It has increased the rift between the Republican government and the MR.
10. The MR does not imply that there should be a coup dletat. It points cut, as
ET. R. N. Setyadjit Soegodo clarified, that it is not necessary to create an
international situation each as is now existing in Greece and Czechoslovakia.
The FDR's primary targets should be *opposition to aggression from the outside ?
which is directed against the national struggle of the Republic*.
11. He feels that the economic reconstruction of the Republic will reach its highest
peak through the nationalization of industry and eventual socialisation. This
is in conflict with Tan Malaka,who is a revolutionary.
12. A national company, stateeSetyadjit, *consists of various categories: workers,
small ground holders, small merchants and middle men, and nationalized bourgeoisie.*
Most of these categories bear labels of "anti-imperialise. Most of the land
owners should be made to consist of the natitnal bourgeoisie and middle class in
the RepUblic--which categories have the greatest political influence and should
have the greatest strenght, in Setyadjitio opinion. 14 interprets this as4he
beginning of a reduction and a gradual elimination of the so-called landed class."
13. The MR considers the youth to be the vnnguard of the national revolution.
14. They speak of a production system resembling that in the USSR. This Propaganda
is expounded primarily to Republican workers and youth organizations. Without
these groups the YDR would be practically impotent. Propaganda is spread by
means of Communistic lectures in the so-called *Marx Mouses* urging opposition
to the 1NIP. The 1011 feather consolidates its position by taking advantage of
political controversies in the PN/ and the Masjoemi.
15. Here are some of the results: Splitting of the Gaboengan Pemocula Islam Indonesia
and the Pemoeda Demokrat from the Madan Kongres Pemoeda Repoeblik Indonesia,
thus breaking the central trade unions into two categories, namely SOBSI and
Gaboengan Serikat Joeroeh Indonesia (ClaZI)aespectively under the
leadership of Setyadjit and Danoesoedo. Other workers under the leadership of
Samsoe I. Oedaya, a follower of Tan Melaka, compose the recently set up
Parte.' Boer?. Merdeka (P1M).
16. On the other hand, the influence of the MR in Republican militaav organizations
must not be underestimated inasmuch as this army, to a great extent_ consists of
elements assembled out of the above groups. In the volunteer army, the Tentera
Nasional Indonesia (TNI) Masjarakat, one division, stands completely ander the
control of the MR. It supplies the bodaguard for Mr. Sjarifbedin and is financed
by the MR.
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17. The personal power of Sjarifbedin is not entirely the result of his tour
of duty as Republican premier, however, this did strengthen his personal position.
The Republican Government does not have the same political outlook as Mr.
Sjarifbedin. It wanted to got rid of him. As a metter of fact, an official
order was given to that effect. It applied, also to Mr. Setyadjit Soegondo, the
would-be "Auctor Intellectualls" of the MR.
18. Sjarifoodin is a sort of figure head, a symbol of socialism--e sort of father
of the Indonesian working classes. Soetan Sjahrir is of the opinion that
Mr. Sjarifbedin is under the complete influerce of Setyedjit.
19. The foreign influence in the MR comes primarily vea Batavia and the Communist
Party of the Netherlands (Communistische Partij Nederland). Connection with
Communist organizations in Southeast Asia is carried out through Chinese groups
here, primarily by way of Toeban. Sosrabaja and Singapore. Before the police
action, close contact was maintained between the Sajap Kiri,(YDR) and the
Communist organizations in Australia. Setyndjit received directives for the
trade unions via the World Federation of Trade Unions in Paris before the
police action.
20. During this time the World Federation of Democratic Youth at Prague sent out
much propaganda material and the Baden Kongres Pemoeda Repoeblik Indonesia was
in contact with the World. Federation of Democratic Youth. Through Tobing,
the BUM recently received a supply of propaganda material from Prague
consisting of brochures and detailed reports on the disastrous results of the
Marshall flan for Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia, and suggesting that the
plan be brought out in open debate at Marx Nouse* throughout Indonesia.
21. Setyadjitss time limit for setting up a radical social Indonesia on a Soviet
basis is two years. He does not believe that there will be a quick outbreak of
conflict between the US and the USSR. Re is pleased with the "cold wee and
sees the USSR winning it because of the Communist expansion with which it Is
being carried out.
22. On the other hand, he feels that there will be a rapid economic breakdown In the
USA. he national struggle here must be brought into harmony with the inter-
national opposition to so-called. "Seo-Imperialism" in order that a new radical
democracy may evolve.
23. Recently a conference was held at Jogjakarta between*. Sjarifbedin, Alimin,
Dr. R. M. SetyadjitSoegendo, Dr. Maroeto Daroesman, Mr. 2LS Ling Ejieren and
Mr. Moewalladi, secretary of the Persikatan Saadakar-Saudaker Indonesia (MSS!).
Moewalladi went to jogjakarta on 17 May concerning the situation existing
between PBRSS/ and the Republican government on the 2bx contract. While there
he served as representative of mu in place of Soepranoto.
24. In BataviaMr. Moewalladi is the representattm of the yna and a member of the
Partai Sosialis. Is stated that the MR was politically oriented toward the
situation in Albania, Bulgaria, Roumenia, Poland, Yugoslavia, Greece, Czechoslo-
vakia, Finland, Italy and France, 1.n, which states the ideological bases of
local Communism existed; and in which the gnmmAimek WAS organized under the
leadership of the USSR-trained personnel. They aided in such activities
as the control of labor unions, education, agriculture, etc., or which (sic)
the most important step was gaining control of the major labor unions, he said.
25. The FDR thus has no interest in the Znglish and US position, and is inclined
toward participation in the Central and Western Kuropean expansion scheme. The
expansion program, as brought out in the previously mentioned conference at
Jogjakarta, concerned Indonesia In the following way:
a. To setup an organization and a fifth column which will have representatives
in trade unions, universities, left-oriented organizations, etc. The fifth
column's leadership would be guided through the Marx 'buses such as those set
up In middle Java.
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b. By agitation and propaganda a campaign would be expanded and intensified,
giving especial consideration to control of the peoples' political ideas,
the condition of factory workers, minorities, a consideration of the social
constructions of the USSR, the "capitalist prodection eystem", *colonial
reactionarieen, American war propaganda, etc. Dvery single person would
be involved in the propaganda by means of brochnres, newspapers, mass action
and mass meetings.
c. The IDR leaders are to infiltrate into key positions in labor organizations
and left-oriented political and social organizations. Moreover, they are to
keep alert for the possibility of infiltrating right-wing groups which cow
stand in opposition to the 7DR, or .to brand these groups as reactionaries.
d. The giving of various positions of leadership to the leaders of the Partel
Romanis Indonesia (MI) so that by means of agitation and propaganda they
can obtain positions in the =XP.
So *emotion of a new Republican parliament in conjunction with Socialists,
Social Democrats, and eventually other leftist groups.
f. The securing of kep positions in high Republican offices in an attempt to gain
control over the Republican police corps, the Republican foreign service, and
following that, arey, foreign policy and others.
g. Speaking out against the so-called "rights against the sovereignty of the
people", and finally elimination of opposition organizations and their leading
officials through a Communist political apparatus which would arrest, accuse,
and sentence them.
h. Carrying out of orders which come out of Moscow and other areas under control
of the USSR; to await the exact psychological momeit for coordination of
their policies with the USSR, with the objectives of gaining possible assistance
and intervention by the USSR whenever they should desire to call on her.
1.Biecution of a coup d'etat and gaining complete control of the government;
the declaration of a peoples' war in which the protection of the Soviet
forces would aid in elimination of the armed opposition.
Complete control would be obtained by the deportation of known anti-Communist
elements from Indonesia; complete control of radio communication, press, etc.
26. For this complete Program, barring ibreign intervention, a time limit of two
years has been set. Consequently official open activity will be avoided to fore-
stall intervention by the "State Department" while carrying out systematically
the steps of the elan.
i.
27. The YDR expects an eventual third world war which will lead to a battle to the
finish between Communists and other ideologies.
The USSR sees a world war as an end product of her expansion activities. She
sees this war (the war in Indonesia) as one of the beginning phases.
The USSR intends to male West Europe and Southeast Asia defenseless through mili-
tary weakening of these ftontr;end through political disturbances.
30. The "state Department", according to Dr. Setyadjit, has its plans built non the
hope that the usza will be satisfied with internal expansion. According to Mr.
Moelan Moewalladi, the Russian regime has no weak points, especially not in the
economic field, because of the deflation policy which has had the effect of
inflation in surrounding states.
31. The FUR feels that a break:will come in Italy, 'tame, the Netherlands and England,
the Trieste question in'Italy being the danger point. Despite the effects of
the recent Italion election,. the IDE is of the opinion that the Communists in
North Italy will be In a dominant position at the Proper time.
28.
29.
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32. In Palembang, the weekly newspaper luatax_Weasida, is the mouthpiece of the
PDR. The editor is Omar Ismael of Batavia.
33. The contacts between the POR and the "progressive concentration" are carried
out via Boemah Sakit Pargooroean Tinge, a hospital in Batavia, also by
Dr. I. A. Mochtar and Dr. Dermasetiawan, friends of Dr. A. X. Gant, and the
head of the Dasaad Musim Concern.
34. Dr. Mochtar has had some contact with the Consulate General of India. Thrther,
it was revealed that Mr. Bashavan, Consulate General of India, on his last visit
to Jogjakarta, told a representative of the APPI, Mr. A. T. Pollan, Your struggle
is no more in Jogjakarta abut here in the territories controlled by the Dntch."
Xe advised the APPI to ignore the now-violence struggle and invited the leaders
to call on him at his dwelling in Batavia.
33. Three leaders of the APTT were arrested in Cheribon by the military police of
Cheribon and consequently were unable to make the trip to Batavia. Other leaders
were arrestedibr subversive activities. Thus it has become difficult for this
to do much, and it has tried to stay clear of MIS and allied organi-
zations.
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