DRAFT PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R000700450031-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2006
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: January 9, 1953
• Content Type: MF

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TOP SECRET
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
Washington, D. C,
42
COPY -PTO .~
9 January 1953
M v,0RANDUM FOR: General Walter B. Smith
Director of Central Intelligence
Subject: Draft Psychological Strategy for Southeast Asia
Pursuant to the Boardts decision of December 18, 1952, regarding
completion of pending planning projects, I enclose a copy of the draft
of Psychological Strategy for Southeast Asia for consideration by the
Psychological Strategy Board on January 15, 19;3.
In order to meet the Board's deadline, it has proved necessary to
curtail the usual period for co-ordination of agency and PSB staff
comments on the panel draft. Some changes are therefore to be expected
in the present text;, and if any agreed revisions are received before
January 15, 1953, they will be transmitted to the Board as corrigenda
to the basic paper. I hopes therefore, that by the time of the Board
meetings the paper will be in such shape as to permit at least approval
in principle.
It is my feeling that if time had permitted, a more succinct
and better fIntegrated plan would have furnished more useful guidance,
On the other hand, it is evident that the panel, in addition to
supplying a wealth of illustrative suggestions for subsequv:t imple-
meiVc,ation?-planning, has constructively clarified some of the problems
of psychological strategy which have hitherto irpedod U;, S. operations
in Southeast Asia. If the Board ratifies the puma1 is work;, it will
thus permit a swift development of U. Sy psychological programs in a
critical area,
It is requested that special seourit nrecautio-Q be observed
_ . Yr.w
in the hax ~_1 ng__of the enclosure and that acsce _s to it be restricted
or. a eed"to -now. basis.
Enclosure:
PSB D-23, Psychological Strata
for Southeast Asia,, Copy No.,
NSC review(s) completed.
25X1 TOP SECRET
Identical Memo Prepared
for:
Deputy Secretary W.C.Foster
Under Secretary D.K,E.Bruce
Mr. W. Averell Harriman
I? :F pp?I-
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Copy 42
PSB D-23
PSYCFOLCGICAII ST#tATF,GY BOARD
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY
for
SOUTHEAST ASIA
5 January 1953
/j 7.
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PSIS D-23
(Draft )
5 January 1953
Tom?, LE OF C ONT .TUTS
T PROBLEM,
d . PROBLEM , , .. .. , . f .................. , .... . 4 ... , ...... 3
II. AREA DEFINITION........~ ........................... 3
III. APPLICABLE APPROVED U.S. POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES.... -3
IV. AM LYSIS ............................................
4
V. PSYCITOLOGICAL OBJECTIVES .................?.......... 12
VI, PSYCHOLOGICAL UNDEPTIA.KINGS .......................... 16
VII. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS........ 37
APPENDIX A - PSYCHOLOGICAL CIRCUMSTANCES
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PSYC FOLOGIC kL STRATEGY
for
SOUTI EAST .ASIA
SECTION I
PR 0B M
PSB D-23
(Draft)
5 January 1953
To develop basic direction for U.S, psychological activities in and
pertaining to Southeast Asia.
SECTION
AREA PEFINITI
This plan interprets the term "Southeast Asia" to include Indochina,
Thailand, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines.
SECTION III
APPLICABLE, d PROVED U.S. POLICIES AN OBJECTIVES
A. POLICIES
NSC 4P/5, 84/2, 9'/1, 124/2
B. OBJECTIVES (As set forth in NSC 124/2)
"To prevent the countries of Southeast Asia from passing into the
communist orbit, and to assist them to develop the will and ability to
resist communism from within and without and to contribute to the
strengthening of the free world."
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PSB D-23
(Draft)
5 January 1953
SECTION IV
ANALYS S
A.. ASSUMPTIONS
1. The USSR and Communist China will continue to present a serious
threat to the U.S. and the free world interests in Southeast Asia.
2. Sufficient time is available to intensify present, and to undertake
additional psychological operations which will assist in attaining U.S.
objectives in the area.
3. In the event of identifiable Chinese Communist oppression in South-
east Asia, responsible Government agencies will implement courses of action
set forth in NSC 124/2,
B. CONDITIONING FACTORS
1. Communist domination of Southeast Asia, whether as a consequence of
identifiable Chinese Communist aggression or of successful communist sub-
version, would:
a. In general, seriously jeopardize fundamental U.S. and Western
interests; and
b. In particular, make it extremely difficult for Japan and India
to resist eventual accommodation to communism.
2. The military, geographic, and political strength of Communist China,
which has the capability of conquering mainland Southeast Asia through
aggression, will provide the strategic shield and psychological impetus
for the continuance of the cold war in Southeast Asia through:
a. Internal subversion,-,
b. Military action by indigenous communist elements assisted and
logistically supported by Communist China; and
c, Political warfare, including the encouragement of extreme
nationalist, neutralist, and anti-colonialist sentiments.
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PSB D-23
(Draft)
5 January 1953
3. Therefore, developments in and concerning China are important in
the execution of Western courses of action in:
a. Mainland Southeast Asia; and
b. Such areas as India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Formosa, and
Japan, whose security would be seriously threatened by communist
domination of mainland Southeast Asia.
4. Psychological activities in Southeast Asia must at all times consider
the fact of Soviet-directed Communist Chinese undercover interference in the
area, and efforts must be made to reduce, or at least counteract that inter-
ference. In addition, it must be considered constantly that Chinese Communiz
overt armed aggression against Southeast Asia is a possibility, and steps
must be taken to dissuade the Chinese Communist leaders from initiating
such aggression. This latter action should comprise active efforts to
prevent Soviet pressure on Communist Chinese leaders for overt military
moves into Southeast Asia, and, also, the developing of psychological
deterrents aimed at the Chinese leaders themselves. To this end, it is
essential that with regard to Southeast Asia mutual distrust between the
Kremlin and Chinese Communist leaders be developed and intensified, that
free nation determination to resist communist aggression in Southeast Asia
be strengthened, and that the flanking position of Formosa be exploited to
discourage Communist Chinese military adventure to the southward.
5. In solving the Southeast Asian psychological problem, U.S. psy-
chological effort alone will not be sufficient. It is important that the
U.S., British, and French psychological efforts be made mutually reenforcing.
In addition, it is necessary that strong support, to the maximum extent
possible, for the U.S. psychological effort in Southeast Asia be developed
in and drawn from the South Asian nations, the Netherlands, Australia, New
Zealand, Japan and Nationalist China.
6. Effective psychological activities in Southeast Asia will require
the arousing of the peoples, and where necessary the governments, of that
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PSB D-23
(Draft)
5 January 1953
area to the undesirability and actual danger of further communist advances
in Southeast Asia; the bringing of the peoples and governments of Southeast
Asian countries into increasingly active resistance to communism in all of
its aspects; and the procuring of the wherewithal necessary for effectively
resisting the communist psychological attack on Southeast Asia.
7. U.S. Government operations in Southeast Asia must take into account
several important psychological factors (See Appendix A -- Favorable and
Adverse Psychological Circumstances). Many elements in Southeast Asian
populations fail to recognize the need for foreign aid, and such elements tend
to view U.S. economic assistance with. attitudes varying from skepticism to
distrust. Foreign pressures of any kind designed to bring about changes
in the present activities or attitudes of Southeast Asian nations are resented
and resisted. Thus, the intense nationalism of the people and their deep
suspicion of any activities by western nations impose stringent limitations
on the number of U.S. personnel who can be utilized to advantage and on the
nature of the work they can do. There exists a point of diminishing return.
Serious consideration must be given, in planning any additional projects for
individual countries in Southeast Asia, to their probable effect on the
over-all progrcm of the U.S. in the country in question and in the area as
a whole. It is generally agreed that in certain Southeast Asian capitals
there are too many Americans at high salaries living in ^ way that contrasts
harshly with local standards. It is probable that new projects involving
the assignment of American personnel Bhould be considered only as old ones
are phased out, thus permitting the new undertaking to be introduced, when
approved, without increase of personnel. Rather, emphasis should be placed
o.j developing programs which utilize indigenous personnel. The position of
the American Ambassador as chief representative of the U.S. in a given
country, and his primary responsibility for coordination of U.S. activities,
should be taken into account in all planning of psychological strategy
programs.
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PSf D-23
(Draft)
5 January 1953
C. PRE ENT S,EFF ORT IF, HE t
1. The over--all U.S. program in Southeast Asia comprises the following
fields of activity: political, propaganda and cultural, economic and
technical assistance, and military assistance. These activities operate
principally through and under the general supervision of the U.S. diplo-
mat_c and consulnx missions and posts in each country.
2. PoJwi,;;? LetivLtjg - U. S. diplomatic and consular personnel in
Southeast Asia, supported by the prestige of the American Government, exert
considerable influence upon officials and others who are in a position to
.r affect the actions of the governments in the area. Our representatives,
through their official and private contacts, continually strive to forward
the foreign policy objectives of the American Government, including most
of those stated in the present paper. In general., our diplomatic efforts
in Southeast Asia during the past year have resulted in a continuing improve-
ment in our relations in the area as well as in our strategic position
vis-a-vis the communist bloc.
ja~ a,it, r. ActLv'ti - In Southeast Asia, U.S. propa-
3. a anda
ganda agencies, operating through the usual programs of exchange of persons,
information media, etc., work toward the following policy objectives:
a. To expose the Communist imperialist threat to the area; to
identify this threat with the Vietminh.,the Associated States and with
the Huks in the Philippines; and to strengthen the will to resist
Communist influence in any form.
b. To strengthen the confidence of the p~-oples in their own
governments, and to awaken them to the necessity for an informed
politically active citizenry for the development and/or maintenance of
popular democratic institutions.
c. To endeavor to enhance the prestige of the National Government
on Formosa in the eyes of overseas Chinese and others in Southeast Asia;
by pointing out progress made in economic, educational and other fields;
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PSB D-23
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5 January 1953
to assist, in appropriate ways, the Chinese National Government in its
efforts to achieve more active cooperative relations with overseas
Chinese communities in the information field.
d. To explain the n'-.ture of the Korean conflict, its implications
for Southeast Asia, and the Asian as well as the American contribution
to the United Nations action against the Communist aggressor.
e. To explain the nature of the struggle in the Associated States
and Malaya, and the relation of these struggles to that in Korea -- the
defense of the free world against the Communists.
f. To explain American aid to the area -- economic, technical, and
military -- and reasons therefor: to strengthen the economy and secilrity
of the region within the free world; and to create, where necessary, an
atmosphere favorable to the reception of U.S. military aid,
g. To assure the people and governments of the area that the U.S.
has no imperialistic designs; that the American people are genuinely
interested in. their welfare and progress.
h. To'strengthen the American reputation for honesty and fair
dealing, sometimes involving direct or indirect refutation of Communist
lies about the U.S. and its motives and actions.
i, To manifest respect for and genuine interest in the cultures of
Southeast Asia, and to acquaint Asian peoples with, and fostor.corres-
ponding interest in, American culture.
j. To encourage among the countries of the area mutual understanding
of their national aims and common problems, and cooperation with each
other and with. the rest of the free world in seeking to attain those aims.
K. To explain U.S. policy toward Japan; the importance of assuring
a secure and independent Japan; to create a favorable atmosphere for
the increasing resumption of normal relations between Japan and Southeast
Asian countries, including mutually advantageous trade; to create confi-,
dance in Japan, understanding of her need to rearm; and to explain her
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(Draft)
5 January 1953
potential contributions to the security and economic progress of the
entire area.
1. To cooperate, as appropriate and feasible, with British, French
and national goverrmionts' information services.
in. To expose to overseas Chinese communities the true nature of
the Chinese Communist regime, its subservience to Moscow, its denial
and destruction of all intrinsic Chinese values.
n. To encourage the, development of anti-Peiping movements among
Chinese and other national groups.
Within the last year or two, there has been a growing tendency to work
more closely with. indigenous individuals and organizations, stimulating
and assisting them to carry on activities -- writing, speaking, publishing,
etc. -- which strengthen those of the U.S. program. Influence in this
regard, though indirect, is steadily growing.
It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of this program but it can
be fairly said that the propaganda and cultural activities have played an
important role in exncsing the falsities of communist propaganda, and
increasing 'indars'.:ardang 'of and sympathy with the policies and aims of the
U.S. and the free world, This is particularly true in Burma and the Philip-
pines. The work of the LISTS libraries and related activities, film shows
and the Exchange of Persons program are generally regarded as the most
effective attributed media in this area.
4. Ecgm}0 ?d T
clinic l ~1s' S ,t n icer - Southeast Asia was included in
the U.S. foreign aid pr-,,,ram only as late as mid-1950, with but a very few
..xperts and commodities actually reaching the recipient countries before
mid-1951. Because the funds earmarked for economic and technical assistance
to the area are limited, such funds have been committed to produce improve-
ments at carefully selected, particularly neuralgic spots in the socio-
economic structures of the countries concerned. Despite the relatively small
dollar amounts involved, some results arebeginning to emerge, such as: large
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PSB D-23
(Draft)
5 January 1953
areas have been sprayed with DDT; scientific and progressional apparatus
has been procured for hospitals, laboratories, and agricultural research
stations; equipment and U.S. instructors have been provided for technical
schools; a few hundred Southeast Asians have received intensive specialized
training in the U.S. Expressed in purely economic terms the impact of the
two-year old program is still small, of course, but the great potential
importance of U.S. aid for modernization of the area is increasingly
recognized, if not yet by the people at large, at least by many technical
and economic experts and by political leaders and officials in the various
fields concerned. Expressed in more general terms, the technical assistance
program has stimulated interest in self-improvement, which development, if
encouraged and perused, can be of major importance,
5. P i ter Assis tane - Joint Army-Navy-Air Force MAAGS are operating
in the Philippines,. Thailand, and Indochina. The MAAG in Indonesia consists
of Army personnel only. There are no MAAGs in Burma and Malaya, though the
British maintain a service mission in the former and armed forces in the
latter.. With respect to Indochina, the U.S. is providing from 30 to 40
percent of the total cost of the war. In addition to military materiel and
technical assistance in the area, training of indigenous military personnel
is being conducted in the U.S.
D. GENERAL GUIDAAICE
NSC 124/2, prepared in cognizance of the Assumptions, Conditioning
Factors, and Present Psychological Program summarized above, delineates
the courses of action or missions best calculated to achieve our over-all
national objective -- "to prevent the countries c.f Southeast Asia from
passing. into the Communist orbit, and to assist them to develop the will
and ability to resist Communism from within and without and to contribute
to the strengthening of the free world."
This NSC envisages two situations, one actual and one potential. So
long as the Chinese Communists do not shift their strategy from unrelenting
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(Draft)
5 January 1953
cold war tactics to overt aggression, our most effective strategy is to
continue present U.S. efforts, including military and economic assistance
to appropriate countries of Southeast Asia, and to initiate or increase
overt and covert psychological programs designed to weaken or eliminate
the psychological appeal of Communism to the peoples of Southeast Asia in
order, thereby, to contribute to the support of non-Communist governments
and to increase sympathy toward U.S. objectives on the part of the govern-
ments and peoples. In the event the Chinese Communists do exercise their
strategic initiative and invade mainland Southeast Asia, we will have laid
the maximum groundwork consistent with our current major poliey objectives,
and will have in the area our maximum capabilities and resources.
The following strategic concept will be governing:
a. Because of the existing vulnerability of mainland Southeast
Asia (especially Indochina and Burma), the initial main psychological
effort shall be made there, to encourage the greatest possible increase
in the will and capability effectively to resist Communism from within
and without. So long as the non-Communist governments of those countries
show reasonable prospects of survival and continue non-Communist in
orientation the weight of our psychological programs (official and
non-official) shall be directed toward, be in support of, and, where
possible, be in cooperation with those governments and the majority
groups. At the same time, the necessary groundwork should be laid,
under the provisions of NSC 10/5 or 10/2, for the development of a
covert program in support of U.S. objectives capable of early activation
in case of need, provided, however, that due regard is given to the
maintenance of good relations with those existing governments and
majority groups.
b. The strategic and psychological importance of both Indonesia
and the Philippines is such that psychological effort toward promoting
their stability and free world orientation should also be strengthened.
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(Draft)
5 January 1953
SECTION V
S
PSLCI:,'OLGGICAL QJECTJ~L
A. WITH U GARD TO SOUTEEAST ASIA
1. To assist the peoples and governments of. Southeast Asia to develop
concerted and active resistance to communism in all its aspects.
2. To develop popular support for and internal stability of the
indigenous non-communist govorrortents of Southeast Asia.
3, To increase the internal security of the countries of Southeast Asia.
4, To generate among the peoples of Southeast Asia an awareness:
a. That Chinese Communist and Soviet imperialism is incompatible
with nationalism and independence;
b. That the peoples of Southeast Asia must develop a will to
resist such. imperialism individually and collectively;
c. That the countries of Southeast Asia cannot solve their problems
by pursuing strictly nationalist and neutralist policies alone; and
d. That the countries of Southeast Asia c:in best develop national
security, political stability, and economic strength by cooperating
with other countries in the area and in the free world.
5. To generate among the peoples of Southeast Asia the conviction:
a. That U.S, aim is peace;
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b. That if war is provoked by the Soviet, it will be fought ener-
getically and successfully by the U.S. in the interest of all free
nationa; and
c. That victory against communism i&inevitable?.
6. To avoid the antagonism toward the United States which is generated
by forcing official, public professions of anti-communism and pro-1',:mericanism
from Southeast Asian governments.
7. To allay Southeast Asian fears that U.S. aid is basically a device
to insure American poldtical or economic hegemony; strengthening conviction
that U.S. concern with and support for Southeast Asia, while motivated in
part by U.S. own interests in world pence and economic progress, are never-
thelgss also in part the result of traditional U.S. sympathy for struggling
nations and deep-seated sentimental urge to render help and improve living
conditions.
S. To encourage Southeast Asih.n belief that U.S. assistance is of vital
technical importance -- regardless of political aspects -- for fulfillment
of national aspirations and transformation of young, less developed nations
into strong modern states.
9. To develop confidence throughout the area in U.S. and U.N. subjective
willingness and objective capability to continue support, especially economic
support, beyond immediate future,
10. To encourage dependence upon and responsible participation in the
United Nations by the nations of Southeast Asia.
11. To develop a U.S. policy for China designed to reduce the power of
Communist China, and achieving maximum U.N. support for that policy.
1?, To promote and develop Formosa as an effective Chinese rcllying
point; and, in this connection, to increase Chiang Kai-SLek's and the
Nationalist Government's prestige in the area.
13. To allay Southeast Asian fear, wherever it may'exist, that with U.S.
help Japan might grow from a useful.. and cooperative member of the Far Easterr3
is
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group into a new economic or political threat to the nations dominated by
Japan during World ?11ar II.
14. To encourage development of Japanese trade with countries of South-
east Asia so as to utilize Japanese industrial capacity and skills to facil-
itate the economic development of those countries as a bulwark against
communist aggression.
15. To reduce to a minimum Soviet Bloc economic influence in Southeast
Asia.
16. .To weaken and eventually to eliminate communist activities in and
.rte concerning the area by all "means available, including, but not restricted to,
the following:
a. Strict control, and ultimately elimination, of communist and
communist-front mass demonstrations.
b. Hcrassment, restriction, and ultimately elimination, of the
printing, sale, and distribution of Soviet, Cominfor2n, Communist
Chinese, and local communist literature of all sorts.
c. Prevention of use by th-q, communists of other domestic
information media.
d. Drying up of communist party income derived from local. sources
in Southeast Asian countries,. especially income derived from commercial
firms dealing with the Soviet Union, its. European Satellites, and Com-
munist Ch:.na, -ind income derived through contributions from local
business enterprises of any sort.
e. Elimination of illegal movement and caching of weapons and
other military and para-military supplies,
f. Effective strengthening and enforcement of existing measures
toward military security, including measures to prevent communist sabotage.
g. Nullification of communist merchant shipping, and merchant shippinj
under the flags of non-communist nations that in any way supports the
communists.
I
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h. Protection of individuals against communist threats, intimida-
tiou, , blackmail, and retaliation.
i. Elimination of communist influence in government and autonomous
agencies in the fields of defense, internal security, public information,
education, hd economy.
Elimination from key positions of members of communist and
communist-front organizations.
k. Development of anti-communist pressure groups, particularly those
of youth, agriculture, labor, women, the intellectuals, and religion to
force a general anti-communist stand in military, economic, political,
and psychological fields.
1. Deviation of great numbers of persons from the communist party
and destruction of communist-front organizations.
m. Discrediting of communist, communist-front, and communist
supported propaganda and political organizations.
n. Discrediting and harassment of business firms and individuals
doing business with communism.
o. Development of aggressive indigenous anti-communist propaganda.
p. Discred:it:ipg of the fear of communist strength and further
communist successes.
2. Destruction of communist military and guerrilla forces operating
in Southeast Asian countries.
B. WITFA REGUfi.D TO THE FREE WORIP
1. To intensify over-all free nation psychological resistance to advance;:
of communism in Southeast Asia.
2. To strengthen the conviction among the peoples of the free world of
the strategic and psychological importance of Southeast Asia to the free world
3. To encourage colonial powers to grant, and to advertise widely the
granting of all prerogatives of self-government consistent with physical
security.
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4. To impress upon the former colonial powers that the U.S. does not
desire to supplant them in their privileged positions in their respective
former colonies.
5. To further understanding on the part.of our Allies that U.S, commit-
ments in Southeast Asia presents heavy burdens accepted out of a sense of
responsibility rather than ai an eye on specific economic or political
advantages to be obtained by the U.S. at the expense of friendly powers.
6. To achieve the highest possible unity among U.N. nations regarding
action and policy in Southeast Asia or in other matters of importance to
Southeast Asia.
7. To intensify overt and covert U.S.-Allies cooperative activity in
economic, political, and- other matters concerning Southeast Asia where
possible to do so without adverse effects in Southeast ;sia.
C. WITH REGRD TO TI'E SOVIET FLOC
1. To discourage any Soviet pressure on Communist China for further
interference in Southeast a ,sirs,.
2. To decrease the effectiveness of Soviet-directed communist inter-
ference in Southeast Asia.
3. To dissuade Chinese Communist leaders from increased interference
or overt aggression in Southeast Asia.
SECTION VI
PSYOCILLQC3IC UNDER.T%K3.T1G3
A. WITH`. REGARD TO SOUTHEAST ASIA AS A,T iOLE:
1. In general, exploit the favorable, tnd counter the adverse psychu-
logical circumstances listed in Appendix A.
2. Develop pro-U.S. and anti-communist action cadres of indigenous
Southeast Asian personnel to operate in political, informational, economic,
and military fields. Unless the local governments should cease to be
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PSB D-23
(Draft)
5 January 1953
non-communist, however, the major consideration should be to take no action
that would involve serious risk of alienating the local governments.
3. Continue to explore with other nations, including at least France,
the United Kingdom, Australia and Now Zealand, means to ensure that Communist
China remain in no doubt regarding the grave consequences of Chinese aggressic
against Southeast Asia.
4. Encourage and promote bilateral and multilateral mutual assistance
agreements.
5. Display U.S. naval end air strength in Southeast Asian countries
when such display is consistent with the existing political situation and
with normal operations schedules, as a gesture of friendship and to quell
fear of and tendency to accommodate to communism.
6. Encourage and assist Southeast Asian groups (e.g., Buddhists, Moslems,
craftsmen, and into lligonsia) in actions which strengthen and gain prestige
for their basically anti-communist heritages. Such encouragement and assis-
tance should be prim^rily by unofficial moans, although dignified official
publicity can be given to such events as the convocation of the Sixth Great
Buddhist Council.
7. Expand exchange and other cultural progrrins along existing lines
but with increased emphasis on:
n. Establishment of informal as well as formal contacts with
indigenous intellectuals through the use of both TJ.S,r and other
Western 'cultural emissaries,' official and unofficial.
b. Encouragement of exchange and other cultural contacts bet'veen.
nations within the area (e.g., Philippino-Indonesian contacts), between
the area and suitable elements in other Asian nations such as Japan and
India, and above all., between the area and anti-communist elements in
Western Europe.
c?. Stimulation of indigenous writing, publication and scholarship
along suitable ideological, lines within the area, particularly some
development of Formosa as an ideological and cultural base.
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PSB D-23
(Draft)
5 January 1953
d,. Translation into English and appropriate distribution and
publicity in the U.S. and the free world of representative indigenous
works of literature, folk)pre, and songs; and exhibitions of indigenous
art in the U.S. and other countries of the free world.
e. Faking available both in English and in indigenous languages, as
cheaply as possible, serious U.S. and Western books and periodical
literature of an ideologically appropriate nature,
f. Stimulation of greater interest and inventiveness in adapting
Western science and technology to the requirements, resources and
cultural patterns of the area.
g. Exploitation of private agencies, organizations and individuals,
indigenous, Western, international and U.S., to promote the objectives
of the plan in the cultural, political and development fields.
8. Encourage by all possible means the non-communist orientation of
overseas Chinese groups, for example, by the recruiting of anti-communist
teachers, by lending support to projects-to send overseas Chinese students
to Formosan universities for higher education, and by influencing overseas
Chinese to refrain from trading with and sending remittances to the communist
mainland. While the government on Formosa should be held up as the center
and symbol of Chinese resistance to coniunism, the identification of overseas
Chinese with, the country of residence, and t,ieir support for non-communist
local governments, should be encouraged at all times.
9. Insofar as possible, improve the quality of U.S. representatives
(and their families) in Southeast Asian countries by careful selection,
indoctrination, training, and discharges or trahsfers as necessary.
10. Improve U.S. indoctrinational methods and intensity and increase the
numbers of indigenous Southeast Asians indoctrinated in the U.S. by augmenting
the number of Southeast Asians visiting the. U.S. in "Exchange of Persons"
programs, including Southeast Asian military personnel as practicable.
11. Whenever and wherever practicable,. persuade Southeast Asian
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PSB- D-23
(Draft)
5 January 1953
governments to take legislative, administrative, military and police actions
which will, in every possible way, result in harassment, restriction and
ultimately destruction of communist influence and activity of every sort in
Southeast Asia; and seek such results either by supporting actions of the
governments of Southeast-Asia or by independent action.
12, Through public utterances of officials, official correspondence and
contacts with: members of Congress, make clear to the American people the
importance of Southeast Asia to the security of the U.S. and encourage U.S.
allies to take similar action so that all tl,:e peoples of the free world may
be psychologically prepared for any courses of action taken in implementation,
of this plan.
B. V121 EG r D TO INDOCY INA
1. Build up faith of indigenous population that communist aggression
ultimately will be defeated by the joint efforts of French and Associated
States' forces supported by U.S. economic-military aid.
2. Instill the idea into the local population that U.S. economic aid wil.
contribute toward their efforts to restore their war-torn economies.
3. Continue military.aid to the French. and Associated States on a high
priority basis with a view towards the Associated States assuming a con-
stantly increasing share of the burden of their own defense.
4.
Commence talks with high-level French officials designed to reach
agreement on the desirability of U.S. development of the political and
resistance potential among selected nationalist groups, and implement such
positive agreements as are reached.
5, In the event positive agreements with the French are not reached,
cultivate and train, and develop united action among indigenous leaders and
groups who can be counted on actively to fight communist subversion, sabotage
and invasion and, in an emergency, form the nuclei of organized political
and military resistance forces,. Fowover, the major consideration should
be to take no action that would involve serious risk of alienating the
governments of France or qf the lasso iate States,
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PSB D-23
(Draft)
5 January 1953
6, Identify U.S. support as on the side of true nationalism.
;'. Identify Viet Minh as acting in subservience to the interests of a
foreign power rather than in accordance with the national interests of the
Indochinese..
8. Assist in inducing; defections among the Viet Minh.
9. Increase popular support for the governments of the Associated States,
by publicizing the facts that:
a. Alternative would be Chinese domination;
b. Associated States, already have a large measure of independence
including:
(1) Membership in U.N. bodies;
(2) National armies; and
(3) Other attributes of national sovereignty.
10. Take appropriate steps to develop the military, economic, and politica.
strength of the indigenous governments and to have the French promote the
growth of stable independent governments by providing more effective political,
economic, military and social guidance,
11. Exert every.eff ort to have the Associated States recognized and
accepted by other non-communist countries and by the United Nations.
C. [1I7'Y? QED TO TH.AILBD
1. Continue to assist the Government of Thailand in maintaining and
improving internal security, in becoming a stabilizing force in Southeast
Asia, and in maintaining its alignment with the free world,
2, Develop in Thailand the belief that U.N. (U.S.) growth. in strength
will deter further communist aggression.
3. Without making commitment, maintain Thai belief that U.S. will render
assistance to Thailand in the event that an aggression is committed against
her.
4. Utilize tactfully the demonstrated willingness of the strongly
anti-communist Thai Government to cooperate with the U.S,
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25X1.
?SB D-23
(Draft)
5 ianuary 1953
5. Cultivate and train, and develop united action among indigenous
25X1
leaders and groups who can be counted on actively to fight communist sub-
version, sabotage, and invasion and, in an emergency, form the nuclei of
organized political and military resistance forces. Unless the Thai Govern-
a.
ment should cease to be non-communist, however, the major consideration should
be to take no action that would involve serious risk of alienating ti_e Thai
Government.
D. WITS RE=D TO BURMA
1. Promote increased stabilization of, and public support for, the
present or a similar successor government by:
a. Developing a greater will and capacity on the part of that
government and people for resistance to internal subversion and
external aggression; and
b. Continuing assistance in economic rehabilitation and
development of the national resources.
2. Create within the government and among the rank-and-file of the people
a feeling friendly to the U.S. and tie West and antipathetic to the Communist
world.
3. Take appropriate steps to encourage the Burmese Government to
cooperate fully with the anti-communist nations.
4. Develop united action and cooperation among indigenous, anti-communist
groups in Burma to resist communist encroachments. Make preparations for the
establishment of guerrilla forces among suitable ethnic groups for possible
use against the communists. Unless the Burmese Government should cease to
be non-communist, however, tie major consideration should be to take no action
that would involve serious risk of alienating the Burmese Government.
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PSB D-23
(Draft)
5 January 1953
t. Promote belief of Burmese in tie capacity of their moderate leaders
to continue meeting national problems, and, with U.S. .financial and
.- technical assistance, to achieve economic progress.
9. Allay fear that cooperation with U.S. might involve country in open
conflict with Communist China; and, at the same time, weaken gradually
Burmese faith in t1l.e concept of neutralism as a practicable proposition, not
by requiring public declarations contrary to policy of neutrality, but rather
by emphasizing that U.S. respects Burma's independence.
10. Alleviate the fears of the Burmese regarding Nationalist Chinese
troops in Burma and alleged U.S. support for those troops.
11. Maintain continued consultation and cooperation with the British
Government in connection with developments in Burma; especially the matter
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5. Prepare to give unofficial assistance (and seek opportunities for
such) when requested by the Burmese Government in matters where an open
request is not feasible.
6. Be prepared to furnish to Burma any military equipment and supplies
needed to complement that being furnished by the British.
e. Through all practicable means reduce and destroy the capabilities
and potential of indigenous communists.
will have maximum short-term favorable impact upon the Burmese people and
government.
E, WIThT aMARD TO MALAYA
1. Give moral and, where possible, appropriate materiel and technical
support to the British in their efforts to:
of military assistance.
12. Attempt to arouse the Burmese (and Indian) governments to the dangers
of Chinese Communist expansion and to the need for effective military defense
against it, including coordinated military action with other Southeast Asian
coup-tries,
13. Increase information and economic assistance programs in Burma which
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PSB D-23
(Draft)
5 January 1953
a. Suppress and destroy the terrorist guerrilla action now actively
and effectively being sponsored, supported, and conducted by Chinese
Communists.
b. Destroy the attitude of tolerance to communism prevalent among
the Chinese population by exposing the true nature of the communist
menace,
c. Conduct effective military operations designed to eradicate t1e
communist guerrilla forces and effective psychological operations designe,
to influence the Malayans to recognize and oppose communist imperialism.
d. Educate and influence the Malayans toward acceptance of and
cooperation with U.N. aims in the Far East and towards distrust, fear,
and hatred of Soviet aims.
e. Curtail and eventually terminate all shipments of strategic
materials (particularly rubber and tin) to Soviet Bloc countrties in
Asia without destroying the economic stability of Malaya.
f. Establish a more even political and economic balance between the
races of Malaya and a greater economic diversity in the country as a whole
g. Stimulate interest in self-government and construct a firm
foundation on which future self-government can be 'based by (a) developing
and strengthening moderate local political groups, and (b) educating
the population in both the techniques and the advantages of self-governmex
L. Develop and strengthen labor groups, groups within the Chinese
communities, and other organizations in order to deny these' elements to
the communists and to elicit their support for Western policy.
i. Create greater racial harmony in Malaya as an essential to
Malayan unity and eventual nationhood,
j. Convince the population that communist guerrillas can and will
be defeated and internal peace restored.
2. hake clear that the U.S. is sympathetic to the British in Malaya,
not out of predilection for "colonialism," but because British presence and
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PS13 D-23
(Draft)
5 January 1953
political, economic, and social experience are essential for the country,
which is presently split into antagonistic racial groups and faced with
economic disruption caused by small, but active,. subversive elements.
3. Foster impression among the peoples that the U.S. is not prejudiced
against any of the rival ethnical groups (Malays,, Chinese, Indians), but is
interested only in their improved cooperation for the common good of all the
peoples of Malaya.
4. Reduce suspicion that U.S. concern for and economic aid (small scale)
granted to h'ialaya is dictated not by any sympathy for that small country but
only interest in rubber and tin. Reassure opinion in Malaya on the future
rubber and tin policy of the U.S., chief customer of these vital Malay export
on the world market,
r. WI 'G RD TO INDPNESL
1. Cooperate with and assist the Indonesian Government in establishing
an effective, independent government eliminating the armed dissident groups
presently threatening internal security, combatting the subversive activities
of foreign powers aimed at the overthrow of Indonesian independence, develop:
a strong and expanding economy for the benefit of the peoples of Indonesia,
and pa' ticira Ling in maa.?3ures Vhich support the security of the area and
Indonesian s:lidarity with the free world.
2. ilIaint.xin the confidence of the population in the capacity of moderatE
leaders: (a) to organize effective administration; (b) to mobilize, with U.:
financial and technical assistance, the country's great potential wealth; an(
(c) to raise low Indonesian living and educational standards.
influence Indonesian public opinion away from tolerant acceptance
of communism as an ideal by exposing it as a threat to hard-won Indonesian
national independence.
4. Counter tIe present tendency to suspect the U.S. of imperialistic
motives in its relations with Indonesia, allaying the suspicion that the
U.S. is bent on pressuring the strategic island republic into open alignment
with the West and, at the same time, undermining Indonesian belief in
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PSB D-23
(Draft)
5 January 1953
neutralism as a practical long-range proposition.
5. Convince Indonesian leaders and people that their own.self-interest
dictates their cooperation with the free world and U.N. organizations.
6. Cultivate and train, and develop united action among indigenous
leaders and groups who can be counted on actively to fight communist sub-
version, sabotage, and invasion and, in.an emergency, form the nuclei of
organized political and military resistance forces. Unless the Indonesian
Government should cease to be non-communist, however, the major consideration
should be to take no action that would involve serious risk of alienating
the Indonesian Government.
7. Neutralize the efforts of Communist China to use Chinese minority
groups for their own purpose;.and turn these groups toward support of non-
communist objectives.
Encourage Indonesian leaders and people to continue negotiations
with the Dutch for a peaceful solution of the New Guinea dispute, but not
in such a manner as to give the impression that the U.S. had assumed a
position on the issue.
9. Convin(e leaders and masses t1,at the U.S., which supported Indonesia
in her strug,-Je for independence, has no intention of substituting U. S.
indirect dom.1 --1.atio. for Dutch colonialism.
10, Promo`'.e ix t.Gt r understanding, at. least among leading Indonesians,
for U.S. rubber,? a%J in price policy.
ll, Encou?."a e l lope, to the extent that it can be reasonably justified,
that In'onesia will he ile to secure from the West, including Japan,
increasing guant .: a~ of ,xrgeritly desired capital. goods.
i2. Treat will. .n .dersta.nding, patience and mature forebearance the
convictions of ner4t ality on the part of Indonesian leaders, making it clear
that the U.S. respects the independence of their country and believes that
the best interests of such independence will be served by Indonesia remaining
outside the Soviet Bloc.
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G.
PSIB D-23
(Draft)
5 January 1953
1. Encourage and assist the Philippine Government and people to increase
the internal strength and security of the country by:
a. Developing a strong indigenous political and military leadership;
b. Improving the moral fiber, the governmental efficiency, and the
national economy by:
(1) Increasing civic responsibility and standards of public
morality.
(2) Creating realization that the Philippine people themselves
have primary responsibility for solution of their problems and cannot
always look to the United States for relief from economic difficulties
(3) Continuing the development of democratic institutions and
insistence on free and honest elections.
(4) Carrying out of recommendations of the "'Bell Report,"
particularly in the fields of landholdings and labor laws.
c. Assisting in the establishment of an honest and efficient
government dedicated to:
(1) Making the Philippines a showcase of democracy in the
Far East; and
(2) Elimiating the appeal and strength of the communist-
dominated f:ukbalahap movement.
d, Encouraging the cessation of anti-Chinese discrimination by the
Philippine Government in order to assimilate the Chinese minority and
encouraging Chinese cooperation with the government. At the same time,
persuading the Philippine poeples that the Chinese community is an asset
to the nation and the repressive measures against its members are unwise;
e.. Developing among the Philippine people full support for continued
effective campaign against the Hukbalahaps.
2. Assist the Philippines in developing her anti-communist leadership
potential among the nations in Southeast Asia.
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3.
PSB D-23
(Draft)
5 January 1953
Continue to encourage the military leadership of the Philippine
armed forces to develop their forees.as a defensive and potential offensive
weapon against communist aggression.
4. Create in Philippine minds.a psychological awareness. of the desira-
bility of accepting and ratifying the Japanese Peace Treaty, the Bases and
Military 1;ssiatcnce agreements, and of recognizing the Associated States of
Indochina.
5. Encourage acceptance of Japan's reentry into the family of nations
and, insofar as possible, create a desire for economic cooperation and
collective security with Japan.
1. Decrease the effectiveness of present Chinese Communist interference
in Southeast Asia by:
a. Convincing Communist Chinese leaders and the Kremlin that this
interference will, in tl.e long run, be unprofitable;
b. Overtly and covertly attacking this interference at its source,
and enroute to and in Southeast Asia;
c. Overtly and'covertly exposing, where consistent with U.S. and
Allied intelligence interests, 'the nature, extent, and specific instances
of this interference;
d. Developing increasing economic pressures on Communist China which
will result in burdensome economic requests by that nation on the USSR
(to assist in accomplishing the psychological undertakings stated in
paragraph VI, R. 1. below).
2. Prevent increase of Chinese Communist interference in Southeast Asia
.by
a. Developing, whenever and wherever possible, with regard to
Southeast Asia, Sino.Soviet friction, divergence of purpose, and
conflict of action;
b. Instilling doubts in the minds of the Chinese Communist leaders
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PSB D-23
(Draft)
5 January 1953
regarding the true Soviet interest and purpose in the Southeast Asian
situation, and fear for the safety of Chinese national interests. (For
instance, increase of Chinese Communist pressure on Southeast Asia might
be prevented, were Communist Chinese leaders to suspect that greater
occupation on their part-with that area might allow the Soviet freedom
of action for further predatory moves against I1anehuria, Sinkiang and
the controlling ports of North China);
c. Convincing the Chinese Communist leaders that there will be
determined U.N. resistance to further communist interference in Southeast
Asia, which in high probability will result in U.N. counteractions which
will cause irreparable damage to their own national interests and possibly
complete loss by them of their control over the Chinese peoples.
3. Dissuade Communist Chinese leaders from overt military adventure in
Southeast Asia by:
a. Weakening the political, economic, and moral strengths upon which
their external military capabilities depend. Specifically, by actions
which will increase internal difficulties for the Chinese Communist regime,
such as those:
(1) Augmenting existing and creating new political, economic,
and psychological confusions and dissatisfactions in Communist China;
(2) Intensifying determination among the peoples of mainland
China to resist Communist Chinese regimentation;
(3) Inciting and increasing hatred in the minds of Chinese people
for their present rulers, identifying those rulers as responsible for
all of the difficulties of the Chinese people and as subservient to the
interests of a foreign power rather than to the national interest of
China;
(4) Convincing the Chinese peoples that the conduct of their
communist rulers is isolating China from the society of decent nations
(presenting always to the peoples of Communist China the proposition
that their entry into. the community of nations is dependent upon
national good behavior and reliable guarantees of peaceful intention);
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Pa8 D--,-23
(Draft)
5 January 1953
(5) Maintaining hope that a free China, including Formosa and
Manchuria, will finally be re-established, and that U.S. economic
and technical assistance of the type now being given to Southeast
Asia will be available to a truly independent China.
(6) Encouraging expectation that U.S., now promoting Japanese-
Southeast Asia mutually profitable trade, will also sponsor resumption
of vital trade between Japan and a China having regained: true sQver-
eignty; at the same time, allaying fear that U.S. may sensor Japan
as a dominating power in the Far East.
b. Convincing Chinese Communist leaders that overt mi44tary aggres-
sion against Southeast Asia would be met by Western counter'.military actioi
of unacceptable magnitude, would require economic And military assistance
beyond that which the Soviet Union is prepared to give, and would result
in irreparable damage to China's national interests.
c. Keeping Chinese Communist military, political, e sonomic, and moral
strengths unsettled and dispersed by overt and covert operations.
d, Increasing in the minds of Chinese Communist. leaders, the political
military, and economic risk for 1 ommunist China of overt military aggres-
sion against Southeast Asia by increasing and.exploiting psychological
and military strength factors inherent in Formosa.
4. In the event of identifiable Chinese Communist aggression against
Southeast Asia take appropriate military action against Communist China as
part of U.N. collective action or in conjunction with France and the United
Kingdom and any other friendly governments.
I. G7T,, GA=xD TO M1 4
1. Stimulate and assist the Chinese Nationalist Government to develop
on Formosa an administration which by its probity and strength can command
respect in Southeast Asia.
2. Encourage the Chinese Nationalist Government to increase its anti-
communist activities among the overseas Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia.
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F-- I
3.
PSB D-23
(Draft)
5 January 1953
Discourage the Chinese Nationalist Government from unilateral actions
and statements which imply that the U.S. is planning offensive military action
against the mainland of China from bases in Southeast Asia and Formosa.
4. Develop Formosa as a Chinese rallying point outside China proper.
In pursuing that end, include the following actions;
a. Continue to discuss with U.S. Allies the resolution of policy
problems relating to Nationalist China.
b. By the coordinated control of the scope and pace of U.S. aid
programs, utilize the leverage V:ereby achieved to encourage and assist
the Nationalist Government of China in effectuating a thorough reform of
its military and political institutions, not only to insure more efficient
utilization of aid but also to promote confidence in the government among
Chinese outside Formosa.
c. Promote confidence of Nationalist Government and of its,military
organizations in U.S. intentions to provide there with military assistance
by steadily increasing the flow of military supplies and equipment which
have been promised for fiscal years 1951 and 1952. Without encouraging
belief in an early return to the mainland, focus i1AAG training program
on building up, as fast as delivery of armaments warrants, sound all-
around Nationalist military force capable of either defensive or offensive
action.
d. Contact and support suitable guerrilla forces on mainland of
China for activation against the communists in the event of aggression.
5. Ensure the internal security of Formosa by developing and maintaining
the will and capacity of all Chinese on Formosa to resist communist pressures
of any sort.
6, To the extent allowed by political prudence, develop Formosa as a
psychological and actual military threat against the South China Coast and
as a base for possible future collective action against mainland China.
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PSB D-23
(Draft)
5 January 1953
Improve the morale and combat effectiveness of the Chinese
Nationalist military forces.
9. Strengthen the conviction of Formosans that U.S. influence and
economic aid will secure steady improvement of their economic situation and
socio-political status.
J. WITf GP D TO O JAPAN
1. Encourage the Japanese to feel that their national interests in
Southeast Asia and the interest of the U.S. and its allies in that area
are compatible and harmonious.
2. Encourage consultation and coordination among the participants of
Pacific Security arrangements affecting all participants thus reducing
suspicion and fear of steps taken by Japan to secure its own defenses.
3. lissist Japan tobecome a U.P. member and thereby improve Japan's
relations with Southeast Asian countries.
4. Encourage the negotiation and implementation of realistic and
mutually beneficial economic agreements and closer trade relations between
Japan and Southeast Asian countries.
5. Stimulate expectation that U.S. will continue using its influence
to expand Japanese-Southeast Asian trade, while U.S. effort to develop
Southeast Asian economy is bound to result in ever larger Southeast Asian
markets for Japanese products.
6. Promote political cooperation between Japan and the non-communist
countries of Southeast Asia.
K. WITH REGARD TQ INDIA
1, Encourage the non-communist government of India to strengthen itr
ability and determination to resist communist imperialism and to participate
in and contribute to the solution of problems arising in Southeast Asia,
2.. Persuade public opinion that U.S. efforts to aid Southeast Asia are
not aimed at transforming comparatively weak countries of the area into U.S.
"satellites" where Indian influence would be more or-less excluded.
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PSB D-23
(Draft)
5 January 1953
Develop an attitude in India which would assist the U.S. and its
allies to obtain the facilities desired in time of peace or required in the
event of war in Southeast Asia and which would cause India to deny such
facilities to the Soviet Bloc.
4. Treat with understanding, patience, and mature forebearance the
convictions of neutrality on the part of Indian leaders, making it clear
that the U.S. respects the independence of their country and believes that
the best interests of such independence will be served by India remaining
outside the Soviet Bloc.
5. Foster official Indian understanding (1) of parallelism between U.S.
and South Asian interests in Southeast Asia; (2) that the loss of Southeast
Asia to communism would result in catastrophic deterioration of India's
strategic position; and (3) that such a loss, in the long run, can be
prevented only through the cooperation of India with the U.S.
6. Encourage the creation of an atmosphere favorable to Indian economic
development consistent with U.S. security interest in Southeast Asia.
7. Remove Indian doubts regarding U.S. neutrality in the Western New
Guinea dispute and make it clear that the U.S. looks to peaceful negotiations
between Indonesia and The Netherlands as the best means for solving the
problem.
8. Nourish carefully the increasingly firm stand of the Indian Govern-
ment against communism within India.
L. WITF REGARD TO PAKISTAP~
1. Encourage the non-communist government of Pakistan in its ability
and efforts to resist communist imperialism in South and Southeast Asia.
2. Encourage the creation of an atmosphere favorable to Pakistani
economic development with regard to Southeast Asia consistent with U.S.
security interests in that area.
3. Encourage increased Pakistan participation in$, responsibility for,
and contribution to the solution of problems arising in Southeast Asia.
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4.
PSB D-23
(Draft)
5 January 1953
Persuade Pakistan opinion that U.S. efforts to aid Southeast Asia
are not aimed at transforming comparatively weak countries of the area into
U.S. "satellites" where Pakistan influence would be more or less excluded.
5. Foster official Pakistani understanding: (1) of parallelism between
U.S. and South Asian interests in Southeast Asia; (2) that the loss of South-
east Asia would result in marked deterioration of Pakistan's strategic
position; (3) and that this loss can be prevented only by cooperation of
South Asian nations with the U.S.
6. Remove Pakistanian doubts regarding U.S. neutrality in the Western
New Guinea dispute and make it clear that the.U.S.'looks to peaceful negotia-
tions between Indonesia and The Netherlands as the best means for solving the
problem.
7. Develop an attitude in Pakistan which would assist tie U.S. and its
allies to obtain the facilities desired in time of peace or required in the
event of war in Southeast Asia and which would cause Pakistan to deny such
facilities to the Soviet Bloc.
M. WITH REGARD TO AUSTRALIA AM NEW ZEALAND
1. Intensify existing Australian and New Zealand disposition to cooperate
with the U.S. in all matters concerning Southeast Asia, and encourage their
participation in coordinated plans for the economic development of Southeast
Asia.
2. Encourage maximum participation, as British Commonwealth representa-
tives and as responsible U.N. member states, in the defense of Southeast Asia
in the event of Chinese Communist aggression.
3. Strengthen the realization that the U.S. is neutral in the Dutch-
Indonesian dispute regarding Western New Guinea, and is in favor of the
solution of the problem by peaceful negotiations between the two parties
to the dispute.
N. WITS? GIRD TO TFE UNITED KINGDOM
1. Reach a resolution of British-U.S. differences on Asian policy as
related to Southeast Asian problems. Failing this, make clear to the British
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(Draft)
5 January 1953
that, whatever the differences of U.S. and British policy regarding other
parts of Asia, basic interests of both in Southeast Asia are similar.
the
2. Engender British conviction that in spite of/former negative attitude
in some U.S. circles toward "colonialism," U.S. opinion as a whole is now
persuaded that British presence in Malaya is advantageous to the free world.
3. Remove any British fear that U.S. economic policy in Southeast Asia
is designed, in part, to weaken British position and influence in the area.
4. Seek an agreement with the British on psychological programs for
joint or unilateral implementation in Southeast Asia.
5. Seek an agreement with the British (and the French) on actions to
be undertaken in the event of certain Southeast Asia exigencies.
6. Continue support of the British program in Malaya.
ri. Influence the British to support U.S. policy with regard to any
South and Southeast Asian initiative toward regional, cooperation.
0. WIT}` REGARD TO IT,0CE
1. Persuade France to carry out in letter and spirit its existing
agreements with the Associated States.
2. Fortify French belief that U.S. support in Indochina is due not only
to realistic recognition of French responsibility but also to a genuine under-
standing of the French dilemma and sincere appreciation of French sacrifices
in defense of the area.
3. Reassure the French that the U.S. is not scheming to replace French
cultural, economic, and political influence in the Associated States, but
is merely eager to het the French build the Associated States into strong
and vital anti-communist nations,
4. Increase the effectiveness of existing agreements for joint
psychological activities in Indochina.
5. Seek a satisfactory agreement with the French (and the British) on
actions to be undertaken in the event of Southeast Asian emergency situations.
6. ilaintain the will of the French people and the purpose of the
French Government to continue to fight communism in Indochina.
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PSB D-23
(Draft)
5 January 1953
P. WITH REGARD TO TYH NETBERIIDS
1. Encourage the Dutch toward implementing a mutually beneficial trade
policy with the Indonesians which will strengthen the stability of bothth.e
Indonesians and The Netherlands and result in mutual financial benefits.
2.' Attain Dutch acceptance of the thesis that any aid they give
Indonesians in developing and equipping their internal security forces will
redound to Dutch arl.rantage through securing their economic investments.
3. Encourage The Netherlands Government to continue negotiations with
Indonesia on the political disposition of New Guinea, but not in such a
manner as to give the impression that the U.S. has abandoned its position
of neutrality..
4. Persuade The Netherlands Government to make every effort to prevent
actions by its subjects which would increase Indonesia's internal security
,problems.
5. Take measures to soften any Dutch bitterness toward the U.S. in
general; and the actively anti-U.S. attitude in many Dutch businessmen
and government advisors in Indonesia in particular.
1. Stim:i:late awareness and support for prograras designed to strengthen
and retain the independence of the nations of Southeast Asia.
2. Identify U.S. purposes in Southeast Asia as:
a. Based upon desire for peace in a pattern of international
responsibility witlout surrender to Soviet domination.
b. Represeril.ing he principles of the U.N. and the interests of
all free nations rather than the particular interests of the U.S.
3. Identify the communist purpose:
a. As seeking the subjugation of the Asian nations to Soviet
imperialism.
b. As a challenge to the security and independence of all states.
4. Furtl..er the belief that U.S.-Southeast Asia policy will benefit
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PSB D-23
(Draft)
5 January 1953
the world eaono*ny by increasing productivity (raw materials) as well as
purcr':asng power (enlarged market for finished and semi-finished goods)
of this important and populous area.
5. flaintain alertness to the possibility of increased communist aggres-
sion in Southeast Asia and conviction of U.N. (U.S.) will to resist it.
R. U1I ( D TO T:;E SOVIET UNION
1. Induce the Kremlin to restrain Communist Chinese leaders from
increased interference in Southeast Asia. Specifically, by action which
will convince the Kremlin that U.N. (U.S.) reaction to greater Chinese
Communi.._,, intervention in Southeast Asia, (e.g., increased support of the
Viet i_i?_nh) especially overt military assistance, would result in unacceptable
military and economic demands by Communist China upon the USSR, the refusal
of which. would lead to a weakening of the bonds now holding Communist China
in the Soviet orbit.
2. Convince the Soviet leaders that pursuance of their policy of
aggression by proxy in Southeast Asia is resulting in increased anti-
communist determination on the part of free nations and the extension of
that policy would be met by collective economic and military counteraction
sufficiently punishing to weaken their global position and which might
spark a global war for which they are not yet prepared.
S. 14TREG QD T(-_,_ O1 1L A ? L TES
1. Reduce the effectiveness of their diplomatic services as agents
of Soviet policy in Southeast Asia.
2. negate the Soviet-directed program for increased communist trade
with South and Southeast Asian countries.
3. Encourage comparison between economic aid policy of the U.S. in
Southeast Asia and economic exploitation practiced by the USSR in Soviet
Bloc countries.
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PSB D-23
(Draft)
5 January 1953
SECTION VII
ADM VLgTR~TIVF MITER
A. COORDINATION. REVIEW AND EVALUATION
The Director, Psychological Strategy Board, shall be responsible for
continuing coordination, review, and evaluation of this basic plan and
departmental and agency supporting plans and operations. The Director, in
his discretion, may establish in Washington, D.C., a coordinating panel of
interested departments and agencies.
B. SUPPORTING PLANS
Supporting plans prepared by the Department of State, Department of
Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Director for Mutual Security
shall be submitted to the Director, Psychological Strategy Board, for review
and such coordination as is necessary.
C. LEGISLATIVE
Congressional support for legislation necessary to further the objectives
of this plan will be developed by the departments and agencies concerned in
accordance with normal programming procedures. In addition, the Director
of the Psychological Strategy Board, using the resources of the PSB member
departments and agencies and of other departments and agencies of the
government, will review other current and proposed legislation which
impinges on or importantly affects the strategic psychological objectives
of the United States in Southeast Asia. Based on this review, he will
recommend such Board action as seems appropriate and desirable in relation
to the successful execution of this plan..
D. PUBLIC INFORMATION
Where appropriate, U.S. domestic public information programs in
support of the general objectives of this plan will be developed by the
member departments and agencies.
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COPY 4.2
PSB D-23
(Draft )
5 January 1953
APPENDIX A
PSYCHOLOGICAL CIRCUf?STMNCES
A. FAVORABLE PSYCHOLOGICAL CIPCIJNSTAATCES:
1, General acceptance and admiration for U. N. and its Charter.
Close identification of U. S. with establishment and principles of U. N.
Demonstrated. determination (Korean intervention) of U. N. (U.S.) to
honor commitments and defend victims of aggression.
2. U. S. reputation as traditional champion of progress, freedom,
and anti-colonialism ( see, however, paragraph B. 9 ), with concrete
examples of integrity of U. S. belief in democratic and non-colonial
processes:,
a. U. S. development from colonial status to world power
and maintenance of historical policy in support of national
self-determination;
b. Voluntary granting of U. S. of independence to the
Philippines;
c. Support by the U. S. of return of sovereignty to Japan
and U. S. disinterest in imperial aggrandizement as demonstrated
by U. S. occupation policies in Japan;
d. U. S. assistance given Indonesia in gaining independence.
3, Concrete demonstrations of U. S. friendship, generosity, and
desire for peace. Willingness of the U. S. to share its wealth and
technical skills as shown by MBA, Point Four, and MAAG programs.
General acceptance of the necessity for raising Asian living standard.
Desire on part of Asians to modernize, and a natural tendency to turn
to the U. S. for technological guidance and equipment. The great
practical importance of the U. S. foreign aid program for "modernization"
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(Draft)
5 January 1.953
of Southeast Asia increasingly recognized, if not by Southeast Asian
peoples at large, by many Southeast Asian technical and economic experts
and political leaders and ranking officials who are actually responsible
in their respective countries for national welfare in general or for
progress in specific fields (Agriculture, Public Health, Education,
Tibor, Transportation, Industrialization, etc.)
~,. Fact that Kremlin direction and control of apparently indigenous
political movements is being revealed by increasing controls and overt
participation by Russian and Chinese personnel.
5. Rumors of Chinese Communist oppression emanating from the
mainland and from overseas Chinese.
6. Awareness of historical examples of the predatory nature of
Chinese imperialism in Southeast Asia and the unpopularity of Chinese
generally through the area. Genuine fear of Soviet expansionism and
communist subversion in all the "moderate" groups, including Burma
Socialist, which now happen to be in power throughout Southeast Asia.
7. Growing political maturity of the new nationalist states and
leaders, causing them to make more realistic appraisals of the inter-
national political situation.
8. Beneficial effect of private Western philanthropic and
developmental efforts.
9. Presence of strategically located groups which are basically
anti-communist.
10. Conservatism and religion as anti-communist and stabilizing
influences, with inherent anti-communist leanings of conservative groups
and of important religious segments of Southeast Asia. U. S. identifi-
cation with freedom of religion; communism with persecution of religion.
11, Potential usefulness of the various overseas Chinese communities
in the area which, because of their inherent pragmatism, can be expected
f-3-_'906 .%
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(Draft)
5 January 1953
to respond favorably to any apparently successful demonstrations of
strength by the Chinese Nationalists or Western-supported local govern-
ments.
12. Southeast Asian instinctive respect for the unique power,
including economic power, of the United States; and Southeast Asian
memory of demonstrated U. S. World War II military power and the success-.
ful use of that power.
13. Success of the Philippine Army in reducing the Hukbalahap
potential and appeal.
14. Strong pro-Western policy of the government of Thailand.
15. Existence of a nucleus of military and civil leaders in various
Southeast Asian countries who have been trained and influenced by American
and British civil and military officers and who might be expected to exert
their leadership, particularly in the event of cormiiunist aggression.
16. Inherent spiritual vitality of the Japanese people; recovery
capabilities and ultimate economic and industrial potential of Japan.
17. Awakening of the Indian Government to the dangers of coirnnunism
and its increasingly firm attitude against communism.
18. U. S. best market for some of most important Southeast Asian
exports.
19. U. S. chief actual and potential supplier of capital goods
absolutely essential for economic advancement advocated by most active
and articulate Southeast Asian leaders.
20. The very limited shipping space available to Soviet bloc as
well as to Southeast Asian countries and the "hostile" nature of land
frontiers between Communist China and Southeast Asia (high mountains
on Burma border, combat area near Indochina border) constitute serious
obstacle to volume trade between Soviet bloc and Southeast Asia. Even
should Soviet bloc and Southeast Asians agree on considerable exchange
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PSB D-23, APPENDIX A
(Draft)
5 January 1953
of Southeast Asia's raw materials for'Soviet bloc finished goods (which,
Soviet would probably be unable to furnish in quantity anyway), the fact
remains that only the West can actually transport commodities from and
to Southeast Asia on large scale and Soviet-directed communism cannot
make good on its propaganda promises regarding trade with Southeast Asia.
B. ADVERSE PSYCHOLOGICAL C IRC UAiSTANCES :
1. The long domination of the peoples of Southeast Asia by the
white race has developed a basic attitude of suspicion and distrust.
2. The effectiveness with which the communist regime has con-
solidated its military and governmental control of mainland China.
3. The failure of the U. S. and European publics to realize
the strategic (psychological) significance of Southeast Asia.
4. The non-existence so far of careful U. S. planning for a
systematic psychological campaign in Southeast Asia; failure of the U. S.
Government to recognize fully the decisive importance of intangibles
involved in Southeast Asia problem; and shortage of U. S. personnel
with psychological qualifications necessary to deal successfully with
Orientals.
5. The apparent conflicts in U. S. foreign policy; the presence
of admittedly unsolved problems in U. S. foreign policy; the lack of
complete U. S. public agreement with present U. S. foreign policy;
foreign fears of instability in U. S. foreign policy; and lack of
Western and U. N. agreement on basic matters of Asian policy.
6. The fact that Southeast Asia is a highly diversified area in
which narrowly nationalistic forces exceed tendencies toward regional
cohesion and cooperation.
7. The failure of the U. S. to adequately consider indigenous
psychological and political attitudes and sensibilities in the formation
and execution of U. S. psychological, political, and economic programs
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PSB D--23, APPENDIX A
(Draft)
5 January 1953
for Southeast Asia.
8. Conviction on the part of Southeast Asians that U. S. does
not really understand or appreciate Southeast Asians cultural and
spiritual traditions.
9. The conflict between necessary U. S. support of Western European
governments (colonial and former colonial) and the announced anti-
colonial policy of the U. S. in Southeast Asia.
10. The lack of significant assimilation of Chinese minorities in
various countries, causing discrimination arid. resentment on the part
of host countries and governments.
11. Local support, monetary and otherwise, of communist activities
in Southeast Asia.
12. Psychological inroads being made in Southeast Asia by communist
economic approaches, gestures and invitations.
13. Impediments (fear of nationalization, double-taxation, etc.)
to the investment of U. S. private capital in the countries of Southeast
Asia.
34. The existence in Southeast Asia of the following considerations
and attitudes susceptible to communist manipulation and exploitation:
a. Pervading subtle terror of communist power and fears of
retaliations in case of the sue ess of that power; and tendency
in some areas to accommodate to the looming threat of that power.
b. Weakness, lack of mature experienced leadership in depth,
and lack of material assets (military and economic) on the part
of the new nationalist states, each of which is faced with the
following major tasks: (1) maintenance of internal stability,
(2) development of governmental apparatuses and initiation of
domestic programs to meet the needs of their underprivileged,
diverse, and largely illiterate populaces, and (3) formulation
of foreign policy during the present period of world crisis.
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(Draft)
5 January 1953
c. Illusion on the part of certain Southeast Asians that
involvement in the world conflict can be avoided by maintaining
a strictly "neutral" attitude.
d. Tendency on the part of. Asiatics, ideological and moral
considerations aside, to take pride in demonstrations of power
by Asiatic forces (e.g., Communist China).
e. Continuing conviction on the part of native nationalists--
amounting to a political shibboleth--that "Western Imperialism" is
a worse and more immediate menace than communism, coupled with an
apparent lack of comprehension of the dictatorial and repressive
practices of communist imperialism which inevitably obtain follow-
ing an accommodation with communism.
f. Misconception that the U. S. may be more intent on war
than the U.S.S.R. which continuously stresses peace motif in its
propaganda.
g. Opinion held by many Southeast Asians that the U. S. is
closely aligndd with colonial and ex-colonial powers or with
"reactionary" indigenous elements, subservient to the West.
h. Suspicion held by many Southeast Asians that even where
the U. S. takes 4 stand against colonialism, such attitude moti-
vated by desire to weaken French, Dutch, British influence in
interest of U. S. "imperialism."
i. General attraction communism holds for violently nation-
alistic elements, because of its apparently zealous espousal of
Asian nationalism.
J. Special attraction communism holds for workers, peasants,
and intellectuals because of its promises of radical economic and
social reforms.
k. Special attraction communism holds for nationalist elements
because of its rationalization of confiscation of foreign enterprise.
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(Draft)
5 January 1953
1. The sensitivity of nationalist leaders, proud of their
recently achieved independence, to any implication that they are
dependent on foreign (Western) advice or guidance,
m. Doubts concerning U. S. trade policies in Southeast Asia:
(1) Growing impression that the U. S. intentionally or
otherwise withholds from Southeast Asia urgently needed
capital goods.
(2) Uneasiness caused by U. S. demands for restrictions
on Southeast Asian trade with Soviet Bloc and demand that
Southeast Asia rely exclusively for buying and selling on
Western markets.
(3) Fear that the U. S., chief customer of important
Southeast Asian exports, may use position to influence world
market prices in manner unfavorable to Southeast Asia.
n. Doubts concerning U. S. economic aid to Southeast Asia:
(1) Many Southeast Asians consider acceptance of U. S.
economic aid necessary but humiliating, while others suspect
U. S. motives and see in aid program merely a tool of U. S.
"economic imperialism" or a move to "lure" Southeast Asia
into Western camp. Still others feel that aid actually
granted is on too small a scale, particularly if compared
to U. S. funds made available to Europe.
(2) Doubts among elements inclined toward cooperation
with West regarding extent of U. S. willingness and capability
to continue present aid policy beyond immediate future.
o. Doubts concerning U. S. ability and intention to protect,
Southeast Asia effectively in case Southeast Asia is overtly
attacked.
Present economic and political weakness of Japans
q. Such Southeast Asian antipathies to Japan as remain from
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(Draft)
5 January 1953
World War II.
r. The existence in Southeast Asian countries of communist--
led dissident groups (of varying degrees of strength and organi-
zation) available to spearhead the disruptive attack phase of
communist rebellion aimed at creating chaos and then assuming
political and military control:
(1) In Indochina, Ho Chi Minh's "Democratic Republic"
with its powerful armed forces.
(2) In Burma, the dissident communist groups now trying
to promote alliance with other insurgent elements including
the non-communist, but anti-government, Karens.
(3) In Indonesia, various disgruntled groups ranging
from communist, including well-organized Chinese groups, to
rightist religious fanatics (Darul Islam) and including pro-
fessional bandits.
(4) In Philippines, the Hukbalahap rebels.
(5) In Malaya, the 3-5,000 hard--core Chinese rebels,
backed by 100,000 supporters and effectively holding down
more than 100,000 British and colonial troops.
(6) In Thailand, small communist groups among the over-
seas Chinese and the Vietnamese minorities are believed to
be organized, but held in check by the alert Thai internal
security forces.
15. Direct and by-products adverse psychological effects of:
a. Flow of weapons and other military supplies from Communist
China into Southeast Asian countries.
b. Flow back into the countries of Southeast Asia of large
numbers of indigenous agitators trained in Communist China.
c. Trade, legitimate and undercover, in strategic materials
to Corcmuni.st China from certain Southeast Asian countries.
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(Draft)
5 January 1953
d. Anti-Western activities of communist diplomatic personnel
in Southeast Asian countries.
e. Comparative freedom of action enjoyed by communist pro-
pagandists in Southeast Asian countries.
f. Support by individuals and business concerns of Southeast
Asian communist parties.
g. Presence of communist-controlled merchant shipping in
Southeast Asian ports and waters.
h. Inadequate anti-Communist attitudes and legislation in
Southeast Asian countries.
i. Commmnist influence in government and autonomous agencies
in the fields of defense, internal security, public information,
education, and economy in Southeast Asia.
16. Communist overt and covert propaganda and related psychological
activities designed to promote the effectiveness of the subtle terror
of communist power while, at the same time, promoting admiration .for
Communist China and concurrently intensifying Asian fears of:
a. Politicaldomination by the U. throe h:
(1) Identifying true nationalism with communism ratlier
than with U. S. democracy;
(2) Emphasizing the friendship of the U. S. for former
colonial powers;
(3) Exhibiting the military sections of the Mutual Security
Act as evi0ence of U. S. imperialistic design. -
b. Economic, domination bar tlie4U, S.-through:
(1) Identifying U. S. efforts to obtain strategic materials
with economic e:,ploitation;
(2) Describing U. S. economic assistance programs as
"dollar imperialism";
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(Draft)
5 January 1953
(3) Promoting trade with the Soviet world as the
counter to capitalistic monopoly.
c. Cultural domination b`theo TJ:_,5. you h:
(1) Emphasizing U. S. discrimination against colored
people;
(2) Disparaging U. S. culture as crass and materialistic;
(3) Promoting communistic culture through special missions
to communist countries.
d. National de tructiop fr2m wax throuh:
(1) Advertising communist desires for peace;
(2) Prosecuting atrocity charges against the U. S.;
(3) Hypothesizing for other nations war damage similar
to that in Korea;
(4) Magnifying the military strength, industrial potential,
and physical proximity of Communist China.
17. Size of U. S. staffs in diplomatic and special missions in
the area causes suspicion of U. S. motives and brings about harmful
local repercussions, especially because their manner of living is
similar to that of former colonial masters.
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