THE SOVIET SA-3 MISSLE SYSTEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T05439A000200320075-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Sequence Number: 75
• Content Type: NIE

Approved For Release 2008/01/03: CIA-RDP78TO5439A000200320075-2
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SPECIAL
NATIONAL. INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 11-11-63
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR Or' CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Coro, rred by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleaf
L
63
DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW by NIMA/DOD
3/16/00
710
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THE SOVIET SA-3
MISSILE SYSTEM
A. The United States Intelligence Board has reviewed the evidence
available on the Soviet SA-3 surface-to-air missile (SAM) system and
concludes that:
1. The SA-3 system probably was designed to provide better
capabilities against low-altitude attack than the SA-2 system.
2. However, the nature of the evidence is such that the char-
acteristics of the SA-3 system cannot be determined.
B. ` Therefore, the judgments expresse1 in NIE 11-3-62 and NIE
11-4-63' pertaining to the SA-3 system are reaffirmed in light of the
evidence available to date.
D. The locations and spacing of deployment sites suggest a rela-
tively short-range system with low-altitude capability. Terrain analysis
indicates that the sites are compatible with the low-altitude role.
E. The low-altitude limitation of the SA-2 system leaves a definite
gap in the Soviet air defense, which the SA-3 system appears to be
designed to fill, at least in part.
F. Classified Soviet documents lend support to the existence of a
short-range low-altitude SAM system.
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1. An SA-3 surface-to-air missile (SAM)
facility was first observed on TALENT photog-
raphy at the Kapustin Yar Test Range on
The first operationally deployed
and subsequently 47 additional sites
2. Lack of firm intelligence on missiles,
missile launchers, and associated electronic
equipment has precluded estimating perform-
ance characteristics for this system, although,
based on available evidence, it has been esti-
mated that the SA-3 is probably a low-altitude
system. Information considered in this estimate
includes: analysis of photographic evidence of
the R&D SA-3 site and equipment at Kapustin
Yar, low-altitude limitations of the SA-2 system,
Soviet documents and literature relating to low-
altitude SAM systems, SA-3 deployment pat-
terns, terrain and siting of known SA-3 sites,
nuclear association, and possible high-altitude
role. `these elements are discussed in the
following paragraphs.
3. Photographic analysis of the SA-3 de-
velopment area at Kapustin Yar as well as the
spacing between adjacent launch pads as well as
the road turning radii are smaller than those
which were identified at the SA-3 site at Ka-
pustin Yar were about 20 feet in length as com-
pared with 35 feet for the SA-2 GUIDELINE
missile. Although the diameter of the individual
SA-3 launch pads is about 50 feet as compared to
about 35 feet for the SA-2, the use of a multiple
launcher could account for this increased pad
size. The above evidence suggests a new system
using a smaller missile, probably having a
shorter range.
4. Soviet documents and clandestine re-
ports which discuss the SA-2 capabilities indi-
cate that the low-altitude limit of the SA-2
system is about 3,000 feet. A few sources -in-
dicate 10,000 feet low-altitude limit. In addition
S. Several Soviet sources have mentioned
and identified a short-range, low-altitude SAM
sytem (other than the SA-2) in the process of
deployment at least as early a~
In one case, the utilization of this low-altitude
SAM system (ZUR-M) was discussed and it was
believed that for the best defense of the USSR the
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ZUR-M should be included in both point defense
(especially for important centers such as Mos-
cow and Leningrad) and peripheral deployment
.with other systems. This is the manner in
which we are seeing the SA-3 deployed. Another
source credits the ZUR-M as being effective
from about 1,000 to 26,000 feet altitude with a
slant range of about 14 nautical miles (n.m.).
This source further states that the ZUR-M would
replace light AAA. Additionally, a source dif-
ferentiates between an intermediate range SAM
system referred to as the ZUR-S and identified
as the SA-2 and a short-range, low-altitude
system referred to as ZUR-M. While we cannot
confirm that the above intelligence equates the
ZUR-M to the SA-3 system, we believe that they
are the same system.
6. Although deployment of the SA-3 system
is not yet complete, what has been observed thus
far indicates that deployment is, compatible with
the concept of defense against an air-breathing
threat. Most of the observed SA-3 sites are
located within or less of known SA-1 or
SA-2 sites, suggesting a complementary func-
tion. In Moscow, where there are 6 SA-3 sites
located on the outer SA-1 defense ring, the dis-
tance between sites is
the sites are not as close as this. The Soviet
concept appears to be to prevent the breaching
of the medium and high-altitude defenses W low-
level attack against those defenses and at the
same time to provide a low-level defense line
on approach routes to the target.
TERRAIN ANALYSIS OF SA-3 SITES
terrain within a
SA-3 sites. C
deployed
sites contained ter-
rain features which could act as minor masks to
interfere with the engagement of low flying tar-
gets. In several instances, deforestation and/or
raising the antenna height would eliminate or
reduce such minor masking. However, even
for the SA-3 site with the worst masking
, it was not sufficient to degrade that
site as a low-altitude defense. The
SA-3 site. has no mask to interfere with low-
altitude defense above 500 feet.
9. Analysis of data including the deploy-
ment pattern does not support the hypothesis that
the SA-3 system is a high-altitude system having
a 40-50 n.ni. range. At the present time there
are 13 SA-3 sites deployed in the Kaliningrad
area. If a 40-50 n.m. missile were employed
there, a 12-fold redundancy of coverage would be
achieved. This excessive redundancy of cover-
age by a 40-50 n.m. system, coupled with the fact
that the area has adequate high-altitude protec-
tion by a large number of SA-2 sites, seems to
negate the role of the SA-3 as a long-range,
high-altitude system.
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