SARNOFF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R000700010017-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 79
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 6, 2003
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: May 23, 1958
• Content Type: MF

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23 May 1958
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : SARNOFF
Executive Registry
Attached is another version of the letter to Sarnoff
modified along the lines that I am told you desire. It has
been discussed with Fitzgerald.
Attachments
25X1
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Inspector General
riv!rtp- 711
Ii ilL
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25X1
Here are new pages 1, 2 and 6 to
be substituted in Sarnoff letter, copies of which
you have. I did not know exactly how many
copies I had made, but this should be plenty.
This new verbion (the original, that is) has gone
to DCI this date.
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25x1Appro
25X1
AP
TRANSMITTAL(?UP
For Release zu ruo/04
: DATE CliVRII/PfleR01731R01
ed
TO:
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
REMARKS:
The original of this letter,
together with all background papers
(including a draft prepared by PP
-- do not know date) were handed to
DCI on 23 April by Mr. Kirkpatrick.
He may not sign this version, but
here are copies if he does. If you
have any questions when (and if) you
receive papers , be sure to give me
a ring.
6---t.a- 4---')
FROM:
rs...i....acc.
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9(103106/04
ROOM NO,
EXTENSION
: CIA-RDP80R0173'
URM REPLACES FORM 36-8
I FEB 552,f.1 WHICH MAY BE USED.
GPO 1951-0-419445
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STAT
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
General David Sarnoff
Radio Corporation of America
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York 20, New York
Dear David:
The months that have passed since your letter of December 16,
1957, are indicative of the intensive study that we have been giving your
views, both as presented in that letter and in your original program
for effective political action against world communism.
I want you to know that we have found your ideas both stimu-
lating and challenging. In many instances certain of your thoughts
have served to focus and clarify some of our own concepts, which may
become occasionally blurred by our closeness to the problem and the
necessity of working through governmental channels. Further, the
perspective you have given the problem has been very helpful to us who
are concentrating intensively on the worldwide struggle with communism.
Finally, there could scarcely have been a more opportune
time to review our activities in this struggle, with changes taking place
in the Soviet hierarchy, intensive diplomatic manuevers on their part,
worldwide unrest, and the possibility of the so-called summit dis-
cussions.
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Certainly you. have focused on an important area when you state
that the problem is one of attaining and maintaining the requisite magni-
tude, financing, coordination and continuity in any political offensive
against world communism. This is especially true when the objective
is to undermine the power of world communism to the point where it is
no longer a threat. Whether this can be done as long as Russia is
Communist is a serious question, for we need no convincing that Moscow
is to the Communists what Mecca is to the Mohammedans.
I am sure it will come as no surprise to you when I state that
the amount we spend to combat world communism is but a small fraction
of the amount spent by the Communist bloc to spread its doctrine. And
in calculating the amount spent by the United States I would include
economic and military aid and the information service, as well as the
efforts of my own organization. In pointing this out I assure you that I
am not complaining about a lack of money for CIA, as we have always
found the Congress most understanding of our needs. The point does
illustrate, however, the fact that our counter effort is on a much smaller
scale than the drive of the communists.
Illustrative of the effort and expense that the Soviet Union is
throwing into the struggle is this paragraph about the Communist World
Youth Festivals from the booklet "Communist Fronts in Focus: Youth":
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2.
3.
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"The festivals are publicized as non-political, and cultural
and social events dominate the schedule, although politics is never
far from the surface. For many of those who attend, however, the
principal appeal of the festival is as a low-cost vacation trip to Eastern
Europe or the Soviet Union. The trip is inexpensive because the Soviet
bloc not only subsidizes travel within the Communist-controlled areas,
but in many cases, pays the expenses the festival visitor would other-
wise incur in travelling from his home to the borders of the Soviet bloc.
For the Moscow Festival in 1957, the British Youth Festival Committee
offered an all-expense round-trip to Moscow for 47 pounds ($141.00)
--less than a third of the cost of the cheapest commercial tour. Nor-
wegians were given the opportunity to make the festival trip for slightly
less than 36 pounds ($100.00)--a quarter of the price of a commercial
10-day Soviet tour. Americans were offered the chance to travel from
San Francisco--half-way around the world--for precisely the same price
the Norwegians were asked to pay. Even greater bargains were offered
to Asian and African youth. As at previous festivals, young people
from the economically less privileged parts of the world were assisted
through "International Solidarity Funds, " a system through which the
youth groups of the more wealthy nations underwrite the expenses of
delegations from specific Asian or African states. To the funds
collected in this manner have been added substantial subsidies from the
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USSR and the Soviet bloc nations. After the Warsaw Festival in 1955,
return tickets home were given free to all who requested them?regard-
less of the distance to be traveled. With the festivals claiming some
30,000 visitors, the total cost to the sponsors of travel alone is
astronomical. The Soviet New Times reported that for the Moscow
Festival 1,075 railway carriages, seven ships, 'many' aircraft and
2,600 busses would be placed at the disposal of the visitors."
It would appear that if the Soviet Union is willing to put this
effort into this one phase of political warfare, their over-all program
may well run into the equivalent of several billion dollars.
Accepting the fact that the magnitude of our effort must
necessarily be on a smaller scale than the communists, it then becomes
even more important that we conduct our campaign in order to exploit
the most important Soviet weaknesses which are accessible. Your
inventory of vulnerabilities is an excellent one, and certainly lists the
major targets. The problem now becomes one of a concentration of
effort where our resources can be most effective.
It is fairly obvious that the greater accessibility we have to the
target group the more effective can be our effort. The new cultural
exchange program has opened new possibilities in this regard. Here
is an opportunity to show Soviet intellectuals the creative freedom avail-
able in the western world, to keep stirring the ferment in Soviet youth,
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5.
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and to give a first-hand view to Soviet managerial personnel of the
autonomy typical of a free enterprise system. These seeds sown by
their own personal observations in the United States may germinate
when they return to the USSR, and we can stimulate the cultivation.
This exchange will also contribute to the deglamorization of communism,
and the awakening of the realization among the Russians that they have
been misinformed by their government about the outside world.
We should recognize however that the exchange program will
also have some drawbacks. The Soviet Union will send forth their best
to the cultural battle. We will be impressed by the grace and excellence
of their ballet, the quality of their musicians, the achievements of their
athletes, their accomplishments in medicine and science, their academic
accomplishments and industrial skill, to mention only a few. Others
will be affected too, particularly in the uncommitted areas of the world,
and probably our friends and allies.
The uninitiated may well ask how these things can be accomplished
under communism. The naive may question whether the USSR could
still be a menace. This will inevitably make the problems of attaining
the requisite magnitude and continuity in our struggle against world
communism more difficult. It will also make it even more important
that our guard not be lowered, undoubtedly a major objective in the
Soviet campaign.
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Another element of the communist offensive that must be
countered is the major economic warfare campaign on which the Soviets
have embarked. This obviously has too many facets to comment on
here. It is an obvious challenge, perhaps deliberately directed toward
creating a crisis in this country, if we attempt to match them item for
item. But we may be able to turn the sword and use it to create
further imbalances in the Soviet economy. It may well prevent adequate
production of consumer goods in the USSR adding to the restiveness of
the Russian people, particularly those who have seen what is available
to the westerner. Further, if we are prepared to engage in this form
of economic warfare?and are willing to create the necessary mechanism
and take the required sacrifices--we may be able to take advantage of
their over-commitments and failures to make promised deliveries.
Other vulnerabilities of the communists will be laid open for
exploitation as the aforementioned weaknesses develop into serious
internal problems for the USSR. If the cultural exchange proves
dangerous, and the economic program boomerangs, the struggle for
power will be accentuated.
What we need to do in a more positive way to speed the process
of undermining world communism is difficult to answer. As you are
well aware, several different organizational approaches have been used
in Washington in recent years in an effort to make the overseas activities
of the United States Government most effective. While the present system
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6.
7.
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may not be perfect, it is functioning reasonably well, and provides in
the Operations Coordination Board a "Strategy Board for Political
Defense." We are constantly re-examining the effectiveness of our
various programs and devising new methods of getting the greatest
impact out of our effort. Obviously we cannot advertize all of our
activities, nor can be boast of our successes. While the size of the
OCB itself is small?and its immediate staff is not large--it does have
a large number of working groups composed of many experts on
different areas and subjects and representing the departments and
agencies of the government most directly concerned. The over-all
effect of its efforts are on a rather considerable scale, and perhaps
can be judged in part at least by the apparent Soviet anxiety to conclude
the cold war.
At least, I am sure we are making progress. Such progress is
aided by contributions such as your valuable ideas, and I can assure you
that we are grateful for the time and effort you have put into this.
With very best wishes.
Sincerely,
Allen W. Dulles
Director
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23 April 1958
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
Attached is:
Tab 1 - A new draft reply to General Sarnoff
Tab 2 - Outline of General Sarnoff's major points
Tab 3 - General Sarnoff's letter of 16 December 1957 and
your reply of 20 December. This also includes
Sarnoff's original memo, "A Program For A Political
Offensive Against World Communism", submitted to
the White House April 5, 1955.
Tab 4 - Draft
25X1 Tab 5 - A clipping on Sarnoff
I'm sorry that preparing this took so long, but I felt a truly
responsive answer was necessary, and this entailed considerable work.
25X1
(Lyman B . Kirkpatrfck
Inspector General
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
General David Sarnoff
Radio Corporation of America
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York 20, New York
Dear David:
The months that have passed since your letter of December 16,
1957, are indicative of the intensive study that we have been giving your
views, both as presented in that letter and in your original program
political ? against world communism. t want you to know
that we have found your ideas both stimulating and challenging. In
many instances certain of your thoughts have served to focus and
clarify some of our own concepts, which may become occasionally
blurred by our closeness to the problem and the necessity of working
through governmental channels. Further, the perspective you have
given the problem has been very helpful to us who are concentrating
intensively on the worldwide struggle with communism. Finally, there
could scarcely have been a more opportune time to review our activities
in this struggle, with changes
intensive diplomatic manuever
so-called summit discussions.
taking place in the Soviet hierarchy,
s on their part, and the lawspyititmqe of the
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14444414you state that the problem is one of attaining the requisite magnitude,
4 ,N=4.4:41.64a.
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financin5coordination and continuity in any political offensive against
world communism. This is especially true when the objective is to
undermine the power of world communism to the point where it is no
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I am sure it will come as no surprise to you when I state that
the amount we spend to combat world communism is but a small fraction
of the amount spent by the Communist Bloc to spread its doctrine. And
in calculating the amount spent by the United States I would include
economic and military aid and the information service, as well as the
efforts of my own organization. In pointing this out I assure you that I
am not complaining about a lack of money for CIA, as we have always
found the Congress most understanding of our needs. The point does
7frillustrate, however, the fact that our counter effort is o a much
smaller scale than the drive of the communists.
Illustrative of the effort and expense that the Soviet Union is
throwing into the struggle is this paragraph about the Communist World
Youth Festivals from the booklet "Communist Fronts in Focus: Youth":
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2.
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OUTLINE OF GENERAL SARNOFF'S MAJOR POINTS
1. Need a decision to undermine power of world communism to point
where it is no longer a threat.
2. Objectives would be:
- to keep alive in Soviet Empire the spirit of resistance and hope
of eventual freedom.
- to break awful sense of isolation of internal enemies of Kremlin.
- to sharpen Kremlin's fear of their own people.
- to provide moral and material aid, including leaders, toapposition.
- to make maximum use of fugitives from USSR.
- to appeal to simple personal yearnings.
- to shatter wave of future aura around communism.
- to inspire moral dedication in free countries.
3. The problem is one of attaining the requisite magnitude, financing,
coordination and continuity.
- we should exploit Soviet weaknesses, sharpen the inventory of
vulnerabilities:
a. monolithic unity of USSR has been damaged
b. nationalist sentiment intensified in non-Russian minorities
c. open ferments among Soviet youth
d. Soviet intellectuals demand more creative freedom
e. managerial personnel want more autonomy
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f. present resistance strong
g. Soviet economy unbalanced
h. struggle for power
i. Communism has lost its original glamor and appeal
j. after 40 years Soviet regime has failed to win allegiance
k. contradictions between Soviets modern technology and
medieval despotism
4. "Free world inadequacy in the understanding and prosecution of the
cold war."
5. Hungary established:
a. that revolution against a totalitarism communist regime
is possible
b. that such a revolution can be successful
d. that the soldiers become people; the military won't save
the Kremlin
e. that a new communist intelligentsia turns against its
creator
6. Create new channels of contact for intellectual and cultural leaders of
free world to make manifest their understanding of Soviet intelligentsia?
7. Cold war must be constructive--it must build views, attitudes,
loyalties, hopes, ideals and readiness for sacrifice.
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(1) Organization - a Strategy Board for Political Defense
(2) Financing - a percentage of Defense Budget
(3) Implementing the counter offensive
(4) Propaganda
(5) Communist targets
(6) Free world targets
(7) Radio receivers and phonographs
Use of facilities in friendly countries
Passive Resistance
Organized Resistance
(11) Insurrections
(12) Collaboration with emigres and escapees
(13) Planned defection
(14) Training of cadres
(15) Campaigns by special groups
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3.
SENDER_Nrly.e. EUT,L...mniyitivi:N. cfric...f.ip
rvu- PPEF01:70 1 ROO
PRMERISW V" H 7 CONFIDENTIAL 1 SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
INITIALS
DATE
1
DDP
1019 '59
DCI
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks:
Per DCI's instructions, herewith a
reply to Mr. David Sarnoff's essay.
This final form incorporates DCI's
marginal comments made on an earlier
draft.
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
'a .- ILL-4%1 ::
2028-K, Ext.
i ???
A ? t gm ., 3 0 ,.. _ _ . 4:
1; ,,..:. ie,n7
SECRET
FORM NO. 037 Replaces Form 30-4
I APR 55 4. which may be used.
(40
* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1955-0-342531
700010017-0
000010017-0
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
General David Sarnoff
Radio Corporation of America
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York 20, New York
Dear David,
Your outline of ideas for prosecution of the "cold war" was
stimulating. I appreciate the detail into which you went and therefore
want to comment in return, over and above my original acknowledgment
of receipt. You have given me too much food for thought in your letter
to permit my comments to be formulated quickly.
You stipulate that there must be a will to undertake a political
and psychological counter-offensive against the USSR. I think it can
be demonstrated that the public will and the official response to it
does, in fact, exist. Every now and then seemingly attractive
propositions obtain attention and hold out hope of some near-miraculous
overall solution. If they are based on the shaky premises that the
Soviets also dislike international tension, that they can be mollified by
appeasement, or that basic issues between two enemy systems can be
solved at a quick high-level meeting, they do not last very long because
the basic good sense of the American public recognizes that acceptance
of these premises could lead us into mortal danger.
It took some time after World War II for this country to come
alive to the peril, but there seems to be no possibility of return to
the misconceptions of war and immediate post war era. Certainly
the government itself has no intention of revoking the general intent
of policies that consistently since 1947 have attempted to keep this
country strong and halt the aggressive expansion of communistic
Soviet imperialism. Even the organization of the government is bent
in this direction and, as you know, my own agency has certain functions
based directly on the governmental will to enter into this field.
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Granted that this is true, I take it that your thinking emphasizes
that certain guiding objectives should be kept in mind, that enough
money should be devoted to the effort to assure a certain magnitude,
and that an organization should be set up to handle these specific
problems.
As to the guiding objectives, I think we are in complete harmony.
Those listed in your letter pages 3-8 are not only praiseworthy and
suitable but most of them are implicitly or explicitly stated in current
directives. That more money should be spent on them is a position I
would not challenge.
That there should be a new cabinet position for these matters,
is a proposal that would run counter to most of the thinking on
organization that has developed since the National Security Act of 1947
and would recall the unhappy episode of the Psychological Strategy
Board, which endeavored to consider a psychological program apart
from the executive decisions themselves. It would be very difficult
to convince those who have lived through the various alternatives that
we don't have a pretty good solution now, i. e., guiding policy is
centralized with the NSC, operations are decentralized to executive
agencies but coordinated through the OCB.
It is the latter, the OCB, that is the strategy board for the Cold
War. It has developed a system of working so that the agencies pull
together on the common task while recognizing their differentiated
missions.
The most recent problem facing us is the development of a
sound strategic plan and appropriate tactics to meet the Soviet economic
offensive in the underdeveloped areas. They offer aid to these countries
but lure them into nationalistic adventures that draw attention of leaders
away from the need for basic economic and political stability at home.
Their long-range plan is to prevent stabilization so that communism
will have a fertile field. Our approach must encourage stable
institutions to which communism will offer little appeal.
My people are checking out the details of your list to make sure
that nothing has been overlooked in their planning and operations.
They have not the slightest doubt about the urgency of keeping up
pressures on the communists.
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And much is being done. I would not be coy with you and flutter
the veil of secrecy but it is a fact that much of what is done in the
cold war would become ineffective if surfaced and therefore has to be
and is conducted in secrecy. Because of this, it is easy to get the
impression that we are not acting vigorously. For the same reason,
there is more of a coordinated effort with our allies than meets the
eye.
I would be the first one to admit that it is not enough; we can
never be complacent on that score. But the will is there, the
organization has had many of the kinks worked out of it, and we have
never yet had to hold back from anything really important merely from
lack of money.
I hope this will afford you some assurance that the effort is
being pursued. Your thoughts and ideas on it will always be most
welcome.
Sincerely,
Allen W. Dulles
Director
3
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5-6 /,4--
3egistrY
a
30 Rockefeller Plasm
New York 7.0. New York
Dear
Your outline of ideas for prosecution of the "cold war was
stimulating. I appreciate the detail into which you went and therefore
want to comment in return aver and above my original
of receipt. You have given me too mach food for thought in
to permit my comment* to be formulated quickly.
You etIpulate that there must be a will to undertake a political
and psychological counter-offensive egainst the USSR. I think it can
be demonstrated that the public will and the official response to it
does, in fact. exist. Every now and then seemingly attractive
propositions obtain attention and held out hope of some isear-nsiraculous
overall *elution. If they are based on the shaky premises that the
Soviete also dislike international tension that they can be mollifi.ed by
appeasement, or that basic issues between two enemy systems can be
salved at a quick high-level meeting, they do it last very long because
the basic good sense of the American public recognises that acceptance
of these prexnises could lead us into mortal danger.
It took time after World War 11 for this country to come
the peril but there seems to be no possibility of return to
of war and immediate post war era. Certainly
elf has no intention of revoking the general intent
sistentiy since 1947 have attempted to keep tide
on and halt the aggressive expansion of communistic
ism. Even the organisation of the government is bent
and, as you know, my own agency has certain functions
ctly an the governmental will to enter into this fleid.
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It that your thinking emphasises
that certain guithag objectives should be kept in mind. that enough
money slamdd be devoted to the effort to **Imre a certain magaitude
and that an organisation should be set up to handle these specific
problems.
As to the guiding objectives. I think we are in complete harmony.
Those listed in your letter pages 34 are not only praiseworthy and
suitable but most of them are implicitly or explicitly stated in current
directives. That more money should be spent on them ii. position I
would not challenge.
That there should be a new cabinet position for those
roposal that would run counter to most of the thinking on
nation that has developed since the National Security Act of 1941
d recall the unhappy episode of the Psychological Strategy
Itch eadesvored to consider a psychological program apart
from the executive decisions themselves. It would be very difficult
to convince those who have lived through the various alternative. that
we don't have a pretty good solution now, i. guiding policy is
centralised with the NSC, operations are decentralised to executive
agencies but coordinated through the OCB.
It is the latter, the 0C/11, that is the strategy board for the Cold
War. It ha* developed a system of working so that the agencies pull
together on the common task while recognising their differentiated
missions.
The most recent problem facing us is the development of a
sound strategic plan and appropriate tactics to meet the Soviet economic
offensive in the underdeveloped areas. They offer aid to these countries
but lure them into nationalistic adventures that draw attention of leaders
away from the need for basic ecanomic and political stability at home.
Their long-range plan is to prevent stabilisation so that communism
will have a fertile field. Our approach must encourage stable
inetituticms to which communism will offer little appeal.
My people are checking out the details of your list to mike
that nothing has been overlooked in their planning and operations.
Thiry hove not the slightest doubt about the urgency of keeping up
pressure. on the communists.
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use
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Is beIng done. I would not be coy with yea snd. flutter
ecy et thst sanich of what is done In the
become jnsffcctiv, if surfaced *ad therefore has to be
In seciecy. $.crn? of this, it is Oen to get the
? are not acting vigorously. For the same reason.
coordinated effort with our allies than meets the
that it is not enough; we an
re Did thewill ii there, the
many of the kinks worked out of it, and we have
k from anyedng really important merely from
Allen W. Dulles
Director
3
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Approved For Release 2003/06/04: CIA-RDP80R01731R000700010017-0 "7/5
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)
SUBJECT: Reply to Mr. David Sarnoli.
1. It i my understanding that you wish to reply to
Mr. David Sartioff** essay on the cold war in some detail. A pro-
posed reply is attached in draft form because it is expected that
you may wish to make changes because of the subject matter and
your personal relationship with Mr. Sarnoff.
2. Any answer, other than a more acknowledgment, opens
the possibility of an extended debate through the mails. Flowerer,
an AMMOs must grapple with the issues that Mr. Sarnoff raise*.
I suggest that this draft letter faces them in a fashion that rounds
DU the exchange of letters without encouraging debate.
25X1 !"cc: DDCI
Attachment
Proposed reply to
Mr. David Sarnoff.
1
Desmond FitsGerald
Chief
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Approved For Release 2003/06/04: CIA-RDP80R01731R000700010017-0
Dear
Y04' outline of ideas for prosecution of the cold war
was
stimulating. 1 appreciat, the detail into which you nd therefore
want to comment in retarn, over and above my original acimowiedusent
of receipt.
You stipelae? that there must be a will to udertake a pollttc&t
and psychological cottnter-offensive against the USSR. 1 think it can
be demonstrated that th? public will sad the official response to it does,
Lu fact, exist. Every se* and then seemingly attractive propositions
obtain attention and hold outhope of some ne iraculous overall
solution. If they are based ort the shaky premises that the Soviets
also dislike international tens on, that they can be mollified by appease-
or that basic iss
betweenj o enemy system be solved at
a quick high-levelsotto& they do tiNItt last very long because the basic
good sense of the American public recolptisee that acceptance of these
premises coLd lead us into mortal danger. It took some time after
World War 11 for this country to come alive le am peril, but there
seems to be no possibility of return to the miiiconceptions of 1946.
Certainly the government itself has no intention* revokin
the general
intent of policies that consistently since 1947 have ttempt.d to keep
this country strong and halt the aggressive impanel* f comuu title
Soviet imperialism. Even the organisation of the g
Approved For Release 2003/06/04: CIA-RDP80R01731R000700010017-0
beat
Approved For Release 2003/06/04 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000700010017-0
in this direct? on and. as you know, my own agency has certain func-
tions based directly on the governmental will to weirs an oif.usiv..
Granted that this is true. I take it that your thinking emphasize, that
certain guiding objective. should be kept is mind, that enough money
should be devoted to the effort to assure a certain magnitude. and
that an organisation should be set up to handle these specific problems.
As to the guiding objectives. I think we are in co plate harmony.
Those listed in your letter pages 34 az. not only praiseworthy and
imitable but most of them are implicitly or explicitly stated in current
directives. That more money should be spent on them is a position I
would not challenge, but I uust atways be aware of other
it sets
of he government,and the ultimate decisions within the government
must always proceed from balanced considerations. That there should
be a new cabinet position for these matter". is a proposal that would
run titer to most of the thinking on organisation that has developed
*ince the National Security Act of PM7 and wputd recall the unhappy
episode of the Psychological Strategy Board,
alder the psychological implications apart from
ch endeavored to con-
cutive decisions
ho have lived
i us alternatives that we don't have d. pretty: good solu-
themselves. It would be very difficult to convince\
through the
tion now. i.e.. policy is csetrattsed with the NBC, o
decentralized to executive agencies but coordinated thr
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Approved For Release 2003/06/04: CIA-RDP80R01731R000700010017-0
It is the latter. the 0
It hag developed a
the strategy board for the Cold
in of working so that the agencies pull together
on the common task while recognising their differentiated missions.
The most recent problem facing es is the development of a sound
strategic plan and approp
te tactics to meet the Soviet economic
offensive in the underdeveloped areas. They offer aid to these coun-
tries but lure them into nationalistic adventure* that draw attention of
Lesders sway from th
at home. Their long-range plan
communism wifl have a fertile fi Our approach must encourage
stable institutions to which communism will offer little appeal.
My people are checking out the dirt Ile of your list to make sure
that nothing has been overlooked in their planning and operations. They
have not the slightest doubt about the urgerKy of keeping up pressures
on the communIsts1 And much is being done:\ I would not be coy with
you and flutter the veil of secrecy but it is a fact that much of what is
done in the cold war would become ineffective Upurfaced and therefore
has to be and is conducted in secrecy. Because of this. it is easy to
need for basic econ
ic and political stability
prevent stablisatien so that
irnpression that we are not acting vigorously For the same
reason, there is mer. of a coordinated effort with our, allies than
meets the eye. I would be the first CMS to admit that it le not enough;
we can never be complacent on that score. But the will Is here the
3
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Approved For Release 2003/06/04: CIA-RDP80R01731R000700010017-0
ornsstion has haa most of the kinks worked out of It, and we h& ,e
never yet had to hold beck from anything really tmportant inersty
from tack of money. Thati I hope. wilt afford you some aseurance
that the good effort is being r.ued. Your thoughts and ideas on it
\
will always be most welcome.
Sincerely,
\
W. Dulles
Director
4
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ILLEG
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NCLASSIFIED
Approved For Release 2003/06/04 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000700010017-0
General. David Samoa
Radio Corporation of AEL**Tie&
30 Rockefeller Plana
New Terk ZO, New Tork
Dee- - Onvid.
J.:02?!
H
Your outline of ideas ihr prosecidion of the CO1d war- was
stirmdating. I appreciate the detail into which yoo went ant therefore
weed to comment in return. over and obeys my *SOW acknowledgment
of receipt. You have given me too much food for thengbt in your letter
to permit my comments to be formulated quickly.
You stipulate that there must be a will to undertake * pefttiral
and paychological countsr-oftenstve against the USSR. I think it can
be demoostrateel that the pUblic and the official response to it
doe*.Inhict. west. Every now and Was seensiney attractive
prepositions obtain attention and hold out bops of some isear-ceiraculeue
overall solution. If they are based on the shaky premises that the
sdvirlets also dislike fastersational tension. that they can be mellified by
appeakeemeat.or that basic issues between two mewl systems can be
*tamed at a quick high-levd meeting they do sol last very long because
the basic good sense of the American public recognises that acceptance
of these premises could lead us into mortal deeper.
It took some time after world War U far this country to come
alive to the peril, but there seem* to be no possibility of return to
the redeconceptions of war and intmediete post war era. Certalidy
the government itself has no late:boa of revoking the general intent
of policies that contistently since 1941 have attempted to keep this
country strong and halt the aggressive expansion of eoznelonietic
Soviet imperialism. Even the organisation of the government is bent
In this direction and. as yen ;mow. my own agency has certain functions
based directly on time governmentad will to enter tato this field.
Approved For Release 2003/06/04: CIA-RDP80R01731R000700010017-0
Approved For Release 2003/06/04: CIA-RDP80R01731R000700010017-0
a tree. I lake it that
live* should be kept to roind, that en
to the effort to assure a certain magnitude.
Ora should be set up to handle these specific
jectiree. I think we are in complete
r pages 341 are not only praiseworthy
f them are implicitly or implicitly stated in current
re money should be spent on them is a position!
That there shindd be a new east position for those
sal that wield run counter to most of the thinking
on that has developed since the National Security Act of 194?
*call the unhappy episode of the Psychological Strategy
h endeavored to consider a pirychological program apart
lye decisions themselves. It would be very difficult
who have lived through the various alternative. that
pretty good solution now, guiding policy is
smed with the NSC, operations are decentralised to associative
es but coordinated through the OCD.
*gene
is the latter. the OCD, that is the strategy board for the Cci
has developed a system of working a. that the agencies pull
to ether on the common task while recognising their differentiated
at recent problem facing us I. th development of a
c plan end appropriate tactics tOmeet the 5OViiOt SC
e underdeveloped arose. They offer aid to
lute nationalistic adventures that draw attention
the need for basic economic and political stability at
it plan is to prevent stabilisation so that communis
? field. Our approach must encourage stable
bich communism will offer little appeal.
people are checking out the details el rnir list to make sure
ng has been overlooked in their planning and operations.
not the alighteet doubt about the urgency of keeping ip
on the communists.
Approved For Release 2003/06/04: CIA-RDP80R01731R000700010017-0
Approved For Release 2003/06/04: CIA-RDP80R01731R000700010017-0
. I would not be coy Isith and flutter
that oztuch id what is done in the
U surfaced and therefore be,* to be
e this, it is gutty to get the
vigorously. For the sone reason,
rt with our allies titan sweets the
newer be
one to admit that it is net enougiu we can
score. But the will is there, the
the khaki worked out at it, and we hove
anything rs.fly important merely from
vietmet Recon
fSizned) Richard Raffe
DDPF-Tit3Gera1d:r1 1$ March 58
1)
Distribution:
Orig Addr seee
Z.ER
DDCI
1 DDP
3
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25X1
,
UNCLASSIFIED
iYEkNAi
USE ONLY
El CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
AO 08 Velt 1-41' algollykdi ?Ai tikaurtifiiiikila t uuu 1 Liu I t -U
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM:
DCI
No.
DATE
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show From whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
47-1160?
13.
14.
15.
USE PRE
EDITIONS
1U1 LVV,JIVUIV'+ . -
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Approved For Release 2003/06/04: CIA-RDP80R01731R000700010017
General David Sarnoff
Radio Corporation of America
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York 20, New York
Dear David,
Your outline of ideas for prosecution of the "cold war" was
emulating. I appreciate the detail into which you went and therefore
want to comment in return, over and above my original acknowledgment
of receipt. You have given me too much food for thought in your letter
to permit my comments to be formulated quickly.
You stipulate that there must be a will to undertake a political
and psychological counter-offensive against the USSR. I think it can
be demonstrated that the public will and the official response to it
does, in fact, exist. Every now and then seemingly attractive
propositions obtain attention and hold out hope of some near-miraculous
overall solution. If they are based on the shaky premises that the
Soviets also dislike international tension, that they can be mollified by
appeasement, or that basic issues between two enemy systems can be
solved at a quick high-level meeting, they do not last very long because
the basic good sense of the American public recognizes that acceptance
of these premises could lead us into mortal danger.
It took some time after World War II for this country to come
alive to the peril, but there seems to be no possibility of return to
the misconceptions of war and immediate post war era. Certainly
the government itself has no intention ef revoking the general intent
of policies that consistently since 1947 have attempted to keep this
country strong and halt the aggressive expansion of communistic
Soviet imperialism. Even the organization of the government is bent
in this direction and, as you know, my own agency has certain functions
based directly on the governmental will to enter into this field.
Approved For Release 2003/06/04: CIA-RDP80R01731R000700010017-0
Approved For Release 2003/06/04: CIA-RDP80R01731R000700010017-0
Granted that this is true, I take it that your thinking emphasizes
that certain guiding objectives should be kept in mind, that enough
money should be devoted to the effort to assure a certain magnitude,
and that an organization should be set up to handle these specific
problems.
As to the guiding objectives, I think we are in complete harmony.
Those listed in your letter pages 3-8 are not only praiseworthy and
suitable but moot of them are implicitly or explicitly stated in current
directives. That more money should be spent on them is a position I
would not challenge.
That there should be a new cabinet position for these matters.
is a proposal that would run counter to most of the thinking On
organization that has developed since the National Security Act of 1947
and would recall the unhappy episode of the Psychological Strategy
Board, which endeavored to consider a psychological program apart
from the executive decisions themselves. It would be very difficult
to convince those who have lived through the various alternatives that
we don't have a pretty good solution now, i. e., guiding policy is
centralized with the NSC, operations are decentralized to executive
agencies but coordinated through the OCB.
It is the latter, the OCB, that is the strategy board for the Cold
War. It has developed a system of working so that the agencies pull
together on the common task while recognizing their differentiated
missions.
The most recent problem facing us is the development of a
sound strategic plan and appropriate tactics to meet the Soviet economic
ektfensive in the underdeveloped areas. They offer aid to these countries
but lure them into nationalistic adventures that draw attention of leaders
away from the need for basic economic and political stability at home.
Their long-range plan is to prevent stabilization so that communism
will have a fertile field. Our approach must encourage stable
institutions to which communism Will offer little appeal.
My people are checking out the details of your list to make sure
*thing has been overlooked in their planning and operations.
They have not the slightest doubt about the urgency of keeping up
pressures on the communists.
Approved For Release 2003/06/04: CIA-RDP80R01731R000700010017-0
Approved For Release 2003/06/04: CIA-RDP80R01731R000700010017-0
And much is being done. I would not be coy with you and flutter
the veil of secrecy but it is a fact that much of what is done in the
cold war would become ineffective if surfaced and therefore has to be
and is conducted in secrecy. Because of this, it is easy to get the
impression that we are not acting vigorously. For the same reason,
there is more of a coordinated effort with our allies than meets the
eye.
I would be the first one to admit that it is not enough; we can
never be complacent on that score. But the will is there, the
organisation has had many of the kinks worked out of it, and we have
never yet had to hold back from anything really important merely from
lack of money.
hope this will afford you some assurance that the effort 13
being pursued. Your thoughts and ideas on it will always be most
welcome.
- Signature Recommended:
(Sigl Rictiard Heine
/Deputy Director (Plans)
0 AN ri in
?
Date
Sincerely,
Allen W. Dulles
Director
25X1 DDPI-1DFitzGerald.. 18 March 58
25X1
25X1
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
- ER
1 - DDCI
1 DDP
3
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Approved For Release 2003/06/04: CIA-RDP80R01731R000700010017-0
Sarnoff
tion of AnisyiC
feller 'Plaza
New York 20: New York
?avid.
Your outline
tirmalating. r appreciate
Want: to comment in return:
of receipt. You have gives
to permit my comments to he formulated quickly.
You Ups/ate that there must be * will to undertake a political
and psychological courter-offeasive against the USSR. 1 this* it can
be demonstrated that the public will and the official response to it
doe,: in hist. (mist. Every now *ad then seemingly attractive
propositions obtain attention and hold out hope of some soar -miraculous
overall solution. If they axe based on the shaky premise. that the
s'oviets also dislike international tension: that they can be mollified by
appeasement, or that basic blames between two enemy systems can be
solved at a quick high-level meeting, they do not last very loin because
the baksic good sense of the American public recognises that acceptance
of these premises could lead us into mortal danger.
prosecution f the cold war'' vras
detail irdo which you went anti therefore
r and above my original acknowledgment
too much food for thought in your letter
it upek some time toter World War U SOT this country to come
alive to the peril but there se-erns to be no possibility of return to
the rtsisconceptiens of war and immediate post war era. Certainly
the government itself has no intention of revoking the general intent
of policies that consistently since 1,47 have attempted to keep this
country strong and hilt the aggressive espeasion of conarnunistic
soviet imperialism. Even this organisittion.of the government is bent
in this direction and: as you know, my own agency has certain &actions
based directly ant the governmental will to enter into this fteld.
Approved For Release 2003/06/04: CIA-RDP80R01731R000700010017-0
Approved For Release 2003/06/04: CIA-RDP80R01731R000700010017-0
As to the
Those listed in
mailable but most
ireclivos. That mere
unsold not challenge.
That there should be a may tabloid position for these
repose' that would rue countor to most of the thinking osi
gaolsatIon that has developed *ince the Notionel Security Act
and would recall the unhappy episode of the Psychological neaten,
Beard, whisk esaeovered to consider a psychological program apart
from the gmoviitive declaims thereselYes. it spread be very &insult
to COWIrintil these .wlie have lived through the verigros enormity** that
we Most have a pretty gaol *elution now, 1. e. pities policy te
centralised with the NSC, opovotions are decentralised Is oneestive
agencies bot coordinated through the OC15.
It is the latter the CCL that is the strategy beard for the Cold
II has developed a system of working so that the apseics poll
r ea the common task while recogaisiag their vegetated
re 11111111141110*
The most recent problem teeing us is the development at a
*mad strategic plat ond oppreirstate tactics to meet the Soviet ecemente
offeaslve le the underdeveloped areas. They offer aid to these countries
but lure them Into notimalistic adventures OM draw attention of leader*
away from the need for basic economic and politteal stability at home.
Their lest-range plan is to prevent stabilisation se *et commusisne
will itelre at.tL. field. Our approach must encourage stable
Institution, to which earunenteur will offer little appeal
dy peoide are checking out the detail. of your list tomake sure
that made has been overlooked In their pleasing and aperstiane.
They have net the slightest doubt shout the urgency of keeping/ lip
pressures on the communiete.
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Approved For Release 2003/06/04: CIA-RDP80R01731R000700010017-0
And mach Is betas dose, I be coy with y wad flutter
secrecy but it is a tact that much of wt is dose in the
4 become ineffective it surtseed sad therefore has to be
in secrecy. Seems. of this, it is easy to get the
t we are set act*" irigarously ray the same reason,
a esardissted effort with war ellies than meets the
Signature Recommended:
IT,;;ned) Tzt:t`
VMS 114111121110e*
and ideas on It will always
Deputy Director (Plans) Date
DDPi
1DritaGerald
DI .tribution
?rig - Addressee
2 - ER
1 - DDCI
DDP
1$ March 58
3
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Approved For Release 2003/06/04: CIA-RDP80R01731R000700010017-0
Radio Corporati
30 Pechefetier Plaza
New York 20. New York
Yore outline s for pro
stirmaating. I appreciate the detail into
want to comment in return. over and *hove m
of reeetpt. Ton have gives me too mach food fez thought in your
to permit my comment* to be foresasted quickly.
that there cruet be a will to undertake a political
r-offensive against the lint-. I think it can
c will and the official response to it
and *en eeemingly ortrective
hold out hepe of some noar--otraculous
the shaky premises that the
that they can be mollified by
appeasement, or that baste issues between two onerny systems can he
solved at a quick Mgt-Level meeting, they do not lost very nog because
the bailie good aerie* a the American publk recovdses that acceptance
of thee. premises could lead es into mortal danger.
It took scene time after ,iorld /I for eta country to COM*
the peril, but there seems to be no possibility of return to
**Wm* of war mad irornethate post war era. Certnialy
itself hat so intention el revoking the general halted
consistently since 1147 have attempted to keep this
strong *ad bait the aggressive empansion of communistic
erialism. Even the organisation of the government I* bent
entre and, as you know, my oleo agency has certain function
y
an the governmental will to enter into this fkdd.
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Approved For Release 2003/06/04: CIA-RDP80R01731R000700010017-0
ie
*dive* elteuld be
to the *Bort to assure a certain magnitude
should be *et elp to haadle these specific
guiding objectives, I think we are la cowl
Thais listed timyour letter page* 3-11 are not only praisewertiry and
suitable moot of them are implicitly or explicitly Mated in current
directives. That mere moor, should be spent on them le a position
would not chilliest*.
there should be sew tabiaet position for the.. mstaers,
that would run reenter to most of the Waking on
that has developed slate the lqatiosal Security Act 4
the unhappy episode ?f the Psychological Sttatt
altered to consider psychological program apart
ve decisions themselves. It would be very difficult
se who keve lived through the variants alteraatives that
a pretty goad solution now, is e., guiding policy is
th the NSC, operations are decentralised to executive
i.e but rdinated through the Oali.
is the laftey, the Oat, that is the strategy board for the Cold
oped a system of workisz so that the agencies pail
task while recogrdeing their differentiated
scent problemfacing us is the drnlapmeat s15
trategic plaa ead appropriate tactics to
in the underdeveloped ar
into siatiosalistic adventure
need for basic ecearesic and political stability at home.
? plea is to prevent stabilisation ee that commotion
? field. Our approach moat encourage stable
ch communtern will offer little appall.
My pseple are checking out the details et your list to make sure
that nothinghas been overlooked in their planning and operation*.
They have sot theslightest doubt about the urgency of keeping up
pressures ea the communists.
I
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25X1
25X1
25
1
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Arosture Itioconmended:
14 Richard bine)
fi- Dopey Director (Pionsi
DDla
DilteGors141-118 March se
see
3
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25X1
-7
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1 Y,
1,1
JAM 195
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA:
SUBJECT: Reply to Mr. David Sarnoff.
Acting Deputy Director (Plans)
l, It is my understanding that you wish to reply to
Mr. David Sarnoff's essay on the cold war in some detail. A pro-
posed reply is attached in draft form because it is expected that
you may wish to make changes because of the subject matter and
your personal relationship with Mr. Sarnoff.
2. I.ny answer, ether than a mere acknowledgment, opens
the possibility of an extended debate through the mails. However,
an answer must grapple with the issues that Mr. Sarnoff raises;
I suggest that this draft letter faces them in a fashion that rounds
off the exchange of letters without encouraging debate.
cc: D CI
ac
Proposed reply to
Mr. David Sarnoff.
(SiEnsd) icT Fit7,3orald
Desmond FitaGerald
Chief
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Approved For Release 2003/06/04: CIA-RDP80R01731R000700010017-0
Dear David.
Yr outline of ideas for prosecution of the cold ware was
stimulating. I appreciate the detail into which you went and therefore
want to comment in return, over and above my original acknowledgment
of receipt.
You stipulate that ther. must be a will to undertake a political
and psychological counter-offensive against the USSR. I think it can
be demonstrated that the public will and the official response to it does,
in fact. exist. Every now and then seemingly attractive propositions
obtain attention and hold out hope of some near-miraculous overall
If they are bailed on the shaky premises that the Soviets
also dislike international tension, that they can be mollified by appease-
ment, or basic issues between two enemy systems can be solved at
a quickhigh-Level meeting, they do not last very long because the basic
good sense of the American public recognizes that acceptance of these
premises could lead us into mortal danger. It took some time after
World War II for this country to come alive to the peril, but there
seems o be no possibility of return to the misconceptions of 1946.
Certainly the government itself has no intention of reveking the general
intent of policies that consistently since 1947 have attempted to keep
this country strong and halt the aggressive expansion of comm istic
soviet imperialism. Even the organization of the government is bent
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direction and, as you know, my own agency has certain Ault-
tionel\a ed directly on the governmental will to wage an offensive.
Granted that this i$ t
I take it that your thinking emphasises that
certain guiding objectives should be kept in mind, that enough money
should be devoted to the effort to assure a certain magnitude, and
that an organix tton should be set up to handle these specific problems.
As to the guiding objectives. I think we are in complete harmony.
Thoee listed in your letter pages 3-8 are not only praiseworthy and
suitable but most of them are implicitly or explicitly stated in current
directives. That more znoney should be spent on them is a position I
would not challenge. but I must at
be aware of other commitments
of the government, and the ultimate decisions within the government
must always proceed from balanced couidderatious. That there should
be a new cabinet position for these matteri,is a proposal that would
run counter to most of the thinking on organised? that has developed
sincethe National Security Act of 1947 and would recall the unhappy
episode of the Psychological Strategy Board, which eudeavored to con-
aider the psychological implications apart from the exeeutive decisions
themselves,It would be very difficult to convince those who have lived
through the various alternatives that we don't have a pretty good solu-
tion now, I. e.. policy le eeatralised with the NSC, operations are
decentr lig d to executive agencies but coordinated through the OCB,
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the lett
OCB. that is the strategy board for the Cold War.
oped a system of working so that the agencies pull together
on the common task while recognizing their differentiated missions.
The most recent problem facing us is the development of a sound
strategic plan and appropriate tactics to meet the Soviet economic
offensive in the underdeveloped areas. Tbsy offer aid to these coun-
tries but lure them into nationalistic adventures that draw attention of
leaders away from the need for basic economic and political stability
at home. Their long-range plan is to prevent stabUsatton so that
communism will have a fertile field. Our approach must encourage
stable institutions to which communis will offer little appeal.
My people are checking out the details of your list to make sure
that nothing has been overlooked in their planning and operations They
have not the slightest doubt about the urgency of keeping tip pressures
on the communists. And much is being done. I would not be coy with
you and flutter the veil of secrecy but it is a fact that Much of what is
done in the cold war would become ineffective if surfaced and therefore
has to be and is conducted in secrecy. Because of this. it is easy to
lie
he impression that we are not acting vigorously. For the same
there is more of a coordinated effort with our allies than
the eye. I would be the first one to admit that it is not enough;
we can never be complacent on that score. But the will is here. the
3
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organisation has had most of the kinks worked out of it. and we have
never yet had to hold back from anything really important merely
from lack of money. That. I hope, will afford you some assurance
that the good effort is being pursued. Your thoughts and ideas n it
will always be most welcome.
Sincerely.
Allen W. Duties
Director
4
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7UNCLASS I F I ED
1NTEINAL
El CONF I DENT1 AL
P SECRET
ikpprovea i-ol. keiedthal 1,61. itilyiketigilifkOtfoicrotri6ofi7-0
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM:
25X1
NO.
DATE
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
1.
DDP
25X1
2.
3.
DCI
4.
5.
in
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
p-ilo2;
kAm
I DEC 56
lti6E'nEIpr
J EDITIONS
-
?U iijilL rirflUtn I-1 USE ONLY
NCLASSI F I ED 7
Z430 E Street, N. W.
Washington. 25, D. C.
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General David Sarnoff
Radio Corporation of America
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York 20, New York
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?
STAT
STAT ro/16 Aug 57
STAT Aug 57 Aetti
STAT Orig - Addressee
1 -
1 - 00/0 - Attn2
1 - JAS
- KR
1 Reading
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Nr. tarid. assreoffjr
Radio Collocation or America
RCA Boading
30 Rockafaller Plata
Nes York 200 Nes York
Dear Mr. Sereoff:
la the absence of Mr.
and thank you for your latter of !moult
of the report shish inw enclosed.
9-6272/a
0-131M
As ON Dulles sill mot zwturn until around the
Ideate of Seiptenberi I here placed the report In the
prepor hands here for evaluation end distribution, ani
br1th We to his attention *on be Is book in the
office.
ilace again, your courtesy is greatly 410Preciatod-
Sinonvelig
Fr/basic
ILLEGIB
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STAT
2 0 JUN 1957
*spa thanks for sending as
t*1 in Ciorostot.
ImrsolY
Otbor goor000 and, as
to no. I grombli improciste
n pioraing It on.
31GNEB
Alien W.
Director
frc/13 Jun 57
Jun 57
Jun 57
dress:tee
vibissic for info
1 - Col. Grogan
1 - JAS
- SR (EXECUTIVE
- Reading
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tanici
25X1
ILLEGIB
25X1
25X1
' 25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
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tration Building
14 June 1957
We appreciate the opportunity o comment on the attached report, on at
and West German television prepared'
and sent informally to the DCI by General Sarnoff.
We find the report quite useful. It very largely confirms the data
has been obtained by the Agency from numerous other sources. The only
ificapt dIfferencq concerns the number of TV receivers in use in East
Germany I figure is 200,000, while our best estimate for the
end of 1956 is closer to 100,000. At the moment we agree in general with
p estimate on the potential of television in the area as an
effective medium of mass communication for propaganda and other purposes.
We also agree with his interesting comments and estimates on the intentions
of both East and West Germany to provide area and some inter-area television
coverage.
As you know, the importance of the role assigned to television by the
in for the USSR and, probably through Kremlin influence, for the 314a-to,
fleeted in the dynamism with which adbitioue plane are being prosecuted
tablish television stations, television network facilities, and a broad
reception base.
We have taken a copy of the attached report for our files. It is
suggested, however, that the report be passed for processing end dis
tribution in the normal way.
Attachment:
Report on East and West German Television.
Chief, ORR1
aNgt
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ILLEGIB
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
-
ckpPI4tEMOlirkNI5414aFt 1:1903/WO batrP80R01731R000700(
Attached is an evaluation of the paper
General Sarnoff sent you.
After you have seen this,
it on
we will pass
17 Jun 57
(DATE)
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FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 ' WHICH MAY BE USED.
(47)
10017-0
010017-0
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RADIO co ll'ORATION OF AME RICA
R CA BUILDING
30 ROCREPVILLBR PLAZA
NNW 1r RN 0, N. Y.
OCA
DAVID DARNOPP
CHAIRMAN OF THE HOARD
November 4, 1957
Honorable Allen W. Dulles, Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.
Dear Allen:
Thank you for your note. I am glad
that you found my speech of October 29 of interest
and I send you herewith a dozen copies for such use as
you may wish to make of it. If you want any additional
copies, please do not hesitate to ask for them.
With warm regards,
Sincerely yours,
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y3/ co
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ER 9-8126/a
OCT 3 0 177
General David. Barnet
Chairman of the Dowd
l?adio Corporation of America
ICA Building
30 Rockefeller Plass
flew Tort 20, New York
Dear Dave:
Many thanks for sending me a copy of your
Octdber 29 address.
The sdbject of your discussion is of great
interest to me sod I note your kind reference
to me in your speech.
With kindest regards.
0/DCl/
Dist:
Ori g - Addressee
1 - DCI
1 - AAB
ER vibasic
1 - Reading
5incere3,y,
Stied
AU
Director
28 Oct 57
182t 11
TO
P. S. Would appreciate receiving some additional
copies of your address in ozder that I might pass
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RADIO CORPORATION OF AME ICA
RCA BITILDIATO
30 ROCKEPELLEIR PLAZA
1,./BW "YORK 20. N. Y.
DAVID RA RNOFF
CHAIRMAN" OF WOO HOARD
October 24, 1957
Honorable Allen Dulles
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Dulles:
General Sarnoff has asked me to send
you an advance copy of the address which he is
scheduled to deliver in Washington on October 29 at
the Third Annual Meeting of the Association of the
U. S. Army. You will note that the release date is
9:00 A. M. , Tuesday, October 29, 1957.
Sincerely,
Z
Secretary
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........
A.. C ' ? -? ell: a
;/Aill.: .) 10700
Amprveehrottv:7 '' 'iNe 1 ENTIAL
SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS1
INITIALS DATE
1
Colonel Grogan
/7--
-7
2
-
3
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
,SIGNATURE
Remarks:
The "note" mentioned in attached letter is
the Director's 30 Oct letter sent to General
Sarnoff thanking him for sending a copy of
the 29 Oct address (copy attached for your
info - pie return).
The 4 Nov letter from General Sarnoff does
not appear to require an answe_
Do you agree.
..
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
Assistant to the Director
. - . -
: a ,-,
- ,Lt.
a Ak INI I or
Al. ro 1 r:'-m' : '- ?r',7:7]-- -e II l'iP"l ,
'oE ' AL
SECRET
FORM NO. 03 7 Replaces Form 30-4
I APR 55 t- which may be used.
(40)
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1955-0-342531
10017-0
0010017-0
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THE IMPORTANCE OF ALLIES
IN THEIR RELATION
TO
U. S. STRATEGY AND POLICY
By
DAVID SARNOFF
October 29, 1957
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'
THE IMPORTANCE OF ALLIES IN THEIR
RELATION TO U. S. STRATEGY AND POLICY
ADDRESS
BY
DAVID SARNOFF
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD
RADIO CORPORATION OF AMERICA
AT THE
THIRD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE U S. ARMY
WASHINGTON, D. C. OCTOBER 29, 1957
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THE IMPORTANCE OF ALLIES IN THEIR
RELATION TO U. S. STRATEGY AND POLICY
The part of the subject assigned to me for discussion
this morning is "The Importance of Allies in Their
Relation to U. S. Strategy and Policy." If my remarks
do not correspond to the precise wording of the title,
I hope you may regard them, nevertheless, as pertinent
to the main theme of our Conference.
That we cannot dispense with allies is, of course,
too obvious to require elaboration. Whatever isola-
tionist illusions may have survived the Second World
War have been washed out by a decade of headlong
progress in aeronautics, electronics and nuclear science.
We live in a world so shrunken that political and
social explosions anywhere produce instant and fre-
quently serious tremors everywhere. Like it or not, we
have become in large measure our brother's keeper.
Areas on the world map which not long ago seemed
too remote and exotic to interest anyone but archeolo-
gists and anthropologists have now become items of
front-page news, objects of Cold War rivalry and seed-
beds of international trouble.
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One of the main objectives of Soviet intrigue and
diplomacy has been to isolate the United States by
stripping it of friends and allies. Every symptom of
free-world disunity ? of what the Communists call
"contradictions in the camp of imperialism" ? brings
joy to the Kremlin. Moscow has used everything from
cajolery to blackmail in its drive to break up NATO
and other defensive alliances. It has not hesitated to
make naked threats of nuclear annihilation against
country after country aligned with the West.
This concentration of enemy effort should be suffi-
cient proof of the critical importance, at our end, of
strengthening existing alliances and winning new
friends among the so-called uncommitted nations.
Every affirmation of free-world solidarity is a body-
blow to Soviet policy. But the allies, actual and poten-
tial, whom I propose to emphasize, are in another and
too often neglected dimension.
CAPTIVE PEOPLES ARE OUR ALLIES
I refer not to nations but to peoples: to millions of
men and women on the dark side of the Iron and
Bamboo Curtains who hate their Soviet chains and
whose cause is therefore our cause. They are the secret
legions of freedom deployed on farms and in factories,
in schools and offices, in the Armed Forces and even in
the ranks of the ruling parties, throughout the Soviet
empire.
This week marks an anniversary at once glorious and
tragic. It was in the last week of October one year ago
that the people of Hungary made their thrilling bid
for freedom. Those who scoffed at the possibility that
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the victims of Communist dictatorship could ever rise
against their masters received a flaming answer, as
they had received it a few months earlier in Poznan,
Poland, and three years before in East Germany and
in Siberian slave camps like Vorkuta.
We know, as the Kremlin knows, that the Hungarian
people have not surrendered in their hearts, and await
only a favorable opportunity to strike again. Tanks
and machine-guns can impose sullen obedience but not
allegiance. And we know that the same explosive
forces of discontent and despair, the same God-given
hungers for freedom and human dignity, are maturing
under the surface of every other Communist-held land,
including Russia itself.
It has long been my conviction that those who plan
our strategy and policy should at all times take this
element in the world equation into their calculations.
Internal tensions on every level of Soviet society repre-
sent the weakest links in the Kremlin's chain of power
and therefore our greatest opportunity for making
common cause with the direct victims of Communism.
For many years we have seen the fateful contest be-
tween two worlds on which depends the future not alone
of our own country but of the human race. On at least
one front of this complex struggle, the one involving
communications, I have been not only an onlooker but
a participant. And it has seemed to me increasingly
clear that the contest is essentially a war of ideas. Ab-
stractly, this has been so widely acknowledged that it
has the ring of a platitude. But concretely, we have
not yet translated the platitude into policy and action
of the necessary potency and on the necessary scale.
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VA.
TECHNOLOGY AND IDEOLOGY
At the conclusion of World War II we witnessed
the emergence of two spectacular species of force, seem-
ingly at the very opposite ends of the spectrum of
power. One was technological, dramatized in V-1 and
V-2 missiles in the European theatre, and in the first
atomic bombs on the other side of the globe. The other
was ideological, manifest in the thunderous clash of
'isms, the collapse of old colonial empires, the dynamic
Soviet challenge to the very foundations of our civili-
zation. Since then, both species have unfolded and
expanded at a dizzying pace.
At the technological end, we have seen breath-taking
aeronautic, electronic and nuclear progress, now con-
verging in a climactic weapon: the Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile capable of delivering unprecedented
destruction and death from any point on this earth
to any other point. The artificial "moon," launched
by the Soviets early this month which circled our globe
every 95 minutes, is a symbol of scientific achievement
packed with peril to the human race.
At the ideological end, the unfolding has crystallized
in what has come to be called the Cold War ? in politi-
cal offensives, propaganda duels, psychological cam-
paigns, wars of nerves. Taken together, these are
changing the patterns of human society more deeply
than did any shooting war in our recorded past.
Technology and ideology ? these span the fields of
tension now prevailing everywhere. Though so differ-
ent in character ? one being in the domain of matter,
the other in the domain of mind and spirit ? they are
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nevertheless part of a single challenge. The penalty
for ignoring or underrating the ideological end and
concentrating almost entirely on the technological end
of the great span, can be total defeat. The surest way
to prevent it is to win the Cold War. For we can
freeze to death as well as burn to death.
The alarming fact is that, in the free world today,
there is nowhere near the concentration on the ideologi-
cal front that there is on the technological front. At
first, in the immediate postwar years, we ignored both
sections of the span. We dismantled our magnificent
military machine and at the same time gave unimpeded
right of way to Communist mischief in both Europe
and Asia. It took a series of major disasters -- the
conquest of Czechoslovakia, the fall of China, the
Korean aggression ? to splinter our smugness.
Belatedly and reluctantly we recognized the reality
of the Cold War and the danger of a Hot War. So
we went to the aid of Greece, launched the Marshall
Plan, undertook the building of defensive alliances,
and started large-scale military programs.
Sputnik ? the Soviet-made satellite ? streaking
through our American skies, is significant proof that
Russia is making greater and faster progress in tech-
nology than was expected even by some of our experts.
We have seen, too, how cleverly and swiftly the Com-
munist leaders exploit their technological advances to
create a psychological impact upon people everywhere.
COLD FACTS OF THE COLD WAR
Because military forces and weapons in the hands of
ruthless dictators represent a more familiar ?type of
menace, our people over the years have been more
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readily aroused to organize and sacrifice in this area.
The ideological challenge seemed somehow too vague
and esoteric to galvanize us into full action. The per-
vasive fear of nuclear war, in fact, fostered the delusion
that we were enjoying peace, though in truth our
world, our interests, our system of human values were
under continuous assault.
Not without bruised egos, we have gone through
several binges of wishful thinking. Recall how recently,
after Stalin's death, some people hailed the end of the
Cold War because of a supposed New Look and a
Diplomacy of Smiles in Moscow. Then something
called the "Geneva spirit" was born on a Swiss summit
That blithe spirit, alas, had already departed by the
time Khrushchev and Bulganin came to England to
celebrate its birth.
Only this July, when old-timers like Molotov and
Kaganovich hit the dust, our mood was one of hopeful
speculation. The hope applied in particular to the
talks on disarmament then under way in London, talks
that soon thereafter petered out in the usual futility.
One after another these desperate hopes have found-
ered on the rocks of Communist inflexibility of pur-
pose. The temporary balmy weather has not melted
the ice of the Cold War. Soviet foreign policy just
now is as tough and aggressive, its blasts against the
free nations are as chill and blustery, as in some of
the nastiest Stalin seasons.
Gromyko at the United Nations Assembly still made
some of the familiar noises about "peaceful coexist-
ence," but he left no doubt that we could have that
blessed commodity only on strictly Communist terms.
8.
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Since the launching of Russia's artificial satellite,
Khrushchev has joined this chorus by suggesting a
Two-Power deal, over the heads of our allies. Red
propaganda continues to play variations on the theme
of "relaxing tensions" but it is only background music
while the Communists go on steadily blowing up little
troubles into big ones. Moscow, in short, exploits our
yearning for peace, as the best way of destroying any
sense of urgency, on our part, in relation to the political
struggle.
Soviet Russia's influence in world affairs is growing.
For the first time in history, Russia has obtained a
foothold in the Middle East and thereby in the entire
Mediterranean. Its naval ships prowl the Mediter-
ranean and the Red Seas, while Soviet arms and planes
and submarines pour into Egypt, Syria and Yemen.
Communists have won control in a key state in India
and in British Guiana; pro-Western leaders have been
ousted in Ceylon; Moscow's influence grows apace in
Indonesia; Red China has ,intensified its pressures on
Burma, South Vietnam and other neighbors.
Only two weeks ago, the British Foreign Secretary,
Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, publicly voiced anxiety about the
continuing Soviet infiltration and subversion "in most
of the countries of Asia and Africa." He said: "This
process is going on. How far it has got varies. But
the Communist forces are at work, eating away ? an
implacable, unrelenting onward movement."
Most serious of all, in the context of the war of
ideas, the Communists retain substantial initiative in
the propaganda duel, often to the point of monopoly.
Despite its barbarous behavior in Hungary, Soviet
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Russia still gets away with the outrageous pose of
champion of anti-colonial movements in Asia and
Africa. Even while brandishing its ballistic missile
and its space satellite, it is accepted by millions the
world over as the noble champion of peace and nuclear
disarmament. The spokesmen of freedom and genuine
peace are still on the defensive.
THE CRITICAL TIME ELEMENT
Time for an adequate Cold War offensive ? not a
mere holding action but an offensive geared to victory
? is running out. If we are to prevent defeat in this
area we must intensify our efforts in the field of psycho-
logical warfare, which I prefer to call psychological
peace/are.
Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Director of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, concluded a recent address in San
Francisco with these words: "The people of Russia,
if given the time to continue their evolution to freedom
out of the narrow bounds of Communist dictatorship,
will themselves help to find a peaceful solution." He
put his finger on the most important "if" ? the time
element.
For the shadow of the ultimate weapon grows more
ominous on the horizons of human affairs. If we are
to win the Cold War, or at least obtain the upper hand
in it, this must be done before mankind is overwhelmed
by the holocaust of hydrogen war.
And this brings me back to the technological pole
in that arch of power. The Kremlin recently announced
a successful test of an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile,
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Manth.tf,..WO
and claimed that it had reached its target area "a huge
distance" away.
The Moscow announcement on the I.C.B.M. may be
exaggerated but it is not safe to rely on that assumption.
The crucial fact is that the perfection of this weapon
is now inevitable. Both sides know its principles and
techniques. It is only a matter of time, therefore,
before both sides have an operational missile, after
which its mass production will become as routine as
the present production of atomic bombs. Here, again,
the time element is all-important.
DANGERS OF 'DREADFUL PARITY'
Because electronics is at the heart of this weapon,
I have been close enough to its development to believe
that this climax will be reached within five years, and
possibly sooner. At that point the prime rivals will
have achieved the stalemate that figures in my own
mind as Dreadful Parity.
An edifice of wishful thinking has been erected on
that Dreadful Parity. But I, for one, am convinced
that it rests on shifting sands, not on the granite of
reality. The argument goes that with each side capable
of annihilating the other, war will have become
"impossible" ? "unthinkable" is the consoling word
most often used.
The argument makes logic. But unhappily logic is
not the final or even the main ingredient in the conduct
of men and nations. Emotion, raised to a pitch of
hysteria by the very magnitude of the menace, may
vanquish reason. Catastrophe could be touched off by
miscalculation. The temptation to strike a sudden
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knockout blow may prove insuperable to madmen in
places of power, to paranoiac fanatics, to dictators in
a mood of desperation. We cannot know who will be
Khrushchev's successor in the Kremlin, nor how soon
he may appear.
Secretary of State Dulles makes an ominous observa-
tion in an article in the October issue of Foreign
Affairs. "Such weapons," he writes, "might in the
future get into the hands of irresponsible dictators and
be used as a form of international blackmail." They
may, indeed, and that opens up another vista of danger
in the hour of Dreadful Parity.
What if Red China, with a Soviet gift of missiles
in its possession, chooses to end the impasse in Formosa
or Korea at one blow? What if a Nasser, or some new
pocket-edition Hitler who may emerge in the interim,
has a nervous finger on the pushbutton of thermo-
nuclear doom? What starts as blackmail can end as
bombing.
No doubt it is true that "nobody wants a third world
war." It is the kind of generalization, however, that
breeds dangerous complacency. In effect it enables the
Communists to operate with impunity as long as their
aggressions are too small in scope, and well enough
spaced in time, to avoid the showdown.
Moscow is too wise to risk a challenge so immense
and alarming that free peoples will be shocked into
armed resistance. Instead it spreads its challenge thin
? in a series of moves, no single one of which would
provoke or justify war. Yet the sum-total of seemingly
minor and unrelated Soviet victories could amount to
absolute defeat for the West. When the current Syrian
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episode, for instance, is evaluated a few years hence
in the mosaic of an array of "Syrias" it may be recog-
nized as infinitely more provocative than it looks right
now.
TWO VITAL PRINCIPLES
It seems to me vital that we grasp two principles:
First, the more "unthinkable" a final showdown
becomes, the more successful the Soviets will be in their
strategy of nibbling on what remains of our freedom
and independence. Second, the more terrifying weapons
become, the more effective becomes the Communist
strategy of intimidation.
The dangers inherent in both these strategies have
been immensely enlarged by the Soviet triumph in
launching the first artificial satellite. Its military im-
portance is not immediate. But its psychological im-
pact is immediate and can be very harmful. It adds
enormously to Soviet Russia's capacity to frighten
small nations into neutralism or submission and to exact
political blackmail from some big nations. More than
ever before, a world with its eyes fixed upon the Soviet-
made "moon" will be inclined to yield on a piecemeal
basis rather than risk war.
Let us grant, for argument's sake, that a military
stalemate would cancel out the chance of a decision
by a Hot War, as so many believe it will. Doesn't this,
in common sense, imply that the decision will be sought
by the Communists on another level, by other means?
The importance of the Cold War would actually be
multiplied a hundredfold. And this makes the struggle,
by means short of total war, our paramount concern.
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THE GREAT NEED ? TO WIN THE COLD WAR
The stakes are too high to gamble survival on the
thin margin of hope that logic will prevail. For even
sheer accident may wash out hopes geared to logic.
We must do all we can to prevent a Hot War and I
firmly believe that the surest way to prevent it is to
fight and win the Cold War.
After all, we are not without opportunities for taking
the initiative. The Soviet empire is racked by inner
pressures, problems and dangers. The enemy expertly
exploits our internal tensions, yet his own tensions are
vastly greater.
The moral prestige of Soviet Communism after
the disclosures of Stalin's crimes during twenty-five
of the forty Soviet years, and after the barbarous sup-
pression of the Hungarian people ? is lower than ever
before. It has taken a nose dive especially within the
Communist world itself. The Soviet intellectuals,
whose number is growing larger all the time, are
reaching out more courageously for some mental and
creative freedoms. Students and young people gener-
ally are ever bolder in asking questions and rejecting
party-line answers. The peasantry still remains un-
reconciled to its collectivized fate. The people's
elementary needs for food, clothes, housing, everyday
consumer goods are still being met with promissory
notes that are being repeatedly renewed rather than
fulfilled. Meanwhile, the murderous struggle for power
among the hierarchs goes on without abatement.
Khrushchev and his henchmen are caught in a
dilemma. Their economy and the rise of a newly
educated managerial class require some degree of per-
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sonal freedom and initiative. But when the terror is
relaxed, all the pent-up hostility of the people breaks
to the surface in demands that threaten the survival of
the regime. So their policy swings in panic between
gestures of moderation and renewals of terror.
This certainly does not mean that we can sit back
and wait for Communism to disintegrate from within.
That would be to forget the time element ? the ticking
clock of the coming Dreadful Parity. No, we must
and can hasten the processes of disintegration with
every resource at our disposal ? moral, psychological,
political, diplomatic, economic. We must make com-
mon cause with the millions of Communist victims
already our allies and draw tens of millions more into
the alliance. We must increase pressures against the
Soviets from every possible direction. There is a
NATO for combined Military Defense. Is it too much
to hope that a NATO can be formed for combined
operations on Political Defense?
I believe that we have possibly five years within
which to take the necessary steps to head off catastrophe
for the human race. But, the perils we face and the
urgency of the situation, admonish us not to waste even
five minutes of this precious time. The free world under
American leadership must concentrate its best energies
and resources on the supreme task of weakening World
Communism ? from within and from outside ? to the
point where it ceases to be a peril. When this is accom-
plished, the United Nations will have the first real
opportunity to achieve agreement between nations on
a practical program of disarmament and to establish
effective safeguards against nuclear devastation.
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Even in this period of grace before the advent of
Dreadful Parity, physical force will, of course, weigh
heavily in the scales. The Soviets have invariably
put bombs before bread and shoes, despite the serious
risk to their political stability involved in depriving
their people of bread and shoes.
We must exert our best efforts to lead, and in all
events not to fall behind in the race for weapon ascend-
ancy. We must maintain well-balanced forces for air,
ground and sea. We must resolve whatever inter-
service conflicts there may be in the field of ballistic
missiles and related weapons, and speed up their devel-
opment into operational forms.
We must stimulate our promising young people to
pursue courses in science, engineering and related sub-
jects and increase their. opportunities to obtain an edu-
cation in these fields. The effectiveness of modern
industry, as well as modern weapons, depends upon
an adequate supply of trained manpower. At the same
time, the United States must preserve and fortify its
ability to intercede quickly and decisively in menacing
situations short of general war. We must preserve our
economic strength and maintain our financial stability.
We must stockpile and protect the sources of vital
strategic materials and help sustain the military health
of our allies and friends. This is indispensable in-
surance.
To attain all these objectives, we must have an in-
formed public whose interest and criticism can be
determining factors in the struggles we confront. The
freedom to criticize is a basic and precious right of
American Democracy. But criticism, especially in the
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perilous times we face, should be constructive and not
destructive. Where we do not agree with their policies
or actions, we may criticize our responsible officials
in Government and urge our views upon them. At the
same time, we must help our Government to carry its
heavy load of responsibility. We should support rea-
sonable requests for appropriations that may be neces-
sary to increase our National Security.
The patriotism of our people, the ingenuity of our
scientists and engineers, the skill of our labor, the effi-
ciency and productive capacity of our industrial plants,
and the dedicated men and women serving in the
Armed Forces and in other branches of our Govern-
ment, make it possible for us to accomplish all these
tasks and to maintain our power as the leading nation
in the world.
But physical power, by itself, is not enough. It must
be accompanied by spiritual faith, political wisdom
and human understanding. They must be so employed
that the ideas and the emotions moving men become
vital factors in determining the outcome of any conflict.
This has been true, in varying degrees, throughout
history. Today that truth is all-important.
It is late, but not too late, to face up to the im-
peratives of the Cold War. In the battle for men's
minds, Soviet successes have been due less to the genius
of the Kremlin than to the lethargy of the West.
We can still turn the Kremlin's own weapons against
World Communism ? and we can lead not from weak-
ness but from genuine strength.
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