DCI REMARKS BEFORE SSCI THE CONTINUING IMPROVEMENT OF AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R002900280001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 7, 1979
• Content Type: SPEECH

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THE CONTINUING IMPROVEMENT
OF AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES
Our nation's intelligence activities are undergoing profound changes
which already are demonstrating improved performance and potential. Don't
believe many Americans, other those your's and House Committee and relatively
few Exec Branch, comprehend extent and importance of changes. Hence I'd
like to discuss what they are and why. There are three factors forcing
these changes:
- The changed role which the United States sees for itself
in international affairs since the end of the Vietnam war;
- The greater interest of the American public in matters of
intelligence since the investigations of intelligence
abuses during 1975-1976;
- The burgeoning capabilities, and costs, of sophisticated
intelligence collecting techniques.
Let us examine each of these factors and what adaptations of the
traditional approach to intelligence they dictate.
I. Changing U.S. Role in the World.
U.S. in state transition - activist - interventionist approach
to foreign affairs - to one of more measured use of influence
abroad
Implicit recognition that there are real limits on ability
to intervene mil, pol or econ in affairs others
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Restraints -
1. Visibility - influence of world opinion
- Greater visibility of foreign policies and particularly
interventions today
- The revolution in international communications means:
* what we do is instantly known around the world
* also means will be widespread attention to it and
- criticism or
- approbation
- I preceive a clear power to influence by means of such
criticism/approbation of international community, even
though that community generally composed of nations
2nd/3rd order real power. In effect, limits/constraints
being forged often by cries of the powerless.
- Today some endeavors of industrialized/traditional big
powers cannot succeed without LDC cooperation
e.g. Law of the Sea
Anti-hijacking/hostage sanctions
Because 1 vote/country
2. Uncertainty who to support
- image of monolithic communism punctured - no longer easy
to pick sides in international arena - and decide where
might want to intervene
Look at some choices we've had recently:
- Ogaden/Ethiopia - side Soviets against was Marxist dictator
who's aggressor - or
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- Cambodia - side Soviets against most repressive regime on
globe today - Pol Pot - or
- even Iran - if had truly understood degree of discontent
with Shah and his policies - should we still back him just
because been valuable, trusted ally/customer? Or, should
been expected to predict and aged, religious figure living
in exile would arise with the charisma to ignite a nation?
White hats/Black hats
3. Lesser ability today to effect change if do intervene -
circumscribed by several factors
1) Attitude of fie on both the house of Romanov and house
of Washington - influence short of mil pressure
- India/Pakistan - Soviets and US
- Yugoslavia - historically not pro US or pro Soviet
- Albania - can thumb nose at US, Soviets, and PRC
at same time
- Iraq - anti-US; growing anti-Communist
- Brazil - anti-Communist but also growing more
anti-US (human rights)
- Sweden - tough on Soviets and US
2) In part, defense dynamic, i.e., modern weaponry is such,
that superior military power may not be enough - defensive,
disruptive armaments can give even militarily superior
aggressor tough time:
``,~_. T
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- we and VN
- now, ironically, VN and Pol Pot
Chances success intervention - mil/pol lessened
4. That when national interests are changing, it is more difficult
to gain consensus - what objective worth
- After VN - consensus not to intervene anywhere short
of W. Europe (almost)
- After 1973 oil embargo, much more focus on Mideast oil
- But recent clamor on Iran has not been to intervene, but
to presume that if CIA had provided perfect intelligence,
somehow, the result would have been different
* little discussion of what we could have done
to influence events there
* besides that, we've thought more of how Indonesia,
Sudan, and Egypt, for example, have all sunk
beneath the red tide only to reemerge on a
subsequent wave
- Today we question not only our ability to influence events
abroad but the need to do so.
Yet, U.S. must exercise its influence behalf free world
More subtle long term exercise of influence vice
finger in dike
Need for longer term approach built on more subtle
understanding of international, political, economic
as well as military, events
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Former stress on military and pol crisis intell
necessary and still required. Additive requirements
in econ, cultural, fundamental pol, terror, scientific,
psychology of leadership, narcotics, etc.
In part requires development of new disciplines; of inter-
disciplinary analysis; and of more assets for both analysis
and collection.
In part, proper ID areas of concentration.
Also, new approach to estimative process
Displaying the facts has been key point in
military estimates. Military commanders want
to know what facing.
U.S. military particular disdain for estimates
of intentions - why -
Led to a style of estimating that emphasized consensus
among CIA, DIA, Services and State
Not too dangerous
Aircraft range - if estimates are 2,000 and
1,000, 1,500 probably reasonable best guess
(both estimators have taken extreme positions
in anticipation of compromise)
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In econ/pol estimating or mil intentions - quite the
contrary -
Whether enemy will attack on Monday or Friday?
Wednesday only surely wrong answer
Whether regime in country x stable or not -
Therefore 2 approaches required:
1. Decisive choice
2. Display of alternative argumentation
Thus the estimating process is evolving:
More important, DCI as President's senior intell
advisor must be intimately involved in estimating
process in order to:
-- give sound advice;
-- ensure that estimating process does not
degenerate into "least common denominator"
compromises that have characterized past
When there are differences, however, is essential that
they be explained -
In pol/econ spheres much more important than mil -
is essence of intel product - explication of
pressures pro and con more valuable than flat
predictions
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Thus change today is to strengthen DCI authority to
coordinate estimates, but to ensure independence of
DIA, INR, etc.; and full explication of their views
when different from DCI's.
Dissenting views vice comments; progress, not
there yet.
To go back to my comment that need expand disciplines and inter-
disciplinary analysis - importance here expands as we move more
and more from tech and mil to other spheres.
Looking at basic recruiting, training and retention techniques.
1) Attempting provide more overseas opportunities for analysts
2) Attempting provide career pattern for pure analysts want
remain with their expertise rather become managers
3) But I am concerned that America's educational foundation
is withering in many areas uniquely important to intel-
ligence - the combination of foreign language competence
and an area or functional discipline, for example.
On interdisciplinary side establishing more fora for discussion
more task force type cells for special areas of concern, e.g.
Cuba, Iran.
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And have created a NIO for warning - attempt ensure alertness
beyond individual analyst concerns to trends and successive
developments that may mean trouble, not just tomorrow but
over horizon.
As for ID areas for concentration analytic and collection
resources - experimenting with technique of involing top policy
makers more in establishing our priorities. NITs. Important -
not there yet.
From that guidance - from my own sense - ID following key develop-
ments which will impose new or increased demands on intell:
Looking at geographic areas -
1) Iran/Middle East
- danger of civil war in Iran in short term and
immense implications for long
- Israel-Egypt search for accommodation
- changes in regional power structure/balance
- will Pakistan and Turkey, on either side, remain
free of Sov influence
- will Saudis rise to exercise influence have/can have
- will Saudi Arabia itself have a political crisis
2) Yugoslavia
- Tito's age--possible waning of power
- jockeying of extant opposition forces
- unpredictability of USSR reaction to succession
- period of Balkan instability after Tito's death
and possible Albanian succession
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(3) South Africa
- signs PM moving to more moderate stand on race relations,
though not on who governs white South Africa
- trend toward moderation could defuse or ignite area
depending on how astutely done and at what pace
- direct affect on US-needed materials
- influence on rest of Africa uncertain
(4) Korea
- tentative signals from North and South Korea
to talk about reunification will further upset
status quo
- adjustment to revised US-PRC; PRC-Japn relationships
(5) PRC
- greater access by US
- may change way we watch USSR
- need to rethink China-watching; do we have expandable
capabilities of the right kind?--need for Chinese
language experts
- US-USSR-PRC relationships undergoing readjustment
- effects of rapid modernization on both PRC and
neighbors - will succeed
- will remain stable
(6) 3 friends/allies
oil and immigration
deep resentment
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Canada
separatism
raw material dependence
14 of 24 stockpiled critical
Germany
push/pull of east-west strains
confidence in US - in European partners
A major characteristic of these predominantly politically or economically
influenced problems is that our accurate reading of them will depend
much more on good HUMINT than technology. It may be necessary to
reallocate HUMINT resources and increase/change analytic expertise.
Social/Economic
1) Raw Materials/Energy
- by 1985 US will import 50% of raw materials
including iron ore aa*x*@jW
affect on US and 3rd World of tactics to restrict
production, inflate prices, use for political
leverage, etc.
how anxiety over cutbacks may be manifest
as 3rd World modernizes, their material/energy
demands increase
controls on foreign exploitation of reserves requires
consumer adjustments
affect on material constraints on war-fighting/
deterrence capabilities
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2) Population
- world population increases 1.4 million/week
- world population may reach 6 billion by 2000 (from
about 4 billion today)
- energy needs increasing while sources of energy
and raw materials decreasing
- prices increasing faster than wages
- pollution increasing
3) Food
- 1 billion people live in 40 underdeveloped countries
along equatorial belt. 60% are malnourished, 20%
border on starvation
- 1 of every 3 people in world (total: 1.3 billion)
live in a country that does not grow enough to
adequately feed its population (70% live in 4 Asian
countries; the rest in Africa and Latin America)
- every year, demand for food and consumer products
increases by 4%
- disproportionate consumption creates pressures: average
grain consumption/year in US = 1850 lbs/person; in
Africa and S. Asia = 380 lbs/person
- pressures developed by inadequate crops or unforeseen
crises
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(4) Nuclear Proliferation
- The production of nuclear weapons is already within
the technological and economic capabilities of many
countries (non-nuclear weapons states), and the
number is growing
- Without violating safeguards (IAEA and NPT), these
countries could accumulate sufficient fissile material,
complete the necessary nuclear explosive research and
development work, and thus be in a position to make
nuclear explosives on short notice
- Countries not parties to the NPT (or having otherwise
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and materials) culd
achieve the capacity to make nuclear explosives even
more easily or secretly
(5) Industrial production/markets
Present imbalance w/Japan--Germany
Future - China industrialize
Not just high market
Every LDC want escape agriculture/raw material syndrome
How rationalize
How protect US interests - find make
These requirements call for new areas of analysis, new expertise -
Also collection of non-espionage data in most cases - collation often answer
Military
(1) Arms Control
- Requirements on intelligence to monitor US arms limitation
agreements will rise markedly with SALT II's broader coverage
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and qualitative limitations. Projected provisions of SALT II
have been developed with verification needs significantly
in mind.
* MBFR, CTB, ASAT, CAT, Indian Ocean and Chemical
Warfare negotiations each also involve complex
verification challenges.
* While we don't yet know the scope of SALT III, we
can presume it will include harder qualitative
verification problems and relationships between
"strategic" and "theater" systems.
* Should Arab-Israeli peace negotiations bear fruit,
intelligence may well be called upon to contribute
to monitoring agreements reached.
2) Sov mil impulsion - must keep track -
3) Smaller outbreaks - SEA, Korea, M.E., Africa
All require more technical collection
Unsure quantitative requirements if all arms control negotiations
Moving to areas like radar to fill vast blank in tech
capabilities
Challenge of squeezing all in within $
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IT. Increased Public Attention to Intelligence.
Investigations eroded confidence, support
Generated suspicions of invasions of privacy
Enough true (even tho much exaggerated) that corrective
action necessary
Action very thorough
Oversight procedures: Pres, IOB, Congress -
including press
Impact
Much greater visibility
Some wanted
Much unwanted
3 impacts on Community
1. Uncomfortable
Secrecy - necessity and habit; e.g. case officer's
stock in trade is assurance of confidentiality
2. Accountability
New -
Techniques unfamiliar
Have adapted beautifully - but painful
Super budget presentations - FY '78 vs '80
3. Lessen valuable capabilities
A. Especially to C.A. - 2 aspects
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1) Leaks
a) Domestic political issues -
Congress
b) Controversial policy issues -
Exec Branch
Hughes - Ryan?
2) Loss of flexibility due detailed
guidance/control
Won't work that way
Spillover inhibition to intell collection
B. To intell collections
Risks of leaks - clearances
Reverse need for disclosure and hold closeness
Lesser confidence - agents and allies
Net impact visibility:
Plus -
Must have public support
Must avoid abuses
Charters and practice of next 2-3 years will establish
balance -
How much dos nation desire assurance against invasions
of privacy and foreign policy moves considered unethical
at some expanse in intell/covert action capabilities
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III. Burgeoning Technical Capabilities.
New dimension of intell - referred to earlier - arms control - but
want expand because magnificent opportunities if utilized well
Missing mechanism -
coordination of 3 elements - PHOTINT - SIGINT - HUMINT
Each an intell community on own -
Collect
Interpret
Produce
Especially need integrate HUMINT
Proper targeting HUMINT greatest need that area
Importance just as critical despite
burgeoning tech int
Intentions
$/Manpower adequate -
Nothing failed to undertake due lack
resources
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2) We are implementing appropriate approaches in human
collection (as elsewhere) to abide by today's moral/legal
constraints on American intelligence while continuing
operational effectiveness:
a) laws such as the Electronic Surveillance Act
passed last Session;
b) E.O. restrictions and limitations involving rights
of US citizens, various types of physical
surveillance/monitoring, etc.
c) some present legal constraints involve serious
handicaps: loss of confidence of individuals and
services abroad in our ability to protect clandes-
tinely collected information in raw form from FOIA
disclosure. We hope the Congress will grant relief
from this category of FOI search. Such relief
would be a signal to would-be sources of information
and friendly intelligence services that we can
protect their anonymity.
3) We also face challenges in continuing to find young people
willing to serve overseas. CIA is in the midst of its
first generational turnover. While recruiting for human
collection area in general is satisfactory, willingness to
undertake restrictions of long-term clandestine life overseas
is not as prevalent as it has been and as is necessary.
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Can't afford not to integrate all three
Cost
Missed opportunities
Pres. E.O. - strengthen DCI
Budget
As noted going well
Tasking
Incipient stages
Objective - max utilization of each system
Not how to do - but where/when to bring
forward - vice dependence on personal
contacts between analysts and collectors
e.g. NFAC - DDO
e.g. DIA - NSA
Also help to analysts - one-stop service
Major problems
1. Transition to greater dependence of tactical commanders
on national systems
Potential is there
Can't afford duplication
Yet CDR must have
a) Responsiveness
b) Confidence
- Difficult generate confidence if not
under direct control
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But many other elements of battle are not
Comm
Logistics
Inter-service report
Delicate balance
Instinctively military will draw into shell and
recreate own systems under IRA and duplicate
Can't afford
IV. Iran - Intelligence Failure?
- Too early to judge
* NFAC review underway
* Improved in-house review finished products
* Refocused analytic effort
* Special Task Force (Aaron and deputies) reviewing
quality of political reporting. Developing
recommendations - some already implemented
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Sequence of events
1) July 77 - Jan 78 - IC reported serious
dissident activity and widespread discontent;
* evaluated: serious but not insur-
mountable
2) January 78 - (after Qum riots) - IC reported
fundamental incompatibility Shah and religious
discontent
3) April-August 78 - IC reiterated depth of gap:
Shah and clergy
* evaluated: Shah uncertain how to
respond
N.B. - NIE on Iran
* In part, above report contributed
to scrapping NIE
* Fluidity of situation negated pro-
ductivity of "long range" NIE
* Media quotes from draft inputs to NIE
4) August-September 78 - underscored seriousness of
situation
* evaluated: Shah embattled; rule
seriously challenged
N.B. - Did not foresee coalescence; thought
Shah could contain with military and
SAVAK
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5) November 78 - IC sent NSC alert memo evaluation:
V. Gentlemen, the priorities of the Intelligence Community and
the way it goes about its business are changing. These changes are
the inevitable result of 3 fundamental forces:
1) The changing needs of our consumers who must grapple
with the political or economic policies of others;
the pervasiveness of global social problems; and the
often negative influence of pivotal LDC's on traditional
world powers.
2) The changed domestic climate where any government secrecy
is viewed with distrust and where strict legal con-
straints are sought to control intelligence activities; and
to control intelligence activities; and
3) The changing character and cost of the tools of intelli-
gence collection.
Each of these forces has placed special demands on the
Intelligence Community. They are requiring the Community to
adjust to a different kind of intelligence problem from the
view of what intelligence is collected; how it is collected; how
it is analyzed; and in what form it would be most helpful to the
consumer.
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The adjustment is profound in that it touches every part of
the Community and everything the Community does. All evidence
indicates to me that we are making that adjustment well. Much of
the credit for that must go to the intelligence professionals
themselves who, through these past difficult years have continued
to recognize the importance of their work for this country and
have done it superbly.
At the same time, the Congress, and particularly those of
you on the special intelligence committees, deserve much credit
for the support, the sound advice, and the encouragement you have
given us. There is no question in my mind that you recognize this
country's need for good intelligence and are making every effort
to ensure our intelligence capabilities remain strong through a
balanced, reasonable approach to all intelligence questions.
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