AN INTERVIEW WITH DIRECTOR STANSFIELD TURNER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R002900060001-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 1, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 22, 1978
• Content Type: TRANS

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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
PROGRAM Face the Nation
4 QO29O &00044HINGTON, D.C. 244-3540
STATION WDVl4 TV
CBS Network
DATE October 22, 1978 1 1 : 30 AM CITY Washington, D. C.
SUBJECT An Interview with Director Stansfield Turner
GEORGE HER1MAN: Admiral Turner, the SALT talks on strategic
arms limitation are reaching a crucial point. At the same time. we're
aDnroachinq a trial of a former CIA official. or agent, or whatever
you want to call him, employee In any case, who is reputed to have
sold to the Soviet Union a manual on one of our major satellites
which detects the movement of Soviet arms and ammunition. Is this
Iikely to threaten the progress of the SALT talks now approaching
their conclusion?
CIA DIRECTOR STANSFIELD TURNER: Any loss of Important
intelligence information is a serious problem for our country. But
at the same time, the talks are in such a delicate stage today, with
Secretary Vance this very day in Moscow. I think it would be inap-
propriate for me to talk about specific details which could be
misinterpreted there, because none of us would want us, on this
show, in any way to prejudice those talks.
Let me say to you, however. that we In the intelIigence
community are very much a part of developing the United States'
SALT position. In short, we are asked reauIarIv "If we propose
this or we accept that. would you. the intelligence community, be
able to verify it?" And we give very forthright and complete answers
to our negotiators on that.
So I believe that our verification interests are taken
into account most fully by the people doing the actual negotiations.
HERMAN: Admiral Turner. I'm not exactly sure that I
understood all of your first answer about the question of qiv-
inq the -- selling the Soviet Union details on an American spy
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 sate lA$ipttve&IrFcbrlRe4ea$e 2QQ1yQ8/14:fQLAtREDRaOd FMRRQQ060QQ'it8 I et me
ask you in 1m form. Are you sanguine out the outcome of
the SALT talks, that we will get a treaty in a reasonable time
now?
DIRECTOR TURNER: I think there's a very good prospect
of that. But one can't ever be confident in something as delicate
as this, because both nations' vital interests are at stake.
NORMAN KEMPSTER: If we could look a little bit more
at the question of selling the satellite, there's an indictment
against a man who had been with the CIA for only about eight months.
He had a relatively low level job.
How is it possible that someone whose loyalty and judg-
ment have not been fully tested can come in contact with major
secrets of this sort?
DIRECTOR TURNER: The stock In trade of the Central
Intelligence Agency Is highly classified Information. On each
of our desks, almost all the papers that pass by daily must be
very highly classified. Yet I would certainly say to you that
after an accusation such as has been made that somebody carried
off a sensitive document, we have checked and reviewed and tightened
our security procedures. At the same time, because we have so much
classified information, we can tie ourselves In knots and not be able
to get our work done if we over-control.
So we always are drawing a fine line between how much
control we can practically exercise and how much we absolutely
must in order to insure security.
FRED GRAHAM: Admiral, can I ask you about clasfified
Information on another level? And that has to do with the upcoming
trial of former Acting FBI Director Pat Gray and two others. it's
been in the press in the last week that the CIA and the other in-
telligence agencies have raised a problem of so-called third agency
rule, information that was obtained, as I understand it, mostly from
overseas. And now the judge has ordered that to be released to the
defense and that the trial may have to be aborted because of that.
Is there any danger that the trial of Pat Gray will have
to be aborted for that reason?
DIRECTOR TURNER: The CIA is not withholding information
here. The stories in the press to this end are totally incorrect.
At the same time, Iet me assure you that I bear a respon-
sibility anytime it is necessary to release classified information
in the courts to advise the Attorney General, and perhaps the Pre-
sident, of what damage might occur to the national security interests
if that information were released. You know, I am required by the law
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of our country to protect sensitive intelligence information. And
therefore, I would not be doing my job if I didn't make the dangers
to the country known about the release of classified information.
GRAHAM: But specifically here, isn't it true that the
judge has ordered the release to the defense of-certain documents
and that you have said there was an agreement with foreign nations
not to release?
DIRECTOR TURNER: We're not withholding anything from
the FBI at this time.
HERMAN: Let me take you back for just a moment. I don't
know whether you finished with that subject. But I was not finished
with the trial of Mr. Kampelles (?), or however he pronounces his
name, on the sale, if there was a sale, of the manual on the spy
satellite to the Soviet Union. Mr. Kampelles, as best I recall,
was a GS-7, which is a very low rank in the government. That's
sort of the equivalent of a clerk, although he was a watch officer.
My interpretation of your answer to the question was that this is.
something that happens, and you have to walk a tight rope between
being too careful and not careful enough.
Are you saying that the CIA did nothing wrong In this
case where Mr. Kampelles was able to get his hand on this highly
classified -- not just classified, but, as I understand it, highly
classified manual?
DIRECTOR TURNER: I'm saying that we have reviewed our
security procedures and we have found some areas where we have since
tightened up. One always finds something like this, I'm afraid. But
I feel that the basic security procedures were satisfactory.
HERMAN: Were satisfactory at the time that he stole this?
DIRECTOR TURNER: Yes. I mean, I believe that his duties
made it quite reasonable for him to have access to this document at
that time.
KEMPSTER: How long was the manual missing before you
discovered It was gone?
DIRECTOR TURNER: I'm unable to respond to a question
like that, as I'm sure you well appreciate. The case of Mr.
Kampelles is coming up for trial in the courts on the 31st of
this month. And for me to discuss details which are appropriate
to that trial here would possibly prejudice the case in the courts.
KEMPSTER: W e l l, I t h i n k I t not only goes to the case.
It also goes to the security procedures of the CIA which we're
talking about. Is it possible that such a manual could be missing
for some time without you knowing about it?
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DIRECTOR TURNER: Yes, it is possible for some time. There
are certain prescribed procedures for when documents have. to be in-
ventoried. And this document was within those procedures. .
GRAHAM: There's been some speculation recently that
there might be a hidden foreign agent within our intelligence
community and that the CIA has made some efforts to determine if
that's true.
Is there a hidden agent there and are you trying to find
out if that's true?
DIRECTOR TURNER: I have no knowledge or indication that
there Is a mole, a secret agent inside the Central Intelligence
Agency. But for me to sit here and tell. you that I was utterly
confident that there was none would be foolish. I must be con-
stantly on guard to check and to find out and to question whether
there is some penetration of our Important agency. We know of
none at this time. But we're constantly looking; we're constantly
being vigilant. That's the only way to prevent it.
GRAHAM: Well, can I ask you about this? There as a
published story lately that In the course of that, you passed out
some misinformation among very high levels within our Intelligence
community and later detected that it popped in a hostile country.
DIRECTOR TURNER: That story is one of the best cases
of misinformation I know of. That's totally false.
HERMAN: In the course of Mr. Kampelles' trial -- this is
sort of a Iegal question, I think, rather than a CIA question, and
perhaps. you can address it.
DIRECTOR TURNER: You're making it difficult, but go
HERMAN: Well, my question Is really sort of basic to this
kind of case. If he's hideously guilty, how can the prosecution prove
it without submitting some of the secret documents that are presumably
under CIA control? If he's blissfully innocent, how can he prove it
without access to some of the documents under your control? Aren't
we sort of in a bind here in this kind of case?
DIRECTOR TURNER: Absolutely. This is a problem we've
discussed already as to making a judgment in each court case as to
what classified information can be released. When does the Interest
of prosecution of a possible offender of our laws warrant releasing
material that may damage our national interests? And in each case
that judgment has to be made separately. And it is not my judgment
to be made; it's the Attorney General, or possibly the President.
HERMAN: Has the court or any officer of the court in
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this case called you or the CIA, or asked for in the discovery pro-
cedure, or anywhere else, any of the documents involved?
DIRECTOR TURNER: You're leading me back exactly to where
I said I could not go....
DIRECTOR TURNER: ...in discussing a particular case
before the courts.
KEMPSTER: Do you have any suggestions for the way that
the government can deal with cases of people who are accused of
real crimes and who seek documents that you can declassify, and
therefore get the cases dismissed?
DIRECTOR TURNER: No, I don't see any real relief to
that. I really don't. I think that's part of our judicial pro-
cess in this country. And in each case we have to weigh the values
and the risks. And we're doing that regularly. And I think It
generally comes out very well.
HERMAN: Let met get you out of the courts here.
DIRECTOR TURNER: Fine.
[Laughter.]
HERMAN: There's a good deal of news coming into this
country from Iran, which is one of our major oil suppliers. A
good deal of trouble has been happening, and a good deal of con-
flict. The question, I suppose the first question to ask is whether
the CIA detects any Soviet influence behind these, any Soviet move-
ment to move in and take advantage of these, anything of that sort?
DIRECTOR TURNER: Well, I think the position the Shah of
Iran Is in today is a very,difficult one. He's been trying genuinely
to liberalize, to modernize his country over quite a period of time
now. In recent months he's met considerable resistance from the
conservative, right-wing elements of his own country. As a result,
however, the left wing's small nucleus of communists has tried to
take advantage of this and to use the disturbances from the right
for their own particular advantage. I'm sure there's some Soviet
influence behind it, in one degree or another. But I think it's
an opportunism taking advantage of a genuine dissent within the
country at the direction the Shah is going.
HERMAN: Specifically, do you see any Soviet, new Soviet
money, new Soviet agents moving in to expand and use this bridge-
head?
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DIRECTOR TURNER: No, I haven't seen that. And I'm
pleased that the Shah is continuing with his liberalization ef-
forts. And as you know, the big event will be next June when
he's promised -- and he's sticking to his promise of free elections
for his Parliament. It's a very important moment-for him and for
us.
GRAHAM: Admiral Turner, ever since the story came out
a couple of weeks ago about the Soviet defector Shevchenko living
a life of wine, women and song, partly as a CIA source: have you
had an upsurge of offers of defection from the Soviet Union and
from other places?
DIRECTOR TURNER: I'm not free to discuss that, Fred. But
I do want to make clear that the Central Intelligence Agency in no
way, directly, indirectly, provided funds for the purpose of pro-
viding female companionship for Ambassador Shevchenko. But I want
to recognize that the CIA is the agency of our government responsible
for handling defectors, for helping them in the transition to a nor-
mal self-supporting life in our country. We've been doing that for
the Ambassador, and it's worked out very well. He's a fine man.
KEMPSTER: How does the CIA decide which defector it's
going to put on some sort of a subsidy or stipend, particularly in
this case when the man apparently had substantial means of his own?
DIRECTOR TURNER: We look at the good old American prin-
ciple of free enterprise. We reward people for their deeds, not
in accordance with their needs, as is the communist si ogan. The
value to the country of what he's doing with us and for us is our
measure of remuneration.
KEMPSTER: Well, can we conclude then that he brought
rather substantial information with him when he defected?
DIRECTOR TURNER: You know that he is the highest level
defector from the Soviet Union to our country. You know how dif-
ficult it is just to understand a country like the Soviet Union'
where the borders are closed, the communications are controlled.
And therefore helping to understand and interpret that type of
a difficult society is a very valuable asset to us.
GRAHAM: Sir, you spoke of misinformation a minute ago,
and I think there's some more misinformation that has been pub-
lished that you may help straighten out for us.
It has been published that the FBI has been investigating
the death of John Paisley, the former CIA official.
DIRECTOR TURNER: That's totally incorrect. I talked to
the Director of the FBI as recently as yesterday on that. And he
has assured me for the umpteenth time that they are not involved
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in the Paisley investigation.
GRAHAM: Now does that mean that you are satisfied, the
FBI is satisfied that he was a suicide and was not murdered?
DIRECTOR TURNER: I'm standing on the fine statement by
the Maryland State Police yesterday that they see no evidence of
foul play here. It's their job to investigate this, not ours.
GRAHAM: Sir, briefly taking you back into the area of
the courts, at the Justice Department, as I understand it, Attor-
ney General Bell has a new policy, although it hasn't been openly
announced, and that is that he will prosecute any foreigner caught,
as he calls it, being a spy in this country, if the person Is not
covered by diplomatic immunity. Now as I understand it, the rules
of the game in the intelligence world had always been you usually
just kick the people out of the country.
Has Attorney General Bell changed the rules of the game?
And Is this likely to bring retaliation against some of your agents
in other countries?
DIRECTOR TURNER: What you call the rules of the game
were the facts of the game previously, because in most cases, people
we have caught spying in this country have had diplomatic passports.
Those who do not -- and In this case. It was just a flagrant violation
of the privilege of being In our country as employees of the United.
Nations that these two Soviets were spying against our country. We
had no recourse. They had violated the laws of our country. They
don't have. special exemption from those laws, as do diplomats, and
so they were prosecuted. This is not the first time we have done
this. There was a man named Ivanov a number of years ago who was
similarly prosecuted, because he, too, did not have diplomatic
status.
GRAHAM: He was exchanged. Do you think these two may
be exchanged?
sphere.
DIRECTOR TURNER: That's a policy matter outside of my
KEMPSTER: Do you think it's possible that the Soviets
may attempt to pick up someone, an American, to prosecute In retalia-
tion for this, either one of your people or somebody just picked up
off the street?
DIRECTOR TURNER: We certainly hope not. But we certainly
believe that their efforts to take action against an American business-
man, Mr. Crawford of the International Harvester Company In Moscow some -
months ago, was a flagrant and direct retaliation for this perfectly
legal action that our country took in this instance.
HERMAN: Admiral, I'd like to ask you a little bit about
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the CIA's role in estimating the energy resources of the world.
I refer you to the CIA report which President Carter quoted when
he was discussing the energy situation, which he found very dis-
turbing. Some of those figures have gyrated rather wildly. The
figures, for example, on Saudi Arabian oil capabilities went up
and down by several million barrels a day over the course of a
couple of months.
Where do you stand now on the world's oil production?
And were these figures gyrating so wildly because you lacked good
information, or because you were tailoring them to something? What
was going on then?
DIRECTOR TURNER: Well, the figures did not reallyy gyrate.
HERMAN: Well, I could read you the various numbers that
you published.
DIRECTOR TURNER: No. The press misunderstood a lot of
that, and it was partly our fault for not making it more clear.. What
we have done is point out that there are two different ways of esti-
mating what a country will produce. One is, what is their physical
capacity to produce? And the second is what will they likely produce,
because they have their own Interests: how much money do they need;
how much oil do they want to consume in this period of time as op-
posed to holding it for the future. And that was a difference in
the predictions in estimating what they would or could produce.
But our basic view today remains that somewhere in the
1980s, somewhere probably in the early 1980s, the world, as a whole,
i s g o i n g to be a b l e to get out of the ground l e s s o i l than it w i l l ,
want to have in order to consume on the surface of the ground.
HERMAN: Do you still believe the Soviet Union will be
importing massive amounts of oil In the first years of the '8Os?
DIRECTOR TURNER: We believe that the Soviets will become
net importers, the Soviet bloc as a whole, not just the Soviet Union,
but taking Into account their Eastern European satellites.
HERMAN: I'm a little puzzled about the numbers once again..
I hadn't intended to read them. But I guess it's the only way to
get around it.
In the bi-weekly reports on oil supplies, in November,
CIA estimated the productive capacity of Saudi
fields at 11 1/2
million barrels a day; in December, 10 1/2; in January, 8
1/2;
in
February, back to 10 1/2. Now that sounds like a little
misinterpretation between the two ways of improving....
more
than
DIRECTOR TURNER: The 8 1/2 figure was actual production.
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The others were capacity. The newspaper....
HERMAN: Well, even the capacity figures gyrated fairly
well, from 11 1/2 on down.
DIRECTOR TURNER: No, no. Our estimates of their
capacity have remained steady. I think you're reading a paper
that has misinterpreted the facts. That's all.
GRAHAM: Admiral, on another subject, Harvard Univer-
sity has adopted guidelines which prohibit its professors from
undertaking covert activities for the CIA, and which prohibit them
from recruiting foreign students on the campus to be agents of the
CIA. And as I understand it, you have said that despite that, the
CIA is going to continue to try and operate that way on the Harvard
campus.
DIRECTOR TURNER: Well, I'm certainly not bound by the
regulations of every college in this country. But I would like to
say this. I think it's very dangerous for our country when a parti-
cular segment of our society, in this case the intelligence community,
is singled out for discriminatory action. If Harvard or any other
university wants to pass rules like that which apply across the
board to recruiting on their campus by American industry, by for-
eign governments or....
GRAHAM: Surely it's not the same, is it, CIA covert
operations on their campus and coporations recruiting on the campus?
Surely there's a difference.
DIRECTOR TURNER: You think that corporations recruit
openly? We recruit as openly on campus as do private corporations.
GRAHAM: But they're talking about covert recruitment of
students by....
HERMAN: And faculty.
GRAHAM: Yes.
HERMAN:, And recruitment of faculty by the CIA.
GRAHAM: Don't you think you should abide by Harvard's
DIRECTOR TURNER: If I were required to abide by the rules
of every corporation, every academic institution in this country, It
would become impossible to do the required job for our country.
HERMAN: So the answer is no.
DIRECTOR TURNER: The answer is no, absolutely no.
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GRAHAf.1: You're insisting on the right to subvert their
DIRECTOR TURNER: I'm not subverting their rules. I
am carrying out the legal responsibilities of the Central In-
telligence Agency, and Harvard does not have a legal authority
over us.
KEMPSTER: Admiral Turner, in years past, the Central
Intelligence Agency has carried out activities to subvert the
rules and the governments of foreign countries. Is the agency
still doing this? And is the agency able to do this under the
intelligence reforms that have been passed in the last couple of
years?
DIRECTOR TURNER: There are very strict rules for what
you are talking about, which we call covert political action; not
collecting intelligence, but attempting to influence events abroad.
And they are definitely controlled by a process established by the
laws of this country. And we must get the approval of the President
of the United States, and we must notify the committees of Congress
if there's any such covert political action going on.
And I'd like to say that that's part of a really Important
development in the intelligence of our country today, and that's good
oversight by the Congress. And In the last year and a half, thanks
to the cooperation of the committees of Congress in this regard, the
oversight mechanisms, the check for the public on what we are doing
in intelligence, have become very strong, very valid, very helpful
to us in the long run. I'm very pleased at this development in
our intelligence capability for this country.
KEMPSTER: Have you had to pass up any covert political
action that you think would be necessary for the national defense
as a result of this oversight?
DIRECTOR TURNER: Yes, we have. It's very proper that
we should when the oversight indicates that that's not in accor-
dance with the desires of the country.
HERMAN: Let me just ask you one question on the other
side of that coin. There have been reports that you were forced,
you felt, to delay or not act on requests for help from the govern-
ment of Italy when Prime Minister Aldo Moro was kidnaped, that you
felt you could not help the West Germans when the Lufthansa plane
was hijacked and taken to Somalia because of these laws. Are those
reports correct?
DIRECTOR TURNER: Totally incorrect. There was nothing
we were able to do and wanted to do that we were not capable of
doing.
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HERMAN: Well, wanted is a little different. Were you
asked to do some things....
DIRECTOR TURNER: Nothing we were asked to do that we
did not respond to.
GRAHAM: Sir, quickly, former Director Richard Helms
is a registered agent of the Iranian government, and William Colby,
former Director, I think represents Japanese Airlines. Do any of
these by former CIA Directors -- does any of this bother you?
HERMAN: You have time for a yes or no.
GRAHAM: Is there a problem? Is there a problem there?
DIRECTOR TURNER: That's too complex a question for a
yes or no.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to be with you
today.
HERMAN: Thank you for being our guest today. And we'll
have a word about next week's guest in a moment.
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