ADMIRAL TURNER'S SPEECH TO THE BUSINESS COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C., 15 FEBRUARY 1978

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R002800020009-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 15, 2001
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: February 15, 1978
• Content Type: SPEECH

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Admiral Turner's speech to the Business Council
Washington, D.C., 15 February 1978
Thank you very much Jahn, Secretary Kreps, Secretary
Claytor, Members of the Council. I was really very pleased
when Jahn called me and asked me to be with you tonight. First,
because I have most enjoyed the privilege of being with you
the last two sessions at the Homestead. At least I enjoyed
it up to the point where Harry Gray and I lost 8 out of
10 tennis games. Beyond that, I was very pleased at this
opportunity because--almost since last March when I took
this office, I have been interested and concerned about the
relationships between the business community of our country
and its Intelligence Community. I happen to feel that John
de Butt's charge to me on the phone that I might suggest
to you what you could do to help us in the Intelligence
Community is something I very much wanted to explore. But
I also wanted to explore with you how we in the intelligence
world might be of better service and better help to you.
I happen to believe that the trends in the intelligence
world today are leading to great coincidence of interests
between the intelligence and the business worlds and greater
opportunities for contact. I would like tonight to discuss
four of those trends, trends that are emerging with a new
mode, a new model of American intelligence. One that has
been shaped out of the crucible of three years of intensive
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public criticism of the intelligence practices of the past.
And I'm encouraged., I'm very encouraged at the directions
that this new shape of intelligence is taking us and, as I
say, I believe it will bring us into greater usefulness to you.
The first trend that I would like to talk about is our
product, because our product is changing today. It's
shifting from a concentration on Soviet military matters to
a much wider geographic sphere and a much wider range of
topics, including a great deal of emphasis on international
economics. And let me emphasize that the stress on
international economics is not just another way of getting into
the military equation. The stress is because there is such
a growing importance to our country of -its economic position
in the world. Now 30 years ago when we first organized
a peacetime central intelligence organization for this country,
we were the dominant political power and we were an independent
economic power. The only threat that we could see on the
horizon for intelligence to explore was a military one and,
of course, from the Soviet Union. As events turned out,
however, the product that we needed in intelligence, while
concentrating on the Soviet military picture, was not really
what they were doing in military matters, it was haw they
were brandishing their military sword and at the same time
threatening and subverting other countries of the world.
And as a result of that, the product the country wanted
from intelligence was not only information about what the
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Soviets were doing in these areas but help--political
action in countering those actions. And so we became a
major player in what we term covert political action.
This was influencing events like the change of governments
in Iran in 1953, in Guatemala in 1954 and our efforts
throughout the 60's in Cuba and as recently as 1975 in Angola,
at least until the Congress put a stop to that. But look at
how the world has changed since those early days and its
primary focus on Soviet military intelligence. Today, we
of course, have commercial and political interests and
relations with most of the 150 some countries in the world.
But they are independent political entities and we are
interdependent economically with so many of -them. This
means that we must keep abreast of the trends, the problems,
the issues in these countries but in by far the greater part
of them those issues, those problems, are e~onbmic and
political--not military.
At the same time our product has had to change because
in this Gauntry there is a lessened interest in meddling
in the internal affairs of other countries--in the covert
political action that I mentioned earlier. This is not,
in my opinion, something that means we could eschew covert
political action or that we should not have that capability
available. But I do believe the applicability of it to our
national needs is less today than it was a decade ago. And
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I believe it must be exercised more judiciously and
under greater control. So our product today in the
intelligence world is good intelligence information--economic,
political and military--on a wide range of countries around
the world. .And we're under pressure to provide intelligence
on subjects today that we never thought about a decade ago--
predicting the Soviet grain harvest. We are much involved
in the question of technological status of the Soviet Union
and many other countries; not just for the military content but
for the industrial as well. We are much involved in the
question of how techno-logy transfer takes place. And
we're involved in the question of economic balance, economic
relationships, between our country and the major industrial
powers of the world.- We work closely with. Juanita and her
people and Mike Blumenthal and his people, but we try not
to overlap, we try not to duplicate what they do. But often
in the intelligence world we do have unique sources of
information even in the economic sphere. In addition, the
analysts we have are a major resource to our economic
community and the government. And they, at the CIA at least,
are the only group of economic analysis who are totally
disassociated from national policy. They are the ones who
have the special responsibility to provide totally objective
analysis to our decision-makers.
For instance, in January you may have noted that
Chancellor Schmidt in his state of the union address to the
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German Republic cited Walter Wriston's corporation
in saying that a 1% rate of growth for West Germany would
have a snow over affect of only 5/100 of a percent of
additional growth in the United Kingdom and 7/100 of a
percent in France. Now we happen to have a different model
than Walt-and I went and told our policy makers that we think
your calculations are off by a factor of four. Now the issue
isn't who's right in this case, and we certainly don't
profess that we've got the answer, but the .issue that I
think was important is that our government leaders have
an independent assessment of that situation; of what impact
the rate of growth on the German economy would have on
our interests in the other economies around the world.
Our intelligence analysis apparatus gives us an
opportunity, perhaps the best in our government, to give
that kind of objective, unbiased analyses to our decision
makers. So what I'm saying to you is that I believe there
is a greater coincidence today of the kind of information
producing that we are now using or now making in our product,
than there has been ever before with the business community
and the Intelligence Community because so much more of what
we are doing is relevant to your concerns.
The second trend that I would like to mention goes
right along with the change of product--the production line.
The traditional production line of intelligence has always
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been the human intelligence agent--the spy. Thanks in
large measure to many of you here, over the last decade
and a half there's been a revolution in the production
line in American intelligence.. Today we have technical
means of collecting intelligence that just bring in vast
quantities of data. 5o much bigger than we've ever had
before and processing and handling it is .really becoming
a major issue for us. Interestingly though, this means
in turn that there is renewed emphasis on the old traditional
human intelligence agent. Because what happens is when you
get data from these technical systems you're getting
information generally about what happened yesterday, or
maybe today, in some other country. When you provide that
to a decision maker the immediate response is that "Stan,
why did they do that, what are they going to do tomorrow,
what are their plans, what are their intentions?" And that,
of course, in defining the plans, the thoughts, the hopes
of other people, is the forte of the human intelligence
collector. The human intelligence agents come in two
categories--clandestine and overt--the spy and the citizen
who just has information. Now clandestine intelligence
agents are risky, they're scarce and they're costly. It
is our policy that we never use the clandestine technique
when we can do it by overt or open means.
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Now with military secrets, it is usually very
difficult to use the open human intelligence source.
There aren't many Americans who go to the Soviet Union
and travel around i.n military training-areas and come
back and report to us on the activities they've seen.
But, of course, there are lots of you, lots of other
American businessmen who do go to the Soviet Union and
more than that go to many of these other hundred-odd
countries with which we-have legitmate interest and
concerns in the intelligence field. And you sit down
with their bankers and businessmen and are able to exchange
ideas. As a military officer, in 31 years I sat down once
with a Russian Admiral and then in a very guarded fashion.
In short, as our needs are shifting today to more economic
and political intelligence, the overt--the open human source
in our production line--has become much more important; much
more valuable than just a few years ago. You the American
business community are one of the best potential components
of that open production line.
In many instances your representatives overseas have
a better feel for both the political and the economic
situation in the countries in which they're living and
working than do the American government representatives
there. I say that because bureaucrats unfortunately tend
to isolate themselves with bureaucrats. It is unfortunate
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but true. Sometimes also it's very valuable for us to
get your feel for the trends in these countries. Because
when you collect economic intelligence, economic data on
what's going on over there, you automatically hav~ to
translate that into your sense of what the trends are
going to be. Is the country going to be stabled Are
they going to nationalize you? Is the market goi g to
be open? And so on. When we go and collect econ mic data
clandestinely we then have to turn it over to and ysts who
have to try to sort out the biases of our sources and try
to interpret it themselves. I would suggest that in many,
many instances your interpretation is far more li ely to
be on the mark than ours. In large measure, of c urse,
because you have the profit and lost statement as the
bottom line. Hence, in many instances, we can st nd to
gain a great deal by benefiting from your interpr tation
of the international scene.
But this leads, of course, to the question o how
we can do that best and properly. And how we can gain
access to what you have through open information nd
exchange. We have in the Central Intelligence Ag ncy
something known as the Domestic Collection Divisi n which
is our overt collection operation in the United S ates.
Headquarters in 39 different cities, listed in th telephone
book and totally open and above board. I am very grateful
for the large degree of cooperation that always has existed
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between most of your corporations and these Domestic
Collection Division offices. They are, of course, an
opportunity for any American citizen to provide information
to his government. But you are not just American citizens,
you must balance your responsibilities to help your government
as a citizen, with your responsibility as president, chairman
or chief executive officer, to your stockholders and your
boards. And I can't tell you haw t? balance those responsibilities
in this, instance. .Most of the corporations with which we
deal take a position that they will work with the Intelligence
Community and they will work with any other element of our
government when it is in the government's best interest.
But what I would like to address to you is our policy
on keeping the relationships we have with you confidential.
We think our record of protecting our sources of open
intelligence information is very goad. And we have a law
which places on my back the responsibility for protecting
our sources of collecting intelligence, wh-ether they be open
or clandestine sources. We pay a very particular attention to
this responsibility. I assure you that the Domestic
Collection Division looks upon the sanctity of its open
relationships with the American business community in the
same light as our clandestine people look -upon their covert
relationships to the agents and spies dependent on their
actions. We are particularly mindful when those occasions
come along when disclosure of the information itself may
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disclose inadvertently thy: name or the corporation that
gave it to us. Or when, by chance, proprietary information
may be involved. Here we make very special precautions to
use this legal authority to withhold information that
relates to our sources and methods of collecting intelligence
and this does give us a protection, a good protection, against
the Freedom of Information Act by which you frequently are
pressed to disclose information including sources but we
never have at this point.
Still I would not want to fail to acknowledge that
there are risks to you in associating with organizations
such as those in our Intelligence Community which have
been so severely criticised. in public in recent years.
I am sure you recognize haw much of that was exaggeration.
But the third trend I would like to mention to you--I
hope it will provide some reassurance to you on this score.
This trend is one toward greater oversight of the intelligence
process in our country today. You certainly appreciate that
in the business that we are in there is no way that, of the
many things we must do, either being done in secret or not
being done at all, that we can have public oversight of our
process.. But what we can have is surrogate public oversight.
And the surrogates are the President, the Vice President, the
National Security Council, something known as the Intelligence
Oversight Board, and two committees of the Congress dedicated
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to the oversight process. And I can assure you that we are
reporting to these people, these surrogates for the public,
more thoroughly more regularly today than ever before. Now
clearly there are risks in doing this but there are also
strengths. We are in the process right now of settling
down and balancing out those risks and those strengths so
that we don't have too much oversight but we have enough.
I can assure you that the process is well enough established
today that you can be confident that .the intelligence
organizations of our country are operating under good control
of the government. And I can also assure you that I have
confidence that over the year or two ahead we are going to
work out the right balance here that will let us continue a
successful and capable intelligence operation for .our country
in accordance with the democratic standards of our society.
Now hopefully there is another side to this coin
that I've been talking about as how you-might help us and
that's how we may feed back to you better and more usefully
both from our overt and covert activities and particularly
from our bank of analysts wYio work on the material that is
gathered by one or the other of these means. This happens
to coincide with the fourtYi trend that I like to emphasize
and that's the trend towards greater openness in our
intelligence process in this country.
Now we've embarked on a policy of greater openness
for a number of reasons. One is simply that we really do
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need more support from the public and I think we'll get
that as we begin to show a greater return on investment.
5o we are publishing today more studies in unclassified
form than perhaps ever before. When we produce a study,
an estimate, an evaluation, we look at it and we ask
ourselves if we took out of it that which must really
be taken out to pieserve our intelligence interests, and
protect our sources of collecting that information, would
there be enough left to be of value to the American public?
And if so, we publish it. We are also being more open
today because it's critical that we protect our classified
information in this country better. One way to do that
in my view is to reduce the amount of classified information.
There is too much of it about today. You look at a document
and one says top secret, and one says secret, and one says
cosmic and one says destroy before reading, and people
simply do not respect it because of the great quantity. The
Ellsbergs, the Snepps, the people like this show that lack of
regard. As a result, I hope by cleansing the system of as
much that can be made unclassified as possible we will generate
a greater respect for what is left.
Now in that process I hope that we can provide the greater
flow of information that would be of interest and value to
you. This last year for instance, we have two studies--two
estimates which we publish on an unclassified basis every week.
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If you recall last March we produced one on the world
energy situation and the bottom line of that was simply
that we believe that within the next three or four or five
years there is a high probability of strong upward pressures
on the prices of world energy. In May we produced one an
the world steel outlook, which simply said that, as we all
know, there are no major steel producing companies today
operating at anywhere near capacity. There is more capacity
being constructed particularly in the lesser developed
countries and we don't see the curve of supply reaching up
to match this growing capacity. In July we produced one
on the prospects of the Soviet economy. Here we simply
said that they've got problems, they may solve them but
in the process you better beware that their ability to
generate foreign exchange to enter your markets and Western
European markets for technology and manufactured goods is
going to be tapped.
And unfortunately we also produced a study last summer
on international terrorism. And it says to you I'm afraid
that over the last several years the percentage of incidents
of international terrorism in which American citizens and
American corporations are involved has increased from 40~
to 60 0 .
Every week we also produce an economic intelligence
digest and every other week we also produce an international
energy digest. Twelve percent of the corporations in the
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business council subscribe to these and to all these
various publications that we put out from time to time.
They subscribe to the Library of Congress which acts as
our agents here. I have tonight on the couch in the back
of the room a number of samples of these kinds of things
we do produce for those of you who are interested.
Now I have hesitated to talk about the world energy
situation, the world steel situation, here in this group;
like that man who drowned in the Johnstown flood and ended
up talking to Noah about it. But seriously we don't contend
that our analyses are any better than any one elses. We
don't think we have a corner on brains or information. But
sometimes we do get unique information which we can utilize
even in the unclassified versions of these studies. What
we really hope we are doing is helping the quality of national
debate on these issues; helping to focus the country on the
correct issues within these various topics. But I am not
always sure that we know which issues are of most interest and
concern to you in the business community. Basically I'm
simply publishing in unclassified form what we're doing for
the government and consumers. But on the other hand, if we
knew what you are most interested in, it might tip the scale
one way or the other as to whether we felt it is worth
publishing something.
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Through our mechanisms in the Domestic Collection
Division we do get, of course, same feedback of what your
concerns are. But it is not really adequate, I don't
believe. Are you really most interested in political
projections about where nationalization may take place
next? Are you most concerned about the rise of Eurocommunism
and its effect on the economy of those countries? Or, on
the separatism in Canada; on the stability of South Africa;
on the future of the OPEC and its conhesiveness? What are
the things that are of most concern to you? I'm not saying
that if we knew these, we could divert resources to those
particular topics, because I have my stockholders and my
board too--the President and the Congress--and I must account
to them the utilization of my resources. But I can look
for areas of common concern here. I can't be your
security officer and I can't be your economic analyst. But
when I do understand what you are interested in and when it
is coincident with what we are doing in some form anyway, I can
and would like to be of greater service to you.
Now also for me there are risks in this program. There
are risks in the distribution of my product. Because I
don't want to be partial, I don't want to be accused of
favoring one corporation or another or giving somebody
information that another corporation is in competition with.
And I can't fill indivi.dua:1 requests for information. But
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I do say that we can share with you, share with you as a
group, what we have when it is of concern to you and
we would like to know better what those concerns are.
In summary, let me just say that your country's
Intelligence Community is on the move today in a number
of directions of which I've disucssed before.. The desire
for a strong capable better control of the Intelligence
Community is very clear. Several weeks ago the President
signed the new Executive Order strengthening and reordering
our Intelligence Community. Last week the Congress submitted
or tabled new legislation following on the President's
initiative and going in very much the same direction. Out
of these orders, ou?t of this charter legislation, out of
these trends that I've been discussing, I believe are emerging
greater opportunities for. proper circumspect interaction
between the business community and the Intelligence Community
and hopefully that can be of mutual benefit.
I am here tonight looking for your views on what that
relationship should be. I want to build on the very
productive relationship that already exists and for which
we are very grateful. I suspect that what is needed next is
improved two-way communications. The fact that you've asked
me to be with you tonight is certainly a major step for me
in that direction and I'm very thankful for the opportunity.
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Business Council Questions & Answers -
15 February 1978
I'd like to make a few comments about your speech here
and very frankly I'm thoughtful about some aspects.
It seems to me that the basic purpose of the Intelligence
Community is to obtain information for our government
and for our country that cannot be obtained in other
ways. Now I understand very well that we have a very
good capability of technical intelligence. We have
a lot of information, but at the same time, our ability
to get the human information has been weak. We have
not been able to know what people are going to do. If
I grasp what you've said, you're going to back-off from
this and you're going to rely more on the information
that's available to other people to build analyses. It
seems to me that you're not in a better position to
analyze the economic trends, than the business community
is, and at the same time, I really think that your
function is to concentrate on covert information--to
get information that is not available to the business
community, to other institutions., and you're trying
to avoid that responsibility by going out and just
doing a lot of what other organizations are doing.
I think that you're missing the whole point of your
responsibility.
A: I appreciate the view and if I gave the impression
that we're going to neglect the covert side of the
activity, I'm afraid it's because I was trying to
stress the relationship I believe does exist and
should exist more between the business comrnunity
and the intelligence community. It must be done
primarily on an overt basis. There is no intent
on my part to reduce either the human covert or
the technical covert activity. But I will say to
you that I have seen in my short time here a number
of instances in which bringing together overtly
available information, and covertly, has paid great
dividends. And frequently the overt information
while available to almost anyone in the private
sector, is not collated, is not brought together
to a critical mass, as it is when we work on it.
I have one instance in mind: When the Soviets
purchase a particular technology in this country
from many of your corporations, the individual sale
was nothing notable, but the aggregate of them gave
us a clue which we then married with some very
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sensitive covert information and from that we
were able to deduce a major thrust, a major
direction of the Soviet economic and military
activities. ...(turned tape over) with a few
exceptions there isn't as much research from that
particular aspect of oil as we think that we have
done, because we have a particular concern about
the Soviet Union. And relationships between the
American oil community and the Soviet Union. are not
as great as between other areas of the world and
our oil corporations. So I only assure you, sir,
I'm not going to neglect the covert side. We are
-very active in it. We're very good at it and it
is an absolutely essential function that we're doing.
Q: For many years I followed the practice of meeting with
CIA representatives after I returned from foreign
trips--visits to Russia and other Communist countries--
and I was willing and they were interested in my
interpretations. Is the proposed legislation going
to minister to that practice?
A: No, there's absolutely nothing in the new legislation--
it is in draft form still--that would inhibit that and
I can assure you that I will resist and fight it if it
does come up in any way.. There is a great deal in
both the Executive Order and the new legislation which
is intended to protect the rights of the American
citizen. But I see no inclination on anyone's part
to deny the citizen the right to share with his
government. I've held firm on that with the newsmen
for instance. I've been banded about and they've said
we must have no relathionships with the newsmen, and
we have no paid relationships with American media
representatives, people who are accredited to American
news organizations. But I have stood absolutely firm
that any newsman who wants to walk into my office
voluntarily and tell me something, I'd be most happy
to see him and any newsmen who want to walk in and say
would you give me your best unclassified information
on country X, I'd be happy to share it with them. That's
a mutual service. A mutual relationship that we must
preserve and not only newsmen but businessmen and any
other form of citizen in the country.
Q: Admiral, you eluded briefly to terrorism, do you see
any indications of terroristic activities within the
continental United States?
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A: No, we've been blessed by a very little of that and I
see no real trend toward it developing but let me
emphasize to you I'm not the FBI. It's not my beat,
but of course, I would be fairly well aware of it if it
were developing and have some connection with the
international sphere. I think, knock on wood, we've
been very fortunate thus far and of course, you know
our hijacking record because of security procedures has
become exemplary.
Q: There's been an awful lot of emphasis lately on the
past abuses of the CIA. With all of the oversights
which there will be, isn't there a likely tendency
far most agents to not play it safe and the way to
play it safe is to sort of dog it and make believe
they're doing a lot of things but in fact not take
any risks?
A: Yes, there's no question, that as you put more controls
on people and you put more emphasis on obeying the law
find the regulations and protections for the American
citizens, that none of us in the Intelligence business
wants to go to jail. None of us wants to be fired,
or whatever else, because we have transgressed in
anyway. So it could become an inhibiting factor
here. I don't think it has reached a serious
proportion. I don't think it is out of balance at
this time with the need and the desire of the country
for better assurance that things .are being done in the
right way. But in addition, we know if our agents
are taking cover and not producing and-we're very alert
to that, and we watch not only the quantity but the.
quality of their product, and they also know that there
are -long-term rewards on producing a good quality
product. So we have to play that very delicately
and putting the pressure on them in an appropriate
way and. nat pressuring them to exceed the limits
of what their regulations are. I don't think the
regulations have yet became unduly burdensome but
this next year, as we negotiate this legislation
with the Congress, is going to be very critical in
that respect.
A couple of years ago, about three days before a
stockholders meeting as a matter of fact, I found
that up until about a year before, there had been
a member of the CIA on the General Foods payroll.
And he had been there for about ten years. I
didn't know it and my predecessor the chief executive
hadn't known it. I felt abused, I felt abused by my
organization, but I also felt abused by the CIA. Now
I wonder whether that sort of thing could s-till happen,
A~~ir~~rRe~elOb PI~8It32p~4i~B~3R~U~2~0(5 the
 -4-
Approved For$~lease 2001/08/22: CIA-RDP80B0155~I ,Q02800020009-5
chief executive level of a company to know that there
is somebody on the payroll who has that responsibility.
A: I'll level with you. Yes-that could happen. I hope
it won't. And I have since taking office
establ-fished new rules in that regard. It is our
policy that the officers of a corporation are to know
when we establish a paid relationship with any member
of their corporat