ADMIRAL TURNER'S REMARKS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY LEXINGTON, KENTUCKY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R002800100001-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 16, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 12, 1978
• Content Type: STATEMENT

Approved FormRrelease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002800100001-4
ADMIRAL TURNER'S REMARKS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY
LEXINGTON, KENTUCKY - 12 APRIL 1978
It's really a great treat for me to be back on a university
camput, particularly that of the University of Kentucky. As Professor
Davis said, I have been here before. I have enjoyed it each time and I
know I am going to enjoy being here with you this evening. It's
especially important for us in the Intelligence world to maintain the
warm and traditional ties that have existed between the intelligence
world and the academic world in our country for many years. These ties
have become frayed in recent years because of public criticism of our
past intelligence activities, but I'm dedicated to trying to rebuild
those in every way possible. It's important to us because so much of
what we do in intelligence is not cloak and dagger, spy-drama type work;
it's good hard analysis and research just as is done on every academic
campus in our country. And, with us, as with any research institution,
you need, you crave outside stimulation. You need people who will come
in from the outside and say, those hypotheses you're working on are
outdated, or have you looked at a different alternative. The influence
of academia to intelligence in our country is extremely valuable in
this regard. We hope too that it's a two-way street; that when we
communicate with your academics that there is fruitful exchange in the
opposite direction, from our insights, as to how the government processes
around the world really do operate.
In addition to this a good relationship between the intelligence
community and the academic community is absolutely essential to us because
out life's blood comes from the annual input of a few of our college
graduates into our various intelligence organizations. We don't need a
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002800100001-4
 Approved Forplease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554 P02800100001-4
great many, but we need some of the best. I hope that in the years
ahead some of you here today will consider joining one or another of
our intelligence organizations. I can assure you it is as challenging,
academic, intellectual exercise as you will find in any profession in the
world today. Let me say that the opportunities are almost unlimited.
But if you make this choice, I'm sure that you will ask the same kind of
questions that I asked myself when the President called me back just a
little over a year ago and told me this was what he wanted me to do. I
first said to myself, what do we have to do today, to collect intelligence
information, analyze it properly so as to be of service to our policy
makers of this government in 1978 and on into 1988, rather than never
looking back and doing what would have been useful yesterday. Secondly,
how can we do that while still protecting the rights under the
Constitution, of our citizens and the basic standards of American values.
Well, I'm happy to tell you that in the year of asking those questions
and surveying our activities, I believe that we are in the midst of an
important and dramatic transformation of the American intelligence
community. It has been going on for a couple of years and it is resulting
in what I term a new American model of intelligence. Let me just describe
to you four changes or trends that are coming over the American intelli-
gence community that exemplify this new model.
The first is a change in our product. When you look back, just
over 30 years, when we first organized a centralized intelligence activity
for our country, back then the primary product of intelligence was
information about Soviet military activities and maybe a little bit
about some of their satellite nations. That was the threat, that was the
focus of concentration. Look how the world has changed around us since
then. Today we have important intercourse with almost all of the 150
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002800100001-4
 Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP80BO1554RR002800100001-4
some nations of the world. But, our relations with the vast majority of
those nations are far more political and economic than they are military.
So the focus of our analysis, our collection of information, has been
shifting and it has called upon us for new demands, new skills, new
academic areas of expertise. Now, let me not overstate the case.
Understanding Soviet military intelligence is still and must remain our
number one priority. But what we have been called upon to do today is
to expand our horizons to include much more than that and we are having
great fun with the challenge, getting into the international economic
analysis, getting into questions of anti-terrorism, questions of anti-
drug trafficking, questions of the world energy situation and its
prospects. It's exciting, it's new, it's demanding.
The second trend I'd like to mention to you, is that our
production line itself has also changed. Historically the basic produc-
tion line of intelligence has always been the human agent, the spy. It
goes back at least as far as Jericho as I know it, because Joshua sent
two spies inside before he marched around with his trumpets. Well, we've
had a refolution. In the last decade and a half or so, we have developed
new technical systems for collecting intelligence, systems which today
are producing prodigious quantities of information and data. I suspect
it's not an uncommon phenomenon to you because in the academic world
there is also a great proliferation of information that is available to
scholars. Scholars have the same challenge as our analysts. How do you
sort it out? How do you keep track of it? How do you tell what is a
critical clue so that it will fit in with something else over here and
unveil a picture to you. It's an interesting, difficult challenge that
lies ahead of us to change our production line in the way we have to, to
absorb these quantities of new technically derived data. But let me
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002800100001-4
3
 Approved For Tease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B015544D02800100001-4
emphasize that it's interesting, that while this great flow of technical
data is coming in, the need for the standard old human intelligence
agent is perhaps even greater than before. Why? Because when I'm given
some of this vast quantity of data and I present it to one of our policy
makers, generally speaking it tells us what happened somewhere in the
world yesterday, or maybe today. But then, I'm always asked the
question: why did it happen and what's going to happen next? Well,
that is the forte of the human intelligence agent--finding out what
people are thinking and what their intentions are. So, today the difference
in our production line is instead of having a single machine, the human
intelligence agent, we have to have teamwork. We have to have a careful
well-oiled meshing of our machinery between the technical and human; we
have to manage our resources better so they complement each other, so
that one fills the gap that the other one leaves. Again, it is an
exciting and demanding challenge.
The third trend I would like to mention is what I call greater
openness in intelligence. Traditionally, intelligence has always operated
at maximum secrecy and minimum disclosure. I don't think we can do that
anymore in this country in our new American model of intelligence. Why?
Because I believe the American public has the right to know as much
about our intelligence process as we can reasonably let them know. So
what we do today, we come out like I am tonight, speak more to the
American public so they can understand what we are doing and what the
contribution is that we are making to our country. We participate more
in symposiums and conferences; we respond more fully to the members of
the media and we publish more. We publish monographs that are of impor-
tance to you in the academic community and we hope of importance to the
Approved For Release 2001/08107 : IA-RDP801301.554R002800100001-4
 Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP80BO1554R002800100001-4
general American public. Tonight when we leave here I have some samples
of these unclassified publications you are welcome to take with you.
What we do today when we publish a classified study, we look at
it carefully and say what do we have to take out of this which, if
revealed, would prevent us from getting this kind of information again;
for, if revealed, it would deprive our policy makers of some unique
advantage they have, having an exclusive on this information. If, after
we've removed those things, there is enough substance left to be of
value to the American public, we publish.... (interrruption).... kind of
publication, we've done at least two studies a week for the last year,
we'll do something to help promote and improve the quality of American
debate on important issues. But, let me not overstate the case to you.
There is no way in this world today that you could conduct a sensible
intelligence activity, an effective intelligence activity, without
holding a great many secrets. But I do believe that by publishing as much
as we can that we are in effect going to protect the necessary secrets
better. When you have too much classified information there simply is
not respect for it because people realize much of it does not need to be
classified. In recent years this lack of respect has been manifested in
a few irresponsible individuals publishing information which should not
have been published in the interests of our country. I think the time
has come when we cannot tolerate that much longer because the ultimate
logic of what they are saying and doing is that each one of us, each one
of us 215 million Americans, has the right to determine what his govern-
ment should keep classified and what it should not--that is an intolerable
position. I think the time has come to again repose a little trust and
confidence in your appointed and elected officials--that they are not all
just out to censure things for their own personal benefit. But I do not
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002800100001-4
5
 Approved For R~,elease 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP80BO1554 902800100001-4
ask you to just take us on trust alone, because the fourth trend that I
would like to mention is one of greater oversight.
Out of the crucible of the last three years of public criticism,
we have forged a new process of oversight. Because we have to have
secrets there is no way that we can have total public oversight. But we
do today have mechanisms for what I call surrogate public oversight. By
this I mean we have created institutions which provide the average citizen,
or the members of the intelligence community themselves, an avenue for
expressing their complaints, their questions, or presenting what they
think should be given to the American public, but which is technically
classified. The first of these surrogates is at the White House itself,
the President and the Vice President--who today take a very active and
daily interest in our intelligence activities. The second is a new
organ created two years ago called the Intelligence Oversight Board.
I am privileged to have with us tonight one of the members of that Board,
the distinguished former Senator from Tennessee, Senator Albert Gore.
Along with Senator Gore, Governor Bill Scranton from Pennsylvania and a
Mr. Tom Farmer from Washington D.C. are the members of this board. They
are appointed by the President of the United States. They report only to
the President of the United States. Any one of you, any one of my
employees may communicate with them, any complaints, questions that you
have about intelligence activities of our country. It does not go through
me. They will look at it, they will determine whether it warrants some
action and they will report only to the President as to what they have
found. Beyond this, in the last several years we have created two addi-
tional oversight mechanisms: a committee on intelligence in the Senate
of the United States and another one in-the House of Representatives. I
am very pleased to mention to you tonight that one of the members of that
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002800100001-4
6
 Approved For Tease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554ZP02800100001-4
Senate Committee is your own Senator Dee Huddleston. He is a delight to
work with and a very fine man in this Senate Intelligence Committee.
These committees exercise a true oversight function with respect to us.
We report to them in considerable detail, they scrutinize our work, they
quiz us and they demand answers of us and we find it a very useful, and
comfortable relationship.
At the same time, let me point out that there are risks in this
oversight process. There are risks that when you've got too many people
who know secrets they will leak. There are risks that if you feel you're
bringing too many people into the process you will be timid in what you
are willing to do. We cannot have intelligence by timidity and we cannot
have intelligence if we have continuous leaks. I believe, however,
that we are striking a balance between the amount of oversight and the
amount of danger of leaks or timidity. But I would be very candid with
you. It will be several years before this balance settles out and we
know just where we stand. In the meantime, as Mr. Davis has said to you,
the President of the United States on the 24th of January, recognizing
these and other trends in our intelligence process, recognizing this new
model of American intelligence, signed an Executive Order which reorganizes,
changes the structure of our intelligence community in the following ways.
It really is going back to the National Security Act of 1947,
which attempted to establish the Director of Central Intelligence who,
as it said, would oversee the coordination of all of our intelligence
activities. It never quite worked that way. So the President this
January strengthened my authority as the Director of Central Intelligence?
not Director of the Central Intelligence Agency which is a separate
assignment--in several ways. He gave me the authority to develop and to
present to him and the Congress the budget for the entire national
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002800100001-4
7
 Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP80B01554p02800100001-4
intelligence activity. Secondly, he gave me full authority to do what we
call "tasking" of those elements of the intelligence world that go out
and collect information. It is my responsibility to see to it that they
are collecting on the right substance, that they are doing it in a
coordinated way so there is no unnecessary duplication, nor should there
be gaps or underlaps that could be dangerous. Thirdly, he has also given
me some additional authority to bring together the analytic elements of
our intelligence community to assure that we do the right kind of testing
and analyzing to help our policy makers. But here, let me express a word
of caution. I have not been given any authority to tell the analytic
agencies outside the CIA which I don't run, the analytic agencies in
Defense, or State, or Treasury, or elswhere; I have no authority to tell
them how to do their business, what to analyze or what conclusions to
come up with, because we must have competitive analysis. We must let
divergent views come forward so the decision makers really understand
what they have before them, not ;just a coordinated single view because
none of us is smart enough to interpret the intelligence data that
perfectly. And finally, the President's new order establishes a committee
under the National Security Council which is to give overall direction to
me, and to all of our intelligence activities in terms of what are our
priorities, what should we be doing, what does the nation need out of us.
Let me conclude by saying that I believe these trends in American
intelligence directed by the President in his reorganization, today are
strengthening our ability to collect and analyze that intelligence informa-
tion which our country's policy makers need. I believe today we are the
number one intelligence service in the world. But at the same time I
believe these procedures are strengthening our ability to do our job in
ways that will support and defend the institutions and the ideals of
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002800100001-4
8
 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554ZP02800100001-4
our country. Let me assure you that I am dedicated to keeping us number
one in intelligence in the world and to doing so in ways that will
support and defend our wonderful, democratic country.
Thank you very much.
9
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002800100001-4
 Approved For W ease 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP80B01554p02800100001-4
Q&A - UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY - 12 APRIL 1978
Q: Do the new authorities that have been given to you lead to the potential
for perpetuating abuses that may have occurred in the past?
A: No, it does not. Most of the abuses that have been either alleged
or proved were in an area which we call political action--trying to change
events in foreign countries as opposed to collecting intelligence. It is
not an intelligence function, it is one that this country has assigned to
the Central Intelligence Agency. Today, under law, if we are going to
undertake any political action in the world, I must obtain the signature
of the President of the United States and make a report of what we are
doing to each of the committees of Congress. I can assure you that
these are very tight strings on our doing anything that is not authorized.
Q: (Inaudible - had to do with elimination of the covert activities branch.)
A: We have not in any way eliminated the covert activities, clandestine
collection activities branch of the Central Intelligence Agency. What
we have done is to pare down excessive overhead in the Headquarters. We
are not reducing the people overseas, we are removing the overhead which
has long been recognized as unnecessary and inhibiting to the young
people who come into our organization and find themselves under-utilized
and over-supervised. We are trying to create greater opportunities for
people like yourself to join up and realize they have a good prospect for
a career ahead of them.
Q: What is your opinion of the human rights situation in Iran.
A: This is truly a matter for the State Department. My position is that
the Central Intelligence Agency and the other intelligence agencies of
our government, conduct liaison in those countries of the world where we
maintain diplomatic relations. I maintain my cue from the State Department
as to where all the agencies of our government have legitimate contacts.
There are, however, no deals or arrangements for any activities by foreign
countries in our country in eschange for our liaison with them overseas.
Q: I have no eloquent speech on the Shah. In fact, I'd rather change the
subject to something that is a bit more important. Do you see the Russian
Cosmos satellites now in orbit, nuclear powered ones, as a threat to
this nation. What are the chances of another one coming down like Cosmos
954 did in Canada and spewing radioactive waste all over the place?
A: Clearly, one cannot dismiss the possibility that that exact thing will
happen again. They have been flying these satellites, ones like that one,
for a number of years. This is the first and only instance we have had
or known about. It's a danger, our President has suggested to the Soviets
that we talk about negotiating regulations that would prohibit this kind
of thing. They have not responded.
Q: Can you tell me, what would be the CIA's activities if they would
find out intelligence information about a country that was planning to
have a socialist government or a government that was not in agreement
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002800100001-4
1
 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554 02800100001-4
or in the style of our government. What would be the CIA's activities
when they found this information out?
A: Our role is to report to our decision makers on what we think is
happening or is going to happen in those countries. We do retain a
capability for the political action that I described earlier. We
exercise it very very little today. We exercise it only under these
type of constraints. We only would take any kind of political action
in circumstances such as you described if we were directed to do so by
these constituted authorities of the government.
Q: What is the ultimate Soviet objective of their involvement in Africa?
A: I believe that the Soviet Union today will probe any opportunity they
have to extend their influence in the countries outside their present
sphere of activity. I believe they look for these opportunities and to
the extent that they can afford the cost either political, or economic,
or military, of trying to establish a position in these countries,
they will do so. They have done it at great cost, great effort just
recently in Ethiopia. We are concerned at what they may have in mind
next.
Q: (Inaudible - concerning an uprising in Iran.)
A: It is not our role to interfere in the internal affairs of other
countries... (interruption).... Let me again emphasize that political
action activity such as was reported to have taken place in Chile is
under very tight controls in our government today, both by statute and by
Executive Order of the President of the United States. There is no way
the CIA can involve itself in that kind of activity without proper
authorization of properly constituted authority.
Q: Does Soviet centralized economic activity give them an advantage over
our international corporate type economic activities?
A: On balance, no. Yes, they can direct their efforts in a more coordi-
nated way, they can reduce prices on shipping for instance and try to
corner pieces of the market. But at the same time we have so many evidences
of these controlled economies of the communist bloc being basically
inefficient and they are not strong economies. They can't even teach
their own people, and they are basically agricultural nations. But, I
don't believe that I would in any way trade ingenuity, the profit and loss
factors of our international corporations, for a controlled centralized
economy.
Q: I would like to ask, in view of the new American look in intelligence,
how does it compare with communist and Soviet intelligence? Are we
placing ourselves at a disadvantage?
A: Basically, I think not. The KGB is a very large, expensive, unscru-
pulous operation on the part of the Soviet Union. They put much more
effort into the human intelligence sphere, that I mentioned to you, than
we do or can afford. We are much better than they in technical intelligence
collection and, in any event, I have great faith that the analytic function
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002800100001-4
 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554RR002800100001-4
which is a critical part of intelligence can be done so much better in
a free society that encourages dissent and differing views such as ours,
than in a totalitarian society like the Soviets.
Q: U.S. Ambassador Andrew Young once stated that the presence of Cubans
in Africa had a stabilizing effect. I would like to know if you agree
with him or not.
A: The Cuban presence in Ethiopia has basically been destabilizing--this
has occured since that remark was made. I think it has tremendous dangers
for the future as to where it will be employed again. I don't see that
the Cubans have a legitimate interest in this kind of a situation. I
think it's a matter of real concern to our country.
Q: In the press, in all sorts of magazines and articles we are getting
a whole series of non-Central Intelligence Agency estimates; this professor
says the Soviets have learned to do this and that we are slipping behind
in that. How can we as the public evaluate these types of reports and
get an accurate picture of where we actually do stand in relation to the
Soviets.
A: It is very difficult to have to decide which are the most authoritarian,
or most unbiased in these publications. If you're talking military
balance, I would strongly recommend the International Institute of
Strategic Studies in London, which publishes very good data every year
on military situations in every country in the world. I would say that
that is exactly why we are publishing as much as we possibly can. You
can write to the Library of Congress and subscribe to everything we
publish, or you can hope to hear about which ones you have most interest
in and subscribe to those individually. They are largely on economic
and political matters because there is not much military that can be
declassified. We are trying to help on this and that's the best I can
do for you I'm afraid.
Q: Inaudible.
A: I have reviewed the material and appointed a fine member from Kentucky
who works for us, Scott Breckinridge, to look at all the data in the CIA
files on the assassination of President John Kennedy. I find no evidence
whatsoever of CIA participation or collaboration in that.
Q: What role, if any, is the CIA playing in the Italian government?
Q: Let me ask another one. What role and what does the CIA plan on doing,
if anything, about the spy device which was taken up the mountain in India--
a nuclear device which has been abandoned now and is loosing nuclear
waste and when the snows begin to melt will run off.... (inaudible)....
A: My understanding is that the report in the newspapers is that that
was 13 or 14 years ago, right? I'm not authorized and do not comment on.
either allegations or ongoing actual CIA clandestine activities. If you
do that once, then you are in the position of always having to deny it
until you get to the point where you ....(interruption).... So, I cannot
commenApWrd ltFae W6bies2OJOhLO : t 1AeRLW OB01554R002800100001-4
 Approved For Ve ease 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP80B01554&02800100001-4
UNIVERSITY QF KENTUCKY
19GO 12 April 1 . 8
Appreciate opportunity to be with you tonight,
1Have special personal affection for University of Kentucky,
Participated in seminars at your Patterson School,
Have enjoyed a. long and warm friendship with its
Director, Vince Davis.
Vince was especially helpful to me last surmier when I
was reviewing the organization of the Intelligence
Community of the United States, His ideas and suggestions
were instrumental in the final organization which was
announced by the President this past January.
While our friendship predates the assumption of my present
responsibilities,/a close relationship has always existed
between the intelligence agencies of this nation and
the academic profession,
This relationship is normal - it is in fact inevitable;
n And although both you and I may be critical of some
intelligence activities which have gone on in the past,
the vast preponderance of what we have done together
has been wholesome, mutually beneficial, and of very
great importance to the United States,
Today, I am working to strengthen the relationship
between the Intelligence Community and the Academic
Community,
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002800100001-4
 Approved For ReJ ease 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP80B01554&02800100001-4
1) Most of what we do is not the cloak and dagger
drama of spy stories, but is analysis and
interpretation of information - the same kind of
research that is conducted on every college campus,
O And, as with any, research activity, intellectual
stagnation is always a danger. Stimulation, new
approaches, and new-ideas must be infused
regularly from the outside.
? Commonality of interests, of expertise, and
of areas of inquiry inevitably make the academic
community the natural place to go,
2) Beyond that, the Intelligence Community is no
different from industry or other government agencies,
We depend on continuing infusions of bright young
college graduates to replenish our ranks. We
don't need many, but we do need some of the best.
,
V
going into intelligence work will be critical to
t,?ia
I)
Over the long run
the quality of young people
our future,
Today - perhaps more than anytime since
1947 first peacetime central intelligence r good knowledge
of what is happening in the world vital to our country.
- Greater than 30 years ago why?
In three areas of our work - military, political, and
economic intelligence - demands greater today than ever
before.
2
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002800100001-4
 Approved For ease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554 02800100001-4
Military, for example, equation today vastly different from
1947
? Then ~ dominant power
? Today ., Soviet Union - can`t compete effectively in
. political or economic spheres - depends on the area
where money can buy capability ,- military.,
? Close to parity - neither side can contemplate
war without tremendous risk,
? In this kind of situation ~ intelligence gives
impressive advantages :.
Know capabilities, plans, influences,
Give chance of predicting actions/reactions.
Can use your forces to greater advantage.
? Enemy doesn't tell you his plans or
priorities but reveals clues.
? We put clues together to determine patterns,
trends, problems.
? Same time alert policy makers facts on
which to base good decisions.
e.g. SALT
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002800100001-4
 Approved For # lease 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP80B0l554p02800100001-4
- In politics
? 30 years ago - USA dominant R other nations
io l l owed
? Today , even smallest, newest nations reject
both American and Soviet models as inappropriate
to their needs. Go it alone,
? Probably healthiest course of action. But, means
for us to continue in leadership role, must
understand the cultural imperatives, motives,
attitudes, needs of all countries learn to work
with them spirit of partnership.
? Can't do unless we learn all we can about other
nations.
Similarly, in economics
? Again, independent 30 years ago.
Today almost a cliche to say interdependent,
? Everyone recognizes the real or potential power of
OPEC, EEC, as well as our far eastern allies r. Japan and
Korea.,
? Without a good understanding of these economic forces
and advance warning of their initiatives we could lose
our shirt - individually and as a nation,
In addition to these increased needs-for good intelligence, today
we have increased public interest in what the intelligence
Community is doing and how- it is doing it,
Approved For Release 2001/08/074: CIA-RDP80B01554R002800100001-4
 Approved For IIease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554J02800100001-4
Developed over past 3 r. 4 years.of intense scrutiny and
criticism.. Much of xt ;justified - some of it not.
What is important today is that rather than a continuation
of the criticism r which frankly has had a profoundly
destructive effect on a valuable resource Z' am beginning
to sense a more constructive questioning of our activities;
? How can you acquire adequate intelligence for our country
and reflect American values while you are doing it?
? How do we know you are respecting the constitutional
rights of Americans?
o As long as much of what you do is secret, how can
you expect to earn the public trust?
All excellent questions. Let me discuss 4 changes that are
taking place which, I believe, will both
- satisfy our need for knowledge, and
- ensure we meet the high standards of our
democratic society.
Shifting Product
- 1947 - o__=one_product: military intelligence about Soviet Union
o Also 6 or 7 countries E Europe
o Soviet forays into 3rd World
o Other characteristics: not just information, but
do something about it - influence events -
Covert Action
o Iran 53, Guatemala 54, Cuba 61, Vietnam, Angola 75.
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 5 CIA-RDP80B01554R002800100001-4
 Approved For lease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B0l554 02800100001-4
- Today- o US interest expanded
o 150 + countries - interested in most
o President interested in. places and
organizations which, 5 years ago, were
little known or non-existent:
e.g., Zimbabwe, Namibia, Benin, OPEC
o So, intelligence product
1) broader geographically
2) broader topically - beyond the military
Other change today - Political or Covert Action
o Attitude - less inclined to want to interfer in
inner workings of other countries
o Utility - recognize its marginal utility.
o But, can't eschew.
Congress requires CIA maintain capability
Most likely future uses -
1) Combat terrorism e.g., nuclear device
2) Fight drug traffic
3) Try to get all sides of issues to
people in countries where the media
is controlled by the government and
only the governments interpretation
reaches people.
Second change =''different production line
Traditionally- human agent
Last decade and half - revolution in how we collect
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002800100001-4
 Approved For RBJease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554WO2800100001-4
information best typified by U-2 - made
world aware that change had occurred.
Today our problem is less how to collect, but
more, how to fully use the quantities we get.
Ironically, rather than making the human agent
obsolete it has made him more important.
o Technically collected information raises
many questions. The more you can see or
hear, the more you ask,why? What does
that mean? What will happen next?
o A photograph cannot usually answer these
questions. A human can uncover motives,
influences, plans, etc.
So today, we are using the human agent better -
pinpointing better the gaps which only he
can fill in.
- So the way we product intelligence has changed.
o Complementary: technical/human
o Stronger emphasis.on good management
of these valuable assets.
Third area of change-.' penness
- Traditionally, intelligence agencies operated
in maximum secrecy.
- Can't do that any longer - nor should we
Reasons:
Approved For Release 2001/08707 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002800100001-4
 Approved ForlWease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO155 02800100001-4
1.) You have a right to benefit from
as much information as we can share with you -
- improves public debate
- let's you know how we are working for you
benefits us through more vigorous
exchange of ideas with you.
have been publishing 2 unclassified
studies a week for the past year.
e.g., Soviet economy:
o prospects bleak
.o implications for world stability & prices
o ability of Soviets to buy technology
and manufactured goods.
e.g.,'Steel; Energy; Terrorism
2) Permits us also to protect better truly
sensitive information
- everything secret, nothing secret
- declassify as much as possible
- improve protection of real secrets -
- What are they?
o our sources - would dry up
o our methods - could compromise
enormously expensive systems
or jeopardize peoples lives
o An advantage gained by knowing
Approved For Release 2001/08/078: CIA-RDP80BO1554R002800100001-4
 Approved For alease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554i 002800100001-4
something the enemy doesn't know
we know.
e.g., if during WW II the Axis
powers knew we had their codes
they would have changed them
immediately and cut off our
unique window on their plans.
An aside - real lack of respect today
for classified information.
e.g., Agee, Snepp - not so much a question of
whether or not they divulged secrets -
although certainly important - more
the problem of any individual taking it
upon himself to decide what can or cannot
be released to the general public
(including, I might add, the KGB, who
read every line printed publicly in
this country).
o Agee and Snepp are not in a position to judge
the harm the wrong information can do in the KGB's
hands because they are not aware of all the
equities in the situation.
o logical extenstion would be for all 215 million
Americans to decide what should or should not
be kept secret - chaos.
Approved For Release 2001/08/079: CIA-RDP80BO1554R002800100001-4
 Approved For4lease 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554$002800100001-4
o Suggest we move away from the
Watergate mentality which holds all
public officials guilty of constant
deception or worse. Time to return to
where public places a modicum of confidence
in public officials.
o Not asking for no checks on what we do --
asking for the use of established checks -
many of them totally new, and, I believe,
.fully effective to protect your interest -
Brings me to fourth change -
Oversight
Public oversight impractical
- Surrogate oversight
President
NSC
IOB
Congressional Committees
- Strengths
o Others share decisions
o Closer contact with public will
Risks
o Danger of leaks as increase number in the know
o danger of timidity
Approved For Release 2001/0&t 7 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002800100001-4
 Approved For please 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80B01554WO2800100001-4
- Finding balance
In January, President recognized these changes I've been
discussing and incorporated them in an E.O.
Three characteristics of E.O.
1) Establishes PRC
o guidance
o priorities
o SecSta/Def/NSC Adv/Treas.
2) Strengthened DCI
o To pull together diverse agencies and coordinate
o Collection expensive - must coordinate
o Analysis - remains independent
3) Checks & Balances through Attorney General
o Protects rights of US citizens.
- New procedures, orders will do 2 things:
1) Strengthen our ability to produce superior
intelligence for decision makers
2) Protects both your rights and the values of this
nation.
- I can assure you, I am dedicated to those goals.
- Thank you.
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 :191A-RDP80B01554R002800100001-4
 G
SE
E:O
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002800100001-4
 Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002800100001-4
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R002800100001-4