LAW OF THE SEA COUNTRY STUDY SUPPLEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R000800140006-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 12, 2003
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: August 1, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Relea 2003/03/28: CIA-RDP80B01495R000 ,0140006-~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
STAT
Law Of The Sea Country Study
Supplement
BGI LOS 74-13 SUPP
August 1975
Republic of India
At Caracas and Geneva, India bowed to the will of other
wide-margin states and dropped its key LOS stance -- that coastal-
state seabeds should be cut off at 200 miles to forestall leaving
"virtually nothing" for the international community. It now
favors extending national seabeds to the outer edge of the
continental margin but insists that revenues from mineral
resources beyond 200 miles should be shared with underdeveloped
states through the proposed international authority.
Seabeds are increasingly important to India as the world
energy crisis, plus New Delhi's goal of oil self-sufficiency by
the 1980s, spur the search for oil resources offshore and on.
Its sole producing offshore field, Bombay High in the Gulf of
Cambay, may yield at least 1 million metric tons this (its
second) year and 10 times as much within 5 years. With foreign
assistance others may soon be developed in areas from the
Kutch Basin and Saurashtra to Lakshadweep off the west coast,
in the Cauvery Basin off the southeast coast, and in the West
Bengal-Orissa Basin off the northeast coast. Interest in these
and other seabed resources has prompted India to start delimiting
its maritime boundaries; agreements have been signed with
Indonesia and Sri Lanka but not yet with its other six neighbors.
New Delhi is having problems with Dacca, which wants the median
line bent slightly westward to compensate for area denied by
its curved shoreline. India disagrees, both to avoid setting a
bad precedent and also to assure its presence in the area should
suspected large oil reserves be found. American firms are
independently conducting the search for the two countries.
This supplement was prepared by the Office of Geographic and
Cartographic Research to support the NSC Interagency Task Force
on the Law of the Sea. The supplement updates, but is not a
replacement for, BGI LOS 74-13. Comments and questions may be
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At Caracas India also adopted the prevailing view on fisheries;
rather than a 100-mile exclusive fishing zone, it now favors a
fishing zone coincident with the 200-mile economic zone.
India's other LOS positions are largely the same as before
Caracas, but some have been altered by events or were more sharply
defined at the Caracas and Geneva sessions.
Before the two meetings India strongly opposed all sea-related
nuclear activities. Doubts it voiced about "free" vs. "innocent"
passage in straits stemmed from a fear of ship-based nuclear
emissions. India still opposes the placement of nuclear and
other mass-destruction weapons on the seabed and ocean floor but
has changed its view on nuclear vessels since becoming the world's
sixth nuclear power in May 1974 and is seriously considering
acquiring some for its navy and merchant fleet. With this, it
appears India's support for the U.S. view on unimpeded straits
transit is now conclusive.
Before Caracas the only archipelago comment from India,
which has two archipelagos and about 1,000 islands, was that it
opposed any claim that restricted passage through traditional
shipping channels. At Caracas, however, India called for a
"suitable regime" for archipelagos and islands and urged that
"no distinction" be made among archipelagos that: constitute a
single state, are an integral part of a coastal state, or are
some distance away from a coastal state. India's "Mr. LOS,"
Dr. S. P. Jagota, particularly stressed that the Andaman and
Nicobar archipelago -- which he called an "extension of the
Indonesian chain" -- be handled on a par with Indonesia or any
other archipelago. After the India-Indonesia delimitation agree-
ment was signed in August 1974, however, India's concern over
"unequal treatment" apparently vanished and its spokesmen said
nothing about archipelagos at Geneva.
In an international forum and particularly in a "Group of 77"
frame of reference, India tends to voice its opinions more
forcefully than it does in low-key, factual meetings with U.S.
officials. What had seemed fairly bland views on scientific
research and marine pollution, for instance, appeared more
pointed as India led the push for exclusive coastal-state control
in these areas. By and large, however, India's LOS stance con-
tinues to be shaped by the same world position it had before
Caracas and Geneva: to be neutral vis-a-vis the major powers, to
champion the underdog -- in this case landlocked and narrow-margin
states -- and to be a major spokesman for underdeveloped nations.
India's future LOS role more than likely will blend these inter-
national objectives with its own national priorities.
Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1495R000800140006-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY