THE EFFECT OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS ON SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCE PLANNING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01439R000500170007-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 1, 2000
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: June 17, 1969
• Content Type: MEMO

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SUBJECT: The Effect of the Cuban Missile Crisis
on Soviet Strategic Force Planning
1. In October 1962 the leaders of the USSR were
faced by a substantial US superiority in operational
intercontinental strategic strike force and the pro-
spect that the margin of superiority probably would
continue to grow for at least another two or three
years.
2. Earlier--perhaps a year or more before--the
Soviet political and military leaders had probably
come to the view that the limited capabilities of
their intercontinental strategic forces compared with
those of the US would, if not redressed, provide the
US with a potential first strike capability. Soviet
defense planners in making a prudent assessment of the
strategic balance had probably concluded that, although
the considerable Soviet strategic forces targetted
against western Europe provided some measure of deter-
rence, the USSR would have no assured retaliatory
capability with respect to the US until about 1966. By
the fall of 1962, the Soviet leaders were also aware
that US intelligence collection capabilities ruled out
reliance on bluff and bluster.
3. These factors probably caused deep concern in
the Kremlin. From the Soviet point of view, the US
strategic posture not only posed a serious potential
threat to the national security of the USSR, but also
severely circumscribed Soviet foreign policy options
throughout the world. Khrushchev probably viewed the
emplacement in Cuba of strategic systems capable of
reaching the US as the quickest way of redressing at
least partially the strategic imbalance. Successfully
carried out, it could have other immediate political
returns as well. Khrushchev's Berlin objectives were
probably closely intertwined with the over-all strategic
goals.
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4. The confrontation with US strategic power in
the Cuban crisis probably confirmed the Soviet belief
that anything less than a rough strategic equality
with the US would leave them vulnerable both political-
ly and militarily. Apparently the experience also
persuaded the Soviet leaders that in order to avoid
another period of strategic inferiority they would have
to react more rapidly to future US plans for force im-
provements.
5. The failure of Khrushchev's gamble in Cuba
probably did not alter the Soviet goal of achieving and
maintaining a credible deterrent, but it may well have
been an important factor in determining the pace, timing,
and dimensions of the Soviet effort to build a strong
strategic offensive capability. The Cuban experience un-
doubtedly provided strong support for those in the Kremlin
who advocated large scale deployments of the SS-9, SS-11
and new SLBM strategic systems then under development in
the USSR.
6. At the time of the Cuban crisis the US had an
overwhelming strategic superiority over the USSR. The
US had an 8-to-1 advantage in intercontinental bombers.
Each nation had about 100 submarine launched ballistic
missiles but the US Polaris missiles had a range of
1500 miles and were deployed in nuclear submarines where
the Soviet missiles had a range of only 350 miles and
all but three were deployed in diesel submarines. The
US had some 125 Atlas andTitan ICBMs--most of them de-
ployed in hardened silos--and 105 Thor and Jupiter
medium range missiles deployed within striking range
of the USSR. The Soviets had only 50 ICBMs, all of
which were deployed in relatively vulnerable soft sites.
7. Probably of even greater concern to the Soviets
was the fact that from their point of view their rela-
tive position would continue to worsen for about another
three years. By the beginning of 1966, when the first
SS-9 and SS-11 ICBMs would become operational, the US was
scheduled to have more than 1100 operational ICBM laun-
chers, all deployed in hard silos, while the Soviet de-
ploymdnt would only be about 225 launchers, most of which
would be located in soft complexes. Moreover, because
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The US superiority
in SLBMs on nuclear submarines would increase to 400
for the US and 15 for the USSR. US bomber forces were
scheduled to decline with the phaseout of the B-47, but
would still outnumber the Soviet bomber force by nearly
4 to 1.
8. The comparisons of forces outlined above
illustrate the vastly inferior strategic position of
the USSR which probably provided the major motivation
for Khrushchev's decision to place nuclear strike forces
in Cuba in 1962. It seems likely that the Soviets de-
cided not to deploy their second generation ICBM systems--
the SS-7 and SS-8--on a large scale not only because of
the shortcomings of these systems, but also because a
crash program probably would have delayed the deployment
of their third generation ICBM systems--the SS-9 and
SS-11. Thus, it appears that Khrushchev decided to de-
ploy existing medium range systems in Cuba as a stop-gap
measure which would quickly and cheaply improve the re-
lative strategic position of the USSR.
9. The attempt to convert Cuba into a Soviet stra-
tegic nuclear base can be interpreted as an admission of
the inadequacy of the Soviet strategic deterrent and as
a measure of the Soviet concern about the possible mili-
tary and political consequences of this inadequacy. By
1961 the USSR probably was aware of the growing US capa-
bility to detect and monitor Soviet strategic force
deployments and knew that it could no longer represent
its strategic capability as being much greater than it
actually was.
10. In addition to causing genuine apprehensions
about the security of the USSR, the US superiority pro-
bably was viewed by Khrushchev as a restriction on his
political flexibility in international relations--e.g.,
in resolving the Berlin queAtion. The failure of his
bold move probably reinforced the Soviet conviction
that the USSR could not afford the military risks and
political penalties of not competing with the US in a
strategic arms race.
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11. A review of military programs and expenditures
indicates that there was no abrupt redirection of Soviet
effort immediately following the Cuban missile crisis.
The relative stability in expenditures for strategic and
general purpose force programs (excluding research and
development expenditures) during the 1963-1965 period
suggests that the Soviets decided to wait until the ad-
vanced systems then in development--e.g., the SS-9, the
SS-11, and Y-class SLBM systems--would be available for
large scale deployment to redress the strategic imbal-
ance . The general size of the deployment for these
systems probably was determined during this period.
Continuation of the rapid rise in expenditures for re-
search and development programs--which began in the
1950's--is an indication of the Soviet determination to
pay the price of running a strategic arms race with the
US. The large R&D programs undoubtedly were designed
to provide the Soviet leadership with sufficient flexi-
bility to fulfill their requirements for strategic forces
under any foreseeable contingencies.
12. The Cuban missile crisis may have provided the
USSR with an important lesson on the nature of a strate-
gic arms race. The US reacted to the "missile gap" of
the late 1950's with plans for major strategic programs,
principally Minuteman and Polaris. The USSR, however,
did not immediately respond to the US force improvement
plans so that by the fall of 1962 it found itself in a
worsening strategic position. Since the Cuban crisis,
it appears that the USSR has attempted to anticipate the
deployment of new US weapons systems and moved to offset
them.
13. The expressed Soviet interest in discussing
strategic arms limitation is probably prompted at least
in part by their desire to preserve their current stra-
tegic position in the face of US improvements in stra-
tegic capabilities planned for the Seventies. Extension
of SS-9 and SS-11 deployment and continued Soviet ABM
testing may represent other-Soviet responses to US plans
for the deployment of MIRVs and an ABM system.
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