IMPLICATIONS OF WASFI TAL'S ASSASSINATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01439R000500080003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 28, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For R~leasa 2004/02/02 : CIA-RDP80B01439F000500080003-8
CENTML INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate c)f Intelligence
2$ November 1971
SUBJECT: Implications of Wasfi Tal's Assassination
1. Jordanian Fri minister Wasfi Tal's assassination
in Cairo on undhy will intensify the already stormy atmos-
phere within ;the Arab world. At the very least, relations
between Cairo and Am --perennially strained, but somewhat
improved of late--will take a sharp turn for the worse.
Damascus, too, may come in for a share of the blame.
2. The incident will again turn the spotlight on the
status of the Palestinians in the Arab world, and par-
ticularly in Jordan. Three of T'al'e assailants--there may
have b "n as ; many seven according Press re orts--_
have been ca ht .
25X1 1 11
un en a woman apparent y telephoned the press in
Cairo claiming that a Palestinian commando group called
the "Black So to er" organization--a reference to last
September's civil war in Jordan--was responsible. This
3. There is little doubt that fedayeen of some stripe
are responsible for the slaying, although there may have
been others involved--either Jordanian politicians who have
long been maneuvering for Tel's job, or Egyptians with
decades-old hostility to Tel, or both. A Syrian connection
is less likely, although individual Syrians working _on
their own may have participated.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/02/02 : CIA-RDP80BO1439R000500080003-8
 Approved For Release 2004/02/02 : CIA-RDP80BO1439R000500080003-8
4. Interrogation of the captured assailants is being
handled by the Egyptian security officials, perhaps with
lose eethusiasm than their Jordanian counterparts. The
Jordanians will certainly bend every effort to ascertain
precisely which group or groups of fedayeen are responsible,
and an ir~xmiedi,a.te campaign will be launched to round up
members. Unless more precise knowledge develops we can
expect round-pups of underground fedayeen and Palestinians
within Jordan----although there is a good chance that the
people responsible are based in Beirut or Damascus; Jordan
has laeeked a favorable climate for fedayeen operations
since July. Vi'al's death will upset the Jordanian army,
which had considerable admiration for his hard--nosed policy
towards the fedayeen, but it will not arouse the kind of
wholesale veeasnce--seeking that the assassination of the
King or the gown Prince would have provoked. There seems
to be no reason to expect a bloodbath.
5. Tel's departure from the scene is unlikely to re-
sult in any significant shift of policy within Jordan. The
King is not likely to appoint as the new Prime Minister any
of Tal's political rivals---particularly if he has any sus-
picion that they might have had a hand in his death. This
would eliminate Bahjat Talhuni and Abd al-Munim Rifai, who
have been angling to replace Tal for the past year, from
the political scene for the immediate future; their names
had been frequently raised an candidates for the premiership
that would be more acceptable to the Palestinians. Tel's
successor will either share the hard-line approach to the
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/02/02 : CIA-RDP80BO1439R000500080003-8
 Approved For Rouse 2004/02/02 : CIA-RDP80BO1439RD90500080003-8
25X1
fedayeen of both Tal and the yin or will be a colorless 25X6
ead
e n
fedayeen will be more rigidly e than ever; no event
could have been better calculated to confirm to the Kin(
the rightness of his previous policies. If anything, the
King and his counselors will be tempted to take the offensive
against more radical commando leaders ;
25X1
25X1
6. Like the hijackings to Dawson's Landing in Septem-
ber 1970, the assassination of Tal will serve to tarnish
further the image of the fedayeen in the public eye.
sympathy will automatically flow towards the Jordanian
government; it might even be strong enough to give Syria
a pretext for reopening its border with Jordan, something
which Syria was supposedly on the verge of doing in any
event. Should pro-Jordanian sentiments prevail in the
Arab world for any length of time, the event might even
induce the Kuwaitis to renew their subsidies to Jordan.
Much depends, however, on actions taken by the Jordanian
government in the immediate future. An instinctive heavy-
handed crackdown on Palestinians and Jordan's few remaining
fedayeen or a punitive raid into Syria could reverse the
flow of sympathy and turn Husayn once against into a popular
villain.
7. Tel's death seems certain to write an end to
negotiations between the Jordanian government and the
fedayeen aimed at permitting the commandos some kind of
official status within the country. These negotiations
have dragged on for months and the latest round broke up
only on Friday; there was little chance of an agreement at
best. The assassination will give the Jordanians a better
reason in Arab eyes for continuing the hard line they have
25X1
Approved For Release 2004102102 m - 00080003-8
 i
Approved For Rbjease 2004/02/02 : CIA-RDP80BO1439R000500080003-8
been taking all along; the government can argue that so long
as the fedayeen are operating primarily against Jordan, and
not against "the enemy," Israel, the government can not
reasonably be expected to facilitate their task. If the
event results in an upsurge of sympathy for Jordan, the
country's previous position of outsider in pan-Arab circles
may be somewhat improved. Again, Jordan's own reactions
may be the crucial factor.
8. Relations between Jordan and Egypt will in part
depend on how much cooperation Cairo gives Amman in the
days ahead. Tal was notorious as a foe of Egypt, and
particularly of President Nasir; he blamed Nasir's socialist,
Arab nationalist movement as responsible for the Egyptian
errors of the last twenty years and the present plight of
the Arab world. A right-wing autocrat himself, Tal had
no use for any of the "progressive" socialist governments
of the Middle East but his hatred was focused on Nasir's
Egypt because Nasir was the dominant force in the area yet
was a failure as a dictator. Tal had a much better opinion
of Egyptian President Sadat, but his. appointment as Prime
Minister was strongly opposed by Cairo and has been a bone
of contention between the two countries for the past thirteen
months. Egypt is unlikely to have had a hand in the plot,
which could upset Sadat's own programs and timetables, but
King Husayn will blame Cairo at least for improper security
precautions. There seems to be little hope that the King's
planned trip to Cairo--which was to mark the dawn of better
relations between the two countries--will come off.
9.1
Jar an an anger may
against amascus as well; it was already inf l am-' ed b
another
y
killi
ng incident near the Syrian border on 27 November. The
effect is unlikely to last, however. Tal's relations with
senior Syrian officials had been by and large good, despite
the border clashes between the two countries last August
and the closure of Syria's border to Jordanian goods. There
are ties by marriage between high officials in both countries,
25X1
25XM
25X1
25
Approved For Releasle 2004/02/02 : CIA-RDP80BOI4 9R000500080003-8
 Approved For ROleas
25X1
10. The most ,t effect of the event on the
pan-Arab atmosphere will be to complicate any kind of
coordinated Arab approach to
mow.
wring for war.
a -it'Tof-ypt has been try nq an
agreed policy on dealing with Israel through the United
Nations and on preparing for the "battle" which he says is
now inevitable. This was the reason for the defense ministers'
meeting in Cairo which Tel was attending when he was shot.
Sadat presumably had hoped to have King Husayn's public
acquiescence in his diplomatic efforts before the General
Assembly debate, and he still needs someone to man the
Eastern Front against Israel. At a minimum, the assassina-
tion will be a distraction from Sadat's scenario, although
a delay may not be unwelcome to him. If the assassination
sets off another cycle of inter-Arab hostility, he will
find it harder still to confront Israel and the great powers
with a believable threat of united Arab action.
Approved For Release X2004/02/02 : CIA-RDP80B01439R0Q0500080003-8
25X1