INTERIM REPORT OF TASK FORCE VII (ANALYST TO ANALYST COMMUNICATIONS)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01139A000500200005-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2001
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: REPORT

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Interim Report of Task Force VII
(Analyst to Analyst Communications)
1. As a result of its own deliberations and informal discussions
with analysts of varying levels in State, CIA (DD/I) and DIA, the
Task Force has reached certain interim conclusions concerning the
problem of communications between analysts. These are based primarily
on our partial investigation of the Latin American area, but we suspect
that they are applicable in large part to other areas of the world as
well.
a) There are, in fact, a surprisingly large number of
by which analysts from differing agencies collaborate and
communicate. Among these ways are: the USIB committees and
subcommittees; the NIE mechanism; the coordination of the CIB;
various task forces set up from time to time; informal analysts
discussion groups, e.g. Guatemala; and the operation of normal,
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analysts identify their opposite numbers in other agencies,
exchange information and opinions, and achieve working level
cooperation. Nonetheless, there is variation in the application
of these arrangements with respect to both geographic and functional
coverage. For crisis coverage, analyst communications normally are
good; in quiet areas, exchanges are minimal.
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b) The time factor has a very real bearing on the question
of analyst communications. This factor also is closely related
to the problem of secure communications that is discussed in
paragraph . Thus we find that consultation on current
intelligence is very spotty -- timeliness takes precedence over
coordination. On the other hand,_longer-range intelligence --
VVVIA,
c) The problem of identifying the appropriate analysts in
another agency is directly related to the organizational structure
of that agency or office. State, which has a straight forward
geographic organization, presents little problem in comparison with
CIA and DIA, which are organized on a mixed geographic and functional
basis. The exchange of current organization charts would be helpful
to each agency as a means of identifying the intelligence capabilities
of other members of the community. Charts, however, should not be
considered a tool for identifying analysts. (See paragraph (d) below).
In order to avoid misuse and to overcome problems of security,
organization charts should be held only in the top offices of each
agency and in established liaison circles.
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d) The problem of identification has two facets. One is
the identification of the responsible analyst at the appropriate
level in the chain of command; the other is identification of the
most knowledgeable or expert person on a particular subject,
wherever he may be within an organization. The first kind of
identification can usually be done, if necessary, through
established liaison channels, albeit these channels are sometimes
slow and cumbersome. The second kind of identification, however,
is extremely difficult and depends on the variables of individual
knowledge or acquaintance. Even within agencies) themselves
organized method for this kind of identification exists, except
within DIA which has now established a roster of its personnel
showing the area or subject specialties and background of each
individual. Rosters, however, should be considered to be
intra-agency tools, primarily for the purpose of adjusting personnel
assignments to meet crisis situations. For inter-agency communications
to be effective, command requirements must be maintained. Thus it is
the responsible analyst who is the key in this type of communications
cycle and not the analyst who might be identif'ed as yior know e eable.
P pi'-A'.4 ~44-1 J I
/or these reasons the idea of an interagency 'rector*?,seems of
dubious value -- even if the many obstacles of its preparation and
maintenance could be overcome. Our present thinking on this problem
of identification tends in the direction of improved liaison arrange-
ments and the development of more clearly established points of
approved contact.
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e) The problem of secure communications between agencies
deserves increased attention. It is suggested that the
distribution and use of the "gray" line might be examined,
with a view to making it more accessible to analysts. Arrange-
ments now under way for secure facsimile transmission between
the NMCC and Operations Centers in State and CIA may alleviate
this problem to some extent. In this general field particulary,
we feel K we shall, as we proceed, need the assistance and expertise
of a representative from the NSA.
f) Indiiual security clearances as a means of promoting
security in analyst to analyst communication does not appear to
present a problem in Latin America.- This may, however, not be true
elsewhere where more exotic types of collection efforts are
employed.
2. It has often been assumed that existing arrangements for analyst
to analyst communication and collaboration were seriously deficient. For
the purpose of confirming this assumption, and pin-pointing more precisely
the specific areas of deficiency, the Task Force has developed a questionnaire
which it is discussing with selected analysts in State, DIA and CIA concerned
with Latin America. DIA has completed these discussions and State and CIA
expect to do so shortly. The Task Force will then be in a position to direct
its attention to specific areas for improvement, if such should emerge.
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