THE WORLD SITUATION IN 1970 INCLUDING AN EXAMINATION OF THE US AND SOVIET WORLD POSITIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01086A000900190020-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2004
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: January 9, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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The Honorable
William P. Rogers
This is the study I mentioned to you at
lunch on Wednesday. I hope you will find it
helpful.
Richard Helms
Attachment - 1
The t~-orld Situation in 1970 -
Including an Examination of the
US and Soviet World Positions.
9 January 1970
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9 January 1970
1. Following up on one of the themes you raised
during our talk at Camp David in October, I thought you might
find it useful at the beginning of the New Year to have a
paper from the Agency taking a look at the world situation.
Accordingly, I asked that the attached document be written.
It is not a coordinated intelligence community publication
although the senior officers and analysts of the Agency
generally agree with its thrust. This is not to say that
fault cannot be found with some assertions on such a large
subject, but it is to point out that we have made a serious ef-
fort to give a balanced picture of the world scene as we see it
at the beginning of this decade.
2. The Secretary of State has been given the only other
copy of this document.
Attachments - 2
The World Situation in 1970
Richard Helms
Director
_D1~1_ D1P> 0~9L1086#0900190020-2
9 January 1970
The World Situation in 1970
Including an Examination of the
US and Soviet World Positions
Page
I.
INTRODUCTION
1
II.
THE COMMUNIST WORLD
3
III.
THE US WORLD POSITION
10
IV.
PROBLEMS IN THE EXERCISE OF POWER
15
V.
THE NATURE OF THE CONTEST
17
VI.
CHANGE AND CHALLENGE IN THE 1970's
20
Urbanization
Anti-Establishmentarianism
Violence
Ethnic and Racial Conflict
Radical Nationalism
Technological Change
Coping with Complexity and "Bigness"
Establishing a Community of Understanding
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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MEMORANDUM
The World Situation in 1970
Including an Examination of the
US and Soviet World Positions
1. A number of developments of the past several years
would seem to have improved the Soviet world position and
weakened that of the US. For example, the USSR is surpassing
the US in numbers of ground-based intercontinental missiles;
it is rapidly building up its force of ballistic missile
submarines and challenging US naval supremacy in certain
waters. It has gained political influence in the Arab world
and political entree to other areas previously barred to it.
It appears to have survived the opprobrium of the Czech
invasion very well indeed; the new West German government is
seeking improved relations with the USSR and its neighbors
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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in Eastern Europe, and the West European states are
responding favorably to Soviet approaches for a European
security conference. While Soviet intellectuals
continue to harass the Soviet system, the regime seems
to have demonstrated both the will and the capacity to
slap down dissension at home.
2. On the other hand, the US might seem to be
faltering in its hold on power. Military and foreign
aid appropriations are being reduced; new military
programs are the subject of serious political controversy,
even when US military supremacy is being challenged by on-
going Soviet programs. US political predominance in
Latin America has slipped and may slip more; US political
influence in the Eastern Arab world is minimal; the US
remains the major external factor in Western European
political, economic, and military affairs, but the West
Europeans are more prone than before to pursue their
own national or regional interests and to subject US
policies to close scrutiny. The US is engaged in the
delicate policy of withdrawing from Vietnam while
trying to preserve in Southeast Asia the objectives
of its intervention. Meanwhile, the US must seem to the
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outside world to be in political and social turmoil,
uncertain of how to cope with problems of crime, dissent,
inflation, poverty, etc., and unable to articulate
generally accepted national goals.
3. On the face of it, these considerations add up
to a gloomy picture, but they are not the whole story.
They do not take full account of the weaknesses and
failures in the Soviet Union and in the Communist
world, but -- most important of all -- they are based
upon an over-simplified view of the contesting forces
in the world today. They invoke a definition of the
cold war which no longer corresponds to reality. Power
and influence are not to be measured simply by the ebb
and flow of international politics or by some current
phase in the inevitable challenge and response of
domestic social change. The problem is one of
perspective.
4. The paramount concern of the United States is
its relationship with the USSR. This is true, not only
because the USSR alone possesses the military power to
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do us real harm, but also because the Communist world
as a whole has lost its capacity to act or even speak in
a unified fashion. In short, the Communist world is replete
with trouble. It is not necessary here to do more than list
some of the problems: China and USSR almost totally at odds
on everything, and China fearing a Soviet military attack;
North Korea run by a self-anointing, intractable dictator
scornful of Soviet tutelage; Tito still defiant and experi-
menting with new forms of socialist polity; Eastern Europe a
hotbed of nationalism with emerging tough leaders who care
less about communism than about power and independence
and who do not intend to make Dubcek's mistake and give the
USSR cause to intervene; the East Germans the kind of friends
the Soviets might happily exchange for less difficult
enemies; the Italian (and to a lesser degree, the French)
Communist Party openly disagreeing with Soviet policy and
openly divided over doctrine and tactics; Castro a costly,
recalcitrant, and inefficient satrap whose dreams of Cuban
economic success at home and revolutionary success abroad
are turning to dust; the many Communist parties around the
world which have found either that they must remain small,
ineffective, and ridiculous, or become bourgeois in
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method -- and almost in doctrine -- if they hope to gain
a place in their nations' political life.
5. As a consequence,'the Soviet leaders have had to
devote an increasing proportion of their time, energy,
and rlt'sources to trying to maintain a semblance of order
in their own camp, and they are not having a great deal
of success at it. For example, the military build-up
against China has absorbed resources which otherwise
would have been devoted to the improvement of their out-
of-date and inadequately supplied forces in the Western
USSR. International Communist conferences designed to
show that the Communist world is not falling apart suffer
delays, postponements, and then dissenting opinions and
abstentions on final resolutions anyway.
6. In many areas outside the Communist world, the
USSR has not done very well either, and seems to be narrowing
both its activities and its hopes. Its foreign aid and
subversive activities have converted no nations to
communism; some -- such as Ghana and Indonesia -- have
even become anti-Communist; some -- such as Syria -- have
become problem children. In two major nations, India and
Indonesia, Soviet arms shipments have even made our
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problems easier; they strengthened India against China, and
they better enabled the Indonesian armed forces to liquidate
the Indonesian Communist Party. The USSR has expanded its
diplomatic and commercial contacts around the world, but
it has found its efforts in some countries (Tanzania and
Yemen, for example) challenged by the Chinese Communists.
And in some places, such as Congo Kinshasa and the Ivory
Coast, its diplomatic and cultural missions have been
severely restricted or asked to leave. There has been a
surge of nationalism in nearly every part of the world,
and ardent nationalists don't make the kind of Communists
the Soviets like.
7. Indeed, it is far from clear that the leaders of
the Soviet Union are actually trying to build up a
Communist empire, whatever Soviet rhetoric may proclaim.
Competition and movement under Krushchev have given way
to preservation and safety under his successors. Many of
their activities have been defensive; to restore their
position among the Arabs after failing to. come to their
aid in 1967, to preserve influence in India after the
antics of the Chinese Communists in 1962, to stop the
hemorrhage in Berlin (in 1961) and to preserve the
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Communist system in Eastern Europe (1968), to prevent the
liberal infection among intellectuals from threatening the
Soviet system at home, to continue the great effort to
pull closer to the United, States in total strategic power.
This is not to say that they have retreated from any
attained position or refused to exploit opportunities.
But they have not seized every opportunity to make mischief
(as for example in Africa) or rushed in to pursue aggres-
sively every opening they have had (as for example in
Syria). They have tempered their doctrinal commitment
to world revolution by a heavy dose of realism. They act
as if they do not want to take on additional clients that
will cause more trouble than they are worth or expose the
Soviets to countermeasures which might not only lose them
the game but expose the USSR itself to danger.
8. It would not be correct to say that the Soviets
are simply trying to maintain the status quo. They are
a thrusting and ambitious power, concerned to enlarge
their world position. They are seeking to gain influence
and position in places denied to them. They want to
become a major factor in the affairs of more nations,
and they are pursuing the age-old formula that the object
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of international politics is to increase the number of
one's friends and decrease the number of one's enemies.
But they are tempering their ambitions with estimates of
feasibility and are controlling their hostility with
measurements of power and risk. In Europe and in
relations with the United 'States, for example, they
are showing a keen interest in legitimizing the positions
they have attained. They are upset over the situation
in Eastern Europe, and -- whether they are aware of it
or not -- and they may have an insoluble problem;
economic and political liberalization threatens Communist
control, but a refusal to liberalize risks economic
stagnation and fails to engage popular cooperation
and constructive managerial effort.
9. It is probably in relation to the United States
that the USSR is behaving with the keenest eye for a
realistic view. The US is clearly the USSR's strongest
and most effective adversary today, but China in some
sense is viewed as potentially even more dangerous. It
is more bitter toward the USSR, less rational about the
risks and horrors of nuclear war, both more populous
and a closer neighbor, and also a possible collaborator
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with the US against the USSR. Partly because of these
dangers from the Chinese side, there has been a shift
in Soviet thinking toward the view that perhaps with
the more rational Americans it might be possible to arrange
some sort of stabilization in Europe, in the Middle East,
in the arms race, or even possibly in Asia. This can,
partially at least, explain the pressure for a European
security conference, the two-power and four-power talks
on the Middle East, the encouraging opening of the strategic
arms talks, and the suggestion of a need for some form
of collective security in Asia.
10. The Soviets have other reasons, of course. In
the field of strategic armaments itself, they are confront-
ed with unpalatable alternatives. To actually surpass
the US would require high expenditures and place a heavy
squeeze on resources; it might not work anyway, since the
US could, if it wished, easily outbuild the Soviets. To
allow the US to press on and make the USSR sadly inferior
is not acceptable either. The Soviet leaders are also
coming to realize that their economy is not what it
ought to be in terms of modernization and efficiency.
That economy has such a high degree of centralized control
and has so many built-in obstacles to the application
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of new technology, to the most efficient forms of invest-
ment, and to the most creative endeavors of workers and
management, that it is failing to grow nearly as rapidly as
desired, and -- worse -- it is failing to narrow the gap
between the USSR and the industrial nations of the west.
The Soviet leaders cannot do very much about this unless
they adopt measures which would reduce the control of the
political apparatus over the economic establishment. This
they are afraid to do for fear of the ultimate political
consequences, and they certainly do not want to do so
when their enemies abroad might be able to take advantage
of it. But until or unless they do so, the. armaments race
will prove very costly, and the USSR will hardly appeal
to the leaders of the developing states as the best model
for economic advancement.
11. The unique position which the US enjoyed after
World War II -- military invulnerability, enormous
financial resources, and the good will and respect of
most of the world's peoples -- was bound to disappear. It
was one of those moments in world history that occur by
happenstance. And it was our policy not to try to per-
petuate it. We recognized that we could not rule the
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world, even if we had wished it. We recognized that the
use of our economic resources to help others in recon-
struction and development was preferable to letting them
slip into despair and chaos. We recognized that other
people had different cultures and social systems and
that they would not wish to follow, and might even
challenge, our own.
12. In responding to the changing situation we were
confronted with a large number of difficult decisions.
How much and what kind of military power should we have,
and how should we use it? What parts of the world were
vital to us? How should we react to the various efforts
of the USSR to overcome its inferiority and acquire a
stronger world position? What did the Soviet leaders
really want, and were their objectives and methods
changing? How much was the Communist world a single
power bloc? What was the best way to assist others in
economic reconstruction and development? Should we
assist, ignore, or try to contain emerging nationalism
around the world? What should we do about friends who
quarrel with each other? And many more.
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13. The policies we adopted, most of them in
response to particular situations and contemporary judg-
ments, were not -- by hindsight -- always the right ones,
and we have modified many of them as the situation has
changed. We have lost influence in some respects, gained
it in others, and sometimes found a substantial loss
followed by a substantial gain, or vice versa. If one
judges influence by the pliancy of foreign offices, there
is no doubt that the loss -- on a world-wide basis -- has
been substantial. But if one judges by the popularity of
American jazz and its variants, the prevalence of Coca-Cola,
or the demand for American products -- from tractors to
toothpaste, the gain has been substantial. Indeed, the
American life-style is being copied throughout a world
which recognizes and seeks to acquire the superior American
technology upon which that life-style is based. In terms
of world economic activity (investment and development
of resources, expansion of trade, movement of technology,
and operations of US and multi-national corporations),
the US and its Western European allies have become the
managerial and financial center of an economic community
embracing all the non-Communist world and greatly affecting
the prosperity of the Communist world itself. If one
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judges US influence in Western Europe in terms of the
urgency which the European members attach to NATO or
the alacrity with which they subscribe to US suggestions,
then our influence has declined; but if one judges by
the cultural and economic ties which have developed,
then the Atlantic community_has been very greatly tightened.
14. There can be no doubt that US credibility as a
guarantor of security to some nations is under hazard, and
there are areas of the world where US commitments and
interests are endangered. The point need not be labored
that a precipitate abandonment of commitments or a
sudden denial of a previously affirmed interest upsets
people and makes them wonder whether they are dealing with
a fickle nation. The real question is the effect of
measured withdrawal, and this is largely a question of
atmosphere. The Western Europeans are already psycho-
logically adjusting themselves to a reduction of the US
military presence in 1971, and they certainly support
our phased withdrawal from Vietnam. No one in Europe,
and few in Asia, seriously doubt that we have done at least
what our commitments called for, and perhaps more. So
long as our actions do not give the impression of a
pell-mell retreat from world responsibility, they may be
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regretted in some'quarters but not widely regarded as
a default of obligation. Indeed, in many quarters, our
withdrawal from Vietnam is regarded as a wise decision
and a sensible re-ordering of external responsibilities
and national priorities.
15. A more serious problem may be the effect of
changes in political alignments, military dispositions
and basing arrangements upon the Soviet and Chinese views
of US policy and posture. A withdrawal from some advanced
positions or a re-definition of our commitments could
conceivably lead some to infer that US foreign policy
was becoming insular and the US military posture less
formidable. This also is more a matter of atmosphere
than reality. The. Soviets and Chinese can have no doubt
about our military capabilities, either against them or
in areas of possible conflict. What they and our allies
could come to doubt is our willingness to use them. The
management problem of US policy is to find the best ways
of combining the restraint dictated by both domestic
politics and good diplomacy with the firmness required
by national security.
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IV. PROBLEMS IN THE EXERCISE OF POWER
16. Whatever we may do, it will be increasingly
difficult to formulate national policy in the world of
the 1970's. It already is harder to separate nations
into the "good guys" and "bad guys"., It already is
harder to draw lines defining areas of national interest;
politics, economics, and technology have a way of making
these obsolete. Memories of past mistakes -- errors of
both omission and commission -- have a tendency to intrude
upon the assessment of new situations. Theories about the
value of military power and about how to use it have under
gone change as the wars in Greece, Korea, and Vietnam have
worked themselves out. Achieving the right balance in the
allocation of resources among military development,
domestic investment, foreign activities, and internal
consumption is proving to be an important question of
national policy and a determinant of national power.
Excessive reliance upon, or inattention to, any one of these
can diminish a nation's stature or stimulate resistance harm-
ful to its natioVal interest. Thus, while Japan has done
extremely well by its heavy emphasis on domestic investment,
it represents a voice in the World far less than its
economic power would suggest. Similarly, Britain's
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tendency to consume rather than to invest has greatly
reduced its role in world affairs despite. its possession
of a nuclear capability.
17. The growth of nationalism in most of the non-
industrialized nations, and even among many of the
industrialized ones, hasalso added new-complications-to
the exercise of national power and influence. There seems
to be a growing tendency for smaller nations (Peru,
Albania, North Korea, Israel) to defy the great powers.
The willingness, to fight. as guerrillas against great odds
(as in Vietnam and Algeria) poses difficult problems.
Military power has become much more difficult to apply.
There are inhibitions against the resort to nuclear weapons,
but also to terror and sometimes to the indiscriminate
killings of bombing and artillery fire. Even conventional
ground force operations are inhibited by fears of escalation
into nuclear warfare on a world-wide scale. Thus, the
use of military power in combat is likely to become more
and more discriminate.
18. These factors, nationalism and the inhibitions on
the use of military power, seem likely to discourage both
the US and USSR from military interventions in local
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situations and to encourage smaller nations to assert
their independence. But beyond that, the great powers will
be discouraged from openly taking on responsibility for
nations, in addition to those they already support, by such
concerns as the high economic costs, the fear of getting
inextricably involved, the difficulty of controlling local
leaders, the often intractable problems some of these
nations face, and the political costs in world opinion which
such actions risk. This is not to say that we are entering
an era of everyone minding his own business; it is merely
to say that there are strong rational reasons why the
great powers will be more prudent about -- and less prone
to -- open, expensive, and binding commitments.
19. For some years the world has not been simply divided
into two opposing camps -- a Communist world and a free
world. There are many conflicts, but they exist on inter-
secting planes -- the US-Soviet contest, the Chinese-
Soviet contest, the US-Chinese contest, the Arab-Israeli
contest, the Soviet-Eastern European contest, the contest
between the industrialized and richer nations (the US,:the
USSR, Japan, and Europe) and the poorer and primarily
agricultural nations (China, India, the Near East, Africa,
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and Latin America), the contest between home-grown
nationalists (in the Near East, Africa, and Latin America)
and the corporations and governments which exercise economic
and political influence in their lands, the contests within
various countries between political forces which are
supported by outside powers. Because these various contests
intersect, bizarre alignments tend to take place. Thus the
USSR and Britain support the same side in Nigeria, while
France supports the other. The US and the USSR are on the
same side on nuclear proliferation, while China and France are
on the other. At meetings of UNCTAD, the US, the USSR,
and the European nations all are reproached by the
poorer nations for their alleged economic callousness.
20. Thus it is impossible to devise any simple formula
for measuring where we stand. A loss of US influence or
position in one arena is not necessarily a gain for the
USSR, China, or whoever our competitor may be. Our loss
may be his loss too. It is not a two-sided poker game;
it is multilateral. Nobody ever cashes in his chips, or
is likely to be forced to do so; he may withdraw for a while
and nurse his capital while waiting for the game to change
or someone to grow careless. The chips are of many hues;
they represent military power, economic power, domestic
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strength, clarity of vision, political skill, diplomatic
technique, and so on.
21. There is, of course, one principal competition,
but it is a complicated one. It is essentially triangular
-- among the US, China, and the USSR (and with the rise
of Japan, it may become rectangular, at least in Asia).
But the triangle is not, now at least, equilateral; the
US-Soviet contest is the most important. Even though
efforts are being made on both sides to stabilize portions
of that contest, it will go on for a long time. But it seems
to be entering a phase where attempts by the US and the USSR
to influence each other are taking precedence over attempts
by either to influence the rest of the world. Of course,
events in the rest of the world are factors in this relation-
ship; we can, for example, draw inferences from Soviet
conduct in the Mediterranean area or from Soviet policy
in Asia as well as from Soviet proposals tabled in bilateral
negotiations. And the Soviets will draw inferences more
from our conduct than from what we say. Persuaded by
doctrine, and to some degree by our past behavior, that
we are changeable and untrustworthy, they will be hard
bargainers and do everything they prudently can to box
us in.
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22. The rest of the world will watch this competition,
and it may be more impressed by the images projected than
by the protestations issued. It would be a mistake for us
to believe that in this game we have it made. We too often
have looked truculent on international issues, over-reliant
on military power and technological prowess, and unable to
solve our own problems of race, poverty, disease, and
literacy while lecturing others on how to behave. Mean-
while, the Soviets have often appeared as supporters of
the underdog, seekers after peace, and patient with those
who offend them. And they have succeeded in this despite
Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The world has been patient over
Vietnam, but it will be watching to see what we do with our
society when that sore has been removed.
VI. CHANGE AND CHALLENGE IN THE 1970's
23. The various international contests going on will
be affected by many things that are unpredictable. Events
often have a way of turning apparent victories into
defeats, and vice versa. The apparently insoluble may
suddenly become soluble. Leaders die or are assassinated;
new leaders and new movements suddenly emerge from latent or
unidentified political forces.
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24. But the world is also being changed by forces more
fundamental than those which happen by chance or by the
calendar. Some of the events of the past decade suggest
that the national and international polities inherited from
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are breaking
down. Ideologies articulated a hundred years ago have
less appeal, and material comforts are more widely sought
and cherished. The advance of technological change,
especially in communications, has caused individuals to
believe that they have rights as persons they did not know
they possessed or had reason to think could be realized.
Many sanctions of the old order are being challenged. The
conduct of war and the well-practiced ways of enforcing
compliance with governmental edict are being exposed,
debated, and contested. As the affluent nations increasingly
accept responsibility for the welfare of their citizens,
hunger and discomfort no longer provide an effective spur
to conformity and achievement. Discussed below are some of
the developments and problems which, while affecting the on-
going and interrelated world contests of the 1970's, might
also be setting the stage for deeper alterations in the
world political order.
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25. Urbanization. The rapid increase in world
population which is occurring in the last half of this
century will be important over the next decade largely
because of what it is doing to the cities, rather than
because of the increase in total numbers. There are not
many areas where there will be starvation for lack of
food; indeed, in many places food production will increase
sharply due to better methods of farming. But there will
be widespread malnutrition (with its debilitating effect
upon mind and body), local shortages, and starvation due
to wars and social failures. City populations will be
growing enormously, partly because less labor will be needed
in rural areas. Hopes for some improvements in personal
status -- as against hopelessness in many rural areas --
and the illusory attractions of the city will draw large
populations even where there is no visible increase in
employment opportunity. This will create grave problems
in housing, sanitation, medical care, education, transport,
crime, etc. Most of these needs will not be met. The
problem will be worst in Latin America, Africa, and Asia,
though parts of Europe and North America will not be spared.
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26. Anti-establishmentarianism. As a result of this
rapid urbanization of the world's populations, and the
failure or inability to cope with it, there will be an
increasing complaint about "the system" and a rather
considerable revolutionary potential. This seems likely
to be essentially non-ideological in character, though
ideologues will try to make something of it. And it seems
likely to be world-wide rather than confined to the
underdeveloped or poverty-stricken economies. How much
revolutionary activity materializes will depend both upon
the responsiveness of governments and upon the degree to
which the urban poor come to believe that something can
and should be done about it. To date, there has been
less urban political ferment in areas (Latin America,
Africa, and Asia) where conditions are execrable than in
areas (the US, Japan, and Europe) where conditions are
comparatively good. But with greater awareness, education,
and political organization this could rapidly change, as
already seems to have occurred in East Bengal.
27. Related to the complaints of the urban poor is
the growing dissidence of students, intellectuals, many
workers, and even middle classes. This arises from the
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inability or unwillingness of governments to cope with
problems affecting them -- outmoded educational systems,
antiquated laws, unresponsive bureaucracies, inadequate
urban transportation, fossilized wage structures and
business management, unfair taxes, and the like. Most of
these people do not want revolution, they just want things
done so that they can live better, and they tend to think
that much of what politicians and government leaders talk
about and devote their energy to is simply irrelevant and
self-serving. It is not possible to state just what this
kind of attitude will do to the political system, but it
does possess a potential for social conflict, particularly
if these non-poor dissenters and the urban poor should be
driven to work together.
28. Violence. Anti-establishmentarianism has already
taken violent form in the US, UK, France, Italy, Germany,
India, Pakistan, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Japan, China,
to name only the larger nations. Even when it embraces
only middle and upper class elements, it throws a fright
into political leaders -- of both the incumbents and the
opposition. And it particularly upsets those who have some
stake in the society, but not enough to feel secure. So
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the initial violence begets counter-violence, and the
rules of an orderly, lawful, and civilized society begin
to be disregarded all around. Thus, in many parts of the
world, there seems likely to emerge a social struggle
between those who want to risk changes and those who
don't; there will be some revolutions and counter-
revolutions, charges of "communist" and "fascist", etc.,
where these will have no substantial relation to the
ideologies to which they refer. This phenomenon of
violence and counter-violence has already disturbed the
scene in Greece, Brazil, China, and Northern Ireland; it
could come also to Italy, Japan, and the United States.
29. Ethnic and Racial Conflict. Some of this violence
and counter-violence will take the form of ethnic (socio-
religious) and racial conflict of the type now going on
in Palestine, Nigeria, Southeast Asia, the white-dominated
areas of Africa, and the United States. Historic
animosities and zealotry always produce efforts to make
minorities conform in culture, language, and religion, but
today -- with more movement of people, better communica-
tions, and a greater capacity to assert authority or to
defend oneself -- these struggles seem likely to become
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more frequent and bitter. Frontier zones (as in Southeast
Asia) and multicultural states (such as India, Pakistan,
and many African states) will be especially prone to
this sort of violence. In many cases ethnic or racial
violence proceeds, not from ethnic or racial differences
in themselves, but from resentments and fears based upon
the political predominance, the economic privileges, the
occupation of territory, or the superior cultural or
commercial achievement of a particular ethnic group. The
Arab-Israeli affair, the Biafran war, the problems of the
Chinese communities in Asia and of the Indian communities
in Africa, all result from these kinds of concerns.
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31. Radical Nationalism. Some rations have such deep
internal divisions, lack so many of he social and political
mechanisms for adjusting or narrowing these divisions,
and have such formidable economic an social problems that
they see no way out. In these circumstances, there are
sometimes revolutions of a nationalist character, often
led by a military officer corps which feels a
responsibility for guarding the national birthright.
This is what has happened in several Latin American
countries, and notably in Peru. The object of these
revolutions is to modernize and re-structure their
societies. Sometimes they abort, as in Brazil. Sometimes
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the new leaders decide the task is simply too much to
expect.of their people, and they return power to the
people, as seems to be happening in Pakistan. Often the
leaders are highly eclectic, as in Algeria and Tanzania.
They talk of socialism, they put the text books into the
local patois, they invite in Western and Communist
technicians, and then they build up a market economy
while sipping Coca-Cola. Some of these revolutions are
going to be violently anti-American, but they may be --
and some are already -- also violently anti-Communist.
32. Technological Change. One of the major problems
of technological change is that it promotes gaping
disparities among nations. Many Europeans, for example,
have worried over the so-called technological gap between
Europe and America and fear that the Europeans will be
condemned to a condition of permanent industrial helotry.
But much more important than a "keeping up" among industrial
nations is the worry of a much larger number of poor
nations that they will never be able to plug into
the rapidly moving technology of the northern tier
of advanced nations. Indeed, some believe -- and
with good reason -- that they will not be able to do so
and will be condemned to permanent penury.
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33. Rapid technological change also creates problems
in foreign and military policy. Fears of falling
behind and risking national security; efforts to purchase,
steal, or copy someone else's technological know-how; embargoes
and security controls and efforts to circumvent them --
all have become commonplace in the life of nations. One
of the main problems of the next decade will be to assure that
one is neither living in a false and-complacent paradise nor
wasting one's resources in a vain effort to do the hopeless
or unnecessary. Unfortunately, this problem has a strong
tendency to become a political issue instead of an analytic
one and to engage political, bureaucratic, commercial,
and regional interest groups. It is a problem faced by
the USSR as well as by the US, and it will tend to exacerbate
the difficulties of decision-making and negotiation.
34. Coping with Complexity and "Bigness". The
abundance of economic, social, and political problems
which the large nations of the world have come to face
raises the question of whether modern life may not have
become too complicated to cope with in large political
units. The nations with the most advanced technology or
the largest populations seem to be having the greatest
problems -- China, the USSR, the US, India, Indonesia.
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The small modern countries -- the Scandinavian and Low
Countries -- seem better able to treat with youth,
technological change, poverty, inflation, and the like.
Since the problem of coping seems to apply to democrat and
dictator, capitalist and socialist alike, it is not a simple
question of political or economic philosophy. Handling
some problems requires managing people in ways that require
their cooperation, and cooperation they are not always
ready to give. So, the years ahead could see both failures
to cope and a search for new ways to govern states and
manage their economics.
35. Establishing a Community of Understanding.
Relations among states would be easier to order, even though
they differed on objectives, if all were operating from the
same data, the same system of logic, the same sense of
reality. Unfortunately, they are not. The Soviets clearly
regard the Maoists as crazy, and the Israelis feel the same
way about the Arabs. Much progress has been made in US-
Soviet relations in trying to establish a common data base
and in trying to understand each other's objectives. The
Soviets have a good idea, as we do, what a nuclear war
would be like. Neither of us can say the same about
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China, and we do not know when we will be able to. One
cannot be certain that the US and the USSR over the decade
ahead will always keep their options open and seek to avoid
confrontations, but most likely they will. The problem of
statecraft is to keep the lines open with the rational
and irrational alike, and to try to persuade others that
communication is at least the road to understanding and
that irrational action can hurt everybody.
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