LETTER TO ALLEN W. DULLES FROM VICTOR BATOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R000400580004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 20, 2002
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 10, 1956
• Content Type: LETTER

? ApProvilly Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80R631R000400580004-5
Dear Allen:
25X1
- ILLEGIB
December 10, 1956
Referring to the telephone conversation I have just had
with you I send you enclosed (in duplicate) my little
memorandum about a U.N. step - that is a resolution to
be passed by the Assembly that in my opinion may repre-
sent a strong gesture giving recognition to the Hungarian
people and probably be of some political effect also.
I greatly appreciate your willingness to read this and do
something about it should you see any point in doing so.
With my thanks and best regards,
Allen W. Dulles, Esq.
2430 E Street
Administration Building
Washington, D. C.
DOCUMENT NO.
Yours sincerely,
vvVV\in
Victor Bator
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
D DECLACSI.7IED
CLASS. CH,r,.??ICTD TO: TS S
NEXT REVIEee' DATE::
AUTH: HR 7010.,4
DATE: /f051, REVIEW
Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP8OR01731R0004005 04-5
STAT
STAT
IIIP
Apbrovillor Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP801.731 R000400580004-5
December 10, 1956
The United Nations resolutions and the charitable care for the
100,000 Hungarian refugees are feeble substitutes for the
support that the Hungarian people - fighting a battle vital
for the free world - deserve. Yet the Western Powers seem to
acquiesce in the belief that, short of war, nothing can be
done now for those Hungarians who are in Hungary, who are and
will remain the Hungarian Nation.
Yet, even within the possibilities open to the U.N. one further
step may be taken at this stage. There are measures which -
if voted by the U.N. Assembly could heal the bitter feelings
of the Hungarians that the free world passed them by and would
give a sense of accomplishment to all the free nations, all free
men - both important spiritual assets. This result could be
achieved within the U.N. by resolving that:
1- The General Assembly instructs the Secretary General to form
eCommittee On Hungarian Reconstructionnof a number of Member-
States for the preparation of a plan for the rebuilding and
restoration of the cultural and material well-being of the
Hungarian Nation, with as much aid from the U.N. and its
Member-States as is required to make the reconstructed Hungary
a living monument of the gratitude of the freedom loving world.
2- The General Assembly instructs the Secretary General to in-
clude in the 1957 budget the amount required by the Committee
On Hungarian Reconstruction. The Committee shall be assisted
by a permanent body of experts and staff for the preparation
of the plan.
3- The General Assembly resolves that - upon the complete with-
drawal of the Russian Army from Hungary - the U.N. shall actively
seek the cooperation and contributions of its members for the
speedy execution of the Hungarian Reconstruction Plan.
For those who may shirk from the magnitude of this undertaking
it may be remembered that Yougoslavia has received from the
Western World since 1948 (without hundreds of millions of UNNRA
help) close to one and one-half billion dollars (London Times,
February 7, 1956) in which the U.S.A. participated with close
to eleven hundred millions. This was done with no certainty,
then or now, that this investment would save that country from
Russian domination.
Would a Hungary, not sitting on the fence but bravely fighting
her way into the free world, not deserve a gesture and aid of
similar magnitude?
Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000400580004-5
Appr
For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP8.1731R000400580004-5
ember
Lone resolutions
ian refugees are fa
Jen, people
serve. Yet the
ief theta: rt of
Ce Hungarian
Hungarian Nation.
for tle
acquiesce in:
done now for.
will remain
charitable
stitutes
ing a bat tai
Western Tseeni to
war, notb1leg can be
Hungary,' who are and
Yet, even within the possibilitiee U.N1 one furthelf:'
step may be taken at this stags'. There are measures which
if voted by the U.N. Assembly could heal the bit
of the Hungarians that the free world passed then d would
give *11,0enie of accomplishment to all the free s, all free
men - Rath important spiritual assets. This resu t coat be
achieved within the U.N. by resolving that:
1? The Geners& Assembly instructs the Secretary General to Jinni
a Committee Oft ingarian Reconstruction of a r' *saber-
States for the "reparation of a plan for the ng and
restora4ion of thi cultural and material well-be ng of the
HungerisikNation, with as much aid from the U. N. and its
Nember-Stetes as is required to make the reconstructed Mono
a living ionument of the gratitude of the freedom loving
g* The Genera/ Asselbly instructs the Secretary o in-
clude in the 1957 budget the amount required by thiCommittee
On flUngarian Reconstruction. The Committee shall he assisted
by a permanent body of experts and staff for the preparation
of the plan.
3- The General AssemblY resolves that ? upon the compinto with.
draws/ of the Inssian Army from Magary - the U. N. shall actively
Seek the cooperntiOn and contributions of its members for the,
speedy execution of She Hungarian Reconstruction nee
For those who 04F Shirk from the magnitude of this undertaking
it may be remembered that Yougoslavia has received igen the
Western World singe 1948 (without hundreds of Minions of UNRRA
help) close to one and one-half billion dollars (London Times,
February 7, 1956) in which the U.S.A. partitipated with close
to eleven hundred millions. This was done with no certainty,
then or now, that this investment would save that country from
RussimmAmmination.
Would a Hungary, not sitting on the fence but bravely fighting
her way into the free world, not deserve a gesture and aid of
similar magnitude?
Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000400580004-5
STAT
IIP
Apkrovlbor Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80.731R000400580004-5
Dear Allen:
December 14, 1956
Since I sent to you my short memorandum on December 10th,
I have come to the realization that it does not make much
sense to connect my suggestion regarding policy with the
form in which it may be realized. My memorandum accompany-
ing my letter of above date tried to achieve this, and it
was a mistake. Now, when I am far from being an expert in
U.N. procedures and in the routine of policy-making, what-
ever merit my suggestion may have should be explained as to
its substance only, leaving its form and every other detail
regarding execution to those who are experts therein.
On account of this I have written up my plan in a new form.
I have omitted therein any reference to the procedure of
how to carry out the project, how to bring it before the
most suitable forum. On the other hand, I elaborated the
arguments in its favor and tried to eliminate doubts that
may arise in the mind of somebody who reads it.
As I told you over the telephone it was suggested to me to
give it to C. D. Jackson. The idea behind this move is
that he, being out of Government, may have an easier task
in working for its adoption.
This letter was dictated originally last night when my memo-
randum was ready for mailing. I am re-dictating it now in
order to add that this morning I saw C. D. Jackson. He has
discussed the idea quite thoroughly with me and it is my
impression that he wants and would like to do something
about it. He asked me whether I had sent it to you and I
told him that I had done so. I hope that by saying so I
didn't go beyond what I could not avoid saying.
By the way it was Norris Darrell who introduced me to him
and it seems that it was Norris who mentioned to him my
friendly connection with Sullivan & Cromwell and, among
others, with you.
Allen W. Dulles, Esq.
2430 E Street
Washington, D. C.
Ft Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000400580004-5
Sincerely yours,
Victor Blir\r
E'6IB
?
ApOrolbor Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP801.731R000400580004-5
December 14, 1956
Our cold-war policies seem to have been aimed in the recent
past at three results:
First-toward the neutralist countries of Asia to reinforce
their neutrality with the help of financial and technical
aid, with no strings attached;
Second- in relation to countries, yet independent but, - on
account of their geographical situation - exposed to direct
Soviet pressure to protect their independence by alliances
and military and economic aid;
Third -toward the satellites, psychological warfare to pro-
mote their confidence in ultimate liberation.
Not having helped the Hungarian self-liberation with positive
acts of support a feeling seems to arise on both sides of the
Iron Curtain that the U.S.A. is not determined to follow up
its cold-war policies with positive actions if events call
for such an act.
This opinion - whether justified or not - may harm in the
future not only the success of our psychological warfare
toward the satellites but may endanger the effectiveness of
our policy in relation to the two other groups of states,
mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 also. Both the neutralists
in Asia and the Bagdad pact countries may wonder: will not
the U.S.A. fail to follow through its own policy in regard
to their independence also when they may need positive
support. Thus, something needs to be done that is beyond
resolutions, moral condemnations and charitable help to
refugees to establish confidence in American cold-war
policies.
This may be achieved by a solemn statement of the President
or the Secretary of State to the effect that,
AS soon as the Russian Army will be entirely withdrawn
from Hungary, and an independent Hungarian Government
will be in possession of power, the United States and
those who may associate themselves with her in this
plan, will do their best:
First, to bring about the rebuilding of Hungary's
Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000400580004-5
? ApProvilly Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP801.31R000400580004-5
-2-
cultural life and economic well-being, by putting at
the disposal of the Hungarian Nation money, raw materials,
industrial equipment, food and technical assistance in
an amount that shall make it possible for Hungarians to
rebuild their country.
Second, to establish Hungary as a viable neutral country
whose genuine neutrality shall be guaranteed by the
United Nations.
Such a declaration is predicated on the assumption that Russia,
for reasons which will be outlined presently, will not only
tolerate an independent but neutralized country on her border but
shall acquiesce therein as a way out of her present predicament.
It is my contention that a subservient Hungary is not a conditio
sine qua non of Russian political power. In other words, a
neutral Hungary is not an inconceivable proposition which a
Russia, even at the zenith of her power, cannot accept. It is
certainly not beyond intelligent diplomacy to work out the
measures and palliatives which will protect Hungary's neutrality
and will exclude the possibility that she may join a grouping of
States, inimical or potentially dangerous to Russia.
The acceptance by Russia of an independent but neutral neighbor
is not without precedent. Finland is a case in point. There is
no reason to assume that this is impossible regarding Hungary.
There are reasons inherent in the geographical situation supporting
this assumption. But even if it were a bitter pill the Soviet
leaders must realize by now that Russia will be better off without
Hungary than with her as a rebellious satellite.
Here we come to a point where knowledge of national character or
rather the image of a nation about itself plays an important role.
There is hardly a Hungarian who does not believe that it is his
1,000 year old tradition to withstand and overcome foreign domi-
nation, at all costs. Every Hungarian fancies himself as a
depository of this tradition. By now the Russians know that they
cannot expect peace in Hungary. The poetic description of Church-
ill about the heroic resistance of the English to invasion by
Hitler seems to have came true. They do
not flag or fail, they fight with growing confidence, they
defend their island whatever the cost may be, they fight on
the beaches, on the landing grounds, in the fields and in the
streets. They shall fight in the hills and they shall never
surrender.
Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000400580004-5
Approvilr Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80R.31R000400580004-5
-3-
Really, how could the Soviets trust the incredible Hungarians
ever? The Kremlin must know by now that a neutral Hungary is
less undesirable than a country of 10,000,000 enemies filled
with hatred in their hearts.
This is still not the whole story. Hungary will continue to
tie down a sizeable portion of Soviet military strength. And,
to boot, that task force will be separated from the Russian main-
land by the Carpathians, a 10,000 foot high mountain chain. It
should appear to a militarily conscious leadership that that is
much too high a price to pay for the difference between a neutral
Hungary and a rebellious satellite requiring the maintaining of
a large army of occupation with no end in sight.
Returning now to our own side of the balance-sheet what will be
our burden on account of the promise to be made toward Hungary?
The reconstruction of as small a country as Hungary in a period
necessarily spread over several years is a relatively small
undertaking. It should not reach the size of the investment
that has already been made in Yougoslav independence without
certainty, then and now, that this will save that country from
joining forces with our enemies. In the case of Hungary, that
risk does not exist.
The charitable care of the refugees and the U.N. resolutions
demanding the withdrawal of the Russian Army from Hungary are
feeble substitutes of positive support of the battle of Hungar-
ians for their freedom.
In fact, the handling of the Hungarian Refugee problem appears
to the observer to be of a defeatist nature. If the Western
World refused to acquiesce in the finality of Russian domination
over Hungary (with or without the actual presence of Russian
troops there) the Refugee problem ought to have been handled on
a different basis. Why should a valuable and important section
of the Hungarian Nation (writers, artists, engineers, students,
outstanding athletes and the incredible freedom-fighters, among
them 4,000 students of the Technical University of Budapest) be
transported to the remotest corners of the world, from where
return to their homeland, impoverished by this loss, will be
an insurmountable difficulty, if the cause of flight is expected
to end soon or at all?
And, all that the U.N. resolutions so far have demanded is the
withdrawal of Russian troops. Unfortunately, this is not enough
Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000400580004-5
ApOrov r Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80R.31R000400580004-5
-4-
for bringing about independence. In spite of absence of the
Soviet Army from Czechoslovakia the long shadow of Russian
tanks ready to move in seems to have been sufficient to keep
that country under Russian domination and to eliminate every
trace of genuine independence. Thus absence in the resolutions
of the U.N. of ways and means for the protection of independence
equals in political defeatism the political implications of the
Operation Safe-Haven.
The declaration suggested in this Memorandum would be a step
in the right direction. It aims at the establishment of an
economically strong state as the basis of political indepen-
dence provided by guaranties sufficient to protect it.
Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000400580004-5
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000400580004-5
Next 7 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000400580004-5
Approve_d_For4ease 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP8OR0173 00400580004-5
NOV 23 1956
m43781864
ere not itithia Tier
act boggy to twee yaw
out oat nose of nr meson
presents itself.
Mac W. Dulles
Director
0/DCI he (21 Nov 56)
2-
1-
- ER vibezie
1 - Reeding
. DOCUMENT NO.
NO c; :N GLAss.
D
CLASS. CH.'1,,!:????..77,
HR ?
? DATE/ iEWER :
Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000400580004-5
STAT
Approvely Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80R.31R000400580004-5,7:
Dear Allen:
November 20, 1956
Ambassador Lodge said yesterday in his UN Assembly speech
that passing the UN resolution is not much but something"
and there seems to exist a general feeling of frustration
all over the world that "short of war" nothing more can be
done.
I venture to disagree. I have written in the enclosed memo-
randum a suggestion that is feasible and may prove itself
more than a little something.
STAT
I realize that the timing of the pronouncement and the deter-
mination of the conditions subject to waicn the fulfilling of
the solemn promise would begin and continue necessitates
difficult decisions. 'hat kind of government (Kados, Nagy, etc.)
shall be qualified to receive the aid, what strings ought to be
attached thereto, are problems about which I better not express
an opinion as they must be controlled by factors that cannot
all be known to me. Yet, subject to such reservations, the
promise suggested in the memorandum may achieve all or some
of the political effects I have outlined in the last paragraph:
I have in mind a speech of the ?resident or the Secretary of
State with solemn build-up of the moral obligation that we feel
toward Hungary. It may be pointed out that: we owe a debt to
the Hungarian writers, poets, artists who - in the last year -
first hoisted the flag of resistance and created thereby the
intellectual foundation out of which the spirit of revolution
sprang up; that we owe a debt to the Hungarian youth who with
bare fist stormed the security police-fortresses; that we owe
a debt to the Hungarian workers and peasants who followed the
flag of freedom into open fight against tanks, artillery, air-
force; and finally, that we owe a heavy debt to the Hungarian
people whose revolution shook the foundation of the Eastern
and Central European colonial Empire of Russia and gave back
the hope of ultimate liberation to the 100 million people T:est
of nussia who now suffer the indignity of oppression.
Yet all this is but an expression of my thoughts on how to
Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000400580004-5
Approved. Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80Rlir R000400580004-5
-2-
approach and garnish the essence of the resolution, the
solemn promise. I hope that you will not find this idea
hopeless.
nth my kind regards,
Sincerely yours,
Victor Bator
Allen q. Dulles, Esq.
2430 *Z. Street
Administration Building
T.::Ashington, D. C.
Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000400580004-5
Approvelir Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP8011131R000400580004-5
November 20, 1955
HELP FOR HUNGARY
"Unable to assist the Hungarians directly in their struggle,
millions of people in this country and the rest of the world
are contributing money in the hope that they can help a little
to alleviate their sufferings. To many Hungarians it is a poor
substitute, perhaps, for the military help they crave; to the
free outside world a meagre expiation for the shameful feeling
that it can do nothing to help a people who are fighting a lone
and hopeless battle so vital to the free world itself. But
both inside Hungary, where blood-shed, starvation and disease
are causing appalling suffering, and outside, where refugees
now number over 20,000, help in the form of medicine, food and
clothes is still badly needed. Perhaps, too, it can do a
little to heal the Hungarians' bitter feeling that the free
world has passed them by on the other side." -(Economist -London-
November 17th).
This quotation expresses the reaction of the civilised world to
the news about the desperate fight of a brave people for free-
dom and the helpless wringing of our hands on this side of the
Iron Curtain.
The refugees' irmediate help can probably be covered from the
money that has been contributed from governments, charities
and individuals all over the world. The medical care of the
wounded, the feeding of those who are exposed to starvation
or physical sufferings will be done by the Red Cross and other
church and charitable organizations which may be admitted into
Hungary by the Russian occupation forces and their puppet-
government.
All this, however, is but a relief-measure, may assuage but
will not achieve more. Reliable information from Hungary shows
that the destruction of buildings, railways, roads, public ser-
vices is greater than what that unfortunate country suffered
as the battlefield between the German and Russian armies and
from successive 3erman and Russian conquests. Ambassador Lodge
said yesterday, and mostly everybody seemed to agree, that the
UN resolutions were "not much but something" add that, short of
war, nothing more could be done now.
This is not true. TZe can do more. A solemn promise of the
Assembly of the UN or of the Government of the U.S.A. and of
Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000400580004-5
Approvelpor Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80411731R000400580004-5
-2-
This is not true. T.'!e can do more. A solemn promise of the
Assembly of the UN or of the Government of the U.S.A. and of
all other governments who might choose to join our promise to
rebuild Hungary, her cultural and material life not
into the state in which it was before the revolt but
into a splendor that was hers before the devastation
of 1.:orld T:lar II and the destruction suffered by
successive German and Russian devastations
would be more than the moral condemnation of Russia by a UN
resolution, would be not only "something" but "more".
For purposes of comparison let us remember that Yougoslavia
has received in help from the ..jestern 'Jorld close to 1-1/2
billion dollars (London Times, February 7, 1955) and from the
U.S.A. alone 500 millions in armaments, another half a billion
in economic help until 1955 (N.Y. Times, July 29, 1953) and
another 95 millions in 1955, altogether close to 1100 million
dollars.
In this frustrating helplessness in which we and the whole
world seem to find ourselves it would be much and of immense
political and moral import if the President or the Secretary
of State went into the Assembly of the UN and personally sub-
mitted a resolution that
at an appropriate time and as soon as political con-
ditions in Hungary will make it safe that aid to
Hungary will be to the benefit of the Hungarian
nation the UN will undertake to grant in money and
raw materials, food and technical assistance an
amount comparable to what other freedom laving
countries have received since the war and that the
U.S.A. will undertake to participate therein it, full
proportion to its resources.
Such a resolution will achieve three purposes: 1st- it will
"heal tae Hungarians' bitter feeling that the free world has
passed them by on the other side." 2nd- it will lift out of
desperation over our helplessness the A_Ier:?can people and
the entire 'estern world. 3rd- it may havetremendous political
effect on tae other people behind the Iron Curtain to wl-,au
Russia now wants to give a lesson about the destruction that
revolt may bring upon them.
Approved For Release 2002/05/09 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000400580004-5