GRILL FLAME (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: STARGATE
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96-00788R001200210002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: November 4, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 24, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 13, 1979
• Content Type: IR

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13 Apr 79
SUBJECT: GRILL FLAME (U)
1. (U) Summary:
a. (S/ORCON) Under the coordination of an OSD oversight committee
established by Dr. Ruth Davis, the DIA, Army, and Air Force are initiating
low level efforts to better understand whether there exists militarily
usable psychokinetic (psychoenergetic?) effects. This effort responds to
written interest by Congressman Rose, Chairman of the House Intelligence
Committee and Service interest in whether there is potential adverse
consequence to known extensive efforts in the Soviet Union in this area.
b. (S/ORCON) Prior work by the CIA"& recent low level support of
experiments at SRI by DIA and Army has been contracted through the Air
Force Foreign Technology Labs at Dayton. These effort's and others
supported at SRI have led to both most unusual apparent capability for
remote viewing and great controversy among the scientific community as
to the clinical suitability of the experiments.
c. (S/ORCON) As a consequence the OSD and the Army believe it is
crucial to conduct controlled in-house experiments under competent
technical staffs who are with high assurance not emotionally involved
with the existance or non-existance of the phenomenon.
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CLASSIFIED BY: ACSI DA
REVIEW ON: 13 Apr 99
REASON: PARA 2-3Olc ~
DOD 5200.141(3)
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d. (S/ORCON) Prior to any work starting, the standard procedures
for protocol verification in cases where human subjects will be accomplished.
To overview the Army efforts, an informal oversight committee has been
established under Dr. Yore of the Staff of the Assistant Secretary of Army
for R&D.
2. (U) Chronology:
a. (S/ORCON) Stanford Research Institute: In 1971, two laser
physicists, Dr. Hal Puthof and Mr. Russel Targ, became involved in a
research program to scientifically investigate PSI. In 1972, they had
the good fortune to acquire the talents of a psychic of some renown, Ingo
Swann. Swann demonstrated the ability not only to remotely view targets
at great distance from him, but, also was able to somehow affect physical
objects mentally. In a now famous experiment conducted in 1972, Swann
was able to significantly disturb, on command, a superconducting
magnetometer, which was as shielded as technology could'make it. In
1973 a second formidable psychic came on board. He was.Pat Price, a
retired police inspector. Price had no trouble becoming extremely adept
at RV. More recently, Hella Hammond has joined the SRI effort as a
psychic and although was first picked as a control case, thought to have
no ability whatsoever, she has performed some rather amazing feats.
b. (U) CIA:
(1) (S/ORCON) In April 1972, the CIA became interested in
potential intelligence applications of PSI. After discussions with Puthof
and Targ, a modest effort began.
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(2) (S/ORCON) By October 1972, the investigation had expanded
to allow a more complete research plan. The results were surprising,
encouraging, and disputed within the CIA by skeptics from ORD* and budding
advocates within OSI*
(3) (S/ORCON) In Summer 1973, Price, working only from a set
of geographic coordinates read to him, provided striking descriptions of
a "military-like" facility. As it turned out, the place was a sensitive
NSA installation in West Virginia. Price was able to penetrate into the
building and among other accurate descriptions, was able to correctly
name people working there--but, most important, spoke out classified
codewords he "read" from file folders.
(4) (S/ORCON) Next, CIA decided to give Price the coordinates
of a Soviet facility whose exact R&D mission was unknown. An extremely
elaborate protocol was developed to guard against fraud or other criticism.
Price again provided a great deal of information, but typically there was
a mix of signal to noise; good data comingled with spurious. Of particular
note, however, is a drawing and oral description of a large "crane" at
the target site. Later, CIA analysts concluded that either Remote Viewing
had taken place, or Price had intimate knowledge of theURDF-3 (an over-
head platform).
(5) (S/ORCON) It was decided to see if Price could operationally
assist in technical collection efforts. In two tests checked against the
interior plans of foreign embassies known to CIA audio specialists, Price
correctly located the coderooms, leading the operations officer to agree
*ORD: Office of Research and D
I: Office of Scientific Intelligence
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(6) (S/ORCON) In Fall 1974, an experiment was conducted in-house
by CIA engineers familiar with the SRI-Price coordinates protocol. The
result was a description of what could only be a SA-5 missile training
site at the coordinates. The Libyan desk officer was impressed, and indi-
cated that a HUMINT agent had previously reported the same information.
(7) (S/ORCON) In July 1975, Libyan coordinates were provided
to Price, who came back with a description of a guerrilla training site--
again, confirmed by CIA analysts from clandestine agent reporting. The
same month Price tragically died of a heart attack.
(8) (S/ORCON) Since July 1975, CIA interest hats remained minimal
and unofficial. The Agency claims to have stopped all work, but there may
be a small, "clandestine" project-still going among a few advocates. The
primary reason for abandoning the effort was fear of winning a "Golden
Fleece Award."
c. (U) Army:
(1) (S/ORCON) Army's interest in Psychoenergetics (PSI) goes
back to 1972 and 1975 when the Surgeon General (MIIA), with DIA, published
studies of Soviet/Bloc work.
(2) (S/ORCON) In 1976, USAMICOM informally expressed interest
in US replication of claimed Soviet experiments. SRI worked up a small
program, and in August 1977 a one-year, $80K contract was let by MICOM.
Work was to be accomplished under the innocuous title, "Investigation of
Unconventional Discrimination Techniques." Of particular interest was
Soviet efforts along the line of man-machine interface;e.g., radar
operators continuing to guide AA missiles to the target despite the CRT
images being obscured by chaff.
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(3) (S/ORCON) By Spring 1978, enough "demonstrations" of the
phenomenon existed to warrant serious consideration for a comprehensive
program to explore military application of PSI. Most promising were
three subareas: Remote Viewing (RV), Psychokinesis (PK), and Telepathy.
The Army ACSI was designated focal point to develop a DA program along
the following criteria: (a) moderate intensity, low profile, (b) balanced
distribution of work--avoid overlap and husband scarce resources,
(c) balanced in-out house effort, (d) in-house effort first center on
replicating SRI-type organizations' experiments, (e) consider both basic
and applied research, and (f) fit within any future DOD program. A
complete security envelope was placed over Army's interest in PSI, and
the effort was given the unclassified nickname, GRILL FLAME.
(4) (S/ORCON) In March 1978, Targ and Puthof presented a talk
on RV to a select AMSAA"DARCOM audience. This led to increased effort
by AMSAA to explore RV in harmony with DA guidance, as it might apply to
target acquisition and target description: (a) ascertain location and
activity status of enemy units, (b) detect changes in status of places
like enemy assembly areas, (c) detect, identify, and report activity of
enemy equipment, and (d) provide real time battle damage assessment.
Also of prime interest was accessing enemy communications, and command
and control s stems.
N~xr PAGE?
O (S/ORCON) In August 1978, Dr. Vorona, DIA', chaired a meeting
to develop a coordinated DOD program. A permanent Working Group,
comprised of representatives from all interested agencies/services, was
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(.5 (S,ORCON) In Juty 1978, DIA sponsored a series of four unique experiments,
in which intelligence analysts intimately familiar with target sites
interfaced directiy with the Remote Viewer. The DIA Project Officer had
prepared three sets of Soviet/Bloc target coordinates, and one US control
set. Even he did not know the coordinates, until the moment they were read
aloud to the Viewer, Ingo Swann. Immediateiy upon hearing
the coordinates, Swann verbalized about and drew sketches of the target.
Only tow correlation of target description to actual site was achieved in
the first three trials. However, Swann provided a
-moderate to high", Lengthy description of ttie ~~st target, a Soviet
strategic missije field east of Moscow; a significant achievement. Most
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amazing perhaps, Swann passed through a si,.o cover, "?traaveiiing" down
until reaching a connecting tunnel. Going through this passageway he
entered a command and control room. One comment, among many, stands out:
The floors are paved in "white tiles...
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established and has met a number of times to: (a) ensure scientifically
acceptable experiments and evaluation methodologies, (b) ensure valid
investigation of military applications of PSI and, (c) investigate
significance of foreign technical and military PSI efforts. The Working
Group also acts as a clearing house for information on the subject within
the DOD framework, and monitors protocols for compliance with legal and
medical. guidelines.
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(.$) (S ORCON) In Sep-Oct 1978, Arn ACSI/and INSCOM designed
a small program to narrowly examine purely intelligence application of RV.
The concept was to familiarize (train) a cadre of personnel who had been
subjectively culled from the whole INSCOM organization. Selection criteria
included: above average intelligence, outgoing personality, adventuresome,
open-minded, mature, artistic nature, and successful life,'career. It
was preferred that the individual not have in-depth PSI knowledge or
background. The following intelligence PSI applications were identified:
locating and effecting undetected entry into denied enemy units/facilities;
SALT verification; advance warning of hostilities; "reading" enemy battle
plans and intentions; tracking and locating key enemy commanders,,others;
and, surveillance of known or suspected enemy clandestine HUMINT opera-
tions and activities. Implicit was the development of appropriate counter-
measures to known or suspected enemy PSI capabilities.
() (S/ORCON) AMSAA concluded a contract in September 1978 to
have SRI conduct a number of experiments in support of the areas of
.interest outlined in paragraph 2c(4) above;These would be carried out
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(0) (S'ORCON) In Oct 78, Congressman Rose (NC), expressed in
writing to Dr. Davis, DDR&E, his strong desire for DOD'to undertake PSI
investigation. He promised full support for the program. On 13 Feb 79,
Congressman Rose and others from the House Intelligence Committee were
briefed by SRI, Dr. Vorona, and John Kramar, AMSAA Project Officer.
Again, full support and commitment to the program was tendered by Rose--
the others seemed impressed by what they had heard.
O (S/ORCON) Also on 13 Feb the GRILL FLAME DOD Steering
Committee first met to hear and offer comments on the program's develop-
mental status. Committee members: All Service ACSIs, Dr. Ruth Davis,
Dr. LaBerge, and Dr. Vorona. The tone of the meeting was a positive one.
O (S'ORCON) Ms Volner, AGC, provided legal guidance on
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15 Feb 79, to the effect that any GRILL FLAME protocol should be reviewed
by the Surgeon General's Human Use Testing Committee. If found to
involve humans as subjects of research, or "risk" was entailed, appropriate
HEW guidelines and AR 70-25 would apply.
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(40) (S/ORCON) On 6 Mar SRI briefed, at his request,
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Also on request, subsequent
briefings were provided to him by DIA, CIA, and Army. (Note: Impression
by Army briefers is that
are positive on the subject, and most likely will soon give Dr. Brzenzski
and the President a full scale pitch on the program.
have also talked with Dr. Davis.)
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(44) (S/ORCON) On 26 Mar SRI and AMSAA presented their RV-
related protocols to the Surgeon General's ad hoc Human Use Subcommittee
for GRILL FLAME. That panel judged the proposed RV work to be technology
transfer and application oriented, rather than research or testing;
]therefore, HEW and AR 70-25 did not apply. It was recommended, however,
that: (a) adequate scientific review of research protocols should be
provided, (b) a behavioral scientist should participate in protocol execution,
and (c) separate organizations like AMSAA and MICOM should develop Human
Use Review Committees and processes. There recommendations will be
incorporated whenever appropriate.
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O (S.'ORCON) This week, MG Thompson requested,the Surgeon General
designate, by name, a fully qualified behavioral scientist to act as
consultant during protocol development. In addition, the Chief of the
Army Science Board, Dr. Yore, was directed by the Under Secretary of the
Army to put together a small team of four-five highly regarded individuals
of diverse backgrounds, to assist in protocol development, and to later
monitor the work for its technical and scientific credibility.
3. (U) Other US Government "players":
a,. (S/ORCON) USAF: Has maintained a small program over the past
few years mainly to replicate known or claimed Soviet PSI experiments.
Since March 1979, AF ACSI has displayed a positive attitude toward the
subject and it is possible that within a year the AF program will escalate
significantly.
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b. (S/ORCON) Navy: In the early 70s, conducted some PSI experiments,
but claims to have dropped out (perhaps because of criticism by press/
Congress of "weird" projects). Suspicion lingers among Army project
personnel that Navy may have nevertheless kept a tightly compartmented
effort going. Navy reps attend all DOD meetings, but remain uncommitted
and literally silent.
4. (U) CURRENT/FUTURE STATUS:
a. (S/OR(JN) Army Science Board: Dr. Yore is now lining up team
members and within two weeks will meet with them to schedule field trips
to SRI, AMSAA, INSCOM and MIA. Dr. Yore will advise and report directly
to the Undersecretary.
b. (S/ORCON) MICOM. Concentrating on development of a program to
exploit potential offered by PK. First, "Phase Zero" calls for replication
and evaluation of certain experiments already designed and performed by
out-house organizations like SRI. Funds are available for a complete
program, but intention is to commit only some contractor support monies
for Phase Zero; the remainder held in abeyance until that phase is
completed. The following near term actions expected within two weeks:
(1) a committee of three senior scientists and engineers has been appointed
to review the entire PK program, (2) the committee will select a qualified
scientist as program director and, (3) the program director will be
assured of a quality staff by the committee. Upon completion of Phase
Zero the following objectives, to which fixed milestones have not been
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decided by MICOM, will be achieved: (1) Develop a PK-activated switch
and (2) conduct an intensive analytical effort. The PK-switch phase will
involve development of specialized software, hardware and algorithyms.
The analytical effort will include research of modern physics and formu-
lation of a protocol to look for the PK "mechanism."
c. (S/ORCON) INSCOM - currently in the initial phase of familiarizing
and introducing six RV specialists to the subject matter. Over the next
six months they will discreetly filter out to SRI for `"training" in RV
techniques. The INSCOM contract is $95K. Long term objectives include
(1) refine specific abilities identified in each of the RV specialists,
(2) establish intelligence collection procedures using RV and, (3) establish
an institutional system for responding to validated tactical and strategic
intelligence collection requirements (ICRs). Milestones:
Feb 79 - Jul 79 Initial orientation
May 79 - Aug 79 Individual training at SRI
Aug 79 - Dec 80 Refine specific individual abilities
Oct 79 - Mar 80 Establish response mechanixm to ICRs
May 80 - Dec 80 Initial introduction of RV data to intelligence cycle.
Although only a very few INSCOM experiments have been conducted, all in
the past two weeks, first cut analysis is encouraging with a moderate-
to-high degree of target correlation. However, it is still too early to
make any accurate assessments or predictions.
e. (S/ORCON) AMSAA - On-going effort is divided between contractor
(SRI) development of RV techniques; and AMSAA independent challenge/veri-
fication of those methods and outputs. Through March 1979, SRI
accomplished the following of significance: (1) Remote Viewer(s) accurately
located person(s) unknown to him, with four out of five first place blind
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judge matches and, (2) three experienced RV specialists scored well beyond
chance in determining access codes to computers. Current contract with SRI
is about $190K. Between April 79 and March 80, SRI will perform as follows:
TASK ONE: (1) Conduct RV.sensing tests on Units/'equipment at Fort Ord.
(2) Provide to AMSAA relevant RV data, protocols and
procedures.
(3) Provide guidance necessary to establish in-house
RV program.
(4) Conduct training of AMSAA personnel on a ten-choice
numerical device.
TASK TWO: Apply and evaluate RV techniques relative to:
(1) Tracking and locating key enemy personnel.
(2) Detect change in status of military unit.
(3) Rapidly determine damage resulting' from non-nuclear
attack.
(4) Determine access code to computers; and other
electronic hardware,
(5) Determine countermeasures to enemy RV.
(6) Determine general context of enemy, documents and
other information items.
Recently, a number of in-house RV trials were conducted', in accordance with
established SRI protocols, with encouraging results. The first were of
the "inbound and outbound" experimenter variety (beacon individual goes
.to target). The next phase (near term) will use the geographic coordinate
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protocol. Targets will be selected that are both distinctive in nature,
and which can be coorelated to tactical maps. Multiple viewers will
be used in an attempt to better "fix" precise target locations. A major
goal is to.develop better procedures for technically demonstrating the
existence or non-existence of RV (NOTE: AMSAA and INSCOM work very closely
on the PSI effort. Within the spirit of a true team effort, MICOM will
probably fold in well with these organizations, resulting in the most
efficient approach to the problem.)
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