A NEW LOOK FOR THE CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R001300390001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 119
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 2, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 21, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

STATINTL
A '~;., !t- i r,.I
Approved For Release 20011/~30 bP80-016
JAMES SCHMSINGER
Late in 1971 James R.
Schlesinger, his wife, Rachel,
and two of their children made
headlines by roaming around
a barren, uninhabited
island-Amchitka, in the Aleu-
tian chain off Alaska's coast.
They were trot there to pur-
sue Schlesinger's h o b b y:
bird-watching. Their mission
was to prove to skeptics that it
was safe to inhabit an area
where the U.S. government
had just exploded the largest
underground nuclear blast,
known as "Project Cannikin."
?A determined man who acts
out his convictions, the
43-year-old native of New York
City now moves into another
controversial area, b Lit one
that produces few headlines:
intelligence network.
-Chosen by President Nixon
today to succeed Richard M.
/ Helms as director of the Cen-
tral Intelligence A g e n c y,
Schlesinger will be giving up
the post of chairman of the
Atomic Energy Commission.
In taking the intelligence po-
.sition, Schlesinger will have
an opportunity to act out some
of his ouvji conclusions about
the ' way that job should be
run.
His first job in the Nixon
administration - assistant
director of the Budget Bureau
(later during his tenure re-
named the Office of Manage-
merit and Budget)-lcd to pri-
mary responsioility for reor-
ganization of the intelligence
.;apparatus cf the federal gov-
ernrtient. -
~l 4 F'7P.11
t
JAMES R. SCHLESINGER
Accomplished In 1971 the
changes streamlined budget-
ing procedures and, more im-
portantly concentrated the
process of coordinating and
assessing intelligence data in
the hands of presidential ad-
viser Henry A. I issirger and
his aides in the While H(Ase.
The reorganization gave the
director of Central Intelligence
full budeetin responsii)ility
for all of the intelligence serv-
ices-enhanced authority
which Schlesinger himself pre-
sumably now inherits.
Created Post
Perhaps by coincidence, a
former colleague Of Schlesin-
ger's at the Hand Corp. "think
tank" in California-Andrew
\I. Marshall-is the member
of Kissinger's National Securi-
ty Council staff most con-
cerned with coorclinatitng intel-
ligence matters.
Marshall's post, as head of
the "Net As essment Group,''
within the NSC staff, was cre-
ated by Schlesin ger's reorgani-
zation plan.
Schlesinger had joined the
Nixon administration in Fcb-
rltary 116t), pr inlarily as a
budget-watcher. His main as-
signment was to oversee the
Petlta'ion's blld etlug proce-
dures, during a period
military spending was easing;
is reputed to have showirti e
Pentagon in one year how to
trim $6 billion out of its budg-
et.
Although much of his profes-
sional and governmental life
seems to have involved nation-
al security in one way or an-
other, he also has a reputation
for being sensitive about envi-
ronmental issues.
Ecology Stand Tested
His friends recall that,
among his other activities
within the government, he per-
suaded the administration to
reverse itself and to allow the
Taos Indians to keep their
sacred Blue Lake lands in
New Mexico.
The chairmanship of AEC
tested his devotion to ecology.
Although environmental orga-
nizations strongly criticized
his full support for the Am-
chitka atomic blast, they have
praised his stand on the so-
called Calvert Cliffs case.
Pressed by the atomic ener-
gv industry to a )peal a federal
court decision ordering the
AEC to act much more ab
t re.:sively to protect the envi-
ronment, Schlesinger refused,
choosing to obey the court.
file chairman also has taken
the position that it is not ap-
propriate for the AEC to pro-
mote atomic energy, or to esti-
mate how much nuclear power
the nation ~,cill need. Instead,
it has been his policy to have
the agency develop energy op-
tions that the public may de-
cide to use as it wishes.
Trained as an economist,
Schlesinger was graduated
summa cum laude from Par-
v2rd in 1P5n. After a year's
travel in Europe on a fellow-
ship, he returned to Harvard
to take a doctorate in econoni-
ics.
Taught at Vii-inia
After, that, lie taught eco-
nomics at the University of
Virginia, and hey*an concen-
trati;n,g oil the budgetary side
of rational security and dC-
fense policy. Ile wrote a book
titled "Tile Political Economy
of National Security."
In part as a result of the
book's favorable notice among
experts is the national s:acuri-
ty field, Schlesinger was of-
fereci the job at Rand in Santa
Monica which carried out
much of the defense estiblish-
ment's computer-based analy-
sis of defense systems.
While at Rand, Schlesinger
headed a study of nuclear
Ft r in S proliferation, and
worked on a study of the role
of "systems analysis" in polit-
ical decision?makir.,. That
work brought h;rn to the atten-
tion of the Nixon r,dnli:listr::-
tion's new budget staff in the
early days after the Prc~!i-
(lent's inauguration.
Durin=g then time in \'; ash-
ington, the Schlcsingers have
avoided much of the city's so-
cial life. Schlesinger is said to
dislike cocktail parties.
He is a Republican and a
Lutheran.
Mrs. Schlesinger, the former
Rachel Mellinger, is a gradui
ate of Radcliffe. 'llicy have
eight children-four daughters
and four sons.
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 NEW YORK TIMES
Approved For Release 2001/03/041:r1CIAeR9080-016
CAI sJ,. kr h HE.::~~Lr,
How purely-military judgment can miscarry even from
a stratveje, standpoint is all too sharply illustrrtc.d by
the bo)-ilbing of I:doith Vietnam that was authotired.
?I)uring his first week in office in January 3.959, presi-
dent Nixon asked the eight key military -And civilian
a.f;envies of the Government concerned with the Indo-
china. yyar what could be achieved by mining hlaipbong
and other ports and resuming the bombing of North
Vi(llrlam, which had been halted three months earlier.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff mid the American military
command, in Saigon replied that: the effect on the war
would be decisive if previous restrictions ware removed
oil the bombing of overland transport from China. But
giro C.I.A. and the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(O.S.I).) challenged the military estimates,
As summarized by the Kissinger staff in the then-secret:
National Security Study 7,4ernor.: ndun, No. 3. (N S.S.Iri.-])
in .February 1.959, the C.I.A. and O.51). s ,,id that "the
overland routes from China alone, could provide North
i(:-,tnaann with enough material to carry on, even with
.an unlimited bombing campaign.."
other kinds moving from China' . lough supplies have
got through for new Connaur Offensives in the ,next
six weeks---including one in the Mekong J)elta south of
Sai~,on-if Hanoi decides to launch t:heni.
Ple nnystc;~y is why a.rnything other than tl:is should
have been expected. As the N.S.S.Ivi. I ,tardy pointed out,
ll-nost four years of air war in Not IL Vietnam have
hown---as did the IS:orean vvar--that, although Jr astrikes
will destroy transport facilities, eq!u pment and supplies,
they ca;nnot successfully interdict tine [mtcrlandj flow of
supplies because much of the damage can frequently be
repaired within hours."
That these facts, known since. 1h99, were disregarded
is bad enough. What Would be even worse;. would bw con-
tinuing illusions that the minin and. bcnii;ins' night
force Ilanoi to accept negotiated defeat. A compromise
political settlement, which involves a sharing or division
of power in South Vietnam, is the one way to cod a war
that neither side can win on the battlefield.
J
'three years ltiter, on May e, 1972, President Nixon
disregarded the C.I.A.-O.S.U. judgment, which was sup-
ported by an impressive array of facts, and took the ad-
vice of the military, who evidently argued that "smart
bombs" and other new techniques would make even
more certain the success they predicted in 1969.
For four months now, the ports have been closed by
mines and a massive bombing campaign has been tinder
way. Indications that the Communists' war effort was
not being impeded have been countered with the asser-
i ;ion that several months would be required before the
interdiction campaign began to pinch. Petroleum sup-
plies, which came by Soviet tanker overseas and had to .be
pumped ashore, were said to be particularly vulnerable.
These predictions now have been exploded by two
separate intelligence studies. The C.I.A. and the I'enta-
g all's Defense Intclligence Agency have both concluded
that the blockade and bombing, after four months, have
had relatively feeble results.
The Communists have built three four-inch petroleum
pipelines-which are hard to hit and can be rapidly re-
paired--south from the Chinese border to the Hanoi area
and another from Hanoi to the southern tip of North
Vietnam and beyond, into the Ashau Valley of, South Vi-
etnam. Ant-like tactics of rapid repair of damaged rail-
ways. and bridges have,also ki;pt. adequate supplies of
STATINTL
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 0I/AIIIVIL
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t, ,
"I 'V
t' t. ..? .f.i.._1i.
ary
u
1 0 v
Under Nixon Auiu is
sit down to hammer, out decisions in
p secrecy
.
. 1 ; 1 here wa a story sc v oral years
manded the Marine Corps comman..
E'l?f-, danf, for j0i9ug; a di?l.lssiou on
\VASI-1I N GTON
They are warriors transformed
into technocrats.
The Joint. Chiefs of Staff, tluasi-
board l of directors of the American
military n1~ichine-?-influencing the
use of billions of dollars each year,
.moving in circles where foreign pol-
icy is nladc; preparing for military
threats a generation into the future,
linking the.President with men un- ?
? der arras.
The institutio) has been under fire
ever fince it was created 25 years
.,ago. Dean Acheson, the late secreta-'
Times staff tin her Abramson coy.
Said one JCS staff officer: "So111e-
times the weight of a discussion is
carried by people who didn% even.'
have a seat at the table in past
years." For such reasons, military
iilen are persuaded they are at least
being heard.
The JCS institution and the men
who manage it have changed ]ouch
more slowly than the limes.
The chiefs themselves are still of-
ficers from a generation that served
with the Lisenbowers, ?Bradleys,
and NacArthurs, survivors of a pre
nuclear age when the men who com-
manded armies were bigger than
life.
'an the 1'entngon, They stayed in uniform when ,the
United States- mothballed its fleets,
r}'' of state, compared it to "my fa- put its bombers in boneyards, and
sell t its conscripts h0111e.
voriie oi$ lady who could net say _ But mastery of the military system
what she thought until she heard
what she said.' and years in prized command posts
I f ? 11, 1C`'
l
a
e
Ti:) its critics, the JCS is a pondc-
xous, ineffective anachronism de-
scribed this . way, "The courts
meditate, Congress deliberates, and
the Joint Chiefs bicker."
Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs are
increasing their influence, playing a
stronger role in U.S. policy than
they have for years.
And paradoxically this is happen-
ing in an atmosphere of tarnished
military image, disaffection over de-
fense spending, and continued rec-
.otlllnellclations for reorganization of
the JCS machinery.
For one thing, the Nixon Admin-
istration has greatly strengthened
the role of the National Security
c 0011 e
an of
no more p
. ..'
than: a. life in politics trains him for
the Presidency.
At the top, they are asked to he
master diplomats, politicians, and
advisers to the President at the
same time they are burdened with
more narrow, responsibilities as
leaders of their individual services.
Bicker, they have. In the '30's the
admirals. and generals feuded over
aircraft carriers versus bombers.
The Army and Air Force fought
over control of ballistic missiles, the
Army contending the new weapons
were a new generation of artillery,
the Air Force' viewing them as un-
manned planes. ?
In the '60's, it was a conflict. with
Council and the crisis-managing Defense Secretary Robert S. McNa-
Washington Special Action -Group mara and his civilian aides poaching
where military advice is fed into the in the preserve of military preroga-
1Vhite House decision-making pro- five.
cess. The chairman of the Joint Not much leaks out of the gold-
Chiefs of Staff is a member of both, carpeted Pentagon conference room
Furthermore, the Nixon :~dminis- called "the tank" where the chief-
trati'on feels more strongly than re-
cool. nast artmifistrafinn'l 11-a1 lip-
with the Marines," he yeas quoted.
NVhy are you getting into this?" To
which the Narllle snorted, "l?ecause
I am an American citizen, god-
danlit."
Such bickering is said to be a thing
of the past,
On paper, the harmony is indeed
astoundiiln. Of 1,0(10 to 1,200 official
recommendations alld po itions per-
sonally endorsed by the chiefs each
year, fewer than l fail to get una-
nimous support. Even during the
'GOB, when Yictnam was escalating',
and :tic\ an ara was conducting. a
management rcvoluti".?-, at the Pen-
taggon, the split dechio.1 never rose
'above: 5 in a year.
. Therein lies the hasis for charges
that rather than basing; decisions on
what's best for the nation, JCS 11oli~
cy emerges from a logrolling exer-
cise that rounds off the sharp cor-
ners of policy, enabling; the chiefs to
march shoulder-to-shoulder.
Said an officer .who recently com-
pleted a tour of duty on the JCS
staff: "They can he very good when
they're dealing; with single service
issues, emergency situations.
"But ask them how the services
should divide up an extra billion dol-
lars in the defense budget, and they
are completely incapable of dealing
with that. They are just not able to
address questions of resource alloca-
tion."
't'his is the so-called "two-hatted
problem" that has hovered around
the JCS organization since- it was
created 2.5 years ago.
The same men called upon to ad-
vise the President on how the mili-
tary should be structured, how to
provide the armed forces to meet the
country's national security objec
Lives are at the same time leaders of
their individual services.
"A chief of staff does not lead his
service by being noble," said Rear
Adm. Gene A. I.,a Rocque, who has
become an outspoken defense critia
since retiring fronl',ihc Navy. "Ileha3
.r ,.- ~.y ..-r ...~.-~-- --- -- - ? --? -- ]18S to 11j, -C dca
distinct conlli nltion from the mili-
Lary. . doesn't care.'
1runkokka
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HERALD AUG 2 0 197C
M - 19,818
S - 21,768
Edito~al Opineon
ole
naISe rity
Iic~
' Recent disclosures that an under-
cover agent of the U.S. security
establi.shi-nent, posing as an out-
?sidi'r and using. obviously faked
credentials, wandered unmolested
~ - for several hours in some of the
security agency's.. most sensitive
areas where he had almost unhin-
dered access. to some of the na-
tion's top military secrets, has led
many people to wonder just how
.the national security establishment
works' and what it is for.
The National Security.Act, which
became law 25 years ago, has
been described' as "perhaps the
most far-reaching measure in its
effect upon the role of the mili-
tary in American life since. the for-
mation of the Navy Department in
.1798."
1.y bringing the three branches
of the armed services together in
a single department, the act,
signed ' into law July 26, 1947, by
former President Harry S, 'Tru-
man, aimed to eliminate inter-
service duplication and rivalry.
But it also had the unintended side-
effect of profoundly altering the
process of formulating U.S. for-
eign policy.
la addition to creating a na-
Jtional military establishment, later
to become the Defense Depart-
ment, the National Security Act
set up three bodies that have
grown in importance over the
years. The Joint 'Chiefs of Staff
was an outgrowth of the Combined
Chiefs of Staff set up by the
{ United States and Great Britain
early in World War II. It was.giv-
en the responsibility of preparing
military plans, reviewing over-all
military requirements,, and direct-
ing unified and specified. combat
commands.
Over
and above the
National
Military
Establishment,
the act
provided
for a National
security
Council
"to advise the
President
with respect to the integration. of
domestic, foreign, and military pol-
icies relating to the national secur-
ity," with the specified duty to
"assess and appraise the objec-
iives, commitments and risks of
the United States in relation to our
actual and p,o t e n. t i a l military,
power."
It is this same National Security
Council from which presidential
advisor Henry Kissinger operates.
Kissinger's influence in arrapiging
and guiding President Nixon'
through a complex round of inter-
national conversations on both
sides of the Iron Curtain, all ap-
parently being strongly related to
the security of the United States,
has provoked a measure of domes-
tic debate, but most recent polls
show that the president has a
comfprtable majority of citizens
who approve policy changes stem-
ming from the world wide, jour-
ney's.
Kissinger, who is now in South '
Vietriarn on a mission for Presi~
dent Nixon after several secret
sessions' with North Vietnamese
negotiators in P?aris, has become
the target of some crii;~ici'sm in.
liberal n'iedia circle and in some
discreet rumbling within the State
Department, where some feel he
has usurped traditional State De-
partment power.
Finally, 'the act established a.
Central Intelligence Agency. CIA
was to "correlate and evaluate in-
telligence relating to the national
security," , but was to "have no
police, subpoena, law-enforcement
? . or internal security functions.'.'
It remained for Robert S. Me-
.Namara, Secretary of Defense un-
der President's John F. Kennedy
and Lyndon B. Johnson from '1961
to 1968, to utilize to. the full the
powers inherent in the National
Defense Act. While McNamara.
found the basic structure of the
Defense Department to he "entire-
ly sound," he nevertheless insti-
tuted a number of changes. In 1961
the Tactical Air Command. and the
.Strategic Army Corps were placed
under the direction of the U.S.
Strike Command. The communica-
tions and intelligence branches of
the three military services were
merged, and plans for streamlin-
ing of procurement of arms and
equipment were instituted.
"Despite its awesome power and
the worldwide sweep of its activi.
ties, the basic, mission of the De-
partment of Defense is s i in p l y
stated," McNamara wrote in 1968.
"The mission is military security;'
or more broadly, to maintain a
constant readiness the military
forces necessary to protect the na-
tion'from attack, keep its commit-
ments land support the foreign
policy. .
In the light of present political
controversy over the relative posi-
tion of President Nixon and his
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Democratic c h a l l e n g eden.
George McGovern, McNamara's
statement is of interest to many,
because McGovern, in attacking
the president's position, has prom-
ised sweeping Defense Department
appropriation reductions which
many critics contend will make
the military unable to defend the
country from attack, let alone.
back up commitments abroad in
support of foreign policy.
Some' critics argue that the De-
fense Department has a hand in
shaping foreign policy, too. Discus-
sion of contingency plans by Penta-
gon. and military planners of for-
eign countries, C. Merton Tyrrell
wrote in 1970, "have tended to di-
minish the role of the State De-
partment, and place the Depart-
of Defense in the quasi-official po-
sition of `suggesting' foreign policy
action." The CIA and the National.
Security Coi' f? likewise have
chipped away at State Department
policy-making powers. For better
or worse, the National Security Act
has had consequences that Con
gress could not foresee 25 years
ago.
With the concentration of U.S.
and foreign. military data that must
have been. stored up during the
past 25 years in an agency that
reaches deep into both military,
and foreign policy decision making,
and with both foreign and domestic
interests trying through both legal
and illegal means, to open. up this
mass of sensitive data, it is little
wonder that the ssecurfiy agency,
has ordered. a :detailed overhaul-
ing of,iits own security.
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 WASHINGTON POST PARADE
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z AUG 1972
SAN CLEMENTE, CALIF.
ith the exception of the President,
no one in the Nixon Administra-
tion has been more publicized
than Henry Kissinger, Nixon's
National Security Affairs adviser.
Yet Kissinger does not work alone.
He heads a `staff of 110 including mes-
sengers, secretaries, researchers, and
brairitrusters, all self-effacing, hard-
working men and women, nerve of them
'known to the public.
Of late, however, one of Dr. Kissin-
ger's loyal' arid intrebid band of devoted
slaves has begun to surface.
Mark his name carefully: Maj. Gen.
Alexander Meigs I laig Jr.
At 47, Al Haig is tall, blue-eyed, and
more handsome and sex-appealing
than secret agent Kissinger whose
deputy he is.
Soft-speaking and tactful, subtly am-
bitious with just the right amount of
ruthlessness, Al Haig is second in com-
mand at National Security Affairs. He is.
Henry's "gute rechte hand" (good right
hand).
Checks on Vietnam
It is he who holds together the dedi-
cated "low profiles" who work for Kis-
singer while. Henry cavorts in strange
and foreign lands. It is through him that
the, mountain of position papers on
Vietnam, the Middle East, the Soviet.
L i_..ta ti_:1i L..s t.
,In
? :`
t `. 1(7)
by Lloyd Shearer
Union, South Africa, and ad infinitum is
funneled. And it is he, without fanfare
or publicity, who wings off to Vietnam
every six months or so, to assess first-
hand for the President how things are
really going.
Last month Haig returned directly to
San Clemente frain his eighth "trip to
Southeast Asia and briefed the Pres-
ident on conditions in Vietnam and
Cambodia. He was then trotted out
on a non-attribution basis to the press,
which described him as "an uniden-
tified, high-ranking source."
Although Al f-laig has spent the past
27 years in the Army, "my entire adult
life," he neither looks nor behaves like
a military prototype. He is not obdu-
rate or parochial. There is no rigidity to
.his mind, which is open and inquiring,
or to his speech, which is academic and
articulate.
Haig could very well be faken for a
college professor or a diplomat, which
in a sense he is. For diplomacy is cer-
tainly a requisite in getting on. with
taskmaster Kissinger whose tolerance
quotient is low and personnel turnover
high.
Last month when Henry invited Haig,
to the swank Bistro restaurant, one of
Kissinger's favorite restaurants in Bev-
erly Hills, along with actress Sally"Kel-
lerman, Soviet Ambassador Anatoli
Dobrynin,.and a flock of screen colony
Probable inheritor
Should anything happen to -Henry;
like being appointed Secretary of State,
or being incapacitated by one of his
scorned. girlfriends, Haig most probably
would inherit Kissinger's job.
Although philosophically Kissinger
and Haig see eye to eye--both are con-
.servatives~-Haig as foreign affairs ad-
viser. to the President, would certainly
avoid the spotlight Kissinger, by his na-
ture, attracts.
To begin with, Haig is a happily-rnar-
ried,-chu'rch oing Roman Catholic.
Son of a lawyer, he was born in Phila-
delphia, attended parochial grade
school in Cynwyd on the Main Line,
moved up to St. Joseph's Prep and
studied two years at Notre Dame before
his appointment to West Point came
through in 1944.
His brother, a priest, is president of
Wheeling College in West Virginia, and
his sister,- Regina Meredith, an attorney
in Pennington, N.J.
Like many young men, Al. Haig set-
his eye on a service academy appoint-
m--nt because it was a financial neces-
sity. "My father died when I was 10,"
he explains, "and I had pretty much to
fend for myself in terms of economics.
I had newspaper routes, worked for the
Post Office, the Atlantic Refining Com-
pany. I even worked as a floorwalker in
the ladies' department of Jahn Wang,
Republican fat-cats, several wailers mis-
took Haig-heaven help litm, for an maker's (a well-known department store
in Philadelphia) to support myself.
actor.
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 VMSIX7.IGTO14 OBSERVER NEt7SLE 2
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;, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger is officially
t'hl
f
rtl ~ designated as Assistant to the
President for National Security
3LJAffairs. And in this capacity lie
presides over the National Security Council staffs
which are -divided into 13 divisional staffs, such as
NSC planning Group, Program. Analysis Staff,
Scientific Affairs, International Economic Affairs,
African and U.N. Affairs, etc. In addition he is
Chairman of the \Vashington Special Action
Group, which directs the activities of all intelli-
. genre agencies, including the CIA and the FBI.
The White House Military Situation Room also
operates under the aegis of Dr. Kissinger. It is
here the military evaluations and strategies are
formulated for the President's decision. The super-
strategist Kissinger frequently. overrides the re-
commendations of the four-star generals and ad-
mirals of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Where did Kissinger acquire all of his military
expertise? Certainly his Army career in World
War II was somewhat mediocre as a staff scrgealit,
and his brief career as a very junior reserve officer
after the war. Since he never even comniancled a
squad; how could. he acquire matured military
judgment?
1-1 1, he resigned his reserve commission as
a-captain in the Military Intelligence. In his resig-
nation letter, Reserve Captain Kissinger had the
audacity to say that he was quitting because of
"pressure of other obligations and the conviction
that I can be of greater service in a high rank in
case an emergency necessitates this step." The
U.S. Ariny was happy to get rid of hint.
The following is an official n lemoranclum, dated
April 3, 1.959 shortly before his discharge:
MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF' OF
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMEN'T'
as a Department of the Army civilian instructor at STATINTL
the European Theater Intelligence School, Oberanl-
mcrgau, Germany. lie served ?in'this capacity for
one year.
Upon return to the United States in 1947 .Dr. KIS-
SINGER applied for a commission in the Officers'
Reserve Corps. He was appointed a 2nd Lieutenant,
1\MI (ORC) on 19 April 1948. He was promoted to the
following grades on the dates shown: 1st Lt. MI
(USAF), 11 May 1.951; 1st Lt. MI (AUS), 5 Nov.
1952; Capt. MI (USAR), 15 Nov. 1955. Since 1948 he
has completed annual tours of active duty of from
fifteen to ninety days duration in his Department of
the Army -Mobilization Designation assignment in
the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, U.S.
Army Intelligence Center, 'Fort Holabird, Md. and
has regularly attended meetings of reserve units to
which he has been assigned. in a letter dated 6
Mar. 1959, addressed to The Adjutant General, Dr.
KISSINGER has indicated a desire to resign his
commission becaue of ". . . pressure of other obli-
gations and the conviction that I can be of greater
service in a high rank in case an emergency neces-
sitates this step. . .." 'T'his action, which has been
referred to The Commanding General, First United
States Army, is still pending.
Upon his return to the United States in 1947, Dr.
ICISSINGER entered Harvard University as an un-
dergraduate. lie graduated in 1950 with the degree
Bachelor of the Arts in Government. From 1950
to 1954. he was. a teaching Fellow in the Depart-
ment of Government at I-Iarvard University. Ile has
been a nicniber of the Harvard faculty since he
received the degree of Doctor of Philosophy from
that University in 1951. The Directory of Officers
in the Official Register of Ilarvard University, Vol.
I,V, No. 24, General Catalog Issue, 1.958-1959, con-
tains the following entry concerning Dr. KIS-
SINGER:
'Kissinger, Henry Alfred, PhD., Lecturer on Gov-
. ernment, Associate Director of the Center for
International Affairs, Executive Director of the
Summer School International Seminar, Editor of
CONFLUENCE and Member of the Faculty
of Public Administration....'
Dr. KISSINGER was subject of an intensive investi-
gation in 1955 because of allegations that the pub-
lication CONFLUENCE might contain items writ-
ten from a Communist or pro-Communist point of
view.
SUBJECT: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger (U).
Dr. KISSINGER was born in Fuerth, Germany on
27 May 1923. Ile arrived in the United States on 5
September 1938 and was subsequently naturalized
while in the military service by the U.S. District
Court, Spartanburg. South Carolina on 25 June
1943. After attending high school in New York City
for one year he worked as a shipping clerk until
inducted into the Army on 26 February 1943.
Dr. KISSLNGF_R received basic training at Camp
Croft, S.C., and was enrolled in the Army Specialist
Training Program at the University of North C~a?o-
]ina and Lafayette University. He served in the
Rhineland, Ardennes and Central Europe campaigns
as a rifleman in Company C, 335th Infantry Regi-
ment, 84th Infantry Division and as an investigator
in the Counter Intelligence Corps. Ile was discharg-
ed as a Staff Sergeant in 19.16 to accept employment
FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF
FOR INTELLIGENCE
(signed) 1tICHARD COL LINS
Brigadier General, GS
Director of Plans, Programs
and Security
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8
 Noam. Chomsky
whether
!Commie
much nationalist as
(May 20, 1949).
Reviewing the record of American
intervention in Indochina in the Penta-
gon Papers, one cannot fail to be
struck by the continuity of basic
assumptions from one administration
to the next.. Never has there been the
slightest-, deviation from the principle
that a noncommunist regime must be
imposed and defended, regardless of
popular sentiment. The scope of the
principle was narrowed when it was
conceded, by about., 1960, that North
Vietnam was irretrievably "lost."
Otherwise, the principle .has been main-
tained without equivocation. Given this
principle, as well as the strength of the
Vietnamese resistance, the military
power available-to. the United States,
and the lack of .effective constraints,
one can deduce with precision the
strategy of annihilation that was gradu-
ally undertaken.
On May 10,. 1949, Dean Acheson
cabled US officials in Saigon and Paris
that "no effort [should] be spared" to
assure the success of the Bao Dai
government, since there appeared to be
"no other alternative to. estab
[lishmcnt] Coinmie pattern Vietnam."
Ile further urged that this government
should be "truly representative even to
extent including outstanding non-
Commie leaders now supporting Ilo."
A State Department policy statement
of the preceding September had noted
that the Communists under Ilo Chi
Minh had "captur[ed] control of the
nationalist movement," thus impeding
the "long-term objective" of the
United States: "to eliminate so far as
possible Communist influence in Indo-
china."We are unable to suggest any
practicable solution to the French, the
report continued, "as we are all too
well aware of the unpleasant fact that
Communist Ho Chi Minh is the strong
est and perhaps the ablest figure in
Indochina and that any suggested solu-
tion which excludes him is an expedi-
ent of uncertain outcome." But to
in May, 1967, - Assistant Secretary of
Defense John McNaughton presented a
memorandum which the Pentagon his-
torian takes to imply a significant
modification of policy toward a more
limited and conciliatory position. The
Saigon government, McNaughton
urged,. should be moved "to reach an
accommodation with the non-
Communist South Vietnamese who are
under the VC banner; to accept them
as members of an opposition political
party, and, if necessary, to accept their
individual participation in the national
government . . ."- (Gravel Edition, Pen-
tagon Papers; vol. IV, p. 489).'.,Exact-
ly Acheson's proposal of eighteen years
earlier, restricted now to. South Viet-
nam.
In a summary of the situation after
the T?t offensive of 1968, Leslie Gelb,
director of the Pentagon 'study, asked
whether the US 'can "overcome the
apparent fact that the Viet Cong have
`captured' the Vietnamese nationalist
movement while the GVN has become
the . refuge of :-Vietnamese who were
allied with the French in the battle.
against the independence of their na-
tion" (II, p. 414). His. question ex-
pressed the dilemma of the State
Department twenty years before, and
properly so. The biographies of Thieu,
Ky, and Khiem indicate the continuity
of policy; all served with the. French
forces, as did most of the top ARVN
officers. "Studies of peasant attitudes
conducted in recent years," the Penta-
gon historian informs us, ".`have demon-
strated that for many, the struggle
which began 'in 1945 against colonial-
ism continued uninterrupted through-
out Diem's regime: ? in 1954, the foes
of nationalists were transformed from
France and Bao Dai, to Dien and the
US ... but the issues ? at stake never
changed" (1, p. 295). -
Correspondingly, the Pentagon con-
like Diem's,2 and substantial segments
of the urban intelligentsia-"the people
who count," as Ambassador Lodge
once put it (II, p. 738)=-now speak out
against US intervention.
A National, Intelligence Estimate of
June, 1953, discussed the gloomy pros-
pects for. the "'Vietnamese govern-
ment" given "the failure of Vietnamese
to, rally to [it]," the fact that the
population ? assists the Viet Minh more
than the French, the inability of "the
Vietnam leadership" to mobilize popu-
lar energy and resources, and so on (l.
p. 391f.). With hardly more than a
'change of names, this analysis.nnight be
interchanged With the despairing report
from. US pacification advisers (MAC-
CaRDS) on December 31, 1967, de-
ploring the corruption. and growing
weakness of the GVN, the "ever
widening gap of distrust, distaste and
disillusionment between the people and
the GVN. With. these words, the
record 'of US-GVN relations . in the
Pentagon Papers ends (II; pp. 406-7).
One may, perhaps, argue that the
mood of the South Vietnamese counts
for less in the war than it did in earlier
years, now that the US has succeeded,
partially at least, in "grinding. the
enemy down by sheer weight and
mass" (Robert Komer, II, p. 575), and
now that North Vietnamese forces
have increasingly been drawn into the
war, as a direct and always anticipated
consequence of American escalation.
In November, 1964, Ambassador
Maxwell Taylor argued that even if we
could establish an effective regime in
Saigon, to attain US objectives it
would not suffice to "drive the DRV
out of its reinforcing role.". Rather, we
will not succeed unless we also "obtain
its cooperation in bringing an end to
the Viet Cong insurgency." We must
"persuade or force the DRV to stop its
aid to the Viet Cong and to use its
directive powers to make . the Viet
Cong - desist from their efforts to
ere
s pro
m
s
liva
Acheson, Hoi4t l;Jf~i f$ra Yease 20 A, ,I 03id}4e~iEIAeRDP8l~t;0~t6:b~0 819Q39UA01-8
IU? XGa;x: 0dIE;i OF BOOK
Approved For Release 2001/1 0JUNaIRDP80-0
to be to "deter the overthrow the government of South
ble
id
d it
nationalist credentials: . "Question `11' -`..-` .1-
today has a power base remarkably
 THE WAS?1IIGTCJis OB:>ERVr2 U EWSLRPTER
x June 1972
Approved For Release 200103/04 : CIA-RDP9--6T98 k00
Several present and former FBI
;,rants are savinw privately that
they suspect that J. Edgar
Hoover died from an overdose
of sleeping tablets. But they add that the exact
cause of his death can't be determined without
an autopsy. And Dr. James Lulke, D.C. Coroner,
has adamantly refused to conduct an autopsy.
The FBI men say: "Regardless of whether Mr.
Hoover committed suicide or died from a stroke
induced by hypertension: there is one thing for
sure: Jack Anderson drove Mr. Hoover to his death
--the same as Drew Pearson drove Jim Forrestal
to his death."
Jack Anderson, a legman for Pearson for 23
years became his successor as the Nation's fore-
most muckraker. For the past two years Anderson
has conducted a continuous, unrelenting campaign
of harassment and vilification against T. Edgar
Hoover. Anderson's gumshoe operatives shadowed
Hoover, snooped in the trash can at his home,
checked on the food he ate and the medicines he
was taking; Anderson also purloined investigative
reports from the confidential files of the-FBI and
publicized them with critical commentary.
Hoover fumed and raged, but he seemed im-
potent to do anything about it. Anderson carried
on his savage personal attack against Hoover with
official impunity. Even when Anderson filched the
C--super-secret reports on the brief Pakistani-Indian
War from the files of White House's National
Security Council and the FBI was ordered to in-
vestigate this flagrant breach of national security
the culprits were not apprehended. Under a re-
organization Executive order all Federal intelli-
gence agencies-including the CIA and the FBI-
must work directly under Dr. Henry A. Kissinger,
White House Chief National Security Adviser.
Since then, the flow of classified documents to
Anderson have increased in volume. He seems
to enjoy complete immunity from prosecutive
action..
Hoover was terribly frustrated with this brazen
security breach but there was apparently nothing
that he could. do. Did hoover become a prisoner
in his own Bureau? Did the F131 that he had.
created in a 45-year strenuous effort turn into a
Frankenstein? Some conservative-oriented former
FBI men believe that this is true.
The FBI men's analogy between Drew Pear-
son's vicious personal campaign against Forrestal
and Jack Anderson's virulent personal campaign
against Hoover is significant. In 19-IS ):lines V.
Forrestal, the first Secretary of the Department
the Jewish occupation of Pale
up of the Arab world against the U.S.
Ironically, Forrestal had been the Vice Presi-
dent of the Jewish international banking firm,
Dillon, Read & Co. And Forrestal was planning.
to soon return to the firm, but he put duty to his
country above self-aggrandizement. Forrestal
exerted every effort to persuade President Truman
not to recognize Israel, but in vain-Truman suc-
cumbed to the temptation of political campaign
gifts from American Zionists.
In their vengeance, the Zionists selected Drew
Pearson to lead the vicious campaign to destroy
Forrestal. The Anti-Defamation League of the
B'nai B'rith assigned David Katz (alias Karr),
former by-line writer for the Communist Daily
Worker, and Andrew Older, member of the Wash-
ington, D.C. Communist newspaper cell, to the
Pearson staff to assist in the vilification campaign,
against Forrestal.
The Zionists furnished Pearson cash funds to
hire Gentile undercover gumshoe operatives to
shadow Forrestal clay and night, check on his
personal life and the lives of his wife and son.
F,orrestal's personal correspondence and office
files were stolen and published by Pearson in his
syndicated column and in his hews broadcasts.
Pearson published not only half-truths but pure
unadulterated falsehoods about Forrestal. When
a Pearson aide remonstrated that an article that
Pearson wrote about Forrestal was not true, Pear-
son replied: "The end justifies the means." Colum-
nist Westbrook Pegler accused Pearson of writing
"unequivocal lies" about Forrestal and when For-
restal committed suicide he castigated hint for
driving Forrestal to his death.
Shortly before his own death, Pearson wrote in
his diary: "After Forrestal's death I suffered from
insomnia. I was haunted with the thought that
maybe Pegler was right-maybe I did drive For-
restal to his death. I felt an almost compulsive
urge to join Forrestal in death."
At the time of Forrestal's death in 1949, some
Washington insiders did not believe that Forrestal
actually committed suicide. Forrestal was incar-
cerated as a patient under guard high in the tower
of the Bethesda Naval Hospital. A Chief Naval
Petty Officer was stationed outside the door of
his room.
Forrestal tied several sheets together, fastened
them to his bed and climbed out the window
holding to the rope of sheets-Ile may have been
trying to escape to a room below. Anyhow, he
fell. sixteen floors and died instantly. It was call-
ed "suicide."
01 J.~c tense nc i reel t \ rat i 'e
e #1OOjJjd$jOj A?-F~[ ` ~opposern i s c come an anti enntie crackpot, was en( angering
STATINTL
 Approved For Release 20 I PZ4X'RDP8OO601 RO
1 JUN 172 STATINTL
X.:: Stone Reports:
16 ~!d
The Washington dispatch which fol-
lows had to be written and put into
type before Nixon's speech the night
of May'8, announcing his decision to
mine North Vietnam's harbors and to.
smash its rail' and road 'connections
with China. But the disclosures to
which the article calls attention pro
vide'the explanation of Nixon's long-
range strategy, its weakness and its
risks.
It is characteristic of Nixon's
secretiveness that National Security
Study Memorandum No. 1-which is
discussed and partly reprinted be-,
low-though intended in 1969 to lay
the groundwork for his policies on
Vietnam, nowhere asked the advice
of intelligence agencies and the
bureaucracy, military and civilian, on
the very policy of ' "Vietnamization"
he adopted.. But at two points in
their responses, there were warnings
against US- troop withdrawal 'and
doubts expressed about ARVN's ability
to stand alone. Four military agencies
.(US MACV, CINCPAC, JCS, and the
vi
office' of the Secretary of Defense)
warned against "a too hasty with-
draw4l of US forces." The CIA went
further and said progress "has been
slow, ' fragile and evolutionary,"
adding quietly, "It is difficultto-see
how. the US can largely disengage
over the next few years without
jeopardizing this."
prepared to gamble America's
and the world's. This is the
behind Nixon's proclaimed
for "a generation of peace."
It is. now clear that Nixon took, the
gamble on Vietnamization in the
hope that if this failed, a bigger
gamble would succeed. The bigger
gamble, as the reader will see, was
either to buy off Moscow and Peking
or, if that- didn't work, to use the
threat of a nuclear confrontation to
make them stand by while we de-
stroyed North Vietnam from the air.
In other words, if. his gamble on'
South Vietnam's future failed, he was
and is
future
reality
search
Th
{ 9t
...,,~- that could ignite. World War III. A Kremlin to make up its collective
gamble of such magnitude, taken by mind or would we see an opera
one man without any real consulta- bouffe cave-in instead of an apoca-
tion with other branches of govern- lypse? If brinkmanship paid off, what
ment, can only be described as an act new hair-raisers lie ahead? Just lafte r
orning at the Caprto vigil
hi
of dictatorship and war. Nixon--one
must assume-is as ready for the
domestic . ? as for, the world conse-
quences. The martial law imposed in
Saigon may be a foretaste of the
repression to be 'expected at home if
the situation deteriorates.
In the literally terrible calculus -of
events, as I write a few hours after
the deadline passed in Haiphong
harbor, the question is whether Mos-
cow 'and Peking will act with the
same primitive irrationality that
Nixon has, putting prestige, face, and
machismo ahead of civilization's sur-
vival, or whether their leadership will
take the blow at whatever cost. to
their own political future, hoping
that Hahoi's armies will shortly have
achieved their aim, which clearly is
not territory "but the destruction of
Saigon's will to resist and an end of
the Thieu regime. But even if the
crisis is thereby resolved "peacefully"
at the expense of the Vietnamese
people North and South, it is dif-
ficult to see a successful summit, a
SALT, agreement as a sequel. It is
easier to see a new era of heightened
suspicion, tension, cold war, and
escalating arms race.
Was this cheerful idiocy merely
. marking time while waiting for the
s m
dawn t
under a cloudless blue sky as theSTATINTL
mines were activated 9,000 miles
away, one listened to the cliches with
which men comfort themselves in
crisis and could only hope that by
some
might
miracle the American people
themselves and force a.
change of course.
Catch the Falling Flag
by Richard J. Whalen.
Houghton Mifflin, 308 pp., $6.95
National Security. Study
Memorandum No, 1:
The Situation in Vietnam -
Anonymous Xerox Pubrication,'
I. F. Stone
Four years ago Richard Nixon was just*
where he is now on Vietnam, i.e., on
the brink of a-wider conflict. He didn't
think the war could be won, but didn't
want to lose "leverage" by saying so in
public. His one hope., his "secret plan"
for "an honorable peace,". i.e., for
snatching political victory from mili-
tary defeat, was to shut off Haiphong
and bring about a confrontation with
the Soviet Union. This is exactly where
he-and we-are today. After all the
years of costly losses, all he offers is a
In the tense moments at the White
House just before press time Nixon
was doing his best to pantomime a
victory, calling in the pTnotographers
and giving them sixty feet of film
instead of the usual forty to record a
visit with Soviet Ambassador Dobryn-
in and Soviet Trade Minister Patoli-
chev. "The atmosphere of the ses-
sion," said the pool report in the
press room, "was extremely amiable,
cordial, and pleasant. There were lots
of smiles all around and the President
seemed particularly buoyant." Do-
brynin looked a bit uneasy, but
mining of North Vietnam's Patolichev, when asked later whether
pqrts ancAdOPfOiWd FoQ11 l*a1SO1QOO1M3(t04til1 #eP~' 8 ab
doubt
.
by sea and air is potentially the gravest there ever any
decision ever taken, by an American
bigger gamble.
Catch the Falling Flag, Richard J.
Whalen's memoir of his service as a
speech writer for Nixon in the 1968
campaign, could not have appeared at
a better moment. It provides the full
text of the speech Nixon was about to
give ' on his own plan to end the war
when Johnson announced on March 31.,
that he would not run again. Two days
before, conferring with his speech
writers, Nixon startled them by an
extraordinarily-and uncharacteristi-
cally-candid remark. "I've come to
the conclusion," Whalen quotes him as
saying, "that there's no way to win the
war. But we can't say that, of course.
1I601cR0013003900 1 L say the
opposite, just tb keep some degree of
bargaining leverage."
 1m w Yom: PEV.+' Or, EoOK:)
Approved For Release 2001/031D4UR 2RDP80-01601 R
A
1P 0
conmen -3 from TM-Lori's ~`~?3-- ecret Study of the :'Jar;
STATINTL
North Vietnam has repaired . all major
supporting targets. road and railway bridges, constructed
QUESTION 28d A. - ?. -
camp "^n as described
o
s
om
an . rmp r . .
A strong' effort to interdict road and buffer restrictions were removed near the the same period. Thus, the act of scaling
rail transport from Communist China Chinese border. off the enemy's Cambodian supply lines
There is not sufficient data available at
through North Vietnam would require a at. must be considered as an integral part of
concerted and coordinated air interdiction this time on either the cost or any plan to prevent supplies from reach-
campaign against all transportation: mili- effectiveness of an air campaign against the ing enemy forces in the Republic of
these land lines to reach a firm conclu-
tart' support; petroleum oil, and lubri- Vietnam.
cants power; industrial; air defense; and Sion as to the chances of isolating NVN '
communications target systems. The inter- from her neighbors. Past attempts to tut ?'I30 tat@
relationship of the effects of destruction rail, road, and water networks in NVN Depwr{'3 ?; El's .nswCT
of targets in one ~ category to the effec- have met with considerable difficulties. It
tiveness of others is such that a cumula- has been estimated ? that a minimum of The crux of this question is the defini-
tive impact is achieved. The air campaign 6,000 attack sorties per month would be lion of "war-essential imports." There is
war-essential of imports that could come with denial of sea imports, would, in
'Into North Vietnam over the rail or road large part, isolate Hanoi and Haiphong
lines from China, even if all imports by from each other and from the rest of the
sea were denied trnd a strong effort ? even country. Isolation of lianoi, the focal
made to interdict ground transport? What point of the road and rail system, would
Is the evidence?? be highly effective in reducing North
Vietnam's capability to reinforce aggres-
,e Defense ' sion in South Vietnam. Importation of
war-supporting material would be seri-
yjear;s~.?.$ ~'''"~~w?1e~ ously reduced. Road capacities would be
Land Import Capacity reduced by a factor well in excess of the
estimated 50 percent believed to have
In 1968, NVN imported an average of been accomplished during the summer
6,800 STPI) (short tons per day); 6,000 months of 1966 and 1967. Over time,
STPD by sea, and 800 STPD by land. North Vietnam's capability to cope with
imports by land were higher in' 1967, the cumulative effects of such an air
amounting to about 1,100 STPD. How- campaign would be significantly curtailed.
ever, the land lines of communication
from China were not used to capacity. It ~-+
is estimated that the two rail lines from. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that
China have ' a theoretical uninterdictcd resumption of an interdiction campaign
capacity of. about 8,600 STPD and the similar. to that carried. out in Route
road network could provide an additional package I between July and 1 November
7,000 STPD during the dry season 1968 would assure almost total fnterdic-
(normally June-September) and about. Lion of truck and waterborne movement
2,000 STPD during the poor weather of supplies . into the demilitarized zone
months. The combined capacity of the and Laos. Naval blockade offshore and
land, routes (9,000-?15,000 STPD) is more interdiction of Regional Package II to
than enough to transport North Vietnam's Thant I-lao would further enhance this
total import requirements of about 7,000 effort.
STPD. If all seaborne imports were to Commitment of B-52 forces following-
come through China, considerable logistic heavy and -unrestricted suppression of
problems would have to be solved by the defenses by fighters, could reduce the
Chinese regime. amount of time to accomplish the above.
Interdiction of Imports from China Although the North Vietnamese have
If seaborne imports can be denied to established a significant by-pass capability,
NVN, her ability to successfully pursue the transportation nets remain vulnerable
the war in SVN would be dependent on at many key points. The locomotive
China population could be attrited quickly if all
rt
f
1 d '
'be free of the militarily confining China. Even at this level of effort, the this subject; but in our judgement, the
constraints which have characterized the North Vietnamese could continue to -use' category of war-essential imports should
tl ii lines to shuttle supplies if they ; 1 d t f th o 'd
ie ra
u
me
e ntos o e e onomc ar pro-
conduct of the war in the north in the
past. The concept would preclude attacks were willing to devote sufficient man:. vided by the Soviets and Chinese, as well
on population as a target but would power to repair and trann hippment[ opera- as nearly all of their purely military aid. aid
accept high > t~nFe@11ra lieA"be s il r`~m~ more
dif clulfo tfee ~l v~equ_a~ly~if ~o tmore`~ important ~ an
ordet ' to achieve destruction of war-
bombing halt. north of 190 in April 1968, military aid in keeping North Viet-Nam a
C=.^;i ;
and expanded the railroad capacity by
converting large segments from meter to
dual gauge truck. These improvements
would make even more -difficult pro-
longed interdiction of the overland lines
of communication.
We currently fly approximately 7,000
sorties per month against two primary
roads in Laos without preventing through-
put truck traffic; the road network from
China. has 7,10 principal arteries and
numerous bypasses. Finally, the mon-
soonal weather in NVN wodld make it
difficult to sustain interdiction on the
land lines of communication. Poor visi-
bility would prevent air strikes during
25-30% of the time during good weather
months and 50-65%n of- the time during
poor weather months. Thus, -it is not
possible to give ?a definitive amount to
the question of how much war-essential
imports could come into. NVN if sea
imports are denied and a strong air
campaign is initiated.
Attention would also have to be given
to interdiction of supplies coming into
SVN from' Cambodia. Over ' the past 2'
years, the enemy's use of Cambodia as a
supply base and a place of refuge has
become more pronounced. During the
period October 1967 to September 1,968,
10,000 tons of munitions transited
Sihanoukville and are suspected of having
been delivered to enemy 'forces in the
Cambodia-Republic of Vietnam border
?
more
regions. This . amount represents
than enough ordnance to satisfy the arms
and ammunition requirements for all
enemy forces in South Vietnam during
CIA tat 0 :T's:, sf3 Ea'Q 1'o t
 Approved For Release ,j atA4scQ"DJ? NV3'8a
June 1972
The Penrngoii Pajels-
A Discussion
STATINTL
The publication of "confidential" materials has inevitably given rise
to a debate concerning a number of different but related problems:
To what extent do the revelations contained in the documents throw
light on events or policy decisions with which they deal? To what ex-
tent, if at all, does the publication of the information contained in the
documents jeopardize the processes of ,-executive decisionmaking?
Ilow can the conflict between the public's right to know and the ex-
ecutive's need for confidentiality be reconciled? The editors of the Po-
litical Science Quarterly have in tu: past published a number of arti-
cles dealing with the issue of access to governmental information and
the terms on which that access is made available, notably, Adolf A.
Berle',; and Malcolm Moos's reviews of Emmet John Hughes, The
Ordeal of Power (PSQ, LXXIX, June' x964) and Theodore Draper's
review of Jerome Slater, Irttcn'ention and Negotiation: The United
States and the Dominican l:evohttion (PSQ, LXXXVI, March -1971).
The recent publication of the Pentagon Papers has given the contro-
versy new urgency. U.S. Senator George McGovern of South Dakota,
candidate for the Democratic party nomination foi president, and
Professor John P. Roche, from 1966-6S special consultant to President
Lyndon Johnson, were asked by the editors of the Political Science
Quarterly to',review the Pentagon Papers and to debate in print the
political and legal issues to which their publication has given rise.
Publication of the Pentagon Papers has raised a storm concerning
the right of the press to publish classified government documents.
But the contents of the papers are so sweeping in their disclosures
of official suppression of the realities in Vietnam, so revealing
of the disastrous, secretly conceived policies and practices which
led us into this tragic war, that it is impossible---in fact it misses
their true significance--to discuss them in such abstract terms.
The integrity of our democracy is profoundly involved, not
only in the constitutio::-1 sense with respect to the warmal:i ng
power, but in the basic sense of the reality of government by pop-
ular rule. It is axiomatic with us that a free people can remain
free only if it is enlightened and informed. It is axiomatic with
us, as well, that a free press is essential to the creation and main-
tenance of an enlightened and informed people. A press which
Approved FoEbIR-1epp
s2~0a/tQ~tQ4re`tI~QI~0e1 COt;~t@0tI,3DO390001-8
what our executive leadership knew and what it led the nation
 Iii r'1'Tluv RIC,!irj
17 MAY 1972 STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001
Those Intelligence Failed?
. NOTHING beats hindsight when choosing where
to kick for making a mistake-the mistake in this in-
stance being wrong about where, when and with how
much the North Vietnamese would attack.
The military intelligence community says that
Washington's strategists-meaning the National Se-
curity Council led by Henry Kissinger-took the in-
telligence reports and decided an attack would come,
if it came at all, west from Cambodia to cut South
Vietnam in half.
U.S. intelligence flights were curtailed. The elec-
tronic surveillance devices employed on the ground
couldn't tell a truck from a Soviet-built tank. But our
intelligence: knew that something was moving on the
supply trails and that the North Vietnamese had
strengthened their forces north of the demilitarized
zo:M
Intelligence reports predicted an attack in Feb-
ruary or March. When'it didn't come; some credibil-
? ity was lost. When it did come--in April-from an
unexpected direction with unexpected force, Wash-
ington was stunned.
It's difficult to run a war from the banks of the
Potomac, 9,000 miles from the battlefield. But if in-
telligence- reports are weighed in Washington and
the decisions are made in Washington, the blame be-
longs i,n Washington. As the long-distance strategist,
the NSC took responsibility for the conduct of the
war.
If intelligence. officials are correct in claiming
that we were caught off guard because of NSC mis-
interpretation of their reports, it doesn't take much
hindsight to know exactly where to kick.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8
 THE OKL,AHOI4A JOURNAL STATINTL -
ADDroved For Release 2?01*$/6$72CIA-RDP80 _0160'LR001
Candidate 9"I ICCt
By STEVE DI14IICK
Of The Journal staff,
YI; S. senatorial hopeful Jed Johnson spent
more than two years as an undercover agent for
.the Central Intelligence Agency during the early
?1960s, he said Friday.
Johnson said he carried on CIA activities
in more than a dozen Asian, African and Latin
American countries while working for one of
the front organizations exposed in the "CIA
on campus" scandals in 1967.
The former Sixth District congressman Fri-
day released a copy of a speech he will de-
liver to the Oklahoma Jaycees convention Satur-
.. . . _---i_
MA i
vnivement
his
n
"I know that the CIA is very, very meticu- Communist officials," he said.
lous and careful in its evaluations and is ac- "I also did get information on what the
curate and precise," he said. of up-and-coming oli
"The point is, if the CIA has given such an political ideology was p
evaluation (of the Vietnam blockade), I know tical leaders," he said.
they've done a thorough assessment of the sit- Johnson- balked.at the word "propaganda"
uation. They're very capable people and are when asked whether his. job entailed more
not political; they're very apolitical. - ; gathering of information or disseminating
"While I was never involved in CIA ;propaganda.
operat?ons in Southeast Asia, I know per- "It involved a lot of both," he said. "But we
sonally that they literally can tell you the were never told what to say by the CIA. We
minutest details about minor African political were never giver any orders about what to say
figures and I'm sure they have done the same. in a speech.
type of investigation in Vietnam,". Johnson "I was simply a youth. leader telling them what
said. we believe, why our economic system is the
Johnson' said he was not at liberty to dis-st productive, why our political system is
while a student at Oklahoma University which Youth and Student Affairs, the dummy foun- was still in colleg with a 1959 trip to Cuba
i
hi
4
b
-
us
dation for which he worked, was still in
was inter thrown back at him during his 19
. congressional race, also was actually a gov- ness.
ernment-sponsored "intelligence-gathering' "For me to say anything would have literal-
trip.-. by endangered the lives of some of our people
In his speech to the Jaycees, Johnson will overseas," he said.
attack President Nixon's new interdiction poi- He came back to the U.S. early in 1964, on
d
icy against North Vietnamese supply routes. leave from the Foundation, and then resigne
He bases his criticism largely on his knowledge from the organization before he made his suc-
of 'the CIA, which reportedly has claimed that cessful race for Congress.
the blockade will not work. ' Johnson served in Congress from 196466.
He said the "whistle was blown" on the cover
Johnson quotes from the "Kissinger Papers," - of the dummy foundation In 1967.
a secret government study conducted by the "I'm still not sure how much I'm at liberty
" he said.
athering groups to tell you
tion
f
r
i
,
g
ma
o
n
CIA and other
.and mane public by columnist Jack Ander- The former student.leader at the University He said another of his missions was to
son two weeks ago. The study reported the of Oklahoma said he was approached by the CIA -debate young Communist-leahers in Cuba.
CIA's belief that no amount of . interdiction (referred to among agents as ".the firm") in However, he was not able to reveal in 1964
,will be successful in stopping the flow of war 1962, a year after his graduation from col- that he had known in 1939 that the Cuban trip
materiel to North Vietnam. lege? was a government-sponsored one.
"I am personally acquainted in some depth "They contacted you to see if you were i y "It was a very interesting ex erietice, but
h
a
y ruouwer
taken it was frustrating that I couldn't rebut some of
- terest ad very 1with the degree of precision that the CIA open . clearanc a nd heesad. 'Later t
me,
ates within its intelligence activities, because against
or 1he afires made
secrets oath
of that trip and so e tother ac-
e J worked under contract as a covert agent for to a hotel divulge sign an
.the CIA prior to my election to the Congress," saying Y
Johnson said. critical information. I was involved in, I was later asked to-
" .
At that time, the CIA had extremely de- "After that, I was what they call `under become an agent for the CIA."
tailed information on such things as which contract' to the CIA until I resigned," he During his years as an agent, under the.
code name "Mr. Page" ("I chose that name
hand an obscure African provincial chief said. because I had been a page in the Senate and
would eat with and the vintage of his favorite "It was fascinating work," he said...If I
thou ht it would be easy to remember,".),
Twines," he said. hadn't run for Congress, I might have made g
a career out of the CIA." he was at liberty to tell only his wife of his
"I am convinced after reading the Kissinger activities.
Papers that the CIA estimates of-our capacity Johnson said he actually worked for the U.S. le of agents before me
-to interdict supplies was done with similar at- Youth Council, which was. funded by the Foun- "There w wtere a disc coupuped a sni
tention to precision and gave absolutely no dation for Youth and Student Affairs, which in who pp
:reason for encouragement that this military turn was funded by the CIA. Johnson says he still has faith in the per-
action will successfully bring the war to a con- His duties, about which he was never too suasive and example type of diplomacy, the
;elusion." specific, involved basically being a sort of good, former the kind he said is practiced by the
dor cum s
CIA
b
ll
py.
.
assa
am
In an interview with The Oklahoma Jour- wi
nal before his announcement Saturday, John- "I led delegations of young Americans to de-
son said he'worked for the CIA from 1962 to veloping nations and spoke before various.le
h islative assemblies." he. said. -We met with
t
g
s
which later returned to haunt him during
congressional race in 1964. -
"There were chat ges made during the cam-
paigning that I, had, taken this trip with other
student leaders in defiance of the State De-.
partment," he said. "This was untrue. The
trip was sponsored by the U.S. government.
'?'I was asked by people in the State Depart-
ment to make the trip to get information about.
what was going on," he said.
At the time the group of young student lead-,
ers made the trip, shortly after the Cuban re-
volution, we didn't know that things in Cuba
would go the way they. went," Johnson said.
as
1964. He said his experience as an agen
ids r si deuLs i e minis-
caused himAppVOVedpFOtf lea ~ g i/blld' : Clw- P'80--01601 P'80-8
CIA'i assessments of various situations an Once at an Indian Youth Congress in Ti-
in the ?aeencv's non-partisan, position.
rupathi, India, I debated_ a_ couule of older
 'I ASHIUGTOU POST
Approved For Release 2001/ /qjy. QV4-RDP80-01601 RO
.Makin Hanoi Dependent on Pelr.in.g '
Interdiction: The Last Big Bluff?
By Allen S.
Having gone to the Chinese Wall, Presi-
dent Nixon is going to the brink. At least he
so declared in his May 8 address ordering
that "rail and all other communications [to
North Vietnam] will be cut off to the maxi-
mum extent possible." If seriously imple-
mented this threatens war with China. If not
implemented the mining of North Vietnam-
ese ports and interdiction of shipping will
accomplish little except to make Hanoi
wholly dependent upon Peking.
As the Pentagon Papers revealed, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander In
The writer, a former State Depart-
nrr.ent official and expert on China,
now teaches at the University of Mich-
igan. This article first appeared in
The New Republic magazine, with
whose .permission it is published
here.
Chief of the' Pacific Forces (CINCPAC)
urged the mining of Haiphong as early as
1965, However, its futility was revealed in
the recent "leak", of national security study
memorandum number one; provided Janu-
ary 21, 1969, at the request of Henry Kissin-
ger for the new administration. The Central
? Intelligence Agency stressed Hanoi's ability
to receive what it needed from China; were
Soviet bloc forces to be cut off.by sea: "all
of the more essential imports could be
brought into North Vietnam over rail lines
or roads from China in the event that im-
-ports by sea were successfully denied .
the uninterrupted capacities of the railroad,
highway and river connections with China
are about 16,000 tons per day."
At this point, the Joint Chiefs finally con-
ceded the difficulty of interrupting the
routes from China, noting "a minimum of
6,000 sorties" per month would be required
against the two rail lines from China. Even
at this level of effort, the North Vietnamese
could continue to" use the rail, lines to shut-
tle supplies if they were willing to devote
sufficient manpower to repair and trans-
shipment operations."
The Joint Chiefs failed to add that China
had supplied such manpower, beginning in
1965, when it sent 50,000 People's Liberation
Army troops, primarily engineer and con-
struction divisions,, to keep supplies moving
across the border. Defended against U.S. air
attacks by Chinese antiaircraft units, these
forces not only repaired rail and road facili-
ties as soon as they were damaged, but built
a huge storage area in the northwest, near
the Chinese border. Additional access to this
vicinity is provided by a newly built road
across northern Laos from southern China,
currently defended by up to 20,000 Chinese
Troops and antiaircraft.
,
ApprovediforpRebea9q,20 4/03104 ClAL 1 t~
,j 4PA ~1, 1-8
transit iroinls at th' border without overfly- mains: c oes rNixon n e
ing Chinese air`pa''c. Whatever else I'resi- he about to be called in his last big bluff?
dent Nixon may have hoped to gain by he Copyright 1972 Harrison-J3laine of'New Jersey, Inc.
Whiting
trip to Peking, he cannot expect Mao Tsp-
tung to duck this challenge now, when it
was met forcibly in 1965-68. Whenever U,S.
aircraft strayed, Chinese radar tracked their
movement, usually accompanied by MIG ef-
forts at interdiction. Peking did not always
announce the intrusions and even kept one
of the shootdowns secret, but Washington
knew that actions spoke louder than words.
Neither side wanted a public confrontation.
Fortunately President Johnson was deter-
mined to avoid the final escalation:
Few persons within government and none
outside knew. how close questions of "hot .
pursuit" and attacks on Chinese bases made
war with China an issue in 1965 and again in
1967. Today similar secrecy insulates Presi-
dent Nixon and Henry Kissinger from the
probing of Congress and the press If the
White House is to he believed, the risk of
war with China is high. How else can we
"keep the weapons of war out of the hands
of the international outlaws of North Viet-
nam"? Since 1966; China has supplied most
of the hand-held weapons to North Vietnam
and the National Liberation Front (NLF).
Eighty per cent of the ammunition and 60
per cent of.the weapons seized in Cambodian
caches during the 1970 invasion came from
Chinese arsenals. All have since been re-
placed by Peking. Nothing Hanoi needs in
the next six months is beyond China's capac-
ity to supply.
Does the President think that by making
Hanoi dependent on Peking he has better
leverage on the battlefield or at the peace
table? This runs counter to all evidence and.
logic, There is no known instance when the
North Vietnamese deferred to Chinese ad-
vice contrary to their own judgment. If any-
thing, Hanoi has defied Pekilig in its con-
duct of the war as welt as in its willingness
to talk in Paris. Nor is there the slightest in-
centive for Peking to play Washington's
game, while the disincentives are vital to
Chinese perceptions of their own role in
Asia as well as to the credibility of commit-
ments elsewhere, from North Korea to Al-
bania.
Regardless of Peking's public pronounce-
ments or its rumored reactions to the new
escalation, its private support for Hanoi can-
not be questioned. The U.S. mining and in-
terdiction by sea of supplies to North Viet-
nam provides China with a virtual monopoly
of influehee in the induchina war. Its influ-
ence will prolong the fighting toward the
ultimate, perhaps imminent, defeat of the
U.S. allies in Laos, Cambodia, and South
Vietnam. This Chinese policy is dictated by
ideology, by national interest, and by power
politics. This policy risked war with the U.S.
in ' 1965-58 when America had more than
500,000 troops on the Asian mainland, but
Peking persisted. It will certainly ac-
cept that risk with only 60,000 troops re-
maining and the President seemly backed
% against the peace wall by a hostile public
STATINTL
 }? 'ail"; ~
aigofi -'\,
5oc.Trang
MICRAR t
REG! 3N W. 0 50 100mi.
with his family, rushed back to Saigon.
So did U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bun-
ker, who had been in Katmandu with
his wife Carol Laise, the U.S. Ambas-
sador to Nepal.
In Washington, Nixon met with his
military advisers: Admiral Thomas
Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Secretary of State William Rog-
ers, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird
and his recently named deputy Kenneth
Rush. Meanwhile Henry Kissinger con-
vened what would turn out to he the
first of almost daily sessions of the WSAG
(Washington Special Action Group),
which consists of ranking officials of the
State and Defense departments and the-
CIA, who form a sort of foreign policy
crisis management team.
Administration spokesmen insisted
that the President was "keeping his op-
tions open." In fact, the options were
limited. Nixon ruled out any pause in
troop withdrawals; he will announce the
next phase sometime before May I,
when the U.S. troop level in Viet Nam
dips below 69,000. The President also
directed that the 6,000 U.S. combat
troops currently stationed in Viet Nam
should not be shifted from their defen-
sive positions around U.S. installations
604ROQ1130()8900()4a8 area to.
 aid ARVNApptnd medtfiamil)Rase 2001 /03104 CIA-RDP8
war," it was decided that reporters' in-
quiries about the South Vietnamese sit-
uation would be bucked to the State De-
partment. The President demonstrated
his confidence that the situation was un-
der control by leaving for Key Biscayne
in midweek.
An Umbrella. The one option that
was available was air power, and Nix-
on made the most of it (see page 39).
For the first time since 1968, four air-
craft carriers were on station in theTon-
kin Gulf; a fifth, the Midway, was on
its way. Also sent to the area were a
squadron of F-105 Thunderchicf fight-
er-bombers and. about 20 B-52s, which
joined the 80 already operating from
bases in Thailand and Guam. Later, two
squadrons of F-4 Phantoms flew to Da-
nang from bases in Okinawa, Japan and
Korea. The additions meant a jump in
U.S. air strength in Indochina within a
week from 450 to 700 planes.
Meanwhile Nixon, in effect, ordered
a resumption of the unconditional
bombing of the North. The invasion
across the DMZ, he charged, had shat-
tered the so-called "understanding"
under which Lyndon Johnson had or-
dered the bombing halt in 1968. (The
North has never admitted acceding to
it.) f=or a "limited duration," which
seemed to mean until the end of the of-
fensive, U.S. Pilots would be allowed to
attack any military targets; before, they
could only stage "protection reaction"
ARYN TROOPS NEAR QUANG TRI CITY DRAG BODY OF NORTH VIETNAMESE SOLDIER
Looking for signs that the lines would bend but not break.
strikes on antiaircraft sites. The new
franchise did not extend to "punitive
raids" on targets such as Hanoi and Hai-
phong. The main objective seemed to be
the missile sites massed in a narrow belt
above and below the DMZ, where they
could extend an air-defense "umbrella"
over the invasion force in Quang Tri.
The step-up in the air war would in-
evitably renew the ugly worldwide
image of the U.S. once again clobbering
the North from the skies. To counter
possible reaction at home and abroad,
How Good ~s Saigon's Army?
rOR better or worse, the Army of the Republic of Viet
Nam (ARVN for short) holds the key to the success of Pres-
ident Nixon's Vietnamization policy. Expert opinions are
strongly divided on whether ARVN can sustain that policy. Re-
flecting the cynical view of more than a few American G.Ls
who have returned from combat'in Southeast Asia, one U.S.
military adviser last week complained: "The colors in the
South Vietnamese flag are certainly appropriate--most of
the people are yellow, and the rest are red."
By and large, though, American advisers believe that
ARVN is a competent and rapidly improving fighting force.
Since shortly after the 1968 Ter offensive the South Viet-
namese armed forces have been expanded from 730,000 men
to 1,100,000. ARVN has become the second-largest military
machine in Asia, second in size only to China's 2,700,000-
man People's Liberation Army. Counting the People's Self-
Defense Force, the volunteer militia, South Viet Nam has
nearly 2,000,000 men under arnis. The main fighting force
consists of 587,000 men, including 492,000 in ARVN (in elev-
en combat divisions), 13,000 marines, 40.000 sailors and
42,000 airmen. It also includes 513,000 Regional and Pop-
ular Force troops, who are assigned to guard the country's
towns and villages and reinforce pacification efforts.
The South Vietnamese armed forces are among the best
equipped in the world-at least for conventional warfare.
The U.S. has provided ARVN with 640.000 N1-16 rifles, 34.000
M-79 grenade launchers, 40,000 radios, 20,000 quarter-ton
trucks and 56 M-48 tanks. The air force has 200 A-1, A-37
and F-5 fighters, 30 AC-47 gunships and 600 transport, train-
ing and reconnaissance aircraft. Despite supch impressive fig-
tires,
rep] acxp QE
WV[i. 0
f 8~t7 cEr ~~1'id 4
the White House ordered up a kind of
pre-emptive public relations strike that
emphasized Communist villainy. Ad-
ministration officials pressed the view
that South Viet Nam had been the vic-
tinm of a flagrant `:`invasion" from the
North; they also emphasized the ene-
my's ample Soviet hardware.
At a tough-talking Washington
press conference, Laird branded Mos-
cow as a "major contributor" to the
war, and blasted the North Vietnamese
for "marauding throughout Southeast
stance, the U.S. fighting force had more than 3,000 in 1969.
Three years ago, ARVN was primarily engaged in rural
pacification programs, while U.S. troops handled most of
the "search-and-destroy" missions. Since then a, number of
ARVN divisions-notably the Hue-based Ist-have acquired
a good deal of combat experience and acquitted themselves
with honor. Nonetheless, the army still has several large un-
solved problems. The educational level of the troops is low
-most ARYN privates are barely literate. Leadership, par-
ticularly at regimental and battalion levels, is erratic.
^
U.S. advisers make two general criticisms of ARVN: it is
not flexible enough to defend the country properly, and it
tends to get bogged down in bureaucracy. When ARVN took
over the U.S. firebases south of the DMZ, the locations and
even the names remained the same, which meant that the
North Vietnamese did not even have to worry about chang-
ing their artillery coordinates.
Furthermore, a call for artillery support from a belea-
guered ARVN field commander must pass through a tortuous
chain of command extending from the district commander
through the civilian province chief to the divisional com-
mander and finally to the appropriate artillery battalion. Be-
yond this, ARVN's divisions are of sharply uneven quality,
and its best units are apt to be in the wrong place at the
wrong time. Last week the crack 1st was resting in Hue
while the bungling 3rd bore the brunt of the early fighting.
In a purely military sense, most U.S. strategists believe
that Vietnamization will succeed. "It is inconceivable that
the South can't hold out against the North Vietnamese," a se-
nior Rand Corp. analyst observed last week. "They are just
too good and well-equipped an army for that-unless the
North Vietnamese are all Prussians and the South Vietnam-
thor: t Vit'~e e(I'1eOh11`FNV04 00011's that
 Asia.' BeftfrPrl9'. FOid Releafo eo?P01IQ3/04iri 1'LI tn ~u ~reQ160i'ROO1ce3 39
the Paris negotiations, "the enemy only defeat. The big loser was the 3rd
would have to draw back across the Division, whose troops abandoned l4
Driz." Privately, Administration offi- firebases below the DMZ in five days.
vials were pleased that neither the So- The 3rd was a newly formed ~.mnit, raised
viets nor the Chinese had reacted sharp- largely by conscription, of local men, in-
ly to the bombing and the rhetoric; cluding a good many draft dodgers and
Moscow, like Washington, seemed un- delinquents. Considering the ferocity of
willing to let the fighting get in the way the initial North Vietnamese barrage,
of May's Nixon-Brezhnev summit. retreat made sense. But it was not sen-
The Proof. The White House saw sibly executed. Some units quit the field
another possible plus in Hanoi's switch so quickly that they failed to spike their
from guerrilla tactics to conventional guns. Many 3rd Division soldiers joined
warfare. By coming out in the open with the 50,000 refugees who fled south for
their heavy armor and artillery, the sanctuary in Quang Tri and Hue.
Communists have made themselves vul- At Camp Carroll, a former U.S. M a
nerable to fearsome losses from air at- rive outpost ten miles south of the DMZ.
tacks. Said one senior U.S. military ad- 3rd Division troopers mutinied. After
viser: "They are going to be hurt badly." three days of brutal shelling, their con- R
Conceivably-but that prophecy points mander ordered a gradual retreat; they iii
to a crucial element in the war: the con- wanted to surrender. Luckily for the
tinued dependency of the South Viet- U.S. adviser, Lieut. Colonel William
namese troops upon massive U.S. air Camper, it passing helicopter heard his
support. Without it, ARVN might well radio call: "They're running up a white NORTH VIETNAMESE SAM MISSILE
have had to surrender even more ter- flag! I'm leaving!" Camper was picked Moscow gave generously.
ritory than it did last week, which would up, along with a couple of the soldiers
have further reduced its credibility with who wanted to retreat too. But the un- viser. "Those outfits are heroes," said
the civilian populace that has counted lucky base commander was reportedly one American who observed the battle.
upon it for defense. tied up by the remaining mutineers and "There hasn't been anyone in the Viet
But can ARVN lose? U.S. military ex- turned over to the NVA. Nam War who fought better."
perts are reasonably confident that un- Single Shot. Inept as the 3rd Di- Hue, the ancient Vietnamese impe-
less overwhelmed by vastly superior vision appeared to be, it was a model rial capital, is presumed to be a prime
numbers, ARVN can handle North Viet- of discipline by comparison with some target of the Communist invasion. So
namese regulars. Nixon's criteria for of the Regional and Popular Force ir- far, the North Vietnamese have been
success should not be beyond ARVN's regulars in the area, who were little bet- unable to slip past Bastogne and Bir-
reach. The President told a press con- ter than gun-happy mobs. South of mingham, the ARVN 1st Division bases
ference last month that he was confi- QuangTri city, one such mob fired away that guard the approaches to the city.
dent that "the South Vietnamese lines with giddy abandon for two hours at Last week, Hue had a besieged look,
may bend, [but] not break. If this proves Communists holding a bridge on High- nonetheless. No effort had been made
to be the case, it will be the final proof way 1. When the Communists finally to repair the walls and shrines that had
that Viet namization has succeeded." broke and ran, reported "fi\tt Corre- been reduced to ruins four years earlier
Last week,. though, ARVN did not spondent Rudolph Rauch. "the South -the traditional period of mourning in
quite live up to Defense Secretary Vietnamese ran off after them, hooting Viet Nam-in the Tet offensive of 1968.
Laird's measure of success: winning in jubilation-until the Communists At the university, faded signs on walls
'75% of its battles. In the very first hours turned to fire a few sobering rounds at urged: sst.ASir s i n . A ] 1 1 ; NI 'r IQ VII I-
ry of mutual see-congratutauons. r ncrc ugees wno ssvarmeu 111LO we city 110111
was a wounded prisoner lying on the the north,
ground, his face covered with dust and Few Clues. "They came by bus, by
NI b 1 .
l
h
IZ
h
h
their pursuers. The troops stopped, then N .A nt IZI; r ttr W &it. The students were out
tied back to the bridge, where they all in the streets, canvassing for contribu-
ernu+rirrl tnoether andl indlntoerl in a flnr- tines in relieve the nlieht of 50.000 ref-
OEOU ers, a oatc army
put-putting
blood oozing from his mout
. A
t
oug
it medic was present, the prisoner was trucks borrowed for an afternoon from
given no attention. A private raised his ARVN," wrote TtsIE:'s Rauch. "Those
M-16. 'Don't!' warned a Vietnamese- who had time to pack chose peculiar
speaking journalist. 'Too many Amer- things to salvage: one family had a re-
icans.' The soldier put his gun down and frigerator' in a wheelbarrow, nothing
the journalist moved off. A few min- else. A lieutenant carried an enormous
utes later there was a single shot; the Sanyo sound system, still in its carton
prisoner had a hole between his eyes." and minus the speakers, strapped to the
But when ARVN was good, it was back of his motorbike. Nearly every-
very, very good. At Dong Ha. it town one seems to have a pig. Pigs are
of rude wooden shacks and prosperous strapped onto Honda seats, pigs are tied
brick houses ten miles south of the DMZ onto front bumpers, pigs hang in wire
on the banks of the Cua Viet River, one cages from tail gates and are slung from
vital North Vietnamese objective was poles that peasants and their wives heft
spiked by the tanks of the tough 20th onto their shoulders. On the highway, a
Armored Squadron. As the Communist Jeep carrying six prosperous refugees
spearhead rolled south on Highway I. had tried to pass it slower vehicle,
the 34-ton M-48s of the 20th sped north. strayed off the tarmac and hit a mine
They met-and stopped-the Commu- buried in the unpaved shoulder. The ex-
nist armor a scant 300 yards north of plosion blew the Jeep and its passen-
the Cua Viet bridge. The tankers and gers clear across the road and into a
two companies of South Vietnamese field. No one even bothered to look at
marines held the bridge long enough for the bodies; like pedestrians avoiding a
., _AppLW@,CI. a if200 /m3104rf KCfl!4-R?il 0a016fl9 ROO1 39Oj04.l8irted the
 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8
hole dug by the blast and continued on
toward safety."
What were the North Vietnamese
really up to? There were few clues from
the Communists: Mme. Nguyen Thi
Binh, the chief Viet Cong negotiator in
Paris, spoke conventionally of over-
throwing "the repressive regime of Sai-
gon" and establishing a "government of
national concord." All that intelligence
officers know for sure is that Hanoi has
planned a five-phase offensive for 1972.
The first two phases, described in cap-
tured documents as terror in the coun-
tryside and attacks on militia outposts,
began after the Tel holidays last Feb-
ruary. Evidently, last week's offensive
began Phase 3: an effort to pin clown
South Vietnamese forces where they are
weakest, inflict casualties, and discredit
Vietnamization. The final phases are at-
tacks on major cities (quite possible)
and a general uprising leading to the
fall of the Thieu regime (farfetched).
In opening a multi-front offensive,
as they seemed to be doing last week,
the Communists could whiplash the
ARVN command by reducing the pres-
sure in one region, only to step it up sud-
denly in another. The idea would be to
force reserve units to move and thus to
weaken vital areas. Saigon last week was
all but stripped of its reserves; even the
presidential palace guard was sent north
to the action.
At week's end, Ambassador Bunker
and General Abrams were said to have
told Washington that they be-
lieve the enemy drive will
is inevitable. Still
most U.S. intelli-
gence sources
If ARVN comes out of the current of-
fensive in good shape, Hanoi might be
willing-or so Washington believes-to
negotiate a settlement along the lines
of Richard Nixon's eight-point peace
proposal. With its provisions for an In-
dochina-wide cease-fire and ' return of
all troops to their national boundaries,
Nixon's eight points add up to some-
thing close to unacceptable surrender
for Hanoi. Most likely, the Washington
speculation goes, a way would be found
to allow the North Vietnamese to save
face, and thus not feel obliged to re-
turn to the battlefield later on.
That is a highly wishful scenario,
and it would be extraordinary if the
North should follow it. Washington tra-
ditionally has inclined toward optimism
in its thinking about the war. In Sai-
gon, however, the prevalent opinion is
that the current offensive is not the de-
cisive thrust, but is aimed mainly at pun-
ishing ARVN and pushing it back from
the border sanctuaries that the Com-
munists have carved out over the past
two years in Laos and Cambodia. With
the reconstruction of the sanctuary net-
work completed, and with the war-
weary regimes. in Phnom-Penh and
Vientiane all but on the ropes, the North
Vietnamese are turning their attention
to South Viet Nam again. The imme-
diate goal is not to topple Thieu in
1972, but to begin to rebuild the weak-
ened Viet Cong and otherwise prepare
to act on the day when the Americans
and their airpower are really gone.
Only then would Hanoi enter what
it might consider, after 26 years of
struggle, a "decisive" battle for Saigon.
For as Ambassador Bunker frequently
reminds dinner guests, the North Viet-
namese have never given up hope of
achieving a military victory.
ouflaged trucks on jungle trails seldom afforded high-fly-
ing iff ear: To ~CG Is to Destroy ing supersonic pilots a visible target. Last week, when-
ever the cloud cover lifted, the flyers could sight the
enemy on the ground. "You had the feeling," said Wad-
For U.S. Air Force pilots iii Viet Nam, it was one of ??--- del, "that you were really doing something significant."
the busiest weeks of the war, as TIME Correspondent Last week's bad weather compelled the flyers to take
David DeVoss discovered when he visited the big Amer- even more risks than usual. Fighter-bombers had to slice
icon airbcrse at Danang. His report:
hrlrnv thn rniarroct to " ? ?1.,...7 ,t.,.._..__i______.. . , . ,
vi vny )vv it. or so. At that low altitude even a rifle bul-
'HE flying weather was poor, air traffic heavy and haz- let can bring down a jet if it strikes a vulnerable point.
ardous, and there were rumors about the infiltration ^
of CAU antinir-1ff
l
so ivrc;en w uy va Captain sty lower.~During one
...... -w" ? a
fighter-bomber. "It was unbelievable," he said. "I've nev- four hour n
ANis FAC Capptain the Con area rad 1 between en 32 e
Cr seen anything like it-columns of tanks, columns of dodged ;5
"~nMS as lie e circled he
trucks, even men marching along the road." Sanh a':ci the DMZ. "A lot of 23nim. and 37i m. anti
-
0
acro sitth ~~ r c '01 /04~ lAa-R0P8O1QMM1d~fl&Mv3O?c8~ft10i~ the of-
avy pi ts in the fc_nsive began," said Pekkola. "Usually they aim at any
war -rarely saw their prey. Elusive guerrillas and cam- break in the clouds because they know that's where
last for several months,
until either victory is
achieved or defeat
seem to think that the offensive, how-
ever intense, will be of limited duration.
Within a month or so, monsoon rains
will make movement and resupply dif-
ficult in most of the country. But in Mil-
itary Region I, where logistical support
via the DMZ and Laos is relatively easy,
the Communists could make trouble for
a much longer time. President Thieu be-
lieves that the Communists may try to
seize South Viet Nam's two northern
provinces and use them as bargaining
chips to force a negotiated settlement
of the war.
Shock Waves. If Huc falls, the NVA
might conceivably set up a "provisional
government" of the long dormant Na-
tional Liberation Front and the Viet
Cong in the old capital. Washington be-
lieves that Hanoi will settle for a few
"spectaculars"-perhaps the temporary
occupation of a city or two-to embar-
rass Nixon and Thieu and perhaps force
the U.S. to begin talking seriously about
the Communist seven-point peace plan,
which includes dumping the Thieu
regime.
But what if ARVN and its air sup-
port hold fast and thwart the spectac-
ulars? What if the Communists move
back to their horder sanctuaries with-
out having inflicted a massive defeat?
If that happens-and Washington is be-
ginning to think optimistically of the
prospect-North Viet Nam would have
lost more than it did in Tet 1968. That
furious onslaught created psychological
shock waves in the U.S. and led to the
beginning of American disengagement.
From a military viewpoint, the post-Tel
counterattack by U.S. and ARVN troops
was a considerable success: it virtually
shattered the Viet Cong infrastructure
and pushed main-force NVA units be-
yond South Vici Nam's borders.
 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8
eventually be." In the first six days of the offensive. the North
Vietnamese shot down five U.S. aircraft and two South Viet-
namese aircraft. One American-manned HH-53 helicopter
crashed while on a rescue mission.
The stepped-up tempo of the air war was reflected last
week in the frenzied activity on the ground. "We're working
double shifts to keep the planes ready to roll," said Staff Ser-
geant John Macy, a crew chief at Danang.
When a flight of four Phantoms lands on the twin I0.000-
f I. runways, the planes quickly.taxi to rows of protective con-
crete revetments. Once a plane is safely parked. the pilot
climbs out and is handed a cold can of Budweiser. While he
sips the brew, a yellow forklift truck trundles tip with ar-
maments, and the ground crew hurriedly rearms the Phan-
tom with an awesome array of weaponry-iron bombs, rock-
ets and napalm canisters. Normally, the entire operation takes
only 20 minutes. The beer never gets warm before the pilot
climbs back into his Phantom to take off on another sortie.
The Sea War: Barrages and Boredom
During the first stages of the North Vietnamese offen-
sive, gunfire front the U.S. destroyers that patrol the Tonkin
Gulf succeeded in turning back 300 Communist troops from
an atempled crossing of the song Ha River. Shortly before
the Navy became engaged in the battle for Quang Fri prov-
ince. TIME's Saigon Bureau Chief, Stanley Cloud, was a guest
aboard one of those destroyers. There lie ivas able to ob-
serve a vital but underreported U.S. contribution to the war:
HE U.S.S. Buchanan, a guided missile destroyer, rolls gent-
ly in the waters of the Tonkin Gulf, 5.000 yards offshore
of the Demilitarize(] Zone. Overhead, a full moon slips in
and out of wispy tangles of cloud. Crew members who are
not needed to tire the guns or run the ship are down in the
mess deck watching Jane Fonda in Barbarella.
One of the Buchanan's two automatic five-inch guns, with
a maximum range of twelve miles, is trained to starboard. A
voice rasps over the ship's loudspeaker: "Stand by. Mount
52. Two salvos." Five seconds later, the gun shreds the night.
A pale orange flame shoots from the muzzle, and a 70-lb.
shell whistles through the air en route to a target more than
three miles inland from the Vietnamese coastline.
In the pilot house, the officer of the deck watches the
flight of the projectile on radar. Then a second round is fired.
"Bore's clear," comes the voice on the loudspeaker. "Next tar-
get is Number 17." So it goes until 5,30 the next morning,
when 200 rounds of the Buchanan's "H and 1" (harassment
and interdiction) fire will have been spent on 25 targets in-
side the DMZ. Another night in the U.S. Navy's long war off
the coast of Viet Nam has ended.
U.S. Navy destroyers first began patrolling the Tonkin
Gulf in 1961, and providing gunfire support for troops on
the ground in 1965. Largely because the small North Viet-
namese Navy has steered clear of combat, ine naval war has
been consistently overshadowed by American fighting on the
ground and in the air. The major exception occurred in Au-
gust 1964. when two American destroyers, the Maddox and
the Turner Joy. reported that they had been attacked in the
gulf by North.Vietnamese torpedo boats. The incident, whose
authenticity is still in doubt, led directly to passage by Con-
gress of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Which Lyndon John-
son used as authority for massive U.S. intervention in the
Viet Nam War.
^
Last week, for the first time in two years, the ships that
have been daily pounding the coast drew return lire from
shore-based Communist artillery. One round hit the U.S.S.
Lloyd 771o11zc1s. inflicting minor damage and injuring three
crewmen.
Normally, though, war ahoard the Buchanan and other
destroyers is an impersonal war. The chief ingredients are ra-
darscopes, computers, control panels, microswitches and ra-
dios-plus movies in wide-screen color. The only time the
ammunition is touched by human hands is when it is loaded
into the automatic hoist. Deep in the bowels of the ship, Fire
Controlman Second Class Jim Fagan of Miami holds the por-
table trigger in his hand, nonchalantly squeezing the lever
when he gets the signal over his headphones. "I don't feet
like I'm part of this war," says one sailor. "I never see what
we're shooting at. or whether it does any good."
In the style of Admiral Zumwalt's "New Navy," officers
and enlisted men alike sport beards, waxed mustaches and
hair long enough to have put them on report three years
ago. The chief disciplinary problems are drug abuse and ra-
cial tension. though in scope they barely match similar prob-
lems suffered in the Army. Boredom is pervasive. As one
Buchanan sailor puts it: "1 sometimes go topside and stand
at the rail. watching the moon on the water. I just stand
there for hours like some damn U.S.O. ad."
It bothers many of the sailors that they are fighting a pas-
sive, unseen enemy. "We've been shooting at the same place
for seven years," says one radarman. "By now, the Viet Cong
must have the area roped off and posted with signs that say,
'Keep out, the ship is firing.' Still, unlike the ground units
in South Viet Nam, the Navy is not setting an immediate
course for home. "When they talk about the U.S. withdraw-
ing from Viet Nam," says a chief petty officer, "they don't
count the Navy, because we're not in the country. I figure
we'll be staying around a while."
IA-RDP8V,-0 601R001.30039000t'
 ---- ' pRY,For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDR& 1 R00
SA1 DI
UNION
.- 139,739
S .- 246,007
APR 1.51972
"Some events In the world ?,POSSIBLY ATTENDED
over which we have little con-
trol may produce crises that we Secretary of Defense Melvin
cannot prevent. But we can Laird was -in the White House
i at the same ti m e to confer
be the masters of events when; _
crises occur, to the extent than with the President on Vietnam
and
h
may
ave partiitd i
cpaen
we are able to prepare our was never
I A `1 e L ~ v I r n selves in advance. 1 ;- the session, but this
announced.
Crisis
Unif
SPECIAL PANEL 1,;' Dr. Henry Kissinger, Mr.
"For this purpose we created Nixon's national security ad-
within the National Security " viser, chairs all WASAG ses-
Council a special senior panel sions.
known as the Washington Spe- The official descriptions of
cial Actions Group. This group WASAG activities indicate they
possible crises, integrating the making contingency plans to
political and military require- meet anticipated crises of the
I r meats of crisis action. future.
NUO''s Vlar "
In 1971, the White House de- " j group also has been in-
Copley News Service so important it raised the mem ?""ling together and examining
WASHINGTON - Hanoi's in bership from the assistant see information on a breaking
retary level to the under-secre-, crisis in order to provide op-;
vasian of South.. Vietnam with; bons, if needed, from which
massed infantry, tanks and! tary level. decision& can be made.
heavy artillery set off a rapid-1- It was also disclosed:
fire series of meetings here fori "In 1970 the WASAG had to
one of the least known but most! deal with Cambodia, the Middle
important crisis management -East and Jordan. In each case,
teams in the government. I it laid the groundwork for rea-
' Called the Washington Spe
cial Actions Group (WASAG), it,
has met regularly at the White;
House since the North Vietnam-i
ese struck across the Demilita-1
rized Zone April 2. !
Members always include
representatives of the State and
soned decisions to prevent
crises from expanding and
threatening our interests and
the peace."
Cambodia, the Middle East
and Jordan were the major
crises of that year.
- Defense departments, the Cell- Again early this year, in Mr.
tral Intelligence Agency and'
the White House. Other depart-
ments are added if the subject
matter requires it.
Ronald Ziegler, White House
'press secretary, has provided!
no information, from the ses-
sions other than to announce
they had been held, name the
participants, and say they were
assessing and coordinating in-
formation from Vietnam.
NO CRISIS
He also attempted to down-
play suggestions that decisions
had been or would soon be
made to counter the invasion,
that WASAG would play a role
in determining what those dcci-
sions would be and to maintain
that there was no crisis atmos-
t~''phere at the White House.
Previous administration de-
scriptions of the duties of the
special action group, however,
suggest that major decisions
were being pondered and that
-'action would follow.
President Nixon's first for-
eign policy report in 1970 stated
in part.
Nixon's third annual foreign
policy report, he said:
"The Washington Special Ac-
tions Group is charged with
meeting the special need for.
coordination' in crisis situations.
.. WASAG serves as a manage-
ment team assuring flexible
and timely actions by the re-
sponsible departments. It is
also responsible for. . . devel-
oping options for NSC (National
Security Council) consid-
erations."
Adding impact to the impor-
tance of the WASAG sessions
launched in the wake of the
North Vietnamese offensive
was the fact that Adm. Thomas
H. Moorer, chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, attended
on Monday, April 3, the day af-
ter the attacks began.
Also participating were Depu-
ty Secretary of Defense Ken-
neth Rush, Central Intel ace
Agee Director Richard
Helms, to ers"? :ecre'Iary of State
Jo~Fin Irwin, and Deputy Asst.
Secretary of State William Sul-
livan.
Approved For Fkelease 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8
 WASHINGTON STAR
Approved For Release 2001/93i0A$ R9RDP80-01601 RO
Key U.S. Aides
`ffietnam
Hulead for V
Maj. Gen. Alexander N.
Haig is going to Vietnam to
assess the war situation for
President Nixon.
Haig, deputy presidential as-
sistant for national security
affairs, two members of the
National Security Council staff
and one representative each
from the State and Defense
departments will spend about
a week in Vietnam.
Ilaig, who last visited Viet-
nam in September, will con-
sult with Ambassador Ells-
worth Bunker and Gen.
Creighton W. Abrams, U.S.
commander in Vietnam.
White House Press Secretary
Ronald L. Ziegler made a spe-
cial effort to tell newsmen yes-
terday that the purpose of
Haig's trip is not to help Nixon
decide whether U.S. ground
troops should be recommitted
to the war.
Edmund S. Muskie and Hubert
H. Humphrey, candidates for
the Democratic presidential
nomination.
Eleven senators reserved
three hours of time for
Wednesday to open the first
full floor debate on the war
since the Red offensive began.
Eight critics and three de-
fenders of Nixon's policies
were set for a general discus-
sion of recent events. Six other
senators, three on each side of
the issue, were said to be con-
sidering joining in.
r
Sen. Alan Cranston, D-Calif.,
said in a statement that he has
invited all 100 senators by let-
ter to join the debate on the
Senate floor. He said it will be
open to all senators wishing to
reserve time.
On the campaign trail, Hum-
phrey, Muskie, George S.
McGovern and Rep. Shirley
Chisholm all hit out at the Nix-
on war policies.
Humphrey Hits Involvement
Humphrey, for example,
said "The United States is
very much deeply involved
again" in the fighting. "It is
my judment we should pro-
ceed to end, this conflict and
withdraw our forces," he said.
Mrs. Chisholm said that Nix-
on should "just for once .. .
listen to the American peo-
ple."
Nixon has dispatched addi-
tional air and naval forces to
Indochina, including aircraft
carriers, destroyers, fighter-
bombers and B52 bombers.
The pentagon has revealed
few details of the buildup. But
four aircraft carriers on duty
in Indochina have 17,000 men
on hoard, and the B52 force is
being built up from, about 50
at the start of the North Viet-
namese offensive to about 130
- a record number to be as-
signed to the war zone.
At the same time, the ad-
ministration has reported a
continued drop in U. S. ground
force stationed in South Viet-
nam, and officials have said
plans to cut the troop level in
South Vietnam to 69,000 by
May 1 will go abed as sched-
uled.
Naval forces based off the
Vietnam coast and air forces
based in Thailand and Guam
used in the fighting are not
included in the strength figure.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8
Ziegler said Nixon is consid-
ering neither recommitment
nor slowing the pace of U.S.
withdrawals because of the
Communist offensive.
' Critics of the administra-
tion's 'Vietnam, policies, mean-
while, were increasing their
attacks against the current
buildup.
On Capitol Hill, 62 members
of Congress sent Nixon a letter
asking that he inform them
and the public "as soon as
possible of the size, purpose
and anticipated costs of the
U.S. military. actions now con-
templated in and over
Indochina."
"If news reports are accu-
rate," the letter said, "our
country is now assembling in
Southeast Asia one of the larg-
est air armadas in military
history. The use of such a
force would certainly add not
only to the destruction our
bombing has already brought
to the people and land of Indo-
china, but also to the number
of American casualties and
prisoners of war."
The signers included 58
Democrats and four Republi-
cans, of whom there were 17
senators and 45 House mem-
bers. The senators included
 NEV YORK I i;,:2n
Approved For Release 200110/OIR:13Th -RDP80-01601
U. S. CaUtiOUSly Op mix I ic.
But Sends Further B- 52's
By TERENCE SMITH
i
Special to TIleNCW York TIMES
WASHINGTON, April 11-The Nixon Administration
provided a cautiously upbeat,assessment of the fighting in
Vietnam today, but Pentagon sources disclosed that two
,more scuadrons of 13-52 bomb ---
1 d b 1 1 performance. Stressing that
ors la OUR fiNell ore CIS tol Saigon still faces "several more
leave for Indochina shortly. .weeks of major engagements"
The additional planes, some! with the North Vietnamese,
30 in all, will increase the fleet! Jerry W. Friedheim, the Pen-
of the giant jets in the combat
zone to approximately 130, the
largest ever assembled during
the war.
At the same time, White
House sources reported that
Henry A. Kissinger, the Presi-
dent's adviser on national se-
curity, had decided to postpone
his scheduled trip to Japan un-
'tiI early May, to keep a close
watch on the situation in Viet-
nam.
nor. Kissinger had been
.scheduled to leave this week-
end for three days of talks
with Japanese leaders. The
sources said that lie still
planned to accompany Presi-
dent: Nixon to Canada on
Thursday for two days of con-
versations in Ottawa.
White House sources said
that Mr. Kissinger bclieve&
briefing that the South Viet-
namese Army had performed
"very well" in the latest fight-
ing.
The State Department
spokesman, Robert J. Mc-
Closkey, asserted today that
the South Vietnamese had
seized the initiative in the last
48 hours and that "the majority
of the attacks" had been begun!
s
i
o
'
f
S
b
.
a
g
n
orce
y
s
Bodi he and Mr. Friedheim
were careful, however, to,
stress the tentative nature of
their remarks and to emphasize
that it was too early to reach
any conclusion about the out-
come of the offensive.
A less guarded - and more.
optimistic - appraisal of the)
cf B-52's deployed in the com-
b-at zone'was 103, in July, 1969.
The sources said this was the
deployment of the giant
third, and probably the last,
bombers to be ordered to coun-
tcr t he enemy offensive. Thirty
if the planes were dispatched
Isle in February in anticipation
of the fighting and 20 were or-
d,-red to air bases in Guam and
Tl ailand last week. -
While Administration of-
ficals have clearly have been,
reI edeFo
offered their firs tentative ap-
praisals of the South Vietnamese
g
er c
.
stressed the effectiveness of the After the Saratoga headed
strengthened American air out into the Atlantic, Naval
power in turning back the Air Station. They presumably
North Vietnamese attacks. landed on the carrier at sea.
A few hours after his re- The Saratoga was expected
marks, Pentagon sources said to pick up other fighter
that the latest deployment ofl ,squadrons on the way to snake
B-52 's would increase the slra- I a full battle complement of 70
tegic bombing force in lndo- aircraft. Sources said that the
c.na nearly 3 r cent, to a
t~lea$~at~(P,6`0~I~Z~01300390001-8
 Approved For Release 2001/OY4di,,~- T.8~~160'IR
9 APR 1
The Challenge:
C ucial
Test. 101
rue Nixon
oil. y
WASIIINGTON _ In the basement
of the White House there is an area
full of reassuringly modern communi-
cations equipment that its known to
its inhabitants as the Situation Room.
In the middle of the complex there is
a small conference room insulated
from the surrounding commotion by
paneled walls. It was to this room
that Henry A. Kissinger summoned
Presidentt. Nixon's senior advisers ast
week, and their mood was as
and serious as the news clattering
over the teleprinters outside.
he Nn,it.h Vietnamese had moved
across the demilitarized zone (DVIZ) to
launch massive, coordinated attacks on
South Vietnamese strongholds, thereby
putting the Vietnam war precisely
where Mr. Nixon did not want it-
back on page one-and raising an
ominous challenge to the President's
-election-year hopes,
By the end of the week the South
Vietnamese seemed to have softened
their resistance. Nonetheless, there
was little question that the enemy
al.tacks had severely shaken tine Ad-
ministration, confronted Mr, Nixon's
military advisers with hard choices
and caused his political strategists to
w,iestioO nis three-year effort to en-
f;:ir.er an American withdrawal from
Vietnam by Election Day without si-
multaneously sacrificing; Vietnam to
the enemy.
Most analysts here saw the offen-
sive as an all-out effort to discredit
the Viet.namization program, shatter
South Vietnamese morale, weaken Mr.
Nixon's hold on public opinion at home
and force him, to offer more gener-
ous terns if and when the suspended
peace negotiations resume in Paris.
Asked on Monday what the Presi-
d ould do to Help South Viet-
t w
oraeref tnem to oegin-was well away
from the scene making a speech and
shaking hands in Philadelphia.
As devised by the Special Action
Group in conjunction with the United
States commanders in Vietnam, the
massive air strikes Thursday and
Friday went well beyond the concept
of "protective reaction" used by the
Administration to justify earlier retal-
iatory raids.
Mr. Laird, speaking for the Adminis-
tration while the President rested and
conferred with Mr. Kissinger in Key
Biscayne, said the bombing would con-
tinue until * Hanoi withdrew its tanks
and troops. Admiral Moorer said the
planes were bombing targets up to 40
to 50 miles north of the DMZ. Other
sources said the "upper limit" would
probably be the 20th Parallel, about
200 miles above the DMZ and about
70 miles south of Hanoi.
In domestic political terms, the pres-
ent round of fighting may yet prove
to be acceptable, Much depends on
how long it lasts. If the South Viet-
namese show themselves capable of
mastering what Is clearly their sternest
test in a year, it would strengthen the
credibility of Mr. Nixon's withdrawal
strategy.
But if the South Vietnamese fail to
stem the tide, even with American air
power to help them, or if the attack
appear.
If this idea were to take root, Mr.
Nixon's speeches about a "generation
of peace" might begin to sound hol-
low. And his inability to shed an old
commitment could make him yet an-
other political casualty of the Vietnam
war.. . -ROBERT B. SEMPLE
en
nam in its moment of trial, White to the enemy's reliance on Soviet*
House spokesmen said ivir. Nixon was supplied equipment -- not the White
keeping his "options" open. But he House, whose occupant still wishes to
did not seem to have many options go to Moscow and has no interest in
left.. engaging in personal name-calling
To withdraw completely from the with the Soviets. And when the first
conflict at this critical moment would massive retaliatory raids began Thurs-
l' App vela or Release 2OO 1/0$104n: CIA--RDP80101601 R001300390001-8
ization. It would seem to many to be
an abandonment not only of Mr. Nix-
on's pledge to find an "honorable" so-
lution in Vietnam but his outit! oft-stat-
ed concerns about the "credibility" of
America's pledges overseas.
The President's withdrawal program
has reduced American forces in South
Vietnam to 95,000 men-including only
6,000 or so ground combat troops-
and , indications have been that the
number would drop to 35,000 by Elec-
tion Day. Reintroduction of ground
troops at this point would have enor-
mous political impact. It would amount
to a public vote of no confidence in
the South Vietnamese and an invita-
tion to a renewal of sharp domestic
dissension over Vietnam.
The President spent most of Mon-
day on the phone-with Admiral
Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, with Melvin
Laird, his Secretary of I)efense, and
with William P. Rogers, his Secretary
of State - receiving estimates of the
fighting and debating the alterna-
tives. In the end he won support
for his own tentative decision that if
the fighting worsened the United States
should seek to 'stem the enemy of-
fensive by the only means available
.-air power.
The President assigned the task of
devising detailed options to the Wash-
ington Special Action Group, a team of proves to he only one of a series of in-
planners headed by Mr. Kissinger and termittcnt enemy offensives, each re-
including representatives of the State /quiring new doses of American help, it
and Defense Departments , the Central may occur to the American public that
Intelligence Agency and the Joint Chiefs the war, after all, is not going to dis-
of Staff that meets at moments of
emergency. The group met daily in the
Situation Room until Mr, Nixon left for
Florida late Thursday.
And to his press secretary, Ronald
L. Ziegler, Mr. Nixon entrusted the
propaganda war, instructing him to
devise some way of portraying con-
cern and preparing the public for re-
taliatory action without conveying or
creating a sense of panic and failure
in the White House itself.
The solution, devised in morning
huddles among Mr. Ziegler and his
counterparts at Defense and State, Dan
Henkin and Robert McCloskey, was to
impose on State and Defense the bur-
den of enunciating Government pol-
icy and articulating official fears and
hopes without directly committi,ig the
authority of the President to any par-
ticular argument or line of reasoning.
It was Mr. McCloskey, for example,
who first pointedly called attention
 5APR1972
Approved For Release 2001/03/04':.CIA-RDP80-01601 R001 30
rushea z 0 more
i Washington Bureau of The Sun'
Washington-The United
States has rushed an additional
force of about 20 B-52 bombers
across the Pacific to bolster
units already there in prepara-
tion for the heavy blows . in
said the enemy has put more, titsky, described as a Commu-
than 30,000 troops from ele-' nist party Central Committee
ments of three divisions and member and head of Soviet air
three separate regiments into defense forces.
the battle-entering South Viet- While he raised the issue of
foam from both the buffer zone
and the Laotian border area.
He said the "invasion in
retaliation for North Vietnam'sI force" is continuing across
attack into South Vietnam I "what used to be the Demilitar-
across the demarcation zone
between the two countries.
This was disclosed by author-
itative sources yesterday as one
ized Zone."
At the State Department,
Robert J. McCloskey, the offi-
cial spokesman, sought to focus
of the major immediate actions; a spotlight on the Soviet Un-
taken by the administration Jon's contribution to the offen-
which continued to say official- ! sive,
,ly that it is keeping "all options) The Communist forces "are
open" to deal with what is supported in a very large way
shaping up as a large set-piece, by heavy military equipment"
battle in South Vietnam's north-i from Russia, he said. This re-
ern province.
Defensive line..
ferred to the tanks, artillery
and antiaircraft missiles (some
STATINTL
Senator Mike Mansfield (D.,
Mont.), the majority leader,
raised his voice here yesterday
against the use of either air
power or American ground
Soviet backing of the new offen- troops against the enemy offen-
sive, Mr. McCloskey said there !save.
was no reconsideration in any l "Its time for vietnamization
way of President Nixon's visit [turning the war over to the
to Moscow, scheduled to startiSouth Vie'namesel to fish or
May 22., cut bait, to produce or else,"
The Washington Special Ac-1Mr. Mansfield said. "My point
Lion Group-a sub-Cabinet level is, and has been for years, we
committee which prepares ana- Iought to get out lock, stock and
lyses and proposals for presi- barrel." He was asked the po-
dential action-met again yes- litical implications for Mr. Nix-
terday on the Vietnam situa-, on of the present attack and
Lion, but no official word shot back: "I'm not interested
emerged on specific actions to in political implications."
be taken. But Senator Barry M. Gold-
The options realistically open water (R., Ariz.) urged the
to Washington are air strikes in President to end the "Dilly-dal-
support of the South Vietnam- ly bombing of North Vietnam"
' The South Vietnamese ap-lof the last-named reportedlylese in the battle area and; and cut loose a major cam-
;pear, informants said, to have now in the buffer zone) which against North Vietnamese tar- paign against enemy supply
fallen back to a defensive line Russia has supplied for years ! gets, along with naval gunfire lines and marshalling yards,
ranging along the Dong Ha Riv-i and, according to Mr. Mc-! performing the same functions. That would include Haiphong
or and then southward before, Closkey, has lately increased. Both are under way, but are Harbor, if necessary.
Quang Tri city and Hue. These) Soviet and North Vietnamese expected to be escalated sharp-' Mr. Nixon faces a "major
,.informants expected the ene-! news media have reported the f ly with clearing weather. ! decision" on how far to extend
.my's next moves to become I visit to Hanoi-just before the! With the'B-52 reinforcements the bombing now. Mr. Goldwa-
:apparent in the next day or so.
Jerry W. Friedheim, a De-
lense, Department spokesman,
offensive started-of a Russian ! sent to the war zone from U.S. to said in the Senate. He had a
military delegation headed by bases, American commanders "hunch" a large campaign was
Marshal Pavel Fedorovich Ba- ;now have about the same nun-. under consideration. He said lie
.her of the bombers as they had had no inside information, how-,
at peak strength in 1968, when ever.
there were 102 based in Thai- The tenor of official indica-
land and Guam. tions thus far has been that air
In mid-February, two squad- power will be used, at least
rons, 30 planes in all, were sent initially, to try to influence the
to Guam to bolster the air battle in northern South Viet-
power than being brought to nam and against the supply
bear on an expected enemy lines and facilities across the
offensive in the Central High-! buffer zone that are supporting
lands and the northern prov-the offensive. The adminisira-
inces, There were 50 at U Ta- tion has left Hanoi to wonder
Pao Air Base in Thailand. [what more may come.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8
 By Courtney R. Sheldon
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
~q' ~~~~ 2d1~ }~i ~IIIl~II ~Ill~lla
Washington seeks to gauge
extent, 'duration of 'new assault
CFz'~:ISaIAtT SCIENCE }~C? SI~Tq
Approved For Release 2001/03/04. CIA-RQF 80-0'6p 1300
5 APR 1972
Washington
Washington may soon know if it has
critically underestimated the military
strength and political punch of the North
Vietnamese..
If it has, a shift in President Nixon's
three-year-old Vietnam war strategy could
well follow.
Administration officials have consistently
predicted harassing attacks by the Com-
munists in 1972, but not debilitating or
even seriously embarrassing ones.
Administration spokesmen indicate a be-
lief that the North Vietnamese "invaders"
are apparently intending to hold onto the
land they have seized.
The North Vietnamese force, according
to the Pentagon, is comprised of conven-
tional ingredients such as "tanks, heavy
artillery, antiaircraft fire, engineers, and
fresh supplies."
Bornbing jab discounted?
At the White House, the Washington Spe-
cial Action Group was summoned for the
second day in a row to advise the President.
The administration continues to discount
the possibility that U.S. ground forces will
be used, but White House officials .will not
say so publicly and explicitly.
Instead, the official position is that, "all
options" are open to the United States. One
extreme one that could be under considera-
tion is bombing of North Vietnam as far
north as Hanoi. However, such action has
generally been felt as unnecessary and
likely to jeopardize the U.S. goals at the
Moscow summit meeting in May.
The panic button has not been pushed at
the, White House. But there is admitted un-
certainty and concern that North Vietnam
will, at the very least, hold on to much of
the territory it now has overrun south of the
demilitarized zone.
Massive U.S. air support for reinforced
South Vietnamese can prevent a rout of
Saigon's forces, administration officials
maintain. Whether U.S. air power can lead
the South Vietnamese soldiers and refugees
back into lost territory is a larger question.
Too busy for theorizing
Administration officials are too busy try-
ing.to bail out of the present military situa-
tion in northern South Vietnam to engage
in such theoretical speculation.
They may soon be faced with .further
frontal-attacks by the North Vietnamese in
the central highlands, and farther south.
Henry A. Kissinger, the President's ad-
viser for national security affairs, said as
recently as Feb. 9 that North Vietnam "ap-
pears to be concentrating, especially in the
area of the central highlands, but perhaps
also for high-point activities, as far south
as the delta."
A year ago, after North Vietnam's in-
cursions into Laos, the White House ac-
cepted intelligence estimates that the North
Vietnamese were no longer in a position
to interfere with the Vietnamization pro-
gram-the strengthening of the South Viet-
namese to go it alone eventually.
At that time, it is understood, the White
advised that Hanoi had been shaken to-the
House was
core.
It was felt that the North Vietnamese could mount
momentary spectaculars, but could not continue a pro-
tracted war if they did.
Administration officials warn against jumping to
conclusions while the battle situation remains so murky
in South Vietnam.
Until the North Vietnamese came swarming across
the border last weekend, the Vietnam issue in domes-
tic politics was subdued. California Congressman Paul
N. McCloskey Jr. (R) had abandoned a futile race
against Mr. Nixon in the GOP primaries.
The continued insistence by administration officials
that withdrawals from Vietnam will continue on sched-
ule has given war critics less room for new criticism.
But this may not hold for long.
While the North Vietnam offensive was in its fourth
day, Senate Democratic leader Mike Mansfield op-
posed "countering the North Vietnamese attack with
huge bombing attacks which will only mean more
planes shot down and more Americans falling into
Communist captivity." He added that "we must get
out, lock, stock, and barrel."
McGovern : `two choices'.
Sen. George McGovern's first reaction to the new
Hanoi initiative was that he had "predicted two years
ago that if we continued on Mr. Nixon's Vietnamization
STATINTL
If this cannot be accomplished, would the course, }which is an effort to sustain General Thieyu in _,1 ra U.S. public/~PPtl}C9VW cFb t6y2a /4~'4e rtloic F fdS rr is e'I i cM,e Q bO001-8
the North Vietnamese ability to a o t eir attack and try to force us out, especially at a time when
ti
real estate after eight years of decima
ng we're bombing them very heavily."
C&?nf i )'1.'
 ~; ~';y y0iti. T~.taFu
Approved For Release 200T/0 jI9l4 -RDP80-0
XON DISPATCHING
~ ION~i~BHO2'~
10 to 20 Craft Are Ordered
to Reinforce Air Armada to
Counter Enemy Offensive
STATINTL
At the White House; fTie;ddpf,'ventional coiniined-arms battle
Gerald L. with the enemy employing
ress secretar
t
u
y p
y, Warren, said that Mr. Nixon tanks, heavy artillery, heavy
was keeping do close touch with I antiaircraft fire, engineers and
the Vietnam fighting through fresh supplies for its troops.".
his advisers. 1: Mr. McCloskey character-
For the second consecutive I ized it as a "naked attack by
day, Henry A. Kissinger, the. the North Vietnamese military,
President's adviser on nationals into South Vietnam."
security, presided at a meeting'
of the Washington Special Ac-
tion Group to discuss the- re-
taliatory options available to
the United States.
The group, which is com-
posed of senior officials from
the State and Defense Depart-
Troop Freeze Is Implied -
Although the spokesmen said
the new assaults would not in-:
terfere with the President's
program for troop withdraw-`
als, other officials implied that:
Mr. Nixon might freeze Amer"
Vican troop strength in Vietnam;
at 69,000 after may 1.
That decision, and the ques-,
tion of resumed bombing of the,
special to The New York Times genCe Agency, meets durin
WASHINGTON, April 4-The emergencies. The officials con-
Unit?d States tonight ordered ferred for an hour and 15 min
the deployment of 10 to .20 utes today and are expected to
more B-52 bombers to Indo- meet again tomorrow.
china to strengthen the Ameri Meanwhile, the President was
receiving conflicting advice
can ability to respond to the from Congress on what the
new North Vietnamese of fen- American response to the ene-; away from suggestions that the
stye, my attacks should be. attacks might effect a major
The new planes will bolster The Senate Democratic lead- change in United States rela-
er, Mike Mansfield of Montana,
thb existing fleet of strato-I opposed the use t;!nns with the Soviet Union.
fortresses by up to 25 per cent.i said that lie specifically said that there
of American air power or corn no reconsideration of the
Eighty more of the giant bomb I bat troops. was
President's intention to visit
I ers -already are stationed at "Bombing the north will not th Soviet Union beginning
airfields in Thailand and Guam.l bring about a settlement," he May 22.
The Pentagon spokesman, said. "I mean, we would just I`he spokesman said he did
lose more planes, increase the ant know whether the Adminis-
Jerry W. Friedheim, declined) number of prisoners of war and tration would approach the So-
comment on the B 52 deploy decrease the chances for a ne- vict Union to persuade Hanoi
jrnent, except to observe than gotiated settlement." to limit its offensive. But other
President Nixon had expressed) He repeated his call for a '.,Ifi, ials said there was no rea-
liis readiness "to take what-I complete American withdrawal rat to believe Moscow would
ever steps are necessary toi from Vietnam, adding: "This is be responsive to such a request.
ern-
1protect the remaining United! a time for Vietnamization to , Rather, the deliberate em-
fish or cut bait." phasis on the role of the Soviet
States forces in South Viet On the Republican side, Sen- equipment in the spokesmen's
nam." ator Barry Goldwater argued statements today seemed to be
Meanwhile, the State Depart- the opposite view. designed. to underscore the
Iment asserted that what it said The President will have to magnitude of the foreign sup-
was North Vietnam's extensive make a decision, he said, port the North Vietnamese are
use of Soviet supplied tanks' whether "we continue the receiving.
and heavy artillery in its five- dilly-dally bombing" of enemy So far as the American re-
da offensive had added "a supplies as they are shipped sponse is concerned, officials
Y south, or "go in earnest at the at the State Department noted
new factor to the battlefield source of supplies in the north, that increased air strikes were
f
or e
situation in South Vietnam." including the harbor at Hai- the only viable option
The department spokesman, Iphong." United States to pursue, since
Robert J. 'McCloskey, said that ; Mr. Goldwater left no doubt the American combat forces
Soviet equipment had permitted that he favored the second had dwindled to the point
the North Vietnamese to wage course. where they could no longer be
"conventional warfare rather The Administration took effective.
than their traditional guerrilla- steps today to insure that it, The officials said they doubt-
style attacks." would speak with one voices ed that Mr. Nixon would seek
Mr. McCloskey's stress on + to re-introduce additional. Amer-.
Its three principal spokesmen,:
Soviet equipment appeared to lean forces.
be an effort to provide addi- Mr. McCloskey; Ronald L. Zieg-` "This has got to be a. test
tional public ju"stifidation in ler, the White House press sec for the Vietnamese," one offi
case of a decision to renew the rotary, and Daniel Z. Henkin? cial said, "and they have ta
bombing of North Vietnam. the Assistant Secretary of De-i pass it on their own."
He specifically said the fense for Public Affairs, met in'
United States was still holding Mr. Ziegler's office this morn-;
STATINTL
open all its retaliatory options, ling ing to coordinate their state7',
including resumed air strikes ments.
deep into North Vietnam while In subsequent briefings; they`;
it continued to review the mili or their deputies all made a;
tary situation. point of stressing that full,
Privately, Administration of- scale conventional fighting was
ficials said that while Presi- now going on.
dent Nixon might order heavy Mr. Friedheim, Mr. I I enkin's
had bn5t` v,41 i it f", t ti A-RDP80-01601 R001 300390001-8
nor,, will depend on the
evef is of the next few days,
the officials said.
Despite his stress on the role
of the Soviet-supplied equip:
 L HT[Ii~ TON POST
Approved For Release 2001/08/'?Fi dI1A-RDP80-01601 K001 300390001 -B
quences. To all these goes
TO ~' Y'~Il1~i91
War l"adiiC
By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer
United States officials said
yesterday that Communist
forces are shifting from guer-
i?illa tactics to frontal warfare
in South Vietnam by introduc-
big "massive" quantities of
heavy battle equipment, in-
eluding tanks, artillery and
anti-aircraft guns.
"These units are supported
in a very large way by heavy
military equipment from the
situation is still too "fluid" to
make any durable assess-
ments.
Sy labeling what has. oc-
curred as an "invasion," "a
blatant invasion," or a "naked
attack" by North Vietnam, the
administration already has
laid out a justification for
greatly intensified U.S. air at-
tacks on North Vietnam. The
continuing expansion of the
official denunciations of the
Communist assault suggests,
in addition, that the Nixon ad-
ministration is bracing Ameri-
can public opinion for more
adverse news about the mili-
tary capacity of the Commu-
nist forces.
In claiming that the nature
of the warfare is shifting fun-
damentally, the administra-
tion, in effect, was throwing a
question mark over its own re-
Soviet Union," said State .De-1 peatedly expressed confidence said the unusually heavy flow
Soviet partniclit press spokesman I that the Communists cannot of this equipment through
t
i
l
d
f
a
n a pro
onge
major o
-;I the Di11Z continues.
Robert J. McCloskey. sus
fensive in South Vietnam. ,! Despite the heavy Commu.
When newsmen asked if the If the Communist offensive ! nist attacks just below the
raising of that issue carried should succeed in seizing the.! supposed buffer zone between
the implication that the input northern provinces of South North and South Vietnam,
of Soviet weaponry might Vietnam, which some officials many officials believe that an-
,jeopardize President Nixon's privately fear, that would not I other and -possibly larger as-
A1ay 22 sumillrt trip to Mos- nniv hnitar flip Nivnn nriminic. -?11 ,~ < 41,.. cr; ,.. t._
claimed any such intention. Vietnamization. A Communist
"No, no," he replied. Until yes- advance of that scope would
t.erday however, U.S. officials also impose a heavy burden of
had avoided statements chat the administration to carry
would raise such questions. through the current presiden-
For the second straight day, tial election campaign.
spokesmen for the White For the second day in a row,
House, the State Department the Washington Special Action
and the Pentagon engaged in Group of the National Secu-
a coordinated escalation of the rity Council, the administra-
ff" ; 1 1 1 r U Q nccrn
o
o
continue dilly-dally bombing conventional warfare is tnat i
or go into the northern part of this is the kind of warfare the
North Vietnam to the source American troops, which are
of supply," he said. This is a 'now largely withdrawn, were
long-standing G o l d w a t e r best equipped to fight. The
theme, and he said he has South Vietnamese First. Dlvi-
been advising the President sion is rated as a prime exam-
privately to take that course, pie of this American training.
Defense Secretary Melvin R. I U.S. officials say it will signify
Laird met with Mr. Nixon for !"serious trouble" for the Viet-
an hour yesterday and spokes-
man Ziegler said the Presi-
narnization program if this di-
vision fails to meet expecta-
dent continues to' follow war tions.
developments closely, which t Pentagon spokesman Fried-
Ziegler emphasized are still in 1 heim said North Vietnam'!
their "early stages." l battle force in the northern
State Department spokes- provinces of South Vietnam is
man McCloskey said North now above 30,000, with the in-
Vietnam has moved into the flow continuing. The United
South far more Soviet-sup- States now has four aircraft
plied tanks and other weapons carriers in the Tonkin Gulf,
than ever before. In addition, Plus the U.S.S. Tripoli, a heli-
he said, Soviet-supplied sur- copter carrier used in amphib-
face-to-air missile sited in the ;ions assaults.
Demilitarized Zone "add an
important factor."
Defense and state officials
1 Central Highlands areal
around Kontum. This is where
the heaviest thrust initially
was expected.
North Vietnamese strategists
openly boasted last week that
since South Vietnamese forces
"have lost their shield"
through the withdrawal of
about 400,000 U.S. troops, Sai-
gon's forces are too weak to
. . t
o rcia eve
tion s top task force for inter-.1 meet challenges from multiple
about the North Vietnamese national emergencies, met at directions. This is the critical
about the offensive. the White House under presi-!' test that is now under way.
"The North Vietnamese are dential adviser Henry A. Kis- U.S. officials said South
in a sophisticated way through
the DMZ (Demilitarized Zone)
into the south," said White
House press, secretary Ronald
L. Ziegler.
'What appears to be shaping
hii;h officials of State, De- ! roved 10.000 to_ 15
000 air-
,
fense, the Central Intelligence jjoorne troops, marines, and
Agency and the NSC. Another some portions of their highly
meeting is scheduled for 1 rated First Division further
today. " I north, to reinforce South Viet-
Senate Democratic Leader ? nam's Third Division at the
up, said Defense Department Mike Mansfield of Montana main point of contact, just
press officer Jerry W. Fried- told newsmen it is "time to north and west of the city of
heim, is "a more convention- fish or cut bait" in the Viet. Quangtri.
al-type battle effort on the namization program for turn- , However, the bulk of the
part of the enemy than we ing the war over to South First Division, which is rated
have known for years." Vietnam. "We ought to get out one of the best in South Viet-
Said lwn or ey, "What we sack, stock and barrel," he nam, reportedly. remains de-
see on the ground ... is a di Another round of ? U.S. ployed around the coastal city,
bombing of Hue about 35 miles south
vcrgenee from the more trad g North Vietnam, said of Quangtri. Some military an-
tional pattern of guerrilla war- Mansfield, will mean that "we alysts believe that the Corn
fare,"
Missing from all these char-
acterizations, however, was
any comprehensive report on
the actual atlkte?
prospects ,wdrbe dat~
projection, of the - conse-
will lose more planes, the munists, probably after an as-
and the possibility of negotia-
tions will evaporate."
Sen. Barry Goldwater (R.
Ariz.), however, advocated ex-
"01 /03/04
resr ent Nixon "must
make up his mind whether to
at Hue, depending upon how
much of the First Division is
drawn off by the battle fur-
ther north.
One of the paradoxes In the
veIA iRDR8O-@1AQ4R
forces are now reverting to
01300390001-8
 3111 !Toll STAR
Approved For Release 2003/d810k: IA-R~ff*N f 01 RO
'(a001u, 0(1311 S JllSS l Ofl
By GEORGE SHERMAN to .open talks on addition sale
Star Staff Writer i:,1'-of American,,grain and feed
The Nixon administratioij the Russians.)
has carefully escalated verbal A fear among on Hanoi's invasion of g some
in-
South Vietnam while insisting formed sources is that what-
there is no crisis here over ever retaliation Nixon decides
what to do on the ground. upon in North Vietnam may
State Department spokes- cause the Russians -to cancel
man Robert J. McCloskey, the President's own Moscow
chief vehicle for transmitting visit. For that reason, Mc-
Nix:on concern, for the first Closkey's official mention of
time yesterday injected a Soviet involvement was kept
mention of the Russians into purposely low-keyed and
his discussion of the "naked sketchy. He referred only to
attack" on South Vietnam. the added SAM missiles and
"I want to call attention to heavy tanks supplied by Mos-
the fact," he told a news brief- cow to Hanoi.
ing, "that these (North Viet- Ziegler said afterwards that
narnese) units are supported he had "nothing to add.11 Fur-
in a very large way by heavy
military equipment from the
Soviet Union."
Both he and Pentagon press
spokesman Jerry W. Fried-
heirn emphasl7?cd that the full-
scale attack by. North Viet-
namese across. the demilitar-
ized 'zone shows a massive
shift to sophisticated couven-,
tional warfare, and a turn
away from the more tradi-'
tional guerrilla pattern.
Russians Equip SA.'1Is
Later, intelligence sources
said that $45 million of the
estimated $100 million military
aid sent by the Russians last
year ,to Hanoi went into equip-
ping 10 of the SAM 2 surface-
to-air missile battalions now
set up in and around the de-
militarized zone.
The $100 million aid for 1971
said that $45 million of the
lion sent in 1970.
But at the White House
press secretary Ronald L. Zie-
gler., who is meeting daily with
McCloskey, insisted that presi-
dential concern over the inva-
sion has not reached crisis
proportions. Nixon yesterday
was still "assessing" the situa-
tion, spending "some" but not
"most" of his time on it, and
there was no "crisis atmos-
phere" at the White House, he
said.
Both the White House and
State D e p a r t in e n t denied
quickly - McCloskey an-
swered "No, no" - that Soviet
support for the invasion was
supply depots, including Hai- scorned the proposal. ? Mc-
phong harbor if necessary. Closkey said that chances are
"The President is faced. with "dim" for public or private
a decision," said Goldwater in -negotiations so long as the mil-
a Senate speech." ... He must itary invasion continues.
make up his mind whether to
continue dilly-dally bombing
or go into the northern part of
North Vietnam to the source
of supply."
I
Although it was his first pub-
lic expression of differences
with Nixon over handling of
the war, the senator added
that he still supports Nixon's
overall policy in Indochina.
His words contrasted with
those earlier of Senate Majori-
ty Leader Mike Mansfield,
thermore, he maintained that who said he would oppose re-
the daily meetings at the sumption of the bombing "un-
White House of the Washing-. der any circumstances."
ton Special Action Groups "It's time for Vietnamiza-
chaired by presidential advis- tion to fish or cut bait - to
er Henry A. Kissinger and in- produce or else," said the
eluding top lieutenants from Montana Democrat. "We must
the Slate and Defense Depart- get out, lock, stock and bar-
ments and the Central Intelli- 'rel."
genre Agency, have been J Sen. George McGovern, who
"routine, to a degree." Ile re- won a victory yesterday in the
"
cri-
fused to call the group a
sis-management" body.
The universal suspicion in
official circles is that the
President will order heavy
bombing of the, North Viet-
namese staging and other sup-
ply sites just above the DMZ
once the weather clears in the
Wisconsin Democratic presi-
dential primary, made the
same point. He repeated his
position that it is time for the
President to set a definite data
for total U.S. withdrawal from
Vietnam.
North. Officials point to a Sen. Hubert H. Htunphrey,
warning Nixon made in a who finished third in the pri-
press conference Dec. 10, 1970. mary, was more cautious.
He said that if he concludes While predicting failure of the
that the North Vietnamese, North Vietnamese drive, he
"by their infiltration, threaten said that continued American
our remaining forces, if they \, air power in support of the
thereby develop a capacity South Vietnamese is necessary
and proceed possibly to use to keep the situation stable as
that capacity to increase the American troop withdrawal
level of fighting in South Viet- continues.
nam, then I will order the U.S. officials here admit
bombing of the military sites
in North Vietnam, the passes
that lead from North Vietnam
into South Vietnam, the mili-
tary complexes, the military
supply lines."
Officials note that this
course of aciion, at least ini-
tially, would not mean re-
sumption of bombing of the
highly populated areas of
North Vietnam above the 20th
Paralled.
causing Nixon to reconsider But yesterday Sen. Barry
his planned trip to Moscow Goldwater, R-Ariz., made his
starting May 22. first attack on the Nixon han-
(The White House an- dling of the Vietnam war and
nniuiced yesterday that Agri- . called upon the President to
CHI' Ire Secretary Earl L. Butz order an all-out bombing as-
great puzzlement over the ulti-
mate intentions of Hanoi in
this conventional-type inva-
sion. Perhaps the best-
informed guess is that made
public today by South Viet-
namese President Nguyen Van
Thieu - that the North Viet-
namese are trying to take a
limited amount of South Viet-
namese territory for bargain-
ing purposes.
Yesterday both the Viet Cong
and Hanoi representatives in
Paris made a formal proposal
that the peace talks normal
Thursday session be held this
week. But both Washington
STATINTL
would visit Moscow next week Sault on . North Vietnamese the talks two weeks ago -
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-[001300390001-8
 L r .T? .sii:: SUN
Approved For Release 2001 047ZCIA-RDP80-01601 RO
Hundreds o I.S. air strikes flown
k ? invaders in South -VIetnam
Amer-
Saigon-A
warplanes fleet has of
lean begun
:flying to aid South Vietnamese
troops hurled into retreat by
the North Vietnamese offensive
in this country's northermost
province.
American military sources
said that "several hundred" air
1strikes were flown in South
1Vietnam this morning by U.S.
planes despite bad weather, but
there was no official command
announcement of what ap-
peared to he the start of an
intensive bombing campaign.
i
f
,
a
t thrted level o
r
Bue repo . ~
ton Spe-
strikes was still only a fraction' 000 to 17,000 North Vietnamese mecting of the Washing
troops who have pushed Saigon cial Action Group, whose func
forces out of 1.5 iron would be to prepare aria-
government rein-
forced capability as morning
fog along with broken and low bases in northern and western lyses and proposals for presi-
clouds.} ept many planes on thei Quang Tri province, which lies dential action.
ground. ' . just south of the demarcation This group, made up of State
The raids this morning, ani zone separating North and and Defense Department offi-
ncrease from yesterdays 123i South Vietnam. , cials, Central Intelligence Agee-
in Quang Tri province, were' American 13-52s bombed a' cy representatives and others
flown by planes based on three series of suspected Communist as required, and chaired by
onccntrations pn-hing on Henry A. Kissinger, the Presi-
c
o
l
STATINTL
op
U.S. aircraft carriers off the t
Vietnamese coast and from Quang Tri city from the south, dent's national security affairs
American bases in Thailand de- southwest and west yesterday assistant, is the action subeom
spite the low cloud ceilings, areas across the buffer zone) mittee of the National Security
military sources said. that are supporting the tanks, Council. It proposes, but does
The American command is and infantry driving into the. not, decide, actions to be taken.
also believed preparing to re- South. The foe has wiped out: Gerald L. Warren, a White
sume the bombing of North the buffer zone, one official; House spokesman, said in dis-
said. closing the high-level meeting
Vietnam, at least on a limited While the first use of air that Mr. Nixon stands by his
north demarcation
zone, in an effort. to blunt the flower, as weather clears, ~cili earlier expressions of confidence
ifive-day-old Communist offen- be aimed at influencing thej in South Vietnams ability to
sive. . immediate course of battle, all; cope with enemy offensives.
[A Reuter dispatch today official indications were that Dr. Kissinger and Adm.
quoted military sources who re- strikes farther north must bel. 'Ihoheas H. Chiefs Moorer, Staff chairman
Joint of , met
q considered likely. I of
ported that 3,000 South y ietna
mere marines waded ashore on Robert J. McCloskey, a Stateffe ive Nixon to discuss the
con.
the banks of the Cua Viet River Department spokesman. recall i ;offensive andhothe ne President
William
below the demarcation zone to ed Mr. Nixon's freouer,t as-Ilferred by p
sertions that he would '-take 'P..Rogers, Secretary of State, with be g ,in counterattack. whatever action he considered and Melvin R. Laird, Secretary
[The marines moved ashore necessary to protect i .S. forces of Defense.
'five hours before dawn after and their continuing r;iritdr:+~-
(being landed by U.S. and South al" during the Viet nam i za tion
Vi,Anamese landing craft, the process.
dispatch added. McCloskey issued the
[Reuter quoted the military Mr. denunciation Mr. Ms Ianoi for "f tae
sources across l arithe grant violation" of the 1754 Ge-
neva agreements on Indochina
beach and surrounding area to and of the 1963 "uuderstand-
?dut off any Communist thrust ings" which brought an end to
know that of the coast America's continuous bombing
;known as as "the Street without
[joy."] of North Vietnam and a move,
The U.S. command said yes- to the Paris talks.
terday that it was taking what , Those "understandings," now
it called "~c~ ~, a~t ion- t~ caned by IIanoi were that
arv meast?~5o ~t~i 9e ~elmog2001l'( 04111sCIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8
sea power t protect-remaining would get under way, and IIa
American fo orces, which were not would respect the buffer
reduced by 6,200 men last week zone and avoid shelling major
to 95,500. South Vietnamese cities. The
An official Voice of America U.S. says it was to continue un-
commentary broadcast latrr
from Washington ' blunl.'.'r molested reconnaissance flights
noi that it would 1~^, over the North. The U.S. al-
d II
a
warne
"a serious miscalculation" to so says that most of its bomb-
conclude that President Nixon ing of the North since 1968 was
in retaliation for North Viet
will not resume bombing of; namese attacks on the photo
North Vietnam if it presses its planes.
attack in the South. President Nixon demonstrat-
The first targets of the Amer-i eJ his concern about the North
ican bombing campaign, how-i Vietnamese offensive by having
will be the estimated 15,-; his spokesmen announce a
ever
 Approved For Release 26 /631/ 4 : CIA' AWO 1601 R
NIXON SEES AIDES
Renewed Bombing of
North Among Steps
Being Weighed
By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Speriai to Tkr New York T!mes
WASHINGTON, April 3 -
The United States accused
Hanoi today of 'launching an
"invasion" of South Vietnam
and said Washington was leav-
ing open all retaliatory- options
,--including renewed American
bombing of North Vietnam.
The justification for such
strikes - if they are ordered
was provided by the State
Department, which charged
North Vietnam with "flagrant
';violations" both-of the 1954
treaty ending the French Indo-
china war and of the 1968
understanding that led to the
end of systematic American
bombing of North Vietnam and
the start of what were to be
substantive talks in Paris.
Spokesmen for the White
House, the State Department
and the Defense Department
refused, however, to predict
what course of action might
.be taken in coming days.
Some Bombing Foreseen
low. That panel, which includes Both the 1954 and 1968 ac- I
representatives from the State `cords have been sources of
and Defense Departments, the emantic contention between
supporters and critics of Amer-
Central Intelligence Agency and can involvement in Vietnam.
other concerned agencies, meets In essence, the United
.during periods of emergency. States has charged North Viet-
Mr. Kissinger met privately nam'with violating the 1954
with Mr. Nixon after the ses- treaty by infiltrating men and
Sion, Ronald. L. Ziegler, the, supplies into South Vietnam.
Critics, however, have charged
White House press secretary,' that South Vietnam broke the
said.
Attack Expected, Ziegler Says
It was evident that despite
the crisis in South Vietnam,
the Administration was seeking
to avoid giving an impression
of undue concern. Mr. Ziegler
referred several times to the
current fighting as "the South"
Vietnamese operation" and said
that the attack by North Viet-
nam had been expected. "Now
i that it is beginning, our posi-
tion is to evaluate it day by
day," he said.
He cautioned newsmen again
matting any "assumptions at
this time" on what would be
done, because, he said, the
President wants "all options
open."
Mr. Ziegler and the Defense
Department spokesman, ' Jerry
W. Friedheim, said that the
American withdrawal of troops
from South Vietnam was con-
tinuing on schedule despite the
increased fighting. Mr. Nixon
has said that troop strength
would be reduced to 69,000 by
May 1 and has promised a new
troop reduction announcement
before then. Mr. Ziegler said
that this plan was unchanged.
The spokesman also said it
was highly unlikely that any of
thb six United States combat
battalions remaining in Viet-
nam would be engaged in the
ground operations. They are
committed. to guarding United
States installations.
In answer to questions, Mr.
Ziegler also said that American
air power would be used as
necessary to aid South Viet-
namese forces in combating
enemy forces within South
Vietnam.
Robert J. McCloskey, the
State Department spokesman-
who had attended the meeting
of the Special Action Group-
was the Administration's sharp-
est voice during the day,
`Flagrant Violation' Charged
treaty in the middle nineteen-
Fifties by refusing to hold elec-
tions that might have led to
Communist control of all Viet-
nam.
The 1968 "understanding,' as
made known by the Johnson
1060
31
Vietnam-on to destroy their
ability to fight.
The Paris talks on Vietnam
have. been indefinitely sus-
pencdel, and the chief American
negotiator, William J. Porter,
has returned to the United
States. Mr. McCloskey said
there were no plans for Mr.
Porter to return soon to Paris.
He will confer with Mr. Nixon
later this week.
Mr. McCloskey also said that
one factor in the United States
decision to suspend the talks
had been the build-up of enemy
forces for the expected attack
against South Vietnamese
forces. He said that the United
Admmtstration on Oct.
, Slates would not negotiate un
provided for an end of Ameri- current
cart bombing of North Vietnam S the gun of the n-
Id Pensive.
in return for the start of sub- When he was asked what led
talks on Vietnam, with 1him to call the latest offensive
Saigon S
Saigon and the Vietcong rep- an "invasion," Mr. Mc'loskey
resented at the table in Paris said that this was the most
along with Hanoi and Wash-
ington. The United States also
asserted that it had an "under-
jstanding" from Hanoi that the
North Vietnamese would not
violate the demilitarized zone
and would not shell cities in
South Vietnam.
The United States also
claimed the right to fly recon-
naissance missions over North
Vietnam. Hanoi hasnever ac-
knowledged that it agreed to
any restraint., and began in 1970
to shoot at these planes. This
in turn led to American air
strikes against antiaircraft em-
placements and other military
targets in orth Vietnam.
Theoretically, under the Ame
icans' interpretation, the abrog-
ation of the 1968 understanding
culd justify a resumption by
the United States of systematic
bombinb of North Vietnam.
Time Limit Suggested
Such a course would lead to
increased tensions with Hanio's
allies, such as the. Soviet Union
and China, and might even
endanger the chances for suc-
cess of Mr. Nixon's trip to
Moscow set for May 22.
It could also lead to unfore-
.seen political problems in this
country, with Vietnam again
becoming a major divisive is-
sue.
For these reasons, it seemed
likely tha, barring very large
North Vietnamese incursions,
American bombing of territory:
north of the border would be,
directly linked to. the invasion
A senior Pentagon official said
privately that he thought Pres-
ident Nixon would order Amer-
iean aircraft to bomb the sup-
ply lines and base camps in
North Vietnam of those enemy
units that have crossed the
demilitarized ? zone in recent
'days into Quangtri, South Viet-
nam's northernmost province.
President Nixon spent most
of the morning discussing the
Vietnamese developments with
his top aides. He met with
Kenneth Rush, Deputy Secre-
tary of Defense, and 'Adm.
Tjjromas H. Moorer, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs . of Staff.
He. spoke by telephone with
Secretary of State William P.
Rogers and -Secretary of De-
fense Melvin A. Laird.
Later in the morning, Henry
A. Kissinger, the President's ad-
viser on national security, pres-
ided at a session of the Wash-
ington SpApproveC >FoI
,to discuss what tactics to fol-
He said that what had hap- of South Vietnam by the 308th
pened in South Vietnam was and other North. Vietnamese
"a flagrant violation by North divisions.
Vietnam" of the 1954 Geneva A Pentagon official said he
agreement on Indochina and expected that, if the decision
the 1968 understanding between was made to bomb north of
the United States and North the DMZ, the raids would be
Vietnam. . limited in time to as long as
"And by any definition, what necessary to get the North
serious violation of the 1968
understanding. He said there
was a "qualitative" difference
as well, because of the heavy:
artillery, tanks and antiaircraft
weapons used by the attacking!
forces. It is also the first time
that an attacking force has
come directly across the de-
militarized zone, he noted.
, 9Qe?i i04'~l koll
AnR P80LO4601800`1300390001-8
 WASHINGTON POST
Approved For Release 2001
/03/g4Apg1.6 DI Q11QgIJR
a U.S. Snot' esmen ,'x a?ess
iuloinaev:
asrri Co.raeerra Thi-list
By Murrey Harder gravity, officials indicated.
ff water
t S
ta
Washington Pos
Administration spokesmen This is a considerable
markedly raised the level of shift of emhhasi from the
official U.S. concern yester- position the Nixon adrninis-
day over the North Vietnam- tration has taken since the
ffensive began last Friday.
ese thrust into South Viet- o
Initially, the public U.S. re-
nam by labeling it an "inva- sponse to the offensive was
story" and a "flagrant viola- low-key, in conformity with
Lion" of the Demilitarized forecasts by officials during
Zone. the past three months that a
After a meeting of mili- Communist offensive was in
tary and diplomatic strata prospect. to demonstrate a
egists at the White House "show of strength' by "spec-
yesterday morning, spokes- tacular" but limited and
men sounded the theme that containable thrusts of Corn-
the United States is "leaving munist power. By publicly
all options open" for its re- forecasting that pattern of
spouse to the offensive that military action, administra-
is unfolding, tion officials hoped to fore-
"The administration ' is stall the 'political and psy-
watching the situation very chological shock produced,
carefully," said White House especially in the United
press secretary Ronald L. - States, by the countrywide
Ziegler. "Our position," said Communist Tet offensive of
Ziegler, is to evaluate the
new military threat in upper
South Vietnam on a "day-to-
day" basis.
During the day, the ad-
ministration backed away'
from the confidence ex-
pressed at the White House
over the weekend that the
South Vietnamese them-
selves "can cope with the
enemy threat." While that
was repeated at the White
House in response to ques-
tions early yesterday, a no-
ticeably more guarded re-
sponse was given later at
the State Department by
press officer Robert J.
McCloskey, in what the
White House subsequently
dciicribecl as the basic ad-
ministration aiVraisal.
. "I would have to say pres-
ently that it is too early to
judge the ability of the
South Vietnamese to meet
this," said McCloskey, fol-
lowing the White House
meeting( presided over by
national security adviser
Henry y A. Kissinger. "The
total situation," said Mc-
Closkey, "is under review. I
ain in no position to antici-
pate what course of action
the United States might
take."
By declining to rule out
any "optiqq,~~t " the a~dnlii~'s-
tra.tiou ev~t] ~~l0thor
What yesterday's height-
ened expressions of official
concern indicated, however,
was that U.S. planners nev-
e r t h e l e s s understirnated
the military-political risks
that North Vietnam was pre-
pared to take in attacking
directly through the politi-
cally sensitive Demilitarized
Zone dividing North and
South Vietnam. This is what
appeared to surprise at least
some U.S. planners, and
which the official reaction
yesterday registered.
The international implica-
tions of this thrust through
the DMZ were still unclear
yesterday, in part because
the full scope of the Com-
munist offensive is not yet
discernible.
If U.S. planners have
greatly miscalculated the
power that North Vietnam
and the Vietcong can bring
to bear in the weeks ahead,
some U.S. officials privately
conceded, that could have
major repercussions on the
current American presiden-
tial election campaign and
also on President Nixon's
planned l y, 22 visit to the
At the White House yes. tinue to fly as part of the
terday morning, the Wash- "understandings."
ington Special Action Group. This -is not the first time
(WSAG) was convened to as- )hat the United States has
sess the situation. In addi- charged North Vietnam with
ion to Kissinger, partici- violating the "understand-
pants included Under Secre- ings." McCloskey, however,
tart' of State John Irwin; said "this is unquestionably
Deputy Secretary of De- a more severe violation than
Tense Kenneth Rush; Adm. h. s occurred heretofore."
Thomas H. Moorcr, chair- When newsmen ask. d
man of the Joint Chiefs of McCloskey if the present
Staff, and other officials. Communist military offen-
President Nixon also con- live exceeds U.S. forecasts
ferred by telephone with about it, he replied; "I
Defense Secretary ?Melvin R.. would he hard put to shy it
Laird and Secretary of is exactly what was antici-
State William P. Rogers, pated in terms of numbers,
and met with Kissinger and targets." While the numbers
poorer, spokesmen said. of Communist forces ero
State Department spokes- in range of the pre'lictioJIs,
man MMcCloskey said after- McCloskey said, the ecrec
The Washington Post recently published
news of a National Security Council rccom-
mendation that the existing secrecy policy
in Executive Order 10501 for safe-guarding
national defense information he reissued in
a new order. Measures currently imposed to
keep Congress and the people from know
what the Executive branch is doing Wound
be continued.
We can all be thankful for the opportunity
to-explore this subject with the President
and express our own views. Excessive se-
cibcy has developed into one of the most
critical problems of our time The court
cases and other events of 1971 show that the
more secret the Executive branch becomes,
the more repressive it becomes. It has al-
ready adopted the practice of honoring its
own secrets more than the right of a free
press or the right of a citizen to free s lt:ech.
The NSC "final draft" revision, as o1T)-
twined by The Washington Post. claims that
an Executive Order is required to resolve a
conflict between (a) the right or citizens to
be informed concerning the activities of the
government and (b) the need of the govern-
ment to safeguard certain information from
unauthorized disclosure. Of course, that sine
ply is not true. The Constitution J id not cre-
atg and does not now contain a basis for any
such conflict. The interests and the power of
the people are paramount in this country.
The only conflict about this matter is the
President's failure to recogilize the citizens'
rights and ask Congress for legislation, in
,addition to existing law, tltlt would provide
the protection he wants for information
bearing on the active defense of this nation.
The information could be called National
Defense Data. A specific definition for the
data could be similar to the one already rec-
bmmended in the report submitted to the
President and Congress last year by the Na-
tional Commission on Reform of the Federal
Criminal Code. The President should take
guidance from the fact that the Atomic En-
ergy Act has been quite effective in con-
trolling Atomic Energy Restricted Data with-
out objectionable impact on the citizens'
right of access to government activities.
if the President still insists on having an
Executive order on the subject of safe. card-
ing information, here are some comments
that.could be helpful:
1. Updating. The procedures in Executive
Order 10501 for classifying defense informa-
tion as TOP SECRET, SECRET or CONFI-
DENTIAL are substantially the same as the
Army and Navy used before WorJa War 11 to
classify military information as SECRET or
CONFIDENTIAL. The policy was suitable
for small self-contained military forces. All
of the SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL mate-
rial held by some of the large Army posts
could fit in a single drawer of a storage cabi-
net. Circumstances are completely different
today. The strength of our national defense
is not limited to military effort. It stems
'front the vast politico-social-industrial-mili-
tary complex of this. country. A cornmensu-
? rate interchange of information is essential.
Therefore, such Lxecutive order as the Pres-
ident considers to be required should be rad-
ically updated..
2. Definition. A fatal defect of Executive lion on a great volume. of information under
Order 10501 was the absence of a definition the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Defense
of "national defense information." That com- that had originated throu;.'h the year 1945.
partitively narrow term was an improvement As for the smaller number of items that
over the broader terms "national security"
should be produced in the future, deelassifi-
and "security information" which were dis- cation by the originating authority would be
carded in 1953. However, it is imperative practicable and enforceable. Exceptional
that the designation used be limited se- classified items, if any, sent to records repos-
verely hich by specific definition to information i
w
which tories could be declassified au*omatically
the President really believes would after the passage of a period of time such as
damage the national defense and which leads 10 years.
itself to effective control measures. G. Privately Owned Information. It is esti-
3. Categories. Consistent with the urgent
need to narrow the scope of protection,
there should be only one category of de-
fense information. Internal distribution des-
ignators could be used to limit distribution
of a given item, but there need by only one
classification marking. Experience proves
that three classifications invite serious con-
fusion, promote uncontrollable . overclassifi-
cation, and reduce the effectiveness of the
Security system.
4. Authority to Classify. The President's as-
sumed authority to impose a defense classi-
sification authority since they are not classi-
cation ought to be exercised by only a tiny
fraction of the hundreds of thousands of
people who are now classifying. The new
definition and great importance of the infor-
mation involved would permit limiting clas-
sification authority to persons designated by
the President and to such others as they
might designate. (Individuals who put mark-
ings on documents containing information
classified by someone else do not need clas-
fiers.) As a new procedure, anyone who as-
signs a 'defense 'classification to material
which does not qualify for protection should
be made subject to disciplinary action as a
counterfeiter.
5. Declassification. The millions of classi-
fied papers currently gushing forth cannot
possibly be kept under review for declassifi-
cation on a document-by-document basis.
But that is no reason for perpetuating as-
signed classifications as the NSC proposed.
The President should take the insignificant
risk and cancel the classification on histori-
cal material by appropriate order. As guid-
ance, this writer authorea DoD Directive
5200.9 in 1958 which canceled the classifica-
mated that at least 25`0 of the material in
this country which bears unjustifiable classi-
fications was privately generated and is pri-
vately owned. The Executive order should
specifically exclude privately owned infor-
mation from the defense classification sys-
tem
.
7. Misrepresentation of Law. The NSC
draft revision would continue the existing
misrepresentation of the espionage laws by
warning that disclosure of information in a
classified document to an unauthorized per-
son is a crime. The law applies only if there
is intent to injure the United States, with no
reference to classification markings. Falsifi-
cation of the law should be eliminated.
The President could do the country' a
great service if he would seek advice from
Congress and others outside the Executive
branch regarding Executive Order 10501. It
is hoped that many concerned citizens will
help influence the adoption of that course of
Washington.
Thos writer retired from. the Air Force it
May, 1971, after 43 years of gov-ern.nient ser
vice, including 26 years as a security policl
specialist.
(See -editorial,. "Official Secrets.")
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0.1601 R001300390001-8
 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R
MONTGOM;rRY, ALA. ~Anvlal3s 11972
M - 61,769
8 - 80,831
STATINTL
A Light Checkrein On The CIA
THE CENTRAL Intelligence
ency gets a large chunk of its
unds through hidden channels. .
A favorite method is for another
agency's budget to be kited by a
certain amount, then that amount
is dec1 ted surplus and
transferred to the CIA.
In this manner, only a handful of
people know what has occurred,
most. of them in the Executive
branch. There is an oversight
committee of the Senate made up
of senior members of the Armed
Services and Appropriations
Committees, plus four members of
the Foreign Relations Committee.
As chairman of the Armed
Services Committee, Sen. John
Stennis of Miss. presides over the
group, which is supposed to
monitor all CIA activities. Last
year the oversight committee
didn't meet a single time.
The Foreign Relations
Committee members on the
oversight panel are angry. They
contend CIA activities around the
world have a decisive effect on the
conduct of U.S. diplomatic policy.
They have taken action to by-
.pass Stennis and to gain some
measure of control over CIA funds,
personnel and activities by writing
new curbs into the foreign aid
authorization bill.
The bill, signed by President
Nixon the other day, requires for
the first time a reduction in
military personnel working for the
CIA in activities similar to the
assistance and advisory groups
now operating in Cambodia and
Laos.
It includes t h e`ZIA in t
$341,000,000 ceiling on aid o
Cambodia and requires CIA ar s
transfers to be counted against the
military aid appropriation. The
CIA is reported to have
warehouses filled with arms at
various points in Southeast Asia
for distribution-to anti-communist
guerrillas.
The CIA will be forbidden to pay
foreign troops - such as the 4,800
"volunteers" in Laos -more than
their' counterparts in the U.S.
armed forces. The bill specifical-
ly..places the CIA under existing
restrictions on giving arms to
forces in Asia.
It will require quarterly reports
to Congress on Cambodia and
,annual reports on foreign aid. CIA
assistance will. be included in the
totals, althpughit will probably not
be pinpointed.
These regulations will increase
congressional supervision over
shadow wars, but the language is
not so tight as to prevent some
circumvention, if the CIA_ is
supported by the White House.
The National Security Council,
the President's consultative
committee to which the CIA
reports, has the final decision on:
the agency's activities.
However, the new controls
should require the CIA to think
twice before committing the U.S.
to clandestine wars, as it has done
all too often in the last several
years.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04.-: CIA-RDP80-01.601 R001 300390001-8
 !TT'T ~rt(T R' mi C 7F' C "I
~'JNITOR
Approved For Release 2001/03f(94 FEMI DP80-01601 RO
View from tie fudge factory
By David K. Willis
Washington
It looks the same, outwardly - endless
antiseptic corridors; subdued lighting; anon.
ymous doors opening into hushed offices;
the flags and the globe and the slippery
floor of the diplomatic entrance on C
Street... .
This is home to that body of men and
women whom Franklin D. Roosevelt called
"cookie pushers," and whom John F. Ken-
nedy characterized as "those people over
there who smile a lot"-the professional
diplomatic corps of the United States.
But the "fudge factory" (as the State
Department has ingloriously been dubbed)
Is not the same at all, really. To a v -i -u .
returning after several years, it is even
more subdued than it was in the late 'GO's.
It feels even less in the mainstream of U.S.
policymaking than it felt in Lyndon John-
son's day; morale is low, and the talk of
the building is often about what might be
done to redress the balance.
The thoughts come thick and fast as Presi-
dent Nixon's party heads to Peking. Dip-
lomats at the State Department welcome
Mr. Nixon's initiative toward the People's
Republic. They want to see it succeed. Some
of them helped in preliminary staff work,
writing papers for Dr. Henry Kissinger and
his national security staff. And yet, even
those officials who would normally expect to
know the ins and outs of evolving U.S. strat-
egy toward Peking were frank to admit in
private conversation a few days ago that
they did not know the exact state of play.
It hardly.needs restating: Major Ameri-
can foreign policy is formed and executed
largely in the White House these days. The
Kissinger staff, according to a late report,
numbers 46 assistants, with 105 adminis-
trative personnel. Both Mr. Nixon and Dr.
Kissinger like to plan quietly-and to move
quickly. Neither demonstrates much regard
for the diplomatic bureaucracy. They ask it
questions, but not for crucial policy recom-
mendations-or so one is led to understand.
They do not ignore it entirely, but-neither
do they keep it informed of just who is say-
ing what to whom when Dr. Kissinger
makes his dramatic, secret journeys: to Pe-
king, to Paris.
Some diplomats, unsurprisingly, don't
like it at all. No one man, or two men, no
matter how brilliant, can cover every nu-
ance in dealings with nations such as China
or North Vietnam, they say. Others are
seriously concerned with the quality of
recent appointments to the rank of ambas-
sador: former Treasury Secretary David
Kennedy to NATO, for instance (consid.
ered? by some too old, by others too inex-
perienced); Borg-Warner's Robert Inger-
soll to Tokyo (recognized, as a gracious
businessman, an expert in business, but
largely inexperienced in Japanese affairs
b ? ess and a co o Asian
s,
Granted, it is said, that Mr. Nixon has dis-
liked the Foreign Service since 1954 when
the Republicans came to power with a fistful
of new slogans such as "massive retalia-
tion." And Mr. Nixon was right: The pro-
fessionals didn't like him, or President
Eisenhower, or John Foster Dulles.. But
those days have gone. The world has
changed.
Issues are increasingly complex. The bu-
reaucracy of State and the Central Intelli-
gence Agency does possess expertise, built
up over the years. True, bureaucracy grinds
slowly-and true, it needs shaking up from
time to time: prodding, cajoling, pushing.
Yet, by cutting State out from the crucial
decisions, the view maintains, the White
House runs clear and definite risks, both
now and for the future.
How, then, to marry professional exper-
tise to the need of the White House to move
fast and flexibly? One answer: the White
House could cut in six or seven top profes-
sional diplomats on China and Vietnam
strategy. This could serve several purposes,
it is said: ensure that all' policy bases are
covered; prevent further atrophy of State,
which is becoming more and more cautious
about making firm recommendations to
Dr. Kissinger's people ("Where is Henry
right now, while we're talking?" asked one
source with a grin; "in Pyongyang? Could
be ..."), thereby lowering its standing in
the White House still more. It could even
help prevent "leaks" from the bureaucracy
of the kind that Mr. Nixon detests. Where
no one knows anything, the argument runs,
disgruntlement can lead to erroneous specu-
lating to friendly journalistic ears; it is
safer, paradoxically, if a few people know
a lot.
Professional diplomats have deep respect
for Dr. Kissinger, and, they say, for Mr.
Nixon's approaches; privately, however,
many feel that the quality of the national
security staff does not equal the best men
in State. The professionals acknowledge
that State needs to find ways to keep se-
crets better-to show Mr.. Nixon that it can
indeed be trusted.
It asks for the chance.
David Willis, Monitor American news
editor, was this newspaper's State De-
partment correspondent for four years
from 1965. -
f
STATINTL
y~
outside u
diplomacy i~Al f"cQve FQ 1a e 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8
rim
play what the professionals consider an
enormously significant part).
 NEW YORK TI :E9
Approved For Release 2001/Q IQ1j RDP80-01601 RO
White Housekeeping
By RUSSELL BAKER
WASHINGTON, Feb. 14 - Dear
Spiro:
Have stepped out for a while. Over
to China for a few days to see Chou
and Mao and that strange bunch of
Commies. Remember? I told you
about it several weeks ago. Anyhow,
would you be a real pal and keep an
eye on the White House while I'm
out? If you get hungry, all you have
to do is pick up the telephone and
tell the operator you want to order
some food. Same thing if you want
to go out. Get the operator and say,
"I want to go out."
She'll say some Lng-like, "Do you
want to go bowling, or do you want
to go to the Azores to see Pompidou,
or what?"
The thing is, Spiro, she has to know
whether to order the limousine or
the helicopter or one of the big jets,
so don't tell her it's none of her busi-
ness where you want to go. She is
just trying to be helpful.
Now about using my desk. . .
When you sit down at the desk you'll
? see a lot of buttons. Whatever you do
. , . and I really mean this, old buddy
.. don't push any of those buttons.
Okay?
I mean, really, Spiro, keep your
'fingers off the buttons, okay? We
don't want to have any nuclear mis-
takes. On second thought, it might
be a good idea if you didn't use my
desk. Get the White House operator
and ask her to have somebody set
you up a little desk of your own by
the window without any buttons.
There's a terrific view of the Wash-
ington Monument from the window.
If you want to be photographed for
the newspapers there, just get the
operator and say you want your
picture in the papers, and she'll do
the rest..
About the Hot Line: If the Hot
Line rings, pick it up and say, "Hello-
ovich, Gospodin. Have you got bad
news for me?" If the voice on the
other end says "Nyet," you can quit
worrying because they are just play-
ing around again. If the voice says,
"Da," you've got a problem.
The best thing is to see if ydu can
get hold of Mel Laird. Also it might be
a good idea to go to the air-raid
shelter. Pick up the phone. Get the
White House operator and tell her you
want to go to the aireraid shelter and
she will arrange for you to be taken
down there.
Oh, almost forgot Congress. There's
a Congress going on at the Capitol.
A Congress is a big swarm of Demo-
OBSERVER
If they come around and start tor-
menting you while you're out walking
on the White House lawn, don't argue
with them. Just tell them, "If you
don't like me here, why don't you
go back to New Hampshire?"
If they insist on coming right on
into the White House, just get hold
of the operator and tell her the
Democrats are giving you trouble and
she'll get hold of somebody who will
have them removed.
Incidentally, Spiro-Congress loves
to get messages from the White
House. It makes them feel important,
as though somebody still needs them.
If you've got some spare time, Send
them a White House message on
something and urge them to pass an
important new bill.
If you want-to send a message to
Congress, all you have to do is get
the White House operator and tell
her what you have in mind and she
will. send in some message-to-Con-
gress writers.
I can't think of much else' that
might go wrong before I get back,
although there's a possibility that a
certain fast-buck roofing contractor
will drop by and give you that line
about how he was working in the
neighborhood and just happened to
see some loose shingles around the
White House chimneys and thinks
you ought to have him go up there
and see if you don't need some roof
work done. What he does then is go
up there wearing hob-nailed boots and
kick holes through the tar paper,
which I then have to pay him to
patch up. If this character takes ad-
vantage of my absence to show up,
just pick up the phone and get the
White House operator. She will know
how to have him put out quietly.
That's about all I can think of,
Spiro, except don't let any hippies
in.
You don't have to worry about any
routine foreign crises. If.. you get a
sudden crisis, the National Security
Council, will meet and tell you what
to do. Of course, you don't have to
accept their advice. If you're in doubt
about whether to do it their way or
not, get hold of the White House
operator and tell her your problem
and she'll work it out for you. .
.Last thing: "What do I do if I pick
up the phone and the operator isn't
there?" you're going to ask. Don't
worry 'about it, Spiro. Believe me,
I've lived with the same question for
STATINTL
ears ApprOweANk oo, aorRelaaaee n "./0409 a yQ~I R R8#t@I*604RQ01300390001-8
the White House. They have places ways.
of their own-the Capitol, New See you on the telly.
 STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001 '!O3/ `'"'L CA-4 80-01601
13 F ti3 3972
Hoes Pinned
on Vast Re forff'
at Stafe Dept
BY PAUL HOUSTON
Times Staff Writer
WASHINGTON-As is,
the' practice of diplomats,
William B. Mzcc)niber ush-
ered the visitor away from
his desk and over to the
more relaxed setting of
couch and side chairs.
"Somebody said the on-
ly thing that had changed
in American diplomacy
over all these years was
the" invention of the teTe-
graph," Macomber
laughed. "Well, now we
have about :00 o t h e r
thingg ."
Macomber, deputy un-
dersecretary of state for
management, is in charge
of implementing a vast re-
form program that rather
desperately seeks to re-
store to the State Depart-
ment some measure of its
old clout-if not its former
preeminence.
New Catchwords
hence, Foggy Bottom
has some new catchwords-
--"Openness" (seeking
more contact with the rest
of the foreign affairs coni-
munity).;
--"Creativity" (encour-
aging more dissent . from
the official line);
-"Democratization"
(ridding foreign- missions
of the hierarchal struc-
ture topped by an authori-
tarian ambassador);
-"Functional speciali-
zation" (turning all-pur-
pose diplomats into politi-
cal, economic, administra-
tive and consular-visa-
staniping-speci alist~ ).
After World War II, the
accelerating complexity of
international affairs
brought many other
government departments
(Defense, Treasury, Com-
merce, Agriculture, -etc.)
and agencies (for intel-
ligence, foreign aid, propa-
ganda) into the foreign
policy arena in a big way.
State was slow to learn
that it was losing prom-
inence by dealing with
these "interlopers" at
arm's length.
Security Council Bises
recently retired, "A lot of. max---New ideas, divergent
the old corps spirit has opinion and "creative dis-
been not only permitted to sent" have been encour-
die but encouraged to die." aged, M a c o m b e r says,
What rubs old guards- through the use of special
men most is the develop- message channels, n e w
ment of a collective bar- staff functions and some-
gain i n g unit among thing called the Open For-
Meanwhile, Congress in foreign service officers um Panel. At weekly,
1947 established a Nation- ..i the establishment of closed-door meetings of
al Security Council to re- strong employe grievance the panel, younger officers
view, coordinate and con- procedures. take issue with various
trol American foreign poli- One disgruntled senior American policies and ad-
cy. This led to the eclipse official says, "There's a vance their views in pa-
of State's traditional quar- great deal of outcry for pers to the Secretary of
terback role in the foreign rights and benefits, but State.
policy process. there 'is very little talk of -A complete overhaul
It is the hope-some say duty." of the controversial "selec-
t.he vain dream-of many 400 Changes Made tibn out" and promotion
in the foreign service that system also is aimed at en-
reforms will persuade fu- Despite these criticisms, couraging officers to take
ture presidents to have the reforms secm to have unpopular positions.
the State Department take gained wide acceptance in
over some of the National a bureaucracy that-must Automatic Retirement
Security Council's duties. have the biggest group of - Formerly, a,.lowel? or
There is not much belief frustrated intellectuals in middle-grade officer had
that President Nixon will government. ' to think twice about stick-
charge his preference for Macomber, noted that Ing his neck out, because
a National Security Coun- 400 recommendations for if he failed to in a promo-
cil directing foreign policy change have been imple- tion to the next grade
under a special assistant, mented out of 500 put for- within a certain number of
Henry A. Kissinger. ward in an inch-thick plan years, he was involuntari-
Charles W. Bray III, ~8, 17 months ago. , lv retired without a pen-
is one of the aging "Young He cites the following sion.
Turks" who prodded the changes as "solid and sig- The system, when fairly,
State Department into in- nificant. although not the administered, was inval-
.tituting a massive intro- millenium": uable in shedding dead
speetire study that led to -Modern management wood. But it was widely
the reforms. techniques have been in- judged to be unfairly arbi-
"Historically," he says, stituted using s y s t e in s trarv. in many cases-in-
'the foreign service has analysis a n d ? interdisci- clucfirig that of Charles
been a very closed torpor- plinary teams of senior of- Thomas.
ation with a highly pater- ficials. The aim is to Men- After Thomas, the father
nalistic system of internal tify priority issues, assign of three, was selected out
administration. . the right kind of manp?w- at the age of 46, he had no
"To some of us the de. er to each issue and re- success with 2,000 job ap-
partment's isolation from view policies periodically plications (being over-
the American mainstream, In toughminded adversary qualified or o v e r -age).
and its declining influence proceedings. Last May he shot himself
fn Washington, were in. Computer Indexing to death.
tolerable." With the micromfilmin,g The suicide stirred a
As', one Indication of and computer indexing of furore and prevented for-
changing department atti- 25,000 documents reuir- mer State personnel direc-
tudes, there was a time Inc, action at the State De- for Howard P. Mace from
r, hen Bray's foreign _ser- partment every year, it is being confirmed by the
vice career was in doubt. hoped there will be no re-
Ms agitating almost got peats of the kind of embar- Sierra Leone,
reform Now, after a junior offi-
him exiled. But then, as rassment that hit the de-
him became the "in; partment in .1067 during cer passes a certain low
taring, Bray rose with un- the Arab-Israeli six day t h r e s h o 1 d, he is guar-
years
common nr m o n swiftness last anteed tenure of 20 years
war. plus a pension-and may
February to become the. American officials could p p department's spokesman not find the copy of a cru- gain promotions in compe-
at daily press briefings. cial letter former Secreta- tition with others in his
As might be expected, rv of State John Foster specialty,
the reforms have not been Dulles had written to Is- A major problem re-
universally cheered. ? raeli Prime Minister Da- mains, however, and . it
"A lot of schisms have vid Ben-Gurion in 1956. will be aggravated by the
been created," complains a Sheepishly , the State De- tenure system. State is
former high official who partment had to ask Israel topheavy with senior offi-
h
f
ti
t
cers w
o re
re
o re
use
Approved For Release 2001/03/d$drti,W='Rb 0-0160*RO 1ha00:2g000"
STATINTL
 Ii V YO:: TS~?ES
/OV044FRDl)P
Approved For Release 2001
' R"ATI 0TP
LAOTIANS ON THE MOVE: Soldiers board plane at Ban Xon, Laos, for flight to- Long Tieng, a base operated by
the,Central Intelligence Agency that was recently under siege. The Airline, Air America, is also supported. by C.I.A. l
`irst Congressional Restraints Are Imposed on C.I.A.
I forts of Senators Clifford P.I'cumvention . of Congressional
By BENJAMIN WELLES '(Case, Republican of New eJr-!iintent in the funding of activi-
Special to The New York Times I sey; Frank Church, Democrat a ties such as the Thai troops in
WASHINGTON, Feb. 12-The of Idaho, and Stuart Svlning-Laos through C.I.A. rather than
foreign aid authorization bill, ton. Democrat of Missouri. f through more open Government
signed. by President Nixon on They are members of thel agencies."
Monday, includes for the first Foreign Relations Committee.] "It would also," he said,
time in a quarter-century new Together with the committee's] "eliminate the possibility that
controls on the operations, cost !Chairman, J. W. Fulbright,' the Cooper-Church prohibitions
and personnel of the Central Democrat of Arkansas, they , against the use of American
Intelligence Agency. I have protested increasingly' in troops or advisers in Cambodia
The controls, which thus fan recent months that Congress could be skirted by using C.I.A.
have attracted little public at- has too little knowledge of, let, personnel."
tention, are the first to bel alone control over, the agency's Stennis Their Irritant
added since Congress creaotedl activities, particularly in South-i
the agency through the Na- east Asia. The ire of the committee
(members is reported to be less
tional Security Act of 1947, a' Senator Case urged on July against the reported than
measure that wsa amended inj 12 a tightening of restrictions.
1949. l over the Defense Department's] against Senator John C. Sten-
This act exempts the CIA use of its funds overseas and nis, Democrat of Mississippi,
from most fiscal and personnel, over its power to transfer "sur- Chairman of the Armed Serv-
and Appropriations committees
,plus four members of the For-
eign Relations Committee. It is
';supposed to watch over all the
lagency's activities.
Under Senator Stennis's di-
rection, however, it did not
meet at all in 1971-to the an-
noyance of Senators from the
Foreign Relations Committee,
who contend that C.I.A. activi-
ties around the world intimate-
ly and sometimes decisively af-
fect the conduct of United
States foreign policy.
They have now moved to by-
pass Senator Stennis and to
gain some control over the
agency's funds, personnel and
activities by writing controls
into the aid bill. Some Congres-t
sional sources say, however,
that there are still loopholes.
Specifically, according to
(legislative specialists, the new
controls will require the fol-
lowing atcions.
ices Committee and of. the so-1
controls imposed on other fed-I plus" military material to other
eral -agencies. Funds, personnel: United States agencies. Mr. called "Oversight" Committee
and material voted by Congress: Case insisted that the C.I.A. be, for the agency. The Oversight
to other agencies, such as the included in the restrictions lest Committee comprises senior
d States involvement in members of the Armed Services
Defense De
artment
c
n
f
Unit
p
,
a
,
or
e
example, be switched legally to Cambodia develop surrepti-
the C. I. A. tiously, as he said it had in.
The controls were insert t Laos. =
various poiA Drtwe rror RSlti 9vQQ01 M? : CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-
aid bill largely roueh the ef- ;said, "would precept e. cir-
 1; FEB 1972
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601
NEW, RULES URGED
Other Possibility
The other possibility suggest-
ed was merely that present
laws be ued.
These'we en hen only legis
ON SECRET PAPERS; e
Security Agency Proposes a
Presidential Order on Law
$peeiel to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Feb. 10-The
National Security Council has
proposed an Executive order
tightening regulations govern-
ing. the handling of classified
information and suggested the
possibility that the President
might seek legislation to make
it a crime for unauthorized per-
sons to receive secret docu-
ments, a White House officiial
said Thursday night.
The legislative suggestion, if
accepted, would result in a pro-
posal by the President of a
tough. new law similar to the
British Official Secrets Act,
which imposes stiff penalties
on those who receive as well
as on those who disclose classi-
fied information.
This was one of three alter-
natives suggested for the Presi-
dent in a draft proposal now
being circulated among the De-
partments of State, Defense and
Justice, the Central Intelligence,
Agency, and other governmen-
tal bodies, the White House of-
ficial said.
Of the two others, the draft
suggested that the President
might seek revision of a sec-,
tion. of the Federal Esp!onage
Act to make it a crime to give
classified information to any
unauthorized person. The law
now provides penalties for dis-
closure: to,"a foreign agent."
lative suggestions in the draft
proposals, which were offered
in response to the President's
demand for a study of the
handling of classifed material,:
made shortly after the publica-j
tion of the Pentagon Papers,
the Defense Department's se-
cret study of the United States
drift into the Vietnam War.
The other suggestions in the
draft proposal applied primarily
to the classification of Govern-
ment documents, setting . up
regulations over how materials
should be classified, the length
of time certain documents
could remain classified, and
who would be allowed to re-
ceive them.
These, the draft proposal
said, could be effected in a re-
vision of the Executive order
that now controls the handling
of classified information.
The draft was being circulat-
ed to the various agencies for
their comments.
STATINTL
.Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8
 ~tASHS;r~iQ:i QST
2' Fk6 l?72
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001
Pentagon Figh ts Secrets Plan
By Sanford J. Ungar
The Defense Department is
opposing a National Security
'Council recommendation that
a11. classified government in.
formation be made public
after being kept secret for a
maximum of 30 years.
Crit.cizing an NSC draft re-
,vision of government security
regulations, the Pentagon has
appealed for a "savings
clause" that would permit
agency heads to designate ma-
terial affecting foreign rela-
Ren. Williarr S Moorhend'Policy Significantly, related to
(1)-Pa.), whose House Subcom- the ?iateona, security" or
mittee on Fore,;;n Operations "jeopardy to the lives of pris-
and _xovernme tt Information oners-af-war.!'
dill open new hearings next ? "Contidential" refers to
north, complained yesterday: national security information
that the NSC draft was or- material, the unauthorized
"aimed only - . t closing infor- j disclosure of which could*rea-
matio.t leaks i n , the executive; sonably : ause damage to the
branch r they than (making)'"national . security." No exam
ilable to
i
-m ava
more inforntat
les war? listed in this cafe- -
the public and to Congress.!' P
Mo.n:ead aatd he had re- gory.
The t'etitagon also said that
queste~t a copy of the NSC "}t is imperative that these re-
remain secret' indefinitely in draft ti mt the White House. strictions be imposed only
the interest of "national sc Ear;, -in the day, the Of- where there is an established
111111curity. " iI fice of . egg1 Counsel at the need.
li
d
d
But the Defense Depart-
ment also questions some sec-1, of the Moorhead subcommit- proposes: requirement that!
tions of the NSC draft as un-I tee, saying that it was only every classified document be
duly restrictive and has sug "a working draft." marked to indicate who had
;gested changes that might The Jan. 11, letter of trans- declared it secret. Buzhardt's
'have the effect of reducing mittal which accompanied the memo called this condition
the number of classified docu- NSC proposal when it was "both un, ealistic and unwork-
ments in government archives. sent to the Departments of able. .
The Pentagon suggestions State. Defense and Justice, the huu,yestit.n Its strongest objection ap-
are 'contained in a memoran- Central Intelligence Agency eared to involve the NSC
durn to the National Security and the Atomic Energy Com fora 30-year rule
Council from J. Fred Buz- mission, however, called it guaranteeing that all secret
r
l
d e
en-
t
'' d
v
ease
ocumen
e re
s a
hardt, general counsel of the "th' final draft.
Defense Department. The Defense Department tuft 11Y.
The Washington Post hasi recommendations concerning "A sav!rgs clause to provide
obtained a copy of that memo-j the draft, sent to the NSC on for exceptions to be exercised
head con
the agenc
b
l
randum, one of several that
will be considered by the Na-
ec
ne
Justice Department
The Defense Department ob-I
to provide a copy to the staff jetted, however, to the NSC'sl
STATINTL.
y
y
y
Jan. 21, were the product of a oi
the three military cerned is essential to 'prevent
review b
y
tional Security Council beforeI departments and "a` working damage to national security,"
submitting the draft for presi- group composed of classifica- ;the Pentagon recommenda?
intelligence tions said
lion specialists
,
dential approval.
Meanwhile, members of experts and lawyers,' accord- "There are certain contin-
Congress and other experts on ing to Buzhardt's memoran- gency plans dating from the
IIt,m, 1920s which should be exempt
security classification attacked Buzhart observed in the from the 30-year rule," the;
the NSC draft for cutting back remo that the Pentagon Pentagon critique added "Re-
vern-
ment pond so many problems with lease of such documents
expanding it. information rather than he draft that it should "be would be unacceptable from a
Rep. substantially reworked before l foreign relations standpoint
the author nof E. Moss the Freedom fof submission to the President." for an indefinite period."
Information Act, said that "no \m~n othe,- matters, the! Willia;it G. Florence, a re-
more stringent regulations are Defense Deparnnent urged an tired security expert for the
needed. They are the antithe- updating of the definitions of Air Force. complained yester
sis of a free society." the three security classifica-I day that the NSC draft, as re-j
Commenting an details of tions in follows: . i ported in The Washington
the NSC draft as revealed in ? "l'ha test for assigning Pist, wll continue to permit
The Washington Post yester- 'Top Secret' classification 1 hundreds of thousands of peo-
day, Moss was especially criti- shall be whether its unauthor ; pie to continue putting unwar
.cal of the suggestion that the ized (hsclosurc -ould reasona-i~ratited security classifications
President seek legislation, bly be expecter to cause ex on information."
similar to the British Official ceptionally grave damage to Florence referred to the
Secrets Act, which would se-v- the nation or :ts citizens." practice as "illegal censor-
erely punish anyone who re- As examples of :,u.h dam-' ship.
ceives classifier' information age, it cited a range of situa-
fts well as those who disclose I tions from "armed hostilities
it. against the Urited States or
Such legislation. Moss said, its allies" to the compromise
"would be ;n outrageous im- of cryptologic and communica-
tions intelligence systems "
people. 1 wiL tight it, and I! ? "Secret" is to be usea tot
would hope that every enlight- prevent "set,nus damage"
ened AmerA~y+&8ttPbr ~64s~r ICIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8
 Approved For RekWIfff-1/03/041:JCFAER1 80-0
'enry Kissinger sits at the round table in the corner of his
blue-and-gold office. His back is to the window, and beyond the
window the White House lawn is just touched by the winter sun.
With the lone exception of Richard Nixon, who is 50 paces down
the hall and already deep into the morning's routine, Kissinger
is the most talked about, most analyzed and most important
man in Washington. There is not a No. 2 man in history
who has ever wielded such power, with such authority.
He has devoured his dietary portion of scrambled eggs,
crunched through half an English muffin and now is pouring
black coffee. He has read hastily through the cover stories on
him in both TIME and Newsweek. After a few'iraustic comments
about how journalists think the National Security Council works,
he grins and says, "I asked [White House speechwriter] Bill Sa-
fire if he thought I could survive two cover stories in a single
week. Safire said, 'No, Henry, but what a way to go.' "
Henry is not going. Now, suddenly, he seems to drop a cur-
tain between this office and such notions as public image. He
leans forward, his brow furrowed. His eyes are wide, even gen-
tle. His physical presence is again unassuming. He is the pro-
fessor, sure enough of himself and the knowledge he brings, but
nevertheless aware of how much he does not yet know and of
how uncertain are the affairs of men.
. "I'm concerned about American civilization," he says, his
hands fumbling with each other, his voice slow. "We live in a
world in which some countries pursue ruthless policies.... We
are in a period which someday maybe compared to one of the re-
ligious ages, when whole values change.... We are a warm-
hearted people, concerning ourselves with a lot that is superficial,
not willing to believe that we can make irrevocable errors, not
willing to trust the judgment of the leaders until all the facts are in
and it is usually too late, absorbed in bureaucratic infighting and
indulging in various forms of debilitating nostalgia."
being where he is. Richard Nixon, gut-bucket
Middle American, and Henry Kissinger, Harvard
intellectual, share doubts about the future. They
also share something else-the. belief that their
particular talents are the right ones for these
times, to arrest the national decay and help revi-
talize the American spirit.
Kissinger looks uneasily at the lighted buttons
on his huge phone console, the fever chart of the
White House. "The historian in me says it can't
be done. The political man in me says it is possi-
ble. This is an elemental country, capable of tre-
mendous effort when moved." Optimism is clear-
Ly ascendant this morning with Henry Kissinger
-and most mornings. Part of it comes from the'
sheer joy of power, a glandular stimulant that is
not four}d in Widener Library stacks or in grad-
uate seminars on international affairs. Another
part is the realization that three years of the Nix-
on-Kissinger sense of objective and order have
perceptibly calmed the world and nurtured hope.
. "That's our major concern about Vietnam,"
Kissinger says, shifting so lie can watch the prog-
ress of the thin sun against the frost on the win-
dow panes. He throws a leg over the chair arm.
"The President very badly wants to end the war,
but not in a way that breaks the American spirit,
in a way.that this country can preserve its confi-
dence in itself." Behind him are shelves of books
on history and politics, a kind of background tap-
estry to Kissinger's life. Since his childhood in
Germany, he has lived in a world of collapsing po-
litical systems. A "sense of things failing" has
been the subject of his scholarship, and guided the
choice of one. of his major study areas, the five
weeks of miscalculation and error which preced-
ed-World War 1. "History is not a cookbook from
which you can get recipes," Kissinger has said..,
But his cardinal rule of diplomatic planning
In hie cl nrn-ndrda~nnlnG~lnl~3ne;fil~i~f fi~'~Iflk 7~h~fcQn~ SfY~~~ ~ I 14 c)kcal prec-
t 1r,t'{
 I
~'rL$ 1 '~3T
Approved For Release 2001/03/)
'NSC U T~, Q rial originated by.foreign gov-` ance of official duties or con- Seeking legislation like
"'N SC 4J ernmcnts or international or- tractual obligations." the British Official Secrets)
"
. m:..t,...r _--+-1 nvnr "rlic.!I At which crveraly nnnishes
Live information or material" semination outs de the ixecu- i tnose wno aisciose anu receivei
Law
Mitter
ut by the heads of five Branch" to such organiza- classified information. I
led
i
ng
o
s
agencies ' and "information or tions as the Rand Corp. in Cal- Touching on an issue that l
material-which warrants some ifornia, which performs de- was repeatedly raised during'
ree of classification for an. fense research under govern-I! the court cases involving the]
de
g
On Secrets
aennire periou? I'll'.^~
? Fc+ahlichmnnt of safe- draft also instructs:
special categories and intro-I keeping standards by the Gen- "In no case shall informa-
I
Tlic National Security Coun- duces a "30-year rule" setting) eral Services Administration tion be classified in order to
cil is proposing tougher regu- the time limit for declassifica- to assure that all classified conceal inefficiency or admin-
lations to keep classified infor- tion of all future secret gov-I material is appropriately istrative error, to prevent em-1
mation out of the hands of un- ernment information. locked up and guarded. barrassment to a person on
authorized government offi- The time period over which ? Markings on every classi- ageny, to restrain competition
cials, defense contractors and some documents would he au- fied document to make it.pos- or independent initiative, or
the public. tomatically down-graded in se- sible to "identify the individ- to prevent for any other rea-
It suggests that President curity classification and even- ual or individuals who origi- son the release of information
Nixon, may want to go as far tually declassified would be nally classified : each - compo- , which does ,not require protec-
-as seeking legislation similar reduced from 12 to 10 years, gent." tion in the ? interest of na-i
?to the British Official Secrets Documents o r i g i n a l l y ? Establishment of its own , tional security."
l Act, which would have the ef- stamped "top secret" could be I rules by every government i Several judges ruled last:
!feet of imposing stiff criminal made public after 10 years.! agency on when and how it it summer that publication of
{penalties on anyone who re- Those marked "secret" could', will make classified informa- the Pentagon papers, a historv
ceives classified information, be declassified after 8 years,j tion available to Congress or';of American involvement in,
as well as on those who dis- and those with a "confiden- the courts. Vietnam, might cause embar
close it. tial" stamp after 6 years. The NSC draft lists 41 gov rassment do g overnment of;;
The recommendations are But before that time has' ernment agencies which would ficials but would not endanger
1contained in the draft revision passed, the NSC draft . sug-1 have the authority to put class the national well-being.
of the executive order that has Bests, "classified information! sification stamps on docu- The draft also substitutes]
governed the security classifi- or material no longer neededi ments and other materials. the term "'national security"
cation system since 1953. in current working files" may] They range from the White wherever "national- defense"
The 'draft was submitted to be "promptly destroyed, trans-! House and Atomic Energy was used in the previous regu-
the Departments of State, De- ferred or retired" to reduces Commission to the Panama lation core olling the classifi-
':fence and Justice, the Central stockpiles of classified docu Canal Co. and the Federal cation of information.
Intelligence Agency and the ments and cut the costs of 1 One expert on security clas-
Maritime Commission.
Atomic Energy Commission handling them. sification said yesterday that
last month for their com- A House subcommittee in- Several agencies which pre- i national security is generally j
ments. A copy was obtained by g viously did not have such au-
vests ating the, avail ability of considered a broader term ?
The Washington Post yester- classfied information has esti- thority are added to the list, which permits the classifica-1
day. - mated the cost of maintaining I such as the White House Of-Ilion of more material.
After suggestions have come Tice of Telecommunications
g secret government archives at The NSC draft also provides
- back from those agencies, a re- Policy and the ExportImport
$60 million to $80 million an- Bank. Ifor classification of anything
'vised draft is expected to be nually. whose "unauthorized disclo-
,sent to the President for ap- Although the special review Only two agencies-AC sure could reasonably be ex-
,-c on his return from of classification procedures TION, successor to the Peace pected to r. esult" in damn x-
China, was commissioned by Press- Corps, and the Tennessee Val-
The National Security Coun- ley Authority-are to be re- to. the nation, a less stringent
dent Nixone long before the
oil draft is the result of a top-secret Pentagon papers on stricted to the use of "classi- condition 'than was previously'
imposed.
year's work by a special inter- the war in Vietnam were dis- fied" stamps, and banned from The preamble to the draft.
agency committee headed by closed to the public last sum- classifying documents "top se-
William- H. Rehnquist, for- mer, the NSC draft reflects a cret" or "secret." states that "it is essential tha'
Except for its final pages, the citizens of the United.,
merly an assistant attorney number of the problems on which are stamped "For Offi- States be informed to the
bated during the Pentagon
general,and now a Justice of cial Use Only," the copy of the maximum extent possible eon-
the Supreme. Court. Among the episode. recommendations eerning the activities of their
NSC draft obtained by The
but adds that it
"
government
,
National Security Council in the NSC draft are: Post bears no security mark-
is "equally essential for their
sources Sara yesterday rrraL It is in the final pages that r_uver111iLC11L
Rehnquist's contributions to agency review committee,", the National Security Council official information against
the revision were "`very impor- `Whose chairman would be ap ! pointed by the President, disclosure.
taut. . - He did yeoman all , to makes its recommendations NSC, is
"
supervise a government secu
Rehnqu i st resigned from the city classification activity and for revising criminal statutes The draft, says the e.
work-" " to deal with unauthorized dis- intended "to provide for a just
onflict be-
inter-agehcY' committee when handle complaints from the closure of classified informa-!. tween resolesolution these of two the ceconflict he-
he was sworn in as a member public about overclassifica tion. The President is offered "
lion three options: tional interests.
include "information or mate- connection witti his perform-1
of the high court last month, ? An annual "physical in- ? Leaving existing law un-
and he has not been replaced. ventory" by each agency hold- changed. -
If adopted in its current. ing classified material to beI ? Revising. one section of
form, 'the NSC draft would sure that security has been 1 the federal espionage act' to
freeze fhe existing secrecy strictly preserved. 1 omit the requirement that dis-
stamps on thousands of docu- ? Establishment of a re- closure, to be considered crim-
ments now in special catego- quirement that everyone using inal, must be "to a foreign
ries exempt from automatic classified material not only; agent." The revision would
declassification over a period have a security clearance, but; make it a crime to disclose
of T12 years
he exec iI fiC" lrrJcwe41 Dq~ Rel UM ~O3 c 'psi Pe "e-91 access" to particular items in gYiatrt . .
11300390001-8
 Approved For Release 2O V ! .P~p TRDP80-01601 R
5 FEB F31 7 STATINTL
Report.s','
Ixon btu U.S. -
.For Upcoming China. Visit
By Paul G. Edwards
Washiu?ton Post staff Writer
KEY BISCAYNE, Fla., Feb.
4 - President Nixon spent
today at his Florida retreat
reading State Department and
National Security Council re-
ports in preparation for his
teiligence Agency; David
Packard, former deputy Secre-'
tary of Defense, and Gen.
Earle G. Wheeler.- former
chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
of Staff.
Those who have resigned,
are William Casey, chairman
upcoming trip to China. or the Securities and Ex-
Press secretary Ronald Zieg- change Commission: Cyrus
ler said at a morning briefing Vance, former Secretary of
that Mr. Nixon plans to study 1; the Army; Peter G. Peterson,
about 500 pages of material on newly appointed Secretary of-
China during the weekend, in- "Commerce, and Douglas Di1-
eluding transcripts of discus- ion, former Secretary of the
sions between White House Treasury.
foreign affairs adviser Henry Mr. Nixon was ? greeted at
Kissinger and Chinese Pre- Miami International Airport
mier Chou En-lai. by personal friend Charles G.
Ziegler said the President (Bebe) Rebozo when the presi-
also has with him some of the dential plane landed at 9:36
(books on China that he has p.m. Thursday night.
been reading, but he said that At 4 o'clock, the President!
-Mr. Nixon had asked that the took an hour-long break for a,
titles of the books not be re- ride on Biscayne Bay in Rebo-j
leased. zo's boat, the Coco Lobo III.'
The press secretary was On board with Mr. Nixon were
asked if the books included Rebozo and the President's
the thoughts of Mao, the "Lit- younger daughter and son-inc-
tle Red Look" of party doe- law, Julie and David Eisen
Chairman, Mao Tse-tung. Zie-
gler replied that he did not
know.
On national employment fig-
ures released today, Ziegler
said that the addition of
240 000 workers to the job
hower. '
The weather was sunny but
windy with the temperature in
the mid-60s.
The plane left Andrews Ait?
Force Base at 7:04 p.m. On
board with the President on
the trip was National Football
force, last month and resulting League. Commissioner Pete
decline in unemployment.from
6 per cent to 5.9 per cent of
the work force "give us a
sense of optimism."
"If the growth in employ-
ment continues at this magni-
tude," he said, "we feel it will
cut away at the unemployment
rate." -
. - Ziegler also announced ap-
pointment by the President of
four former top government
officials -to the general advi-
sory committee of the U.S.
Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency. If confirmed by
the Senate, the, nominees will
replace four, members of the
committee who have resigned: -
Appointed were Robert Ells
iroii6edifamRe(ea 001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01.601 R001300390001-8
NATO; John A. McCone, for-
mer director of the Central In-
 STATINTL THE LONDON DAILY GRAPH MA
Approved For Release 2401 : TA-RDP80-011
When Britain pulled -out of Rhodesia after the 1965 Unil2
the CIA worked . to ferret out details of the sanction-bust
In the popular, traditions of spying, secret documents disa
were used to convey messages in invisible ink. It was a shock
one of the informers was a prominent lawyer. But it was. not
the CIA had expanded into an area where the British were una
-active in Egypt, Iran and Syria. E. H. COOKRIDGE ends his
and looks at the Director, Richard Helms -
ANY of the bright young
L
'J
,,+ . - '
recruited to CIA from [
i
Other Cl,
law offices and univer- British sanction policy became, British
and SIS men were were Cal
-;ties had gained their
fT
ti,
ices
consular o
spurs in London, where they were sent supposed to watch the steady flow of former A
to glean some of the methods of the Rhodesian pig-ir.n, tobacco, and other Francis P
British Secret Intelligence Service. products through the Portuguese ports who had
cloak-anc
Dulles enjoyed making' wisecracks of Lorenqo Marues and Beira in East clo and
-about the Victorian and Indian Army Africa to Europe and the Far East clo
traditions still surviving in the British Merchants and shippers there had Wigant,
secret service, but he had a healthy made fortunes out of the traffic which Congo dL
respect for its unrivalled experience the Portuguese were bound, by United and sever
and great professionalism. He knew the most
Nations resolutions and agreements ward '
ard as illegal. Edward
CIA could learn a lot from the
to re
i
i
h
B
g
n,
with
ta
at
r
t
British about operations in the Middle After the closure of British missions -
'East and Africa, where its stations in Salisbury all -information about 1957 from the State Department;
were rapidly expanding. from 1959 he headed the East and
Rhodesian exports dried up at source. African section and, at the time
After Archibald Roosevelt, one At this juncture CIA stepped in to South
~.' CIA's foremost "Arabists", had re- - assist the British. it was not merely a of his new appointment, was Station
stored cordial relations with SIS when ead in Pretoria. Among his various
labour of love. American tobacco exploits he was reputed to have
station head in London, a plan of co- syndicates in Virginia, Georgia, initiated the first contacts between the
mof the ;on was devised for Africa, d North and South Carolina, Ten- South African government and Dr
most ose independence, prm ish h colonies had nessee and Kentucky greatly in- . Banda of Malawi.
cmin and were and creased their production and sales to The CIA agents were perpetually
cooming subject t to to strong ong Soviet t annd Europe when Rhodesian tobacco -journeying between Salisbury and the
ill
Chinese pressure. Roosevelt was st
in 1965, Rhodesia growers lost most of their trade Mozambique ports, and Murray was
in London when, made her momentous "Unilateral through sanctions. Traditionally, temporarily posted to Lusaka to main- STATINTL
Rhodesian tobacco was used for cigar twin . personal contact with British
whichraeo dn of Independence"
the conflict t the and cigarette manufacture in Belgium, officials resident in Zambia. Mr Ian
which G toverr thenment. coct with h the Holland, Germany and Switzerland. Smith and hcabinet colleague, Mr
British G When these supplies dried. up, Euro- J. H. and his i Howman, who looks after foreign
There is no better instance of the pean manufacturers turned to Ameri- affairs as well as security and the
strengthening of CIA-SIS collabora-
ed can growers. But by and by Rhodesian secret service of.the Rhodesian regime,
lion than the hitherto undisclosed
exports began to flow again, by the were not unaware of.the unwelcome
story of the services CIA rendered use of false certificates of origin and operations of the Americans. They
the British authorities in Rhodesia, smuggling through the Portuguese suffered them for the sake of avoiding
particularly since about, 1968. ports and through Durban in South an open clash with Washington. Their
indeed, in assisting the British 5IS Africa, much' to the displeasure of the patience, however, became frayed
in its thankless task of implementing Americans. when it was discovered that secret
the policy of economic sanctions Thus, obliging the British and help- documents had disappeared from the
against the Smith regime, CIA put its ing American business, CIA ordered hof the ruling Rhodesian
relations with the Portuguese in its agents to ferret out the secrets of the National headquarters
Front Party. Subsequently,
jeopardy. It has an enduring under- sanction-busting schemes devised by
standing with the Portuguese Govern- Mr Ian Smith's regime. Soon the CIA
ment and its PIDE secret service on station in Salisbury was bustling with
many aspects: NATO security, anti- activity. Since 1962 it had been headed
communist operations, the use of radio by Richard L-t Macchia, a senior CIA
stations in Portugal and her colonies, official, who had joined it in 1952 from
and of bases,~q~a ~ k~as~ 01~ 0 doy! IP80-016018001300390001-8
and Special ForZ`e$ in AngoTa, ' in the guise of an o ~cial
bique and Macao. However thin .the to Africa pontinue+
the U.S. Development Aid Agency.
 To NEW RE[?UBZIC STATI NTL
Approved For Release 20 8"d/=04.9 A-RDP80-01601 R
The Nixon Watch
Shooting at Henry,
The worst possible judge of the need for secrecy in
government and of the ethics of officials who break
the rules of secrecy is a working reporter such as my-
self. I do what I can to penetrate the official fog and
I'd welcome a lot more collaboration in that endeavor
than I get at the Nixon White House. It is with diffi-
dence, therefore, that I state at the outset of this note
on a recent breach of government secrecy that in my
opinion the official who must have been responsible
for the breach is a rat who should be dug out of his
hole and fired.
The occasion for this observation is the theft from
classified government files of documents that were
given to columnist Jack Anderson in early December
and have been publicized by him in fragments and in
text since then. "Theft" is the proper word, although
the responsible official looted his own files and gave
facsimiles to Anderson. Jack Anderson inherited the
"Washington Merry-Go-Round" newspaper column
when its founder and his employer, Drew Pearson,
died in 1969. Pearson Was and Anderson is a master
seeker ' and purveyor of secrets. Conducted as it is in
the Anderson column, the traffic in secrets is a bus-
iness that makes the columnist the instrument of
sources ,who may be trying to use him for the noblest
or the most vicious ends. My infrequent reading of
"Merry-Go-Round" indicates tome that Anderson does
his best to conduct it in a decent way. He appears to be
more careful than Pearson was to deny the column and
its outlets in some 700 newspapers to self-servers and
back-stabbers. It is believable that Anderson believed,
as he says he did, that the initial source of the docu-
ments in question made them available because he was
convinced that the Nixon policy toward India and Pak-
istan was disastrously mistaken and ought to be ex-
posed and discredited. It is also believable that Jack
Anderson was had. The difficulty with the explanation
that he. says he accepted is that the policy was already
known and discredited. Another columnist, Joseph
Kraft, presented a more credible explanation of the
original act of disclosure when he wrote that "most.
of the evidence suggests that the true cause is a vul-
gar bureaucratic row aimed at getting the President's
chief assistant for national security affairs, Henry
Kissinger:" . '
Only. five of the many documents that Anderson
says he garnered in his December haul and later are
alluded to here. Four of them are official and verbatim:
accounts of meetings of.' the Washington Special
Action Group, the action arm of the National Security
Council, on December 3, 4 and 6. The fifth document
it the parapApp abFDraRekbaSfer2IIeQ O4
can Senator Kenneth Keating, the US ambassador in
New Delhi, sent the State Department on December 8.
I deduce from Anderson's cautious account of how he
obtained the documents that the WSAG texts came
from a single source who first offered him a dozen or
so classified items and subsequently, under pressure
from the columnist, let him take his pick from "a STATIN'
whole massive file of documents." Anderson says that
the stuff. came from "plural" sources and implies that
their rank is such that public identification of them
would embarrass the Nixon administration. The nature
and variety of the documents on which Anderson has
drawn in successive columns indicate that this is true
of the total haul. The WSAG texts are special. Their
content suggests to me, as it did to Joe Kraft, that the
official who gave them to Anderson was shooting at
Henry Kissinger and only incidentally, if at all, at the
Indo-Pakistan and perhaps other policies with which
Kissinger is associated. It is this official whom I take
to be a high-ranking rat.
Kissinger'
issinger brought the publication of three of the
four WSAG texts, and extensive printed quotations
from the fourth, upon himself with his remark that
,previous references to him in Anderson columns were
"out of context." Anderson, angered, gave the texts to
The Washington Post, The New York Times and sev-
eral other newspapers in order to prove that his Kis-
singer references were accurate understatements. The
texts are fascinating documents. They illumine a part
A the Nixon-Kissinger policy operation as it has never
before -been exposed. But it. is important to distinguish
between the parts of the policy process that the WSAG
texts do and do not illumine. They do not, as one com-
mentator thought they did, show how "the decisional
process" actually works. The Special Action Group
deals with policy after it has been laid down. Kissin-
ger's job when he functions as WSAG chairman is to
see that the military services, State, Defense, CIA and
other agencies involved in foreign policy understand
exactly what the President has decided and implement
the decided policy exactly as he wants it to be imple-
mented. The Anderson texts show that Kissinger per-
forms this task with a certitude, an arrogance, a dis-
play of proxied presidential authority that smothers
any tendency toward dissent that there may be in the
WSAG forum. A reader may gather from the published
texts that Kissinger dominates subordinate NSC bodies
where preliminary policy options are discussed in the
same way with the same effect. But the WSAG texts do
not prove that this is.-the case. They make it difficult
but not impossible to believe, as I have been told at the
White House and elsewhere for three years, that Kis-
singer in these formative sessions and in the course of
directing preliminary policy studies for the NSC and
:f ClA RDP d6nb i Wo0` 1cY81b&ob eoands a
 Wks,1IINGTON POST. STATINTL
Approved For Release 200'YQ3(J1:1O7 -RDP80-01601
The Washington Herry-Go-Rou>tnd
ixon to omy. via'
.N 'con
By'
Jack
Anderson
. President Nixon has called
an abrupt halt to military cut-
backs and will grant the
of the next budget. I big Soviet warheads. For this' his friends. (.'roxmire Room." Hurt, how-.
He has-decided to us~~i]! ?divvedc uer,Releasea 2:Q 0t l/0t4ni G#A-RDRW ,160$RQ&IZN399001 finder what
In the leaked report on the Special do not authorize sales to the ultimate the Government now will do to tighten
Actiori'Group's White House meeting on recipient, such as Pakistan." protection of its secrets. LEND]
 Approved For Re ease M in1A'~3~/W 6rk-kbP80-0160
i n JAN ?1972
? STATINTL
o-Washington Whispers
Administration officials are more con-
cerned over publication of the so-
called Anderson papers detailing secret
National Security Council meetings
on the Indian-Pakistani war than they
were about the Pentagon papers on
Vietnam. Says one: "The leak to Jack
Anderson, the syndicated columnist,
came from the 'inner sanctum' of the
Administration. If you can't trust the
people in the White House Situation
Room, who can you trust?"
Chou En-lai startled American offi-
cials with the tough demands the
Chinese Communists intend to present
to President Nixon during his Peking
visit next month. The Reds want the
U. S. to cancel its 1954 security treaty
with Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan and
to announce publicly that the island
is an integral part of mainland China.
Aides say Mr. Nixon has no intention
of going a fraction of that distance.
The 10-year-old Berlin Wall and other
massive barriers have failed to dam
the flow of escapes from Communist
East Germany. In the past 12 months,
nearly 17,000 East Germans made it
safely to the West.
Approved For Release 2001103/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8
 j~QS A,rGyLES TIMES
Approved For Release 2( 0q I O C1A-RDP80-0160
STATINTL
SECRET U.S. DOCUMENTS
India Aim Seen to Cru~~ ~akdstan
Exclusive to The Time: from against Indian out of per- secretary of state for -Near
the' Chicago Sun?Time$
sonal pique or to protect Eastern affairs.
WASHINGTON -- CIA relations with China, Kis- S i s c o reportedly said
Director Richard Helms . 'I has been putting that "if the situation were
er
not want to be even-hand-
ed. The President believes
that India. is the attacker.
We are trying to get across
the idea that India has
jeopardized relations with
told the White-House that smb
India did not intend. to out word that the CI A of- ' to evolve as Dr. Kissinger' the United States."
stop fighting with Pakis- fered "conclusive proof" of had indicated, then, of The day b e f o re .t h e
tan until Pakistani air and an Indian intention to de- course, there was a serious WSAG meeting was held,
armored defenses were de- molish Pakistani defenses risk . to the viability of Kissinger told reporters at
stroyed, a new set of An- and dismember Pakistan. West Pakistan. a b a c k g r o under that
derson papers revealed. The Anderson document Expressed Doubt' "there have been some
Presidential a d v is e r says Helms told the Mr. Sisco doubted, comments that the Admin-
tion is anti Indian.
Henry A. Kissinger re- WSAG, "It is reported that however, that the Indians istrstraa is isy inaccurate." This
sponded that "elimination prior to terminating pre- had this as their objective. discussed
ed
of Pak armored and air sent hostilities, Mrs. Ghan- He indicated that Foreign The possible ways, WSAG in discss
forces would make the di (Indira Ghandi, Indian Minister (Swaran) Singh psi le ways, "turn the
screw" words,
Paks defenseless. It would prime minister) intends to t o 1 d ambassador (Ken- ger's
in the situation,
turn Western Pakistan attempt to eliminate Pa- neth) Keating that India apparently
vassal." force capabilities." any Pak territory. none.
The newest set of secret Threat to Kashmir "Mr. Sisco said it must There is no mention in
documents released by col- Kissinger and H e I m s also be kept in mind that the document of the plan
um n i s t Jack Anderson agreed that India intended Kashmir is really disputed that. Kissinger now says
tend . to support current to seize Azad Kashmir, the territory. - was successful-a forceful
claims by Kissinger that, portion of the disputed After further discussion, message to the Soviet
fear of an Indian assault p
on West Pakistan was the northern territory in Kissinger said that "what T
K a s h m i r in Pakistani we may be witnessing is a Union insisting that Rus-
U.S. policy to ar "tPa" in hands. The documents do situation wherein a coun- sia stop her ally, India,
tan policy toward Pcin not make f u l l y c l e a r try.(India), equipped and from attacking West Pa-
eluded in war. the recently con whether it was thought supported by the Soviets, kistan.
lu the Indians were intent on may be turning half of Pa- According to the doc-
First Indication still further "dismember- kistan into an impotent T h .e latest document, ment" of Pakistan.
state and the other half ' unfents, it was King Hus-
minutes of a meeting of Kissinger said that "if into a vassal. We must sein of Jordan who initiat-
the Washington Special the Indians smash the Pak consider what other coup- ed an offer to provide
Action Group on Dec. 8, is air force and the armored tries may be thinking of, eight U.$. built jet fight-
the first of the Anderson forces we would have a de- our action." ens to Pakistan, another
papers to give any indica- liberate Indian attempt to Kissinger said that "we Muslim country. Previous
tion oI U.S. motives dur- force the disintegration of are not trying to be even installments of the Ander-
ing the crisis. Pakistan." handed. There can be no ? son papers implied that
Amid speculation that A dissent was registered doubt what the President the United States had
President Nixon a c t e d by Jospeh Sisco, assistant wants. The President does - thought up the plan.
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 UW XORK TIMES
Approved For Release 2db5lAW1~2CIA-RDP80 STATINTL
R
on' IndianPakistafl War
Text of Memo.
gram to which Mr. Williams
d
k
WASHINGTON, Jan. 14-
'Following is the text of a
memorandum on a meeting
of a National Security Coun-
cil committee on Indian.
Pakistani hostilities, made
public today by the columnist
Jack Anderson:
SECRET/SENSITIVE
THE JOINT STAFF
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
?8 DECEMBER 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR
RECORD
SUBJECT: Washington Spe-
cial Action Group meeting on
Indo - Pakistan hostilities; 8
December 1971
1. The N.S.C. Washington
Special Action Group met in
the Situation Room, the White
House, at 1100, Wednesday,
8-December to consider the
Indo-Pakistan situation. The
meeting was chaired by Dr.
Kissinger.
2. ATTENDEES
/ A. PRINCIPALS. Dr. Henry
J Kissenger, Mr. Richard Helms,
C.I.A., Gen. John Ryan, J.C.S.,
Mr. Donald MacDonald,
A.LD., Mr. David Packard; De-
fense, Ambassador U. Alexis
Johnson, State.
B. OTHERS: Mr. Maurice
Williams, A.I.D., Mr. John
Waller, C.I.A., Col. Richard
Kennedy, N.S.C., Air. Samuel
Iloskanson, N.S.C., Mr. Harold
Saunders, N.S.C., Mr. Armi-
stead Selden, Defense, Mr.
James Noyes, Defense, Mr.
Christopher Van Hollen, State,
Mr. Samuel De Palma, State,
Mr. Bruce Laingen, State, Mr.
David Schneider, State, Mr.
Joseph Sisco, State, Rear Adm.
Robert Welander, O.J.C.S.,
Capt., Howard Kay, O.J.C.S.
Group 4 downgraded at 3-
year intervals; declassified
after 12 years.
.3. Summary. Dr. Kissinger
suggested that India might be
attempting, through calculat-
ed destruction of Pak armored
and aic forces to render Pak-
istan impotent. He requested
that the Jordanian interest in
assisting Pakistan not be
turned off, but rather kept in
it holding pattern. He asked
that Pak capabilities in Kash-
tnir be assessed.
4. Mr. Helms opened the
meeting by briefing the cur-
rent situation. In the East,
the Indians have broken the
line at Comilla. Only major
river crossings prevent them
from investing~vd
Indians are add c ng rapid-
ly throughout East Pakistan.
All major Pak L.O.C.'s in the
Associated Press
East are now vulnerable. In
the West, the Paks are now
claiming Punch, inside the
Indian border. However, the.
Paks are admitting fairly
heavy casualties in the fight-
ing. Tank battles are appar-
ently taking place in the
Sind/Raiasthan area. Mrs.
Gandhi has indicated that be-
fore heeding a U.N. call for
cease-fire, she intends to
straighten out the southern
border of Azad Kashmir. It is
reported that prior to termi-
nating present hostilities,
Mrs. Gandhi intends to at-
tempt to eliminate Pakistan's
armor and air force capabil-
ities. Thus far only India and
Bhutan have recognized Ban-
gladesh. It is believed that
the Soviets have held off rec-
ognition primarily so as not
to rupture relations with the
Paks. Soviet action on the
matter of recognition, how-
ever, may be forthcoming in
the near future.
5. A4r. Sisco inquired how
long the Paks might be ex-
pected to hold out in East
Pakistan, to which Mr. Helms
ake owners
p,
e
7. Dr. kisstnger as
how long it would take to responded that nothing was
shift Indian forces from East under negotiation at the
t time
sen
.
to West. General Ryan said pre
it might take a reasonably 13. Dr. Kissinger inquired
long time to move all the, about next year's [A.LD.]
forces, but that 'the airborne budget. AIr. Williams stated
brigade could be moved that what goes into the
quickly, probably within a budget did not represent a
matter of five or six days. commitment. Dr. Kissinger
8. Dr. Kissinger inquired stated that current orders
about refugee aid. After a are not to put anything into
discussion with Mr. Williams the budget for A.I.D. to
it was determined that only India. It was not to be
a very small number of U.S. leaked that A.I.D. had put
dollars earmarked for ref- money in the budget for
ugee relief was actually India, only to have the
entering the Indian economy. wicked" White House take
Contrary to the sense of the it out.
14. Dr. Kissinger suggested
last meeting, toest Indians foreign n that the key issue if the
have actually Indians turn on West Pakis-
exch exchange in n the process of tan is Azad Kashmir. If the
event, the entirrefugees. I any Indians smash the Pak air
fort e. relief e susnended force and the armored forces
In is c India and Pakistan. we would have a deliberate
in both t then Indian attempt to force the
9. zed Kissinger thhen em- disintegration of Pakistan.
phasied that the President The elimination of-the . Pak
has made it clear that no armored and air forces
further foreign exchange, would make the Paks de-
velo
-480 p ? ment l oans coul ld or be de- fenseless. It would turn West
signed to Indcould as. Pakistan into a client state.
signed of India the a Witwitho ut se. The possibility elicits a num-
proval of Witte House. ter of questions. Can we al-
Mr. Williams stated there
low a U.S. ally to go down
was no nroblem of anything completely while we partic.
ah. sliding throe ssi ipate in a blockade? Can we Dr. 10. the next tur iofth the allow the Indians to scare
what i next turn of the us off, believing that if U.S.
screw m might be. Mr. Williams supplies are needed they will
said that the only other pos-
sible option was taking a po-
sition concerning aid material
currently . under contract.
This h' v; ever would be a
very messy problem inas-
much as we would be dealing
with irrevocable letters of
credit. Mr. Williams further
stated that we would have to
take possession of material
that was being consigned to
the Indians by U.S. contrac-
tors and thus would be com-
pelled to pay U.S. suppliers,
resulting in claims against
the U.S.G.
11. Mr. Packard said that
all of this could be done, but
agreed that it would be a
very laborious and difficult
problem. He further elaborat-
ed that all the items involved
would have to be located, the
United States would have to
t
settle with
hi
It the situation were to
evolve as Dr. Kissinger had
indicated then, of course,
there was a serious risk to
the viability of West Paki-
stan. Mr. Sisco doubted, how-
ever, that the Indians had
this as their objective. He
indicated that Foreign Min-
ister Singh told Ambassador
Keating that India had no
intention of taking any Pak
territory. Mr. Sisco said it
must also be kept in mind
that Kashmir is really dis-
puted territory.
16. Mr. Helms then stated
that earlier he had omitted
mentioning that Madame
Gandhi, when referring to
China, expressed the hope
that there would be no Chi-
nese intervention in the
West. She said that the So-
viet had cautioned her tha
time to reach the ultimate
climax is probably a func- etc. Nevertheless, if such was' the Chinese might rattle the
lion of the difficulties en- desired it could be done. Mr. sword in Laddakh but that
Williams said that in a very the Soviets have promisee
countered in river crossings, limited way this type of ac- to take appropriate counter.
6.' Assessing the situation tiori had been taken against action if this should occur.
In the West, General Ryan some Mid-East countries, but Mr. Helms indicated that
indicated that he did not see that it had taken years to there was no Chinese build-
the Indians pushing, too hard settle the claims. up at this time but, never-
N ~e " 4Y&3C0? 'rn ial a dl' i r x 6fl oe' '~u ie8
lion. - year's development. loan pro- ans and rattle the sword.'.
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wept ra t
Undermi
HIGH POLICY differ.
ences are widely supposed
to have prompted the leak
of secret documents on the
Indo-Pakistani crisis to Jack
Anderson. But most of the
evidence suggests that the
true cause is a vulgar bu-
reaucratic row aimed at get-
ting the President's chief as-
sistant for national security
affairs, Henry Kissinger.
The most striking evi-
dence is like the evidence of
the dog that didn't bark in
the Sherlock Holmes story.
The fact is that no enduring
policy issue of high impor-
tance is involved in the
leaks.
The fight over East Ben-
gal is largely a one-shot af=
fair. Hardly anything that
happens on the subcontinent
is' central to international
politics. The United States
had already tipped toward
Pakistan - and practically
everybody knew it-when
the leaks were sprung. At
the time, as some of Dr. Kis-
singer's comments make
plain, the administration
was anticipating a return to
more normal relations with
New. Delhi.
A SECOND BIT of evi-
dence' involves Mr. Ander-
son himself. He is not
deeply versed in foreign af-
,fairs. No one who aimed to
change a line of interna-
tional policy would single
out Mr. Anderson as the
agent for deflecting that re-
sult through the leak of se-
cret information.
Mr. Anderson's specialty-
and it is an important spec-
ialty-is putting the jour-
nalistic arm on wrong-doers.
By no mere accident the
chief fruit of his disclosures
was not something that af-
fected policy. The chief eon-
sequence was to impugn the
integrity of Dr. Kissinger.
As a third bit of evidence
there is the state of rela-
tions among senior officials
and principal agencies of
the foreign affairs commu-
nity in the Nixon adminis-
tration. Washington veter-
ans tell me that to find a fit
counterpart they have to go
back to 1950, and the deadly
you-or-me rivalry between
Dean Acheson
at the State 4010,
and Louis Johnson, who
then'rul'ed the roost at the
g Kissingei
Pentagon. In any case, rela-
tions nowadays are marked
by paranoia, jealousy and
hatred.
The chief target for most
of the venom is Dr. Kissin-
ger, and some of the fault is
his. He has a sharp tongue,
and he has been unnecessar-
ily unkind in comments
about some of the senior of-
ficials of the most pres-
tigous departments.
But most of the resentment
has been caused by what Dr.
Kissinger does in the serv-
ice of the President. The
present administration has
expanded the job of special
assistant for national secu-
rity affairs way beyond what
it was under Walt Rostow
and McGeorge Bundy. Dr.
Kissinger has virtually elim-
inated from the decision-
making business some of the
most high-powered men and
agencies in town.
The office of Secretary of
Defense is perhaps the chief
victim. Secretary of Defense
Melvin Laird is going to be
stepping down soon with
practically nothing to his
credit. Even his claim
(which has at least some
foundation) to be the author
of the policy for getting out
of Vietnam is not widely be-
lieved.
He seems hostile to the
administration's policy on
an arms control agreement,
and he was completely cut
out of plans for the Presi-
dent's visit to China. His
general reputation for trick-
iness has caused the cognos-
centi, rightly or wrongly, to
establish him as the short-
odds favorite for almost all
leaks regarding national se-
curity these days. Indeed,
sonic White House officials
at first believed Mr. Laird
leaked the Pentagon papers.
formed military are in the
habit of leaking classified
information to serve their
own interests.
Not that the State Depart.
ment or other civilian agen-.
cies can be entirely ex-
empted from suspicion
.Except as regards the Near
.East, Dr. Kissinger has
taken over the whole realm
of foreign policy-including
even negotiation with for-
eign officials. This assump.
tion of the State Depart-
.mont's traditional role is bit-
terly resented by many of
the department's leading of-
ficials. Indeed, one of them,
not long ago, voiced the sus-
picion that Dr. Kissinger
spent an extra day on his
last trip to China in order to
embarrass the State De-
partment which was han
ating the United Nations
vote on Chinese admission.
With suspicions at that
level, there is every reason
to figure bureaucractic ri-
valry as the key element in
the background of the An-
derson papers. There is no
case for lionizing, or even
protecting.the sources of the
of the leaks.
On the contrary, for orice
there is a case for a presi-
dential crackdown. Mr. Nix-
on's interest-and that of
the country-is to find the
source of the leaks and fire
them fast.
STATINTL
THE UNIFORMED MILI-
TARY comes a close second
in the odds. Many of them
do not like the way the White
House is winding down the
war in Vietnam. Almost all
are opposed to the arms con-
trol, agreement which the
White House is now negoti-
ating with the Russians.
Some are hostile to the Oki-
nawa reversion agreement
which the White House has-
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in the government, the uni-
 UW YORK TIMES
Approved For Release 200@1/,=0Q72QlA-&8bLT)~16
ouse Too teps to titop Lea Ls
Months Before Anderson Disclosures
!+i T According to one source, Mr.
By ROBERT M. SMITH
Krogh and
Special to The I:ew York Times Mr. Young are
, authorized. to call on the F.B.I.
kWASIJINGTON, Jan. 8-The but hold d the principal re-
columnist Jack Anderson hasls "it is a
been able to disclose secretiponsonsibil Hot se because
problem" and b a
rriemoranda concerning . Na-IW]iite
"it would be inappro-
tional Security Council meet-1priate to send some F.B.I. man
House recently despite Whitojaround to talk with people like
Kruse steps months ago to! the Secretary of State." It is not
prevent leaks ec reporters known whether Mr. Rogers
proceedings. the secrecy of co uncil cil'Ihimself was interviewed.
The article that prompted
According to reliable sources, the move was written by the
the White House quietly orderedPentagon correspondent of The
David R. Young of Henry A. Times, William Beecher. They
'
American proposals had been
made orally at negotiations in
Helsinki but that specific draft
agreements were still being
written in Washington.
According to one Govern-
ment official, the disclosure
came "during a very critical
stage of the negotiations" and
the proposals involved "were
nnt even in any written memo."
He said the Administration's
feeling was that the informa-
tion had to come from someone
present at the discussions of
the National Security Council.
/ Officials at council meetings
include representatives of the
Kissinger
s national secuxityi article reported that American
staff and Egil Krogh Jr. of
negotiators had proposed to
John D. staff hman s domestic , he Soviet Union an arms-con-
advisory staff to investigate the trol agreement that would halt
leaks and to stop them. The ac construction of both land-based
tion was prompted, according missiles and missile submarines.
to Government sources, after er Mr. Beecher also reported that
an article in The New a companion proposal would
j Times July 23 that dealt with allow as many as 300 defensive
the talks on limitation of
strategic arms and caused con-
cern in the White House.
It' is not known specifically
what Mr. Krogh and Mr. Young
have done in the five months
since the security assignment
was added to their duties. They
are reported to have reviewed
the procedures used by the
counCil'and to. have inquired
into the methods used by coun-
missiles in both the United
States and the Soviet Union to
protect offensive missiles.
The article said that the
cil members, such as Secretary
of State William P. Rogers, to
'prepare for meetings and to
handle the council's papers.
F.B.I. Called In
presumably, Mr. Krogh and
Mr. Young have had their task
made more difficult by the dis-
closures by Mr. Anderson. The
Justice Departure-nt has con-
firmed that the Administration
had called on the 'Federal
Bureau of Investigation to in-
vegigate the leaks.
Defense and State Departments,
the intelligence community and
t Chiefs of Staff.
i
n
the Jo
The F.B.I. has conducted an'
extensive investigation over
more than four months in an
effort to uncover Mr. Beecher's
sources. The inquiry has been
Conducted here, elsewhere in
the United States and abroad,
and was still. going on last
week..
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 NEW YORK TIf r"s
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Approved For Release 2001/U84 1 A-RDP80-01601 R
he.
Anderson
now going to Peking and Moscow to
negotiate .a "generation of peace."
Never mind what "third parties"
think. Never mind the human con-
sequences of the massacres In East
Pakistan. Never mind the strategic
implications of losing influence in
India to the Russians. Never mind
doing one thing and saying another.'
:`list do as the President says!
document or understanding? And
WASHINGTON though the Senate is supposed to
ratify such treaties, nobody on Capitol
.'Council's Special Action Group for Hill seems to know about any secret
Dec. 3, 4 and 6, it is hard to get the understanding with India or Pakistan.
,impression that Dr. 'Henry Kissinger Even the President seems to be left
nd other top officials are really in the dark at points under this sys-
la tem. For here is Kissinger, in the Dec.
grappling with the political, strategic
4 meeting, saying that whoever was
and moral problems of the Indo-
Pakistani crisis. Mainly they are being putting out "background" information
'told by Dr. Kissinger, who is obviously on the Indo-Pakistani war was gro-
under pressure from his boss, what voking Presidential wrath. "The
.the President wants done-he wants- President is under the 'illusion,'" Dr.
no even-handed stuff but wants to Kissinge is quoted as saying. "that he
favor Pakistan-and there is a clear is giving instructions; not that he is
suggestion that the bureaucrats are merely being kept apprised of affairs
opposing the President, as they progress. Dr. Kissinger asks
that this should be kept in mind."
"I'm getting hell every half hour Again from the Dec. 4 memo: "Dr.-
'from the President," says Dr. Kis- Kissinger said he did not care how
singer, "that we are not being tough third parties [countries] might react,
enough on India . . . the President is so long as Ambassador Bush under-
blaming me, but you people are in the stands what he should say."
clear." It is an Interesting approach for a
TJ'ti~I n e4sr~eAFn 41 the a~e s ~haUAc t 9~f i eQ18001300390001-8
AMA9along with his friends in Pakistan, would "bring us together"-and Is
and that the official explanations were
'so;inacturate-orincomplete that even
the American Ambassador in New
that they "did not add to our position,
or, more importantly, to American
credibility."
It is the old story, and it has
poisoned American policy and di-
plomacy under both Presidents Johnson
and Nixon for almost a decade, The
issue is "credibility."
Something new seems to have
come over American political life, and
it is not official lying. It is the wide-
WASHINGTON - The Anderson ?pread public tolerance of misleading
Papers on the U. S. Government's official statements, and even a general
handling of the Indo-Pakistani war tendency not to denounce the twisters
.suggest that the Nixon Administration who indulge in this practice but the
has learned very little from the reporters who expose it.
damning disclosures of the Pentagon ' The Johnson and Nixon Administra-
Papers on the Vietnam war. tions have been deceitful, clumsy and
t For Jack Anderson's classified docu- unsuccessful, but even after the Penta-
n-i nts tell much the same story of gun Papers and the Anderson Papers,
damaging decisions arrived at in the reaction seems to be, not that they
secret; of subjective Presidential or- were wrong and deceptive, but that
ders imposed on the objective analysis they were caught.
of the President's own principal ad- It is clear that policy is being
vsers; of official explanations which planned, not in the State Department,
mislead the Congress and the American but in the White House, and that in the
people, and finally of defiant dis- Indo-Pakistani case it was being guided
closures of the true facts by officials primarily by Dr. Kissinger, who is not
who have lost faith In the judgment available for questioning even in
and truthfulness of their superiors. secret by the responsible committees
Every time these official deceptions of the Congress.
are published, the Issue is presented "We need to think about our treaty
to the public as a conflict between obligations," Dr. Kissinger told the
the Government and the press, but National Security Council Special
the issue is much deeper than that. Action Group in the Dec. 3 meeting.
It Is a conflict within the Government "I remember a letter or memo inter-
itself on how to make and present preting our existing treaty with, a
policy in such a way as to retain the special Indian tilt, When I visited
confidence and trust of the civil serv- Pakistan in January, 1562, I was
ice, the Congress, the nation, and the briefed on a secret document or oral
other governments of the world. understanding about contingencies
If you read the official reports on arising in other than a SEATO con-
the meetings of the National Security text . . ."
What does that mean? What secret
Papers
 DAILY WORLD
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By CONRAD KOMOROWSKI
Andrsc'nF p r
The bloodhounds are baying on the tracks of Jack
Anderson, who conducts a weekly news column, The
Washington . Merry-Go-Round, published in 700 news-
papers at home and abroad.
Investigators for the FBI, State Department, De-
partment of Justice and probably other agencies are /
hot on his trail. Rep. F. Edward Hebert (D-La.), V
anti-union, racist chairman of the House Armed Ser-
vices Committee, announced Thursday a subcommittee
will get into the act immediately when Congress
opens on Jan. 18.
Anderson has published in his column excerpts
from the minutes of the Washington Special Action
Group (a subcommittee of the National Security Coun-
cil, abbreviated as WSAG) and other documents and
memoranda meant only for the inner circles of the
Administration. They expose the double-dealing and
lying of the Nixon Administration, particularly in rela-
tion to the Indian-Pakistani conflict. Anderson has also
made some of this material available to the press
generally.
Among the information Anderson disclosed is the
revelation that Nixon's adviser on national security
affairs, Dr. Henry Kissinger, on the one hand pub-
licly told the press that the Administration was
friendly to India and on the other hand told the Wash-
ington Special Action Group behind the screen of of-
ficial secrecy that Nixon "wants to tilt in favor of
Pakistan" and that Nixon believed "we are not being
tough enough on India."
It is quite possible, after the exposure of the gov-
ernmental lying during five Administrations, Democrat-
ic'and Republican. in the Pentagon papers, that some
governmental figures may have begun to think twice
about the questionable "wisdom" - from a pro-
capitalist point of view - of Nixcn's policies in the
Bangla Desh situation and in Asia generally.
The differences in the ruling class and its collabo-
rators on this score are useful to the people.
Besides the facts revealed by Anderson, there is
an important issue involved in his disclosures. That is
the right of the people to know. Anderson has not made
this a major feature of his expose, but it is there any-
-way. It, is also involved in the defense of Dr. Daniel
Ellsberg and Anthony Russo, who are being prosecuted
and persecuted for their part in tearing away the veil
of secrecy in which the searing facts of the conspiracy
which plunged the United States into barbaric aggres-
sion in Indochina had been buried.
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 a;lirt aVi{li I)4?LY ~tG;VS't
8 JAN 197Z
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t~aa~eee sera ',~_.
By FRANK JACKMAN
Washington, Jan. 7-0ne of the local television sta-
tions has been showing old Marx Brothers movies on the
late show this week-possibly as a sort of relief from the
real-life zaniness that abounds here in the capital of the
Free World.
Certainly, Groucho's role in "Horsefeathers" as Prof. Quincy
Adams Wagstaff, president of Mythical Huxley U and head coach
of its woefully inept football team, seems no more nutty than the
Chico to Harpo
To Groucho
.-To Henry?
flap over the so-called Pakistani tilt in
the latest secret papers caper. Nor can
it compare with those early-morning
presidential phone calls to pro football
coaches.
(In fact, President Nixon's pros.
pensity for ringing up Washington's
Redskins coach George Allen with play
suggestions prompted one sportswriter
to remark that the chief executive
actually wasn't interested in running for the presidency again, but
rather was bidding for the opening as head coach of the Chicago
Bears. "If he gets it," the wise guy added, "look for Martha Mitchell
to work the phones.")
. For those of you who may not remember, what plot there Is in
"Horsefeathers" revolves around the theft of Huxley U's secret foot-
ball signals. Of course, any team
whose backfield includes Harpo
Marx riding a horse-drawn. sani-
tation cart certainly doesn't need
any secret plays, right Mr. Prez
-uh, Coach? In the end, Huxley
wins and everybody exits singing.
(In the case of Groucho, ni a k e
that leering.) But what, you ask
in wonderment, does this have to
do with Washington.
Well, substitute secret papers
for s e c r e t signals, fellows and
girls,' and you h a v e a real-life
"Horsefeathers," right down to a
swinging Groucho like professor
(guess who?). -
In the beginning, there was
-columnist Jack Anderson charg-
ing that secret White House and
Pentagon documents in his pos-
session showed there was a sharp
conflict between what the Nixon
administration said in public and
what it said in private during the
-India-Pakistan War. Anderson
said that the President-whose
suggestion of an end-around play
to Coach Allen lost the Redskins
13 crucial yards during their
Harpo Marx
The hero of the white wines
playoff with San Francisco-wanted U.S. Policy to "tilt in favor 0
Pakistan." You may recall that the Paks lost a lot more than 13
yards in their game, so the Nixon coaching record remains Un-
blemished at .000. -
Then Nixon's national security affairs adviser, Henry Kissinger,
while flying out of the Western White House with the chief execu-
tive, did something he swore he wouldn't do again-he briefed the
newsmen on board the plane, "not for attribution." He claimed that
remarks attributed to him by Anderson were taken "out of context."
This prompted Anderson to leak some of the confidential goodie
he had to some of his newspaper clients before they got copies 0
his column, so they could. get a running start on the story.
Is Somebody Going Through the Garbage?
But this, in turn, roused other newspapers, so Anderson had to
release the text of three secret memoranda of meetings of the hush-
hush 'Washington Special Action Group. In the words of the Im-
mortal Kingfish, Anderson, who once was the leakee, thus become
the leaker. And he didn't like it much. Pretty soon, he had to take
his phone off the hook and go into seclusion to get any work done.
Secrets-hungry reporters were calling him from everywhere, badger.
ing his secretary and office staff for new revelations. There were
reports that the FBI was going through his garbage.
Meanwhile, back at the White House, certain high officials were
hinting that maybe the administration wasn't going to look too
closely into who did the leaking because maybe they sort of wanted
this stuff leaked. It would take the likes of the late IIarpo, complete'
with ever-tooting bicycle horn, to figure that one out, friends, so
don't try.
There's No Substitute for Henry K
One thing becomes clear upon closer reading of the top-secret
memos, however, and that is that Central Intelligence Director V,
Richard M. Helms and Kissinger apparently are the only senior
biggies who go to all the meetings they're scheduled to go to. Th
other members of the Washington Special Action Group all sen~
substitutes, even such relatively obscure types as the head of the
Agency for International Development. In Kissing?er's case, it's easy,
to see why he was at all the meetings; after all, it's his club,
Down the Pike From Appomattox
One of the faithful WSAG attendees was the Hon. Armistead
I. :ielden Jr., who now rejoices in the title of principal deputy
assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs. A.
Democratic congressman from Alabama for 16 years, Selden was
involuntarily retired from elective politics in 1968 after lie was
defeated in a bid for his party's Senate nomination. At that time,
his colleagues were predictably effusive in their praise of his service.
"The greatest hour of Robert E. Lee came not when he was com-
manding the great army of the Confederacy, but after he had met
military defeat and surrendered his sword to Grant at Appomattox,"
said the late Rep. George Andrews (D-Ala.).
How right Andrews was proved out a few months later when
Selden took his last congressional junket, a taxpayer-financed tour
of Latin America. Just to make. sure that there would be no com-
munications gap, Selden's office thoughtfully provided a full bean
of pre-dated handouts and statements from the lawmakers for usg
during the first week of the trip. .. .
STATINTL
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 CHICAGAppLoved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601
ITRIBUN'Z
M - 767,793
en agon J. with Kissinger 's remarks dur- I ciet court cited a 1963 decision that
Dgec. a 7. briefing of newsmen on "any system of prior restraint
D
Kissinger held a lengthy and of expression comes to this
unusual briefing on that day court bearing a heavy pre-
detailing what he said were the sumption against. its constitu-
Nixon administration's actions tional validity."
h
regarding the India-Pakistan
conflict.
BY JOHN 1 IACLEAN "Kissinger: I am getting hell administration more than it All the Anderson documents',
[Chicago Tribune Press service] % every half hour from the would me," he said. "It would were marked "secret/sensi-
WASHINGTON, Jan. The resident that we are not be- make a very funny story ." Live," but it is doubted the
Federal Bureau of Investiga- ing tough enough on India. Ile Anderson said his sources for I federal government will take
tecret(memloranda of high-level has just called me again. He the story consider United States any action to stop publication.
White House consultations clur-does not believe we are carry- handling of the Indian-Pakistan The Supreme Court's decision
the India-Pakistan War. mg out his wishes. He wants affairs a "colossal blunder."
last June in the Pentagon Pa-
to tilt in favor of Pakistan. He I Anderson released the docu-
Jack Anderson, whose syndi- feels everything we do comes menu to newsmen with the pers dispute ruled in favor of
rated column Washington newspapers publishing the sc-
out otherwise. 1urging that they compare them I'' t stud The hi~=h
Merry-Go-Round appears in "Dr. Kissinger said that who-
700 newspapers, released the ever was putting out back-
t
text of the secre
papers? ground information relative to
Anderson has been writing I the current situation is pro-
columns from the material ahd I yoking Presidential wrath. The
has concluded "that Presiden- president is under the `illu-
tial braintruster Henry Kiss- ! sion' that he is giving instruc-
inger lied to reporters when he tions; not that he is merely
told then the Nixon adminis-
tration wasn't anti-India."
Why Papers Released
Anderson released the papers
-because Kissinger, President
Nixon's chief adviser on na-
being kept appraised of affairs
as they progress. Dr. Kissinger
asked that this be kept in
mind." -
"Dr. Kissinger said . . . 'it
is quite obvious that the Presi-
tional s e c u r i t y affairs, said dent is not inclined to let the
Anderson "took out of context" Paks be defeated.' "
remarks indicating the admin- "Dr. Kissinger then asked
istration was against India in q whether we have the right to
its recent war with Pakistan. authorize Jordan or Saudi Ara-
The FBI investigation re- I bia to transfer military equip-
portedly has narrowed down ment to Pakistan." [Anderson
to the National Security Coun- said this morning on the tele
cil after checks in the Depart- vision program Today that he
merits of State and Defense, has additional memos which
Spokesman for the W h i t e show that fighter planes were
House, State Department, and l among the things being con-
Pentagon used nearly identical sidered in a scheme to
He disclosed that India had
attacked Pakistan even tho the
STATINTL
United States has informed I A typical exchange ? involved
India that Pakistan was willing 1 Kissinger and Maurice W'il-
to make concessions. Hams, of the State Department
'India a Great Country' staff.,,
"There have been some corn- During the Dec. 6 meeting,
ments that the administration Kissinger asked if there al- I
is anti-Indian," Kissinger said. ready had been a massacre of
"This is totally inaccurate. Bihari people living in East
"India is a great country ... Pakistan. Williams said he ex-
when we have differed with petted there would he killing
India, as we have in recent of these people in reprisal for
weeks, we do so with great their support of West Pakistan.
sadness." ' . "Mr. Williams states that
The memoranda released by perhaps an international hu-
Anderson deal with meetings manitarian effort could be
held before this briefing, the launched on- their behalf. Dr. -
phrases as they declined to ; "sneak" aid to the Pakistanis. last one on the day before the
answer all questions on the A cutoff of military aid to briefing, 'Dec. 6.
subject. The response of Charles Pakistan was ordered early The sessions were attended
Bray, State Department spokes-
man, was typical when he told
reporters: "I won't discuss the
issue." Asked why he wouldn't,
he said, "because I won't."
The documents are minutes
of, three meetings of a special
action group of high level of-
ficials of the National Security
Council.
Some of I iighlights
Excerpted ?tdiirr%yecxIE,
here are some of the high-
lights: _
Iasi. yea"' Chiefs of
"Dr. Kissinger also directed- by heads of the Joint Ci
e
that henceforth we show a cer- Staff, C e n t r :>jg gon
tain coolness to the Indians. Agency, and representatives of
The Indian ambassador is not the Defense and State Depart-
to be treated at too high a I ments.
level." Kissinger was chairman of
From High Sources the meetings, which typically
involved an appraisal of the
Anderson indicated the docu- situation in the India-f akistan
menu came from high sources conflict followed by discussion
within the Nixon administra-
ivoRelease 2001/03/04
"If the. sources were identi.
fied, it would embarrass the
en
The Supreme Court said t
that government had failed
to meet- the "heavy burden"
needed to justify such a move.
Kissinger asked whether we
should be calling attention to',
the plight of these people now.
Ir. Williams said that most of .
these people were centered,
around the rail centers . .
and that some efforts on their
behalf might now well be ;
started thru the United Na-
tions. ,
"Dr. Kissinger suggested that
this be done quickly to prevent
a bloodbath. Mr. Sisco [Joseph
A=1 1 p8U-d'16.61,koost .O(A8 Oi gir sastein af-
90i2tinU;3d
 r.y Xtp
Approved For Release 260 3)W : CIp~~1 IVTp~gpL016
5 I-A
Disturbed Nixon administration officials;
Washington; Jan. 5 (NEWS Bureau) -
admitted today, after a two week intensive manhunt, that they have failed to uncover;
the ' source 'of the most sensational -leak of White House secrets in modern history _;
The secrets, revealing in now ies of cables, orders, (u'ectwes
painful detail the inner debates
and official recommendations. Coun- of the National Security
t
The administration was caught
t ii
o
c
on of
cil's Washington Special Ac
Group at the peak of the Ind o- aflat-footed
leak tn Dect 14 11when the first
Pakistan war, were wrapped
in three long- memoranda for the Anderson about appeared, quot-held
record. White House Silent barely a week treated rquicklyu and
t
Syndicated columnist J a c k
Anderson released texts of the
memos to the press generally to-
day. Ile has been -quoting seg.- 1
has been regarded as
of tl Ill occasional I the case
meets o pem
ti ative" affair and
i
i
"
pen
were au
the hunt for the source was be-
gun
id that to date,
ne official sa
n
s
adm
an
weeks
t
f
.
wo
or
columns
The White House, which is di- not a cause for criminal action.
irecting the search for the leak, There were 11 officials at the
refu.ed comment on the case. but first meeting and 19 at each of
ii,, private officials expressed die next two. Henry liissiuger,
#?: aye concern that sensptn e I
?r. irfe niation distri- foreign affairs adviser to the
k
now
bated only on a "need to
b:c"i~ could become public so
Swill lly.
There was no denial of the
authenticity of the documents.
Anderson, amused at, the ad-
ministration's discomfort, said
the papers Caine from high
sources, and added, "If the
sources were identified, it would
embarrass the administration
.more than it would me."
meetings, and Central Intelli-
gence Agency Director' Richard
Helms was present at all of them,
but representatives from tip c.
State Department and the Pen-
tagon varied.
Y
FBI Makes Check
- , An official close to the nman-
1'tunt denied that a "high source."
was involved with the leak but
would not amplify the statenment.
The FBI, asked to assist the
search, has made a cursory check
but because of the, small number
of top level officials who were
present at the Special Action
Group meetings, has not launched
,in intensive investigation ' vet.
The case is considered of vastly
greater importance than that of
Daniel Ellsberg and the Pentagot;
_papers, because it is undeniable
evidence that someone with - a
pipeline to innermost [`"bite
Rouse. consultations has other
than the interests of Presidents
`Nixon at heart.
( However; because of the nature
of the documents, and despite:
-their super - sensitivity, it was
'suggested by some officials that
the individual concerned probably
would not be prosecuted, but
merely fired, if his identity be-
came known.
The memos were records of
notes of the Special A c t i o n
Group meetings on Dec. 3, 4 and
6, not official transcripts. While
the papers were stamped "secret
'sensitive," they (lid not include,
as did the Pentagon papers, cop-.
STATINTL
- Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8
 M YORK T 9 STATINTL
Approved For Release 2CPJ$/Q4z: CIA-RDP80-016
u.Z): iiscussions of Indian-Pakistani Wa.
`texts of secret Documents on "lop-Leve
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Jan. 5-Following ai a the texts of three secret
documents made public today by the columnist Jack Anderson describ-
ing meetings of the National Security C'ouncil's Washington Special
,Action, Group on the crisis between India and Pakistan:
M on Dec 3 Meeting
emo.
Secret Sensitive
:'ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
{ WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
Refer to: 1-29643/71
,International Security Affairs
;Memorandum for Record
SUBJECT
WSAG meeting on India/Pakistan
rparticipants.
`Assistant. to the President for national
security affairs-Henry A. Kissinger
'Under Secretary. of State-John N.
Irwin
Deputy Secretary of Defense-David
Packard
Director, Central Intelligence Agency-
Richard M. Helms
Deputy Administrator (A.I.D.)-Maurice
J. Williams
'Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff- Adm.
Thomas H. Moorer
Assistant Secretary of State (N.E.E.A.R.)
-Joseph J. Sisco
Assistant Secretary of Defense (I.S.A.)
=G. Warren Nutter
Assistant Secretary of State (I.0.)-
Samuel De Palma
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense (I.S.A.)-Armistead I. Selden
Jr.
,Assistant Administrator (A.I.D/N.E.S.A.)
-Donald G. MacDonald
TIME AND PLACE
3 December 1971, 1100 hours, Situa-
tion Room, White House.
SUMMARY
Reviewed conflicting reports about
major -actions in the west wing. C.I.A.
1 agreed to produce map showing areas
.of East Pakistan occupied by India.
.The President orders hold on issuance
of additional irrevocable letters of
credit involving $99-million, and a hold
ton. further action implementing the $7-
'million P.L. 480 credit.. Convening of
Security Council meeting planned con-
.tingent on discussion with Pak Ambas-
,.sador this afternoon plus further clari-
I f t of situation in West
tea lon o actual
SISCO: We will have a recommenda-
tion for you this afternoon, after the
meeting with the Ambassador. In order
to give the Ambassador time to wire
,home, we could tentatively plan to con-
vene the Security Council tomorrow.
KISSINGER: We have to take action.
The President is blaming me, but you
people are in the clear.
SISCO: That's ideal!
KISSINGER: The earlier draft for
Bush is too even-handed.
SISCO: To recapitulate, after we have
seen the Pak Ambassador, the Secretary
will report to you. We will update the
draft speech for Bush.
KISSINGER: We can say we favor
political accommodation but the real job
of the Security Council is to prevent
military action.
SISCO: We have never had a reply
either from Kosygin or Mrs. Gandhi.
WILLIAMS: Are we to take economic
steps with Pakistan also?
KISSINGER: Wait until I talk with
the President. He hasn't addressed this
problem in connection with Pakistan
yet.
SISCO: If we act on the Indian side,
we can say we are keeping the Pakistan
situation "under review."
KISSINGER: It's hard to tilt toward
Pakistan if we have to match every
Indian step with a Pakistan step. If you
wait until Monday, I can get a Presiden-
tial decision.
PACKARD: It should be easy for us
to inform the banks involved to defer
action inasmuch as we are so- near
the weekend.
KISSINGER: We need a WSAG in the
morning. We need to think about our
treaty obligations. I remember a letter
or memo interpreting our existing
treaty with a special India tilt. When I
visited Pakistan in January, 1962, I was
briefed on a secret document or oral
understanding about contingencies aris-
ing in other than the SEATO context.
Perhaps it was a Presidential letter.
This was a special interpretation of the
March, 1959, bilateral agreement.
Prepared by:
/S/ initials
JAMES M. NOYES
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Near
Asian Af-.
in view of conditions on the
pended Eastern, African and South
Pakistan. Kissinger asked for clarifica- subcontinent. The next issue is the U.N. fairs
ton of secret special interpretation of IRWIN: The Secretary is calling in the
=March, 1959, bilateral U. S. agreement Pak Ambassador this afternoon, and the Approved:
e signature)
g
with Pakistan. Secretary leans toward making a U.S. For
G. KISSINGER: I am getting hell every move in the U.N. soon. F Warren Nutter Assistant onal
half-hour from the President that we KISSINGER: The President is in favor retary of Denfense for International
are not being tough enough on India. of this as soon as we have some con- Security Affairs
'He has just called me again. He does firmation of this large-scale new action. Distribution: S , DASD: NEASA
not believe we are carrying out his If the U.N. can't operate in this kind of ASD(ISA), PDASD(IS (ISA) DASD:
wishes. He w o, a a be till lit,~o , l~ ~?,~'; Q 0 6` -8
Pakistan. He e s everyt Ing to an end an it is use ess to t Ink o
comes. out otherwise. - U.N. guarantees in the Middle East.
Q~lit iit: t7 i2
tion in the west wing, there are con-
flicting reports from both sides and the
only common ground is the Pak attacks
on the Amritsar, Pathankot and Srina-
gar airports. The Paks say the Indians
are attacking all along the border; but
the Indian officials say this is a lie.
In the east wing the action is becoming
larger and the Paks claim there are
now seven separate fronts involved.
KISSINGER: Are the Indians seizing
territory?
HELMS: Yes; small bits of territory,
definitely.
SISCO: It would help if you could
`provide a map with a shading of. the
areas occupied by India. What is hap-
pening in the West-is a full-scale at-
tack likely?
MOORER: The present pattern is puz-
zling in that the Paks have only struck
at three small airfields which do not
house significant 'numbers of Indian
combat aircraft.
HELMS: Mrs. Gandhi's speech at 1:30
may well announce recognition of
Bangladesh.
MOORER: The Pak attack is not
credible. It has been made during late
afternoon, which doesn't make sense.
We do not seem to have sufficient facts
on this yet.
KISSINGER: Is it possible that the
Indians attacked first and the Paks sim-
ply (lid what they could before dark
in response?
MOORER: This is certainly possible.
KISSINGER: The President wants no
more irrevocable letters of credit issued
under the $99-million credit. He wants
the $72-million P.L. 480 credit also held.
WILLIAMS: Word will soon get
around when we -do this. Does the
President understand that?
KISSINGER: That is his order, but I
will check with the President again. If
our whole economic program and that
the granting of fresh aid is being sus-
STATINTL
 NEW YORK TIMES STATINTL
Approved For Release 62MIl/d3704 : CIA-RDP80-0160
US, ENVOY IN INDIA
DISPUTED POLICIES
BAChI~GPP,KISTAN'
Keating Said Explanation of
Nixon's Stand Was Hurting
Americans' Credibility
FACTS ALSO QUESTIONED
Ambassador's Cable Bared
by Columnist, Who Also
Replies to Kissinger
The documents provide an'
unusual look into the thinking
and actions of Mr. Nixon and
his advisers on nationaa se-
curity affairs at the start of
the crisis,. which eventually led
to the Indian capture of East
Pakistan and the establishment
of , a breakaway state there white noise on Dec.
under the name Bangladesh. forth the Administration's just _j Operations, came close by say
Because the White House Se- fication for its policy. ing it would take one to two
curity Action Group, known That briefing also became a I weeks, but there is no sign yet
here as WSAG, did not have a source of contention between that he was correct in predict-
14r. Kissinger and Mr. Antler- ing that the Russians would
formal structure, the language ush for ermanent use of a
p p
t'
said tn
t
Ki
i
o
es
ss
t r.
of Mr. Kissinger and the other' son. In
the United States was not base at Visag, on India's east
participants was often looser,,! "anti-Indian" but was opposed coast.
more piquant and franker than to India's recent actions. Mr. I Often Mr. Helms simply read
that. in public statements by Anderson, seizing on the denial, rival claims by Pakistan and
rove that the Ad- India, without making any
ht to
p
sou
Mr. Kissinger and other Admin?, istration spokesmen at the ministration was "anti-Indian," judgment on, their accuracy-1
and therefore lying. indicating that the United
f States had no independent in
time. R
li
e
e
On Dec. 3, the day that full-' Dispute over formation.
scale fighting broke out, Mr. In his briefing Mr. Kissinger Fears for West Pakistan
a
Kissinger told the white Houser the United things,
allocated! By Dec. 6, when it was clear
strategy session, according toll
to avert famine ins that the Indians would win in
one document: East Pakistan at India's "spe-1 East Pakistan. Mr. Sisco said
IF
'
"I am getting hell every half-
By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Jan. 5-Ken-
neth B. Keating, United States
Ambassador to India, com-
plained in a secret cablegram to
Pakistani war that the Nixon wants to tilt in favor o a `-'settlement on grounds such an !can intelligence community
Administration's justification for 'tan. He feels everything we do effort might serve to bail out".ihad reason to believe that
its pro-Pakistan-politydetracted comes out otherwise." Gen. Agha Mohammad Yahya,'there were forces in India
The group included John N.! Khan, then President of Paki-, pushing for total victory but
from American credibility and Irwin, under secreta of state' y~tan, who was displaced after: that under pressure from the
was inconsistent with his know)- Richard Helms, Director of1`he loss of East Pakistan. United States the Soviet Union
edge of events. The Ambassador noted that' convinced India to order a
The secret message to the Central Intelligence, and Adm. the briefing said that the Indian' cease-fire once East Pakistan
made Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman. Ambassador in Washington, L.1 surrendered.
State Department was of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 'K. Jha, was informed on Nov.! This version of events has
available 6. "The New York The next day, Dec. 4, the l9 that the United Sttates and! been officially denied by New
Times at its request by the syn- United States called for a meet- Pakistan were prepared to dis I Delhi, which said it had no
dicated columnist Jack Ander- ing of the United Nations Sc- cuss a precise schedule for PO-I plans to invade West Pakistan.
son, who says he has received curity Council to discuss the,litical autonomy in East Paki-' But in documents made
olublic by
war and to press India for a stan but that India had Sabo the p by
from,'un"identifled United States`ed the efforts by starting the! Mr. Anderson there seemed
Government informants "scores" sistant Secretary of state for war. considerable confusion in the
of highly, classified documents Near Eastern and South Asian "The only message I have on Administration. At one point
relating 'to the conflict last Affairs, told newsmen that the record of this conversation Mr. Kissinger said that Mr.
month. United States believed that makes no reference to this crit- :Nixon might want to honor
India bore "the major respon- ical fact," Mr. Keating said. )any requests from Pakistan for
Today Mr. Anderson-assert sibility" for the fighting. Mr. Kissinger said at the 1 American arias - despite an
ing-that he was irked by a coin The decision by the Adminis. briefing, that when Prime Min- I American embargo on arms to
metit from Henry A. Kissinger,ltration to attach blame to India istcr Indira Ghandi was in I India or Pakistan.
President Nixon's adviser onicame as something of a surprise Washington in early November, it was decided at the Dec. 6
national security disputing the in Washington since most dip-"we adreason to believe session to look into the possi-.
lomats and officials had ex military action was that bility of shipping arms quietly
accuracy of some of his recentpected a more neutral stance. unminent and that we did not to Pakistan. But the State De-
Folumns-released the Defense, shave time to begin to work on partment said today that no
,ii-jEpartment s record of threeI Disagreed With 'Tilt'' la peaceful resolution." action was taken.
top level White House strategy Critics of the Administratloni "With vast and voluminous Carrier Sent to 1160111
such as Senator Edward M.,efforts of intelligence commu-
.kthe twossians -week held at war. the start of (Kennedy, Democrat of Massa ,pity, reporting from both Delhi "It quite obvious that the t
chusetts, and Senator Frank and islamabad, and my own President is not inclined to let
`Secret Sensitive' Reports Church, Democrat of Idaho, had decisions in Washington, I do the Pales be defeated,"
are.
The reports of the meetings been complaining about ibir.:not understand statement that Kissinger said, apparently
s failure to criticize Paki-'Washington was not given the ferring to the possibility of the
s tan for her bloody represscion'slightest inkling that any mill loss of West Pakistan.
of fled " Dec. 3, 4 secret and 6, sensitive." were A classilow- Nixon's `-of the East Pakistani autonomy Lary operation was in any way Later on in the crisis the
key, investigation is underway movement and the arrest of its imminent,'" Mr. Keating re- United states sent the nuclear-
to, ascertain who leaked the leader, Sheik Mujibur Rhaman. sponded. He said that on Nov. Powered aircaft carrier Enter-
documents to Mr. Anderson. He Mr. Anderson has indicated 12 he sent a cable "stating prise into the Indian ocean, ap-
said arently as a show of force to
s P
today that he was read that the documents in his pas quite
Q -n deter an attack on West Pak-
sag }y r le by o fi specifically that war is
if necessary, ppl'ovedi t3~ ~i6 g X1{11 /04n'TFie PeLiQPdfOffl~l i! time.(
hour from the President that
e
Pakistan. 'Ambassador ' Keating' Gated that intelligence informa-
is also understood to have tion on the situation in South
argued since March, when the. Asia was quite thin, at least
repression began, for a stateI in the early stages.
ment against Pakistan. Mr. Helms and the Joint
Mr. Keating' cable, dated Mr. of Staff-while agreeing
Dec. 8, was in response to the) that India would win in East
United States Information Pakistan - disagreed on the
Agency's account of a briefing
t the time it would take. Adm. Elmo
a
from a political point o
cific request." I that
Mr. Keating said that his;. view our efforts would have to
directed at keeping the In-
recollection from a conversa-lib
we are not vemg wugn enuu};n! tion withtion with Foreign Min-Indians from extinguishing west
on India. He has just called me lister Swaran Singh was that `IPakistan." _-
Ig out his wishes. He Irelief program started in East:lNixon said in an interview in
ribr to a nnlitlcalITime magazine that: the Ameri-
P
ki
t
an p
a
s
the Government. [Details on Administrations tit Page, .,," d House strategy:sessionsindi CAlatlniled
 WASHINGTON EDS2
Approved For Release 2001/03 04 ? IA- 01 R
House Committee Will Probe
Classification of Documents
By Sanford J. Ungar memoranda describing meet-
,~CI;UTA
ings Ur VIe IN UUIUU
T_ ^- Specie
I;yep. F. Edward Hebert . (D-. Council's Washington
Action Group
Armed Services Committee, The sources stressed that
yesterday announced "a mayor the memoranda,,prepared for
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
inquiry into the problem of for G. Warren Nutter, assist-
proper classification and han- ant secretary of defense for
sling of government informa- international security affairs,
Lion involving the national se- had been circulated only
"
'
.
within the Pentagon.
eurity.
He said it was "a-- coinci- to be more progressive and ment, as in the case of the
They said they were espe- minded." Pentagon papers.
dente" that. the investigation dally surprised by the leak of peace- The New York Times said
ne
f
l
t
e, o
emen
would come on the heels o
the memoranda, because it' In San C
the release by syndicated col- it would publish the docu-
umnist Jack Anderson of se- would be relatively easy to Japanese diplomat in the ments in today's editions.
trace their limited distribu- Sato party told Washington; Responding to Anderson's
Bret government documents tion. Post reporter Stanley Karnow suggestion Tuesday that the
concerning American policy in I
. Other government officials, that it was ?alarming' tojsecret documents and others
th' Indo-Pakistani war
Nonetheless, the disclosure however, pointed their fingers learn the content of the secret; in his -possession could be
elsewhere. :, American papers. . I made available to Congress as
of Pentagon -j One White House officiali "I must pay my compliments 1 the basis for an investigation
papers the on top- the secret history of Viet and war last summer, and said he suspected that the to the White House," he added, l of American policy toward
State Department was the however. "They ,understand.) India and Pakistan, a high-
now renAnderson's , release afcur to - source of the security breach.; Japanese attitudes very well.";
rent documents, appeared ppe ranking aide for the Senate
"You know that place leaksI The diplomat said he was
,have focused new concern j , orein~n Relations Committee
throughout the government like a sieve," he said, especial-I especially concerned by refer- iI said, "I think that's fine."
,over the troubled security ly in instances that might epees in today's Anderson~I Sen. J. W. Fuibright (D-
make Henry A. Kissinger,; column to growing interest]mittee, !classification system.. Ark.), chairman of the com-
Hebert assigned the new President Nixon's national se-; in Japan in a revision of the was in the Caribbean
1 probe, which will begin curity adviser, look bad. American-Japanese security ,ion vacation and could not be'
shortly after Congress recon At the Pentagon, on the treaty.
breached for comment.
venes Jan. 18, to a subcommit- other hand, attention was di-'; Assistant White House press) Fuibright staff aides. direct-
tee headed by Rep. Lucien vented to the National Secur- secretary Gerald Warren con-lied attention, however, to a,
Nedzi (D-Mich ), a critic of the ity Council. . tinued to refuse comment on !,;report issued by the Foreign+
~
''
the
Pentagon and of administra-1 The Justice Department con-
any of the disclosures in tion policy in Vietnam. tinued to decline comment on', Anderson columns, and Kis-;
In 'a. telephone interview+ the continuing FBI investiga-. singer, who is in San Clemente
last night, Nedzi said that "it tion. with the President, refused to
is not my intent to investigate Anderson continues his bat-1 dscuss them.
16, which said, "The problem!
for Congress in the foreign!
affairs field ... goes beyond;
reducing unnecessary classi-'
i the leak" of documents to An- tie against government secrecy In response to a question fication."
derson. today, switching from the! about Kissinger's earlier com- The report added, "It in-
"What we what to go into] Indo-Pakistani war to secret!, ment to reporters that Ander-. volves finding a way for Con-
t used I t b t t k tain that it
n
er
d
are the general problems of
classification and security,
,how much is required and how
ocumt
s son had taken commen s a ou gress o r- t
N bite House
by President Nixon in prep-, India and Pakistan "out of con- receives the full information;
aration for meetings at Sani text," Warren said, "I am sure necessary for exercising itsj
Clemente with Japanese Prime!, Dr. Kissinger stands by what war and foreign policy pow
it is handled and what kind of Minister Eisaku Sato. he said.... The President is 1 ers, including information
.'new legislation may be neces- I In a column distributed to aware of the matter." which most people would
Anderson said Tuesday thatlagree should be kept secret
sary," Nedzi said. 700 newspapers, including The
He acknowledged, however, Washington Post, Anderson he was releasing the full texts j from potential enemies.
I
that the Anderson documents, discloses the contents of brief- of the three documents to re-1 "It may also involve finding
three of which appeared in ing papers prepared for the fute Kissinger's claim. la way for Congress to share,
full in The Washington Post President. There was a run on Ander-' in determining what informa,
yesterday, would "almost nec- Those papers, Anderson son's Washington office yes-I tion is classified and thus
says indicate that Sato has terday for copies of the secret kept secret from the Ameri-
iessarity" come up during the , been dismayed with American "
;prone. documents which had ap- can people.
policy in the Far East and is peared in The Washington That appeared to be the
t Meanwhile, government in. considering an independent, post. focus of the upcoming inves-
ivestigators pressed their ef. Japanese aproach to China. By day's end, a member of Itigation by the House Armed
!forts to locate the source of Anderson quotes a cable ;tin staff said, 18 news organi-'Services Subcommittee. Nedzi!
from Armin Meyer, U. S-I zations had picked up copies said that it might not be;
Anderson's documents. Ambassador to Japan, which! of the three memoranda and "appropriate" to look into Kis-j
another nine had asked that singer's activities, but saidI
A report circulated yester- said that "whereas heretofore!
day among high-level adminis- anti-Americanism was pretty! they be sent in the mail. the probe would focus on the!
d
tration sources t /~s e~Qg q~ V s Qhandle
tigatiori had A ~ I7fn dsitiali~~j s ~1YRZQ4&r ab -?Y'ithL~s,"T!i60UEE~YFHi]i~9d4rtYl ~lYt.
pointed offices In the Pentag-l tendentious press, develop-i Francisco Chronicle and The, ~pu~ ~_ ?:BC~
on as the probable source oft ments of past few months have?
fostered'seeds of doubt within I Boston Globe all published the
i
d
n
n
a
oriented texts of the memoran
yonrmally American- ommunity." yesterday's editions after they
A?nunr DI CA fnlrl WVachinntnn rprpiver1 them from the
that the Japanese have the Los Angeles Times-Washing-
"Impression that Japan is ton Post News Service.
k war confrontation posture of the documents in news-1
while President's mission to papers throughout the coun?
Peking gives (the U.S. govern- try appeared to obviate the
possibility of any action in
ment) advantage of appearing court by the Justice Depart
 WASHI.Ii.G1O2 P_0S1
Approved For Release 2001IOSId N G' R5T*_&Lb1JJ0
U.So Stance on India
Baffled Diplomats
.By Laurence Stern
Washington Post'Staff Writer
In inid-April last year a.
? s "secret" cable from New
Delhi dropped into the in-
' coming traffic of Secretary
of State William P. Rogers.
"Pakistan is probably fin-
?` fished as a unified state,"
,.said the message from U.S.
`Ambassador Kenneth B.
Keating. "India is clearly
t the predominant actual and
potential power in this area
of ' the world. Bangladesh,
with limited potential and
massive problems, is proba-
-:bly emerging as an inde-
pendent country.
"There is much the
,'United States can do ..."
The classified cable was
the, first attempt by the U.S.
embassy in New Delhi to set
out in comprehensive terms
a policy for meeting the on-
.coming, holocaust in the sub-
continent.
Its substance was to be re-
peated at least a dozen
times, in varying form, as
the pattern of armed con-
frontation between India
and Pakistan hardened into
a full-scale military conflict.
But, as events unfolded,
the Washington view of how
to deal with the threat of
war on the subcontinent
began to diverge ever more
sharply from the course that
was being propounded by
the U.S, officials "on the
ground" in India and East
Bengal.
Initial puzzlement at the
responses of Washington
gave way, among the diplo-
mats in the field, to incre-
dulity and privately ex-
pressed anger at America's
Increasingly isolated posi-
tion on the subcontinent, ex-
cept In West Pakistan.
The only top-ranking
American diplomat in the
region who seemed to be in
phase with the Nixon admin-
istration's evolving policy of
partiality to Pakistan was
Ambassador Joseph S. Far-
land, who heads the U.S.
embassy in the West Paki-
stan capital of Islamabad.
The cardinal points of dis-
agreement bApprav 3d
ington and the officials In
on the magnitude of the kill-
ing were disbelieved at the
time in Washington. The dis-
patches, It was said here,
were considered "alarmist."
choice arises, we should be
the field were anticipated in A petition was circulated
guided by the new power, at the Dacca consulate by
the first Keating cable last
realities in South Asia_
L VL11. V11C was yuCn issue ' with the administra-
which fortunately, in the
of whether the he United ted present lion's policy of silence at the
case, largely paral-
States should forcefully tell lel the moral realities 215 civilian massacres in East
STATINTL
the Bengali majority in East the document, but passed it
the systematic slaughter, Pakistan, as well as to insist starting on the night of one to Islamabad and Wash-
upon the release of Shiekh March 25, of Bengali civil- inbton with appropriate clas-
Mujibur Rahman, the pre- fans by the Pakistani army sification.
eminent political leader of and its local On June 5, Blood returned
paramilitary to the United States. Al-
the Bengali state. forces in the former Prov- though he had been sched-
Keating advised Rogers ince of East Pakistan. uled for another been sch 18-month
that the United States Just how many Bengalis tour In Pakistan after home
should "encourage the GOP were slaughtered in the leave, he never. returned to
(Government of Pakistan) to ensuing eight months is sub- leave,
post. He was eturned to
change its policy of military ject to a wider range of con-
repression ..." as well as to jecture. "I would not serf. the personnel department at
make a clear statement of ously consider any estimate the State Department in
"displeasure at the use of of less than 250.000," said ar Washington.
American arms and mate- American official who The administration chose
riel" in East Bengal. served in Dacca during the not to make an issue of the
Keating also proposed reign of terror, repressive tactics employed
that the United States voice Most Western estimates against the Bengalis, a n d
its concern to Yahya over are in the range of 300.000 particularly Awami League
the fate of the sheikh, who to 500,000. The Bangladesh supporters, on grounds that
was imprisoned in West government puts the toll of the United States would
Pakistan after having been victims at closer to 2 mil- have lost diplomatic lever-
arrested March 25 at his lion. There is no ready way age Wit h Yahya's ? govern-
home in Dacca. to count because of the ab- ment. At the time, the Nixon
Only three months earlier sence of accurate census fig- administration said it was
the sheikh and his Awami ures or. burial markers and pursuing a course of "quiet
League had won 167 of the the speed of decomposition diplomacy" to avert war.
169 seats allotted to East in the warm, loamy and But it'has been acidly ob.
Bengal in the Pakistan Na- bone-scattered soil of East served by U.S. officials in'
tional Assembly. Bengal. the field that "uiet p
diplo-
In addition the m But American eyewit- macy" was widely construed
bassador said an American am nesses and other western in India and Bangladesh to
expression of hope newsmen who were whisked mean American ae uiesence
political early settlemmeen nt a in an out of Dacca at the begin- in one of the bloodiest re-
early
East Bengal would, "if sou- ning of the terror spoke of pressions in recent times of
pled with termination of thousands-of killings in the a largely unarmed civilian
American military supplies first week after Pakistani population by a modern
and suspension of economic troops surged out of their army using American weap-
assistance, have a sobering garrisons. They reported the ons.
effect" on Yahya's govern- chine-gun clatter of ma- Some 10 million Bengalis,
ment. -gun and small-arms about 13 per cent of East
"Moreover," the Keating fire and the sight of flames Bengal's led
f
rising throughout the city as population, flee
cable said, such a course of tudent buildings, Hindu across the borders into the
U.S. action would be consist- students and residential surrounding states of India,
distric ant with the realities of Pak- strongholds of the sheikh's already among the most ov-
istan's deterioration, India's strong easheik on erpopulated and destitute
predominance and of Bang- Awami Ldesggo the
their anion areas of the world.
ladesh's emergence ... were razed . From the standpoint of
The secret message went bitants incinerated or ma- the American diplomat In
on to say it was of question- chine-gunned. the field, the administra-
able value to American in- The civilian slaughters be- tion's assertion of a quiet
terests to "continue to refer came another point of con- and even-handed style of di-
in official communication tention between the admin- plomacy in the subcontinent
and public statements to Istration in Washington and strained credulity with the
ArQ,erica fcialswho
h
she subcontinen[t..~.
the midst of the war.
CtP t !r' A
affair' in this context has be, Archer Blood former
come a code phrase in India U.S. consul-general in
'and Pakistan for acquiesc- Dacca, cabled detailed re-
ence in the military repres- ports on the killings to the
sions." embassy in Pakistan. But
"In short," Keating con- government sources in
eluded, "the United States Washington said the reports
Pakistan and Bangladesh
which probably. cannot be
equally well served.
"Where the necessity for
 wksul zo PQSl
Approved For Release 204141/d47?CIA-Q1DNQ'L6
The "Anderson papers" - secret summaries of to Pakistan, Dr. Kissinger "indicated he would like
e r,enar by tmmnrroW."
4hn r,,,te%.Pakistan; crisis. made public by columnist ; tho ~Anrlersnn naners is not inconsistent with a
Jack Anderson - confirm the starkly anti-India policy dedicated to the principle of national terri-
aspect of American policy and. illuminate its seem- torial integrity. India did invade Pakistan: its viola-
ing cynicism as well. For, although Mr. Nixon in- tion was extremely serious. We continue to believe,
gists the United States acted for "the principle that however, that the best chance of preserving Paki-
any nation has a right to its integrity," nowhere in stan lay in much early, heavy and sustained Ameri-
the Anderson papers is there a single reference to can pressure on President Yahya Khan-such pres-
any purpose except to "tilt toward Pakistan." "I sure was never applied-and that once Pakistan
am getting hell every half hour from the President had dumped 10 million refugees into India, India
that we are not being tough enough on India," , had a provocation and a pretext that probably no
'Henry Kissinger, his leading aide, said at one point. country could have withstood. In those conditions,
"He does not believe we are carrying out his an American tilt toward Pakistan,'in the name of
wishes. Ile wants to tilt in favor of Pakistan." Pakistani integrity, seemed to us at the time-and
Mr. Nixon succeeded, too. For months, the United seems to us even more now, with publication of the
'States had avoided condemning Pakistan for mur- Anderson papers-as a baffling flight into geo-
dering tens of thousands of Bengalis and for ex- political fantasy.
polling millions of others into India. But now, with cw
some Biharis threatened by Bengalis, "Dr. Kissinger Or is it so baffling? Could it not be that Mr.
suggested that Ian international appeal] be done Nixon's endlessly trumpeted invitation to Peking
quickly in order to prevent a bloodbath." Impartial is almost enough to explain the gratuitous fervor
observers had long believed that a political settle- of American support for Islamabad? It is all very
ment required release of the imprisoned Bengali well to talk about respecting the principle of terri-
leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Now, according torial integrity. But it could not have been far from
to a paraphrase by the author of these reports, Dr. the President's mind that if he went to Peking
Kissinger said "we will go along in general terms having just let a client go down the drain, or having
with reference to political accommodation in East seemed to, his position might have been consider-
Pakistan but we will certainly not imply or suggest ably undermined. If this is so, then the long lead-
-any specifics, such as the release of Mujib." time of the Peking trip-seven months from an-
nouncement to scheduled arrival-did in fact put
Advised that Security Council action against In- Mr. Nixon in hock to a Pakistani regime that lie
'dia was unlikely, Dr. Kissinger said, according to otherwise could have treated with the coolness it
'the documents, "Everyone knows how all this will deserved. A similar observation might be made
dome out and everyone knows that India will ulti- about Mr. Nixon's trip to Moscow, although there
irately occupy East Pakistan. We must, therefore, other complicating factors obtain.
make clear our position, table our resolution." Ad- We cannot know for sure. But we know a lot
;ministration statements on the war, its steps on aid more than we did, and for that we can all be grate-
cutoffs: all had to show "tilt." Among the deci- ful to Jack Anderson, who has brought to the pub-,
lions: "Dr. Kissinger also directed that henceforth lie's attention material essential to the public's
,we show a certain coolness to the Indians; the In- understanding. If the Anderson papers do not solve
dian Ambassador is not to be treated at too high a every riddle of American policy in the Indo-Paki-
level." Told that the law prevented transfer of stani crisis, they are an undoubted contribution to
Jordanian, or Saudi Arabian military equipment - the public's right tq know. -:..
Now we are aware that the material. revealed
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8
 _ a is ? i OLN DAIL., '0V Wu
Approved For Release 20814 Id 2 CIA-RDP80-016
--jack Anderson:' A funny story
By TED KNAP
Scripps Howard staff writer
The Justice Department has directed the
`FBI to investigate who leaked highly embar-
rassing classified documents detailing White
House policy meetings on the India-Pakistan
?war to columnist Jack Anderson, administra-
tion sources said today.
A Justice Department spokesman ended sev-
eral days of "no comment" by admitting for
the first time that the matter was "under
investigation."
Earlier reports were that a search for the
source of the leak was being conducted only
within each of the departments which had offi-
cials at the secret meetings. Government
sources said the probe now has moved to a
'higher level with the calling in of the FBI and
,also the Internal Security Division of the Jus-
tice Department, which would handle any pro-
secution.
NO MUZZLE
,press further publication of the Anderson col-
umns, as it did after initial publication of the
Pentagon papers last year. ..
The Washington Post today said Mr. Ander-
son gave it the full texts of three of the secret
documents. The Post, which carries Mr. An-
derson's column, said the three documents
were on the letterhead of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and of Warren G. Nutter, assistant secre-
tary of defense for international security af-
fairs.
The Post quoted Mr. Anderson as saying his
.sources for the papers hold high positions in
STATINTL
left, and Henry Kissin-
ger.
hell every half hour from the President that
we are not being tough enough on India."
Mr. Anderson said the documents disclose
that Dr. Kissinger sought to get around the
ban on U.S. arms shipments to Pakistan by
having them sneaked in thru Jordan or Saudi
Arabia
"Dr. Kissinger asked whether we have the
right to authorize Jordan or Saudi Arabia to
transfer military equipment to Pakistan," =Mr.
Anderson quoted from the Dec. 6 minutes.
"Mr. (Christopher) Van Hollen (State Depart-
ment Asia expert) stated that the United
States cannot permit a third country to trans-
fer arms which we have provided them when
we, ourselves, do not authorize the sale direct
to the ultimate recipient."
,OUT OF CONTEXT' -
-
had been crippled by initial Indian' attacks.
The war was over in two weeks, before any
such shipment was made. Mr. Anderson said
the documents indicate that a final decision
had not been reached.
Mr. Anderson said the President overrode
the advice of State Department senior officials
to appeal to the West Pakistan government to
atop persecuting Bengalis in East Pakistan,
and to remain neutral between West Pakistan
and India. One of those participating in the
secret meetings wrote this report, according to
Mr. Anderson:
Dr. Kissinger said that we are not trying to
be even-handed. The President does not want
to be even-handed. The President believes. that
India is the attacker... .
"Dr: Kissinger said that we cannot afford to
ease India's state of mind. "The Lady' (Mrs.
Indira Gandhi, India's prime minister) is
cold-blooded and tough and will not turn into a
Soviet satellite merely because of pique. We
should not ease her mind. He invited anyone
who objected to this approach to take his case
to the President."
STATE LEAK
Speculation here is that the leak came from
the State Department, which has had its ego
bruised lately by Dr. Kissinger's emergence as:
the dominant foreign policy figure in the ad-'
ministration. Mr. Anderson refused to pinpoint
his source.
The minutes described meetings in early De-
cember of the Special Action Group, com-
prised of State, Defense, CIA, and White',
House officials. The papers were variously
including "secret sensitive." Mr.
lassified
,
c
Cle- Anderson said he has received two calls from
"out "friends" in the government warning that he
11. l1IC. 3VU11- .. 111e1ILG, L.a1u., a.,u.. ------
quoted Mr. Anderson, "it would embarrass the of context" from the documents, but refused to could be indicted.
administration more than it would me. It elaborate. In response, Mr. Anderson told Government officials said that altho classifi-
would make a very funny story." Scripps-Howard newspapers he would make cations were violated, the substance of the re-
Mr. Anderson said the documents show that, the full memoranda available to the public. ports indicates they would not be covered by
contrary to the administration's professions of Mr. Anderson wrote that a cable from Ken- laws against sabotage or espionage.:
strict neutrality, Mr. Nixon sided strongly with neth Keating, U.S. ambassador to India, When several newspapers published excerpts
the military dictatorship in West Pakistan warned that "any action other than rejection of the secret Pentagon papers last year, Atty.
against the world's largest democracy in In- (of the plan to ship planes to Pakistan by way Gen. John Mitchell asked the courts to sur-
dia. of Jordan) would pose enormous further diffi- press further publication. His request was re-
'GETTING HELL' culties in Indo-U.S. relations." jected by the U.S. Supreme Court. Following
the government is prose-
Dr: Henry Kissinger, Mr. Nixon's chief ad- The documents indicated the United States an FBI investigation,
viser on national security, was quoted as say- was considering sending eight F104s via Jor- cuting Daniel Ellsberg for having leaked the
which papers to the press.
Pakistan air force
h
l
,
e
y t
ing in, a Dec. 3 strategy session, "I am getting dan to resupp
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8
 c
WASHING.-TON POSX.
Approved For Release 2001/0 UM 4W1-RB1PAQ4OJ1IB-01
turned over to !he Washing-
ton Post yesterday by Syndi-
cated columnist Jack Ander-
son.
SECRET SENSITIVE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
r >~- '"Refer to: 1-29643/71
DOWNGRADED AT 12
YEARS INTERVALS
(Illegible)
Not Automatically
Declassified
INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
MEMORANDUM FOR
RECORD
SUBJECT: WSAG Meeting
on India/Pakistan
of the secret documents further actioii implementing KISSINGER: Is it possible
a~~inoer: 9 Am. Ue
He'll .~_ 6, ''? 11 1 1
olro t e
Participants: Assistant to
the President for Nation-
al Security Affairs
Henry A. Kissinger
Under Secretary of State-
John N. Irwin
Deputy Secretary of Defense
-David Packard
Director, Central Intelli-
gence Agency-Richard
M. Helms
Deputy Administrator (AID)
Maurice J. Williams II
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff-Admiral Thomas
Moorer
Assistant Secretary of State
(NEA)--Joseph J. Sisco
Assistant Secretary of De-
fense (ISA)-G. Warren
Nutter
Assistant Secretary of State
(10)-Samuel DePalma
Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense
(ISA)-Armistead I. Sel-
ci'en' jr.
AssistAnt Administrator
(AI:DINESA)-Donald G.
MacDonald
Time and Place: 3 December
1971, 1100 hours, Situation
Room. White House.
the $72 million PL 480 cred- that the Indians attacked
it. Convening of. Security first, and the Paks simply
Council meeting planned (lid what they could before
contingent on discussion dark in response?
with Pak Ambassador this MMOORER: This is certain-
afternoon plus further clari- iy pusgible.
fication of actual situation KISSINGER: The Presi-
in Nest Pakistan. Kissinger (T nt wants no more irrevo-
asked for clarification of ;?;;hle letters of credit issued
secret special interpretation :ruler the $99 million credit.
of 'March 1959 bilateral U.S. ' i,, wai-,ts the $72 million
agreement with Pakistan. 1'I. 4;P) credit also held.
KISSINGER: I am getting 11-IMAADIS: Word will
hell every half hour from soon et around when we
the President that we are do rhi, Does the President
not being tough enough on underst and that?
India. He has just called KISSI GER: That is his
me again. He does not be- order, but I will check with
lieve we are carrying out the P r e s i d e n t again. If
his wishes. He wants to tilt asked. ,we _can say we are
in favor of Pakistan. He reviewing our whole eco-
feels everything we do nomic proiram and that the
comes out otherwise. granting of fresh aid is being
IIEL. IS: Concerning the suspended yin view of condi-
reported action in the West tions on 'the Subcontinent.
Wing, there are conflicting The next issue is the UN,
reports from both sides and IRWIN: The Secretary is
the only common ground is calling in the Pak Ambas-
the Pak attacks on the Am- sador this afternoon, an
ritsar. ?Pathankat, and Srin- the Secretary Raps toward
alai- airports. The Paks say making a U.S, move in the
the Indians are attacking all U.N. soon.
along the border: but the KISSINGER: The Presi-
Indian officials says this is dent is in favor of this as
a lie. In the East Wing. the soon as we have some con-
action' is becoming larger firmation of this large-
and the Paks claim there are scale new action. If the
now seven separate fronts U.N. can't operate in this
involved. kind of situation effectively,
KISSINGER: Are the In- its utility has come to an
dams seizing territory? / end and it is useless to
HELMS: Yes: small bits q think of U.N. guarantees in
territory, definitely. the Middle East.
SISCO: It would help if SISCO: We will have a
you could provide a map
with a shading of the areas recommendation for you
occupied by India. What is this afternoon, after the
happening in the West-is a meeting with the Ambassa-
full-scale attack likely? dor. In order to give the
MOORER: The present Ambassador time to wire
pattern is puzzling in that home, we could tentatively
the Pales have only struck at plan to convene the Secu-
three small airfields which rity Council tomorrow.
do not house significant. KISSINGER: We have to
numbers of Indian combat take action. The President
SUMMARY: aircraft is blaming me, but you
Reviewed conflicting re- HELMS: Mrs. Gandhi's people are in the clear,
,pbrts about major action in speech at 1;30 may well an- SISCO: That's ideal!.
the West Wing. CIA agreed nounce recognition of Ban- KISSINGER: The earlier
to' produce map showing gla Desh. draft statement for Bush is
areas of East Pakistan oc- MOOLER: The Pak attack too evenhanded..
cupied by India.' The Presi- is not credible. It has been SISCO: To recapitulate,
dent orders hold on issuance made during late afternoon, after we have seen the Pak
of additional irrevocable which doesn't make sense. Ambassador, the Secretary
KISSINGER: We can say
we favor political accommo-
dation but the real job of
the Security Council is to
prevent military. action.
. SISCO: We have nevar
had a reply either from Ko-
sygin or Mrs. Gandhi.
STATINTI
WILLIAMS: Are e to STATI NTL
take economic steps with
Pakistan also?
KISSINGER: Wait until
I talk. 'with the President.
Ile hasn't addressed this
problem in connection with
Pakistan yet.
SISCO: If we act on the
Indian side, we can say we
are keeping the Pakistan sit-
uation "under review."
KISSINGER: It's hard to
tilt toward Pakistan if we
have to match every Indian
step with a Pakistan step.
If you wait until Monday, I
can get a Presidential de-
cision.
Pt' CKARD: It, should be
easy for us to inform the
banks involved to defer ac-
tion inasmuch as we are so
near the weekend.
KISSINGER: We need a
tVSAG in the morning. We
need to think about our
treaty obligations. I remem-
ber a letter or memo inter-
preting our existing treaty
with a special India tilt.
When I visited Pakistan in
January 1962, I was briefed
on a secret document or oral
understanding about contin-
gencies arising in other than
the SEATO context. Perhaps
it was a Presidential letter.
This was a special interpre-
tation of the March 1959
bilateral agreement.
Prepared by:
/s/initials
James H. Noyes
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Near Eastern, African
and South Asian Affairs
Approved:
Illegible signature
for G. Warren Nutter
Assistant Secretary of De-
fense for International Se-
curity affairs
letters of er dit i , 6 Fibric R tape t2@?dt/03/04aatf eI eF ' 4~e6~fh1`~ 161 R001300390001-8
$99 million, 1P.P
Bush.. t COt2ii::'~~d
 WASHINGTON ILQ&T .
Approved For Release 20b113 1 A-RDP80-016
STATINTL
By Sanford J. Ungar
Syndicated columnist Jack Anderson, in a
major challenge to the secrecy surrounding
U.S. policy in the Indo-Pakistani war, last night
gave The Washington Post the full texts of
three secret documents describing meetings
of the National Security Council's Washington
Special Action Group (WSAG).
The documents indicate that Henry A. Kis-
singer, President Nixon's national security ad-
viser, instructed government agencies to take
a hard line with India in public statements and
private actions during last month's war on the
Indian subcontinent.
Anderson released the documents after Kis
singer told reporters Monday during an air-
borne conversation en route to the Western
White House in San Clemente that the col-
umnist, in stories based on the materials, had
taken "out cf context" remarks indicating that
the administration was against India.
Among the significant statements bearing
on U.S. policy in the documents were the
following:
? "KISSINGER: I am getting hell every half
hour from the President that we are not being
tough enough on India. lie has just called me
again. He does not believe we are carrying out
this wishes. He wants to tilt in favor of Pakis-
tan. He feels everything we do comes out
'otherwise."
? "Dr, Kissinger said that whoever was put-
ting out background information relative to the
current situation is provoking presidential
wrath. The President is under the 'illusion'
that he is giving instructions; not that he is
merely being kept apprised of affairs as they
progress. Dr. Kissinger asked that this be kept
in mind."
? "Dr. Kissinger also directed that hence-
forth we show a certain coolness to the In-
dians; the Indian Ambassador is not to be
treated at too high a level."
%' ? "Dr. Kissinger ... asked whether we-
have the right to authorize Jordan or Saudi
Arabia to transfer military equipment to Pak-
istan. Mr. (Christopher) Van. Hollen (deputy
.assistant secretary of state for South Asian
affairs) stated the United States cannot permit
a third country to transfer arms which we
have provided them when we, ourselves. do
not authorize sale direct to the ultimate re-
cipient, such as Pakistan."
? "Mr. (Joseph) Sisco (assistant secretary of
estate for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs)
suggested that what we are really interested in
are what supplies and equipment could be
dors to India and Pakistan, as'
well as numerous other docu-
ments bearing on American
policy.
He showed this reporter a
briefcase with about 20 file l
folders, each containing some'
of the documents.
Anderson declined to name,
his sources, but suggested that;
they occupy high positions in
the Nixon administration.
"If the sources were identi- j
fied," he said "it would em-
barrass the administration I
more than it would me, It
would make a very funny
story."
Since the controversy last
year over release of the Penta-
1 gon Papers, a top-secret his-
tory of U.S. policy in Vietnam,
Anderson said, his sources had
become more, rather than less,
material.
The texts obtained by The
Post provide substantial de-
tails of the back:-and-forth
at Special Action Group meet-
ings among representatives
l of the White House, State
and Defense departments, Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, Na-
tional Security Couiacil, Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Agency
for International Development.
The three texts are:
? A "memorandum for rec-
ord" about a 1i'SAG meeting in
the Situation Room of the
White House on Dec. 3, by
James H. Noyes, deputy as-
sistant secretary of defense for
STATINTL
r Near Eastern. African and J
South Asian affairs. it was ap-
,proved by G. Warren Nutter, as-
sistant secretary of defense for
international security affairs,
and was printed on iris station-
ery. '
'? A memorandum for the
way by Joint Chiefs of staff, on their
made available, and the modes of delivery of agents. They said the scope of stationery,' concerning a meet-
this equipment. He stated from a political their investigation would be in on Dec. 4, by Navy Capt.
point of view our efforts would have to be narrow because "very few peo- I Howard N. Kay, a JCS staffer.
directed at keeping the Indians from 'extin- pie" have access to minutes of ? Another memorandum by
guishing' West Pakistan." the meetings. Kay on JCS stationery about
? "Mr. Si t ~ jj~ ee~~~~(~ri~ m~id ink _ OR 14 Paks increas P?&"t e?I 3tF~'6cf'~With te"Fort"SN'tTP W-t "fi'rkl`-ti~~iM Q
getting emergency requests from them . . . had copies of cables to Wash-! ings was held on the openingI
pr. Kissinger said that the President may ington.from the U.S. ambassa-J day of full-scale hostilities be-
want to honor those reque'sts:?
The matter has not been
brought to Presidential atten-
tion but it is quite obvious that
the President is. not inclined to
let the Paks be defeated."
After getting the documents
.from Anderson, The Post de-
cided to print the full texts in
today's editions.
Anderson said he would
make the documents avail.
able to other members of the
press today, and he invited
Sen. J. W. Fulbright, chair-
man of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, to use
them as the basis for 'an in-
vestigation of U.S policy in
South Asia.
Fulbright, out of Washing-
ton during the congressional
recess, could not be reached
for comment.
The columnist also suggested
that other members of Con-
gress might wish to investi-
gate government security clas-
sification policy.
Most of the significant. state-
ments in the three documents
released last night had al-
ready appeared in Anderson's
column, which is distributed to
700 newspapers, including The.
Washington Post.
The Justice Department ac-
knowledged yesterday that the
FBI is investigating the nature
of the security leak that. led
to the disclosures.
But Anderson, who said he
will write several more col-
umns based on the documents,
pointed out that no govern-
ment agent had visited him
and that he had received no
request to halt publication.
The Post has not received any
such request either.
Pentagon sources said an-
other investigation is under-
 A
WASHINGTON STAR
Approved For Release 2001/%3 :1 ,4-RDPiW b4R
erson kelleSeS pers
ecrat U.S. Pocy Sess's
By ORR KELLY
Star Staff Writer
Syndicated columnist Jack ' "I am getting hell every half
/ Anderson has made public hour from the President that
~/ "SECRET SENSITIVE" min- we are not being tough enough
utes of three White House on India. He has just called
meetings dealing with the In- Me again. He does not believe
dia-Pakistan War. we are carrying out his wish-
The documents show the es. Ile wants to tilt in favor of
government was secretly fa- Pakistan. He feels everything
voring Pakistan in the war we do comes out other wise."
while saying publicly that it The d o c u m e n t s provide
was not taking sides. more detail on the meetings
Anderson used extensive than had been made public
quotations from the docu- previously, but many of the
ments in recent columns and essential details had already
then released the dull text as a been used by Anderson in his
deliberate challenge to the syndicated column.
government's system of classi- He did not release what he
lying information. said were ."dozens" of other
.After the Anderson columns documents giving what he
appeared, the White House be- called a complete picture of
gan coordinating a broad-scale the government's decision-
investigation to learn who making process during the In-
leaked the documents to him, dia - Pakistan War.
Material Confirmed Meetings of WSAG
The 'hite House today re-
say whether the pub-
fused to
lfshed material is authentic.
But a State Department offi-
cial who asked not to be identi-
fied said there is no question
of the authenticity of the docu-
a.nents. .
Anderson released the docu-
Iments after Henry A. Kissin-
tger, , presidential ?adviser for
(national security affairs, told
iaewsmen yesterday he was
. uoted out of context in ex-
The papers published by An-
derson, on the other hand, cov-
er a current international cri-
sis.
The minutes of the meeting
of Dec. 3 were made by James
H. Noyes, deputy assistant
secretary of defense for Near
Eastern, African and South
Asian Affairs,- and approved
by his boss, G. Warren Nutter,
assistant defense secretary for
international security affairs.
The minutes of the Dec. 4
and 6 meetings were prepared
by Navy Captain H.N. Kay,
who works in the office of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff at the
Pentagon.
Government sources said an
investigation of the source of
the apparent leak to Anderson
was being coordinated from
the White House and ; in-
volved security agencies at the
D
t
epar
-
The papers released by An- State and Defense
derson covered meetings 01 meats as well as the Secret
the Washington Special Action Service. Contrary to earllier
Group at the White House oon reports, the Federal Bureau of
Dec. 3, 4 and 6. The WSAG is a Investigation has not been
top advisory committee to the cailled into the case so far.
National Security Council. Officials at the State and
All the. d o c u m e n t s are Defense Departments seemed
marked "SECRET SENSI- to be most concerned about
"In view of the sensitivity of The Concern
information in the NSC (Na- Several officials called at-
;cerpts from the documents tional Security Council) sys-
:printed. earlier by Anderson. tem and the detailed nature of
. Anderson gave the docu- this memorandum, it is re-
lnents to the Washington post quested that access to it be
last night, and the paper print- limited to a strict need-to-
ed them today. The Star ob- know basis."
tained its own copies of the The documents appeared to
documents. have come from two different
Anderson said in an inter- offices in the Pentagon-
View last night that his column although it is quite possible
kepared for release tomorrow that copies of the minutes also
would carry excerpts from se- would be available in the other
cret documents dealing with areas of the government.
relations between the United Anderson says he has even
States and Japan. The column more such documents. The
will appear on the same day disclosures amount to a major
President Nixon meets with leak of -sensitive government
Japanese Prime Minister Ei- papers-in some way even
Calif. ernment officials than the re-
lease of the Pentagon Papers
VI Am ...Getting Hell" earlier this year.
One of the documents rg- In that case, the documents
'eased by AAP li'o tt@ Ll~(
bo
t
di
u
1
ng a
Kissinger as telling a White ?L 'listory en
douse Meeting on Dec. 3 that:
tention to a column published
by Anderson on Dec. 28 de-
scribing a secret intelligence
report in which Emory Swank,
U.S. ambassador to Cambodia,
gave an unflattering assess-
ment of top Cambodian offi-
cials. Publication of the re-
port, the U.S. officials said,
will greatly complicate
Swank's task in dealing with
the Cambodian government.
Anderson acknowledged that
an argument could be made
that the cables of an ambassa-
dor to his government should Assistant Secretary of State
be classified. Joseph Sisco said that "as the
"But I think I had a duty to Paks increasingly feel the heat
report his warning that the we will be getting emergency
country (Cambodia) is about requests from them."
"
he said.
to collapse,
that a pattern of leaks now
may make government offi-
cials reluctant, in the future,
to offer proposals that might
be embarrassing if they were
published, or to be candid in
their comments on policies un-
der consideration.
The Anderson documents re-
veal what appear to be two
major discrepancies between
what the administration was
doing - or thinking about
doing - at the height of the
India - Pakistan crisis and
what it was telling the public.
Anderson suggested a com-
parison be made between the
minutes of the sessions - par-
ticularly Kissinger's comment
that he was getting hell from
the President for not being
tough enough on India - and a
Kissinger "background" brief-
ing for the press on Dec. 7.
Anderson said the comparison
would show the government
"lied" to the public.
In that backgrounder, Kis-
singer ..denied the administra-
tion was "anti-Indian."
Arms Transfer Suggested
The other major discrepan-
cy noted by Anderson arises
from the minutes of the Dec. 6
meeting in which Kissinger is
said to have asked whether the
United States could authorize
Jordan or Saudi Arabia to
transfer American military
equipment to Pakistan.
Two State Department offi-
cials responded that such a
transfer would be illegal and
that the Jordanians would
probably be grateful if the
United States "could get them
off the hook" by denying au-
thority for such a transfer.
The government said public-
ly at that time that it was not
providing aid to either coun-
"Dr. Kissinger said that the
Two Key Discrepancies President t may want to honor
04heQl r~-AilfiOlP n.-' ffi0'1"t~e3~lfa';Un~t
about the Anderson papers is
STATINTL
 NEW YORK TIMES
Approved For Release 2t0)jR3{9A: CIA-fib A601
.olunnist Says Nixon Pressed Policy Against India
J
By TERENCE SMITH
1 1 to The New Yo:r Times
a
S
pa
NVASIIINGTON, Jan. 3-Pres-,crises , that dealt with the India-i This instruction was ampl
"
with; Pakistan conflict. The meetings Ified on Dec. 8, when, accor
ddent Nixon was "furious
his subordinates during the re-were held in early December. irg to the column, "Dr. Kissi
cent India Pakistan war for not, Notes by Pentagon Aides ger stated that current ordc
taking a stronger stand against; are not to put anything in th
ndicated colum- The notes he has published bud et for India. It was als
s
t h
i
y
e
Ind
a, mist Jack Anderson reported so far, the columnist said, ate not to be leaked that AID had
today. from those taken for tho De. put money in the budget only
Mr. Anderson quoted Henry fense Department - and are to have the 'wicked' White
A. Kissinger, the President's ad? signed by two Pentagon offi- House -take it out."
viser on national security, as cials. . On Dec. 4, the Administra-
having told a meeting of senior Mr. Anderson said he had "ion suspended its aid program
Administration . officials: "I'm received scores of other classi- in India.
getting hell every half-hour fied documents, including se-
front the President that we are cret intelligence reports and
not being tough enough on In- cablegrams, that he intended to
dia." publish during the next two
According to Mr. Anderson weeks.
IMr. Kissinger directed that al: "I am trying to force a show-
United States officials "show a!mown with the Administration
"The Indian Ambassador is not
to be treated at too high a
level," he is quoted as having
said.
The quotations in Mr. An- I in the public interest in a?
dOrson's column today were the'demecracy."
latest in a series of verbatim ! Mr. Anderson said neither
reports of secret White House he nor members of his staff had
strategy sessions dealing with
the crisis that the columnist has, yet been questioned by Gov.
published during the last several ernment investigators, but that
, he had "positive" information
dayIsiss column is syndicated to that the F.B.I. had alreedy in-
700 newspapers, 100 of them terrogated individuals at the
White House and State and De-
overseas. Mr. Anderson took fense departments in an effort
lover the column on the death to discover who had provided
of his colleague Drew Pearson him with the documents.
In September, 1969. Aide Declines Comment
The publication of the re- Gerald L. Warren, the acting
ports, which Mr. Anderson says Press Secretary at the White
are classified "secret sensitive," House, declined today to say
has infuriated the White House whether an investigation had
land unsettled national security been ordered. He also declined
I officials. I all. comment on the Anderson
Government sources can columns.
firmed today that an investiga-I In the column published to
White House to determine who
leaked the classified documents.
Tho sources said the new in-
vestigation, reportedly being
conducted by the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation, is directed
at individuals in the State and
Defense Departments, and on
the National Security Council
.staff who have had access to
the notes quoted by Mr. Ander-
son.
The quotations published by
the columnist are not official
minutes of the meetings, butt
rather notes prepared by repre-
.sentatives of the various de-
;partments attending.
In a telephone interview to-
day, Mr. Anderson said he had
ben given two complete sets
f mates of e
over their classification sys-. /
ten,," the columnist said. "Ev-
erything Kissinger does-even;
the toilet paper he uses-is be.
day, Mr. Anderson quotes from
notes taken during the Wash-
ington Special Action Group's
meetings of Dec. 3, Dec. 4 and
Dec, 8.
In the first session, he quotes
Richard Helms, director of Cen-
tral Intelligence, as saying the
Indians were "currently en-
gaged in a no-holds-barred at-
J
STATINTL?
!tack on East Pakistan and that
tve t o,~
~~aslxingtan
IGroup, ?a high-level strategy
1committee assembled during
they had crossed the border
on all sides."
"Dr. Kissinger remarked that
it the Indians have announced
a full-scale invasion," the col-
umn continues, ,this fact must
be reflected in our U.N. state-
ment.'
On Dec. 4, Mr. Kissinger is
quoted matters the President wants to
p1 11
CIA-RDP80-01601 R001 300390001-8
Ifor International Development.
 FOREIGN .ate s
Approved For Release 2001/ 10. CIA ${ Dl
1:1!?
THE CIA AND DECISION-MAKING
By Chester L. Cooper
cording to the actual. conditions. When we study the causes of the mistakes we have mad
we find that they all arose because we departed from the actual situation . . . and wer
subjective in determining our working policies."-"The Thoughts of Mao Tse-tung."
11N bucolic McLean, Virginia, screened by trees and sur
j rounded by a high fence, squats a vast expanse of concret
and glass known familiarly as the "Pickle Factory," an
more formally as "Headquarters, Central Intelligence Agency.
Chiselled into the marble which is the only relieving feature o
the building's sterile main entrance are the words, "The Trut
Shall Make You Free." The quotation from St. John was
personally chosen for the new building by Allen W. Dulles over /
the objection of several subordinates who felt that the Agency,
then still reeling from the Bay of Pigs debacle, should adopt a
.somewhat less lofty motto. (In those dark days of late 196r, some
suggested that a more appropriate choice would be "Look Before
You Leap.") But Dulles had a deeper sense of history than
most. Although he was a casualty of the By of Pigs and never
.sat in the Director's office with its view over the Potomac, he
left a permanent mark not only on the Agency which he had
fashioned but on its building which he had planned.
Allen Dulles was famous among many and notorious among
some for his consummate skill as an intelligence operative
("spook" in current parlance), but one of his greatest contribu-
tions in nurturing the frail arrangements he helped to create to
provide intelligence support to Washington's top-level foreign-
policy-makers.
Harry Truman, whose Administration gave birth to both the /
National Security Council and the Central- Intelligence Agency, ,I
recalls that, "Each time the National Security Council is about
to consider a certain policy-let us say a policy having to do
with Southeast Asia-it immediately calls upon the CIA to
present an estimate of the effects such a policy is likely to
have. ...1 President Truman painted a somewhat more cozy
relationship between the NSC and the CIA than probably
existed during, and certainly since, his Administration. None
the less, it is fair to say that the intelligence community, and espe-
cially the CIA, played an important advisory role in high-level
policy deliberations during the i95os and early r96os.
To provide the most informed intelligence judgments on the
effects a contemplated policy might have on American na-
tional security interests, a group especially tailored for the task
was organized in rgso within the CIA. While this step would
probably have been taken sooner or later, the communist victory
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001300390001-8
 Approved For ReleaWAQY%./Q4s CIA-RDP80-01601 R
1 JAN 1972
The Washington Itlerry-Go.-Round
By Jack Anderson
Pakistan wasn't the only
loser of the bloody, two-week
war over Bangladesh. The In-
dian blitz also badly damaged
two bigger victims.
We have already shown
.from the secret White House
Papers that the United States
isuffered a strategic defeat.
Thanks to President Nixon's
n
,
bungling, Russia has emerged) replied Kissinger. "Let's go
as India's partner, and thel ahead and put in our own
United States is out In the cold I statement anyway regardless
on the Indian'subcontinent. I of what other countries want
The other big loser is the to do. We need now to make
United Nations, which failed our stand clear even though it
dismally to keep the peace be-i has taken us two weeks of fid-
tween India and Pakistan. The Idling."
U.N.'s Impotence, as it groped
for an International consensus I Kissillger's Comments
to end the struggle, caused
President Nixon's foreign pol-
icy adviser, Henry Kissinger,
to blurt at a secret White
House rneeting:
"If the U.N. can't operate In
this kind of situation effec-
tively, Its utility has come to
an end, and it Is useless to
think of U.N. guarantees in
the Middle East."
ama"ed"b ''In'dian Blitz'
White House strategy session
on Dec. 4:
"We will have difficulty In
the U.N.," suggested Samuel
DePalma, the State Depart-
ment's specialist In Interna-
tional organizations, "because
most of the countries who
might go with us do not want
to tilt toward Pakistan to the
extent we do.".
"We have told the Paks we
would make our stateme
t
"
The secret minutes con-
tinue: "Dr. Kissinger (said) it
was Important that we register
our position. The exercise in
the U.N. Is likely to be an ex-
ercise in futility, Inasmuch as
the Soviets can be expected to
veto. The U.N. itself, will In
all probability do little to ter.
minate the war."
At this point, Kissinger de-
America's U.N. Ambassador, I Glared: "Nothing will happen
George Bush, suggested in one at the Security Council be-
secret report that Secretary
General U Thant's ineffective.
'General might be attributed to
"physical strain due to his re-
cent illness." But Kissinger
put the matter more bluntly
by calling the U.N. wrangle a
"farce,"
Kissinger made clear his
contempt for the U.N. at a
cause of Soviet vetoes. The
whole thing is a farce."
"The Soviet tactic will he to
stall, as they do not want a
cease-fire yet," agreed Christo-
pher Van Hollen, another
State Department expert.
DePalma said the Indians
"could shilly-shally for three
or four days"-long enough,
chimed in CIA director Rich
and Helms, "far them to occu-
py Past Pakistan.
Footnote: When Indian
troops threatened Dacca, Sec-
retary General U Thant's first
reaction was to evacuate the
U.N. mission.
This brought stern, secret
instructions from State Secre-
tary Bill Rogers to Ambassa-
dor Bush: "Request U.S.U.N.
(U.S. delegation) to convey to
SYG (Secretary General) or
appropriate senior official our
deep concern regarding deci-
sion of SYG to withdraw all
ago. The court recommended
Kennedy receive $100,000. Sub.
sequently, however, he was
stricken with cancer. So th?
Justice Department promptly
sought to cut down his award
on the ground that cancer had
reduced his life expectancy,
Now Kennedy has died and
his wife and child need the
award more than ever.
PX Blues-Three separate
surveys taken by the Penta-
gon, a civilian research firm
and the Army itself have turn<
ed up widespread dissatisfac-
tion with the multibillion-do1-
U.N. officials from East Paki-; lar commissary system. The
ctan nc rirtnnnrinrl by Tertian i Pentagon study found "custom.
government.
"In earlier message from
Dacca, U.N. group in East Pak-
ers rated commissary service
unsatisfactory." The civilian
survey showed 76.9 per cent of
commissary customers -wanted
instructed.. by U.N.N.Y. (U.N.~a better selection. The Army
headquarters) to 'defer evacu- I discovered that, out of eight
ation of U.N. officials so they
may be in place for possible
assistance in arranging cease-
fire .. .
"Suggest In course of discus-
sion you stress critical role
which U.N. can play in pro-
tecting human rights and seek.
ing peace during current cri-
sis."
Washington Whirl
Reverse Justice-We re-
ported earlier that the Justice
Department was trying to re-
duce a U.S. Court of Claims
commissioner's damage recom.
mendation to a Miami Herald
photographer named Doug
Kennedy who was wounded by
American Marines in the Do-
minican Republic six years
aspects of military life, the
commissaries and post ex.
changes ranked seventh. Mean-
while, despite revelations of
waste and corruption in the
system, the generals in charge,
continue to assure Dcfense?
Secretary Mel Laird that all
is well.
Dole's Dunning-Sen. Bob
Dole (R-Kan.), _ the brassy Re..
publican National -Chairman,
has sent out letters soliciting.
$50 and $75 contributions for
the Senate campaign of his:
old pal, Sen. Bob Griffin (R-
Mich.). But the letters were
sent to non-Michigan money
Wren, thus angering other GOP
candidates who see the dun.
ning as ponching, on their,
homestate preserves.
01972, Uc TMcClure 8ynd1c&t4
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