ONE THING IS LEARNED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R001200080001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 9, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 10, 1971
• Content Type: NSPR

STATINTL
Approved For Release! 01/03J04 ?-Or1; =R' 8'0 01601
10 't9f -
One thing is clearly ascertained
by a perusal of the Pentagon
study, about the publication of
'which so much controversy has
arisen.
That thing is the perceptive lev-
el* of performance of the Central
Intelligence Agency as to In-
dochina in the 1.tiC'I-forward peri-
od in which American involvement
in Viet n alai was I;nishrooming .
The CIA clearly "read" very
well the indications of what alight
develop in Indochina as the: Amer-
ican corm itment was extended.
In speecifics, the CIA rejected
the domino theory - that if
South Vietnam fell, there would
also topple Laos, then Cambodia,
then other Asian states, like a fall-
ing row of dominoes. The CIA
saw only limited damage to Anier-
-ican interests from a Red victory
in South Vietnam. This still could
have been a faulty conclusion but
the intelligence on which it was
based Was sound.
Again in specifics, the CIA ex-
pected --- and rightly - little, im-
pact on the war potential of North
Vietnam through restricted bomb-
ing. It did not believe North Viet-
nam would be intimated by the
possible loss of its minuscule in-
1,
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R001200080001-3
rt E o
~.,~' ? EIS E .
I
dustrial complex ---- it had the So-
viet Union and Red China on
which to rely. Its ov'n production
Was a drop in the bucket mea-
sut'ed against the outpouring' of
martial and industrial aid from
the Big Iteds.
Most of the strategic conclusions
made by the CIA were rejected. by
the policy makers and the rejec-
tion was ratified by action of then
President Johnson. This included
the CIA dissent to commitment of
U.S. forces to offensive combat
operations without any change in
the limited tempo of bombing, op-
erations being conducted. An
April, 19G5, memo from the CIA
director, John A. 'McCone, put the
dissent this way In effect if the
planned ground operation goes in
motion we will find ourselevs
mired down in combat in the
jungle in a military effort that we
cannot win and from which we
will have extreme difficulty ex-
tricating ourselves."
Hindsight being 20-20 in-
variably, one could wish that Mr.
McCone might have been a little
more persuasive with Mr. Johnson
and those to whom the then presi-
dent did listen.
STATINtL
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