U.S. CIVILIANS DYING UNHERALDED IN LAOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000900090001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 146
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 19, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 27, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

tr ft Cr' Cr. TI?
Approved For Release 2001V/R010: E?IA-RDP80-0
? ? rl ?
,Nk /poi 7,17)
V iH J kr,)
By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Star.tiews Special Correspondent
VIENTIANE ? Some Amer-
icans killed in Indochina com-
bat do. rot appear in the U.S.
Indochina death toll which
stands at latest count at
45,915.
These unacknowledged com-
bat deaths are of American
.eivilians performing military
duties normally carried out by
U.S. Air Force or Army per-
sonnel.
. As they are civilians the
U.S. military does not include
.them in the death toll when
? they are killed in action.. .
.. For example, U.S. officials.
this weekend announced two ?
, American military deaths:'
-They said U.S. Air Force Capt._
Harold L. (Skip) Mischler of.
.
Osborne, Kan., was killed Sat-
urday when his light observa-
tion plane was shot down by
small arms over the .embattled
.South Laos town of Saravane:
U.S. officials said a second
. American was lost over the
: plain of Jars area but were
'. unable to indentify him tun
, next of kin were notified. .
On Friday, Dec. 15, how-
ever, at a town on the South
Laos' Bolovens Plateau called
.Paksong another kind of
death occurred. John Kearns
? of Alvaredo, Tex., was listed
.? as killed by North Vietnamese
mortar shells which hit the
command- post of the Lao ir-
.regular unit he was advising.
Killed at Saravane .
s An embassy spokesman de-
,scribed Kearns as "American
?Centract personnel attached to
/n irregular Lao unit." Irregu-
.ar Lao units are handled by
ii the Central Intelligence agen-
cy. Kearns was the third
American adviser to irregu-
lars killed in action since Sep-
tern bee. .
, Another American was
I killed when Lao irregular
units launched a heliborne at-
tack on Saravane on Oct. 19.
. He was aboard one of eight
? U.S. Air Force helicopters
- which carried Lao irregulars
,into the :.-ar avane airstrip un- civilians 1,1( former mem_
?
p
u
Al
Li
V:ss:67 E
cy or other U.S. government
agencies.
The U.S. failure to announce
engaged were hit by Commu-
nist fire but none crashed. A
third American adviser to the
irregulars was killed during
.an operation which failed to
retake the Plain of Jars in
North Laos in September.
Air America officials say
about twenty of their Ameri-
can crew members have been
killed in Laos since -March
1970.
Air America is a private
contractor to the Central Intel-
ligence Agency and other U.S.
government agencies and as
air crew personnel are civil-
ians.
They are not carried on the
military death toll.
Air America engages in re-
supply drops to irregulars of-
;ten under intense enemy anti-
aircraft fire and in infiltration
and eifiltration of irregular in-
telligence and commando
teams behind enemy lines. An-
other company, Continental
Airlines, has lost some Ameri-
can personnel in similar oper-
ations in Laos.
American of ficials say
roughly 800 Americans were
killed or are missing in Laos
since Mo.y 1961 when the Unit-
ed . States first shouldered a
greater burden of the Laos
war. This figure includes all
categories and is mostly mili-
tary.
The unheralded paramili-
tary deaths in Laos indicate a
trend which may start to show
in South Vietnam as American
military wind down the war
there and various private
American civilian companies
are poised to move in to take
over paramilitary chores.
Deaths Unreported
Increasing use of disguised
paramilitary organizations will
allow the U.S. military to put
out figures of zero American
casualties on the ground as
they do now in Laos, as it will
be "civilians" who are I,-sing
killed, not U.S. military per-
sonnel.
. As in Laos most of these
?
a list of paramilitary deaths in
Laos, however, is one of the
few faults which mar these
operations.
In Laos, instead of having
thousands of Americans as the
entason has poured into
outh Vietnam, the war is run
just as effective if not more
so by 500 to 600 Americans.
-Small Group Functions
While Hanoi fields four, and
in the dry season, five weak
divisions of some 40,000 com-
bat troops in Laos, the United
States has only between 30 and
40 men on the ground at the
most in combat areas through-
out the country.
In the past eight years an
estimated 31 of these Ameri-
cans been killed. This figure
includes some technicians
caught flatfooted onthe
ground in .1963 at Phou Pathi,
a supersecret installation in
North Laos which the North
Vietnamese overran.
About 60 Air America crew-
men of American nationality
are ? believed to have been
killed in the same time period.
The small number of Ameri-
cans with the irregulars are
essential to insure good Lao
leadership and lack of corrup-
tion. Poor leadership and
non-payment of troops severe-
ly weakened Royal Lao regu-
lar forces throughout the war.
It has been suggested, how-
ever, that U.S. Embassy offi-
cials should admit it when
such Americans are killed in
action instead of trying to pre-
tend they are "American per-
sonnel in management'' as
happened initially in the
Kearns' case and these Ameri-
can deaths should be included
in military casually figures re-
leased weekly in Saigon. .
Ejos
STATOTHR
(kr juten'e A101400,4foreRalteasesPOilA03/A4 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000900090001-6
American wt s
the helicopter touched down, and similar units contracted to
? Six of the .U.S. helicopters the Central Intelligence Agen-
WASH/NG TON Pal
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0160
2 6 1972
takie nesearen
BANGKOK (UPI)?A Pen-
tagon agency said to have
carried out intelligence and
policymaking in Thailand
&?er the last decade is to
quietly close its doors at the
rend of this month as part of
the wind-down in America's
military role in Southeast
Asia.
The agency is a field facil-
ity of the Pentagon's Ad-
vanced Research Projects
Agency (ARPA), a little-
known organization that de-
velops classified electronic
research and intellignece
systems as well as more
_mundane items such as new
-combat packs, hoofs and
' field rations.
-.. When AFJ'A'sufFice Ire !
was opened in 1902, it was
billed as a. facility to help
? Thailand's military develop
its own research and devel-
opment capability. It grew
-to an organization with a ?
staff of more than 140 and
became by far the largest of
ARPA's five overseas
branches, spending about
- half of a $25 million yearly.
-budget for a program known
as Project Agile.
ARPA's Bangkok office t
also became involved in:
wider activities such as de-
foliation and counterinsur-
gency work, leading to
charges that the advisory
role to the Thai milli at was
merely a cover for other
jobs.
'Almost to a man, the pro-
fessional staff of about 30
American scientists that, has
phased out the facility's last
research projects over the
last few months feels that
much of the criticism has
been unjustified.
U.S. officials still decline
to discuss, ort grounds of se-
curity, many of the projects
ARPA was involved in, and
era cy
iaiia
17-7,11
STATOTHR
An ARPA source said the
defoliating was done to test
results in an area under se-
cure conditions that were
not available in Vietnam.
The same source said that a
later Thai government re-
quest for ARPA's help to de-
foliate an area in North
Thailand where Communist
guerrillas were active was
refused because the defoli-
ants had been found harm-
ful to animals and humans.
there is still no official con- ARPA also ran projects to
firmation that the agency gather intelligence material
used airplanes of Air Amer- ki on Communist guerrillas
ica, a charter line that from Thai sources, and
works for the CIA and other ARPA teams helped develop
U.S. government agencies in ground and airborne sensor
Southeast Asia, to defoliate systems to detect. Comnm-
an area of jungle in Thai-. nist movement through the
-land in 1965 and 1966. jungle. Sonic of. these sys-
.
tems have had application
in the electronic warfare
system the United States
has used to locate bombing
targets in Laos and Viet-
nam
The workers at ARPA say,
they have clone valuable
work in such areas as soil
testing, vegetation and envi-
ronmental sciences that
have peaceful as well as mil-
itary applications. .
When ARPA closes its '
doors here it will leave be-
hind the military research
and development center, a
facility built jointly with
Thailand that will be oper-
ated by the Thai supreme
command. - ARPA is also
leaving about half a million
-dollars' worth of electronic
equipment and the unclassi-
fied portion of its reference
library, which runs to about
20,000 volumes.
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J.
STATOTHR 20 DEC
Approved For Releasegpkin94 : C
3
? "Even as the U.S. military is packing up
,,,???-?%rin for its expected exit from Vietnam,
American officials :here are secretly plan-
\es
ning a major postwar presence of U.S.
? ?
i?,:ppi.j anej civilians in Vietnam, with many of them
doing jobs formerly done by the military,"
. wrote Fox Butterfield in a report from
1 Saigon in the Nov. 27 New York Times.
Without ? alluding to the delay in Paris,
Butterfield noted that the U.S. is in the
process of augmenting its "civilian advisory"
force in Vietnam, from saco to io,ca, its
peak level at the stage of maximum U.S.
military presence in Vietnam. But it should
be apparent that this "advisory" apparatus
could not be assembled overnight, anymore
than the enormous flow of U.S. arms could
? be brought to Saigon in a day. Saigon's air
force was increased two-fold, from ap-
proximately 1030 to 2020 aircraft during the
past two months, to give only one item of
U.S. supply effort.
? To place recent developments in their
proper perspective, it must be noted that
there has been a major shift in U.S. strategy
sot in motion lest spring in the wake of the
10es-sustained offensive 1-ny the Liberation
Armed Forces in South Vietnam. .
Despite administration efforts to play
down the Strength of the offensive, it is
evident that once again the whole. U.S.
strategy for victory in Vietnam was smashed.
Only the most drastic U.S. measures of the
E"3
LH
;
. 1 ?
L-3
By Placard E. Word
Despite press speculation a 'peace
agreement for Vietnam may soon be con-
cluded, there is concrete evidence indicating
the U.S. is planning to prolong the conflict
and will attempt to subvert any peace ac-
cords.
U.S. procrastination in .Paris, intensified
bombing and the huge shipments of arms to
Saigon, among other developments, are all
indicators that the .White House has no
desire for true peace and has not abandoned
. its neo-colonial designs in Indochina.
An even more ominous proof of U.S.
intentions of maintaining its puppet regimes
in Indochina, ..was the apparent effort by
presidential envoy Henry Kissinger to press
Saigon's "demands" in Paris at the end of
November, which would have virtually
scrapped the agreement reached in October
by Kissinger and Le Due Tho of the DIZVi
There have been various hypotheses put
forward in the Western press concerning
Kissinger's seeming about-face on behalf of
Saigon, after proclaiming in October before
the world that "peace is at hand." Nearly
every possible explanation has been
proposed by the pundits eacept the most
plausible one. The U.S stalling in Paris does
not represent any deference to its Saigon
puppets, but rather it is for the purposes of
U.S. policy and the Saigon regime is merely
i.. expressions of "support"
such as USOM, USAI , USIS, etc. While
these agencies may be under CIA direction,
you don't know and you don't care. The
novernment agencies direct the routines and
scliedulings, your company provides the
techinical know-how and you fly the air-
The brochure makes it clear that "civilian
Eying" is merely a cover for ciandestine
military activity: "Although flights mainly
serve U.S. offiical personnel movement and
native officials and civilians, you sometimes
engage in the movement of friendly trocps,
or of enemy captives; or in the transport of
cargo more potent than rice and beans!
There's a war going . on. Use your
irazigination!" -
In what Burgess describes as a
"hastily"added postrcipt, the brochure
states: "Foreign rid situation unclear
pending outcome military situation in RVN
(Republic of Vietnam), but it looks as if well
finish the war (and peace terms favorable for
our aide); if so, it is expected that a boom
among contract operators will result.... "
In other words, here we have the first
?concrete indication that the White House
waa implicitly admitting ? defeat of its
"Vietnemizastion" program .and reverting to
a less cbstly program of clandestine warfare.
The U.S. strategy shift was probably equally
dictated by a desire to further diminish the
nolitical impact of the war on American
war prevented the complete collapse of the opinion and finally by a desire to diminish
Saiaon regime and its armed forces: the tbe blow to U.S. prestige in the event of
blockade of the DRV, the greatest aerial eltime.c. fr,!inre, that is the colir.pse of the
escalation against the DRV and liberated in.r,pt regimes.
areas of South Vietnam (while heavy The U.S. is clearly trying to stave off this
bombing of Laos and Cambodia was develo,ernent as long as possi:ele, but it also
sustained), and unprecedented' aerial fac-.
?
tical and logistics support for the Saigon wants to avoid the impression of being
forces. engaged in direct and large-scale U.S. in-
The augmentation of the U.S. air logistics terveation at the time, which sooner or later
support 'for- Saigon's forces during, the of- Nixon and Kissinger must know is inevitable.
fensive surged from a monthly average of Even if they cannot face this reality, they
about nine million Poonds of cargo before are now in deadly earnest about maintaining
the offeasive to 60 milliOn pounds in ?May. support for the puppet regimes, regardless of
Amino:Med U.S. "support" for Saigon after any peace 'agreement. If the U.S. honestly
the offensive bean, raised total. U.S. ex- adhered to a peace agreement, Saigon's
penditurcs on the war by an annual rate of political collapse would quickly follow. That
approximately tilt) billion or nearly double is why the U.S. is: stepping up clandestine
the rate _prior to the Offensive. support for the Saigon regime, military aid
The.Nixon administration concealed this disguised as civilian "contractual" aid,
augmentation by requesting additional war provided mainly by U.S. private military
funding only for the period ending Sept. fi0. contractors.
an nstrument. TIC
for Saigon's policies, now as in the past, to At about the same time the administration There is a relationship between the U.S.
the extent they are not fictions for deceiving presented Congress with a request for these arms build-up Indochina and the proeram
American opinion, are fundamentally ex- funds in June:, Air America and Continental /or secret contractual aid. Before the Oc-
Air.Serseces, the CIA contractual "civilian' to her peace agreement, the U.S. made little
presaions of the aims and designs of the U.S.
bceen stepping up rec.ruineg among effort to. keep the program Secret. In
Air Force personnel in Indochina, according testimony before the Senate Approoriations
to a Dec. I report of Dispatch News Service?ICommittee on Sept. 13.. Air Force Maj. Gen.
by John Burgess. He quoted from a con- Joseph R. DeLuca explained in detail U.S.
fit'ential recruiting brochure which, among . plans for contracting for personnel to train
other points, stated:- Saigon Air Force members. In the area of
maintenance alone, the U.S. was planning to
ll in Clot Osloec v '3-m-Fare ? . ? ? make contracts for $54 million of one to
Oblong the struinele in Vietnam, aS We as ? ?
a 647 t in-4.6541ln
Gain time
In essence, American procrastination in
Paris has been an effort to gain time for
augmenting Saigon's war machine and
settinp, up a huge clandestine network of
"civilian advisors" Which will attempt to
the rest of iikpbilovefdrFornRelease
f s.
W?Ab ft01409401101b6aillti personnel, ac-
um-cements have c
-apart reached.
government, that is government agencies
,
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01
MIAMI, FLA.
RERAT'D)
N 61973i
M ? 380,328
S 479,025
By FREDERIC SHERIMAN
herald Editorial Writer
THERE is at Yale University a doc-
toral scholar who would like to believe
Richard Nixon is trying to cut loose
from Vietnam because of e?,d(ince that
American involvement
in Southeast Asia is a
major factor in the
increasing problem
with heroin addiction
here in this country.
Alfred W. McCoy
has offered such evi-
dence in his book enti-
tled The Politics of
Heroin in Southeast
Asia (Harper & Row).
Those who support American
intervention in Vietnam as a selfless act
in defense of freedom will judge the
McCoy book as a spurious indictment
filled with wild ,and baseless charges.
But there is too much in this book for it
to be dismissed as anti-Vietnam propa-
ganda. Eighteen months of study pro-
duced the names, the places and the
dates of trafficking in the poppy gum
that is turned into the powder of white
death.
Sources of opium and heroin are
traced through the ponies and the econ-
omies of the military dictatorships in
South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and
Thailand,
Aircraft controlled by General Icy in
Saigon transported from Laos the hero-
in that was pushed on tens of thousands
of American servicemen. It was sold:,
cheaply because there were more than
500,000 potential customers. It was
General Ry's sister who directed much
of the traffic in heroin from the Sedone
s?p?a?),ace Ilotei in Pakse, a city in western
k ji
-FL
Laos near the Thai border.
The Cambodia invasion, did not ac-
complish the capture of the North Viet-
namese headquarters, but it did enable
the Saigon Navy to expand its role in
the heroin traffic. Up until the invasion
of Cambodia, here was no surface tran-
sit for heroin from Laos. But with the
protection of American air power, the
Vietnamese admirals were able to run
their heroin in competition with General
Ky's aircraft.
STATOTkR
THIS is a book the CIA tried to sup-
press because it doctuneriirS' "the use of
American money and American
airplanes in the heroin traffic. This
again is more of the political expediency
on which Washington's stumbling in
Southeast Asia is based. The loyalty of
mountain tribesmen could only he
bought by purchases of their poppy crop
and trans:iort of the opium gum to pro-
cessing plants. controlled *by political
leaders in Laos and Cambodia. It was a
repeat of the game invented by French
intelligence officials who use profits
from heroin traffic to finance political
machinations.
On Page M. McCoy writes, ''With-
out air transport for their opium,. the
Meo (tribesmen) faced economic ruin..
There Was simply no form of air trans-.
port available in northern .Laos except
the CIA's charter airline, Air Americii.
And according to several sources, Air
America began flying opium from moun-
tain villages north and east, of the Plain
of Jars to Gen. Vane Pan's headquarters
at Long Tieng." This, then, is the major
factor in the so-called secret American
war in Laos: traffic in opium destined-
for pushers in Saigon and for the smug-
glers coming,' into the United States by
way of Miami from Latin America.
THE BASIC problem, as McCoy out-
lines it,. is that American officials in
Southeast Asia who .know the inside
story or the heroin traffic cannot or
won't do anything about it because of
fears that their actions would somehowi".;
hamper the war effort.
If agents of the U.S. Bureau
Narcotics, for example, were to gefi,,
tough with Thai leaders mixed up wititi
heroin in Bangkok, American commancit,
ers of the airbases in that country wouls;,
suddenly find it impossible to get jcii
fuel delivered or other vital supplic
delivered.
This is why McCoy called his booli,'", .
, The Politics of Heroin.
c.,-.M.,,,?-k,!,S7KATie..511. ructO,aa ,,,,T1,10,1,44,it
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STATOTHR WASH TON STAR
Approved For Release 2001103/C143:10114A-MP80-01
. ? ? tr
or nw rca: ruyting ano
? By JOHN BURGESS
Special to The Star-News
? BANGKOK ? "The flying is
',rion-military; in other words,
? 'civilian flying. You are flying
.':.for the U.S. government, that
? Is government agencies such
:;as USOM, USAID, USIS, etc.
While 'these agencies may be
, under CIA direction, you don't
knew and you don't care. The
government agencies direct
.the routings and schedulings,
? your company provides the
technical know-how and you
fly the airplane."
;,.-?? Thus an unnamed American
?,!.pilot describes "civilian
- flying" in Southeast Asia ? for
Air America and the leSser
? known Continenfal Air Serv-
ices ? both private companies
t on contract to.the U.S. govern-
9nent. The pilot's comments
bare part of a confidential,
'.16-page brochure available at
certain Air Force personnel of-
flees. It is shown to Air Force
?..pilots interested in flying for
? 'one of the companies upon
s completing their military serv-
rice. ?
The brochure lists no author
;or publisher, but it offers an
.;illuminating view into the in-
? 'teena.1 .operations of Air Amer-
:Ica, which .has played a cru-
cial role in the Indochina war
-theater since the 19505. Air
:?-America, along with the other
ompanie s, has airlifted
troops, refugees, CIA agents,
?American politicians, war ma-
?-terial, food and occasionally
'prisoners all over Southeast
Extravagant Salaries
- The brochure, dated June 29,
1972, boasts that Mr America
ranked as one of the most
'profitable corporation in the
United States in 1969, a year
when .most of the world's air-
lines lost heavily. Air Ameri-
ca's customer is the U.S.
government. . .
It employs about 436 pilots,
according to the pamphlet, of
which 384 are working in
. Southeast Asia. The center of
Air America's operation is
Laos, where the presence of
-? military or military-related
-personnel is prohibited by the
rhuch-abused Geneva Confer-
ence of 1962: '
Air America's profits are
? high despite the somewhat ex-
travagant salaries it pays for
' flying personnel. According to .
the re t a ilot with 11
years ellyih9ra
UH-34D heliccpter based, at
Udorn air base in Thailand an
average of 100 hot rs monthly,.
will take home $51 525. All sal-
aries are tax free.
A newly hired pilot flying.a
C-7 Caribou transport based in
Vientiane, averaging 100 hours
flying time monthly, would
earn a minimum $29,442. The
U.S. commercial pilot .average
Is $24,000.
Also available to Air Ameri-
ca personnel, in addition to a.
liberal expense account, is life
and medical insurance, two-
weeks leave, tickets on other .
airlines at 20 percent normal
cost, ?PX and government.
mailing privileges and educa-
tional allowances for depend-
ents. Many Air America pilots
are retired military men re-
ceiving military pensions, ?
'Good' Investment
Americans can also become
"air freight specialists", coin?
monly called kickers. Their
job is to push cargo out over
drop. zones. Salary is
$1,600-$1,800 per month. Quali-
fications: American' citizen-
ship, air borne training, expe-
rience with the U.S. Air Force
preferred..
Air America, Inc., is owned
by a private aviation invest-
ment concern called the Pacif- -
ic Corp. Dunn. and Brad-
street's investment directory
places its assets in the $10-$50
million category, and rates it
"good" as an investment risk.
Air America itself employs al-
together about 8,000 persons,
ranking in size just below Na-
tional Airlines and above most
of the smaller U.S. domestic side); if so, it is expected that
airlines. In boom among contract opera- I
Formerly called Civil Air J tors will result when imple-
Transport (CAT), Air America mented, due to inevitable re-
was organized after World . habilitation and reconstruction
War II by General Claire 'aid in wartorn areas.... Job
Chennault, commander of the market highly competitive and
American fighter squadrons in you'll need all the help you
Burma and China known as can get."
the Flying Tigers. CAT played According to Pacific News
a major role in post-war China Service, the following men sit
supplying Nationalist troops. ion the Air America board of
CAT also supplied the French directors:
during their phase of the war Samuel Randolph Walker ?
in Indochina. ' chairman of the board of Wm.
Air America is commonly ?C. Walker's Son, New York;
considered an arm of the CIA. ? director of Equitable Life As-
In Laos, the CIA for the past surance Society; member of
10 Years or more has main- ,Federal City 'Council, Wash-
tamed an army of hill tribe- ingten, D.C.; member of Ac-
men, mainly Thai aed Lao tion Council for Bitter Cities,
mercenaries. Most ? of the air ? ?
Urban America, Inc., and life
supply and transport needs for trustee, Columbia University.
this army have been handled William A. Reed ? chair-
by Air America. . man of the . board of Simpson
ReleaR?
Timber CO.; chairman of the
atsfapt4 ? ciAaR9Raoloim 000090001-6
Tim"g 'e ? roe ure. d6e Co ? director of crown
i hi t t th subject of con- I/
traband: ?
"Although flights mainly
serve U.S. official personnel
movement and native officials
and civilians, you sometimes
engage in the movement of
friendly troops, or of enemy
captives; or in the transport of
cargo much more potent than
rice and beans! There's a war
going on. Use your imagina-
tion!"
Air America works hand-
in-hand with the U.S. Air
Force. At Udorn air base in
Thailand, Air Force mechan-
ics repair the airline's trans-
ports and helicopters, many of
them unmarked. The Air
Force has reportedly leased
giant C130 transports whe.n the
. planes were needed for opera-
. tions in Laos. In the section on
? Air America's benefits, the
brochure lists in addition to
normal home and sick leave:
"Military leave will be gtant-
ed appropriately" an appar-
ent acknowledgement that
there are military people
working directly with Air
America.
One should not conclude,
however, that the salaries, ex-
citement and tax advantages
mean that Air America pilots
hope the war will continue. As
? the brochure's author notes in
a typed postscript: ?
"Foreign aid situation un-
clear pending outcome mili-
tary situation in RVN (Repub-
? lie of Vietnam), but it looks as
if we'll finish the war (and
peace terms favorable for our
Seattle First ?National 'Bank;
director of General Insurance
Co.; director of Boeing Co.;
director of Pacific Car Found-
ry CO.; director of Northern ?
Pacific Railroad; director of
Stanford Research Institute.
Arthur Berry Melia rdson --
foreign service officer in Rus-
sia, China and England from
1914 to 1936; chairman of the
board of Cheeseborough
Ponds, Inc. from 1955 to 1951;
director of United Hospital
Fund, New York; trustee of
Lenox Hill Hospital.
? James Barr Ames ? law
partner in Ropes & Gray, Bos-
ton; director of Air Asia Co.,
Ltd., director of International
Student Association; member,
Cambridge Civic Association
and trustee of Mt. Auburn
Hospital.
STATOTHR
not mention opium explicitly, son Timber Co.; director of
STATOTHR
ASIA LZTTEIL I
Approved For Release 2001/03/114cl,Wp80-01601R000
NEW DESTINATION: Air America, which has had its Asia headquarters in
Taiwan for many years, is relocating its main .operations to Thailand.
The airline---often referred to as the Central Intelligence Agency's
(CIA's) air arm---has been tied in with Taiwan's old Civil Air Transport (CAT)
complex, which includes Air Asia, for management and operational'purposes.
CAT doesn't operate its own planes anymore but provides management services
for others. It's Air Asia arm is the biggest aircraft maintenance operation
in the Far East. Both will stay in Taiwan.
Word about the Air America move has just leaked out. We'll have a more
detailed report on what the move is all about and what it means in a later '
issue.
:y
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000900090001-6
??
PHILArALPIIIA They Want Out CIA militarization has
Rprovbcrbr Refeasd 2 /04.: tetAaRE08040 $6,01 ROO
BUT T E ing more than to escape the the Lao Toting. But the once
SGU and the war, return to prosperous Meo have been
E ? 634,371 their villages and families, decimated by the CIA's mili- n
S ? 701,743
0 1 f. titt.
OLT 1 0 1972
and grow rice. tary programs.
. s The deterrent to escape was The tens of thousands of un-
? the Royal Lao Army ? 26 willing and unknowing tribes-
,. years in the Royal Lao Army. men helicoptered up to the
: Military service is compel- Plain of Jars each dry season
Lo llrremilars s.fory 13-year-old
all nlaidles. of i 151 though since 1968 have been cut to
d
Get More Aid
Thi ejars
By JOHN EVERINGHAM
Special to' The Bulletin
Phou Dum, Laos ? The
twin antennae of a small U.S
communications transmltte
sticks up from a lonely moun
lain top '10 miles' northwest o
the village 'of Luang Prabang
in northern Laos.. .
According to a Thai civilian
emploSied by Air America
(under contract to the CIA) to
maintain the ? installation, i
Provides the ? U.S. military
with communications between
northern Laos and the U.S. air
base at Udorn, Thailand.
! Pro-Communist Pathet Lao
f orces control everything
north and west of the moun-
tain, beginning just a few hun-
dred meters from the trans-
mitter.
Not 'Irregular'
The 400 Lao Teung (moun-
taILLao) "irregulars" at the
ipaallation are among the 30,-
000 mountain villagers who
form the backbone of the
CIA's no longer secret army
in Laos, an army that is vir-
tually Independent of Laotian
eontral.
Officials refer to them as
!Irregulars," but they are
fulltim e, highly trained
troops. The Special Guerilla
Units (SGU) are given credit
o r the Vientiane govern-
ment's not having lost control
.Of the whole country. Commu-
nist forces occupy three-
fourths of Laos.
:? How did these mountain sol-
diers wind up in an American
army?
? "Money," I was told over
and over again on a repent
'overnight visit to the moun-?
lain. (Chances of a journalist
being given a lift aboard the
'American ? helicopter that'
serves the mountain are about
Oun'tialliens hi e agt?diPpr Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000900090001-6
Ito .111.old eirnehe II drafted,
Wi )11enough
shelling.
And
communist guns an
And once a soldier, the only Barely 10 percent of the
way out is bribery or
until you're 40. Twenty-six
serving Meo % survive in their tradi-
years in the Royal Lao Arm tional mountain-top homes: As
is risk" at the very best odds.
y recruiting teams munist lines, they were bomb-
A r .
reach even remote villages, ed by the Americans.
: 1?ls, national
Dispatch News Service Inter- ;(../
getting in by helicopter where .
:trucks won't go.
, It isn't hard to see why
'those who' had the chance
r opted for being an "American
_ .soldier" instead. "American
1-Army" pay begins at 12,500
kip per month ($15); Lao
:army at 4,500 per month ($5).
? : Food too, I was assured,
was far better and more
plentiful, chiefly because the
t Americans deliver it them-
'selves.- Even big jars of local
firewater whisky are occa-
sionally given out.
In battle, SGU troops have
access to 'superior weapons
and a more reliable flow of
ammunition than their broth- ,
ers in the Lao army. Air sup-
port comes faster and their
wounded are evacuated more
swiftly, said Lieutenant Olin
See, the company command-
? er.
More Respect
The Lao Teung speak of the
"American bosses" with more
respect than do the Meo SGUs
with whom they share these
highlands.
Before CIA militarization of,
111.1-Trtr?rrteritnta?in. tribes, the
Meo had a firmly established
socia I-political structure
which the CIA brushed aside.
But the Lao Teung were dis-
organized and scattered; and
the CIA had no need 'to inter-
fere with their traditional ?
leadership.
The Lao Teung's economic
position has always been well
below that of the Meo. Their
crops were less carefully ten-
ded and their livestock fewer.
Y their villages fell behind Com-
.
STATOTHR
iA
?
STATOTH R
BALT.I.M4E SUN
, . . Approved For Release 2001/03/041:0C3AgRee80701601R
U.S. aid .is' still ,n.ozi73fq
:,....4 s
,,,07 -.. .
glli b I b 0
LL,
o.
Il ?
? .. . Ipervismn, though- -others may i , . ,
It is known, though, that the ..., i
i In 1969-1970. a period M which ?..partly because many Ameri-
:i cgthar units "just grew"--
,
, By ARNOLD R. ISAACS 1 have faded across the border. i bombing has been very
Sun 'stall Correspondent The war quickly resumed, and i heavy.
Vientiane, Laos-L-The United so did American support. . . -- ' most bombing of North Viet- . eans felt the Royal I,ao Army
States ? role in the Indochina . In 1,964-1965, when the Ameri- nam was suspended, the sor- was simply too inept to be
war may have diminished?but cans launched full-set-ile - air .tie rate over Laos was re- in ide. into a eiyable fighting
'force. '.
not in Laos. war in Indochina and the ported. to have been 400 a day? . ,
No longer top secret but still North Vietnamese increased
a higher rate than. has ey .
"Has evolved",
partly. concealed.. from public their commitment of men and er been -reached over North. Viet-.
view, the American war effort arms to the battles in South nam. . "The situation has evolYed,
In the ground war, American ? . ? ,
said an ? American officer,
in support of the Lao govern- i Vietnam, the Laos war took on
Inuit remains as large as i a pattern that has remained Embassy officials, military at-- spetiking of the formation of
ever. Without it, U.S. and Lao i essentially unchanged ever tactics and Central Intelligence the irreguliir units, "and Fin
officials agree, the war against since, . _ Agency. personnel are deeply not sure our policy has evolved
Vietnamese allies would cal
the Pathet Lao and its North i. The- 1.I.S., seeking to tihr-cdc. involved in war planning. '1 'he la:vie-L.5, ix,ith . it is . it should
'- j e flof Counist troops U.S. Embassy spokesman' in
lapse not in months but possi- 1 th w o mmand supplies the llo Chi Vientiane, gives a military
bly in days. ? I Minh trail 'complex in eastern . _ ? .! . ..- . units. the U.S. pays mid equips
Along with ' the irregular
"They might last a couple of I Laos; briefing 'for correspondents ati
stepped up its supprt of
? battalions of "volunteers".
wecks without us," said.. an 1 Lao government troops th re_ 11.30 every morning. .. . i ,
i irom ' Thailand. Almost is civ officer. with long ex.1 turn for diplomatic silence on The briefings ? are. quite' de-1 thing about the Tind units is
perience in Laos. He grinned, i U.S. bombing of the trail. Thc tailed except on U.S. opera: ckissified, becztuse both the
.but he wasn.'t joking. A Lao Nor lb Vietnamese in turn in Hons. ',Fhough the .:spokesman
Colonel, asked how long it 'creased their aid to the Lao will often refer to air strikes Lao and Thai governments are, sensitive on. the subject. There
would take with continued out-', Communist forces in northern ? for example, ,he Will not say are sti to be about 12.000
side aid for the Lao 1.rmy to i Dios, co:11111111:in, ?thousanis of whose Planes yere flying . Thai troops in the cotintry
be able to defend itself, said 1 their own men to keep Lao them. ? " - now, .almost double the ? num- .
seriously: "Eight or 10 years". 1 government troops pinned
? supplies ? '. . ber present a year ago, i!
,
In support of the govern- down safely away from the , . , All suppl. ,
??? ---- - - ??r- Working with the Lzio forces
. ,
' menr s war effort, the U.S. is i appm.iches to the trail and On the ground, the U.S.:fu ?tccording to the U.S. Ern-
providing direct miliary aid of !North Vietnam's border. rushes all the weapons. ammu- bassy, are 320 U.S. advisers.
$3a0 million a year. This is In the ensuing years,' both nition and . supplies for the which does not seem a large
about 10 times the whole Lao : Washington and Hanoi at 50;000-man ?-Royal Lao ?Army number but actually represents
. national budget, - and almost ; tempted to hide the degree of ?which, despite the. U.S, aid, a far higher ratio of :1merican.
'twice the country's gross na- i theft involvement in Laos. '1 he 'still - is l'er.,artiod as ?poorly
a -
tional product. ? ? ,,North Vietnamese have. never .trained. badly?led and largely dvisers to local troops than
The aid totals do not include tacknowledged the presence of :ineffective except for defensive ? has existed for year.A.' in South
theft troops in the country? garrison duty. ' .." : . -' I Vietnam. ?
the cost of American bornbirvi,, ? ,
The main American effort It is not klIONVI1 how many
which is mounted from outside n?w -estimated to number
about 20.000. The Americans, has been with. the irregular Americans working for "the
Laos. Although rie present ex.
Hiough feeling their aid was units, , origimilly. ...organized,
'tent of bombing in Laos is not annex"?local slang for the
s and Justified by North Vietnam's trained, paid and- in. many
' known, fight er-homber CIA?are ? directly involved
violation of the Geneva agree. cases directed by the CIA. The
I3-52's have at times in the
past, reached sortie rates over ment, apparently felt it wolf.] irregular forces have grown to with military or paramilitary
Laos exceeding the highest be embarrassing..o .n_ .f i t
ervene , about 30,000 "men; and many 1 unit's. ?
ever reached over North Viet- openly while Hanoi continued- of them are Only very loosely 1 Between 300 and 400 Ameri-
nam. to dimy its role. - controlled by the Lao.militaryi cans provide logistical support
U.S. ald?to LaoS began in the Though an effort as large.- aS? command?a fact w w hich is no for Lao forces, mostly 'through
?1950's. During the confused the U.S. war in Laos could not giving sonic concern to the i
Air America, the CIA-financed
Warfare preceding the Geneva really be kept hidden, official governinent and to U.S. offi-
charter airline that flies troops
Conference of 1962, the Amen- secrecy was maintained for a aheadblealcseluosoel-dflitrge. to a possi-
! and - supplies throughout the
cans '. supplied nearly half a long time.. It was not until .
.,
billion dollars for militar_ sal- Mara., 1970, that President The origins or country Air America's hi Iii irregular!
? .
aries and equipment, adminis- NiXOn ' publicly acknowledgd forces areterg--and?transport planes,
still shrouded in i
.. w
tering the military assistance Amer n a
icaircra some of them ith the coitipi-
ft were bomb- secrecy, but the information ;
ing Laos, though the facts had available suggests that the ny's insignia but most un-
through a mission misleadingly
called the Pi o,ranis F.,-.,ilua- been knownlong before: - Americans did not intend, in marked, can he seen at sir
lion Office an the beginning, to create what tually every airstrip in Laos.
d manned by . FCW details ? -. has become .a parallel army. I
g
r ' Though. the .bombing is now , The .first units apparently were
clothes under the
military officers in civ ilian , .
guise (-4 officially admitted, few details ? formed by the CIA to wage'
"technicians"?an oper-?'?ion are made available. The num- i guerrilla warfare against thel
that foreshadowed later clan- ber of missions each clay, for i lin, chi
destine efforts. . example, is not disclosed nor 1: Nlinh trail-7-an activity
that might have embarrassed
When the Geneva Accords . are. weekly, monthly or m
even!
i the I.ao governent,. ? :which
ma thiss(;11.1 i
s, ,IIiits
iiE:l
iii,\,%-tiv-isi'iticLasrcalse.di'litQhe? war
*.banned foreign military aid. yearly totals. Presurnably
? withdrew 666 military advisers. since the Americans have f,ori! of. the All1CfiCanS and! North
affair
. ,. .
the Americans conscientiously is not. for security
Only ?1.0 of the b0,000 North years relelised Ii.lidY preCISC i Vietnamese. ? ? i
? VietriamAppritYvd-floriRjeitg0 4 . c '4'
IA' RDP80-101401R000900090001-6
. . :
Laos withdr w uncer Interna- ajr a ac :pow ? ...
? ,, t-
-Itional Control Commission su- and South Vietnam. American official sato, he ir
THE M1W-U.3E1h, N. J. DAILY JOURNAL
28 Nov 1972
' Approved For Relekse,?2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601
The fall'aSCO STATOTHR
(Former C,rcen }levet.
Capt. Robert F. Marasco
and seven other Special
Forces members were in.
volved in (inn of the majcr
controversies of the Viet
Main-War in when ac-
cused of murderilV. a triple
agent. Now a civilian in
Bloomfield, he spent many
hours bein interviewed by
Daily Journal reporter
Thomas Michaiski. recall-
ing events surrounding the
.,assassination that he says
DCVO' were made public),
Tt
MSi
111
wisamm????0411
_47A-1,1
in r
I) TV1
If7(0)11-in
mercurial chief of state. Were directed to Laos. SorlIF! to
Sihanouk was at that, lime the herder area and others
balancing the east, against the in Cambnclia.
west, attempting to maintain If we had the South
Cstnbodials independence Vietnamese in there, with u7.."
and in strop his conntuy clear Marasco explained, "Project,
of the Vietnam War. He did Gamma would have become
not. succeed, however. just another worthless unit
'Hanoi, at that time, became lihe '7-n many others."
ttonre demanding in its deal, It. was in April 19119 \viten
ines with Sihanouk as th(' (111.1N-en's triple identity came
Canimunisis built up large In light. The entire story,
base camps and underground marosen said, was never told.
arsenals in border areas. "f had a split camp." he
explained. "Myself and two
men were in one camp. I had
a sergeant., Alvin L. Smith Jr.,
who was at. another location.
setting up a team of
Vietnamese and Cambodians
of his own."
Cbuyen was Smith's
principal agent. Ultimately,
Marasco relieved Smith and
assumed total responsibility
for the second camp or "net."
Prior to the actual takeover,
however, :Marasco said he
handled Smith's net only in a
supervisory rapacity.
"Prince Sihanouk has al-
J3'. T110:k1A.S Mint Al..Sici kA a. 7 COOterlded that. there
,Ionrull Staff Writer were no VC nr North Vietnam-
Virtrar.p.,-.0 It11 le_a-ent
.- 177.P in Cambodia and that
0 Thai 1_12SbtYen wa',.; , camhndia was not used as a
'-'r-li. :-derectia_sals_.inat?e_d_hlill_be._ rrjup:P nr as a supply route."
Central Intelligence Agency in l\Iarasen said. "In 069
?-riTi-FITI..1-i-Tru-se 1:1-e.,-1;:,W)),-. teb Sihanouk was starting to Poole
much nicjarteyt_rela...... artlund, The was sayin,,'.. 'yeah,
-Itons ??i-t11-- PrutreNorndorn well, there may be a few.'
---sir.-1.1-,?ut., \., :in 5.85 Rdm,,n,E.., l'ltVi, were about. to send an
....tri71-t- The Cnmmunisls were American charge de-affairs In
-setting up base camps in Cam- Cambodia because relations
: 'India, Capt.. Robert, F. ere impt'oving," Marasco said.
Marasco
'tad Chinyon talked ah.out
savs.
This. plus the fact that the intelligence , operations in
CIA lcai-netd Chuyen was a. Carnhodia to the North?
Norlit?I let nante,,,e_ agent., Vi011atres'". it ' mistht have
resnItrd_ ji-L.....an ...order to affected relmtinns with 'Prince
'1V5-Fasjito__,and, his_wen "it; Sitlall?0L
. . _..?
"Chuyen also knew that
?
"Ile 1:Chnyeni was more Project Gamma was a uni?
dangerous without_ a rifle than lateral oncration and, did, in
100 i'en with rifles," Marasco fact. inform South Vietnam
abnut our highly classified
told The Daily Journal. "Ile
had 0)P konwledee, inieiti oPerations." :Marasco said.
genre :rid capability of killing Although the United Slatr!;
mant pronlo. . and South Vietnam were
?
'There was no difficull allies, the latter could not he
drcF41^n to 1n21,e. It W;4; OPP I rirti'd enott;11-1 for involve.
7.0%. 1,:ain,-.,i, , went in Proircl, Gamma,
_ .
1,41s7.0,!v tho,L-...v-rts of mar,,-4ro said.
AmeiAen GIs. There was no "We wantrd it. to he
_pow! f..- riisciissinn." successful," Marasco added.
(11v:aert knew Marasco's "It rout(' not h?-taT been avtill
ttheln:zranhir. eon! all the pIhin--; nun all tlir
tntinn-??in)s and othil. mirth ?k," might, have
grimed rquilltront , Moro found a'. ,air
itn;lor,,le'.. he alsn hnew 111,1i .d:o'n,-.co r:d1(1 Prnircf, rmr' lillT111011 the normal
Pr.aject GannAa tvas 1,er4r* i 1).1,1 nitir c,10-16-; P!or('S.;in herore hisf
After an emergency leave to
Florida when Smith's mother
died, the sergeant was
assigned In Nha TranZ Spectal
'Forces headquarters. One day
he was going through some
Second of 5 articles
captinted photographs from
another, unrelated operation.
One of the pictures. Marasco
sa:d, shnwrd a known Viet
Cuing general standing with his
arm arniind Chuyen, in a
friendly manner.
Maraseo was called from
the field and, after a inretirw,
it was decided to "run a
check" on Chuyen.
"We fannd that he it;id not
STATOTHR
STATOTHR
"Supposedly, it was hard to
collie 110 with enough
appointments with the guy
who ran the lie detector. . . it
.was tough to do it., so there
was always an OXOOSP as to
why it hadn't been done."
As it turned out, it was
discnverc.d that Chuyen had ?
been trained in North Vietnam
"in the equivalent, of our
CIA." Ile had arrived from
Hanoi in 1951.
During the early 19511's Ho
('hi Minh had allowed great.
numbers of people to migrate
to the south, Some of those
who settled in various hamlets
were,, Hi
agentsin fact,
whoNo
rth
'?,?'ricould
be called upon at any time to
perform a service.
Thus. it. is possible that
Chuven was an "inactive"
agent until 19(;8 when Hanoi
"Tapped him" for espionage
duties.
"Chuven came to us highly
recommended hy the South
Vietnamese," Marasco said.
"When took over Smith's
net. Chuyen had already been.
eFiabliShed as a principal
brought him to Nha
Trang. and eventually to
Saigon for questtontng,"
Maraaco aaid., "This was all
based on the photograph we
had found. We put him
through three he deicrtnr
examinations which he flunked
miserably."
It was early Jun. of 1141-19
when Chuyen's guise was
discovered, Between the time
Chin-en was hi-might from :Oa
Tran:z to Saigon.Marascn had
gone home in New .ler:-.ry on
emergency
"When my leave was-, no,"
he said. "I would have had
only four weeks to serve in
close pprove , ore,, ease 201011 3 4a:43KADP8041601.R000900090001-6
A proved F
PARIS) LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR
27 Nov - 3 Dec 1972
/04: CIA-RDP8-0-01601R00
O STATOTHR
0
N., I
N./
I I
STATpTHR
Michel: K. Lamberti el Catherine Lamour ont Jit le tour du monde. pour
remonter toutes les fiVres qui menent aux Vrais patrons de la drogue
? - 4 Si nous ne venons pas a bout de
cc Nan, mi qui vicndra a
flout de nous 1,, s'exclamait, le
17 juin 1971, le president Nixon devant
des dizaines de millions de telespectateurs.
Les Etats-Unis ont, en effet, le triste pri-
vilege de compter le plus grand nombre
d'horoinomanes du monde plus d'un
demi-million actuellement, dont trois cent
mile., pour la seule ville de New York.
Plus de 50 % des crimes perpetres dans
les grandes villes sont directement lies h la
.drogue : on tue pour se procurer l'argent
necessaire.. -yachat d'une dose d'heroIne.
Le phenomene,n!est pas settlement ameri-
cain : tous les pays europeens voient croitre
une vitesse vertigineuse le nombre de
leurs herolnomanes. En France, oilt la pe-
metration de la drogue n'a ete sensible qu'a
partir de 1968, on en compte &jilt vingt
(
mule. Et le ministere de la Sante estime?
que le pays pourrait .compter cent mile
heroinomanes en 1976.
Couper la source
? La drogue n'ast plus un simple pro-
bleme de police. Partant du principe evi-
dent, expos?ernierernent a un journaliste
americain de c U.S. News and World
Report ) par l'ancien directeur des Dona-
hes americaines, Myles J. Ambrose, et scion
lequel c on ne pent pas devenir toxico-
mane si l'on ne troetve pas de stupe-
fiants ), :Washington a decide de remon-
-te a la sourde, c'est-a-dire a la produc-
tion' meme, de l'opium, dont Pherolne est
up derive. ?
? Couper la source d'approvisionnement
des trafiquants, c'est intervenir dans les
?affaires des pays producteurs : de poli-
ciere, la lutte contre la toxicomanie est
devenue politique. Se posant une fois de
Plus en .c gendarmes du monde 3. mais,
.cette fois, pour une cause dont personne
no songe a discuter le bien-fonde, les Etats-
Unis se sont lances dans une croisade que
d'aucuns jugent d'avance vouee a l'echec.
On produit, en diet, chaque annee, dans
le monde, assez d'opium pour approvision-
ner les cinq cent mile heroinomanes am&
ricains pendant cinquante ans : deux a
trols mile tonnes, dont la moitie seule-
ment est destinee a rindustrie pharmaceu-
tique. Le reste passe sur le marche entre
les mains des trafiquants qui approvision-
nent les fumeurs d'opium et les heroIno-
manes.
Les trafiquants peuvent se fournir 5: deux
sources differentes :
O 1) Les pays danslesquels la culture du
pavot est legale et contrOlae par l'Etat,
mais o? une partie de la recolte echappe
aux autorites administratives.
? 2) Les pays dans lesquels la culture
du pavot est en principe interdite, mais
qui n'ont pas les moyens materiels et poll-
tiques ?.ou le desir ? de faire respecter
cette loi. ?
La Turquie, troisieme producteur mon-
dial, entrait dans la premiere . categoric.
Jusqu'a cc que le gouvernement d'Ankara
decide de 'proscrire la culture du pavot
sur tout le territoire turc a partir de 1972,
25 e,lo de la production d'opium etait de-
tournee vers le marche clandestin, alors
qu'elle aurait dii. en principe, etre entiere-.
me:nt achetee par l'Etat. Ce pays n'est pas
le seul a connaitre pareil probleme. tine
enctuete effectuee par le service strategi-
que des renseignements du Bureau des?Nar-
cotiques americain (B.N.D.D.) donnatt,
pour 1971, les chiffres suivants. :
Production
(1) ocoulee
SUr
le mambo
licit?
Production
acoulee
sur
le marche
clandestin
Turquie
lode
Pakistan
150
1 200
6
35 a 50
.? 250.
175-200
Iran .
150
U.R.S.S.
115
Republique popu-
laire de Chine
100
Yougoslavie
0,83
1,7
Japon ?
5
Triangle d'or
(Thailande - Bir-
manie - Laos)
750
Afghanistan
100-150
Mexique
5-15
(I) En tonnes.
Contrairement a cc que Pon pourrait
penser, les c fuites ne sont pas propor-
tionnelles a l'importance de la production
licite ni a cello des superficies cultivees
en pavot. Elles dependent du plus o
moms grand sous-developpement admin?
tratif du pays concerne et de la capacit
des autorites locales a exercer un control
effectif sur les paysans.. au moment cit
recoltes.
Pourtant, memo des controles rigot
reux ne suffisent pas a eviter les detou
nements. compte tenti de la difference dc
prix pratiques sur le marche officiel et st
le marche clandestin. L'exemple de l'Inc
le prouve, oil, en depit d'un s:ysteme c
contrOle gouvernemental cite en. exemp
par toutes les instances internationales,
fuites s'elevent a 18 % de la preclude
totale. La Yougoslavie laisserait Cchappl
pres de 70 % de sa production. Le Paid
tan, enfin, qui .produit leg:dement six toi
nes d'opium, contribuerait pour pies
deux cents tonnes a l'approvisionnemel
des trafiquants.
Le pavot peIrtellit
Dans une deuxieme categoric de pa)
la production de l'opium est llegate.
n'existe evidemment aucun organisn
d'Etat charge de controler tine productic
qui, en principe, n'existe pas. Clandestin
la recolte d'opium est entierement ecoul
sur le marche parallele..Selon le B.N.D.L
ces pays contribueraient pour huit cent ci
quante a mile tonnes a l'approvisionn
ment du trafic.
D'autres regions, sur lesquelles on
possede absolument aucune informatic
produisent de l'opium en quantite apt)!
ciable : le Nepal et, probablement, la Syl
et le Kurdistan irakien. On signale'
l'apparition de champs de pavots en Air
rique du Sud. Contrairement a cc que
a sotivent affirme, la culture du pavot
requiert pas de conditions geographiqu
ou climatiques exceptionnelles. Elle racial-
seulement une main-d'ceuvre abondante
bon marche car la recolte demande bea
coup de soins et de minutie.
Nombre de pays qui ne sent pas c
producteurs traditionnels d'opium p01
raient, le voulaient, se mettre a cultiN
du pavot. C'est le cas tout recent du
pon. La production d'opium a, de cc
tendance a croitre en fonction de la c
mande et pourrait encore augmenter con
derablement. Des indices nombreux
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000900090001-6
-NAI0N STAtOTH
Approved For Release 2001A7OP:VCIEWARDRERI
PYRRHIC PLOY
Elrodmramm CAL2Derom
E. W. I?P'EnTrER
Mr. PfeiDer is professor of zoology at the University of
Montana and a co-author of Harvest of Death: Chemical
Warfare in Indochina (Free Press/Macmillan). He visited
Cambodia in 1969 and 1971 and was in Hanoi in 1970.
While on a visit to Hanoi in June 1970 my two compan-
ions. and I met with Premier Pham Van Dong. During the
conversation, I asked the Premier to evaluate Nixon's in-
vasion of Cambodia which had occurred one month ear-
lier. His .answer was straightforward: "It makes things
very favorable for the success of our revolution." By
"our revolution" I supposed him to mean the revolution
of the Indochinese people 'against foreign invaders.
. How well does Premier Pham Van Doug's 1970 evalu-
ation accord with the situation of Cambodia in late 1972?
Redent dispatches from Indochina suggest that he knew
what he was talking about. According to the A.P. (Sep-
tember ? 1), only one-third of Cambodia is still under
"Kilmer Republic" control. It has been revealed that the
lanks used in the fall offensive against the An Loc area,
(only a short distance from Saigon) came from the Chup
Rubber Plantation and nearby areas in Cambodia. These
are the very areas that President Nixon characterized
In April 1970 as "Communist sanctuaries" that must be
cleaned out.
-? Two factors have been principally responsible for the
failure of Nixon's Cambodian policies. First, the Presi-
dent Wa-S badly misinformed about past U.S.-Cambodian-
Vietnamese relations and about the situation on the Viet-
namese-Cambodian border prior to the March 1970
change in the Cambodian Government. For instance, in
his speech of April 30, 1970, announcing the U.S. -irt-
Nasion ,of the Fishhook region of Cambodia, Mr, Nixon
stated: "Tonight American and South Vietnamese units
will -attack the headquarters for the entire Communist
'unitary operation in 'South Vietnam. This key control
center has been occupied by the North Vietnamese and
VietcOng for five years in blatant violation of Cambodia's
neutrality." Mr. Nixon, standing in front of a map of
. Cambodia, put his finger on the little town of Wilmot as
he made this accusation. That puzzled me a great deal,
for I had spent two days in and around Mimot about
four months before the U.S.' attack, and knew it to be
controlled by French and Cambodian rubber interests.
Malty Europeans were working there, and some of them
(e.g., a Belgian plant pathologist) were in complete
sympathy with the American effort in South Vietnam.
These Europeans were living with their wives and chil-
dren in an environment of complete tranquillity.. We
asked many of them Whether they. had seen any sign
..of North Vietnamese or Vietcong activity and they all
answered no.
My colleague A. H. Westing and I had visited the re-
gion to insect the damag.e_dow. iqy a clandestine defolia-
tion raid APPNI(Pgi it9Fint1504,P192.04.1AVQ4st
200,000 acres of eastern Cambodia. According to a letter
I. received some months later from Sen. Fiank Church,
the raid was carried out by Air America, a CIA airline,
for what purposes we still do not know. After the raid,
the Sihanouk regime asked that American officials visit
the region, with a view to making reparations for. the
'damage. Although the U.S. Government to this day offi-
cially denies having carried out this operation, it did send
.a team of experts, including Charles Minarik of the Chem-
ical Warfare Laboratories, U.S. Army, into the Mirnot
region shortly after the raids. This team's report describes
how they were flown over the region, driven 'through it,
and how they walked in it?just as Westing and I did
some months later. It is inconceivable to me that the
North Vietnamese and Vietcong, who according to Nixon
controlled the area, would have permitted an official U.S.
Government team to wander through what Nixon called
"the headquarters for the entire Communist military op-
erations in South Vietnam." After the invasion began it
was widely reported that no key control center could
be found. Some arms caches were reportedly uncovered
and, of course, -a great deal of rice. The rice did not'
greatly surprise me, since at the time we were there, the
main occupation, in addition to tapping rubber, was har-
vesting rice.
When speaking about the Cambodian "Communist
sanctuaries," Mr. Nixon failed to mention that, on orders
of Prince Sihanouk, troops of the Royal Cambodian
Army had in' fact swept these areas about three months
before his invasion. The troops were led by Prince Sink
Matak, a loyal American prot? and one of those later
involved in Sihanouk's overthrow. Sihanouk ordered
Matak to search' out and destroy all Communist-Viet-
namese positions in Cambodia. Paul Bennett of the Cam-
bodian desk of the State Department informed me in an
interview, March 22, 1971: "A Cambodian Army opera-
tion began in January of 1970 in a northeastern province
at approximately the time when Sihanouk left for France
and when Prince Sink Matak was Acting Prime Minister.
They sent up a number of additional battalions, among
the better troops in the Cambodian* Army,- and carried
out a series of small sweeps generally in this area. They
did have, as I recall, a number of contacts with small
V.C. and North Vietnamese units. They found and de-
stroyed- a number of small supply* dumps, -a relatively
small campsite, but there Was no major contact with the
main North Vietnamese forces." Where were the thou-
sands of North Vietnamese troops that Nixon said had
occupied the area for five years?
Besides ,being mistaken about the nature of the
sO-called Communist sanctuaries in eastern Cambodia,
Mr. Nixon grossly misrepresented the facts when he
stated that "American policy since 1954 has been to
scrupulously respect the neutrality of Cambodia. . . .
North Vietnam, however, has not respected that neutral-
. 1 I LiAtile KA 11 *
0)gitrD Qr. riper plan-
tk0 MeV bVV;"*4 WY.l.",,W311olation of
WASHINGTON STAI1
Approved For Release 2001/0110141 d-RD313,410601
52 Raids Calle
Signal
By EDITH M. LEDERER
Associated Press
SAIGON ? U.S. B52 bomb-
ers continued their heaviest
raids of the war over North
Vietnam yesterday.
The North Vietnamese For-
eign Ministry issued another
statement condemning the
bombing attacks, and Ameci-
can military sources indicated
the raids were a signal to Ha-
noi that the United States will
not stop its bombing below the
20th Parallel until a peace
agreement is reached. The
peace talks have gone into re-
,cess until Dec. 4.
U.S. officials disclosed, that
secend B52 was damaged in
'a surface-to-air missile attack
last week that claimed the
:first 1352 combat loss of the
. Vietnam war. None of the six
crewmen on the damaged
plane was injured but two of
the six crewmen on the
downed aircraft were hurt.
U.S. officials In Vientiane,
Laos, also disclosed that an
Air America C7 Caribou cargo
plane flying in support of Lao-
tian irregular forces, was shot
down by enemy antiaircraft
fire Thursday, killing two
Americans, a Thai and a Lao.
?Air America is backed by the
7" U.S. Central Intelligence
c>
Agency.
? 10th Lost in 5 Days
The Air America plane was
the 10th American aircraft lost
in Indochina in five days, one
of the heaviest tolls in several
months. Six Americans were
killed, 11 rescued and three
are missing in the crashes.
As reports circulate in Paris
of serious differences between
U.S. and Hanoi negotiators,
the North Vietnamese Foreign
Ministry said the B52 attacks
."laid bare the deceitfulness of
the Nixon administration's
professed desire to end its
? military involvement and re-
store peace."
? In South Vietnam, tens of
thousands of marchers demon-
strated along a 50-mile stretch
of Highway 4 in an anti-
Communist protest to show
that the government is in con-
trol of the main road through
? The Air Force credited the
pilot of the downed B52 witlj
saving top-secret electohi
equipment from falling into
to Hanoi'
The marchers carried flags
and banners demanding that
North Vietnamese troops get
out of South Vietnam and de,
claring that "coalition with the
Communists is suicide."
During tte 24-hour period
ending at noon yesterday, the
U.S. command reported 14
more B52 missions against
North Vietnamese targets be-
low the 20th Parallel. Sources
said that brought to more than
200 the number of missions
against the North in the last
five days, the heaviest B52
raids of the war in the North.
The U.S. command said the
attacks were centered on sup-
ply caches awaiting shipment
to Laos and South Vietnam.
But the North Vietnamese -
claim the Stratofortresses ere
bombing populated areas and
causing heavy civilian casual-
ties and damage.
President Nixon baited
bombing above the 20th Paral-
lel Oct. 23 in a move adminis-
tration officials described as a
good-will gesture following an-
nouncement of thedraft
cease-fire agreement.
Less than three weeks later,
air strikes were intensified be-
low the 20th Parallel to count-
er what American officials de-
scribed as an intensive North
Vietnamese supply buildup.
Heavy Ground Fighting
Since monsoon rains have
sharply curtailed strikes by
smaller fighter-bombers, the
B523 have undertaken the bur-
den of the bombing mission in
North Vietnam's southern pan-
handle.
On the ground, heavy fight-
ing continued in the central
highlands 15 to 20 miles south-
west of Pleiku City. SheIlings
were reported at Dalat in the
highlands and at Cu chi base
camp 18 miles northwest of
Saigon. No casualties were re-
ported.
the MeknoWilleiVed, For Release 2001/03/04:
?
North Vietnamese hands.
The Air Force praised Capt.
Norbert J. Ostrozny, SO, of
Lackawanna, N.Y., for guiding
the crippled bomber from
North Vietnam into friendly
territory before it crashed.
U.S. officials said a SAM
rnissile exploded 150 feet off
the right wing of Ostrozny's:
aircraft near the North Viet,.
namese port of Vinh. Frag-
ments of the Soviet-built mis-
sile set two outboard engines
afire. They fell off and the
two inboard engines then
failed, dooming the big air-
craft.
CIA-RDP80-01601R000900090001-6
NEW YORK TIMES
Approved. For Release 2001/03011103/IfigFEbP80-01
STATOTHR
1-Enemy Military Leaders to Show Respect,'
- By MALCOLM W. BROWNE ? i
f1ACi ftl to the New York Times
- ? VIENTAINE, Laos, Nov. 25
'--, There were ferris wheels
and Charlie Chaplin movies
and horse races and canacn
dancers and a one-legged
American stunt pilot to
? entertain both royalty and .
revolutionaries at the That
Luang Fair.
The annual fair, which
ended today, is a two-week
festival just outside Vientiane,
in which this. little country's
.:citizens gather to reaffirm
their faith in Buddhism and
fealty to the King.
It is also an occasion for
. 'spectacular displays of the
kind of fraternizing between
enemies that has led some
? outsiders over ?the years to
conclude that the war in Laos
is not to be taken seriously.
It was taken for granted
, this year that the- Commu-
-nist-led Pathet Lao delega-
tion currently in Vientiane
., would loin enemy military
leaders of the Vientiane Gov-
ernment in prostrating them-
,. selves before King. Savang
Vatthana, and the public was
not disappointed.
'Asked why the Pathet Lao
had participated in the an-
nual profession of loyalty to
the King, their spokesman,'
. Set Petrasy, replied:
I "We participate in religious
, festivals because of our wish
to show respect for the cus-
toms and religion of our
' country."
Nine nations contributed
small pavilions to the fair
this year, mainly to show
photographs of life in those
? Countries. ,
Bow to a King at a Fair n Laos
The French pavillion of-
fered a juggling act and
dancing the Soviet pavillion,
showed moN, les of World War
II on an outdoor screen and
the South Vietnamese dis-
played lacquerware, nuoc
fish sauce and other prod-
ucts. "
But as King Savang Vat-
thana and the royal entour-
age, accompanied by the
Premier, Prince Souvanna
Phouma, made the rounds of
the pavilions, the first stop
was at the relatively elabo-
rate American pavilion,
Inside, there were movies
of astronauts, recorded music
and a model of Niagara Falls.
The King paused politely
before each exhibit as it was
explained by Ambassador G.
McMurtie Godley. The diplo-
matic corps that followed
the King into the pavilion did
not include the Russians or
Chinese; they waited outside.
As the King emerged, the
Americans treated him to a
show that captured the at-
tention of most of the tens-
of thousands of people on the
fair grounds. ,
Roaring out of the sultry
low overcast was a tiny white
biplane that pulled up just
over the King in a spectacular
display of acrobatics.
The King, the crown prince
and the Premier seemed to
be enjoying the show, but for
some of the spectators, the
show was not without em-
barrassment.
Word i was spread that the
pilot of the plane was James
H. Rhyne, a pilot of Air
America, the quasi-military
airline operated by the Cen- ?
tral Intelligence Agency.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000900090001-6
PHILADELPHIA, PA.
INGZIER
Approved For Ilelease 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0
- 465,503
- 86.7,810
Nov 9 1972
:
n - - ?/1,, 4 ,
't -7 %?"Lj
;.- --? 7 -71, roaa
'1
?
STATOTHR
Li ;1 ?
Si? 1 I 1
! r1;
r, 1.'r, '. - i. ' i i ; : '-. !,' 1 1. 0 Cr? i I -I, i
-- 1 (-_--a ? a I ''''''' I i I - - ? ---- " - . .i i.
H
H L, - i 1 I. ,, 1 ,., ?
".. ?_ ?...., .: .,.
;.. .... .. I.,. , il .1
L.1 ,i,....iL....-_,,..1 Li \,........ \ L..-
By Richard E. Ward
In Laos the Nixon doctrine of using bombs and dollars to support -
reactionary forces is suffering serious setbacks.
The booths which primarily kill and maim civilians have not been
able to slop or blunt the line ration forces led by the Lao Patriotic
Front (Pat bet Lao). Arid sharply increased U.S. militaty aid to its
mercenaries in Laos has not been able to raise the morale of these
forces still experiencing heavy losses annually, especially in recent
years.
Once the pro-U.S. mercenary force of 30,000, directed and
financed by the CIA, con skied almost entirely of Lao minoriiies,
mainly Meo, led by the Meo Gen. Vang Pao. Now after a decade of
operations the Meos have been bled white in the service of the U.S.
and no amount of money can replenish their ranks in Vang Pao's
forces. The CIA has had to turn to other minorities and to
"volunteers" from the military forces of Thailand to fight for the
U.S. in Laos...
Thai troops now constitute the majority of Vang Pao's secret
army which operates virtually independent of the Vientiane
government. Their orders come from the U.S. embassy and in
particular from ambassador G. MeMurtrie Godley, who relishes
informal titles like field marshal and procounsul given to him by the
press.
Offeusive bogged down
Vang, Pao's mercenary troops are now engaged in their annual
offensive. This drive, which began in mid-August, is reportedly
'bogged down and being turned back .by the Pathet Lao earlier than
ever before, even during the present rainy season when virtually all
advantages are with the pro-U.S. forces.
The main CIA-backed operations customarily begin during the
rainy season because during that period ground transportation, the
only means available to liberation forces, is extremely difficult at
best and in sonic regions even impossible. While the liberation.
forces must fight under this disadvantage, the CIA's mercenaries
have U.S. aircraft providing transport and logistical support as well
as tactical and strategic bombing support.
But despite these advantages, Vang Pao's troops are engaged in
what is probably their weakest offensive ever. Starting from Long
Cheng, the once top-secret CIA base, Vang Pao's troops have.
moved against the Plain of Jars. Detailed information has been
entirely withheld from the press, an indication that the drive is
failing, which is the conclusion of few assessments made by Western
press sources.
In a report in theSept. 2.3 Far Eastern Economic Review, D.E.
Ronk, writing from.. Vientiane, noted the disparity between official
U.S. claims that Vang Pao was making satisfactory progress and the
reality "that (progress) if any ... is being made at a snail's pace."
Ronk adds that Vang Pao's forces scattered around the edges
of the Plain of Jars are being hit hard, while "progress toward the
plain itself has been slow, to say the least; probably it has now
stopped." As for the near future Ronk, an experienced observer in
Laos, writes:
Precarious hold
"Most observers in Vientiane, including military men, are
concerned for the safety of Long Cheng while Vang Pao's best
troops are on the offensive. Long Cheng's defenses are being
ritt rOitedviPareRO/tegi$W2001/0
manned bymm
by Coun pp
ist o es This year, \ am, r ao's map 011t
-I fl r7;1 r7Li
.?
I
-I 1 1 : i
1. 1 ! -\,-2,-
)
I [ , 1. '-, r 1 0.-1
L' -I ,i ''- ri . '
,.. '
_.,....-i ,..,........,,.._
STATOTHF
munist hands. Few in Vientiane would be surprised if the Com-
munists managed to sweep Long Cheng-Sarri Thong into their
control before the end of the current rains, then turned on Vang
Pao's isolated forces around the plain 20 miles to the northeast."
Last winter, liberation forces mounted a three-month siege of
Long Cheng during which the CIA-mercenary base was evacuated
for a period. The siege Was maintained in the face of unprecedented
U.S. bombing and despite wide deployment of Thai troops -who
suffered heavy casualties. The heavy losses taken by the reactionary
troops; including Vang Pao's Meo forces, has caused serious morale
problems among all their elements.
. For leading the Meo into disasters year after year, the CIA and -
Vang Pao are meeting increasing resistance to recruiting among the
relatively few able-bodied potential soldiers left among the Meo,
who once readily took tip arms for relatively high mercenary wages
in impoverished Laos. Those still in uniforms are, according to the
New York Times correspondent Fox Butterfield, "bedeviled by
exhaustion after many years of war...."
Butterfield, in a Sept. 27 dispatch, confirms the dismal outlook
for the pro-U.S. forces in, a ,report sent front the Long. Cheng
headquarters at Vatig Pao: Although the general appeared
"energetic," Butterfield states that his troops are "reportedly
exhausted by last spring's fighting and afraid of the Communists'
newly introduced 130-mm long-range guns."
? One feature of the current fighting is that the liberation forces did
not fall back during the rainy season, leaving many units in place. In
past years, Vang Pao's advances and "victories" were generally
achieved with virtually no opposing forces on the scene and his
forces could entrench themselves -before having to face the
liberation troops.
;
Fill (he breech
It is doubtful that Thai forces will be able to fill the breech of the
depleted ranks of Vang Pao's troops. The U.S. is currently spending
at least $100 million to support Thai troops in Laos, but despite their
IlleFCellary wages of many times the pay of regular 'iii ii troops, the
heavy fighting has reportedly dampened their enthusiasm. One
indicator of this is a 30 percent desertion rate among Thai troops in
Laos. -
Secrecy still . enshrouds many aspects of U.S, operations in Laos,
apparently in order to disguise violAtion of Congressional
restrictions. Congress has prohibited -the U.S. -from financing
mercenaries recruited outside Laos. The Nixon administration
sidestepped that barrier by calling the Thai troops and airmen in
Laos "volunteers." The Thai government denies any role although it
allows recruiting from the regular armed services and supplies Thai
officers to command the CIA units in Laos. The charade is main-
tained by giving the Thais Laotian names and Laotian military
identification cards.
In a preface to a Senate Foreign relations committee report
issued in May, Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) observed that the
administration was violating the Congressional ban cm the use of
Thai troops in Laos. Ile said that Congress had virtually no control
over CIA programs, in part, because of Congressional abdication of
responsibility as well as because of administration furtive?ess.
"It is a fact," stated Symington,"that not only the American
people, but even the proper committees of Congress, have not been
? given much detail of our use of Thai irregulars in Laos. .. . This is
4"4YCIALR OLO1z304R0009000900G1u6ns of dollars of aP-
Lorigtsropriated monies ale involved."
Cheng-Sam Thong defense line is precarious, at hest, with most of
- the outer line ten miles north and northeast of the base in Corn-
tontinued
THE FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW
Approved For Release 2001/03104 :1(11A-RDPSD6C11110FI1RO
THE CALM
IN THE EYE
OF .A STORM
Houei Sai: Air America-US AID base
operations at the airport here waggish-
ly identifies itself as "Houei Sai Inter-
national." But on detailed maps of
Laos the only maps on which it ap-
pears ? this place is still shown as
"Ban Houei Sai" ? a village. Today
Houei Sai is both village and interna-
tional settlement, and many other
things besides: regional supply centre,
Mekong River port, customs and immi-
gration point, tourist by-road and, ac-
cording to the grapevine, headquarters
for a substantial spy network.
Houa Khong Province, in which
Houei Sai is located, is no stranger to
flux or intrigue. Bordered on the
northeast by China (Yunnan), on the
west and southwest by Burma and on
the southeast by Thailand, the pro-
vince has been the home in recent cen-
turies of a large number of tribal peo-
ples pressed generally southward. Its
hills, for example, have provided sub-
sistence to increasing numbers of
Sinitic peoples including Yao, Lahu,
Ikau and various Miao 'groups who
have entered Laos through Yunnan ?
or indirectly, through Burma-- in the
past 150 years. Its valleys have shelter-
ed lowland groups such as the Thai
Dom and the Lue peoples.
Yet Houei Sai itself seems an unlike-
ly candidate for international noto-
riety. Situated on the Mekong in the
southernmost corner of the province,
" its only road link with the rest of Laos
? even when the country was nominal-
ly united ? was through the capital at
Louang Nam Tha. In recent years,
approximately two-thirds of the pro-
vince including Nam Tha has been
firmly in the hands of the Pathet Lao;
today, Pathet Lao or Thai communists
. (or both) exercise control over Me-
kong River traffic east and southwest
from Pekbeng. Houei Sai thus is com-
pletely cut off from surface contact
with the rest of the country. As a con-
sequence, while postal communica-
tions and some urgent supplies reach
here from Vientiane by air, the prin-
cipal supply route is through Thailand.
In fact, with Thai-Laotian border con-
trols extApprOvedifeir Release 200
Laotian side of the river find it a sim- ?
ple matter to do their trading in Thai-
land, at Chieng Khong or Chieng Rai.
And most transactions here seem to be
in baht, not in L,oatian kip.
Paradoxically, the war, which com-
pleted Houei Sai's isolation from the
rest of Laos, has also raised it import-
ance ? if not to Laos itself at least to
the Americans. US concern with Pe-
king's assistance to Hanoi and to the
other communist forces in Indochina
undoubtedly led Washington several
years ago to undertake surveillance of
Chinese activities in Yunnan. (The
Chinese-built road from Yunnan to
Muong Sai and from Nluong Sai to
Pakbeng ? and ultimately, it would
seem, to the Thai border ? is evidence
of China's similar concern with deve-
lopments in the region.) Because of its
proximity to China and also its mino-
rity groups with Yunnan ties, Houa
Khong was a "logical" base for espion-
age activities directed at the Yun
Ching area. And for security and stra-
tegic reasons, Ilouei Sai, with its ready
access to northern Thailand, offered
the only reasonable centre from which
to operate the multiple activities that
make up the intelligence operation in
northern Laos.
The changes in the international
political situation have produced some
changes here (although fewer than one
might expect). Since the partial rap-
prochement early this year, Washing-
ton has been under some compulsion
to avoid the kind of espionage acti-
vities within China that it once might
have undertaken; at the same time, it
has less reason for concern regarding
developments at the border. On the
other hand, there are large numbers of
Chinese ? a recent estimate said
20,000 ? currently engaged in build-
ing a road not far east of Ilouei Sai.
When completed, this road could well
sever this area permanently from the
rest of Laos.
For reasons that are not hard to
conjecture, the US has made no at-
tempt to interrupt the construction of
the road. But it is intensely aware of
the Chinese presence here in northern
Laos. Whether or not the US mission
continues to send spies into Yunnan, it
is certain that it continues to collect
intelligence on Chinese and North
Vietnamese activities here.
The Yao people, many of whom are
fluent in the Haw dialect and whose
written language utilises Chinese ideo-
graphs, have been employed most fre-
quently to gather information on the
Yunnanese. But it is probable that all
of the tribal peoples and particularly
those classed as refugees have been
used as informers to some degree.
Even liouei Sai's small colony of Lahu,
who come from Burma, owe their new
houses and their air of prosperity, we
are told, to their diligence in passing
information to the Americans.
The presence of a significant num-
ber of tourists passing through Houei
Sai seems'to support the claim that the
immediate area is quite secure. (These
are generally students and other young
people en route from Luang Prabang
to Chieng Rai ? either through Chieng
Khong,. directly across the Mekong, or
via Chieng Saen, five hours up-river by
boat and almost on the Burma bor-
der.) But there is another aspect to the
security picture here. As the tourist
traffic indicates, the major highways
between here and Chieng Rai have not
been seriously threatened. In June,
however, both Chieng Khong district
and Chieng Kharn to the south were
declared sensitive areas by the Thai
Communist Suppression Operations
Command and hill peoples in the re-
gion ordered to move out. At the same
time, military operations against Thai
insurgents were stepped up. In many
ways, Ilouei Sai's calm today, it seems,
could he equated with that in the eye
of a storm.
It is doubtful that the Vientiane
Government is much concerned with
Houei Sai today. (Concerning its eco-
nomic potentialities, one AID official
says cynically: "The French took the
wrong side of the river.") It has bigger
problems, much closer to Vientiane.
For the Americans, the Thais and
SEATO, however, Houei Sai is in a cr1-
6101 R000910009O1Pse.
- trrances Starner
'USE T T ON POST STATOTHR
, .
Approved For. Release 2001/03104CTC1N2RpP807016_01 R000
VIENTIANE, Laos -L. Still savoring "They weren't ten deep for the Laos assignment,
but I just pinch myself daily when I think I'm
being paid for doing this.,"
his cigar after a three-course
luncheon washed down with French
wines, G. McMurtrie Godley answered
the telephone, postponed his tennis
game, dashed to his sedan and was
driven off at top speed.
"Wheatburner 50 to Wheatburner
Base," he intoned into the car's radio-
telephone, "heading for airport ? ten-
four." The rush mission of American
Ambassador Godley on an otherwise
sleepy recent afternoon in the Laotian
capital turned out to be a false alarm
of sorts. There was just a chance that
three captured American pilots North
.; Vietnam had agreed to release might
be on board the regular weekly Aero-
flot flight which was arriving from
Hanoi ahead. of schedule. And "Mac"
Godley wanted to be on hand just in
ease the men accepted, his personal
suggestion they disembark and accept
U.S. government transportation home
rather ,than continue in the company
of their antiwar chaperones.
While Russians in sports shirts and
North Vietnamese in pith helmets and
business suits streamed off the
Ilyu-
shin 18, Godley saw that the pilots
were not among the passengers, got
back into the ear and headed home to
change for tennis. "Forty-five minutes
is about all the tennis I can take in
this age anyway."
At 55, Godley has been going at this
pace for more than three years in Laos
and, for that matter, ever since he
graduated from Yale, class of '39. Part
proconsul, part traditional striped-
'pants diplomat and part general, God-
ley personally directs the no longer
quite so secret American war in Laos
r?-and loves every minute of it.
He has no doubts about Ms job or
:how to carry it out even though his
critics suspect he is more Defense Sec-
retary Melvin Laird's man in Vienti-
ne than Secretary of State William
Rogers.' "Call me field marshal if it
makes you feel better," he is inclined
to -say. "I don't care. But please note
rve got no troops."
,"Uncle Sugar',
INVOINED in undercover work since
World War II when he dealt
with American prisdner of war prob-
lems while based in Switzerland, one
of the first U.S. diplomats to work
closely with the military, activist am-
bassador to the Congo during the
'Simba" revolt in 1964, Godley be-
lieves in the American world mission
; in uncomplicated terms uncomfortable
to more doubting Americans.
So big and burly that Congolese
called him "The Bear that Walks Like
a Man" ?,vlien he was ambassador in
G. 111clIfurtrie Godley
ti,3_67'
By Jonathan C. Randal
. Washington Post Foreign Service
Godley is given to pithy, direct lan-
guage of a nature which an earlier age
would not have found repeatable in
mixed company. Pure product of the
Cold War in warm climates, he invaria-
bly refers to the United States as
"Uncle Sugar," a sobriquet reflecting
the persuasiveness of American power
in underdeveloped countries.
? Even with a staff of 1,`TO diplomatic,
military and CIA men, as ambassador
to this Oregon-sized country Godley
has his hands full:
? Requesting and approving all
American air strikes against North Vi-
etnamese and Pathet Lao troops?who
numbered over 100,000 just before the
Easter invasion of South Vietnam?in
northern Laos and along the Ho Chi
Minh supply trails leading south to
Cambodia and South Vietnam.
? Directing CIA military operations
and the activities of some 230 military
attaches whose tasks include supplying
arms and ammunition to the Royal Lao
army, Meo tribesmen and Thai volun-
teers in the Plain of Jars north of Vi-
entiane and in the southern Laos pan-
handle.
? Keeping able neutralist Premier
Souvanna Phouma in office despite re-
? peated right-wing efforts to dislodge
him, to ensure that the tatty facade on
the 1962 accords remains intact for an-
other effort to neutralize Laos in the
event of an Indochina-wide peace set-
tlement, a task even the North Viet-
namese and Pathet Lao representa-
tives here privately concede he per-
formed brilliantly in the past month.
? Maintaining the precarious and ar-
tificial Laotian economy within the
limits of a congressional aid ceiling of
STATOTHR
'OW million annually, a far from easy
task since most of the money goes for
military spending. Indeed, the annual
threat of the fall of the CIA's base at
Long Cheng on the Plain of Jars is
feared.less than the economic crisis re-
flected by the fall in value of the Lao-
tian kip from 500 to 800 to the dollar
in the past year.
Dropping the Veils
MIOR MOST of Godley's first year as
ambassador, and indeed since the
1962 Geneva accords were broken first
by North Vietnam and then by the
United States, American military in-
volvement was kept as secret as possi-
ble. But in the past year or so, Wash-
ington has progressively dropped the
principal fiction imposed by the Ge-
neva accords which set up the tripar-
tite right-wing, neutralist and left-wing
government under big power auspices:
a,promise to avoid any foreign military
establishment in Laos except for a
small French training mission.
As early as .1064, the United States
was deeply cofnmitted to the Souvanna
Phouma government, providing aid, a
stabilization fund for the kip and mili-
tary help. In return, Souvanna
Phouma allowed the United States to
bomb North Vietnamese positions on
the strength of a verbal understanding
which even now remains the only basis
for American military operations here.
In March, 1970, President Nixon
started lifting the secrecy after a Sen-
ate Foreign Relations subcommittee
headed by Stuart Symington held
hearings on Laos as part of its investi-
gation of U.S. commitments abroad.
Whatever major mystery was left dis-
Leopoldville, A optivetfltsfflease 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01
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LifItig46UOMUUQUUMilub of Long
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Foreign Service" and "if I end up "
? '
being the fall guy I couldn't care less." rued
7
vomm.????
Ai6
Oc + el 7 STATOTHR
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : ?-14c-IWIW-016
Frictely,l.reft21,1972 THE IVASHINGTON POST
ii
GeTileralLi_nzied LTihnileiued, Itoy 1.42 Nhe,
Drug Trade
To. D
I?'L Vii
By George C. Wilzon Used As
Witytaikitton rost Vtatt
WASMNGTON (AF ii:Dep
cRL
? A-10
? ' x
ern;
Ia Plant
Front
11
To judge from yet another study of
the uncommonly unpleasant subject,
there seems to be about as much chance
of getting the drug business out of Indo-
china as there is of getting the -officials
of Indochina out of the drug business.
The prospects for reform are seem-
ingly limited?at a time when the U. S.
military is having mixed results in trying
to detoxify addicted American GIs?and
the situation is one more deadly, degrad-
ing element associated with U. S. in-
volvement in Southeast Asia.
Some of the latest facts have been
presented by Yale graduate student Al-
!ta
0:71%
fred W. McCoy, who testified before a
Senate foreign aid appropriations sub-
committee that a flourishing narcotics
trade in South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos
and Thailand is carried on with the di-
rect, active support of the highest gov-
ernment officials?and that U. S. offi-
cials make virtually no effort to inter-
vene.
Perhaps such attempts would be in-
effectual. The "Vietnarnization" of the
drug trade may be out of our hands
as long as we remain resolved to "see
it through withThieu."
NEW YORK POST, 6/3/72
IVS
eroin: Viet Cis L ced t: Trc
OrtigerehatItS
Se Viet officials t
1HE EVENING STAR
Washington, D. C., Friday, June 2, 7972
Cc.-A
heroin rachct ,01.115'4e f:41
Approve or e east 0 :4K-16A-RDP 001
STATOTHR
STATOTHR
U. S. Aides
Rapped in
Drug Study
1.7n-V
Associated Press
?0
J
IIABPER's STATOTHR
Approved For Release 2001/03A4 tp-K-Rgimer-Atritgi
STATOTHR
Interrupting its .usual silence, the CM has provided
Harper's with a rare public document. It is awofficial letter
of protest against 0111 July COLT!' story, "Flowers of Evil,"
an extrelnely compromising report by Alfred 117.- McCoy
about the CIA's complicity in the heroin trade in Southeast
Asia. "I trust," writes IV. E. Colby, the Agency's execu-
tive director, "you will give this response the same prom-
inence in. your publication as was given to the McCoy
article."
The letter appears below in full, together with Mr.
McCoy's reply and the testimony of a former USA/T) rep-
resentative who witnessed the CIA's participation in the
Laotian drug Ira ie. This exchange, we hope, throws fur-
ther needed light on a little-known stretch of the sewer
that runs between Washington, Saigon, Vientiane, Pnom-
penh, and Bangkok.
- Beyond all that, we are surprised by 31r. Colby's use
of the word "trust." Ire may well be reading too much.
into it, but that word, and indeed the whole 1012e of the
letter, suggests that 311.. Colby expected an immediate mea
culpa from Harper's. Is the CIA that naive? Air. Colby,
who once presided over the notorious Phoenix program in
Vietnam,* is hardly an innocent. Still, his entire letter
reflects a troubling simplicity, an unquestioning trust in
the goodness of his own bureaucracy. He asks us to share
that trust, whatever the stubborn facts may be. As con-
clusive evidence of the Agency's purity, for example, he
even cites Director Richard Helms' public-relations argu-
ment that "as fathers, we are as concerned about the lives
of our children and grandchildren as all of you."
THE AGENCY'S BRIEF:
Harper's July issue contains an
article by Mr. Alfred W. McCoy alleg-
ing CIA involvement in the opium
.
traffic in Laos. This allegation is false
and unfounded, and it is partieulady
disappointing that a journal of
Harper's reputation would see fit to
publish it without. any effort to check
its accuracy or even to refer to the
Such curious expectations of trust apparently moti-
vated the Agency to ask Harper S.: Row to hand over the
galleys of 3:Ir. McCoy's book, The Politics of Heroin in 7
Southeast Asia, front which. he drew his magazine article.
The Agency declared that it simply wanted to check the
book for factual inaccuracies, possible libel, or damage to
national security. To deliver this unusual request, the
Agency dispatched Cord Meyer, a man with the proper Es-
tablishment connections who, as 'the CIA's overseer of the
sin ce-tran s ormed Congress for Cultural Freedom, * t
be said to have once been in the publishing business him-
self. Although the galleys were duly sent to the Agency, the
CIA's subsequent C011iplaints about Mr. McCoy's research.
failed to mi press Harper S.: Row, which, has since confi-
(lenity published the book, unchanged. Apparently there
are limits to trust, even among gentlemen.
Although. Mr. McCoy won't agree with us, our own re-
action to this episode is to feel a certain sympathy for the
beset bureaucrats of the CIA, who seem. to be impaled on
the defensive notion, "The Agency, right or wrong." By
definition the CIA finds itself involved with a good many
questionable people in Southeast Asia. That is a condition
of its mission?a mission it did not invent but simply
carries out on White House orders?and we suspect that
thc public would trust the Agency a good deal more if it
either acknowledged the facts or remained silent. /11(4's,
the CIA now seems determined to revamp its image into
something like a Cross between General Motors and the
League of Women Voters. But so endeth our sermon. Let
the reader draw his own conclusions.
public record to the contrary.
Normally we do not respond pub-
licly to allegations made against
CIA. Because of the serious nature of
these charges, however, I am writing
to you to place these accusations in
proper perspective and so that the
record will be clear.
The general charge made. by Mr.
McCoy that "to a certain extent it
[the opium trade in Laos] depends
on the support (money, guns, aircraft,
etc.) of the CIA" has no basis in fact.
To the contrary, Mr. John E. Inger-
soll, Director of the Bureau of Nar-
cotics and Dangerous Drugs, in a
letter to Representative Charles S.
Gubser of California on May 27,1971
---7x.Phoenix is a campaign of systematic counterterror designed to root out and destroy Vietcong sympathizers. As U.S. pacification
chief from 1968 to mid-1971, Ambassador Colby headed CORDS '(Civil Operations and Rural Development Support), which ran
Phoenix in cooperation with the South Vietnamese police. Mr. Colby has testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
that, in 1969 alone, Phoenix agents "neutralized" 19,531 suspected Vietcong, killing 6,187 of them in the process. Critics argu.e. that
Phoenix uses assassination methods and that Mr. Colby's figures are extremely conservative.
Kt
**The t ilDg0-61 dultikoodb000sobol -6
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I.- ? ? ? .? tot' roafraAne- throtwhout the world.
its
conti mlnezi
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Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000900090001-6
BJ-:ST cop
Available
Approved For Release 200.1/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000900090001-6
ILLEGIB
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000900090001-6
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000900090001-6
Apprfiv-ed:Fpfrgelsapig 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDFgi-V1V13116009
R2CulM
SU 25 1:72
E
C-* r
/I
-;_11
.;,
r
On paper at least, Septenther'IS looked
like a gre:fl_ day for thag nod guys in their
battle awinst international drug traffic.
There on fiCapitol Hill was the U. S.
Senate ratifying by a vote of 69 to 0 a
strengthening -r evision of a 90-nation
treaty designed to clamp down on the nar-
cotics trade.
Henceforth, the revision provides, the
International Narcotics Contiol Board \yin
see to it that, the world production of dope
is limited to the quantity needed for medi-
cal and scientific use. Production above
that ceiling will be. reported to the signa-
tory nations and the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly.
And there at the Department of State
was President Nixon saying this country
will suspend all American economic and
military assistance to any govet nment
"whose leaders participate in or protect
the activities of those who contribute to
our drug problem."
Just which initiative will be the more
productive is hard to say just now.
That of the Senate is dependent on
- devious channels and protocols, but it
does have the advantage of being taken
without benefit of George McGovern jaw-
boning.
- The route the president can take is a
!good deal more direct, if only he will
follow it now that he has made a Mc-
Govern-nudged pitch for
But the chances for clamp-down would
KUNT:1,111.3.2..Pil,; 41i
Approved For Release 2001/03/04
P
I -4A e
P-.74n /5.
#
be a great deal fatter, one suspects., if the
president had been right whn he said he
is "required by statute'' to cut off aid to
governments contributing to our drug
Problem.
The statute is not quite so forceful.
The rule, written into List year's For-
eign Assistance Act, is than aid shall be
cut off only when the president himself
decides that a government has "failed to
take adequate. steps" to supprc.!ss danger-
ous drugs. The president is the sole judge
of which countries are being helpful and
which ire not. He is "required" to take no
action that his personal verdict on the
evidence does not support.
His evidence, clearly, is not the same as
that which has disturbed Senator Mc-
Govern.
The president, says his challenger, has
failed to "crack clown on the narcotics
trade in Laos, Thailand and South Viet-
nam" because the administration needs "air
bases in Thailand, Laos" and "mercenaries
and Vietnamese soldiers to fight its war."
There may he more partisan testimony
than hard evidence in that accusation, of
course. Even so, the McGovern statement
is not barren of corrc-iboraliOn.
There have been charges that the CIA's
Air America has helped transport heroin
in Southeast Asia. In his hook, The Poli-
ties of Heroin hi Southeast As in, Arthur W.
McCoy raised the question of CIA agents
knowingly engaging in such traffic to help
maintain alliances. And Mr. McCoy quail-
-lied with no question his assertion that
officials in Southeast Asian governments
allied to the U. S. have profited from the
drug traffic.
To accuse is not to prove. But if Mr.
McCoy's questions and statements are
rooted in nothing firmer than supposition,
they suggest that the president., even if
not derelict, will have a difficult time
being diligent in application of that stat-
ute. ?
The helpfulness (or, for that, matter, the
helplessness) of allies like South Vietnam
and Thailand in areas other than drug
control cannot fail to influence Mr. Nix-
on's reading of the evidence.
Not,-that is, so long as a keystone of this
nation's foreign policy is to prop up such
allies. ?
Presidential options running afoul of
presidential- commitments, it's just possi-
laIALREW80a011601RGOONOOR0001-6
to narcotics control,
Lac_ THE BULLETIN
Approved Fo4aiti9g2001/03/IttstgAMMF'
STATOTHR
? "LADIES and gentlemen," announced
. the genteel British diplomat, raising his
:glass to offer a toast, "I give you Prince
Sopsaisana, the uplifter of Laotian
youth."
The toast brought an appreciative
smile from the guest of honor, cheers
and applause from the luminaries of
Vientiane's diplomatic corps assembled
at the farewell banquet for the Laotian
ambassador-designate to France, Prince
Sopsaisana. A member of the royal
house of Xieng Khouang, the Plain of
Jars region, the prince was
vice-president of the National
Assembly, chairman of the Lao Bar
Association, president of the Lao Press
Association, president of the Alliance
Francaise, and a member in good
standing of the Asian People's
Anti-Communist League. After
receiving his credentials from the king
in a private audience at the Luang
Prabang Royal Palace on April 8, 1971,
he was treated to an unprecedented
round of cocktail parties, dinners, and
. banquets. For Sopsai, as his friends call
him, was not just any ambassador; the
Americans considered him an
outstanding example of a new
generation of honest, dynamic leaders.
The final send-off party at
Vientiane's Wattay Airport on April 23
was one of the gayest affairs of the
season. Everybody was there; the
champagne bubbled, the canapes were
flawlessly French, and Ivan Bastouil,
charge d'affaires at the French embassy.
gave the nicest speech. Only after the
plane had soared off into the clouds did
anybody notice that Sopsai had
forgotten to pay for his_saiirp8i.
reception. Approveu
His arrival at Paris's Orly Airport on
STATOTHF
STATOTHR
*el
By ALFRED W. McCOY
and KATHLEEN B. READ
the morning of April 25 was the
occasion for another reception. The
French ambassador to Laos, home for a
brief visit, and the entire staff of the
Laotian embassy had turned out to
welcome the new ambassador. There
were warm embraces, kissing on both
cheeks, and more effusive speeches.
Curiously, the prince insisted on waiting
for his luggage like any ordinary tourist.
and when his many suitcases finally
appeared after an unexplained delay, he
immediately noticed that a particular
one was missing. Sopsai angrily insisted
that his suitcase be delivered at once,
and French authorities promised, most
apologetically, that it would be sent to
the Laotian embassy as soon as it was
found. Sopsai departed reluctantly for
yet another reception at the embassy,
and while he drank the ceremonial
champagne with his newfound retinue
of admirers. French customs officials
were examining one of the biggest
heroin seizures in French history.
The ambassador's suitcase contained
60 kilos of high-grade Laotian heroin ?
worth $13.5 million on the streets of
New York, its probable destination. A
week later, a smiling French official
presented himself at the embassy with
the suitcase in hand. Although
Sopsaisana had been bombarding the
airport with outraged telephone calls
for several days, he suddenly realised
that accepting the suitcase was
tantamount to an admission of guilt and
'Tiffa'fly (RI rittilssVirglir 8
his declaration of innocence, the French
government refused to accept his
diplomatic credentials, and Sopsai
remained in Paris for no more than two
months before he was recalled.
DESPITE its resemblance to comic
opera, the Prince Sopsaisana affair
offered a rare glimpse into the workings
of the Laotian drug trade. That trade is
the principal business of Laos, and to a
certain extent it depends on the support
(money, guns, aircraft etc) of the CIA.
Unfortunately, the questions raised by
the prince's disgrace were never asked,
much less answered. The French
government overlooked the embarrass-
ment for diplomatic reasons, the
international press ignored the story,
and the United States embassy
demonstrated a remarkable disinterest
in the entire subject.
Over the past 50 years, Laos has
become something of a free port for
opium. The delicate opium poppy
grows abundantly at high elevations in
the northern mountains, and under a
sequence of different regimes (French.
American, Laotian), the hill tribesmen
have been encouraged to cultivate the
poppy as the principal cash crop.
Opium dens can be found in every
quarter of Vientiane, and the
whereabouts of the opium refineries are
a matter of common knowledge.
The Laotian indifference to Prince
Sopsaisana's misfortune therefore
becomes easily understandable. The
reticence of the American embassy,
however, requires a few words of
explanation. Sopsai had allegedly
received his 60 kilos of heroin through
the kind offices of a particularly
ao.my) Tot:row? 9000 'fa&
ang ao also happens to be the tolr.,;laued
commander of the CIA secret army in
wiR-q91-71, icrr-7-.Retease-2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-0
CALIFORNIA VOICE
WEEKLY - 12,500
By Mark Iienriquez
Almost universally atiOnow-
lodged as something akin to
, the great plague itself, it is
often surprising to learn that
heroin was once proclaimed
to be the wonder dinig of the
age. The time was ;i1;Orti:: be
fore the 1 urn of the contur
and the place was iinneritl
Germany where heroin hici
just boon deecloped as a etrc
for a more sinister addiettm,
that of llicirphine, As USE of
the drug became more v ide-
spread and us disadvan ages
more obvious, heroin otickly
Jest its priveleged positiir and
? the scientific inatitutims of
the day renewed their search
in other directions. ?
Quantities of heron first
appeared in this cotntry a-
round 1h3u. The pritriple im-
porters of the drug vere sail-
ors and other glol.1.1 trans-
ients whose aLtivistes were
confined primarily to the larg-
er coastal cities. 'Me ghettos
for the most part rimaincd un-
touched.
MORPIPNE
With the comirg of W W 11
the situation Indcrwent a
radical change aid once more
the use of mophine \vas in-
volved. Standesd procedure
adopted by tin U. S. armed
forces for the treatment of
wounds recciwd in combat in-
volved immtdiate massive
injections d the drug
to deaden tie pain. So wide-
spread was he use of mor-
phine durin; the war that
many G. l.'s were issued their
own persmal drug sunply
and hypodcmic needle in the
event that self treatment be-
came necesary. Despite the
fact that mirphine was known
to have bim dangerously ad-
dictive sone fifty years be-
fore the cabreak of the war,
the drug had become an in-
tegral pal of America's war-
time medcal machine.
It was with the reloase of
many etthese wounded veter-
ans ham service that the
specter of widespread drug
addictim first app aimed. No
one, it poems, hod yet develop-
ed a etre for morphine addle-
? . ,??
Li Li '44 ty'
tion but heroin was a good
substitute, Sailors soon found
that they could zco:d,o a lot
more money selling heroin
than they could on any ship
and the rush was on to secure
the most hiczative markets
and methods of production.
EFFECT
Nowhere seas the effect of
heroin felt more dramatically
than in the Tilack COMMunity.
Seemingly overnight scores of
young men, whose only mis-
fortune was to have served
STATOTHR
rt n el
: : 1
..,
, 4,..., u 1 : ,
LI ,.. _-,. k.:..
Freedom Party and even a
fledgling Black Panther Party
(New York chanter) have all
espoused this position at one
time or another. Whether or
not this charge is valid in and
of itself, there is a substantial
body of evidence to sugoest
that the United States govern-
ment has actively encouraned
large scale heroin production
to further he own political
ends.
The genesis of this intrigue
began shortly before the mc-
their country, returned home
with
them
only their wits between
anti what was most often
a slow agonizing death.
Five years after the close
of W WT lithe pusher was al-
ready established as the new
king of the ghetto. The post
war baby boom, the newfound
affluence of the if ties, and the
Korean conflict in which even
more Americans were intro-
duced to use of narcotics all
played a role in the rise of
smack. As a result countless
millions of young men and
women, most of them Black,
found themselves involved
with heroin before reaching
the age of twenty.
Black power advocates were
the first to allege that heroin
addiction was actually en-
couraged by this country's
federal government as a
means to further subjugate
the Black population, and
thereby avoid full scale revo-
lution in the face of increas-
ing repression. Stokely Char-
michel, Dap .lirtrivn, the now
defunct Sale, Peace and
tual introduction of American
troduction of Americtin
ground troops in South Viet-
nam. Before the American
army could embark it was
necessary to determine the
amount of local support they
could expect. Since the South
Vietnamese arzny was barely
on the edge of destruction and
the civilian population almost
solidly behind the Viet Cong,
or just as solidly neutral, the
search concentrated on cer-
tain jungle tribesmen who in-
habit the remote mountain
areas that border Iiisios and
Cambodia. It just so happen-
ed that these fieo (prottooric-
ed Mao) and li?totitinntyord
flib.2.sinen traditionally enittort-
ed in runaing nuns and opionl_
to the It:crania markets of
Thialrnd and 'Via Nam.
As they were already (Ic-
ing a booming business on
their own, some incentive Was
needed to Intsli them into the
uncertainti:r6 of war. It seems
that since these trllotismen had
little or no contact with any
government, political appeals
were largely inetlfeative,
COMPII0f,IISE
What evolved was a com-
promise. Montingyard and
Moo tribes would fight and
provide intelligence for A-
therican troops if the Ameri-
cans would, in turn, help them
move greater qumtities of
opium and heroin.
The details as to how this
compromise has worked have
been thensubject of numerous
articles appearing in publica-
tions ranging from Ramparts
to THE NEW YORK TIMES.
Air America aircraft, a chart-
er owned and operated by the
CIA, certain aircraft belong-
ing to the USAF, and in one
case documented by CBS, even
the personal aircraft of the
American ambassador to Sai-
gon have all been involved in
the trafficing of heroin.
That a new generation of
American soldiers becomes
addicted while serving in Viet
Nam is seemingly a small
price to pay for the oppor-
tunity of stopping the insid-
ious 'red hoards.
- Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000900090001-6
YEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOK,7
Approved For Release 2001/01/94qp167DP80-0160
'
-
t.L.6
0
7727J1
. Alfred W: McCoy
I? the galley proofs to the CIA could set a
dangerous precedent and ultimately weaken
On June 1 of this year an official of the First, Amendment guarantees concerning
US Central Intelligence 'Agency paid a visit freedom of the press. Moreover, in view of
to the New York offices of my publisher, what I had learned of the CIA's operating
Harper and Row, Inc. This CIA official was methods in Southeast Asia I was convinced
'
/ 'Mr. Cord. Meyer, Jr. (now the CIA's Assist-
li that the Agency was, capable of using
.? ant Deputy Director of Plans; formerly the unethical means?such as coercing my
. CIA official?in charge of providing covert sources into retracting statements they had
financial 'subsidies for organizations such as made to me about US complicity in the
the ? National Student Association, En- international narcotics traffic?in order to
-counter Magazine, and the Congress for induce Harper and Row to withdraw the
. ' Cultural Freedom).' Mr. Meyer urged sev- book from publication.
icral of his old friends among Harper and After a week of negotiations, however,
-iRow's senior management to provide him Harper and Row told me that they would
with a copy of . the galley proofs of my not be villing to publish the book. unless I
history .of. the international narcotics traf- agreed to submit the manuscript to the
fie, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast CIA. Faced with what I believed -would be
U Asia. In this, book I show the .complicity lengthy delays if I took the book to
of various US agencies?particularly the CIA another publisher and the prospect of
arid tk..-r: State Department?in organizing losing my Harper and Row editor, Elisa-
,
' the SoUtheast Asian drug traffic since the beth Jakab, with whom I had worked STATOTHR
early 1950s. ." . .
closely, I capitulated.. Thus began more
'fr. Meyer presented one . of Harper and
than two months of lengthy negotiations
-.Row's senior editors with some documents
and Row by stating categorically that it
giving the CIA's view on . the Southeast between the CIA, Harper and Row, and
could rebut all .my charges about its
Asian drug traffic. His manner was grave. myself. Most of what happened during
complicity in the international narcotics
-He said,.. "You ,wouldn't want to publish a these elaborate negotiations is in the corre-
traffic. We were surprised, however, that
.spondence reprinted belo