SPY NET ENGULFS ALL S. VIETNAM'S CITIZENS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000900030001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 183
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 2, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 29, 1971
• Content Type: NSPR

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Approved For Release 2001103/0910.1.CIA-kEeilk-11316
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- of gunmen. organised by the U.S. j
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): .
. The reports from informers move.
? ili SGI?jc:n Up through channels to -hundreds of
. En:-,-.'27=-..-,-.as, Distsict Intelligence Operations Cons-
INH is a poor farmer. He grows rice . mands (DIOCs), the hubs of the Phoe-
nix programme. Each DIOC is man-
..
. .
..
= on an acre of land near the South
ned by South Vietnamese .sOldiers, po-
China Sea. He lives with his wife and
lice and psychological warfare specia-
three children in a cramped. hut made
. lists as Well as an 'unofficial member-
of straw and mud. ? "
from the U.S. army, American sources
- Linh ?like inillions of other ? has
said.. :
been forced by the South Vietnamese
? U.S. intelligence officers said the
Government to spy on his own family.
DIC)Cs use the reports: to prepare
for the Phoenix programme, a contro;
."target folders" on . suspected poll-
versial allied drive using torture and
tical leaders of the Vietcong, the
assassination to destroy ,the Commu;
Saigon government's name - for ? the
nist political leadership in South
Vietnam: - ? ,NLF.
' The officials said green sheets of
.-"I don't want to get into trouble:" wires to the genitals.
- paper in the folders arc used . to list
,Linh said. through - a translator. . When the questioning is over, the
what they want. I don't tell thc
.such items as physical sdescriptions,
'
"That's why I tell the governmenta
7 friends and visiting habits of suspects. suspect is brought before a province
in
everything, of course. just a security committee headed,., by the
' Pink sheets are used for copies of all
s much as local province chief.' .
1 have to." . . agent reports on suspects.
- 'The committee ha;; tile.:PoWer to
' South Vietnamese Phoenix. offi-
The Phoenik programme has tried'
. to get a VIP trvong (family head) like' dais said informants are graded on a sentence a suspect in secret . trials to
a maximum of two. years in prison,
scale ranging from A (completely
Liith to spy in every hut, house and The sentence, however, is renewable
shanty in South Vietnam. They're , reliably to F (reliability cannot be
judged). They ? said information pro-
indefinitely as long as Vietnam is at
the lowest rungs on a ,massive Intel' judged).
by .agents is grade from I (con- war.
ligence apparatus providing reports.
..
. On suspected leaders of the Com- firmed) to 6 (truth cannot be judged). U.S. sources said the suspect cnn-
inunist National Liberation Front DIOC members? not question his accusers or even find.after deciding a.
(NLF)....... i: suspect is likely to be a Communist out who they are. "It's pretty ? much
' ? The ola truonos . don't get any leader?meet to decide, how he should up to the province chief," one Ameri-
? money .for their information-Aust be "neutralised." The suspect can be can official said. "If he's a good mart
prosecution as suspected Communists .. assassinated, arrested or t-dised into there'll be at fair trial. :If he's not,
if they fail to report accurately on switching sides. . . - there won't."
. .
the actions of their families. - , A fOrmer U.S. Phoenix coordina-
? Allied sources said- the Phoenix tor (adviser) said most DIOCs-requise I"I think it's safe to say that whim
all over not many people get off,"
x
programme also employs a large net- ? at lest a.' C3 rating ? agent fairly one current Phoeni adviser said.
work of paid informers?national police, reliable, information possibly true--
"Just about everybody who mrles
undercoxeakear, civiliaij.secreLlignnts, before "targeting" a suspect for ass-
the whole route winds up in Jan."?
army iMiKuNPYR.,947PrilK4teAse 20111:03/04.: CIA-RDP80-016tHR00090003000t-2
The field police-,:struse arm of the
national Police,' are -usually used for
arrests. CIA-financed PRU's,. mem.
hers of Province Reconnaissance
Units, are used to kill suspects, ac?
cording to allied intelligence sources.
But in Vietnam, no operation ,i
water-tight. Allied intelligence of-,
ficers said most Communist. political
leaders find out ? through in fosma-
tion leakage -- that they've been tar-
geted for assassination or arrest and
go.into hiding before the government
can get to them. ? - ? ?
? They said the Phoenisapronralnane
then issues wanted posters sl.loWing
mug shots and offering small re?Yarsia
for inforrnation about the where-
abouts of suspects.
- The programme recently bvrn a
trial pr?..ject ii:( few psovineass nfi'er-
ing bountiea euphernistinaily cajed
"maximum incentive ? awards". of
several ? thousand dollars for really
highCommuniatleaders-Ideaslosalive.
a After a suspect is arrestad,. the -
next itep is a trip to a Province- In-
terrogation Centre (PIC) also orgsnissni
by the CIA, according to allied source's.
A former U.S. Phoenix edviser
sail, torture is used at all PICa al-
though interrogators usually use psy-
chological rather than physical techni-
ques. A eouple:of favorites are:
a Cover a suspect's face with a wet
washcloth. Pour soapy. water over
the cloth- each time he refuses to
answer a question, The water isn't
supposed to hurt him, but it gives the
suspect the impression he's drowning.
?Tie a suspect to a chair and
attach-wires to a 12-volt car battery.
Shock the suspect every time he
'refuses to answer a question. If he's
really a tSug,h customer, apply the
I S
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Strvey of ../i?talrfeles Is
? Ida.d6. by Anz.e..14c.-.ciiis' ?,..1
were ,basically hopeful. Gov-
ernment assistance- has been
provided to over a third of
those interviewed, .but it has
been invariably late and usu-
ally . considered inadequate.
iTheir attitude toward the Gviq
GI.?11TA EmErzsl'P' .has been generally favorable
sp.:dal to The New York Tither; _although they do not credit
SAIGON,' - -South Vietnam, GVN with doing much for
. . .
Oct: 25 .? An bifida! Arne.r7 them beyond providing se.cur-
lean stirvey. Of attitude's ainang, it-Y." , . -
refugees has found that many .'Not Sense of Urgency'
take a neutral view- of the Viet- On the question of initial cart. . ? - ,
t
con and that they consider -1;v- Goverment assistance to the gram known as Operation miles, out replacement, the report On
ing ' conditions' under. Commu- refugees, the report says: ,,As .nix, whose purpose.. is to weed 'Quangnam said.
'nista control. to 'be ? reasollably. in the past, no sense or ur-i out Vietcong political leaders. - The senior province . official
good. ' .' .. gency was felt by the Gov- - "In this province the Gov. In Paclieu Province, on the
? .1.1 181 refugees I led ogat-: eminent,. . . ernme.nt will not allocate even southern coast, reported that
ed,. from a group believed to ',Due- to the '..high mobility a. pencil, paperclip or piece of the Phoenix Program was - of-
number almost 80,000, are from of the refugees, . a "Let-the- paper on a regular basis to the fective against low-level Viet-
U
the .:Minh' Forest, ?where a ciust_settie but "ineffective against
efirst, attitude aptly Program," according to Russell cong
L.' Meerdink, senior American the hard core" of the leader-
Ship. . .
I Experimental Rewards -
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U.S. A.00iV',3i:SVO;Citza 1-/C.,3fEbtC,!
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13e,sqvc !s11 (..)i)ovvtion
SP6'Ad to Till NeVY.OER.Tittp
Speciel to The Nee; Yetk Thne3
SAIGON, South_ Vietnam,
Oct. 25 ? Many American ad--
stress, the- , program's impor-
tance has resulted in the re-
moval of many Vietnamese
visors the provinces are once vitally involved i it. Men
voicing doubt about the willing- n
trainer! exclusively for the pro-
ness of Vietnamese officials to
? ' the s ? 'r gram are being removed with-
out
to dear out enemy describes the initial, feelings
Concentrations . has been un-of many officials about future adviser in Phoyen, on the cen-
(lack tral coast.
der way since December, 1970. assistance," it continues. ?
The Government puts the num- of sufficient social-action ca- "It would seem that the
her of refugees at 45,000. slow problem is common," he said
dre and the generally
Government assistance is procedures of the services corn. in a confidential report on paci-
considered inadequate by some, plement ed fhis a ttitudc, lie tion in Military Reaoion II,
of .the refugees intervievJed, ac-; In Thoibinh District in An a coastal and highland area
.cording to the survey. The. xuyen Province, for example, north of Saigon.
death .and destruction caused"The low quality of person-
20 per cent. of the beneficiaries
by frequent military 'activities failed to show the first time nel eJ,signeci to the. program
.by allied forces ? which means for payments of a 30-day rice must also be considered ! some-
, allowance, the report den-
troop . movements, artillery notes, thing other than 'coinci
lStrike8 and bombing ?. were explaining that there were ,,nu_ tal,' " he added. . ?
major reasons why many had inerous Problems": failure to Who Is -Being Fooled? '
'fled their homes, rei;ister the refugees, compiled .
Net,- ? 1 i He said it Was the peroga-
-- The . report on the findings the nece- '
,-,sary a,a ( OCLI- ?
. tis e of the Government. in Sal-
?points up the . complexities of ments-. and notify the refin,ces
'dealing with the refugee prob- when and where to appear,
,lem despite the long-established "Many of these refugees
:apparatus and the 'benefits 05- were out working to support_
tensibly proyidd. . themselves,? the report says.
when . the seeonct.myrrienc give the Government .of South lions. . .
- - Long, a Vietcoug Piase - ... . 'Vietnam the satisfaction of
? ?
last August, in an attempt
to bolster the program, the
United States and the South
Vietnamese Government decid-
ed to begin experimental cash
reward.,, in four provinces, pay-
ing up to the equivalent of
811,000 for certain key lead-
ers. It is doubtful that the re-
wards are effective. .
Last May -the senior American
adviser in binhtuy Province,
'15 miles west of Saigon, said
the primary reason for the
gon to withhold support from lack of success was "the in-,
the Phoenix Program, but, he he.rent distaste" of people for
added, "certainly the United inducing relatives, friends of
States Government should not people with political conneo-
The Ti milli -area, long a session arrived, after ample - Quota for Each Province
'base for the vietedng guerrit, notification, the report says,
las of South Vietnam, is at the "many of the refugees who
southern; tip. of the peninsula show the first time went away
in three provinces. It is a corn- disappointed --- someone else
piex of dense jungles, ..open had gotten their payments."
cultivated land, winding, While the report says that
streams and straight canals. , life under Vietcong control- in
.. The survey. and report were the U Minh area was difficult.
done for the Pacification' Stud- :for a majority of the refugees
interviewed, "a surprising mull-
to Civil Operations and Rural
her,. 37 per cent, considered it
si
ies Group, which is attached
.Development - Support, ' the to be good or better."
American 'agency that con- The area was a major strong-
Ceived of the pacification pro- hold of the Vietminh, who
grams and super vise's' them. fought the French. From 1940
-Marked "For Official Use to 1954, under Vietminh con-
Only," the study is in an idiom tr?,1, - living standard3 ,rose to
Meant for United Stoics- ofti-. a level where the People col-11dt
dais. A summary says: - ? be termed well off, the report
."Living conditions' -'of the says. From. 1954 to 1966 the
pc:61)1e -in the past while -un- area was a major training and
der ve : control were.- consul- supply center for the Vietcong.
ered reasonably good. Few of Long exposure to one Ions'-
the. refugees considered, them- or another of Communist con-
selves to have been . living in trot did not seem to worry the
want. The people's attiudes to-
ward the VC while under their
control .. were largely neutral,
while feelings about their fu-
ture reeeption in GVN [Coy-
eminent or (South) Vietnam]
_ . half this number, the report traced the declining interest to
Approvedf?fisiltRgIfvillaM1100VOLV:ifelAwRDP 101601R000900030001-2
thinking it is 'fooling' the Am-
ericans."
The Phoenix Program, con-
ceived by the Central Intellk
gene? Agency in 1937, was
turned over to the South Viet-
namese in principle the follow-
ing year. Americans have since
pushed the program, providing
advisers and funds as a pri-
mary means of seeking out. the
Vietcong. .
Since South Vietnam has not
given the program the empha-
sis some American officials feel
it should have, they are con-
sidering a reorganization of it
program and its basic concepts
in the hopes of salvaging it.
Lack of - interest in or dis-
taste for the program is not
'limited to Vietnamese in Mili-
tary Region II.
Under the Phoenix operating
kin, each province receives a
quota of Vietcong to be "neu-
tralized" each month, which
can mean arresting a man, talt-
ing him into the Open Arms
program, which accepts defect-
ors, or killing lihn.
The quota system led to 60 t-
leSZ-111S here and in Congres-
sional hearings in Washington. ?
"Volume rather than quality
neutralization" became the pat-
tern, a senior adviser wrote:
tem, a senior adviser wrote,
discussing the quotas. 'Much
of this can be attributed to
U.S. guidance and Maumee:
and quotas,', he added.
Testimony in Washington
disclosed. that American aid to
the program from 1968 to May
, ?. . 1971, amounted to 8732-million.
L'ag Tracco to 8"011 Current contributions have not
"There seems-- to be a de- been disclosed.
people. as long as they . we-re crease in the interest and cm-
ablo to make a living. As for phasia in the pregra.m," wrote ?
the future, two-thirds of them the senior, American advisor in
worry over their ability to earn Quangnam Province,, which is
a living, while .concern about in the northernmost military
security is found only among region of South .Vietnam. He
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01
; SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.
EXAMINER
E 204,749.
EXAMINER & CHRONICLE
?. S ? 640,004
I -Cla
Bob /? .4:1;
he
STpkTINTL
??
'It , Shortly before the interview, the U.S. more or less -,
inadvertantly put Diem .in a bad spot politically. One Wait
- there was a hue and cry outside the Embassy office bund- ?
ing. The lone Marine on guard opened the door. Thich Tri .
,. Quang, saffron. robes flying, bounded in. He was being
pursued by Diem's police. The Marine motioned the monk
into a room, slammed the front door .and locked it. Then
he called Lodge, wile was dining at his residence. '-
Hours passed before Lodge could get through to the
State Department and ask for instructions. When the word .
did come it was to keep the monk indefinitely. In the
course of our interview, Diem said with some heat that
this was , unpardonable affront to him by a foreign ?
.1 power. He demanded that Tri Quang be turned over to the
police to be put. on trial for the crime of fomenting revolu-
tion against a recognized governmen% Washington re- ;
;* fused.
. *
IT WAS NOT toe long after that that Diem. was of-
fered asylum in the same building. As the hour of the
Kennedy-supported eoup approached, Lodge was instruct-
ed to call Diem and tell him he'd better leave the palace
and take refuge in the U.S. Embassy. Saigon was quiet;
Diem felt his army was loyal to him, and so he indignant-
ly refused. Lodge called a second time, and again the
invitation was rejected.
Lodge ,called Big Minh to a secret conference and
?
-President Johnson's memoirs give appropriatelyshill-
ing attention to the dumping of Ngo Dinh Diem .by the
administration of his predecessor, John F. Kennedy.
It was, indeed, a bloody bungle. . . ?
? I ' There had been a State Department group out to oust
i.
' Diem, or change him into the group's own image and
.. likeness, for some time before the CIA-backed coup that
, ,..
;.-ran him out of office, replaced him'nrit Gen. Big Minh,
..
/ '. and led to his smseless murder. The group's chief spokes-
man was Roger Hilsman, former OSS operator with Mer-
rill's. Marauders .in Burma, educator, diplomat, etc.
I .
( . ; His favorite warning to Diem (or .about Diem) was
I "that fellow's got to pull up his socks." By that he proba-
bly ,meant that Diem had better stop trying to keep front
being toppled by the likes of the 'Buddhist rabble-rouser,
Thich Tri Quang. . ' . , ..
. - The whole ouster process demeaned the dignity and
traditional fair- play of the United States. Misinformation
about Diem was rife. Ambassador Henry "Cabot Lodge, for
example, assured the Hearst Task Force that was about
to interview Diem in Saigon ? a week or two before the
COUP ? that we would find him a broken, graying man
who had lost his hold. Diem turned out to be a ball OI fire,
i. Tblack-haired, vigorous and sure of where he and his coun-
try were going. He said, "We won't need your American
I.,troops after the end of 1965.".
-* * ?
WE BROUGHT up the question of the troublesome
: Madame .NInt, wife of his brother and his (Diem's) official
' ? hostess at affairs of state. Diem was a bachelor ?and de-
:vont churchgoer who lived '?ait ascetic life. He smiled and
defended Madame Nhu's right to act like a fentale. 116 ;
told us that Washington had had the audacity to ? offer to
send his brother and sister-in-law to Paris for an extended ,
vacation, at the expense of the American taxpayer, in
ordcy to, get them. out of the way. ?
r, wrung from hint a solemn pledge to give Diem and his
k brother safe passage out of the country. (Madame Nhu
? and her children had left before.) Minh agreed, and shook
hands on the deal. ,
Diem and his brother first sought refuge in a church
in the raucous Chinese section. of Saigon, were rooted out
by troops after an all-night vigil, put in a troop carrier
' and shot in cold blood.
It was the worst day of John F. Kennedy's life as
President; more than one of his historians has written. A
cloud of conscience hung over him during the three weeks
that followed, the last three weeks of his life.
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STATI NTL
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-
ATLANTA, GA,
JOURNAL
E ? 257,863
JOURNAL?CONSTITUTION
2.'36,497,
tICIclt
(1 A , r.fy? ?
The Editors: I have not liked the
Ign
commtnd organization in regard
to the adminh?tration of ihings in South
.Vietnam. I have not blued the way in
. which the Central Intellbzence Agency
has handled the facts of life. For one ?
- thing, the Nixon adminstration could
have moved troops foster from Viet-
nam than it has accomplished and it
has bean bombing too much. Detter
.(lealings whit the National Liberation
? Front could have tahen place at Paris. ?
The great historians have not fa-
vored military offensives in Vietnam.
Many escapades in South Vietnam
? , have been run without ,the knotvled2;e
of the American people and the CIA
7 can start small wars without any con-
trol by Congress. What the CIA is able i
to do is to conceal the motives of a
? conflict.
intellectuals believe that the. CIA
- helped put Ngo Dinh Diem our of of-
fice. We know that the Kennedy ad- I
ministration. did vot continue to sup-
port the Diem regime so the Diem line
- could not s--;?o Qn.
have read. reports that contend
that the CIA had Prince Nordam Si-
hanouk removed from office in Cam- ?
bodia. I think that Prince Sihanouk j
had a splendid plan fOr the people of !
- -Cambodia. I like his plan better than I I
- like the -plan. eof Riehard M. Nixon for
i4 ? ? military offensives.
1 I found that John F. Kennedy did
!veil in planning things in Laos.
CHARLES W. SI-LUBER!?
, -Atlanta_
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Or ifT/1
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'71 --rq tcA 11\I
STATINTL
Just how valid are ,the charges against the Central Intelligence Agency? ?
guarantees do Arm.,,ricans have that it is under tight ,control? A point-by-point de-
fense of the:organization comes from a man who served in top posts for 18 years.
Following is on analysis of intelligence operations
-by Lyman 13.. Kirkpatrick, Jr.., former executive direc-
tor-comptroller of. the Central Intelligence Agency:
The Central latelligence Agency was created by. the Na-
tional Security Act of 1947 as an independent agency in the
executive branch of the United .States Govrnment, report-
ing to the President. Ever since that date it his been sub-
jected to criticism both at home and abroad,: for what it has
allegedly clone as well as for what it 'has failed to do.
Our most cherished freedoms are those of speech and the
press and the right to protest. It is not only a right, but an
? obligation of citizenship to be critical of Our .istitutions, and
no organization can be immune from scrutiny. It is necessary
that criticism be responsible, objective and constructive.
It should be recognized that as Arnericans \VC have an
inherent mistrust of anything secret: The. unknown is always
a worry. 'We distrust the powerful. A secret organization de-
scribed as powerful must appear as most dangerous of all.
It ,was my responsibility for my last 12 years with the CIA
?fiEst as inspector general, then as executive director-
comptroller?to insure that all responsible criticisms of the
CIA were properly and thoroughly examined and, when
'required, remedial action taken. I am confident this practice
has been followed by my .successors, not because of any
direct knowledge, but becatise the present Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence was my respected friend and colleague for
more than two decades, and this is how he operates. ?
It is with this aS background that I comment on the cur-
? yent allegations, none of which are original with this critic. but,
.-any of which should be of concern to any American citizen.
- CIA and the Intelligence System Is Too lug
This raises the questions of how much we are willing to
pay for national security, and how much is enough.
.what are the responsibilities of the CIA and the
'other intelligence organizations of our Government?
Very briefly, the intelligence system is charged with in-
suring that the United States learns as far in advance as pos-
sible of any potential threats to our national interests. A.
moment's contemplation will put in perspective what this ac-
tually fmeans. It can range all the way from Russian missiles
pointed at North America to threats to U. S. ships or bases,
to expropriation of American properties, to dangers to any
one of our allies whom we are pledged by treaty to protect..
It is the interface of world competition between superior
powers. Few are those who have served in the intelligence
system who have not wished that there could be some
limita-
tion of responsibilities or some lessening of encyclopedic re-
quirements about the world. It is also safe to suggest that our
senior policy makers undoubtedly wish that their span of
required ?information could be .less and tnat not every dis-
turbance in every part of the world came into their purview..'
- (Note: This should not be interpreted as meaning that the
U. S. means to intervene. It does- mean that when there is a
Mr. Kirkpatrick
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick; Jr.,
now prefessoi- of political
science at Brown University,
joined the Central Intelli-
gence Agency in 1947 and
advanced to assistant direc-
tor, inspector general and ex-
ecutive director-comptroller
before leaving in 1965. He
has written extensively on
? intelligence and espionage.
Among other honors, he holds
the President's Award for
Distinguished Federal Civil-
ian Service and the Distin-
guished Intelligence Medal.
boundary dispute or major disagreement between other na-
tions, the U. S. is expected to exert its leadership to help
solve the dispute. It does mean that we will resist subversion
against small, DOW nations. Thus the demand by U. S. policy
makers that they be kept informed.)
. What. this means for our intelligence system is world-
wide coverage.
-To myTersonal knowledge, there has not been an Admin-
istration in Washington that has not been actively concerned'
with the size and cost of the intelligence system. All Admin-
istrations have kept the intelligence agencies under, tight' con-
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STATINTL
Is the CIA starting to spy on Americans at horne?turning talents and money
against students, blacks, others? That is one of several key gocstions raised in
a wide ranging criticism. A direct response starts on page 81.
The following was written by Edward K. DeLong of
United Preisinternational, based on on interview with
a Central Intelligence Agency official who has re-
.
signed. The dispatch was distributed by UPI for pub-
lication oh October 3. ?
Victor Marchetti embarked 16 years ago on a career that
was all any aspiring young spy could ask. But two years ago,
after reaching the highest levels of the Central Intelligence
Agency, he became. disenchanted with what he perceived to .
be amorality, overwhelming military influence, waste and
duplicity in the spy business. Ile quit.
- Fearing today that the CIA may already have begun "go-?
Ing against the enemy within" the United States as they
may conceive it?that is, dissident student groups and civil-
rights organizations?Marchetti has launched a campaign for
illorcir?presidential and congressional control over the entire
U. S. intelligence community. ?
? "I think we need to do this because we're getting into
an awfully dangerous era when we have all this talent
(for clandestine. operations) in the CIA?and more being de-
veloped in the military, which is getting into clandestine
"ops" (operations)?land there just aren't that many places
any more to display that talent," .Marchetti says.
"The cold war is fading. So is the war in Southeast' Asia,
except for Laos. At the sarrie time, we're. getting a lot of
domestic problems. And there are people in the CIA who?
if they .aren't right now actually already running domestic
operations against student groups, black movements and the
like?are certainly considering it.
"This is going to 'get to be ? very., tempting," Marchetti
said in a recent. interview. at his comfortable home in Oak-
. ton, [Val a Washington suburb where many CIA men live.
"There'll be a great temptation for these people. to sug-
gest operations. and for a President to approve them or to
kind of look the other way. You have the danger of intelli-
gence turning against the nation itself, going against the 'the
enemy within.'
Marchetti speaks of tfic CIA from an insi'der's point of
view. At Pennsylvania State University he deliberately pre-
pared himselffttc,4ikii,i,40
with a degree ir:MVilIttf. Ace a I: ory.
re9ri gldt20 eel kitICI4
STATINTL
Through a professor secretly on the CIA payroll as a. ta eat
'scout, Marchetti netted the prize all would-be spies dream
of--an immediate job offer from the CIA. The offer came
during a secret meeting in a hotel room, set up bv a stranger
who telephoned and identified himself only as `-`a friend of
your brother."
Marchetti spent one year as a CIA agent in the field and
10 more as an analyst or intelligence relating 'to the Soviet
Union, rising through the ranks until he was helping pre-
pare the national 'intelligence estimates for the White House.
During this period, Mar-
chetti says, "I was a hawk.
1 believed in . what WO
were doing."
Then he was promoted
to the executive staff of
the CIA, moving to an of
flee on the top floor of the
.Age?cy's headquarters
across the Potomac River
from Washington.
For three years he
worked as special assistant
to the CIA chief of plans,
programs and budgeting,
as special assistant to. the
CIA's executive director, .
and as executive assistant.
to the Agency's deputy
director, V. Adm. Rufus
L. Taylor.
"This put me in a very
rare position within the Agency and within the intelligence
.
community in general, in that I was in a place where it was?
being all pulled together," Marchetti said.
"I could see how intelligence analysis was done and how it?
fitted into the scheme of clandestine operations..It also gave
me an opportunity to. get a good view of the intelligence
community, too: the National Security Agency, the DIA:
(Defense Intelligence Agency), the national -reconnaissance;
organization?the whole bit. And I started to sec the politics
within the community and the politics between the com-
munity and the outside. This change of perspective durins
those three years had a profound effect on me, because I
began to see things I didn't like."
With many of his lifelong views about the world shattered,
Marchetti decided to abandon his chosen cateer. One of the
Ifilltp!b8011616d11404:309000301101 Director .1
c ins why le was leaving.
My. Marchetti
Con -I. -1 nue el':
Approved For Release 2001/0MALVDP80-01601R0
LOS ANGELES, CAL.
IJERALD-DISPATC,IJ
. OCT 7 19.ii
SEIAIVIEEKLY 3 ,000
I:ohtrE
, 1- t?? ? C,
Breast-beating white' liberals
-- liberals today, n.eo-fascists,
tomorrow-- are having a field.
-lay with the Attica N.Y. prison'
-.situation. On Thursday, October
the 12, Channel 28 (KCET) in
!Los Angeles, will air or rap
on the officials. in New .York;
!what cauesd Attica, why the?
uprising. None of them will
Wally tell you it was 'plotted,
planned from_ ? the 'beginning
io?inpe Lent and - "Y On W111
NV11111 the specific purpose of ge t - ,
? -I never e permanent if you do
:ting rid of Nelson Rockefeller o
.as -a potential candidate- for the ''n
no learn to respect me." -Wq.
?1
presidency in 1972. believe its unfortunate- that
.
a .
. While we were on the issue .! This Editor explained in per-
of Channel 28, we understand son to --Mrs. HaYlnes that Rev.
that they went digging for' Wilkins did 'not give us the
"Black Pride." liadies. a n el news relative to the poison food
-gentlemen, where do you think which she served to the black.
STATI NTL
Mrs. Carrie Haynes, ths Princi-
pal, maintained that Rey. Wil-
kins gave the STAR-REVIEW
the news of the bad' feed,. the
poisoned food, which madesev-
eral children ill. ?
Mrs. Haynes became 'famous
through her Time Magazine
article in which she ripped her
black faculty apart with such
statements as ? they were "in-
blacks spend so much time
'fighting each other but they do,
Channel 23 is digging for black
pride? ln Africa? No, in-deed.
Channel 28 went to Brooklyn,
Now York to dig for black
pride, and they came up with
a group of black -journalists
employed by black front news-
papers to discuss "black jour-
'nal.''
a a.
The black Journal Project
deals allegedly with black news,-
papers . throughout the nation,
The question, which came. to
our mind, is how can these
people working for newspapers,
..that are owned by caucasians
and fronted by blacks call
'themselves Black journalists.
,They do, this is one of the
'events of our time.
?
It appears that things -arc
Popping Pt the Watts-Willow-
brook area, particularly around
Grape Street School, ?
Our reaclers will 'recall last
spring that .there were some
?problems at Or a pe Street
School and illness due to 'RIM
food. Some of the parents ob-
jected, and the STAR-REVIEW
ran the news.
_
The-Piincipal of Grape Sliree.t
- School came to the conclusion
--that one teacher, very well-
'liked by the children, the Rey.
Lloyd \-VlIkApprovedifq)
children in that continually. In-
deed we did get the .nws, but
not front Wilhins. None the
less,. since Wilkins, according
to her own statement-, was one
of her best teachers, she wanted
him removed and.Worked with
the white superinte/ident to
have him transferred. Mr. Wil-
kins belongsr to a Union, which
we understand sold him out- and
went along with the white
superintendent.
We have always distrusted
Unions ---? they are a part of
the establishment and will sell
you out quicker than the estab-
lishment when the.. chips are
down.
CHICANOS VS. BIACIIS
The danger of Chicanos and
Blacks fighting is eminent, as
pointed out by the HERALD-
DISPATCH from time to time.
Now comes the TAM,. mess.
This poverty program has al-
ways been used by the estab-
lishment to put the two largest. .
and he. 'became, before graduat- This Black African "nigger"
rninorities in the. 'state of Cell-1
fornia against each other. If in one of CIA'S , most -ctn./represents a country of people
these two could work together, dent SPies.. \i/ who have suffered under the
they could both come. up out R.appears from investigation . , f ' .
British French Belgian and
that UCLA works hand and ? .,
other Eastern European couth
of the mud. . .
.
- . hand v4rti the CI \ Evei-vor tries ? they know what suffer-
rl'he Chicano Employees of , - ,=. .-
MOWS that the ? CIA, the larg-
' -- --- --le in g ifi. lie comes with a Wh i te
the local poverty EYOA walked 1
Etrici most efficient S pt or - woman to re-inslave them un-
out in protest over the alledged c?st.
anization ' this ' der Neo -Colonialism. Durin, the
According to reports,--? Mr.
Salvador Velasquez, Associated
Deputy. Director of EYOA led
the protest. Valasquez was. for-
merly Executive Director of
Rio Hondo, Community -Action
Agency, located, in East L.A.
The sante source has revealed
that neither Rio Hondo or ..the
former Eastland Community
AA ever employed ally blacks
while Vala.squez was the Direc-
tor,
The, Pitliz.A.Lo DISPATCH
concludes that Valesquez is
saying to the black Director,
Ernest Sprinkles, who hired him
in Korea, . Latin 'America and
other places in the world where
America's mighty army has
killed more non-v,diites and
more black and white boys dur-
ing the past 3-years than has
been killed in the history. of the
world.
?
.CIA .also hires more Foreign
Diplomats as spies. First they
get themlato compromising po-
sitions and threaten them. Not
so long ago they sent in an
African national to -threaten an
African Diplomat. The national
said the Diplomat, could have.
killed him-, but just shot into
the ceiling. The Diplomat, was
net worth killing. First he lost
favor with his country and the
blacks in this country. lie left
his African wife and took upon
himself a white woman ---- who
in the first place, "Nigger this.,
.was and has always been in
the pay of the CIA. They then
made him a full fledged CIA
spy. He does not travel with
his white wife but he is in
the .payroll of the CIA.
is my way of showing my ap-
preciation to you for hiring me.
I never hired any of your people
when I had the power to do so."
Fur fherniore, .NT al a sq e.z
should try to be :mast - en6tTb.
to realize that the establish-
ment is .trying to close the
project to put.both blacks and
chicancis into the. streets. Both
groups ar e - discriminated
against. C.11 i comes .to hir-
ing,?and give' the unions credit,
they hire whites. Neither blacks
DOI' Chicanos, some think so,.
are. considered white when it
comes to hiring.
We think the Chicanos and
Blacks should. try to work. to-
gether for their own good.
'UCLA'S EFFICIENCY
We suggest that the ,public
investigate u r statements.
UCLA the school where Angela
Davis .was fire.d from- her pro-
fessor's .position is credited with
turning out more and efficient
Spies than any other college or
university in the United States.
UCLA ga aduated Ron Karen-a
. ?
This African Diplomat, a.p-
pointed a white man ate Coun-
sul General in one of the large
cities. There are thousands of
African Nationals from his own
country in this country who
cduld h;_ive 'filled the position.
No, he at the insistence of .his
white wife and the CIA gang
hell bent upon getting the
Wealth, diamonds, 'etc. .of his
country, appointed the white
Council General to represent
a black African country
which is supposed to be inde-
pendent. Death is too good for
this 'skunk. His white wife is
an efficient SPY --- his half-
white children will also be good
spies and destroy bla.ck Africa.
Thus, we submit that it is the
responsibility of the African
women to kill him if he comes
back to his home. If he does
not, way-lay him and hill him
in this country ---- but the black
African nigger Must be killed.
clikeljninatory arecitices ni ... c.oun try. is --osw
2 p ? t le. white
ro Meg / 3/04 ? efittRt4P80J-04601
nam AgressIve War --- the wa
0.440,ikand abused
man
lOntftraicla
Approved For Releasei2001/
01116.41 t:A1,1..cl.
Olk%
STATI NTL
? ..U.S, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird
iS reported to be considering a major in-
novation at .the Pentagon, a civilian to be
in charge of intelligence gathering and
evaluating. And high time.
One of the very big lessons which came
out of the "Pentagon Papers" was that
Pentagon intelligence was different all
through the Vietnam war period from in-
telligence gathered at CIA (Central In-
telligence Agency) and at the State De-
partment's Bureau of Intelligence and Re-
search (INR). And there seems to be
little doubt about which was the, more
reliable.
The Pentagon's intelligence ? from its
own sources was guilty all through of
underestimating the capabilities of the
other side and of overestimating what
various levels of American forces could
accomplish. The most pertinent 'fact about
it is that in 1965 Lyndon Johnson agreed
to. the commitment of .a half a million
Americans to Vietnam On the assumption
that it. would be all over successfully in
ample time for the 1968 election.
Had President Johnson?listened to CIA
.and State. Department intelligence rather
than to Pentagon intelligence he would.
not have made that mistake. Their reports
and estimates were consistent closer to
re-Oity.
The reason for the difference is Plain.
enough. CIA and State's INR are both
staffed by full-time professionals in in-
telligence' work, most of them civilians.
There are a good 'many former military
men in thes,e services, but they are men
(and women) who have gone pernia--.
nently into intelligence, not just for a
short tour of duty.
Military intelligence is heavily staffed,
and always. so far headed, by officers to
whom it is a temporary duty between
regular serVice tours. They are not profes.-
sionals devoting their entire time to in-
telligence. Nor are they civilians who can
see such matters from a nonservice-con-
nected point of view. It is difficult for an
Army, Navy or Air. Force. officer to for-
get his own service when handling intelli-
gence. His inevitable tendency is to hear,
sea, and stress any information or pur-
ported information which will enhance
.the. role of 'his own service, particularly if
he is going on in that service.
Ideally, the Pentagon would take its in-
telligence from 'CIA and INR. CIA- has
no ax to grind but its own, .and there is
really almost nothing it can want which
it -doesn't .already have --- including rela-
tive anonymity and total freedom from
detailed scruti.ny in the Congress. A
select committee of Congress goes over 7
its budget every year. Much of itr.is totally V
secret.' There are never any debates on
the CIA. budget in Congress. The commit-
tee is always generous to CIA. It has no
.special reason to turn out anything but
the most objective intelligence it can man-
-age to produce.
The Pentagon won't take its intelli-
gence from the CIA. Human nature
doesn't work like that. But it would. help
to have a nonservice-connected civilian in
'charge of Pentagon intelligence. It would
reduce the likelihood of: another Vie.tnarn
-war, .
STATI NTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000900030001-2
ro's
Approved For Release 200433/04?dA1-RDP80-01601R
1 . ,.. . . ., ..
leaders . of the military coup
9 17
t/lthe presidential TaCe there hi.
1
T,f2 against Presid6nt Ngo Dinh.
It
1,L:i !/ , Diem in 1903. Still ? a promi-.,
nent fikure in South Vietnam
C' ? Minh recently withdrew from
'W
.. n? -,.,-;,'.,...... t, _
- -:.!...4..)zi protest against the activities
Ji.. ir.) President Nguyen Van
..,..:.?? , -
,
- Govein... Thieu,
? ?.:An expurgated effidid 12- Aceorditi to. ?The
q Certain troop movements'
?
yolume set of the Pentagon
papers, weighing 31 pounds , ?
...and costing $50 per set, went
:on sale yesterday .at the coy.
.ernment Printing Office. By
Owing time, 27 copies had
been sold.
...... The screcned-and?roleased
-' version of the Defense Depart-2
?Merit's secret. hisiory .of the
iVietnam war had been
..stripped of large amounts of
original document 'ition and
-SOine selected para'n'aphs and
'pages of histor:cal analysis
' depo
that had been -rs,:iorted 1).," The .52 3 t o 13.,s. ?sitery lib caries noses, so-
ci?.1 tlibdtilltil,ne, \ ietnarn
South Korea, Thai-
New, York Tilit',,s, The Wash- throughout the country. Many laud, ;\ustralia ano. New Zen-,
)ngton Post and other newspa. of the rest---some 500 copies--
pers in June. .
were reserved for public sale. land, and some discussions re-
official version relcied
Beacon Picas of Boston is
- ?yesterday al"? (lid "t inchide!preparillg to publish the en-
:four' stm:71?'-' (1;a ling ?Ivitli diP-1 lire .1)ellth 011 Palia'S-11thillS
...lorriatic nc:Jet:ations in search i the diplomatic studies--in an
of a seteinerit or the w"1"-; edition scheduled ? for release
These four studies, which ,oci. 1.7.
!
- -were .not obtained by the
, ., ---- ' T.17 0 GPO version of the doe-
newspapers that publisnea ar- urrp.jii is released yesterday
ticks in June, were listed yes-
terday as: "Histories 'of Con- w;.is _printed- by. a photo-offset
tacts-1. 1965-1950, 2. Polish..s-upplied by .
the Pentagon.
process from . original copies
meat Printing Office, the by North Vietnamese forces
press run for the papers re.- moving northward back across
leased esterday 2 2
the demilitarized zone late in
. v wr,s ,33
copies, Of these; 7 Official3,1 'copies 0
U.S. iseussions
were dispatelled to members d . am estimates of actions that
.of Congress; congre,7sion'al the Soviet. Union or China
committees and Viiight take in the Library of response te var-
ious .
Congress., 32 copies were sent military. .actions-by the
- ? United States -in 'Vietnam, and
to the congressional press gal- Idiscussion of U.S. counter
levies, 73 copies to agencies of ;moves.
the Department of Defense, et; U.S. discussions regarding
to. the State Department and relations with the troop-co.n-
garding the role of neutral
countries.
c References to U.S. diplc.)-
matic contacts with the Spyiet
union andRomania ,regarding
:negotiations.
" 6 References to corruption
in the South Vietnamese gov-
ernment,. and U.S. plans for
fighting it.
? Public Printer Adolphus N.
-TTlis'aicelk:', 81967:1\119?6s871 L?11(1"' The" is no index to the vas' did not anticipate a large pub-
, Spence said yesterday hr.!
collection of materiel, - other
lie: demand for the officially
BadY A. johnson, assistant than brief listing of the title released version of the Penta-
to the Secretary of Defense of various studies, Some of the
for legislative affairs, said a Materkl is reprodueed from 1iii.eLle7si..)uibllei.f:t1tginti?:(.))etticT
. latter to .Congress accompany- xerox. copies of original doeu-
ing the papers that the four., ments and in some cases is dif- her by Beacon Press, -Spence
'diplomatic studies were being! ft cal to read. said, "Why should people buy
.'withheld because their diselo-' The largest collection of it (the . official version) if
sure would adversely affect original documents published there's a commercial edition
continuing efforts in search of yesterday is from the.. Eisen- available that's not supposed
Peace and the release of pris? -hov, or administration, includ-. to he expurgated?"
!oilers of war. Chairman P. Ed- ing many relating .to the pro-
:ward Hebert of the House posed American intervention
Armed Services Committee, at the time of Dienbienphu,.
who ordered the PnintillL of just prior to the 1954 Geneva
the ?official declassified ver- conference on Indochina
sion of the Pentagon PaPers, Alany original documents from
said the diplomatic studies the earlier Kennedy years are
"deal with negotiations which included, but virtually all orig-
aid still in progress." 1110 clocurnents from the John.-
son administration have been
deleted although many of
them were published in The
New York Times.
Other . material that. has
been deleted -from the offi-
? cially released version of the
'Vietnam history includes:
,lleferences to Meeting',s be-
tween CIA operatives in 'Viet-
nam and Gen. Duong Van
Minh ("Big Mitth") and 'other
STATINTL
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POnTL
ORE,G0 ,Irc944c1 For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601
? ---.
2 6
- 245,1'32
S 407,186
,-;
\VVVVV/ II(;--..";111S
[II[1.'1;41 ?ev,'S. ICJ d':;-?1
r. . ?.()
Lfirla - .1 11.110PC.:).1JCiD
;1..ly KEYES NE,E,C11',".
, ivrom st,rvico ? ;
:SAIGON , Political unrest
in this uneasy capital took a
. :violent ;anti-American. turn
Saturda vLb.ut threatened
collar rerwired s''tveral
. .
stit,Ches for injuries suffered '
when : his. head . bounced 1
against the windshield as the
driver braked sharply, to a
str,p wb-r, th2 van was hit by
demonsipations against thet fire bomb. Anethr_-tr sailor
I...13 r,c ft i. d e n:t.-rntiguvon, van I was treater' for minor inju- l
..I.Chiett'S Oet. one,-1-rp-c,,;,-.' ries after being knocked tc.)
,. at e.1.1 tal oletio'c I,oled ic, , .the gioancl,
? t. materialize, 2 . ? ... .;,..-.--. - Up to nryw, the students ap- ,
One ;American cl.' ' '? . Tr-'re'ltiv i'V'enti'cl Pp
i-Wounded by gunfire, iio ir - ? Cal harm to the Americans, .
:Amorlears sailtrs v,re-vvt 1,-, ,.. ; - beir..g satictied to sot fire, to
1
t":?,en v up and -four ; Amo- !rt r ': ? ('''''),PLY r al l'e(1 Cars' : . ? ? 1
. veljejcs ,-wc,ve - Ii re 17,0.n.ibf (. i v . v'The new trAtbrea,k Cii: VIO-
? i' by 1051 1f bands of Sou I i ' ler c? ' `I'''IY-PlY liflcierf;""r1 ?
? v I,: :tnarrieso:stod, it ra i . Jthe.U.S. military command's ,v
' e , .? 7 ? '
? 'arm late,:Friclay night e creased antt-Amerlea;
walkj:tig froln ? dont:;:Earlier in Da .1\l'ang
3-Cd ; ceutral Vietnam, a CI drivr_
near '.Can Son 1,1hut Au .
?AS barracks. 'Ifs. c:Actpa f', for life as a
?1/4?,,as Ftlotiii
! i t ? 7 7-
1.1-.:
ihie (-i? .
;tanother who was cso mob, gleefully burned
' ? ?
j.11.4.11: .ILSVO FhOiS -NV-3 , 'ice '
:.ifireA as fc.A?... ?0 question is hew inc c,'
IAA nr.ti
eSe, Ca by On tV,r() n-oridaF ? -1:ougori we can keep env ms...t.
'i lie 50or got a,70...,) and :under c!.-mt..-,o1 in the face C.
folore to i1.,11(.1,.:to5 Ii a rovocal ions," saidib s-t c
stitdciTi?. ? . ?U.S. senior officer. "Su far,
A u.s. NEI y (thics our boys have for the nics
ficer died a fow ,lays camel. -1 part kept their cool, hut thcy
::?after he was evacuated to ? -311st don't fah;
;1-a1,ari for treatment of burns theP0cri?1-3 thevY 1110 herd
;s u If Cr CCI when he was 'help siculd'attack'
; rapped in a parked plelmit The :students -1.;Pii'ar-ently
r- 1.1,0 k, which was: fire -::switcned tactics to hit-and-
bombed -an front of U.S. ;,- run, attacks On Ainerician ve;?? ?
Navy headquarters. :hieleS.:after their th'Etva,tentLi;
,sollvys Stine% , drive to -latock ae;
v , , v ? ; v ? iOet.-.3.
'Pine four Sail0173 wore Vat.,r- off:: the -groUnd,
" 'tacked at; the same spet.
When their vwl was, fire
? tiombed by students at :noon .111104,., liveliest action tot&
? Saturklay. ? vplace Lei ':Van ? Duyet
the sailors?scramlhed' -Street, acne .thc Cairul:odian
oct of noir bprn.10,17 vchiol.,:Cifill3RSSy, where three tumor-
-
E- ithet'i were vattao,;,4 ht): lean cars and, a Scutli Viet-
: dents wialdin7 s mes
'.:ones 'and na? 11 of
01013qt-deg.:She sailors; fled. burned'within a couple
OtourS.::.
STATI NTL
'Ono of the vehicles was a
-blue Ford station wagon
:identified as belonging to the
?Agency. J
,o,,ne in tinifo:an and the elber
gl
in civilian cloes, fled v.,11t.til
COL caught Inc .
Ilia they returned zt - few
minutes later, the civilian .:
carrying a ./.,5 callher ptstol
.-and the: uniformed Irian. an -;
1V116 -.to-;:reorztirCC
_papers they' had left: on Vie
'fron t ,seat.
;
.v
okt-
seryers felt was' commenda-
blo 'restraint, ? Niettla mese
combat police. drovo e'Zii the
'.:.students. with tear gas- gisCilLI:
ad -while v-whilepolice
kr ,-)t traffi- roovinf,
: At one -point-, 'a police. oat'
:?ccr fired several shotsito
:the au To drive may the ?;
crowd : and student radicals ;
T ?
ING one was injure'.1 during
'this action., .
. ,
v ;flitt U.S. -,Army ,n:plesivve
ts See'113-,
P.SL!.q.1 f;i7i5 InaSJiS,
from., ; l'ere
,tuting into -a cloud of
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Approved For Relea4A
0 4 C.A. k tj
A
?i
t. 111`::
infl-nr1
fro "J";i
By, Crocker Snow Jr.
Globe Staff
it
ti 5,7f i
?
The written report of a confiden-
tial discussion about Central
genee Agency .operations held in
1968, a year after the public contro-
versy over agency involvement with.
the National Student Arm., shows.
the CIA was anxious to establish new
?contaols with other student groups,
foundations, .universities, labor. orga-
nizations and corporations for its
oVerseas work. ?
The discussion was held in Janu-
I 963 among ranking government
officials and 'former officials, incluct-
Ing several former CIA officers,
junder the auspices of the Council on
Foreign Relations in New York. ?
Though no. direct quotes are at-
tributed in the report, the ?pillion
was stated by the discussion leader,
V 'Richard M. Bissell Jr., formerly' a
deputy director of the CIA, that: "If
the agency is to be effective, It will
have to make use of private- institu-
tions, on an expanding scale, though
these relations which have 'blown'
cannot be resurrected."? '? .
The discussion also referred .to the
continued utility of labor groups and
American corporations to CIA opera-
tions. No such groups or corporations
are named. ' .
? The ? written report, like other
sponsored by the council, is consid-
ered by the participants as "cona.-
clential" and "completely off the rec-
ord."
? ?
t-N
itIA-RDP80-01601
. The document reflects
individual. assessments of
the CIA by flips:: present.
The report includes a num-
ber of general statements:
?The, two elements of
CIA activity, "intelligence
collection" and "covert ac-
tion" (or "intervention")
are not separated within
the agency but are consid-
ered to "overlap and inter-:
act."
?----The focus of classical
espionage in Europe and
other developed parts of
the world had shifted
"toward targets in the un-
derdeveloped world."
.? ?Due to the clear juris-
diet ion al boUndary be-
tween the CIA and FBI, th
intelligence agency was
"adverse to surveillance of
US citizens overseas (even
when iTeeifically ,request-
cd) and adverse to operat-
ing against targets in the
United States, except for-
eigners here as transients."
----The acquisition of a
secret speech by Soviet
Premier Nikita Khrush?
.chev in February 1956 was
a classic example of the po:-
litical use Of secretly ac-
quired intelligence. The
State Department released
the text which, according
to one participant, prompt-
ed "the beginning of the
split in the Communist
movement." Since this
speech had been specifical-
ly targeted before [IC-
quired, the results meant to
this participant that "if you
get a precise target and go
after it,' you ,can change
history." .
---"Penetration,": by es-
tablishing personal rela-
tionships with _individuals
rather than -simply hiring
thein, was refrarcied
during the .'SOs
provided "limiti
but dramatic re:
flights were latc
of the cancell
scheduled some
between Presic'
hower and
after Francis G
was shot down
sic.)
'After' five d
flights were
from the 1-tw
these operation
highly secret. in.
States, and wit]
son," reads the
these overflight
!leaked' to thE
press, the 1_3;
lave been forc
action."
The meeting,.
was not to consi
CIA missions so
characterize gc
cepts and procc
-discussion v.:as
of a council sir
"Intelligence a;
Policy!' -
The chnirm
meeting' was
Dillon, an i n v
b,anker who ha.., 11 r
Washington. as undersecre-
tary of State and Secretary
of the Treasury in the Ken-
nedy Administration.
Twenty persons were
listed as attending includ-
ing proininent former offi-
cials and educators ?like i?titivities, only occasionally
Harry Howe Ransom.. ofYto point them in a partieu-
Vanderbilt University and lar direction, but primarily
David B. Truman, presi-. to enlarge them and render
dent of Mt. Holyoke Col- them more effective."
lege.
an article in the Sat-
, .
The list 'included Allen Vrday Evening Post in May
W. Dulles, former. director 1957, Thomas Braden, who
?of the CIA, and Robert )(ad helped set up the sub-
Amory Jr., who had been' sidies with Dulles, defend-
deputy director, as well as
Bissell, who had been dep-
uty director until shortly
after the Bay of Pigs inva-
sion, in which the CIA was
involved.
1?.
STATI NTL
- CETI-UT-1c 111%.
thd statement that "it is.
notably true -of the subsi-
?dir.:s to student, labor and
cultural groups that -have.
recently- been publicized
that the agency's objective
was never to control their
? cd the concept .as a- way to
combat the . seven major
front organizations of the
communist world in which
the Russians through the
use? of their international
inc discussion took place fronts had stolen th'z' great
words such as peace, jus-
just a year atter re.vela-
tice and freedom."
ate on the 'internal power Lions by Ramparts Maga-
balance, often with a fairly zinc concernin g' CIA- The report shows that
are scheduled to appear Shoyt-term objective." funded training of agents, the publicity had not ? been
today in the "University ? reconnaissance of ? for South Vietnam at to CIA activi-
Review," a farirroTigf For Relsziaste20614,03/041-701A-RDP80-01601R000900 0 1-2
"
,based month y.
especially useful in the un-
as
?
t(bythe Africa Research Group, ..o. derdeveloped .world. The
Th e document is being cireulateu.
small, radically orientedorganizatIon statement- is made that
hr;aciquartered in Cambridge, because "covert intervention (in
"it offers a still-relevant primer on the underdeveloped world)
the theory and practice of CIA ma-' is usually designed to oper-
nipulations.:'.
. Portions of the document
0Ontintio(i
STATINTL
To, 014 APPrPv@gi-F9itg*.A9919A/194___:)glATRPP49-PlAP37
that the "current SALT talks may lead to
dangerous technological and political im-
balances which may leave us without .the
means to defend ourselves against Soviet at-
tack,"
Congressman Philip Crane (R-111), who
took part in the colloguyn observed that
America's leaders no longer tell us that our
c,ountrY is the world's most powerful. It isn't,
of course. The U.S. has 1,051 intercontinental
ballistic missiles. The Soviet Union has 1,500
ICBM's. -
Rep. Crane commented: "It is as if Amer.
leans awakened one morning to find that all
of their confident 5 ssumptions about their
country were no longer true, as if they clis-
covered that not duly could their country
not fulfill its commitments to others, but
could not even defend itself,"
It is to be hoped that the U.S. public will
heed these warnings, Happily, the special
order arranged by Congressman Spence and
his EtSSOCIPACS indicates a bipartisan rally in
support of stronger defenses. But presidential
leadership is needed if the anti-defense lobby
is to be overcome. This presidential leader-
ship has been lacking the last 21/2 years.
President Nixon undoubtedly erred early in
his term when he accepted the strategic
doctrine of nuclear "sufficiency" proposed by
his chief foreign policy adviser, Dr. Henry
Kissinger. In the years after World War II,
the U.S. sought military supremacy. This
supremacy deterred Soviet nuclear-aggression
Now, our supremacy in arms is gone. The
'USSR is moving ahead in every type of weap-
ons system. The Kissinger doctrine of "suf-
ficiency" is proving to be our undoing, More
and more, it is clear that Mr. Nixon hes
received had advice from Dr. Nissinger?ad-
vice dangerous?to the American people. .It Is
Imperative that Mr. Nixon dispense with Dr.
Kissinger and start listening to concerned
members of Congress end to the Joint Chiefs
? of Staff, the real experts who are the Presi-
dent's authentic military, FICIViSC,ES according
to the law of the land.
In the meantime, the American people can
be thankful that there IS a substantial )nun-
her of congressmen who take seriously their
responsibility to alert the nation regarding
the deteriorated condition of the country's
defenses.
PTIOENJX. I-TZOGRAM" IN
SOUTH VID'INAM
.110il. CORNELIUS E. CALL/ICJ-MR
. OF NEW JERSEY
-. IN THE HOUSE OF Pli;PRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, Septe-mber .15, .1971
. Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Speaker, dur-
ing the recent debate and passage of the
foreign assistance bill, one of the ques-
tions of the so-called Phoenix program
in South Vietnam was discussed. Several
allegations were confusing if n.ot inac-
curate. . ? - ? .
. I have recently received a letter from
? the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, Mr. G.
? Warren Nutter, which I believe very
-. adequately sets the record and the facts
straight on this mattei' and I would like
to take this opporUnity to read his letter
. into the HEcoaa.
But before I do that, I would like to
- note that as the chairman of the Asian
and Pacific Allah's Subcommittee of the
Foreign Affairs Committee I am per
y?-
socially aware of the program and have
also discussed it on numerous occasions
with Ambassador Dill Colby who, until
recently, was in charge of Phoenix.
Phoenix operates on the district and
province level in -South Vietnam with
U.S. support and is designed to gather,
evaluate, and dis:ienrinate intelligence on
the identity and movements of members
of the Vietcong, the so-Galled Vietcong
infrastructure. "fliese ere nonmilitary
figures who govern parts of Vietnam still
controlled by their movement and who
slip in and out of Government controlled
and contested areas. And I want to
stress, Mr. Speaker, that this informa-
tion and intelligence data is used to neu-
tralize this Vietcong,, effectiveness not for
"assassination and torture" as was al-
leged here on the floor.in support of an
amendment whose aim was to withdraw
U.S. support from this program. The
letter received from Mr. Nutter which
I believe sets this matter straight stated:
ASSISTANT i3ECRETAItY OP DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., August 21, 1971,
non. CORNELIUS B. GALT,LACEnt,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Asian ancl Pa-
cific Affairs, Comm/lice on Foreign Af-
fairs, Washington, D.C.
Din.e, Ma, CHArnmAN: Tho Congressional
Record of August 3, 1971 (page 117761-2) re.:
ports an amendment. to the Forl?ign Assist-
ance Act offered by Mr. Reid of New York,
which was defeated by voice vote. This
amendment would have barred any assist-
ance under the Act to any nation for pro-
grams which encompass the assassination or
torture of persons, or which violate the
standards set forth in the Geneva Conven-
tions, In his remarks submitting the amend:;
inent (copy attached), Mr. Reid inade ref-
erence to the Phoenix Program of the Govern-
ment of Vietnam, which is supported by the
United States.
Ambeeador William E. Colby, cited by Mr.
Reid, has suggested that clarification would
be appropriate of certain aspects of the
Phoenix (Phung Hoang) Program in refer-
ence of Mr. Reid's remarks and the testimony
received by the Subcommittee on Foreign
Operations of the House Committee on Gov-
ernment Operations subsequent to Ambassa-
dor Colby's appearance there on July 19, 1971,
As described in some detail in Ambassador
Colby's testimony to the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee In February 1070, the
Phoenix (Pining Huang). Pt 0g,ratil of the
Vietnamese Government was effectively be-
gun in. July 1903, as the result of a Viet-
119.111 CSe, Presidential directive. United States
support of this program has been principal-
ly advisory in nature, directed at improving
the intelligence methods, the apprehension
techniques, the legal procedures and the de-
tention arrangements involved in the strug-
gle of the Vietnamese against the Viet Cong
infrestruct are, or clandestine, subversive and
terroriet apparatus. As -testified by Ambassa-
dor Colby, unjustified abuse occurred in this
struggle in the past, and could occur at pres-,
eat, but the Phoenix Program does not en-
compass Cr condone unjustifiable abuses in
any way, and in fact is designed to eliminate
them. United States policy in this regard was
set out in MACV Directive 521-30 of 13 7,,Tay
1070 (copy attached) which formalized an
earlier memorandum of 15 October 1969 cited
in Senate Foreign Relations Committee hear-
ings February 3970, page 72,5. The Vietnamese
Government in Its Connnunity Defense and
Local Development Plan for 1971 includes the
following provision in lt Annex I covering
the Phoenix .(Phung lloang) Program:
"In order to gain the e.Onfidenee of the
people and their support for the Govern-
ment's program to neutialize the \ICI, all
personnel working' with Pining licang must
closely adhere 'to the policy of treating the
population and the. Vol rin'tai mcii With a
sense of high respect for the law and not
abuse their authority 'in their performance
9
or duty. Consequently, Placing Huang com-
mittees of all echelons must concentrate on
the following points in 1071 :
a. Cooperation and coordination with Vil-
lage, hamlet, ward, end . quarter oeicials
when. performing missions in their Etl'CaS, to
Include notification of the -e officials regard-
ing the disposition of any people arrested.
b. Screening should be performed quieldy,
humanely, and fairly With emphasis on im-
mediate release, of innocent people wthout
causing Vann undue trouble mid Et11110y-
ft /Ice.
C. Perfection of target dossiers. Arrests are
to be made only when sufficient evidence and
accurate information is' available.
d. Province and City Security Committees
must meet at least once a week (or more
often depending on requirements) to con-
sider detainee cases and sentence the VC]: ?
as appropriate.
e. Notification of detainee disposition
must be made to the appropriate government
echelons and agencis ? to ensure effective
monitoring."
As indicated in the Department of State's
opinion, filed with the Subcommittee on
Foreign Operations in r6sponse to its request
of Ambassador Colby on July 19, 1971, the
Phoenix Program is not violative of the
Terms of the Geneva Conventions. Although
certain aspects give concern in their field of
due process, the Vietnamese and American
Government a, working together, have
brought about a number of improvements
In its procedures and are cooperating in
the formulation end application of addi-
tional measures to bring greater effective-
ness to the struggle against; the Viet ,Cong
infrastructure and to ensure that the pro-
gram ineets high standards of justice. Re-
ports of unjustified abuses predating the
implementation of the Phoenix Program or
involving US or Vietnamese military intelli-
gence or combat operations should not' be
mistakenly ascribed to the Phoenix Program
of the Vietnamese Government nor to trs
support thereof.
In surmnary,.the struggle between the Viet
Cong infrastructure and the Vietnamese
Government is an integral part 'of the eve mall
mistakenly astribed to- the Phoenix program
has brought about improvements in the
effectiveness and propriety of the Vietnamese
Government's conduct of this stru,sglc.
United States support of this program is
conducted uncles' the same restraints as sup-
port of other Vietnamese military and civil
programs.
Sincerely,
0: WARREN Nin.'.CER,
ASD-ISA.
-?
AMENDMENT OITEIZED By Mn, 11 or Nnw
Yonic
Mr. P,Fao of New York. Mr. Chairman, I
offer an amendment.
The Clerk reed as follows:
".Amendment offered by Mr. REM of New
York: Page 12, line 13, strike out the quo-
tation marks and the period immediately
following such quotation marks.
"Page 13, after line 13, insert:
" `(x) No assistance shall be furnished
under this Act to any nation for progrnmS
which encompass the assassination or tor-
ture of persons, or which violate the stand-
ards set for in the 0E21101'a C0114 en LiOn."
Mr. Rsic of New York, elds amendment is
simple; I believe. It is directed to insuring
that there are no programs -through which
the United Stales provided funds to any
nation which enc.ompasses as a program, the
assassination or torture, or programs which
violate the standards set forth in the Genes-c,
COD.V8/3.tiOnS.
More explicitly, my amendment would re-
quire that no U.S. funds would be furnished
1.0 pregrains which are characterized by a?,
pattern of aseassimution or toeture or other
violations of the Geneva Conventicais, to
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