B-52S POUND N. VIETNAM FOR 7TH DAY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000900020001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 67
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 3, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 24, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

WASHINGTON POST
Approved For Release 20011942ft 451/k-RWAEhgaff4NRID
in Saturday's raids. bringing to broadcast by Hanai Radio, at.; Ilea of the Bach Mai hospital,-
wrecked the ear-nose-throat in-
ass'
?
1 11-52s Pound dio claimed two more B-52s The North Vietnamese Fn . :
were shot down over Haiphong eign Ministry, in a statemeat
North Vietnam claims to have waging an :siitute and "completely de-.
N. Vietnam. 17 the number of big bombers cused the United States of
"extermination" molishedg a research section,
F
downed this week, bombing campaign against Hanoi said. A second 11-52 or 7'11:,Day gon announced that two I3-52s homes, schools and pagodas.
The U.S. command in Sal- populated areas. destroYin" raid Saturday "laid a carpet,
of bombs of different calibers
were shot down in Friday's "By doing this. Nixon has , on a lone stretch going from
From News Dispatches raids. It has now reported that committed crimes even morel t gate of the hospital to dif-
U.S he . planes continued the a total of 10 B-52s have been barbarous than those of Bit- resent sections and patient
heaviest assault of the war shot down since the renewed ler," the Foreign Ministry wards," the agency raported.
on North Vietnam through a bombing of Hanoi and Hai- statement said. This strike damaged every
sixth day Saturday, as Ha- phong began last Monday. A statement issued by the untouched room, including un-
not accused the U.S. of wag-, Agence France-Presse corre- Hanoi delegation in Paris said derground sections of the hos-
ing an "extermination" bomb-i spondent Jean 1.horaval re- B-52s had leveled villages hos- Pita', and destroyed the de-
ing campaign against popu-1 ported from Hanoi that U.S. pitals and schools in
. ,
partments of dermatology, in-
lated areas. , planes made their 40th raid of "saturation bombing" raids ternal medicine, pharmacology,
U.S. and South Vietnamese the week against the North Vi- against `..the most densely pop_ administration, kitchens, re-
intelligence agents monitored etnamese capital at dawn Sat- ulated regions in North Viet- pair shops and laundries,
i radio message reporting, urday. nam." .Hanoi said. , .i
that North Vietnam's legen- He reported that while some The Hungarian news agency I a
dary Defense Minister Gen. W
. residents of Hanoi can he seen and Tess both reported that ! orldwide Protests
Vo Nguyen Giap was killed : fleeing to the countryside on ! the Hungarian commercial I 31-minted on Bombing
Friday in an explosion while ; bicycles or carts, people re-; mission and the East German 1 ' .
touring a bomb-damaged area main in the city in "big num.; embassy in Hanoi were dam- ' From News Dispatches
of Haiphong. i hers, .calmly continuing their i Denunications of the U.S.
i need in the U.S. h V
om iin?f
a bombing campaign against
' But Washington Post corre- I daily activities, despite the -.
spondent Peter Osnos report- alerts and the destruction of r,- aids. The Bulgarian news 'North Vietnam were reported
ed from Saigon that the origin buildings, sometimes rig.ht in , agency reported that the Bul- in a number of cities around
of the report, a spoken and . the middle of the city, that are, garian Embassy in Hanoi was the world yesterday.
uncoded message from some-. in no way military." . also damaged. Radio Hanoi Sweden's Prime Minister
where in North Vietnam, was Thoraval also reported that Saturday added the Albanian Olof Palme called the bombing
not clear and intelligence the weekly Aeroflot flight and Cambodian embassies to an "outrage on . a level with
sources expressed doubt that which lands at Hanoi's Gialam!,.the list of those which have the Nazi massacres of World
it was genuine. .airport was cancelled Satur- been reported damaged by. War II.
The North Vietnamese dee- day because the only stretch U.S.i bombs. . U.N. Secretary General Kurt
gation to the Paris peace talks of runway left unscathad by i In New Delhi, U.S. charge Waldheim said he was greatly
denied the report of Giap's bombs was too short to re- 1 d'affaires Lee Stull was sum- disturbed by the continued
death with extraordinary ra- ceive a four-engine jet. i moned to the Foreign Ministry bombing and called for a I re-
clay, to receive a protest su
i mption of the Paris talks.
pidity, Washington Post corre- But he said a turboprop Chi-
Saturday
damage to the Indian em- In Dacca, Bangladesh stu-
spondent Jonathan Randal re- nese civilian plane managed to
ported. The formal denial was land in Hanoi after waiting, in !bassy in Hanoi Thursday. A dents ransacked the U.S. In-
U.S. spokesman said Stull ex_ formation Service building and
In-
issued 90 minutes after the re- Arming, Southern China, for j
port first surfaced in Paris. more than 20 hours fur a lull !. pressed deep regret over any burned. President Nixon in
night.
Seven foreignbombers. embassies in in the bombing.. !, damage caused by American effigy Friday
.1 About 200 persons demon- i
The North Vietnamese mes- i
lIanoi?those of East Ger- In Warsaw, U.S. charge d'af- strated against the bombing in I
many, Bulgaria, India, Egypt, sage reporting Clap's death :' i
Cambodia, Cuba and Albania? said he was killed Friday. at !faires Davis E. Booster saw :front of the U.S. embassy in
and the Hungarian trade mis- the Tran hung Dao arma- i.' Poland's deputy foreign minis- !Tokyo.
sion have now been damaged ments depot in Haiphong . ter Friday and delivered
by American bombs, according, when a delayed-action bomb "profound condolences" for
to reports from several capi- dropped by U.S. warplanes ex- :the death of three Polish sea-:
taIs. plodcd. . Inca killed in Haiphong, when i
The Soviet news agency Correspondent Osnos re- Itheir ship was reportedly hit !
Tass reported .Saturday that ported from Saigon that intel- I and sunk by U.S. bombers,'
'U.S: airstrikes on Hanoi had iigence officials said a rues- 01-ars= newspapers reported
resulted in casualties ainunt,, sage of such importance would !today.
American pilots held in the almost certainly have been in The Bulgarian and Hun-
mainI POW camp in the North code.
Vietnamese capital. "It could wellarian news agencies also re-
have been a ported that the Pach Mai Hos-
'l'ass correspondent Alexan. plant," one official told ()silos. pi tat in Hanoi?head. ily dam-
der11Iine,yeV reported from ? There have been erroneous re- . aged in Friday's raids?was
Hanoi that raids sd a ti Ports before of 'the death of. int for the second time Satur-
n' mg . iree
0 North Vietnam's top military! day.
1 'g , ^ 1 s dc di oPPed . strategist, who became a leg- The North Vietnam News
camp, bombs in the area of a prison end after defeating (10.' French n
Aeeey said Sunday. that
.achere were wounded at Dienbienphu in 1054. "more than 25" workers at
among the prisoners," he said. In Paris, the North Vietnam- Bach ,,iai IleTital and mem-
He did not indicsde the nun, ese (101 ton to the peace hers of their families v.-ere
her of casualties and repotted talks termed the report 01 killed in the two raids. Casual-
(hat, Cliap's death "an outeind-out ties to patients were avoided
ft POW (amp official saio invention of the CI :a." :`,.
the injuri.d had Man taken to y evacuating them before the
spokesman said: -We do not.
.1 . . or .t eatment. al to denv this product of asite_ arit, buiphilla _pluiLk_
1.,:orth vio f rrori
nlilmiiTcd sat- ''t"Rel . 200.013iO4 ! QML-RDRUOrfultiviito00900020001-3
u.s.i.;.!ids ,i4hiattivedfore Rase , Lc . 1
airday add Sunday, Hanoi Ha- IA'arfare."
bombing,
U1 GUARDIAN
Approved Wbf:kcailige 200103/NY: aliRDP80-016
C21
By Richard E Ward
Second. of a series
Clandestine sabotage, combat -and
espionage missions have been conducted in
Laos and Cambodia by U.S. military per?
sonnet, despite White House denials and
contrary to congressional prohibition.
Such missions are top-secret actions
directed by the Studies and Observations
Group of the U.S. Army Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam, located in Saigon and
'generally known by its initials, MAC-V
SOG. The most comprehensive picture of
these activities available, based on testimony
of former participants in these missions,
known as Cornmand and Control operations,
is contained in a series of three articles by
Gerald Meyer, published in the Nov. 5, 10
and 12 issues of the St. Louis Post Dispatch.
Unless otherwise indicated all material in
this article is based on the articles by Meyer,
a regular staff member of the Post Dispatch,
who interviewed former Special Forces
members, helicopter' pilots and others who.
took part in the Command and Control
operations during the 1960s and into 1972.
The Post Dispatch's informants, whose
names were not revealed to protect them
from possible prosecution, stated that the
clandestine commando raids were still in
progress as of August. One informant said
that in August when he left Bien Hoa, one of
the Command and Control bases, more than
180 Army Special Forces were stationed
there and reinforcements were being sent
?
from Okinawa.
The commando raids' in recent years,
utilizing Army personnel who generally
command teams composed of mercenaries
from Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam,
were also sent into North Vietnam and
liberated areas of South Vietnam. There is
evidence that the Air F.orce las operational
jurisdiction over a similar program based at
Nakon Phaon, Thailai3s1,Fit& reggaee
Laotian boMRProveu
Commando raids were ordered by
volved in missions.
?
Washington against the Democratic
'Republic of Vietnam in the early 1960's, as
documented in the Pentagon Papers, but
which provided few details. ?The present
program, apparently undergoing a partial
ticipated in Command and Control raids
from Danang, said he had taken part in
missions in North Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia. "He said they were for the
"Vietnamization," is an outgrowth of the. ether American missions threatened by
purpose of gathering intelligence, rescuing
original escalation of CIA-Special Forces
North Vietnamese forces, destroying
missions in Indochina ordered by !he supplies and disrupting enemy corn-
Kennedy administration., munications facilities."
Although the Post Dispatch does not Command and Control Central, operating'
mention the CIA, it is clear that Studies and /ut of Dakto and Kontum, near the tri-
Observations Group is a CIA operation. The, border area of South Vietnam and Laos and
informant most knowledgeable about SOG. Cambodia, was used for raids deep within
a Special Forces officer, was described by
correspondent Meyer as fearful of being
jailed or fined, saying: "If I talked to you and
got 'caught, I could get 10 years in prison and
a $10,000 fine." ?
The Special Forces officer said that the
connections between Command and Control
and the 'MAC-V SOG' organization in
Saigon were so highly classified that we
would not risk commenting on them," wrote
Meyer. ?
Despite his reluctance to talk the officer
explained that the Command and Control
operations were "formally" under the
direction of the Fifth Special Forces Group
until Jantiary 1971, when the Fifth Special
Forces officially was described as having
been withdrawn from Vietnam. Actually,
according to Meyer, "numerous Fifth
Special Forces were left behind at Command
and Control bases throughout South
Vietnam" and various efforts were employed
to conceal their continued presence. They
were forbidden to wear the green beret and
? Special Forces insignia while they remained
in Indochina.
Symbolic of the Command and Control
operations, was a gestapo-like insignia, used
'by one of the units, a green-bereted .skull
with blood dripping from its teeth. This Was
the emblem of Command and Control
Central. There were at least two other main
units, Command and Control North and
Command and Control South. The North,
Central and South referred to the base areas
of the commando teams.
Apparently most of the operations under
the Command and Control program, at least
in recent years, took place in southern Laos.
However, after the U.S.-Saigon invasion of
Cambodia and subsequent Congressional
prohibition against use of' U.S. ground
troops in Cambodia, it is safe to assume that
the secret U.S. missions were increased in
the latter country.
the two latter countries.
"A Special Forces soldier formerly
assigned to Command and Control Central
said that the group's missions were handled
by about 150 Americans and from 30Q to 400
Montagnard tribesmen. Men participating in
missions first were transported to Dakto and
then sent by helicopter across the borders,
he said.
"The missions were rotated among the
men and casualties were severe, the man
said.... Such teams usually included two or
three American leaders and about half a
dozen Montagnards.
"Dakto was the starting point also for
large 'hatchet forces,' with larger numbers of
Americans and Montagnards. . . .
"Less frequently?apparently only about
once every six months?very large groups of
Americans were sent across the borders on
so-called Slam (Search, locate and an-
nihilate) missions. More than 100 men
sometimes participated in such missions. ...
"Some penetrations into Laos apparently
were quite deep. Both the Special Forces
(two of Meyer's informants) said the U.S:
operated a radio relay station on a mountain
top about 30 miles inside Laos.
? "This station, called the 'Eagle's Nest,' was
used to transmit messages between South
Vietnam and Command and Control teams
operating beyond the mountain top in the
Laotian countryside."
The radio station, whose .exact location
was not specified, could have been located
near the Bolovens plateau, in Southern Laos,
where the Pathet Lao told this correspon-
dent in 1970 there was a secret U.S. base.
The Pathet Lao liberation forces captured
Airborne bandits ?
Typically, Command and Control missions
comprised several U.S. officers or NCO's
commanding a mercenary team .which
would land in Laos or Cambodia, and
"aimed at taking prisoners, gathering in-
formation and disrupting communist ac-
tivities." The commandos would -be tran-
sported in . four helicopters, while four
helicopter gunships would. provide air cover,
itifilia;?0,1trArNallsb R00090002r-
the forward air controller, were also In-
WrSHINCITON POST
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11. hivo
By ..Art Buchibald
If Richard Nixon wins the election next week, most of
.? the credit will go to Lu Doc Toy who heads the "Com-
munists For . Nixon" Committee in -Hanoi.
Lu Doc Toy who, until this election, always voted the
straight Communist party ticket, deeided to support
? Nixon this year because he said, "I'm sick and tired of
having my kids bused along the Ho Chi Minh Trail."
. Having made the decision, Lu Doc Toy contacted the
Committee for the Re-election of the President in
.Washington. which sent one of their top CIA men to
...Hanoi to help him in the campaign. -
Lu Doc Toy told the CIA man, "I need bumper
.stickers, buttons, posters and a secret fund to- get the
Communists For Nixon off the ground."
The CIA map said, "We've written off North Vietnam
as far as electoral votes go, but you could help us -
tremendously in getting the President re-elected with a
small favor."
"What can I do? Lu Doc asked.
?... "Arrange a peace treaty with the U.S. -a week before
:the elections." . .
? "It's clone," Lu Doc Toy said. "My cousin is a member
-,.of the Politburo and he owes me a favor."-.
Lu Doc Toy went to see his cousin Ton Son Not in his
bomb shelter .the next day. During a 15-minute break
in the bombing he said, "Ton Son Not, as you know I am
head of the Communists For Nixon and I have a small
-favor to ask of you." -
"You have dishonored your ancesters, Lu Doc Toy,"
Ton Son Not said. "How can you support a man whose
party would bug the Watergate?"
"It was a prank," Lu Dec Toy said. "Everyone does
it 'during an election year. Besides Nixon knew nothing
about it."
"Thats what all the Communists For Nixon say. But
we -know differently. Besides, how could you work for
:A man who said he would stop the war in 1968?" .
. "Exactly," Lu Doc Toy said. "That's what I came to
,speak to you about Nixon wants to stop the war again,
only this time before the election."
'"It's a trick," Ton Son Not said. "What does he want
in exchange for it?"
? "Nothing we wouldn't have given him in 1968. It's the
.same deal. that was offered to him then."
"But why now? I thought the U.S bombing was
'working." .
."Who knows what goes on with those cockamamie
Americans? But I'm giving it. to you straight. If you
'people - say okay Nixon will send what's-his-name to
paris to .sign the cleal."..,
;
STATI NTL
"Wait a mimic," Ton Son Not said, "If we agree to a
Peace settlement, that means we'll have four more years '
of Nixon."
"Look, Ton Son Not," Lu Doc Toy said, "We hold the
key to the American presidential election in our hands.
We have to decide whether we want Nixon for President
and a generation of peace, or whether we want the mis-
guided, badly thought out, socialistic programs of George
McGovern."
?- The bombing started again. "WHAT ABOUT TffiEu?
1,1VILL HE GO ALONG WITH IT?" Ton Son Not yelled.
"DON'T WORRY ABOUT THIEU," Lu Doc Toy yelled
back. "HE'LL DO ANYTHING NIXON ASKS IHM TO!"
? . 1972. Los Angeles Times
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STATOTHR
Approved .For ReleasedgfINROA: ic -Rpm-0 1 601 ROO
1 1 OCT 1972
Ii61.-ce covertly hroadcast
ropagancla to Vietnamese
By I3ernard Zubres
. ? . . ? . ?
ritten fcrt The Christian Science Monitor
The hews unit of the Voice of America has
been covertly broadcasting anti-Communist
propaganda to the North Vietnamese since
the beginning of their spring offensive. The
Operation was launched on direct orders from
the White House ? reportedly over the
protests of the newsroom editors.
- The VOA's news unit is supposed to be as
Untainted as possible. News writers are
supposed to have two separate sources of
Information on any story used (if it doesn't
come from a field reporter). The Voice is
. supposed to be a paragon of objective
reporting, modeled on the British Broad-
casting Corporation (BBC).
The 18 hours of daily programming beamed
at North Vietnam are intended to weaken the
morale of the North Vietnamese. The shows
Include reading the names of North Vietnam-
ese prisoners of war, and any editorial
material from American newspapers critical
of North Vietnam.
This propaganda activity is in apparent
contravention of the VOA's charter which
calls for news to be presented in a balanced
and factual manner. Propaganda is left for
? the nob-news programming. On language
programs other than Vietnamese the VOA
news is generally scrupulous about its objec-
tivity.
The VOA's propaganda activity first came
to. Public attention when the Japanese Gov-
ernment protested the use of the American
transmitter in Okinawa in broadcasting anti-
North Vietnamese programs. The State De-
partment flatly, and in good conscience, said
no propaganda programs were being broad-
cast from Okinawa. What the State Depart-
ment failed to say was that the programs are
simply being retransmitted from Okinawa.
They are broadcast from Washington.
The voice has not staffed the operation with
regular employees, because they don't be-
lieve it will become a fixture. The special
programs are supposed to end simulta-
neously with the termination of the spring
offensive. VOA newsroom editors and man-
agers protested its existence.
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and
military aircraft often drop transistor radios
to the North Vietnamese so they can listen to
the programs.
Critics of the programs say the broadcasts
probably are self defeating,. The North
Vietnamese can listen to the BBC, Radio
Moscow, French, Dutch, Australian, Korean,
Japanese, and Chinese newscasts. There are
those who say the harm to the VOA news'
repptation from these U.S. propaganda pro-
grams under VOA auspices is great.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000900020001-3
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000900020001-3
BE .H7' CO
Available
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Approved For ReleaseTtlikeinPATCPCIAIWORD-T04601R0009
1 Oct 1972
ct:
? .
'
? , ? :
44 ? c: ? -;
/ Pr
A. Falk, ju,t LL.ck :rf.m AN-,;rciir.,..=, 1,'Zir, a favora-
:neeton P.ic'oard strtictive 1espf;:.1se," .he law at Princo-
Cortin" 'some ttJ tt:ree IlAve been
er,,n pp-w,s 3-c:er,..,..:;;;;.i ;;...:roi, ati;t,..;d,:.- ofikr.Mri..-Ti?
Cia:Iris the 1);;:el4:-.a atlon fcir r.:iettse or the threa
rnoy ha,.?;; d pt.r or in tiordig
the safety of z;ii 'POW's ron:ztrued as a
in North North 'Vietnam by --?!;Jrc" such as hal::ng
esp;ona,c;0 rilaterials tht: of North Viet-
pLzeL?fige:,, t:. jr . .
f:imi1rs.. . .
? :tIanis-;vteitt
In taiidng the aci-
pric:oners; Faik -..kts -per.istently"
(}! CIA. , pitois
boon se:`..t to. ;;?.r, thcir ;Inc: cil:sert1;txt
.tnuirtrtvrt Pi ?
1.:e.artu;s"
"a recap:ar,..er,ri:Inor.y ratra,r
n "5(:C:";te,".:d 6.aLtd 1hz;r1 a r--
"
"What i'otn..:1 most irre-
dr".1
s?
Li" -"?
vel
of Mia.h, unc
fcr.ir? p n : I Cie
i02.:1Ce Wil0 r. roieritc...:, of this
tn.'",?-cd tr.e ?OW*3 from not ,niy hara:is-
Hanoi, the rr.lea,,,e ";;;ds n;.,, }-.;ut
an 0:1,,,,2!ricnce to !..oe whether;zovera-
, ,
cait a*, Ther:t.o its, thu prmts, or
cf.',ostc..;(tive. rt:spo;:.? ti-,c v..hy it mig:It.
port if the Unitc:i Goy- ;;;?:.:T:ad..1.f.r.., thu chance3 of
efrohenr." ? c,:horsif t?hey per.,,isk?f-i Ia hi
"it ;11:in't a con- octet,," said the pr,-.f..,ssor of
saisi there was no
ioe basis far such
fc "
t"::roe were prc.1-.)an.-. to
t::rn the.n...?eic?e3 ti)
tory after a fcx days haci
with thei- :a---'1:os,"
Falk utid the
Nu' Vtat-
soy
f.:rthr
rf this typ. La
th,-iy did F..ay in a c.ega-
Iiv tazt aN.cm.:s
to
-Jeu!..3r.1;ve
further prison...r
...eleae.os," F.:111:s
W?22
c , .
\ tb: of tic:' c,..n-
finer?r-J "
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Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601AORMW0001-3
Pui-CELAND, ORE.
OREGONIAN
OM- 1197k
- ?4q),132
S ? 407,186
Col. Hogan in Hanoti
it looks as if Hanoi's Communist propa-
;? ga.ndists have gone astray, again, in charging
that packages received by American prisoners
of. war Irani their relatives at home have con-
tained hollowed out peanuts, .soap and toys with
- messages and a giant-size tube of toothpaste
with a radio receiver in it.
The accusation is that these and other de-
vices have been sent to POWs in an effort to
enlist them as spies. Spies? From prison cells?
The Politburo must be tuned in to those
everlasting re-runs of the TV comedy series,
Hogan's Heroes, who are pictured as World War
11 POWs raising all kinds of hell for the Nazi
war machine from a spy base in Stalag 13.
It's really too much to believe that relatives
would knowingly endanger their sons and hus-
-hands in Communist prison quarters by sending
them materials for spying. Or that the CIA, the
Pentagon or any official of the U. S. government
would do it, considering the futility of such .a
project.
The display was shown to the anti-war ac-
tivists who went to Hanoi to help Hanoi's propa-
gandists publicize the release of three American
POWs. One of them said, "It looks to us an un-
mistakably professional job." Meaning, one
supposes, the CIA. The CIA has done some silly
things, only revealed when their agents have
been caught, but wed hate to think the agency
is as naive as the Hanoi Politburo is in making
such charges, and the people who swallow
them.
V
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Approved,. For Release 2001 601
2 9 SEP 1972
STATOTHR
Inade North Vietnam
This is one of a series of
articles by the chief Washing-
tot correspondent of the St.
,LOuis Post-Dispatch, Richard
Dudnian, who has returned
front two weeks in North
,Vietnam.
?
? ,
.Long before it was bomb-
ed this year, the catherclral
of Phatdiem was_ a routine
'showplace for foreign visi-
tors. North 'Vietnamese
, leaders wanted to refute the
. idea that they suppress
,. Catholicism.
, Now the wrecked church
t complex has become a high-
priority exhibit of the hor-
rors of the war for such
' views as the three U.S. pilots
i released this week and the
American delegation that
went to bring them home.
A tour of the area on Sept.
l: 4 showed at least four bomb
craters within the cathedral
t compound.
t_
1 - The central Cathedral Is
1 In two parts, one Of them an
i
, ornate stone belfry topped
*, with swooping Chinese-style
:'? roofs and human figures as
; well as crosses. It was tin-
damaged.
Behind it, the huge wood-
en main building, 230 feet
long and 70 feet wide inside,
: had ben battered by a bomb
: that had struck in a court-
yard beside it. Fragments of
, 'tile lay in the pews, and the
: wreckage of carved wooden
' paneling lay on the floor.
, ?
Flagstones from the court-
yard lay on the roof, where
? they had ben hurled by the
. explosion.
.,
'
Two Churches Gutted
! To the west, across the
' eourtyard, two -smaller
! churches, St. Joseph's and
1 St. Peter's, both had been
: gutted by the blast. A choir
i hall had been wrecked by
1 another bomb that shattered
Itwo .walls and the roof.
On the east side of the
! main cathedral, St. Roco's
-`, Church had been smashed
- by another bomb. Behind it,
a small all-stone church said
to have been built in 1875
, and to WOO
group *-1
a
religious statues had been had been there. I ran to the
removed for safekeeping. place and f was about half Catholic. He
;fou ? ,
Take Toil
Some of the churches in -
the Roman Catholic com-
plex had been damaged by
the Johnson administration's
bombing raids of the 1960s.
Officials said they had been
restored by the time regular
bombing of North Vietnam
' was resumed this year. The
craters and wreckage ob-
served there this month ob-
viously were fresh.
A local official, Pham
Ngoc Ho, vice chairman of
the Kimson district adminis-
trative committee, said that
two of the churches were hit
July 24, when six bombs
were dropped on the area.
He said 19 persons were
killed and six injured.
Ho, who said he was not a
, Christian, reported that a
second attack came on Aug.
15, which he said was a reli-
gious holiday?"the day St.
Mary went up to the sky."
, Aug. 15 was the Feast of the
Assumption. He said five
were killed and three
j ured.
; "The Cathblics had sev-
eral masses that day, but
they were in an evacuation
church away from here," he
said. "Four planes came just
before 4 o'clock in the after-
noon. They circled overhead
for 20 minutes. Then they
dropped 10 bombs on the
churches and some houses
next to them."
Survivors presented
Several victims and survi-
vors of the two attacks were
presented. One of them was
a 12-year-old girl named
Nguyen Thi T,ho, who wore
a St. Mary medal on a string
around her neck and the
customary white cloth
around her head for mourn-
ing.
"On Aug? 15, my mother
was drying rice in the sun
on the stone pavement near
the church, on the other.
side from our house," she
said. "When I heard the
warning, I got into our shel-
ter. The American planes
:came, and I heard a bomb.
explode close by. People
there. She was already.
dead."
"Little Tho," as the Viet-
namese call the girl, is the
eldest of four children.
Their father, a farmer, now
builds, dikes and digs irriga-
tion canals, she said.
The pastor of three focal
parishes expressed tile opin-
ion that the bombing of the
churches was deliberate..
The Rev. Vu lieu Cue, 75,
was interviewed in a parish
conference room decorated
with a crucifix, a defunct
grandfather clock, two sets
of water buffalo horns and
an elephant's tooth.
A.sign on the wall in Viet-
namese said, "Deep regrets
at the death of Ho Chi
Minh."
"I think the Americans
have suffered heavy failures
on the battlefront and now
are trying to threaten us by
killing many people," he
said. "And now they are
trying to kill many Chris-
tians and -destroy many
churches in order to arouse
the people against the gov-
ernment."
If that was the intent?to
turn a potentially dissident
minority group against the
government?he said it had
failed in his parishes.
"Fight to the End"
"These Christians know
very well the crimes corn-
mitted by the Americans,"
he said. "They know that
they must take up arms, and
I know they are willing to
fight to the end even if the
war drags on for many
years."
He said he was advising
Catholics to dig bomb shel-
ters at their homes and
around the churches. In an-
swer. to a question, he said
he would shoot down an
American plane if he had
the opportunity.
. ?
Father Cue said the con-
gregations of his three par-
ishes totaled 1,850. The num-
said it hit in the churchyard ber of crosses and religious
. on the other side of the
medals worn by townsfolk m
/lurch.
Faed
`rC./
TAD -Ara.,
many Catholics there were
. in all of North Vietnam, but
he said there were 80,000 in
Ninhbinh, province, which
includes the Phatdiem dio-
cese.
Officials in Hanoi. said
there were 800,000 practicing
Roman Catholics in North
Vietnam. Some well inform-
ed U.S. government speci-
alists consider that figure
reasonable. ?
Whatever difficulties the
'Hanoi government may Ii eve
had in the past with its ?
Roman Catholic minority,
the Catholics now appear
to be regarded as a loyal
segment of the population.
Officials referred to what
they called a propaganda
campaign by the United
States in 1954 to try to per-
suade all the Catholics to
move south of the 17th par-
allel. They described the
campaign as partly success-
ful.
Reports Disputed
Reports that the Hanoi
government had executed
some 500,000 Roman Cath-
olics in a ruthless land-re-
form. campaign in 1955 and
1956 have lately been dis-
puted. On the contrary, it is
said by some students of the
episode, this "bloodbath"
story was a piece of black
- propaganda fabricated by
' persons subsidized by the
U.S. Central Intelligence v/
Agency.
?
In any case, many Roman
I Catholics remain in the
North and continue to prac-
tice their religion there..
Their attendance at daily
mass in large numbers and
their obvious knowledge of
the ritual supported the of-
ficial line that freedom of
religion is permitted.
Whether the Catholic;
can be considered first-class
, citizens in a Communist so- ?
ciety is another question. One
bit of evidence suggested
blhabbir-b not.
Continued
tv kg Re easib2Q0a1/003/04lieCIA412plo ontaggp o
nd her lying
said he did not know how
EIZ
Approved For Release 2001/031,9440PARDP80-0$61X111M1
27 SEP 1972
Reds gay ?
71-3)T{17
U.; B (71Z-
fCgiti:5
Peking (.4 ?American anti-
war activists, in Pelting with
three prisoners of Nvar released
by North Vietnam, disclosed
yesterday a charge by Hanoi
that United States packages
mailed to POW's have con-
tained spying devices, rigged
into' such things as cans of
The Pentagon called the
charge ridiculous.
The charge was first made
on the American delegation's
second -day in Hanoi Septem-
ber 17. Hoang Tong, editor of
the official Communist party
newspaper, Nhan Dun, said his
government was "extremely
upset by electronic devices hid-
den in packages regularly sent
to prisoners."
The activist delegation?Cora
Weiss, David Dellinger, the
Rev. William Sloane Coffin and
1/Richard Falk?who went to
" Hanoi to get the prisoners,
said they asked for evidence to ,
prove the charge. This evi-
dence, they assert, was dis?
played Monday shortly before
the group left for Peking and
thence Moscow en route' to the
United States:
As described by the delega-
tion, the nearest thing to an
"electronic device" seemed to
be material for a radio re-
ceiver.
A correspondent accompany-
ing the .group did not see the
display. He had attended var-
ious meetings with the three
released POW's and seven
- other POW's who were brought
forward for interviews Mon-
'day, but was not advised that
!- the alleged espionage materi-
als were to be shown.
- Later Mrs. Weiss told of the
;display and passed on photo-
graphs which she said the
North Vietnamese had de-
scribed as showing packages
' and contents sent to American
"Too ridiculous"
A Pentagon spokeSman, Maj.
Gen. Daniel James, said when
asked to comment in Washing-
ton: "The charges are too ri-
diculous to dignify by trying to
. address them in detail. I know
, of no instance of such actions
' taking place, and I think it is
just another of the propaganda
web that Hanoi is spinning to
obscure the real facts concern-
ing her intransigent jiasition in
refusing to negotiate meaning-
fully for our prisoners of war."
From the pictures could be
discerned three -names of al-
leged recipients?Charles B.
Tyler, of Mesa, Ariz.; Edward
A. Brudno, of Harrison, N.J.,
and William Robinson, of Rob-
ersonville, N.C.
Mrs. Weiss's group told of
the following:
1. An extra-large tube of ;
Colgate toothpaste which when
squeezed revealed what Hanoi
said was a receiving apparatus
with a battery compartment
,and an earpiece.
I 2. Inside a candy bar were
;two pieces of cellulose paper,
each 2 by 3 inches. with in-
structions for writing messages
:that would not. be detectable.
The special paper was to be
folded so that it Made a sharp
edge, and the secret message
was to be written with this
edge, the North Vietnamese
said. Then, by using a code
word in a normal letter, the
prisoner would tell the person
receiving his letter that there
was a special message to be
found by special processing of
the paper.
3. A peanut shell that had
been hollowed out and con-
tamed a message, .and also
cans of milk and instant coffee
which -Hanoi said also had con-
tainedyiessages.
4. A toy hipOpotamus about
Pk inches long, sealed, which
when opened showed an enclos-
ure with raised writing on one
side reading "see secret hiding
place" and on the other, 'hold
together, stand op."
5. A wrapped bar of soap
that had been cut in half,
each half gouged out and con-
taining plastic hags full of cap-
sules said by the North Viet-
namese to be used for secret
writing.
One small cellulose sheet
was said to have asked for
verification of the deaths of
five American fliers, as an-
nounced by the North Vietnam-
ese, and information about any
others known to be dead.
- The same sheet asked recipi-
ents to provide any informa-
tion about prisoners captured
anywhere in Indochina. The
instructions with this were said
to read:
"Identify X reference word
X provide details on letter
writing procedure X. Are you
under constant observation by
guards or interrogators while
writing home queries? Are
some POW's not allowed to
write? Do you get to keep your
letters from home? Do POWs
have access to or control of
communications receivers?
What frequencies and times.
can you receive queries? If not
available, what critical parts
are needed to build a receiver?
How effective is covert POW
I communications?"
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Approved For Release 2fttil1Y03ffi4eatliA-RDP8001601R
September 1972
STATOTHR
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E. OLD WORLD WAR TWO C-46 bounced ' - ?'? But he manago?die drop down and
.-.
and yawed in the violent turbulence as contour fly the valley floors, below the
Lts:tWin engines strained to maintain 160 .: -:-Red radar, and just after dawn they
knots. Its American pilot gripped the landed back at their base. They climbed.
- .:controls with every ounce of strength he ? I.' :from the plane, -their gray uniforms
could muster, and his eyes ached from Soaked through with sweat, and the pilot
- ' the strain of searching the darkness-- -. muttered for the thousandth time, "There's gotta
-.- to avoid the towering Himalayan :- : .. :- -;:.--. -- ..?-- ?.; be an easier way to make a buck."
?? mountains on each side. Th .o C-46 was ancient, but its skin had been polished
ley'd taken off from an secret base over _ -? ? _?to shine like a mirror. Back toward the tail were
three hours ago and were threading small blue letters that spelled out "Air America." The
' their way cast of the Tibetan capital of '-', only other identifying marks were the fresh
' ?-?-Lhasa,-long occupied by the forces-- ?' - 37mmholes in the left wing panels.
of Rd China. Their mission: drop .
. . .. .
,agents -and supplies to a band of Tibetan:: .1-Throughout Asia, people have come to rc,cognize
'-.---' - . . guerrillas who were still fighting: -- . ?
?. -. - ? ,- these strange aircraft and their even stranger
.
the Communists. American pilots.?.Especially the pilots. You learn to
-.-.
The copilot, .sweating over the air chart :'-_-,..--,:-. spot them wherever you are. They!re the guys
in his lap, tried to guide thorn to.the-n ? in the gray Air Force-type uniforms, crushed caps,
drop zone that a mysterious American - - . '_.: .cowboy boots, with pistols hanging at their.
'T..-!.`civilian"- at their bi,se had earlier ?-?i,._-.:?sides. They can be found raising hell in the Suzy
:described. "Hold your course," he '-'- -7...- --,-1-.Wona section of Hong Kong or racingmotor
died. "Another two minutes should bikes along Tu Do Street in Saigon or joking with the
-put us right on." :- ? - girls at the Vienq Rattay Club in Vientiane.
.: They're the pilots of the cloak arid dagger Air
America, one of the world's least known airlines.
Many are "old China hands" Who first
, began flying for the "outfit"..back?when mainland
' . China belonged to Chiang Kai-shek. They're
I0 last of that breed known as soldiers of fortune,
,and these devil-nay-care mercenaries .will.
he VpViIbt kached nup, flicking Orr the -
'get-ready" light to alert the-Tibetan-
-agents who'd be jumping, and.the
lane crew who would kick--the supplies
out :,"Gol." he, yelled and switched
?- on the buzzer. .
rjtist as' the last chute-Opened, the old
plane -was suddenly rocked by deadly
Communist 37mm antiaircraft fire and
the:pilot cursed to himself, "Goddam?
continuod
A.porlintett Igo rilFtbrkklg@IMMOMPA : CIA-RDP80-01601R000900020001-3
r bastards were waiting for us:'
NATIO= GUARD IAN
Approved For Release 200160Ra4n..91A-FWARallif0
r; 11
(2.?,
) ;
V:',L4 6Li
uy Wilfred Burchett
Gitardian tag corivpondtril
Q:1-.) U:'J. A
pi:14.72-7%,
?
tiL \U
U
Where the dikes are not directly bombed the nearby
1-1
bombing causes cracking Gf the earth of the dams and in
t r.5 e77:;;) ? ,
; ? 3 ( this .way the result is the same."
!!' Waldheim continued: "I am deeply concerned about
t-'`..) this development and I-appeal to stop this kind Of born-
binge which could lead to enormous human suffering,
enormous disaster."
Waldhcinr enraged the White House. Nixon .promptly
declared the Secretary G('neral and other "well in-
tentioned and naive' people" had been "taken in" by
Hanoi's statements.
The President was clearly put on the defensive. He got
the State Department to hand out a re-port?palmed
largely by the CIA?that claimed "no major dike has been
breached.?.. . Photographic evidence shows conclusively
? that there has. been no intentional bombing of the dikes."
But the report admitted damage had been caused .at 12
points?allegedly because they were "close to identified
individual targets." By ?the end of July DRY radio was
asserting theedikes had been damaged at, 60 points.
Waldheim met with U.S. representative to the UN
George Bush. Bush emerged from the talk ''subdued and
troubled," according 10 one account. Bush said ,the talks
were "frank and full" and "I think the best thing I can do
on the subject is to shut up."
The Sc.e.retary General's condemnation of the? dike
bombing's is the strongest UN censure yet of any U.S.
actions. But .he had made other statements against the
Vietnam war. An earlier memo the Security Council said:
"I feel strongly that the UN can no longer remain a mute
spectator of the horror of the war and of the peril which it
increasingly poses to international peace."' And in a
statement in May he said it war, time for the "full
machinery" of the UN to be used to stop the war.
Democratic presidential nominee Sen. George
McGovern (S.D.) said Nixon "stooped beneath the dienity
of his office yesterday in bragging, that %Nye could finish off
North Vietnam in an afternoon.:
"The President is again deceiving and misleading the
- American people," McGovern said: "And at the same
time, it nm; becomes clear he is rimning the war, and
peace talks to try to fit his own election timetable."
It was Nixon who boasted March 10 last year that those'
who think Vietnam is going to be a big political issue next.
year, are making a grave miscalculation. The truth s that
the Nixon-Kissinger attempt to sweep the Vietnam
question under the rug has turned out to be an abysmal
failure a?d?iniscalculation. The barbarous attacks against
the dikes in North Vietnam are a measure of Nixon's fury
?oyel? his gre'at failures.
"lust and generous".
At the peace talks July 13, Porter called attention to the
"just and generous" nature of Nixon's peace proposals.
"As you know," he said,' ,"they envisage first of all the
? return of all U.S. POWs and an accounting for I !lose
reported missing in combat."
. There was no mention in this most "just and generous"
proposal .of a reciprooal release of Vietnamese POWs
(North Vietnamese and NU) who are held under the most
barbarous conditions in South Vietnam. This is one more
symptom of the racist nature of the war. The main point is
that, as with every ?other question, Nixon tries to place the
cart before the horse. Ile tries to extort the roost favorable
conditions for the U.S. while refusing to tackle the
question of the comprehensive political and military
- solution to the war.
Paris
President Nixon's real attitude toward the Paris talks on
Vietnam, the pilot wisoners-of-war and the Vietnamese
people was sharply resealed at his July 27 press conference
when he aid .he. conk) "finish off North Vietnam in an
:lltenioon were it not for the "great restraint" he 'has been
e.erting.
On July 13, when delegates took their places around"
'the Paris conference table for the fir it time in two months,
it was cleat Nixo'n still believes that because the ? U.S. is a ?
supe'rpower and Vietnam a small, ecantornically un-
derdeveloped ,country, the U.S. delegation can negotiate
front a "position of strength" and the ? DRV-PRG
delegations from a position of weakness.
U.S. "strength" has been shown in the last few weeks to
result in-devastating deleats on't he battlefield at Quang Tri
and An Locand.in a censure of its bombing of the dikes in
North Vietnam by the Secretary General of the UN, Kurt
Waldheim. .
Saigon. President Nguyen Van Thien ordered the
provinc,e of Quang Tri. including its capital city of the
same name, captured by July 13. Despite paper claims to
the contrary, Thieu's troops were reeling back front the
area on the. target date, never having entered the city and
not having retaken anything of importance in the rest of
the province.
Unprecedented bombings
This defeat occurred despite the use on an un-
preeedented scale in military history of 8-52 bombers and
the big guns of the 7th Fleet to escort the Saigon troops
&cry step of the way. By the Aug, 3 peace talks, the elite
paratroopers-.had been withdrawn, having lost one full
regiment?a third of the only parachutist division loSt in
one action. The division had already been severely mauled
in other actions during the past three months.
The citadel in the heart of QuangTri city'remains in the
hands of the resistance forces and it is now Saigon's single
Marine division that is being cut to pieces in the same
area?all to insure a prestige victory and give U.S. am-
bassador to 'the talks William Porter- a "strong hand" at the
'negotiations'.
As for An Loc, the battle began there :when Thieu or-
. tiered Highway 13, connecting An Loc with Saigon,
opened early this April. Three months later it is still shut
down and another division?the Third-- is out of action.
The Nixon administration received another jolt in late
July when jiiN Stig-Atztv G cegilaar conunciAiwoi
/M opii 's
Vyk A
reports of ni .9(.!! ,kft Oc191re'13-RWA?%ffett!Mq,,,91cY
outrage at the bombing of-the dikes, said: "Even in cases
: CIA-RDP80-01601R000900020001-3
-utninued
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R0
SAN JOSE CALIFORNIA MERCURY
1 August 1972
10 Aa-s'4-tia ion
locked Dv GA
SAN FRANCISCO (UPI) ? was still alive atthe time he
The CIA opposed a suggested was working on it. The North
American plot to assassinate Vietnamese leader died on
North Vietnamese leader Ho Sept. 3, 1969.
Chi Minh and the attempt smith met newsmen - on
was never made, the author file publication date of.
V
of a ,history of the intellig- - The Secret Ilisto-
/Tice agency said Monday. ? ry of America's First Cen-
t/ R. II-a rris Smith, whose tral Intelligence Agency"
book deals with the Office of published by University of
Strategic Services (OSS), California Press.
predecessor of the CIA, told Smith tells in his book of
a nev.,s conference that he the OSS backing Ho Chi Minh
heard about the assassina- during World War II.
Lion plot from an ex-CIA offi- -The OSS felt an emotional
-cer but, had no documenta- rapport with Ho," Smith
tion. said. "They felt he was fight-
"The plot was. conceived Mg to free his country from
by a retired high -I evel the Japanese. and also to free
State Department official it from colonialism.
? but was opposed by the "An OSS medic once saved
CIA director and was Bev- iTo's the in the jungle and
er put into effect," Smith then 20 years later the CIA,
said. which followed the OSS as
The suggestion was consid- America's intelligence agen-
e'red at the highest levels of cy, apparently saved his life,'
government 'and was turned again by its opposition to thel
down by the White House at assassination plot." ?
the CIA director's recom-
mendation. the writer said.
. "CIA got into the act be-
cause they were the ones
who would have had to carry
out the plot," he said. "They
opposed it as politically fool-
ish, stupid and insane."
Smith said the man who
gave him the information did
not say when the plot was
conceived, but that it ? must
nave been between 1966 and
I.969, because these were the
rears that the informant was
active in the CIA. He was in-
luential in both the Johnson
and Ni o n administration,
:he author said.
Smith, 25, a former CIA
analyst, told the news confer-
ence he did not use the inci-
dent in his book because Ho
STATOTHR
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Ye.T.i;-
Approved For Release 2001/03/00;00A-13E2P80-01601R
STATOTHR
U.S. Terms Damage to Dikes Minor and Accidental
?
Special to The New York rtints come from such sources as the
WASHINGTON, July 26 Rev. Dr. Eugene Carson Blake;
secretary general of the World
Council of Churches and Secre-
tary General Waldheim of the
United Nations.
President Nixon, Secretary
of Defense Melvin R. Laird,
and Secretary of State William
P. Rogers have denied that
American aircraft have been
'authorized to bomb the dike
system.
But for a month, State and
Department officials
The Administration said today
that any damage done to North
Vietnams dike system by Ameri-
can bombing was accidental and
had only "the most incidental
and minor impact' on the sys-
tem.
Repeating what has become
an almost daily denial that
American aircraft are deliber-
ately bombing the irrigation Defense
system, the State Department
said that any damage to the
dikes was a result of legitimate
attacks on military installations
such as antiaircraft sites. .
Charles W. BY.ay 3d, the de-
partment spokesman, said that
the 'United States had evidence
to bear out Ins contention that
'There has been no new inch-.
cation of anything but the moat
incidental and minor. impact on
the system of levees as the re-
sult of strikes against military
installations."
"This is a fact," he said.
Administration Annoyed
In recent days, the Adminis-
tration has made no secret of
its annoyance and frustration
over the growing world con-
cern that the American bombing
of North Vietnam might lead
to catastrophic results during
the curfent rainy season if the
dike ;system breaks down,
North Vietnam has repeatedly
charged the United States with
system-atic bombing of the
dikes and has invited various
observers to inspect the dikes.
Expressions of concern have.
have acknowledged ? as Mr.
Bray did today?that some
bombs may have fallen on or
near the earthen levees along
the Red River, either by in-
advertance or because a mili-
tary target was there.
The Administration made
plans to hold a special briefing
for newsmen yesterday to pre-
sent photographs to buttress
its arguments but at the last
moment the briefing was not
held. Informed sources said
that the Administration recog-
nized that Hanoi could also
produce photographs.
('We cOuld show an undam-
aged dike and they could show
one with a crater in it. Or if
they didn't have one, they
could drop a mortar in it and
make one," one State Depart-
ment official said.
So far, despite the start of
the heavy rainy season, there
have been no reports of any
flooding. The Hanoi press has
printed several articles exhort-
ing the population to take part
in the regular summer dike
building program to prevent a
repetition of last year's flood-
ing,- the. worst since 1944.
- In another matter, Adminis-
tration witnesses opposed to-
day the adoption of a Senate
resolution that would outlew
the use of weather modifica-
tion as a means of war.
Witnesses from the Arms
Control and Disarmament:
Agency and the Defense De-
partment refused to discuss the
military uses of weather mod-
ification, asserting that such
information was classified. They
testified before a hearing of
the Senate Foreign Relations
subcommittee on oceans and
international environment. ?
Senator Claiborne Pell, Dem-
ocrat of Rhode Island, the
subcommittee chairman, said
there was "no doubt in my mind
that the United States has in-
deed beenconducting weather
modification operations in
SOutheast Asia."
The New York Times re-
ported on July 3 that the United
States Air Force and the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency had
conducted cloud-seeding opera-
tions over Laos since 1967,
and over South and North Viet-
nam since. 1968. The Pentagon
has denied-that anoy of it5..1 air-
craft were involved in seeding
over North Vietnam but has re-
fused to discuss operations else-
where.
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oci
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BENNINGTON, VT.
pANNER jut. 13 1972.
E- 6 , 409
onkeying with weather
The first man-made snowstorm took
place about 25 years ago in northern
? Berkshire County in Massachusetts,
when scientific researchers of the
General Electric Co. dumped some dry
ice pellets into a cloud and produced a
snowstorm over Mt. Greylock. (There
are 'those familiar with the Pittsfield,
Mass. snow belt who might wonder
why anyone would want to produce any
more snow in that area, but there's no
accounting for the whims of the
scientists. They probably seeded the
cloud because it2was there).
, But show and rain making have
made some unheralded advances from
the days when they were a matter
depending largely on either witchcraft
et? prayer, depending on one's religious ?
point of view.
Now we find rainmaking in the news
; again and also find that it has become a
highly sophisticated and effective
enterprise. Last week the New York
Times reported that the. United States
has been secretly seeding clouds over
Indochina in an effort to use rain as a
Weapon against the Communists. It
seems to have been going on in one
/ fashion or another since 1963, initiated
\/ ? by the.,C19_and then pursued by the Air
Force and Navy, reportedly under
direct White House supervision.
As with the civilian rainmaking
attempts over the past quarter-
century, there is dispute about the
effectiveness of the Indochina
operations. But the more basic dispute
involves the whole concept Of
?geophysical warfare" -- of tinkering
with the atmosphere in this manner for
military purposes.
The Pentagon seems to feel that it
doesn't matter whether one drops
bombs or rain. But scientists have
protested that using weather as a
weapon is fraught with ugly poten-
tialities. At best, cloud-seeding is an
unpredictable and. nonselective tactic,
more damaging to civilians than to
combatants. Further, although the
federal government is spending an
estimated $20 million annually on
weather-modification research, there
are no reliable answers to questions
about the long-term impact on regional
of global ecology.
Particularly disturbing to scientists
is the danger that the Pentagon
nenmakers may cripple current ef-
forts to expand and strengthen the
World Weather Watch, an in-
ternational program of global weather
forecasting with huge potentialities for
benefiting all mankind. Many of the
nations now participating are likely to
pull out if they feel that the information
they are furnishing to the program
may be put to military use.
Last year the National Academy of
Sciences recommended that America
take the lead in seeking a U.N.
agreement under which the whole field
of weather modification would be put
under international auspices, with a
specific ban on its Use in war. It is a
recommendation worth pursuing. And
as a preliminary step the Pentagon
should be firmly instructed to lock up
the Pandora's box it has opened in
Southeast Asia.
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Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-016SIIIR-989999020001-3
BOSTON , MASS.
RECORD-AMERICAN
M - 438,372
ADVERTISER
S - 432 063
30Lii -1972,
A Fair-4'(.f her Protest?
irrameenstsx-eacw,smaketeneuezatoo,,,vemier......,-....
A minor storm has been bvewing in recent
weeks over reports that the U. S. has; been tamper-
ing, with the \\Tattler in Indochina to hamper North
Vietnam's-, military operations.
Several con,gressmen, a few scientists and some
members of the liiti-war crowd ha' e lodged pro-
tests alleging that. the Pentagon is engaging in
cruol, a'nd unusual weather warfare, causing floods
and other unpleasaiit
Pentagon spokesmen deny the accusation, in.-
sistiug that it is merely a propaganda ploy de-
signed to blame -Uncle Sam for monsoons that have
been occurring in Indx-hina for centuries.
Apparently, however, the. CIA has seeded a
few clouds MIST 11,19 Ho Chi Mini"' flail. But these
rain-making efforts to hinder Communist supply
and troop Infiltration movements haven't been very
st.i:eessful.
And if they were. would that be so had? The
.purposF.:, after all, seems to he 'to curtail the .right ?
lug.,.\.nd we have noticed that, year afters year,
there is always, a lull in the battle during the mon-
;soon season (just as the turn-out at. anti-war i hies
is always much smaller xvnen it's cold and damp).
Anyway, isn't it. more humane to hit tile
enemy ;with raindrop, instead of bombs and 11.A
-
palm? If they had their wits about them, the pro-
testers should be applauding the CIA's cloud-seed-
1117 efforts and Nvishing -them more success in the
futute.
In fact. if the war h2r-n't encir.7d before they can
hold another anti-war rally in the Common. \ve
e:,:pect to see at least a few signs that read: "Make
Bain, Not \..--cr" next time.
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STATOTHR
Approvocj ForRelease2001/03/04 : CIA-
coUjJR
(?)16tET
- 239,949
S - 350.303
America s new morality: 'What's worse,
7
F17;27.0.:. THE SAME-? people who gave the
y.a.d the Gatling gun, the A-bomb and plastic
shrapnel we now have, once again, a new, im.-
;- proved way of making war.
V , The U.S. Air Force and the CIA can now
make it rain on your parade, whether that
parade is a - military convoy on the lb o Chi
' Minh Trail or a political demonstration in
. Saigon (or Louisville?).
...We understand . the Nixon administration's
'.unwillingness to brag about the cloud-seeding
operations that the United-States-haS'-been
conducting in :Indochina. Any. braggingainiv-:-
.. - or. 'even any. ;admission that such operations
have,- indeed, taken - place?would make ? if ap-
pear that Defense Secretary Laird lied to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee last
month when .he was asked about Air Force
rainmaking activities. The Secretary said,
"We have not engaged in any over North Viet-
nam." .
Now at least a dozen present and former
...military and civilian officials tell The New
, York, Times that our planes have seeded
i-
clouds over North Vietnam at least as late as
1971--and over Laos, Cambodia and South
Vietnam as well.
In addition to damaging Secretary Laird's
impeccable credibility, premature admissions
to rainmaking might also lose Mr. Nixon the '
votes of those environmentalists, if any, who
still take him seriously when . he puts on his
Smokey the Bear hat and proclaims himself
hard to beat at admiring and protecting
Mother Nature.
For it appears that Mr. Nixon, who rarely
hesitates to rush in where angels and Demo-
crats fear to tread, has outrained?as well as
outbombed?the previous . administration.
? State Department protests that our tinkering
with Indochina's .rainfall was taking environ-
mental :risks of unknown proportions appar-
ently, persuaded former Defense Secretary
McNalnaral to ..call.'-off:-;c1bud:Seeding'.?.epera-
- tions in 1967. .. ..' ,-?'. ' ' -'.' ..- ' ''' , '.-,'. ,?? .,,- r? .. - ,:.
But; ? in the 'word S' -Of - one ' pre-rainmaking
' official; "What's worse, dropping , bombs or
rainr,'.
Added ingredient possible
If we overlook the fact that Mr. Nixon and
his generals (or perhaps, as seems to be com-
mon, ithe generals without Mr. Nixon's con-
sent) are dropping both, it's a fascinating ques-
tion.
The: residents of our drought-stricken
Sbuthwest probably would reply that bombs
are worse than rain. However, the citizens
of Rapid City, S.D., or our eastern seaboard
might not _agyee. Ad_ the tightly cl s
mouths atApp,M1 otoihROle4Sen
?
13ombs or rain?
tempt the people of Rapid City to. ask a few -
more ' questions about- that cloud-seeding ex-
periment that was conducted _ in the Black
Hills on the day their city was flooded and
scores of their friends and relatives were-
kille d.
The anonymous official's question also
prompts a 'second question: Is the destruction
wrought by our bombing in Indochina as
in-
discriminate as that wrought by the forces
of ,nature? If it is, then we've been lied to
again about the pinpoint accuracy of our at-
tacks on wansupporting lirdtstrieS and sup-
plies in North Vietnam, in which. our ``smart"
bombs always seem to demolish our targets
but leave the civilians unharmed. If it isn't,
then the rain could be far worse than the
bombing?especially during the two monsoon
seasons when, as ...an official explained, the
cloud-seeding amounts ? to "just trying to add
on to something that you already got." One
thing the Indochinese peoples have got during
those seasons is the strong danger that they'll
be wiped out by floods. And it's a safe bet that
the soldiers in that American Special Forces?
camp that received seven inches of rain in
two hours, courtesy of a CIA blunder, didn't
laucch ?
In addition to sizable quantities, the Ameri-
cans, never content to let nature go unim-
proved-upon, can now deliver two kinds of
rain?either the plain, old-fashioned variety
or a new, improved rain with an extra secret .
ingredient. This new rain, according to one
source, has "al acidic quality to it and it
would foul up . mechanical equipment?like
radars, trucks and tanks."
We're left to wonder ,whether it damages
other mechanisms, such as humans and trees.
But-, even if it doecn't, we hope the White
House reserves the fancy rain for. export only.
,If,our government begins using rain to break
up political -demonstrations,.- as the CIA did
in Saigon. when the Diem- regime was totter-
ing, we nope the protestors will be spared the
, ? additional indignity of having to hitch-hike
home. .
Richard Jordan .Gatling,. the inventor of that
primitive machine gun that we see used with -
such effectiveness against the Iadians in
Western movies from time to time, hoped that
by developing such a terrible weapon he
would make men more reluctant to resort to
arms. If meteorological warfare fulfills its po-
tential, Mr. Gatling's dream might yet come
true. Our future disputes may be settled by
a few wizards?heads of state, maybe?at con-
trol panels, instructing Mother Nature where
-------020001-3
There'll be no need of arms then, and
"World War" will have a new meaning.
13ALTIM01113 NITIS .111ERICAN
Approved For Release 2001/113/514.:9-tc-RDP80-01601R00
Laird Acknowledges
Some Viet likes Hit
? WASHINGTON (UPI) ?
Softening previous flat U.S. de-1
Mats of Hanoi's claims, Defense
Secretary Melvin R. Laird has
acknowledged American
warplanes may have damaged
some flood control dikes in
North Vietnam.
Laird charged, however, that
most of the claims result from a
deliberate effort by Hanoi to
duck responsibility for failing to
repair the dike system ade-
quately after disastrous
monsoon floods a year ago.
North Vietnam's dikes
themselves have never been the
target of U.S. bombs or rockets,
Laird said Thursday. But he
said in certain cases dikes may
have suffered damage during
attacks against antiaircraft
weapons firing from them or
supply convoys traveling down
roads built on them.
Laird said U.S. pilots are
allowed to fight back against
antiaircraft fire "wherever it
comes from," including from
emplacements on the dikes. He
said he considers this proper,
but implied it does not happen
often.
? Other defense officials said
they saw no inconsistency be-
tween this policy and the presi-
dential order against attacking
dikes. Although the dikes are
prohibited as targets, these of-
ficials said, neither are they in-
tended to be sanctuaries for
Hanoi's war effort.
The CIA declined comment on
hhe -.reports, which indicated the
, experiments were conducted in
past dry seasons along with
other .0 S. efforts to hinder
supply-truck Movements from
North Vietnam to Communist
troops in South Vietnam and
Cambodia.
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DAILY VIORLTI
ApprSTA.TDTI-
oved For Kelease 2001/03/b4iPtI1A7-iRDP80
-
r
The very phrase "war crimes" is tabu in Wash-
ington because it fits the deeds of the Administra-
tion, military, CIA and other circles. It cannot be
said that they can claim to be unaware of their
crimes. Their maneuvers give them away.
The National Academy of Sciences last year
issued a statement urging the Nixon Administra-
tion to sponsor a UN resolution "dedicating all
weather modification efforts to peaceful purposes
and establishing, preferably within the framework
of international non-governmental scientific organ-
izations, and advisory mechanism for consideration
of ? weather-modification ?problems of potential
international concern."
The request has gone unheeded.
Pell, with 13 other Senators, has filed a resolu-
tion calling on the U.S. to join in a treaty outlawing
an use of any environmental or geo-physical mod-
ification activity as a weapon of war, or the carrying
out of any research or experimentation with respect
thereto."
Pell has so far drawn Zero attention from the
Nixon Administra,tion. But that does not mean it is
indifferent to the issue. What it means is that it is
opposed to it. ?
1 The proof is that at the recent Stockholm world
conference on the environment, sponsored by the
UN, the U.S. delegation managed to have inserted a
weasel-worded limitation into a recommendation
calling on all governments to "carefully evaluate
the, likelihood and magnitude of Climatic effects", as
a result of weather modification.
Not only were efforts made to produce deluges
of rain, but special types of rain, such as an acidic
rain to foul radars, trucks and tanks.
In 1971, the program was under the direct con-
trol of the White House, but the operation was kept
secret from all but a few because it was so dreadful
and foul a deed. The Department of Defense refused
to give information.
"This kind of thing was a bomb, and Henry (Kis-
singer) restricted information about it to those who
had to know," a Government official told Hersh.
The horror of this inhuman warfare is intensified
by the danger that it may be combined with the de-
struction of -dikes, flooding all of the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam ? and its people, down to the
babies. The last time there was a flood, two million
people died of starvation.
While warfare unrestricted by law or human or
moral considerations is conducted in Indochina, the
Commerce Department'sNational Oceanic and At-
mospheric Administration is establishing rigorous
regulations for weather modification in the U.S.
with fines up to $10,000 for violations. This contrast
indicates in its own way the genocidal character of
the U.S. aggression in Indochina.
Lying, of course, accompanied the secrecy in
which this hideous "scientific advance" was cloth-
ed. In April, Sen. J. William Hulbright asked. Sec-
retary of Defense Melvin Laird why the secrecy.
Laird replied: "We have never engaged in that type
of activity over North Vietnam" ? but the U.S. had.
The U.S. delegation insisted on adding "to the
Maximum extent feasible." According to the New
York Times (July 3): "Officials later acknowledged
that possible military use of weather modification
was the basis for the an- endment."
It was not "possible military use" that was the
consideration, but actual use. Used in 1963, rain-
making waslaken up by the CIA.
"We first used that stuff in about AuguSt of 1983,
when the Diem regime was having all that trouble
with the Buddhists," a former CIA agent is quoted
by Hersh as saying. Notice, Buddhists.
Rein-making activities were expanded in ?the
following years and by 1967 the Air Force was in-
volved. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in February 1967
proposed wider use of rain'-making to the White
House. Operations were kept super-secret because
even Calloused war-makers felt it "might violate
what we consider the general rule of thumb for an
? illegal weapon of war ? something that would cause
unusual .suffering or disproportionate damage."
according to a former State Department official. Ile
sai also there was "concern because Of possible
ecological risk.
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STATOTHR
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15 JUL 1.972
7e?1/67. ce',56-'nge4
nor ..,........??????.-..r,...NC.isl.gy.yaes,r,,asr/9?14.47.rFreia.dtfed?msmh..g.gg.g..n.lqkVollenwv.alnr.nsticpae3-
FAKE ALTERNATIVE
The working of the war-maker's mind is a
Wonder to behold. The calloused Indifference to
human values is stunning.
When it became known that the .U.S. military
and CIA had been using rain-making devices in
Indochina since 1963 in their drive to win the
war, one Administration official (unnamed by the
reporter) asked: "What's worse, dropping bombs
or rain:?"
These are not alternatives; both are destructive.
That a real alternative exists ? neither bombing
nor spreading genocidal destruction by precipitating
deadly rains ? apparently never entered his mind. .
?LOUISE MARTIN, Bronx, N.Y.
EDITOR
THE DAILY WORLD
APS 191?)
14E:VI YORK 10011
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PhiiviLENCE, P.1. STATOTHR
JOUR 1
?war girRelease 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0
M.? 66,673
S ? 209,501
tt
By BRUCE DE SILVA
Former Navy Secretary
john II. Chace and the White
Ifouse both refused comment
yesterday on Providence
3ournaleItulletin and New
York Times reports that the
Pentagon has seeded clouds in
Southeast Asia for military
reasons.
Dave Sweet, a member of
Mr. Chafee's Senate cam-
paign staff, said Mr. Chafee
will entertain questions on the
matter at his press confer-
ence tomorrow morning "and
not before then."
The New York Times yes-
terday gave the first: indica-
tion of Navy participation iii
the seeding project, which is
believed to be predominantly
a Central ,..intellieenee Agency
and Air Force opeeTition,
The Tirnes quoted a "well
informed source" as saying
lhat Navy scientists devel-
oped a chemical which when
deposited on clouds produces
an acidic rain that fouls radar
equipment, tracks, tanks and
other mechanical equipment.
The Times story mu died, but
did not state, that this chemi-
cal has been used in South-
east Asia.
Sen. Claiborne Pell, Mr.
Chafee's November opponent,
has said he believes the Unit-
ed States has sedded clouds in
Southeast Asia for military
reasons.
. Press aides with the Pres-
ident at the Western White
House in San Clemente, Calif.,
? yesterday took two hours to
scrutinize a list of seven ques-
rVions submitted earlier in the
ikty by the Journal-Bulletin. ?
4.'he 1Vhite House then' re-
. fet+ed the questions to Jerry
W. Priedheirn in the Pen-
tagon's public affairs office.
When Fished. if this meant
that the President would not
,comment at all on the matter,
a press aide, who asked not to
be quoted by name,. said:
"Yes, it does."
4e
reel;
The New York Times yes-
terday quoted an unnamed
former high-ranking official
a.s saying that the weather
modification activities over
Southeast Asia have been
under the direct control of the
White House since 1971.
Mr. Friedhenn, reached in
his Pentagon office yesterday,
said the United States has
never enetteed in rainmak-
ing activities over North Viet-
nam. They were the same
words used by Secretary of .
Defense Melvin R. Laird dui.- -
log a confrontation with Sena-
tor l'ell and Sen. J. William
Fulbright, D-Ark, in a Senate
foreign relations committee
hearing several 111011thti ar,O.
toW0V4,1', Mr. Friedheiro
said, "It. can't enlarge on
that" when asked if rainmak-
ing activities have been ear-
Tied (111t. ii South Vietnam,
Cambodia or Laos.
When asked about the U.S.
capability to produce acidic ,
rainfall, Mr. Friedheirri re-
plied: I have no knowledge of
that."
545 N.Y. Vines News KervIve
Washington --- Two former
high-ranking officials of the ;
Johnson aelministrat ion said
yesterday that Robert S. Mc-
Namara, while Secretary of
Defense, specifically ordered
the Air Puree to stop all rain- ,
making late in 1997, well be- ?
fore its first use in North Wet-
But other officials, who-e!
.?
served in both the Johnson
and Nixon administrations,
said they recalled 110 stleh.
cleareut order.
It was not clear whether
McNamara's order was dis-
obeyed, ignored or -- as one
official seggested "there was
a kind of slippage" in putting
it into effect.
. According to a number of
government sources the rain-
making program apparently
has grown in importance in
the last few years. The two of-
ficials of the Johnson adminis-
tration both recalled the rain-
making efforts to be little .
.more than experiments con-
(-7:4* ti
At' g
I
Repeated- State Department
protests tdiouf the project led
to a re?evalualion by the Pen-
tagon, a former Defense De-
-partment official said, "and
MeNamarit killed it."
''lie had reservations about
? it," the former official added.
'There was a dial met feeling
that we Were dealing with
something shady --- something
tled could cause frotilee in
case people were killed be-
cause of it.''
A former high-ranlene. in-
telligence oif keel similarly re-
called in an interview that
"the 'technical poSSibilittea
Were briefly explored ond it
was de.eided that it not be
used."
These official recollections
-- that the program had been
stopped. by the end of the
Johnson administration -- were
disputed by a number of Nixon
ad minisn'at ion ol ficials.
One well-informed eovern-
ment source said that he had
'received regular, pe-chapi
monthly, top-secret reports on
operations from 1997 he
left the government in 1971..
He said specifically that he
had received the documants
without interruption.
A former ? hieh-ranking Air
.Force official who els? served
in both administrations said
that it was his "recollection
that there was no elearcut
line of demareation.regarding
the effective cutoff of the pro-
gram."
"Within the various en-
claves of the government,"
the official added, "there are
Intel pretetions and interpreta:
tions ?7 even of White House
orders." .
"Don't forget that the peo-
ple who are espousing the
prOgrnm feel that it is great,"
he said. "And it's clear that
you can affect weather."
Ft?,
Discussing the continuation
of the program in tie fece of
at17elgious government objec-
tions, the former official also
said:
''The fact is that tree thime
did go by fits and starts, There
.were holds and delaf.s and in-
torruptions and reinterpreta-
thins. These. alines are very
complicated 'When they're so
sensitive.
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?u
PRoVIuENCE, R.I.
JOURNAL__
Approv:Gator FEbigpase 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0160
- 66,673
S - 209,501
r
440!1Q,-1,0"eoiliticl
A k
0 V9 r Vi
U.S.
C1
PI
, 4aria '.!;!, iloi
.......?
? By BRUCE
/ ---- Quoting unnamed Central
Intelligemia-Agone.g.,and State
Department sources, The New,
York Times News Service yes-
terday reported new evidence
that the Pentagon is changing
the weather over Southeast
Asia for military reasons.
In a story by ? Seymour M.
Hersh, the reporter who first
broke the story of the My Lai
massacre, the Times said the
United States first began
?seeding clouds to increase
rainfall over Hue in the north-
ern part of South Vietnam in
1963. .
According to a former CIA
official, the action was taken
to prevent Buddhist demon-
strations in that city against
the South Vietnamese govern-
ment, the Times reported.
"They would just Stand
around during demonstrations
when ? the police threw tear
gas at them, but we noticed
that when the rains came
they wouldn't stay on," the
former agent is. quoted as
? saying.
The story repeats, as first
reported in the June 25.Provi--
dence Sunday Journal, that
seedili g operations were
begun in the mid 1960's to
create heavy rains which
!.- washed out portions of the Ho
Chi Minh Trail and impeded
.? infiltration of supplies and
.- men to the South.
?, Sen. Claiborne Pell said late
- last Month he strongly ?be-
lieves the United States is
: seeding clouds in Southeast
s'. Asia for?military reasons.
f ? . Reached.- at his home last
...night and informed of the
Times story, the Senator said:
'This. provides additional
: foundation for ray own belief,
a belief that I have advanced
; for several months, that these
1 activities have been conduct-
ed by the United States." .
., The Senator is planning
, .Senate hearings for later this
summer - on his proposed
! treaty to hau. the use _of:
ANiailtrove41,17C1E0ReOatise
1. weapon 0f war. ? .,
DeSII,VA
.In addition to impeding infil-
tration, the Times reported
that the Pentagon rain-making
program has the followilig pur-
poses:
0 To provide rain and cloud
cover for infiltration of
South Vietnamese comman-
dos and intelligence teams
into North Vietnam,
o To serve as a "spoiler" for
North Vietnamese attacks
and raids in South Viet-
nam.
01 To divert North Vietnam-
ese men and material from
military operations to keep
muddied roads add other
lines of communication
open.
The Times quotes a
"former high-ranking' -of-
ficial" as saying that by the
end of 1971, the Program was
under the direct control of the
White House,
Henry Kissinger, the Pres-
ident's special adviser ler na-
tional security, felt the pro-
gram was politically sensitive
and ordered it kept a secret
from all but a handful of ad-
ministration officials, the of-
ficial is quoted as saying. .
The ? Times quoted a "well
informed source" as saying
Navy scientists developed a
new chemical agent effective
in warm stratus clouds that
produces an acidic rain capa-
ble of fouling "mechanical
equipment -- like radars,
trucks, and tanks.".
The story implies, hut does
not say, that the chemical
was actually used over the
North.
The Times reports that of-
ficials interviewed said the
United States did not have the
capability to cause heavy
flooding during the summer in
the Northern parts of North
Vietnam last year. The flood-
ing destroyed crops- and re-
portedly killed thousands.
STATOTHR
? However, Sen. Pell and
David .Heaney, a member of
the Senate foreign relations
committee's- ? professional
staff, told the Journal they
believe the United States does
have that capability and was
responsible for the floods.
In a letter to Senator Pell
last year, Rady Johnson, the
assistant secretary of defense
for legislative affairs, said the
. Pentagon has the power. to
increase rainfall by up to 50
per cent.
A 50 per cent increase in
the torrential monsoon rains
of the region could obviously
have a considerable effect.
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LL A,):.u:c4.ii aig,.e
STATOTHR STATOTHR
Approved For Release 2001/03k4jYaiRDP80-
'%?.a.infrialcing, is L
As Weapon ? by
Cloud Seedin? g in IndochinaCHICAGO TRIBUNE
Approved For Release 20011/63/04 :IMA-RDP80-01601R00
Era
-A I
? BY WAYNE.THOMIS An increasing series of such
[Aviation Editor) , raids have come from the sea_ shift.
[ChicRgo Tribune Press Service]
SAIGON, Viet Nam, June 14 coasts and from helicopter air-
The riders are heavily ar-
-
?Hanoi broadcasts infrequent- bridge links in Laos and .Thai- med. Not one operation has;
failed, and none of the raiders
mention "works of s a bo- land to points where damage have been trapped, according
teurs" in North Viet Nam's can be done or information oh-
to informed sources. .
panhandle, and Saigon's ver- tamed from the North Viet-
naeular press occasionally re- namese, it was learned from Casualties among these spe-
port odd little aircraft acci- reliable sources. cial forces have been low. Pay
dents with nonmilitary planes Communist broadcasts from scales are said to be "quite
high" and morale among these
in mountainous regions or Hanoi in the past have used
Laos, Northwestern South Viet "saboteur" in an ideoligical specialists in demolition, elec-
Nam; and sometimes in North- sense. Now they are referring tronics sabotage, and interro-,
eastern Thailand.' to actual dynamitings by these gation is very high. The men
These are mere peeks by the raiders. They specialize in tar-
regard thetnselves as an elite
general public at a tremen- gets which are too difficult for corps. ?
dous submerged "iceberg" of - bombers to identify from the ? Financed by CIA
clandestine operations continu- air, or are too well hidden to The mysterious, CIA-financed
ously.: and now increasingly be spotted by aerial photogra- Air America civil flying fleet
carried out against the
phy. They also carry out a seems to operate on a super-
munist North. traffic in agents not otherwise national basis across Cambo-
These actions probably nev- Laotian, and South
possible under present condi- dian, Thai,
Cr will be disclosed in full de- tions. Vietnamese. borders. It has
tail but it can be said respon-
Size, Diiration Vary had a part in some of this
sibly that today they constitute work. However, much of the
an important phase of this Reports filtering from Ceri/ Nvork is being done by mil-
tral Intelligence Agency an
Southeast Asia battle.
associates :military establish- itary detachments, temporarily
It is a silent war.- It is ear- posted to the special forces.
ried out by special forces and ments indicate such raids may The military establishment
vary from 20 to several hurl-
by mercenaries. It is a hit- here generally ? attempts to
tired men. They may stay in
and-run ?war in which units are suppress mention of this side
North Viet Nam from:a. few
airlifted or sea borne dcep into of the war for a number of
minutes to 24 hours.
North Viet Nam for demolition reasons, with security aOnst
missions, for seizure of prison- Mercenaries enlisted for enemy knowledge being the
ers, for probing forays, and?it such secret actions include least important. The North Vi-
now is -understood?for accu- Europeans, Chinese, Malays, etnamese are fully aware of
mutation of information on iJapanese and Americans. T h e the nature of the CIA-directed
American prisoner of war camp oerations are c a re f u 11 y and financed special opera-
locations. ? I planned and surrounded by the tions.
. This type of action has been tight security. / It is known that after each
taking place in the North Viet- The CIA now believes the /such raid all civilians and mil-
namese panhandle f Tom the large-scales American attempt itary personnel in the North
Demilitarized Zone I to well I to free prisoners from a camp who have had contact with the
north of Vinh during the last I hear Hanoi a year ago failed raiders are subjected to rigor-
60 days Ibecause of a security leak bus and lengthy questioning by
Communist secret police and
political commisars.
The U, S. forces seek to hide
the clandestine side of the war
to prevent embarassment to
Thai, Cambodian, and Laotian
governMental departments.
It is recognized by American
leaders that such concealment
is merely "token" but is re-
quired in certain diplomatic
Approved ForAelease 2001/03/04: C1AiRDB804116061R000900020001-3
tries fringing South Viet :Nam.
Maintain.'
which resulted in a prisoner
STATOTHR
STATOTHR
TIE miAla HERALD
kA, 16 June 1912
Approved_For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R
American prisoner of war i
I; f!)iv,-tl,cr
\T:7-7
0
lJ L,
iIi
\, v T 0 .,,
AR V He 11:M MIR
Saboteurs Harass
North's Panhandle
?y WA.YNE THOMIS
Mlamj Hereld-Chiceria 'irit:zre Wire
SAIGON ? Hatioi infre-
quently broadc.asts mention
"works of saboteurs" in.
North Vietnam's panhandle.
Saigon's vernacular press
occasionally reports odd lit-
tle aircraft accidents with
nonmilitary planes in moun-
tainous regions of Laos,
northwestern South Vietnam,
- and sometimes in northeast-
ern Thailand.
These are mere pecks by
the general public at a tre-
mendous Submerged iceberg
of clandestine operations
continuously and now in-
creasingly carried out
against the Communist
north.
These actions probably
never will be disclosed in full
detail, but it can be said re-
sponsibly that today ti ey
constitute an important
phase of this Southeast Asia
- battle.
It is -a silent war. It is car-
Tied out by Special Forces
and by mercenaries. It is a
hit-and-run war in which
units are airlifted or sea-
borne deep into North Viet-.
nam for demolition missions,
for seizure of prisoners, for
probing forays, and ? it now
is understood -- for accumu-
lation of information on
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000900020001-3
camp locations.
THIS TYPE of action has
been taking place in the
North 'Vietnamese panhandle
from the Demilil:arized Zone
to well north of Vinh duriag
the last GO days.
An increasing. number of
such raids has come from the
seacoasts and from helicop-
ter air-bridge links in Laos
and Thailand to points wht7re
damage can be done or infor-
mation obtained from the
North Vietnamese, it was
learned from reliable sources-.
Communist broadcasts
from Hanoi in the past have
used "saboteur" in an ideo-
logical sense. Now they are
referring to actual dynamit-
ings. These raiders specialize
in targets that are too diffi-
cult for bombers to identify
from the air or are too well
hidden to be spotted by aeri-
al photography. They also
carry out a traffic in agents
not otherwise. possible under
present conditions.
THE MYSTERIOUS, CIA-
financed Air America civil
flying fleet seems to operate
on a supernational basis
across Cambodian, Thai, Lao-
tian and South Vietnamese
borders. It has had a part in
some of this work. Howeve.r,
much of the work is being
done by military detach-
ments temporarily posted. to
the Special Forces.
The military establishment
here generally attempts to
suppress mention of this side
of the war for a number of
reasons, with security
against enemy knowledge
being the least important.
The North Vietnamese are
fully aware of the nature of
the CIA-directed and CIA-fi-
nanced special operations.
It is known that after each
such raid all civilians and
military personnel in the
port!) who have had contact
with the raiders are subject-
ed to rigorous and lengthy
questioning by Communist
ia:roaTs rILTERING secret police and political
I commissars.
from the Centn-11 Intelligence: /
Agency and associated mili-
tary establishments indicate
that such raids may vary
from 20 to several hundred
men, They may stay in North
Vietnam from a few minutes
to 24 hours.
Mercenaries enlisted for
such secret actions include
Europeans, Chinese, Malays,
Japanese and Americans. The
operations are carefully plan-
ned and surrounded by the
tight security:.
The CIA. now believes that
the large-scale American at-
tempt to free prisoners from
a camp near Hanoi a year
ago failed because of a secu-
rity leak, which resulted in a
prisoner shift.
The raiders are heavily
armed. Not one operation has
failed. And none of the raid-
ers has been trapped, accord-
ing to informed sources.
Casualties among these
special forces have been low.
Pay scales and morale are
said to be quite high.
STATOTHR
e-
(
viA31-.TINGToli .20S(.g
Approved For Release 20DVQ.440497CIA-RDP80-01601
ii
rOps AfiiaR
GtaerrillaS
)oteursRaid 110
By D. E. Ronk
? Special to The.Washington 'Post
ietnaa
Inaccessible . ' CIA - maintained - where they conduct sabotage,
- VIENTIANE, Laos, June bases in Laos are used to espionage a n d propaganda
i :14?Use of Laotian territory train, house, and transport the missions in that country's least
i and? specially recruited. As- guerrillas. inhabited and defended areas.
ian mercenaries for CIA- Nam Yu, the CIA's most se- Precise information on targetS,
.'
cret base in. Laos, situated in and types of guerrilla action
sponsored espionage a n d
northwestern Laos near the is not available 'here.
sabotage missions in North town of Ban 'loud. Sal; is re- It is known, however, that /
. Vietnam has been confirmed ported to be the primary train- the CIA is distrustful of many
here by American sources log center. claims made by the guerrilla
close to the operation, Nam Yu was formerly a infiltrators and frequently
'
The missions are original-
base for intelligence teams equips the units with cameras
! ?
;
ing from a number of small being sent into South China so they can photograph them-
mountaintop sites in north-
to ? report on telephone and selves at targets. The photo-
ern Laos within 30 miles of road traffic, a program dis- graphs prove the missions
the North Vietnamese bor. continued last year when were carried out, and provides /
President Nixon accepted an intelligence data for CIA V
der. The guerrilla troops areanalysts.
invitation to visit China,
transported by unmarked - From Nam Yu, the guerril-
Each mission uses at least!
?Air America planes. lag are moved to the Long one specially equipped twinsi
engine Otter plane, said to 1
.- - The existence of the guer- Cheng area 80 miles north of .
rilla missions inside North Vientiane where they continue carry half a million dollars
Vietnam was first reported to train; -making forays into worth of radio and electronic
the surrounding mountains in- gear for pinpoint navigation
in Saigon earlier this week. side Laos on lower-level recoil- and locating of ground forces.
Such missions were known naissance missions for season. 13e-cause of the twin Otter's
to have been initiated in ing and practical experi^nce virtual silent operation as it
early 1960s, but were not re- in avoiding capture and inflict- Passes close over the ground,
its short take-off and landing
garded at the time as very jog, harm. on Communist
forces. capability, and the load it can i
effective and were apparent- carry, its basic function has
ly suspended after the 1968 : Many of the potential North been the h
e clandestine ilISCT-
- bombing halt. 'Vietnamese infiltrators are tion, pickup and resupply of
highly trained mountain "weeded out" during this guerrilla missions.
tribesmen from northern training period, sources say. -
There are also reports of
Laos and some Thai mercenr , Resident newsmen here have,
been unable to visit Lonc guerrillas being snatched froin
Cheng in recent months. '' enemy-occupied territory by a
aries with Ion g experience -
Jump-off points for the hook dangling from rescue
,s in special operations are
said here to make up the guerrillas are considerablv aircraft. The guerrilla on the
teams. Most . of the guerril- east and northeast of Lon' wig ground inflates a large balloon
? ? las are said to speak Viet- Cheng, according to the sour- th lighter-than-air gas, at-
taches it to a thin line which
name-se, some fluently. ces, most being tiny hilltop is then 'attached to a harness
-
Officially, the Air Amer positions hardly known to
. he fastens to himself. The res-
exist. A major point of de-
-:
: lea management in Vienti- paste is said to be at Bouamiclou(emc passes over the hal-
, raft
pasture
ane is unaware that the corn- Long, sometimes called "the; up. hooks on and hauls him
s pany's - pilots . or planes are fortress in the sky," about 40. ---- -
miles northeast of Long Cheng," -?"Qualified sources here say,
. flying such .missions. Air .,
America is a quasi-private ,
a base the Communists have meantime, that they believe
.
' airline under contract with never been able to wrest from that such espionage missions
U.S. government agencies. .ts Meo defenders, will be increased in northern
Practical training exercis.es Laos' and may be resumed
._
inside China itself, to sabotage
are also conauctect at Botiam .
war material that?because of
Long. Communist radio broad-
the mining of Haiphong?is
casts frequently note the pres-
once, capture or killing of expected to flow increasingly.
through China's Yunan Prov-
commandos from Bouam Long ince and the Laotian Province
in the Sam Neua area of north-
nearby rth Vietnam.
of Phong Saly on its way into
east Laos. Caves in
mountains contain the head- No
quarters of the Communist-
supported Laotian rebels,
The highest priority, how-
ever, is given to missions that
Fefasen20011(t3404eQ G
move _into North.. Vietnam
Pilots used on the espio-
nage-sabotage mission flights
are carefully selected and re-
ceive special pay for hazard-
ous duty by a "white envelope
system." This means that the
money received is not account-
:able or traceable, even for tax
purposes, sources say.
Official U.S. spokesmen in
Vientiane decline to comment
on the operation, but informa-
tion pieced together from
Ameriiitcp proved) ForrRe
.here indicates that virtually
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-RDP80-01601R000900020001-3
SCH3NCE YQ1.1.1411 ?
Approved For Release 20014:4/9411 -RDP80-01601R
? ??.?.(C6rantinarritolo
raids-
on North
'Mercenaries' (CIA recruits?)
hit supply. and transport lines
STATOTHR
By Daniel Southerlan.d
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Saigon
United States-hired commandos are mak-
ing unannounced raids into North Vietnam,
according to U.S. sources in Saigon.
The sources said the raids are being
made against North Vietnam's supply and
transport system, mainly in the country's
southern panhandle', by ? "Asian merce-
naries." Most of the commandos are be-
lieved to be recruits of the U.S. Central In-
telligence Agency .in Laos.
Many of. the commandos are being in-
serted into North Vietnam by unmarked
aircraft, the sources said. But according to
one report, some have been slipped into
North Vietnam. on boats.
' The sources said the raids are being
staged from a "neighboring country," un-
doubtedly .meaning Laos; But it was thought
that bases in Thailand might also be in-
volved.
Targets spotlighted
? Truck parks and supply depots are among
'the targets, the sources said.
The CIA had organized sabotage and in-
telligence raids into North Vietnam in the
early 1960's, but these were believed to have
met with little success.
In early 1964, the raids were stepped up
and came under the control of the U.S. Mil-
itary Assistance Command in Saigon. Some
of the details of those raids were disclosed
in the ."Pentagon papers" published last
year.
The raids were apparently suspended
after the bombing halt in 1968.
The renewed raids are no secret to the
North Vietnamese. Hanoi publications such.
as Quan Doi Nhan Dan (People's Army)
have made at least half-a-dozen references
over the past few weeks to "puppet ranger
groups" making raids in the north.
Publication warns ?
The armed forces publication recently
warned that the United States is "attempt-
ing to conduct surprise attacks by infantry
or commandos in vital areas to sever our
transportation to the front line."
I In another issue, Quan Doi Nhan Dan said
that North Vietnam's locOrtorces,ar "
termined to..Ratlegi 9irPaY
groups."
"Alt present, along with using aircraft and
warships to . . . attack us, the Nixon clique.
is maneuvering to continue to use rangers.
to carry out sabotage activities in the north,"
the paper said. "These activities are aimed
at sabotaging our communications lines and
military and economic installations.
"They use aircraft, boats, and rubber rafts
to land these rangers or send them across
the borders. Their basic plot is to land
secretly, quickly carry out sabotage activi-
ties, and then withdraw quickly."
But it added that "sometimes they leave.
behind a small number of rangers to carry
?out activities for a long time."
Although the North Vietnamese publica-
'aon called the raids "desperate," activities
which "cannot escape being appropriately
punished," there is no evidence So far that
the Communists have had much success
in stopping them. . .
'Along with the bombing, mining, .and
commando raids, the United States has also
resumed the dropping of propaganda leaflets
aver North Vietnam.
The Voice of America has increased its
broadcasts to North Vi?-!!..int from a pre-
offensive level of 6 h?;_-?,,cs a day to a current
level of 13 hours a day.
2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000900020001-3
. DISSENT
STATOTHR sprinz 13072
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-
D-21101-,7 We Sank Erillt`a Vthi
Joseph Buttinger
0 ne of the most puzzling questions future
historians will have to deal with is why the
United States ever got involved in the con-
temporary struggle for Indochina that has
been going on since 1945. Did the consid-
erations that determined the course of
'American foreign policy after World War II
, make this involvement inevitable or could
in have been avoided in spite of the tensions
'that arose after 1945 between the West and
the so-called Communist bloc? On this point,
opinions will probably always remain . di-
vided, but those who believe that no other
. course could have been chosen without dam-
:age- to the West or the United States would
do well to consider the following:
(1) no Indochina war would have taken
:place if France had not insisted on reestab-
lishing its control over Vietnam, Cambodia,
and Laos after these countries had gained in-
dependence following the Japanese surrender
in 1945; ?
(2) if is questionable that the United
*: States would ever have reached the point of
even considering intervention in Vietnamese
affairs. if it had refused from the beginning
to support the reestablishment of French rule
in Indochina.
It is indeed one of the important conclu-
sions' of the Pentagon Papers "that the Tru-
man Administration's decision to give mili-
tary aid to France in her colonial war against
the Communist-led Vietminh 'directly in-
volved' the United States in Vietnam and
.`set' the course of American policy." 1
Yet this decision was made only iti. 1950,
after the victory of Communism in China
and the recognition of Ho Chi Minh's regime
by the Soviet Union and Communist China.
It would never have come about had it not
been preceded by the decision made by the
victorious Allies at the Potsdam Conference
of July 17 to August 2, 1945, which gave
the French not 'only a free hand but also
Allied support for the reconquest of 'Indo-
china. This Potsdam decision, supported only
by the British under both Churchill and At-
Roosevelt had still been alive. It was op-
posed by Nationalist China under Chiang
Kai-shek and certainly not favored by Stalin.
Vigorous American opposition to it would
probably have led to the acceptance of
Roosevelt's concept of a United Nations
Trusteeship for French Indochina as a first
step toward full independence. ?
Surprisingly on this crucial point the con-
clusion of the Pentagon Papers is that Roose-
velt "never made up his mind whether. to ?
support the French desire to reclaim their
? Indochinese colonies from the Japanese at
the end of the war." 2 In view of the forceful
statements Roosevelt made against the re-
turn of the French to In.doehina?to his Secre-
tary of State Cordell Hull and to his Son
Elliot, as reported in their inemoi?rs,8 this
conclusion must be :regarded as erroneous.
There has been much speculation about
the question whether American massive mili-
tary intervention in Vietnam might not have
been avoided if President Kennedy had been
alive. It is unlikely that this question will
ever be answered with any degree of cer-
tainty. But it is probable' that Vietnam after
1945 would have experienced a period of
peaceful evolution toward independence, un-
der a regime not unlike that of Tito's Yugo-
slavia, if Robsevelt had lived and succeeded
in imposing his anticolonial solution for In-
clochina. Nor is it far-fetched to assume that
Roosevelt would not have disregarded the
appeals of Ho Chi Minh, in at least eight
letters to Washington in 1945-46 for United
States and United Nations intervention
against French colonialism.4 "There is no
record . . . that any of these appeals were
answered." 5 Not until publication of the
Pentagon Papers did the American public
hear of the existence of these letters.
Yet the Truman administration's policy
toward Vietnam remained ambivalent for at
least the first three years of the Indochina
war. On the one hand, the U.S. "fully rec-
ognized France's sovereign position," as Sec-
retary of State George Marshall said in a still
secret State Department cablegram sent to
StATOTHR
? I
tlee, might noAt have been .taken_if PresidenLthe U?S. Embassg in Paris....: I t'isfeViiMp
pproved For Release 2001/03/04 ? VIA-RUPF. - 90002900e1c3t
1
STATOTHR
Approved For Release 206/002124 tArriA4R131g30411601
June 1972
" The Pentagon 1)afiers?
A Discussion
The publication of "confidential" materials has inevitably given rise
to a debate concerning a number of different but related problems:
To what extent do the revelations contained in the documents throw
light on events or policy decisions with which they deal? To what ex-
tent, if at all, does the publication of the information contained in the
documents jeopardize the processes of .executive decisiomnaking?
How can the conflict between the public's right to know and the ex-
ecutive's need for confidentiality. be reconciled? 'The editors of the Po-
litical Science Quarterly have in tL': past published a number of arti-
cles dealing with the issue of access to governmental information and
the terms on which that access. is made available, notably, Adolf A.
Berle's and Malcolm Moos's reviews of Emmet John 'Hughes, The
Ordeal of Power (P52 LXX IX, June 1964) and Theodore Draper's
review of Jerorne Slater, Intervention and Negotiation: The United
States and the Dominican Revolution (PSQ, LXXXVI, March 1971):
The recent publication of the Pentagon Papers has given the contro-
versy neW urgency. U.S. Senator George McGovern of South Dakota, -
candidate for the Democratic party nomination for president, and
Professor John P. Roche, from 1966-68 special consultant to President
Lyndon Johnson, were aSked by the editors of the Political Science.
Quarterly to review the Pentagon Papers and to debate in print the
political and legal issues to which their publication has given rise. -
Publication of the Pentagon Papers has raised a storm concerning
the right of the press to publish classified government documents.
But the contents of the papers are so sweeping in their disclosures
of official suppression of the realities in Vietnam, so revealing
of the disastrous, secretly conceived policies and practices which
.led us into this tragic war, that it is impossible--in fact it misses
their true significance?to discuss them in such abstract terms.
The integrity of our democracy is profoundly involved, not.
only in the constitutioi-A sense Nvith respect to the warmaking
power, but in the basic sense of the reality of government by pop- ?
ular rule. It is axiomatic with .us that a free people can remain
free only if it is enlightened and informed. it is axiomatic with
us, as well, that a free press is essential to the creation and main-
tenance of an enlightened and informed people. A press which
Approved FcmiRejeA495 pcklictaio4c...vpiAgRpnot4:0691RoDostaoo2oom -3
what our executive leadership knew and what it led the nation
?
Approved For Release 206
ginDP80-01601
Duplicity on Vietnam
The comments on "Nixon's Peace Spec-
tacular" in the March Progressive were ex-
cellent. It is .a bit misleading, though, to
emphasize that "virtually every item in his
plan had previously been proposed by the
United States, and all had previously been
rejected by the other side." The important
point is not that the proposals have all
been rejected in recent years: the impor-?
taut point is that nearly every item was
(leo-Herr Iln Chi 1'1;1. I.
is -our steadfast refusal to oltsetve
agreement that makrs. it diffirillt Jut tb
Vietnamese to believe tic now.
We now offer to repent some of II,.
promicrs which we f?
In
but reprat Own) iii gteatly v.eatctir
Anulcr circumstances V1 /Iv
The Vietnamese ate acutely a -
even . though we like in foTrt that
?iiiIrtrialioital agreements involving th,
.United States are made ineaningle,s by the /-
aCtivities of the CIA., ?vhi(h .tm,?rates
.complete disregard of international law,
specific I, cities, declarations of principle,
or. -tradition. In 19711, it .violated the
Geneva accords as soon as they wile
signed, by stimggling in tons of ptohibitcd
military snpplies, sabotaging North Viet-
namese railways and bus lines, and Imming
down those W ho In, ml been pumnitietil iii
the snuggle for Vietnamese independence.
At present, the CIA is placing major
emphasis on "Operation Phoenix"? a pro-
gram for subsidizing the assassination of
individuals suspected of being part of "the
Vietcong infrastructure." On July 19, 1971,
William- E. Colby, who had dire.cted the
program for the CIA, testified that it had
killed 20,587 suspects since 1968, and that
the program was being stepped up. Pre-
sumably, therefore, N5 P. have managed to
murder at least 30,000 Vietnamese by now.
Since Vietnam is less than one-tenth the
size of the United States, this is equivalent
to slaughtering more than 300,000 Amer-
icans, as far as political impact is con-
cerned. Would Nixon really insist that the
1972 election was a fair one if the Dem-
ocrats were allowed to assassinate the
300,000 most prominent Republicans be-
fore November?
William Palmer Taylor
Hamilion, Ohio
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Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000900020001-3
STATQTH
April 17,Aptrittved For RergatigINFIVOISIbT4 MiialtiFf8kaiV01R0009000 001-3
suit of startup problems at Litton's new
facility. In terms of concept and design,
Litton has taken a revolutionary ap-
proach to shipbuilding that if successful,
would greatly improve both efficiency and
costs in our shipbuilding industry. How-
ever thus far the experience of Litton has
resulted in neither increased efficiency or
lower costs.
- In October 1968 Litton won a contract
' for 7 Merchant marine ships including
four container ships for the Farrel Line.
Three weeks after launching, the super-
structure of the first Farrel container
ship sank by 1/2 inch. There is no doubt
the Farrel Line is very dissatisfied with
the shoddy construction on the ship and
delays in its deilvery.
-There have also been significant labor
problems at the Pascagoula facility. Dif-
ficulty has been accounted in recruiting
? both skilled labor and managerial per-
sonnel. The turnover rate at the new
west bank facility has been twice that at
the old cast bank facility reaching levels
as high as 50 percent per year. Litton
has also undertaken a major recruitment
.program of skilled managerial personnel
which I understand has been quite suc-
cessful.
In addition to labor problems, there
have been production problems at th
yard forcing the movement of some ship
from the new west bank yard to the east
bank -facility. Several' of the merchant
marine ships which initially were sched-
uled to be built in the west bank yard
are now being constructed on the other
side of the river. In addition, some of the
.LHA ships have been moved to the old
yard and some DD-963's may be con-
structed in the older and traditional
facility.
In sum, Mr. Speaker, we have a huge
' mess on our hands. The Navy chose dur-
ing a 13-month period to pour more than
$3 billion for 39 ships into a brand new
and untested shipyard. The result thus
far has been nothing less than disastrous.
Cost overruns, delays, and now a series
of complex negotiations between the
Navy and Litton have been the -result.
It is no secret that now Litton expects
a major increase in the cost of the LHA
program. .
It is my hope that the Navy will an-
swer all these serious questions that I
have raised during the next several
weeks. It is also My hope that the Navy
will hold Litton to its original contract,
and not grant ? huge price increases to
Litton. The Navy and the Congress must
resist the temptation to bail Litton out.
The letter to Mr. Staats follows:
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF ItEPRESENTATIVEs,
Washington, D.C., April 17, 1972.
Mr. .ELMER STAATS, .
Comptroller General of the United States,
General Accounting Office, General Ac-
counting Office Building, Washington,
D.C.
? DEAR M. STAATs: I am writing to you to
request the General Accounting Office mi-
dertake a study of escalation charges in the
3a ship DD-9133 program. In its latest Se-
lected Acquisition Report (SAR) for the DD-
963, the Navy estimates that the cost of
escalation' will be $509.6 million. In the same
report the Navy also indicates that it has
? revised its method of computing escalation
and the result has been an increase of $136.5 Mr. Speaker, this morning's New York
million in estimated cost growth. Later Ln the Times carried an editorial which notes
same report an increase of $455 million as that: .
recorded "due to including contractors esti-
mate of escalation", Apparently there is
Every new air raid means more pilots shot
a
down and captured.
discrepancy in the estimate of escalation cost .
by the Navy and Litton of approximately Since it is clear at this point that our
$145 million, prisoners will not be returned while we
Specifically, I hope that the General Ac- bomb North Vietnam and maintain a
counting Office will evaluate:
. 1., Has Litton Industries realistically evalu-
ated the escalation charges for the DD-963 South, it is plain that Mr. Nixon's pri-?
program? Are all the costs reflected in the mary interest in the POW's is their use
$455 million the result of escalation and cost as pawns, for his actions only serve to
growth? prolong their detention and to increase
2. Why is there a discrepancy of $145 mil- their numbers. The Times editorial is
lion between the Navy's estimate of eseada- an excellent one, and I wish to read- it
tion and Litton's estimate of escalation? Is
in full at this time:
the Navy including escalation charges under
other items in the Selected Acquisition Re-
[From the New York Tilnes, Apr. 17, 1971]
port (SAR) ? OF BLOOD AND SLOGANS
I also hope that the General Accounting Slogans Can have a fateful significance.
Office will be able to determine if all of the Taking office in 1969 on a pledge "to end
escalation estimates by both the Navy and the war and win the peace," President Nixon
Litton Industries seem to be reasonable and made a fateful decision concerning the true
within guidelines established by the Bureau content of that vague but beguiling cam-
of Labor Statistics. paign slogan. "Winning the peace," he de-
A member of my staff, William Broydrick, cided, meant that an anti-Communist Gov-
is ready to discuss details of the studies with ernment had to be consolidated in power in
any member of your staff. South Vietnam. Otherwise the "peace" would
Thank you very much for your coopers- be lost because additional military effort by
tion. the Communists would soon bring them the
Sincerely, _ - victory they have long sought.
LES Asrm, Since the United States and its South
Member of Congress. Vietnamese allies had not conclusively de-
feated the Communists on the field of bat-
tle, there was no immediate visible way to
"win the peace" in Mr. Nixon's special sense
of that term. As a result, "ending the war"
had to be indefinitely postponed and the
subtly but significantly different objective
of "winding down the war" had to be substi-
tuted. Even this phase had to be defined In
a special sense. The war itself was not wound
down; on the contrary, it was extended to
Cambodia and Laos and American bombing
greatly increased. What was "wound down"
was the scale of American involvement in
the ground fighting.
When these special Nixonian interpreta-
tions have been decoded, that 1968 promise
"to end the war and win the peace" trans-
lates into ordinary English as a promise "to
continue the war until the enemy concedes
defeat and accepts American peace terms."
Would the American people have accepted
Mr. Nixon's leadership four years ago if they
, had understood the true import of his slo-
gan? The question is unanswerable. What can
be said is that the Communist forces in Viet- ?
nam ate not prepared to accept Mr. Nixon's
special definitions. The Moody fighting of the
last ten days demonstrates that the war was
not ended.
South Vietnam's Army has been able to
achieve at least a temporary stalemate but
on terms that have ominous implications for
stated that massive bombing of the North long-term American involvement. Only mas-
has no noticeable effect upon the flow of sive American bombing, including heavy raids
supplies to the South. Why then are we in North Vietnam itself, enabled the South
bombing? The fact of the matter is that Vietnam forces to halt the Communist ad-
Vietnamization has been an abject fail- vance. And it is the precarious position of
South Vietnam's embattled forces that has
ure, as it was doomed to be from the be- led to the weekend's American escalation of
ginning. The South Vietnamese military the air war near Haiphong and Hanoi. ?
Is no better able to defend itself from If American air support on a large scale
the people of Vietnam than it was 2, or is the essential prerequisite for staving off a
THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a
previous order of the. House, the gentle-
woman from New York (Mrs. Antra) is
recognized for 60 minutes.
Mrs. ABZUG. Mr. Speaker, the Ameri-
can people have made it clear time and
time again that they want this Nation to
get out of Vietnam and to get out now.
They want this withdrawal to include
not only our men, but our planes, and
our bombs, too. ?
They want it to be contingent solely
upon the release of our prisoners of war.
They do not want it to be contingent
upon the continued existence of the cor-
rupt Thieu dictatorship or upon the de-
struction of the North Vietnamese people
and nation.
It has been so long since the will of
the American people became apparent
.that it is truly incredible to see this ad-
ministration reescalating the death and
destruction and returning us to the dark
days of 1967 and 1968.
The Pentagon's own studies have
3, or 10 years ago. Mr. Nixon, recogmz- south Vietnam defeat, the United States
Ing the political impossibility of recom- may be fighting an air war in Southeast Asia
mitting American ground forces to this for several more years?on and on into the
futile conflict, thinks that if he devas- indefinite future in an elusive effort to "win"
tates North Vietnam from the air, he an ever-receding "peace."
will somehow secure the position of the , America's involvement in the Vietnam
Thieu government. There is no other war cannot be satisfactorily ended until this
conceivable reason for his action. The country obtains the release of its prisoners
Defense Department's own studies show
of war. Every new air raid means more pilots
shot down and captured. The number of
that the bombing will not stop the flow American prisoners steadily grows. Thus, ev-
of supplies, and will, therefore, be of no cry raid not only brings death and devasta-
use in "protecting" the American troops tion to Vietnam but postpones the ?kid of the
who remain in Indochina. war.
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WASHINGTON POST
Approved For Release 2001/g30*:1*-RDP80-01601R
'The Washington Merry-Go-Round
? ..,:ilL L
By !Jack Anderson
IP/%V Secret; ' ' ' , ? A
Government red tape and
t secrecy . rules have kept
hundreds of documents on
prisoners of war in Saigon for
up to. two years while the
POW families waited and won-
dered about their loved ones. .
? One classified data includes
reports of Vietcong prisoner
Interrogations, CIA mentos,
4 Army intelligence papers and
1:other fragments of military in-
,.-formation gleaned from the
'field in Vietnam.
- Interwoven with genuine se-i
cretS are such innocuous factil
las the location of POWs, thei
cOndition, orders given fo
their protection and even an
Intriguing plan to buy freedon.
for some prisoners throtah
double agents. . - -
... Although the White House
has paid lip' service to the
POWs and their families, it
did not unlock the files until
the case of Sgt. John Sexton
came to light. His family
feared he was dead, although
U. S. intelligence authorities
had heldja letter from him for
two years which said he was
alive.
.To bead off more "Sexton
cases," Defense Secretary Mel
? Laird ordered a housecleaning
of old POW data. This brought
bales of documents to Wash-
ington from U. S. intelligence
fileinin Saigon.
The suppressed documents
included nothing so dramatitli
as the Sexton letter. Neverthe-,
less, some of the details, if rei
leased sooner, would have
spared the news-starved fami4
lies months of anguish.
--. To the credit of the Army
tausalties section handling the
data in Washington, once a
new fact was discovered it was
telpehoned to the family, or in
some cases an officer flew to
, the, POW family's home? to
ibrlef theM. . ,
: . A :: ? 4 it
STATOTHR
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SATURDAY MN1131I
Aprl 1 1972
STATOTH
ovF6T6a-'4%nit9M1 inPAONEWA1
SR: 60VA he A c t
?
ST ATOTAW Review Editor:
ROCHELLE GIRSoN
IN THE MIDST OF WARS:
An American's Mission
to Southeast Asia
by Edward Geary Lansdale
Harper & Row, 386 pp., $12.50
Special Committee on Indochina held
on January 29, 1954.
Why is this important? Because if
there is one word Lansdale uses re-
peatedly it is "help"?and he uses it
personally, simulating a Lone Ranger-
like urge to offer spontaneous assist-
ance. Thus, the first clay he ever saw
Diem, ". . . the thought occurred to
me that perhaps lie needed help. . ? I
voiced this to Ambassador Heath. . .
Heath told me to go ahead." The in-
formal atmosphere continues when
Lansdale, upon actually meeting Diem,
immortalizes him as "the alert and
eldest of the seven dwarfs deciding
what to do about Snow White."
Further desires to serve inform Lans-
dale's Concern for the "masses of
people living in North Vietnam who
would want to ... move out before the
communists took over." These unfortu-
mites, too, required "help." Splitting
his "small team" of Americans in two,
Lansdale saw to it that "One half,
under Major Conein, engaged Jo
refugee work in the North."
"Major" Lucien Conein, who was to
Reviewed by Jonathan Mirsky
ri With the exception of the Pentagon
Papers, Edward Geary Lansdale's
memoir could have been the most valu-
able eyewitness account of the inter-
nationalizing of the Indochinese war.
Lansdale, a "legendary figure" even in
his own book, furnished the model for
the Ugly American who, from 1950
through 1933, "helped" Magsaysay put
down the link revolution in the Philip-
pines. He then proceeded to Vietnam
where, between 195-1 and 1956, he stuck
close to Ngo Dinh Diem during Diem's
first shaky years when Washington
couldn't make up its mind whom to
tap as the American alternative to Ho
Chi Minh. Lansdale's support insured
Diem as the final choice for Our Man
in Saigon. While the book's time span
is, therefore, relatively brief, the period
it covers in the Philippine and Viet-
nam is genuinely important.
There is only- one difficulty with In
the Midst of Wars: from the cover to
the final page it is permeated with lies.
That Harper & Row finds it possible
to foist such a package of untruths on
the public?and for $12.501?several
months after the emergence of the
Pentagon Papers, and years after the
Publication of other authoritative
studies, exhibits contempt for a public
trying to understand the realities of
our engagement in Vietnam.
The lie On the jacket describes Lans-
dale merely as an OSS veteran who
Spent the years after World War II as a
"career officer in the U.S. Air Force."
In the text Lansdale never offers any
explicit evidence to the contrary. In-
deed, on page 378?the last of the text?
ile states that at the very timc Diem
was being murdered in Saigon, "I had
been retired from the Air Force."
For all I know Lansdale drew his pay
From the Air Force and, as the photo-
graphs in his book attest, he certainly
wore its uniform. This is irrelevant.
Lansdale was for years a senior opera-
tive of the Central Intelligence Agency;
Ott page 244 of the Department of De- Pentagon Papers, however, reveal that
fense edition of the Pentagon Papers, the CIA "engineered a black psywar
Lansdale, two other men, and Allen
Dulles are idenlifi. strike in Hanoi: leaflets signed by the
Approfibas FrairMI6lisbic20011/03sfeart:inCIAQRDP804
how to behave for thc Vietminh
play the the major role the CIA had in the
murder of Diem in 1963, is identified in
the secret CIA report included by the
Times and Beacon editions of the
Pentagon Papers (see SR, Jan. 1, 1972)
.as an agent "assigned to MAAG [Mili-
tary Assistance Advisory Group] for
cover purposes." The secret report
refers to Conein's refugee "help" as
one of his "cover duties." his real job:
"responsibility for developing a para-
military organization in the North, to
be in position when the Vietminh took
over . . . the group was to be trained
and supported by the U.S. as patriotic
Vietnamese." Concin's "helpful" teams
also attempted to sabotage Hanoi's
largest printing establishment and
wreck the local bus company. At the
beginning of 1955, still in Hanoi, the
CIA's Concin infiltrated more agents
into the North. They "became normal
citizens, carrying out everyday civil
pursuits, on the surface." Aggression
from the North, anyone?
Lansdale expresses particular pleas-
ure with the refugee movement to
the South. These people "ought to be
provided with a way of making a fresh
start in the free South... . [Vietnam]
was going to need the vigorous par-
ticipation of every citizen to make a
success of the noncommunist part of
the new nation before the proposed
plebiscite was held in 1956." Lansdale
modestly claims that he "passed along"
ideas on how to wage psychological
warfare to "some nationalists." The
anot legion in early
October [1954] including items about
property, money reform, and a three-
day holiday of workers upon takeover.
The day following the distribution of
these leaflets, refugee
tripled."
registration
he refugees?Catholics, many of
it_ whom had collaborated with the
French?were settled in the South, in
communities that, according to Lans-
dale, were designed to "sandwich"
Northerners and Southerners "in a
cultural melting pot that hopefully
would give each equal opportunity."
Robert Scigliano, who at this timo-
was advising the CIA-infiltrated Michi-
gan State University team on how to
"help" Diem, saw more than a melting
pot:
Northerners, practically all of whom are
refugees, [have] preempted Many of the
choice posts in the Diem government....
[The] Diem regime has assumed the as-
pect of a carpet bag government in its
disproportion .of Northerners and Cen-
tralists ... and in its catholicism.... The
Southern people do not seem to share the
anticommunist vehemence of their North-
ern and Central compatriots, by lvhorn
they are sometimes referred to as un-
reliable in the communist struggle, ,
[While] priests in the refugee villages hold
no formal government posts they arc gen-
erally the real rulers of their villages and
serve as contacts with district and pro-
vincial officials.
Graham Greene, a devout Catholic,
observed in 1955 after a visit to Viet-
nam, "It is Catholicism which has
helped to ruin the government of Mr.
Diem, for his genuine piety has been
exploited by his American advisers
until the Church is in danger of sharing
the unpopularity of the United States."
Wherever one turns in Lansdale the
accounts are likely to be lies. He re-
ports how Filipinos, old comrades
from the anti-Huk wars, decided to
"help" the struggling Free South. Thc
spontaneity of this pan-Asian gesture
warms the heart?until one learns from
Lansdale's own secret report to Presi-
dent Kennedy that here, too, the CIA
had stage-managed the whole business.
The Eastern Construction Company
turns out to be a CIA-controlled
"mechanism to permit the deployment
of Filipino personnel in other Asian
countries for unconventional opera-
tions.... Philippine Armed Forces and
other governmental personnel were
'sheep-dipped' and sent abroad."
Elsewhere Lansdale makes much of
Diem's success against the various
sects, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh
Xuyen. (At every step Diem was ad-
vised by Lansdale who, at one pathetic
moment, even holds the weeping Chief
1)6 Ott ROD 09120020001yd ing de-
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(A?br .);.?.1.4?????
Text by Morton Kondracke
-
Photography by Dennis Brack & Fred Ward
?
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PROGRESSIVE
Approved For Release 2001/0&041:96A-RDP80-0160
What the Pentagon Censored
? Publication .of the Pentagon Papers
by several prominent daily news-
papers last June confirmed the general
suspicion that the Government's secur-
ity classification system serves as much
to protect political leaders from embar-
. rassing public scrutiny as to preserve
genuine military secrets.
Now the publication' of the Penta-
gon's own censored version of the Pen-
tagon Papers demonstrates that the
system is not only abusive of the dem-
ocratic process but self-deluding as
?The Pentagon rushed into print with
its "sanitized" version of the Papers
when it became known that Beacon
Press was about to publish the original,
classified version of the ? papers?as
made, available by Senator. Mike
Gravel) Alaska Democrat.
The Pentagon's motives were un-
'clear, but the effect was to reveal what
it considers to be the most sensitive
,portions of the original document, a
development of interest not only to
the American public but also to any
potentially hostile foreign power.
- Much of what the Pentagon cen-
sored had already appeared in 'The
Neil) York. Times, The Washington
Post, the Chicago Sun-Times, and
other newspapers. The rest of what
.was deleted was immediately apparent
to those reporters who possessed the
original papers and should _now ' be
evident to. any foreign intelligence ser-
-vice which takes the time to put the
Pentagon version and the Beacon Press
...version side by side.
An analysis of what the Pentagon.
.deletcd shows that the Government is
still anxious to conceal the role of the
United States in several crucial aspects
of 'the -Vietnam involvement: how the
first U.S. combat troops were sent to
:Vietnam, how plans were drawn up
to use nuclear weapons against China,
Mow the secret war?in Laos has been
waged, how the CIA conducted exten-
STATOTHR
"If escalation brought about major
sive covert operations in North. Viet-
Chinese attack," Rusk is paraphrased
nain, and how U.S. officials plotted
the overthrow of .South Vietnam Pres-
by the Pentagon Papers historian as
declaring, "it would involve use of
ident Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963.
nuclear arms. Many free world leaders
Other deletions were more predict-.
Nvotild oppose this. Chiang Kai-shek
able, largely the record of diplomatic
had told him [Rusk] fervently he
? dealings with the Soviet Union, the .
did, and so did U Thant. Many Asians
Western European powers, and several
"Third World" countries. seemed to see an clement of racial dis-
crimination in use of nuclear weapons;
The most inexplicable deletions deal
something we would do to Asians but
' with the Diem coup. The Pentagon
not to Westerners... One must use the
censors obviously failed to get the word,
-ree onc had; if Chinese used masses
from their Commander-in-Chief, Pres-
Thmanity, we would use superior
ident Nixon, who admitted openly at a ?
- White House press conference Septern-! iirepower."
On the eve of President Nixon's trip
bcr 16 that "the way we got into Viet-'
! to Pekihg the ?Pentagon censors obvi-
nam was through overthrowing Diem
ously thought it best to leave such
and the complicity in thc murder of
? blatant "Yellow Perilism" on the cut-
Diem." ?, ?
Iting room floor. But unless China's se-
Yet the Pentagon censors sniPPcd. curity officials are as obtuse as ours,
out page after page of narrative detail-. it is likely that Rusk's remarks are al-
ing the intimate .involvement of U.S. ready part of their briefing book for
Embassy officials in the sordid maneu-the visit
Pres?m em,a.1to_Pekiruz.
ble explanation, in current political RO-S- and .
MoaTON KozsmaAokr.
wring. that led to Diem's fall. A possi-
? terms, is that the deletions contain sev-
eral citations of U.S. hostility toward
General Dtiong Van (Big) Minh.
Minh sought- briefly this year to mount
a campaign against President Nguyen
Van Thieu but backed out, charging
that Thieu had tigged the elections
with tacit U.S. approval.
The deletions covering the diSpatch
of the first combat troops to Vietnam
in 1965, amount to more than six pages.
Apparently they were -made to obscure
indications that the troops were con-
ceived from the beginning as the van-
guard of a' major offensive buildup, not
the small, defensive, and support force
they were depicted as being at the
time. In the original version, the Pen-
tagon historians concluded that the
evidence pointed ?"in support of the
phased build-up proposition."
The deletions about nuclear- weap-
ons include a devastatingly matter-of-
fact comment by Secretary of State
Dean Rusk in 1964 that nuclear weap-.
ons would be used if Communist
China entered the Vietnam war.?
(Air. Ross and Air. kondracir;e are
'erns(Lingto;: correspondents for the Chi-
cago Sun-Times.),
STATOTHR ?
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11:02:(0)1 c-i:J.Amv;
Approved For Release 2001/03/ :1biA-'-libig80-01601R0
1 I/. n 9
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"flood relief." In a report to KednedyTaylor
wrote: "The risks of backing into a major Asian
war" by -way of SyN. are present but are- not
impressive. N VN is extremely vulnerable to
conventional bombing, a ,.--we?a,kpess Which
should be exploited diplomatically in convinc-
ing Hanoi to lay off SYN." -
In a report of Nov. 8, 1961, endorsing the
Taylor recommendations; Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara spelled out ti-m implications
of al?-military victory with the use of U.S.
troops: "The other side can be convince-d we
mean business only if we accompany the initial
force introdtiction...by awarning ..to Hanbi
that continued support of the Via Con will
lead to punitive retaliation against North Viet-
By Richard E. Ward nam.
Fourth of a series on the Pentagon papers "If. we act in this way, the ultimate possible
extent .of our .military commitment- must be.
faced. The struggle may be brolonged and
Hanoi and Peiping (sic) may intervene directly
hi view, of the logistic difficulties faced by the
other side, I believe that we can assume that the.
maximum U.S. forces required on the ground in:
Southeast Asia will not exceed 6 divisions, oil!
about 205,000 men."-
Although the 'Kennedy administration never)
actually made the decision to send the forces.
for fighting a full-scale war, its strategy (con-
tinued by the Johnson administration) foresaw
their use and its actions laid the necessary
groundwork for the subsequent escalation. One
of these preparatory steps deemed necessary. by
Washington was the elimination of the Diem
regime. ? t- --
U.S. responsibility for the eliminationf
Diem was no less than for- his installathiM'in
?Saigon. Both roles have always been offici;illy
disclaimed by Washington, although there has
been sufficient evidence of tile facts for anyone
who wanted to draw the correct conclusions.
Of course details were missing. Some of them
have been supplied in the Pentagon report.
The published communications between
Washington and the U.S. embassy in Saigon
show that the U.S. gave .the plotters full
assurances that the U.S. desired a coup. The
U.S. furnished the generals with plans of Saigon
military installations and at the time of the
coup a CIA liaison man waS in the generals'
command -post. White House officials and ,Am-
bassador Henry Cabot Lodge were aware that
Diem was likely to be assassinated and made no
serious effort to save him, despite all his Past
services to the U.S.
. The - published documents . tuld narratives
concentrate primarily on the U.S. role in
Diem's downfall, but provide less details on
what is perhaps a rnore important question?the
reason -why the U.S. prompted the coup. Yet
there seems, to be enough evidence to say that
the primary reason was not the regime's un-
popularity at home- and abroad, but rather
because with the increase' in U.S. troops in
Vietnam Washington7wanted T'a.gt?eater degree of
control over the Saigon adminiStration than
-Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu were
willing to grant.
. If only John F. Kennedy had lived, certain,
writers have asserted, the U.S; never would have
become bogged down in a major war in
Southeast Asia.
?
The Pentagon papers are unkind to that--
myth, for the documents clearly show that the
Kennedy administration set the ,Stage for the
escalation in Vietnam by its successor. In
effect, Lyndon Johnson carried out a program
germinated by the Kennedy administration,
some of whose chief figures contemplated as
early as 1961 the massive use. of U.S.. ground
forces and the bombing of North Vietnam...
Tho. Kennedy administration took office:just
a month after the formation of the National
Liberation Front of South Vietnam in Decem-
ber 1960. The NLF quickly gained wide sup-
port throughout the South and the U.S.-spon-
sored regime of Ngo Dinh Diem was soon- on
the defensive militarily and politically. FrOm
19.61, there was a steady escalation in U.S.
interventio.nary activities. Espionage missions
against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
were stepped up and the first regular American
ground troops were sent to the South as
"advisors" to the Saigon armed forces wliich
were being expanded by the U.S. By mid-196-3,
the White House- concluded that its ainifl'of
victory in Vietnam would not be possible wider
the. Diem regime and the U.S., gave the green
light for a coup in Saigon.
As the number of U.S. personnel in Indo-
china approached 20,000?an almost 20-fold
increase in. less, than three years--the Kennedy
administration came under increasing domestic
criticism. In response, it stated the U.S. military
presence in Vietnam had reached its peak and
would be concluded by 1965. While that was
what the- public, heard, the Pentagon papers
reveal that most top administration officials
were aware that the commitment of the first
complemerr,-. of U.S. troops implied a larger
American combat role in the future.
The President's' personal military advisor,
Gen. Maxwell Taylor, recommended the use of
U.S. forces on a limited scale in early November
1961, fonwing a visit to South Vietnam.
Taylor himself discounted the,POssibilit.y?that a
major war would restill from the .use of
American troops, which he sucTested could be
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-00ntimAna .
? STATOTHR
STATOTHR
Ea' 6)ciP-5
Approved For Release 24y9M3:7plA-RDP80-01601R000
LI il
Py CADJLL
Washington, Aug. ii (NEWS Dureau)--- The United .?
States and the Chinese Nationalists for 20 years launched
espionage, sabotage and guerrilla forays against Conunu-
nist China from Cliktng Kai. slick's is kind bastion of 'Tai-
wan, a former State Department official told Congress to-
day.
Allen S. Whiting, professor of
political science at the 'University
,of Michigan, who served in the
State Depart in ent's Bureau of
intelligence and in the U.S. Con-
sulate in Hong Kong from 1901
to 1908, said the covert "opera-
tions included support of the ill-
fated uprising in Tibet in 1959.
Increased After ii ocean War
Whiting said America's "slm-
dowy involvement" in the clan-
destine operations grew steadily
after the Norean v?ar and the
1954 Geneva Conference. He- said
they triggered the FO11110Sa
Strait crises of 195-1 and 1.9-dS
and helped set the stage for the
Sino-India war in 3902 along the
-Tibetan frontier.
. Testifying before a subcommit-
tee of the Senate-House Joint.
Economic Committee, Whiting
said the publication of the Pen-
tagon papers provided partial
documentation of the operations,
particularly U. S. and Nationalist
.Ghine'se vverflights of mainland
China. ?
Quoting from a tdp-secret mem-
orandum from Brig. Gen. Edward
Lansdale to Con. Maxwell Taylor,
Whiting said a Nationalist Chi-
nese airline called Civil Air Trims-
port carried out "more than 200
overflights of mainland China /
and Tibet." in addition, the line
Provided aircraft for an abortive
CIA effort to overthrtr.v the Su-
karno regime in Indonesia in 1058,
and helped transport sabotage
teams into North Vietnam as
early as 195-1, the witness said.
. Airline Linked to CIA
In 1960,- Whiting told the sub-
committee, a new Taiwan-based
airline, China Air Lines, came in::
to being, and engaged in "clan-
destine intelligence operations"
as well as commercial flights to
Laos and Vietnam. He linked the
airline to the CIA-backed Air
America, which raided Northern
Laos iiithe course of the CIA's
"secret war in Laos."
..?t times, he said, the bombers
strayed over the border, hitting
mainland Chinese territory. This
may explain "much of Peking's
expanding military presence in
road construction and antiaircraft
activities in Northern Laos," he.
went on.
STATOTHR
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000900020001-3
)1ATIONA3J GUARDIAN
?
Approved For Release 200140th4:brA-Ps-CIPA81(b9-101R
I !I
t, _ (7:2' ): \ti C:(-011'.1);;:i
n ?"- to?A too, koi ?
ill ? ))). tk; . W J ?????,-!' L
r.
- By Richard E. Ward i
, nstructions from President EisenhOwer and Secretary or ?
. Zhird of a series of articles .: State John- Foster Dulles opposed any international
. ? - . - . recognition Of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,
Official U.S. policy statements on Indochina issued, to which had existed for 'nearly nine years and led the
! the public characteristically have charged the Viet- resistance against the French.
namese with the crimes actually being committed by the Blind policies ? _ _
, .U.S. From 1954. to. the present, day, among the U.S. Prior to the Geneva conference itself, Washington
.ideological keystones have been the spurious claims of policy papers of 1954 underscored U.S. aims in Indo-
North Vietnamese aggression and violations of the 1954 .china as "a military victory" for the French, whose
Geneva settlement, armies were on their last legs?indicating the lack of
?. Although . U.S. responsibility for sabotaging the realism in Washington. Thus it is not surprising that the
'Geneva agreements has been recognized widely for well U.S. worked to destroy the new peace. Till? was evident
.. bvcr a decade, the first time it was seriously suggested in at the time to anyone who wanted to see what was.
the New York Times was. last month in its final happening in Vietnam. ? .
. .
! installment of documents and reports from the Punta- Clearer than before, the ..newly available documents
. gon's history-of U.S. intervention in Vietnam. - shovi. that the U.S. never intended to respect the Geneva
.? Following - the disastrous French defeat at Dien- settlement. On August 3, 1954, just two weeks after the
; . bienplitt in. May 1954 as well as serious military reverses Geneva conference concluded, the National Security
i elsewhere in Indochina, France finally faced the neces- Council discussed Vietnam. About the meeting, Fox
j, sity of negotiations to avoid complete destruction of. its Butterfield in the Times wrote: "The objectives set by
forces. The ensuing settlement at Geneva contained. the [National Security.] Council were 'to maintain a
: provisions for .a . durable peace in Indochina. But as friendly non-Communist South Vietnam' and 'to prevent
: quickly as French troops left Indochina the U.S. began a Communist victory through all-Vietnam elections.' "
its direct intervention, preventing essential provisions of Although the Pentagon analyst denied that the U.S.
? the Geneva agreement from being carried out. "connived" with Diem to prevent national elections,.
Butterfield noted that Washington had made its desires
Armad resistance houins known to Diem and when Diem later blocked the
As is well known, the U.S.. caused its puppet Ngo? elections, the U.S. indicated its full "support." The
, Dinh Diem' to be installed in Saigon, even before the Pentagon papers could hardly conceal the fact that Diem
I- settlement had been reached in Geneva. Under programs remained in power by virtue of U.S.- backing, although
financed and largely conceived by his CIA tutors, Diem the dependence on the U.S. is sometimes obscured,
instituted a neo-fascist regime. Thousands of patriots particularly in ascribing to Diem the repression, for
? who - had served in the anti-French resistance were. which U.S. was ultimately responsible.
assassinated or jailed and tortured. Armed struggle Washington's cynical attitude toward the Geneva
became the only road to survival; this developed settlement. was stated by John Foster Dulles'in a cable to,
. spontaneously in some regions or under the direction of the U.S. embassy in Saigon on Dec. 11, 1955: "While we
- local 'cadres in others. Full-scale, coordinated resistance should?certainly take no step to speed up the present
began with the formation of .the Nittional Liberation process of decay of the Geneva accords, neither should
Front of South Vietnam in December 1960, which was we- make the slightest effort to infuse life into them." -
- headed by a representative cross-section of the leader- Perhaps thc. most 'revealing new document from the
- ship of democratic ,and progressive-organizations in the ' post-Geneva period is a lengthy report on the activities
. South. , ? of the so-called Saigon Military Mission, headed by Col. /
? In the U.S. version, which the American press rarely Lansdale of the CIA. Ostensibly written by anonymous ?
challenged (except to gj.ve a partially true picture as? members of the group, there is no doubt that the report
" Diem nearedhis end in 1963), the Saigon puppets were .which eulogizes Lansdale was largely his doing. Lans-
treated_ as .the legitimate rulers, threatened by subversive dale's-activities were described in. fiction by Graham
agents acting on behalf of Hanoi. In essence, according Greene, in "The Quiet American." Lansdale's chauvin-
to Wanington, in the late 1950s the U.S. was not ism and callousness might also be compared to the comic
intervening in ,Vietnam while "foreign aggression" was strip character, Steve Canyon, like Lansdale an Air Force
carried out by Vietnamese. - - . . ..
.. 7colon el: S.-
,
Unfortunately the press has only published a small.
amount of Material from the Pentagon study _on the
period .following the Geneva settlement. However, there:
is ,sufficient information from the Pentagon report to
idemonstrate that Washington consciously and deliberate-
ly was. trying to crush the revolution in Vietnam and
that virtually every public statement was-nothing but a ;
tissue .of lies designed to conceal U.S. activities frorrrthe :.
AmeriCan people. ? ? ?COntinuod-
..
At various stages the U.S. and its apologists have
blown hot and cold about the Geneva agreements. At
the conference itself the chief U.S. delegate,. Walter' /
Bedell Smith, pledg,ed that the U.S. would not mit
them by force. (ApprovediforsIReleasee, 1/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000900020001-3
ambiguous, hardly concealing their dissatisfaction: Dis-
satisfied . they well might be, for Bedell Smith's initial ?:
STATOTHR
Approved For ReleasV/O1bikY41?C9A-WS80-01601R
22 JUL 1971 STATOTHR
A E-3z.D77.0.1....2:.[:;,?c7.37:717.D7.-.D7r
' ?
?
'71 nThi
??,1-7.:;,;-,..,? 0
'-r;?-s] 67) r? ? -
cIt. 2.1
z; The articic. that follows is part of The
A/ Planning of the Vietnam ?War, a study
by members of the Institute of Policy
Studies in Washington, including
Richard J. Barnet, Marcus Ras-kin, and
Ralph Stavins.* In: their introduction
to the study, the authors write:
"In early 1970, Marcus Raskin con-
calved the. idea of a study that would
. explain how the Vietnam disaster hap-
pened by analyzing the planning of the
,War. A group of investigators directed
.- ?by Ralph Stavins concentrated on
finding out who did the actual plan-
:nin.g that led -to the decisions to bomb
North Vietnam, to introduce over a
half-million troops into South Viet-
'nam, to defoliate and destroy vast.
areas of Indochina, and to create
?,millions of refugees in the area.
?? -"Ralph Stavins, assisted by Canta
.Plan, John Berkowitz, George Pipkin,
and Brian Eden, conducted more than
300 interviews in the course of this
.studji. Ainong those interviewed
were many .Presidential advisers to
Kennedy and Johnson, generals and
'admirals, middle level bureaucrats who
occupied strategic positions in the
national security bureaticracy, and offi-
.eiali , military and civilian, who carried;
out the policy in the field in Vietnam.
' "A number of informants backed up
their oral statements with documents
,ctn , their possession. including informal
minutes of meetings, as well as por-
tions of the official documentary rec-
ord ".now known as the "Pentagon .
Papers.? Our information is drawn not,
only from the Department of Defense,.
but also from the White House, the
Department of State, ,and the Central
Intelligence Agency." ,
The study is being-published in two-
? volumes. The first, which includes the,
- article below, will be published early in
August. The second will appear in-
?
May, 1972. . .?
.*The study is the responsibility of its
' authors and 'does not necessarily reflect
the views of the Institute, its trustees,
or- fellows, .
nh L. Stavins
6.71
? :
,
At the end of March, 1961, the CIA
.circulated a National Intelligence .Esti;
mate on the situation in South Viet-
nam. This paper advised Kennedy that
Diem was a tyrant who was confronted
with two sources of disContent the
non-Communist loyal opposition and
' the Viet Cong. The two problems' were
closely connected. Of- the spreading
Viet Cong network the CIA noted:
Local recruits and sympathetic or
intimidated villagers have enhanced .
Viet Cong control and influence
over increasing areas of the coun-
tryside.. For example, more than
one-half of the entire rural region
south 'and southwest of Saigon, as
well as some areas to the north, -
are under considerable Communist
control. Some of these areas are in
effect denied to all government
authority not immediately backed.
by substantial armed force. The
Viet Cong's strength encircles Sai-
gon and has recently begun to
move closer in the city. ?
? ?
The people were not opposing these
recent advances by the Viet Cong; if
anything, they seemed to be support-
ing them., The failure to rally the
people against the Viet Cons was laid
to Diem's dictatorial rule:'
- ? There has been an increasinc, dis-
position within official circles and
the army to question Diem's abili-
ty to lead in this period. Many
feel that he is unable to sally t'ne
people in the fight against the
Cornmunists because of his -reli-
ance on virtual one-mad rule, his
tolerance of corruption extending
even to his immediate entourage,
and his refusal to relax a rigid
system of public controls. ?
The CIA.referred to'the attempted coup
-.agains! Diem that had been led by
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP8
STATOTHR
'?oeneral 1 in Tovember; 1960, and
concluded that another coup was likely.
'In spite of the gains by the Viet Cong,
they predicted that the next attempt to
overthrow Diem would originate with
the army and the non-Communist
opposition.
The Communists would like to
initiate and control a coup against
Diem, and their armed and sub-
versive operations including united
ftont efforts are directed toward
this purpose. It is more -likely,
however, that any coup attempt
which occurs over the next year or
so win originate among non-
Communist elements, perhaps a
combination of disgruntled civilian
officials -and oppositionists and
army elements, broader -than those
involved in the November attempt.
In view of the broadly based opposi-
tion to Diem's regime and his virtual
'reliance on one-man rule, it was unlike-
ly that he would initiate any reform
measures that would sap the strength
of the revolutionaries. Whether reform
was conceived as widening the political .
base of the regime, which Diem would
not agree to,. or whether it was to
consist of an intensified counter-
insurgency program, something the.
people would not support, it had;
become painfully clear to Washington
that. reform Was not the .path to
victory. Buf victory was the goal, and
Kennedy called upon Deputy Secretary
of Defense Roswell Gilpatric to draw
up the. victory plans. On April 20,
1961, Kennedy asked Gilpatric to:
a) Appraise the current status and
future prospects of the Communist
drive to dominate South Vietnam.
b) Recommend a series of actions
.(military, political, and/or econom-
ic, overt and/or covert) which will
prevent. Communist domination of
? that country. ? -
150 k t-jk al s
ac, Lt.?& P A v?- vl vt
L,
0-01601 R00000:102001-3
NEWSWEEK
Approved .For Release 2001iO3/440: gbi-gpipso-co 6
Lansdale's Secret War
They were America's first Vietnam "
warriors?a small team or Central Intelli-
gence Agency operatives called the Sai-
gon Military Mission,- headed by the leg-
endary Col. Edward Lansdale, and sent "
into Vietnam in the chaotic, eleventh-
hour summer of 1951, to try to stave off a
' Communist take-over. How they did it
was revealed last week in a diary kept
by some of. the SNINI agents and excerpt-
ed lw The New York Times among its n-
al selections from the Pentagon's secret
study of the war, Undated, unsigned,
the diary chronicles one year of CIA op-
erations in North and South, Vietnam--
operations plainly in violation of the spirit
if not the letter of the Geneva agree-
ments, which the U.S. had pledged not
to disturb?and provides a revealing
glimpse of the earliest covert moves that
led ultimately to massive, open U.S.
involvement in the war.
It was fearfully late to be establishing
a U.S. mission. Ho Chi Minh was rushing
to consolidate control in the north, and so
wobbly was Premier Ngo Dinh Diem's
original government in the south, the
diary relates, that high-level officials in
Washington already considered Vietnam
probably lost. "We admitted that pros-
pects were gloomy," the diary states,
"but were positive that there was still a
fighting chance."
Lansdale was certainly the man to
I. take it. A tough Air Force career officer
turned CIA agent, Lansdale had become
the foremost American counter insurgen-
cy expert helping the Philippines Eamon
Magsaysay crush the Communist Huk-
balahap rebellion .two years before?and
reportedly was the model for Colonel
Hillandale in "The Ugly American." He
threw SMM?and his own prestige?be-
hind Diem, and sent a crack American
paramilitary team to Hanoi to try to slow
the Communist take-over.
The northern team was led, ironically,
by U.S. Army Major Lucien Conein?the
same CIA agent who, nine years later,
was to sit in on the planning and execu-
tion of the South Vietnamese Army gen-
erals' overthrow of President Ngo Dinh'
Diem. This time, using the refugee evac-.
nation program as a cover, Concin and
his men worked furiously to recruit a
team of North ?Vietnamese insurgents
(c.xide-nanual Binh), "exfilt rate" them
for training at a secret U.S. base' and
smuggle them, with supplies and am-
1111111a1011, 'Ma into the north before the
'Vietminh seized Hanoi.
They were also engaged in psycho-
logical warfare?and sabotage. According
to the diary, one leaflet circulated in
Hanoi, ostensibly announcing Vietminh
plans for such program us as in re-
form, so demoralized the populace that
the value of Vietminh currency fell by
half and refugee applications to move
south tripled in a single day. But when
Hanoi finally fell in October, Conein and
his men very nearly fell with it. On their
last raid, the team attempted to wreck
Hanoi's bus system by pouring a contam-
inant into its oil supply. "The team," the
diary relates, "had a bad moment in
an enclosed storage room. Fumes from
the contaminant came close to knocking
them out. Dizzy and weak-kneed, they
masked their faces with handkerchiefs
and completed the job."
Tricks: SMM was up to the same kind
of paramilitary, psy-war tricks in the
south?including recruiting another team
of Tonkin-bound insurgents code-named
Hao, and publishing an almanac filled
with calamitous astrological forecasts for
the north. But Lansdale's biggest head-
ache seems to have been keeping the
man he had backed in power. Army
Chief of Staff Gen. Nguyen Van Hinh
made no secret of his eagerness to over-
throw Diem, and it apparently took all
of Lansdale's considerable wiles to keep
him from doing it. Ile managed to stave
off one coup by dispatching Hinh's two
key aides on a junket to the Philippines,
and he developed his own spy-lines to
the general. "Our chief," the diary re-
lates, "... was a friend of both Milli's
wife and his favorite mistress ((lie mis-
tress was a pupil in a small English class
conducted for mistresses of important
personages at their request ...)." Within
a month, IBA had departed for France,
spurred on his way in no small measure
by Lansdale's operations. ,
The diary's conclusions ring with pride
in a job well done. "We had smuggled
into Vietnam about eight and a half tons
of supplies," it relates. "Our Binh and our
northern Hao teams were in place, com-
pletely equipped. It had taken a tremen-
dous amount of hard work ..." Later,
Lansdale had an opportunity to see
where it all had led. When he returned
to Vietnam in 1965, the man he had
backed was dead, the South Vietnamese
Army was all but inoperable?and the
U.S. had begun the infusion of half a mil-'
\lion fighting men.
STATOTHR
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000900020001-3
?
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.i I.." t. i i i,--..,-- eittn-lcrit's e.c:-.e1a'.-fsii.:).11-v?r; pi-ocess for 'au::: Penta-
I_I . Lon 1o, 111u goveramenL u..,et-Itht. courts z-',.;";
Thr.?,r.e, t Wo (deo-write-the tv..o.vsceic time span a II ICto 'get the3:?"!O'.;S::-24.?0;" ZttOIOSS."
and t'il:: 10-itelli liet.---'3-rointerlocititv',.. . U.S. A .to: rley Whit ncy l'orti.i. Seymour first
'fogoi.be.r they censtituto the heart of the :::.,.),..-- stImitted a 22-pnge "sps,cial appencilx" hiz.,fetre
erearient's contention that it \vent into court, the, fcdfu n1 Appellate Coart in I-I.-v.; York in the
not to prevcrat crInbarraSSTIC'nt to .'provic;...15 - NOv.' YOla In case, cining items- in tilf... Pen-
administrations or to t"iwart the First Amend- Cazon . study which ths. f],o....-eitttracrit believed
moot, btit to it Off -1..,.1,....tp.:.:1:-it)10. injury" to. v..ould c.?.tiFe. ;.:.,i,,ve- r",,,,tiomd e?,,,,,,,,,, if dis.,
the Elt;)a.! Sr."CZ1!* of the United Statc:s. - , closcd. l',,fhsn. the Cirf.O MOVCd tO ti;C: SI.IpretrIO
(Utinici Eii.,1,,c1..,?,. t'ilc fofmc.t. pc,ita4c,i?Ttaf.: -'..0-,Z1'1, Li CII General Irwin K. Grisv,'old.
for and Rand- Corp. e-mi...10yrt, has said re_ s.umr.-inri".,er_l these mat'ers in Pis 1D-iten-1 list
pealedivi that he x,s the. conduit to ;he Itfc.,s, gi`,'en to ilia justices in a serakd crivelc,po for
I OF:.: 11111CS, CO,C. POSt 'Fild other newspepers,), In-charuhers pent:fat. .
-,,,, , -,--..
. As proof of ih,r.:. ---,0'.,:cl'ili-i'l:-,rj-'6????tic---,=;--,',s in this Wl-it,.t the govemnr.-:nt l':elieves it has been
t.:y....T. l'''. "Tk.i.3..I.1-I.iP.S'ii rca,),":.et, the ocial citcd the rator- Of stories SUCC.`,2'..flil in preventireg it": the pniplicatiton or
iu 1:,,,,,. 'riroes 'aid fr"'cist,nite7: the StIpucinc Celli. 1.. details of c.ertain 1?entaLtn J' 15 on that list,
c..-111,..1 or. OLr V:t'?,?....11.1,..:-.1:'n 1:.7r,":.1.1
. , ,,,-,,,,Iva them pt,rrn;,..,.--..,.'?or., it:, rc.,:stam,-_,, publio,ai,ior, of obtain's,d to), this ropc.,..-tc.r. The cor..tcrus E.V3 ?
2 ??,..o.p:"I'xilt, !?,-4.;.!, I.;.? Th, r),?,,-,.?., N,,,,,,.:,
stimintirizted here oaly iri iteneral forms so as.
I he P,.itagon papers.
\VASIIIIIC'Ci'ION ---- One pc rc aeon vyhy the
government 'went it-ito court to try to sten pub- -rhey haven't surfoc.:eti nny cf. the lilt l'a t-,...tn- - to vi'-'iat'' s'f-ci-t-'n.Y. . ?
The Nevis 1-1F.,5 been nssured that the foil is
tzi_iff eii the 10-itel ,, - i-list.," he si.id. .
lication of 'the PC1-0.:::,".:On t'apE."1"5 ",".,?::::'S a -Ica": that
certain disclosures1r ;' 'tvreck tho ct. ,111. stcr
--, 1,,.71?..t th,...,.gov,,,,,,,,,I. f?..,1 ,..,d froin it.,, irl,,. paints, withotit 1 ut [her 'amplification, e.0
planning thca under -way for Pre.sidsr,t Nixon's 1
iav.'s,'its., in spip. ef 01,-, .Sii:;r:.:me Coml. \-,,x, not 1.ite1 an:,,, security breach or threat to the
eofivo.
1C11 1(1 tr un clict
ip to Commist C1-"ina. .
; p lc in lved
In t",oing, to court, the governmetit's top law.. -,..) 1 1-.,,-. tefo-v,:c_ek injunction re.fiod gave the Ci Thz-',1-I)c'''11;a6:r011 .i.1utl.:'..-7 ilichill'-'q Pr'IF'? C1-0C1-1--
:
yet s believe they f,..iso saved the lives of sev- ContiA IntelliLetIce zi.,.,'ency (CIA) sufficient. 1-11.?1.1``.11''' of '.1fle.fIc-`'1.` Iec-cr'.1..."-:s.s'2111-'..:' 0-11'..1..41-'
era1 Aroericenrs, headed -c?ff sorne f?.,,,save se.eu.-. time. to "cy.fract" tc.,--y agents frorn dely,."..erous telligence activitiC,5 In Vu.VI:ig ccrtam Asian
-countries supporting I---Ianc,i's side in the Viet-
Tity Icai-S- anci .preserve) the macbinery of 0,5:iignmcnts n'orc,"-.d. . ,..,..
some Of tOd,ly's rt-ios.t delicate and, s'ecret peaco ifincse a,'gekAs "airaost certain.1}., wotild have riar'..,1 I'''"' , ..
1 ne-se. act,viiies were itnov,,n. to be taking
3110V OS in'v'01\,:nz; many IL "'S of the. II.,2ast Local hiilIsci," one" source said, 11,,d ESVOl'al Pan- ,
ee ,t,-,-,' the s,-,ied-uoon countries but they
and I,,Vesf. . . ? tag on ..I..or.uroc-tits been printed or described in :? .?,?;,,, , ? ,.. 1- I ?.....,. ,. t
? ,,,I, t,,,,,,lica.ly ?,o,,,)1,_" to sioizi it ano so f.ack
The Washington-Pol.ing thav/ is one of thorn.. detail, - . . sear, potrunf, publicly.
. Mr. l'sli:wn, it Call br?. said on high aiithority, "Ily soing into c...6iii.l. we gained enough time - - .- ;- ' - - 4' ? ? ? 7' '' '
shares tills .vicv,I. . ' to "get th,.:ro. the hcil cot," Ite. said. . trom ine I' '1 papers, cicLaii:,.:17'S'nec.:7