WHO RUNS THE SULTAN OF OMAN?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000800070001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 16, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 3, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

Who runs the' Sultan of . man
With the British virtually hone, the southern stretch of the Arabian peninsula is an
ominously ragged patchwork, and minor items of news this week suggest that tensions
in the area are going to build up. The forces of Sultan Qabus of Oman, who seized
power about 18 months ago, are reported to have occupied three enclaves belonging
to the Ruler of Sharjah; and the two resistance movements which have been the
spearhead of the Dhofar rebellion against the Omani government for the past seven
years (the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf, and the
National Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman) have merged in a new
movement, under what purports to. be a unified command.-
The world has heard this kind of claim from Arab revolutionaries in the past, and
will wait to see what happens. But at least it is a sign that the Dhofar rebellion, and
everything currently going on in Oman, cannot be swept under the carpet. The
Americans realise this; despite the disavowal. this week by Mr Alexis Johnson, the
Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs ('we have no intention of replacing the
British'), with regard to Bahrein, all the evidence suggests that the Americans are
moving into the area fast, and their influence on the Sultan of Oman is certainly
increasing.
Briefly summarised, the factors in the Oman situation arc:
(i) The Dhofar war and the British involvement. The rebels are supported by
both the Russians and the Chinese (as well as by the South Yemen government),
though how exactly Moscow's men and Peking's men dovetail their efforts remains a
mystery. It was officially admitted a few weeks ago that two men of the British Special
Air Service regiment had been killed last October. An expert observer who has recently
visited the country insists that the number of casualties is appreciably higher - according
to this source, as many as six officers and a score or two of Omanis have been killed -
but it is very hard to get correct figures. There is strcing evidence that the SAS goes
beyond its `official' task of training the sultan's forces - hence the casualties, and the
capture of some equipment.
The British personnel involved are in two categories: officers seconded to the sultan's
defence force, and an unspecified number of men who get paid X300 a mopth, all
found. The progress of the rebels has undoubtedly worried the sultan, and he has
recently been asking for more arms - guns, aircraft, gunboats.
(ii) Political conditions in the rest of Oman. So far there is no evidence that
disaffection is spreading from Dhofar to other parts of the country; but Qabus's
popularity has waned, after a gopd start. Political activity in Oman is led mainly by
the Omani students' association; (a body which Qabus fears), and some 30 Omanis
who have been educated in the Soviet Union. The strikes and demonstrations which
occurred in Matrah in September were basically economic in derivation - the Omani
labourers resent the way foreigners get better wages and better housing - but were
also, in part, a protest against the way Qabus is spending his money: on his defence
force, on military hardware, and on Dhofar instead of on the development of places
like Muscat and Matrah. Som. observers fear that with the passing of time he is
becoming increasingly like his f~ther.
He is accused of selecting selfish advisers and using Britons in key posts; his critics
say'tl-at he hides behind them to cover his immature thinking. He stays as often as
possible in Salalah, in the company of British officers, some of whom are his inseparable
companions. All this may seem mildly gratifying to Whitehall, but it is not necessarily
a situation which will permanently be of advantage to Britain.
Of his other foreign advisers, the most influential - and the most unpopular - in
recent months has been Abdullah At-Ta'i, from Abu Dhabi, who last year worked his
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R0008000bbd1-9