LETTER FROM INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000700010001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 154
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 29, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 30, 1971
• Content Type: OPEN

STATI NTL
Apiii 30, 1971 CTORESSLO_NAjo
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Approved For e eas
y LETTER FROM INDOCHINA
MON. MiCHAIL J.-HARRINGTON
:Or MAsSACHUSETTS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Friday, April 30, 1971
Mr. HARRINGTON. Mr. Speaker, the
April 24 edition of the New Yorker con-
tained a most penetrating analysis by
Robert Shaplen of our recent foray into
Laos and its repercussions throughout
Indochina. It is one of the most knowl-
edgeable and objective accounts of our
involvement in Vietnam I have yet en-
countered and I recommend it to my
colleagues.
LEITER FRoLl INno-CTILNA
SAIGON, APRIL 14.
It may be six or eight months before any
final assessment can be made of Operation.
Lam Son 719, the South Vietnamese invasion
of Laos, supported by vast American air
power, which lasted from February 8th until
March 25th and was followed by brief com-
mando forays until early in April. Neverthe-
less, even though this operation has produced
more heated debate than any (other Indo-
Chinese battle since the French fell into the
trap of Dien Bien Phu in the spring of 1954,
a few conclusions can be reached now. The
invasion failed to achieve anything close to
Its maximum aims, for, though it caused the
death of a great many South and North Viet-
namese, it did little?contrary to American
and South Vietnamese expectations?to speed
the end of' the fighting, either by forcing
Hanoi to negotiate or by assuring the success
of the still inconclusive VietnamiZation pro-
gram. It may, at most, have postponed some
major offensives that the Communists had
planned in South Vietnam over the next few
months. On the other hand, at least one big
attack?in Kontum Province, in the Central
? Highlands?bas been pressed during the past
fortnight, and there has been a noticeable
Increase of terrorism throughout the coun-
try. Costly as the Laotian invasion was to
Hanoi, it apparently hardened the determi-
nntion of the North Vietnamese to continue
fighting throughout Indo-China. Moreover,
it led to a reaffirmation of Chinese and Rus-
sian pledges of assistance. Finally, the oper-
ation was a political setback for President
Nguyen Van Thieu, whose reelection in Oc-
tober is now, for the first time, open to
question.
The Americans, who are going all out to
'uphold Thieu and make their -South Viet-
namese allies feel "six feet tall" as the
monthly rate of American troop withdrawals
Increases, have come up with the customary
set of sanguinary statistics, this time claim-
ing a nine-to-one "kill ratio" in favor of the
Saigon forces. If that is believable?and even
President Nixon, in his television interview
of March 22nd, indicated that a. five-to-one
ratio might be more realistic?it could be
due only to the preponderance of American
bombers and artillery. There can he no doubt
that if it had not been for this support the
results would have been disastrous .for the
twenty-four thousand South Vietnamese who
were fighting deep in unknown jungle ter-
ritory against about thirty-five thousand
North Vietna mese?:a far more experienced
force, which was fully determined to protect
It s lifeline to the South in the Ho Chi Minh
Trail -complex. The gruesome game Of body
counts has long been the bugaboo of cor-
respondents in-Vietnam, and in -this case the
confusion has been compounded by a flood
of often contradictory -statements and as-
seesments emanating from Washington and
Saigon. Indeed, never in the past ten years?
net cern during the chaotic months before
the overthrow of the Ngo Dinh Diem regime,
In 1163, or during the Communist Tet-offen-
sive at the beginning of 1968 and the Ma
and August offensives that followed?hay
I witnessed such dissension as has taken
place between the news media and the au-
thorities, both American and South Viet-
namese, over the invasion of Laos.
According to the latest official American
figures, the losses of the South Vietnamese?
who for the most part fought bravely and
well but lacked a cohesive command?were
about fifteen hundred dead, more than six
hundred missing, and fifty-five hundred
wounded; so far there have been no estimates
of how manat of .the wounded have died or
are likely to die. Unofficially, however, ac-
cording to what South Vietnamese sources
have told me, the number of men missing and
presumed dead is actually between a thou-
sand and fifteen hundred, and the number
of wounded is at least seven thousand. Some
of those listed as missing are still straggling
back across the border, but the majority, it
is said, either died of their wounds in Laos
or surrendered or were captured by the North
Vietnamese. In their flight from Laos, under
extremely heavy North Vietnamese attacks,
the South Vietnamese abandoned many of
their wounded?something that the govern-
ment is reluctant to admit?and though
American rescue helicopters did remarkable
work under the most hazardous conditions,
they couldn't bring out all the wounded. (A
hundred and five helicopters were lost in the
Laotian operation, and five hundred and
y along the Trail; again, most of these losses
e ',fere the result of bombing, and only about
three hundred trucks ..teere deetroyed in the
actual area of the ground invasion. The -
North Vietnamese also loet more than a hun-
built PT-76, T-5,.1, and T-34 tanks that Hanoi TI
dred tanks. (The number of new Ruseian-
used, sometimes right under the noses of
the South Vietnamese, was one of (he sur-
prises of the campaign, and the lightertanks
of the South Vietnamese forces, many of
which got bogged down, were no match for
them.) In addition, Hanoi lost nearly seven
thousand weapons, big and small, and nearly
five hundred tons of heavy ammunition?ar-
tiliery and mortar shells, and the like?but
Saigon's claim of' a total of a hundred and
seventy-six thousand tons of North Vietnam-
ese armnunition blown up, mostly by bomb-
ing, seems ridiculous, since the average
monthly flow south in the past has been
only about fourteen thousand tons. Further-
more, no major storage depots were taken?
only some medium-sized way stations along
the, Trail. The French used to say that for
every ton of ammunition captured the Com-
munists had three more tons available near-
by. No one knows how much the North
Vietnamese have currently stashed away
around the Blovens Plateau, about a hun-
dred miles below the invasion area and
near the border point a-here Laos, Cam-
bodia, and South Vietnam meet. However,
the North Vietnamese and their Pathet Lao
accemplices recently extended theta con-
trol in that region, and they obviously have
quite a lot of supplies cached there. Con-
sequently, just how much time Hanoi lost
and Saigon gained by the invasion can be
determined only next fall, when matoriel in
the northern part cf the Trail complex is due
to arrive farther south, some of it destined
for Cambodia and the rest for the central
and seuthern parts of South Vietnam.
For anyone attempting to evaluate the
Laotian operation, what has perhaps been
most significant is the fact that the Com-
munists have struck back quickly and vio-
lently in various parts of South Vietnam and
in Cambodia, clearly demonstrating that they
have enough nien and arms to cause a lot
of trouble?at least during the present dry
season, which will last another month. And
most observers believe they will continue
their attacks across the now expanded Indo-
China fronts throughout the coining rainy
season, which will last until the end of
October. The attacks in South Vietnam over
the past two weeks have ranged from a suc-
cessful assault on an American base in
Quang Nam Province, in the north, In which
thirty-three Americans were killed and
seventy-six were wounded, to quick strikes
at district towns and headquarters and at
fortified artillery fire bases that are set up to
provide strong points for Allied military op-
erations in all battle zones. By far the most
serious of these attacks has been the one
Imp Kontum,. in the Central- Highlands. Al-
though the Communists have lost about
twenty-five hundred men in this province as
a result of American bombing, they have been
making a concerted effort to capture Fire
Base 6 there; if they succeed, they will pre-
sumably try to advance southward to Pleiku
and Quang Due Provinces and eastward as
far as possible toward Dinh Dinh and other
coastal areas where there has been a recent
flurry of fighting. The Communists also seem
determined to pin down South Vietnamese
troops and inflict heavy -casualties. That
being so, it is significant that the equiva-
lent of five South Vietnamese regiments Is
heavily engaged in Kontura, which in itself
would seem to belie Saleon's claims that its
casualties have been lint. In mid-February,
the Commitnists, having apparently antici-
pated a move westward into the border region
below the Eolovens-Plateen and adjacent to
the Highlands, repulsed a South Vietnameee
assault
LU anti se,-
- , -
enty-six Americans were killed during those
weeks, on both sides of the border, and forty-
two are missing.) Each Vietnamese unit com-
mander reports on his own losses, so it is
difficult to come up with comprehensive fig-
ures. The dependents of known dead get full
pension awards, while thee? of the missing
get payment for only four years, and the
Minister of Veterans' Affairs, Pham Ven
Dong, said to me, "I won't know for months
how much I have to pay to how many."
The North Vietnamese assuredly suffered
heavier casualties, but whether these were
as high as Allied authorities claimed can
never be determined. It is admittedly diffi-
cult for troops engaged in bloody fighting or
in flictht to count the bodies of those killed
by bombs, but if the given figure of thirteen
thousand- five hundred dead is correct, and
if one assunses, as Allied military officials do,
that twice ns many North Vietnamese were
wounded as were killed, then the total cas-
ualties come to about forty thousand, or
more than the number of North Vietnamese
that the same military officials say were fight-
ing in the Laotian battle. There would seem
to be more realism in the estimate that from
a third to a half of the thirty-three North
Vietnamese battalions engaged were rendered
"combat ineffective," and that it will be no
easy task for North Vietnam, which is suffer-
ing from a manpower shortage, to replace
these losses. About a third of the North Viet-
naineSe losses were specialists?technicians of
one sort or another who directed the flow of
traffic on the Trail?and those men will be
the most difficult to replace.
Nevertheless, the North Vietnamese quickly
sent in between four thousand and eight
thousand reinforcements to repair the damn-
agedone to the Trail,aostB-52
bombers, and within a fortnight after the in-
vasion ended, the movement of trucks south
had been resumed at a more or less normal
pace. (fn comparison to the North Vietnam-
ese battalion losses, at least five?and some
say eight?of the tasenty-two South Vietnam-
ese battalions involved were hurt to the point
of combat ineffectiveneas, and it must be
stressed that Saigon threw its best forces into
Lam Son 711. It will take between six months
and a year to build theee units back up to
strength, and then then, will certainly not be
as well trained and "elite" as they were be-
fore.) The North Vietnamese apparently lost
between three and four thousand truck
there and caused
heavy
ca sua t cs o
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Apiil30, /Approved For Q.fiRtseg.s0VJ.,;(4/0,4p:c9hR_DEI,89A01
o'er GoVernment; and the niter :cations. of its
violation raise S.n"101,13 proMmm; indeed.
.In sure, I contend that the Melte, arising
under the emsaratiomef nowers doctenie lend
themselve3 portieularly to the hind of analy-
sis thet political sclentiete aee emeipped to
make, for the doctrine, when reduced to its
basic components, is coneerned with .the al-
location of political power among the three
branches of the Government. A3 long as I
am lessor:laded with the Subcommittee, I
intend to continue to call upon members of
your profession to assist us in our efforts
to give effect to this basic political concept.
I sincerely invite you, individually or as a
group, to contact are about any issue you
consider to be of sun:tont significance to
warrant the Subcommittee's scuds- and inves-
tigation, and I can assure you thaS your sug-
gestions will receive our serious consieera-
tion.
As one who :s ins daily contact with the,
governmental process, I want to urge all of
you to become active participants in the
business of Government, and not mere con-
temptuous, albeit al3le, observers. The Gov-
ernment needs your constructive criticism
and the stimulation your creative analysis
provides.
? If the separation of powers doctrine is
to work properly?or even to survive?the
informed, aggressive participation of the
citizenry roust provide the missing link be-
tween the governors and the governed, this
missing link must exert its influence over
the three branches of Government in a man-
ner so pervasive that abuses of political
power Cannot occur. In the final analysis
this element accounts for every instance
where our system works or fails to work?
the army of citizens W1103'e involvement or
apathy, whose assertiveness or acquiescence,
is ultimately reeponsible for every triumph
and every failure of this Government.
rSHAPLEN ON INDOCHINA
Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, dur-
ing my recent trip to Southeas'6 Asia, I
had the good fortune to talk with Robert
Shaplen, a journalist who has watched
-Vietnam .and Indochina- since 19-45.
'Whether in conversation with military
men, diplomats, or other journalists,
when the subject of news coverage came
up, so did the name, Robert Shaplen?
always in the context of high praise. He
knows, perhaps as well as anyone in-
volved in Vietnam, what has happened,
what is happening, and what is likely to
happen.
He is by no means a "dove." His in-
formed - commentary on recent - events,
Including Lam Son 719, the war in Cam-
bodia, the upcoming Vietnamese elec-
tions, are well worth reading and reflect-
ing upon, by both "hawks" and "doves."
I ask unanimous consent that his re-
cent "Letter From Saigon,". published in
the Now Yorker. magazine of April 24,
be printed in the RECOMM
? There being no, objection, the letter
was Ordered to be printed in the EniC0F,D,
as _follows:
LETTER FRONE INDO-CEIINA
Satooer.?It may be six or eight months
before any final assessment can be made of
Operation Lam Son 719, the South Viet-
nametie -invasion, of Laos, supported- by vast
'American air power, which lasted from Feb-
ruary- 8th until March 25th and was followed
by brief 'commando fornys until early in
April. Nevertheless, even though this opera-
tion has produced more heated debate than
any other Indo-Chinese battle, 'since the
French fell into the trap of Dien Dien Phu
in the spring of 1034, a few conclusions can
be reached. now. The Invasion felled to
achieve anything close to its maximum aims,
for, thougic. it ceneed the death of a great
many South and North Vietnamese, It did
little?contrary to Mmericen and South Viet-
namese -ezpeettitions?to speed the end of
the fighting, either by forcing Hanoi to siege-
"nate or by aseuving the success of the still
inconclusive Metimmeleation program. It
may, at meet, have postponed some major
offensives that the ?CerninuntsC3 had planned
in South Vietnam Over the next few months.
On the other hand, at least Ona big attack?
in Ieontum Province, in the Central High-
lands?has been pressed during the past
fortnight, and there has been a noticeable
Increase of terrorism throughout the coun-
try. Costly as the Laotian invasion se its to
Hanel, it apparently hardened the determi-
nation of the North Vietnamese to continue,
fiehting throughout Indo-China. 3itoreover,
it led to a reaffinnetion of Chinese and Rus-
slate pledge; of essistence. Finally, the oper-
ation was a political setback for President
Nguyen Van Thieu, whose reelection in Oc-
tober is now, for the first time, open to
question.
The Americans. who are going all out to
uphold Thiele and maim their South Viet-
namese allies feel "six feet tall" as the month-
ly rete of American troop withcirewals in-
creases, have come up with the customary
set of sanguinary statistics, this time cis bit-
ing a nine-to-one "kill ratio" in favor-of the
Saigon forces. If that is believabla?and even
President Nixon, in his television interview of
March 22nd, indicated that a five-to-one
retie might be mom realistic?it could be due
only to the pseponderance of American
bombers seed artillery. There cen be no doubt
that if it had not been for this support the
results would hare been disastrous for the
twenty-four thousand South Vietnemese who
were fighting deep in unknown jungle terri-
tory against about thirty-five thousand
North Vietnamese?a far mere experienced
force, which was fully determined to protect
its lifeline to the South in the He Chi Minh
Trail complex. The greesome game of body
counts has long been the bugaboo of cor-
respondents in Vietnam, and in this case the
confusion leas been componnded by a flood
of often contredictory statements and as-
sessments emanating from Washington and
Saigon. Indeed, never in the past ten years?
not even during the chaotic months before
the overthrow of the Ngo Dinh Diem regime,
in 1963, or during the. Communist Tet of-
fensive at the beginning of 1063 and the May
and August offensives that followed?have I
witnessed such dissension as has taken place
between the news media and the authorities,
both American and South Vietnamese, over
the invasion of Laos.
. ?
According to the latest official American
figures, the losses of the South Vietnamese?
who for the most part fought beavely and
well but lacked a -cohesive command?were
about fifteen hundred dead, more than six
hundred missing, and fifty-five hundred
wounded; so far there have been no estimates
of how many of the wounded hive died or are
likely to die. Unofficially, however, accord-
ing to what South Vietnamese sources have
told me, the number of men missing and pre..sumed dead is actually between a thousand
and fifteen hundred, and the numl3er of
wounded is at least seven thousand. Some of
those listed as missing are still straggling
back across the border, but the majority, It is
said, either died of their wounds in Laos or
surrendered or were captured by the North
Vietnamese. In their flight from Laos, under
entrernely heavy North Vietnamese attacks,
the South Vietnamese abandoned many of
their wounded?something that the govern-
ment is reluctant to admit?and though.
American rescue helicopters did remarkable
work under the moat hazardous conditions, _
they couldn't bring out all the wounded. (A
cooSTATINTI
-
hun re ant ve cc. iseme OSt, in the
Leotien operation, and five hundred entl
fifty-sin were damaged; a. hundred raid
seventy-six American., wen:, killed diming
these weeks, on both SICIe3 of the border,
and forty-two are messing.) Each Vienne mese
unit commander reports'on his own losses, so
it is till-Tu.:mit to cores up with comprehensive
figures. The dependents of known demi get
full pension awards, while those of the mess-
ing get payments for only four years, and the
Minister of Veterans' Affalm, Pham Van
Dong, said to roe, "I won't know for month;
how much I have to pay to how mem',"
The North Vietnerneze aesuredly suffered
heavier casualties, but -whether these were
as high as Allied authorities; claimed caIi
never be deter:Mined. It is admittedly dif-
ficult for troops engaged in bloody fighting
or In flight to count the bodies of those killed
by bombs, but if the given figure of thir-
teen thousand five hundred dead is cee erect,
and if one assumes, as Allied military ore-
eleis do, that twice as many North Vietna-
mese were wounded as were killed, then the
total casualties come to about forty Limit-
sand, or more titan the number of North
Vietnamest.? that the same military officials
say waie fighting in the Laotian battle.
There would seem to be more realism in
the estimate that from a third to a half of
the thirty-three North Vietnamese belt; lions
engaged were rendered "combat ineffective.,"
and that it will be no easy teak for North
Vietnam, which is suffering front a manpower
shortage, to replace these loeses. About a
third of the North Vietnamese 1osse3 were
specialists?technicians of one sort or en-
- outer who directed the flow of traffic on the
Trail?and those men will be the moat den-
cult to replace.
Nevertheless, the North Vietnamese quichly
sent in between four thoosand and e:-:ht
thousand reinforcements to repeir the cis lea-
age clone to the Trail, mostly by our D-32
bon:bees, and within a fortnight after the in-
vasion ended, the moVement of trucks south
lied been resumed at a more or less normal
pace. (in comparison to the North Vietna-
mese battalion losses, at least five?and some
say eight----Of the twenty-two South Victim-
mese battalions involved were hurt to the
point of combat ineffectiveness, and it muet
be streesed that Saigon threw its best forces
into Lam Son 719. It will take between six
months and a year to build these units bsck
up to strength, and then they will certainty
not be as well trained and "elite" as they
were before.)
The North Vietnamese apparently lost be-
tween three and four thousand trucks along
the Trail; again, most of these losses were
the result of bombing, and only about three
hundred trucks were destroyed in the actual
area of the ground invasion. The North Viet-
namese also lost snore than a hundred
tanks. (The number of new Russian-built
PT-76, T-54, and T-34 tanks that Hanoi used,
sometimes right under the noses of the
South Vietnamese, was one of the surprises
of the campaign, and the lighter tanks of
the South Vietnamese forces, many of which
got bogged down, were no match for them.)
? In addition, Hanoi lost nearly seven thou-
sand weapons, big and :small, and nearly .fiva
hundred tons of heavy ammunition?artil-
lery and mortar shells, and the like?but Sai-
gon's claim .of a total of a hundred and sev-
enty-six thousand tons of North Vietnamese
ammunition blown up, mostly by bombing,
seems ridiculous, since the average monthly
flow south in the past has been only about
_fourteen thousand tons. Furthermore, no
major storage depots were taken?only some
mediuni-sized way stations along the Trail.
The French used to say that for every ton
of ammunition captured the Communists
had three more tons available nearby. No
one knows how much the North Vietnamese
leave currently stashed away around the
Polovens Plateau, about a hundred 'miles
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EAU CLAIRE, WISC.
LEADER?TELEGRALI
E & S - CIRC. N-A
APR 2 (1 1971
Some US. Alhs
?Folmcl Wcnin
To the Editor:
There is a law to the effect
.that anyone aiding another in
the act of a crime is equally
' -guilty as an accessory. On this
basis Uncle Sam has quite a
few points against him. Ac-
cording to an article in the May
Issue of .Ramparts, Marshall '
Ky, vice president of S. Viet-
. Darn IS the-srps
-! dope in that country. We have
. supported Ky for over six years
with billions of dollars and over
40,000 of our boys have died
.in his cause. While President
. ? Nixon is declaring war on
? narcotics and on crime in the
streets he is widening the war
. in Laos whose chief product is
? opium.
ep ub ic, murderer of
? thousands of his people and who
built a mansion on a hill top
surrounded by high walls upon
which were built pill boxes
? armed with guards and whose
private army guarded his many
? ships. N. sea ? this man was
on good terms with the United
States and was dined and wined
on onc of his trips to
Washington.
When a country, tho richest
in the world becomes a mecca
for brigands and pirates such
as the above we may question .
the entire picture. Good citizens
do not make bosom friends out
of robbers and thugs and
generally one can get a good
idea of one's character by the
company he keeps.
bi t usher of
V. P. MOCK,
Chippewa Falls
The Central intelligence V..
Agencel-M-not only protects
the opium in Long Cheng and
various other pick up points, but
has also given clearance and
protection to opium laden air
craft laden with dope in flying
it out to sea drops.
One holds his breath when
contemplating all the brigands,
dictators and pirates that Uncle
Sam has protected and dealt
with. To. name a few: Chiang
Kai-shek whose lobby in
Washington is one of the
largest; the former dictator of
Cuba, Batista who made a
fortune on Cuban peasants and
then forced into exile. Syngman
Rhee of Korea (ousted by his
own people); Franco of Spain.
whom we have spread the rccL,
carpet to for 30 years for ,
allowing us to build for-
tifications in his country.
'Trujillo of the Dominican
SIAIINIL
.?..
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29 April 1971
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The KMT are tolerated by the Thais for several refineries?called "cookers"--which manufacture crude '
reasons: they have helped in the counterinsurgency morphine (which is refined into heroin at a later
efforts of the Thai and U.S. governments against the transport point) under the supervision of professional
-hill tribespeople in Thailand; they have aided the pharmacists imported from Bangkok. Rathikoune
, training and recruiting of Burmese guerrilla armies for also has "cookers" in. the nearby villages of Ban
\,t the CIA; and they offer a payoff to the Border Patrol Kirwan, Phan Phung, and Ban Khueng (the latter for,
Police (BPP), and through them to the second most opium grown by the Yao. tribe.) Most of the opium
ra "
powerful man in Thailand, Minister of the Inte;ior he procures comes from Burma in the caravans such
Gen. Prapasx Charusasthira. The BPP were traine,d in Chan Chi-foo's; the rest comes from Thailand or from
the `50's by the CIA are now are financed and advised the hill tribespeople (Meo and Yao) in the area near
by AID and are flown from border village to border Ban Houei Sai. Rathikoune flies the dope from the
village by Air America. The BPP act as middlemen in Ben,Houei Sai area to Luang Prabang, the Royalist .
the opium trade between the KMT in the remote capital, in helicopters given the United States military
regions of Thailand and the Chinese merchants in aid program.
Bangkok. These relationships, of course, are flexible
Others in the Lao elite and government own
and changing, with each group wanting to 'maximize
refineries. There are cookers for heroin in Vientiane,
profits and minimize antagonisms and dangers. But
two blocks from the King's residence; near Luang
the established routes vary, and sometimes
Prabang; on Khong Island in the Mekong River on the
doublecrosses are intentional.
Lao-Cambodian border; and one recently built by
In the 'Summer of 1967 Chan Chi-foo set out from
Kouprasith Abhay (head of the military region
Burma through the KMT's territory with 300 men
around Vientiane, but also from the powerful Abhay
and 200 packhorses carrying nine tons of opium, with
family of Khong Island) at Phou Khao Khouai, just
no intention of paying the usual fee of 880,000
north of Vientiane. Other lords of .the trade are
protection money. But troops cut off the group near
Prince Boun Oum of Southern Laos, and the
the Laotian village of Ban Houei Sai in an ambush
Sananikone family, called the "Rockefellers of Laos."
that turned into a pitched battle. Neither group, Phoui Sananikone, the clan patriarch, headed a
however, had counted on the involvement of the
U.S.-backed coup in 1959 and is presently President
kingpir of the area's opium trade: the CIA?backed of the National Assembly. TWo other Sananikones are
? Royal La3 Government Army and Air Force, under deputies in the Assembly, two are generals (one is
the command of General Ouane Rathikoune. Hearing Chief of Staff for Rathikoune), one is Minister of
of the skirmish, the general pulled his armed forces Public Works, and a host of others are to be found at
out of the Plain of Jars in northeastern Laos where lower levels of the political, military and civil service
they were supposed to be fighting the Pathet Lao structure. And the Sananikones' airline, Veha Akhat,
guerrillas, and engaged two companies and his entire leases with opium-growing tribespeople. But the
air force in a battle of extermination against both opium trade is polular with the rest of the elite, who
sides. The result was nearly 30 KMT and Burmese rest RLG aircraft or create fly-by-night airlines (such
:dead and a half-ton windfall of opium for the Royal .as Laos Air Charter to Lao United Airlines) to do
Lao Government. ? ' their own direct dealing.
In a moment of revealing frankness shortly after CIA Protects Opium Traders
the battle, General Rathikoune, far from denying the Control or the opium trade has not always been in.
role that opium had played, told several reporters the hands of the Lao elite, although the U.S. has been
that the opium trade was "not bad for Laos." The at least peripherally involved in who the beneficiaries
trade provides cash income for the Meo hill tribes, he were .since John Foster Dulles's famous 1954
argued, who would otherwise be penniless and commitment to maintain an anti-communist Laos.
therefore a threat to Laos' political stability. He also The major source of opium in Laos has always been
argued _hat the trade gives the Lao elite (which the Meo growers, who were selected by theCIA as its
. includes, government officials) a chance to accumulate counterinsurgency bulwark against the Pathet Lao
.capital to ultimately invest in legitimate enterprises, guerilla.% The Meos' mountain bastion is Long Cheng,
thus building up Laos' economy. But if these a secret base 80 miles northeast of Vientiane, built by ?
rationalizations-sPemed weak, far less convincing was the CIA during the 1962-Geneva Accords period. BY
the general's assertion that, since he is in total control 1964 Long Cheng's population was nearly 50,000,
of the trade now, when the time conies to 'put an end comprised largely of ? refugees who had come to ;
to it'he will simply put an end to it. escape the war and who were kept busy growing '
Morphine Refineries -poppies in the hills surrounding the base., .
The secrecy surrounding Long Cheng has hidden ,
It is unlikely that Rathkoune, one of the chief the trade from reporters. But security has not been i
warlords of the opium dynasty, will decide to end the
trade soon. RAOrb;Stedi"IFIRete aSie F2"110144:2A4tFrOve r negOtt/PeVrotIggl or
? 1 "6
Sai, hidden in he jungle, are several of his "
T-2F, bombers while armed CIA agents chatted with n .,,,,
o 1.5 years, and their population reduced from
uniformed TAV ['toyed cFccits Ref easlenROT11/031040: ClAgROP804 Wel R000710001,0001-6
for sale in the market ( a kilo for $52). It s oid slat by service, in other words, has been their destruction as a
now, but the U.S. embassy press attache and the people.
director of USAID's training center was denied . Madame Nhu and Premier Ky: Pushers
clearance to visit the mountain redoubt." The CIA Both the complexity and the finality of the opium
not only protects the opium in Long Cheng and web which connects Burma, Thailand, Laos and South
various other pick-up points, but also gives clearance Vietnam stretch the imagination. So bizarre is the
and protection to opium-laden aircraft flying out. opium network and so pervasive the traffic that weze
For some time, the primary middle-men in the it to appear in an Ian Fleming plot, we would pass it
off as torturing the credibility of thriller fiction. But
opium traffic had been elements of the Corsican
the trade is real and the net has entangled
Mafia, identified in a 1966 United Nations report as a
pivotal orgardzation in the flow of narcotics. In a part, governments beyond the steaming jungle of
Indochina. In 1962, for instance, the. opium
of the world where transportation is a major pi oblem
smuggling scandal stunned the entire Canadian
and where air transport is a solution, the Corsicans
Parliament. It was in March of that year that Prime
were able to parlay their vintage World War 11 aii planes
Minister Diefenbaker confirmed rumors that nine
(called the butterfly fleet or according to -Pop"
Canadian members of the immaculated United
Buell, U.S. citizen-at-large in the area, "Air Opium")
Nations Internatioiial Control Commission had been
into a position of control. But as the Laotian civil war caught carrying opium from Vientiane to the
intensified in the period following 1903, it hename international marketS in Saigon on UN planes.
increasingly difficult for the Corsicans to operate, The route from Laos to Saigon has long been one
and the Meos started to hay e trouble getting their of the well-established routes of the heroin-opium
crop out of the hills in safety. trade. In August 1967, a C-47 transport plane
The vacuum that was created was quickly filled by carrying two and a half tons of opium and some gold
the Royal Lao Air Force, which began to use was forced down near Da Lat, South Vietnam, by
helicopters and planes donated by the U.S. not only American gunners when the pilot failed to identify
for fighting the Pathet Lao but also for flying opium himself. The plane and its precious cargo, reportedly
out from airstrips pockmarkina the Laotian hilin This owned by General Itathilzoune's wife, were destined
arrangement was politicallymore advantageous then poor for a Chinese opium merchant and piloted by a
ones, for it consolidated the interests of all the former KMT pilot, L.G. Chao. Whatever their
anti-communist parties. The enfranchisement of the ownership, the dope-running planes usually land at
Lao elite gave it more of an incentive to carry on the Tan Son Nhut airbase, where they are met in a
war Dulles had committed the U.S. to back; the sale remote part of the airport with the nroteetioe. nr
transport of the Meos' opium by on ideologically airport police.
sanctioned network increased the incentive of these
GI Trade
CIA-equipped and trained tribeemen to fight the
Pathet Lao. The ' U.S. got parties that would A considerable part of the opium and heroin ?
cooperate with its foreign policy not only for remains in Saigon, where it is sold directly to U.S..
political reasons, but on more solid economic troops or distributed to U.S. bases throughout the
grounds. Opium was the economic cement bineing all Vietnameae countryside. One GI who returned to the
the parties together much more closely than States an addict was August Schultz. He's off the
anti-communism could. needle now, but how he got on is most revealing.
Agent Collects Opium Explaining that he was "completely straight, even a,
As. this relationship has matured, Long Ch 'ug has right-winger" before he wept into the Army, August,
become a major collection point for opium gi?-';'-'n in told Ramparts how he fell into the heroin trap: "It
Laos. CIA protege General Vang Pao, former officer was a regular day last April (1970) and I just walked:
for the Fiench colonial army and now head of the into this bunker and there were these guys shooting
Meo counterinsurgents,- uses his U.S.-supplied uP. I Said to them, 'What are you guys doing?' Believe
helicopters and STOL (short-take-off-and-landing) it or not, I really didn't know. They explained it to
aircrat to collect the opium from the surrounding me and asked me it 1 wanted to try it. 1 said sure.
area. It is unloaded and stored in hutches in Long . Probably a fifth of the men in his unit have at least
Cheng. Some of it is sold there and flown out in tried junk, Schulte. says. But the big thing, as his
Royal Laoitan Government C-47's - to Saigon or the buddy Ronnie McSheffrey adds, was that most of the
Gulf of Siam or the South China Sea, where it is sold officers in his company, including the MP's, knew
, to Chinese merchants who then fly it to Saigon or to about it. McSheffrey saw MP's in his own division
the ocean drops. One of Yang Pao's main sources of (6th Batallion, 31st Infantry, 9th Division) at Tan An
transport, since the RLG Air Force is not under his shoot up, just as he says they saw him. He and his
control, s the CIA-created Xieng Kouang Airline, buddies even watched the unit's sergeant-major receive
which is still supervised by an American, though it is payoffs at a nearby whorehouse where every kind of,
scheduled soon to be turned over completely to Vang drug imaginable was available.
Pao's men. The airlines tow C-47's (which can carry An article by Kansas City newpaperwoman Gloria
, maximum of 4000 pounds) are used only for Emerson inserted into the Congressional Record by,
transport to Vientiane. . Senator Stuart Symington on March 10 said:. "In a
Prior to Nixon's blitzkreig in Laos, the opium brigade headquarter at Long Binh, there were reports.
trade was booming. Production had grown rapidly that heroin use in the unit had risen to 20 per
since the early `50's to a level of 175-200 tons a year, cent...`You can salute an officer with your right hand.
with 40e of the 600 tons produced in Burmas, and and take a "hit" of heroin in your left,' an enlisted
50-100 tons of that grown in Thailand, passing man from New York told me? Along the I5-mile
through Laotian territory. But if the opium has been Bien Hoa highway running haeth to Saigon from
an El Dorado for the Corqicans, the Aao elite, the Lorig Binh, heroin can purchase 1 at any of a dozen?
CIA and others, it has been a li emesis for the Meo
tribesmen. for in becoing a_pawn in the large; thi r,pottex f
conspicuous places within a few minutes, and was by
139 ,
strategy ofA PP1113Yeet MOSs KeleaSeta0A1?03T64 : CAMOrtt- tAMOR,1:?B10010001-6
virtually wiped out, with-the average age of recruits CO
S T/ -WO ri Ii 8 o - 1(2 if6 '1;
Approved For Release sie,31
?
LezifTs From The People
STATINTL
. 'Prove You're Honorable' -
What the Central Intelligence Agency is
shrouded in basically is the shrug of
American shoulders convinced that all the
secrecy and covert activity is necessary. I.
To take more on "faith," as Richar d: ?
Helms asks us to do, is to further turn our
backs on an agency that seems to eNist
outside the reach of the U.S. Government
and its controls.
What Americans must assume is that
the same President who looks earnestly
into the TV cameras and promises to ex-
tract us from a monumental blunder initi-
ated by this constitutionally questionable
organization is at that very moment insti-
gating other such manipulations in the
"n ational interest" that could lead Us
right back into another Vietnam or Bay of
Pigs or Laos (and what are they doing in
.the Congo?).
Perhaps the CIA is a necessary part of
the system, but Americans are no longer
-
blindly taking on "faith" honorable men
devoted to service. We say prove you're.
honorable. Geraldine Ferris;
Ballwin
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?
THE BO TO:1) iAS.
fg=-Lee 1971.
Approved ForRelease,2001/03/044CIA-RDP80-016
..
Man in Indochina
0
it
ffl
0
f- !, 71
?
771
. 6'1 .."--7)P
3.-L.4-17:Vajw L2.1
0 Congressmen Hindered in Search
For Report on Refugee Problem
0 'Report Calls American Bonthirig
,Major Reason for Refugee, Plight
0 US Lists 236 'Advisers' in Laos
But &Haut on Eiuntlrecl
By Matthew V. Storm
Globe Staff
? VIENTIANE,' Laos ? Last week US
Reps. Paul N. (Pete) McCloskey and Jer-
ome Waldie of California had an extended
?dinner meeting here with the American
ambassador and his 11-man staff, Mc-
Closkey remarked later:
"I thought I was having dinner with
?
the commander of the First Marine
and his staff."
McCloskey won a silvere star for
heroism-as a Marine officer in the Korean
War so he ' knew what he was talking
about. The embassy here. is more like a
military operations center than a diplo-
matic post.
?
Ambassador Mcl\elurtrie Godley works
? in an Office lined with top-secret maps.
They presumably show the areas of
northern Laos where American planes
- have boinbed suspected Communist posi-
tions.
Godley has virtual autonomy over the
military 'operations in northern Laos. This
is distinct, of course, from the bombing
O Missions against the Ho Chi Minh trail
in ? southern Laos. Those are part of the
Vietnam war and are directed from.Wash-
ington and Saigon.
The major difference between US oper-.
ations in -Laos and Vietnam ? aside .
! from their scope?is the degree of se-
crecy about what goes: on in this country.-
Nixon and other US officials.
It is' a difficult problem for President
: Officially. the US is illegally involved
in Laos. The 19,Q2 Geneva 81.ecordsmpti
la w the Vin1ii
, personnel in the country.
The North Vietnamese Army is
clearly in Laos in force. Privately the
US justifies its own illegal presence on
this basis.
But to admit a US military presence
would pose propaganda problems for the
Soviet Union and Communist China, US
officials claim, thereby prompting them
to esCalate their support for the Pathet
Lao and North Vietnamese Communists.
The latest figures on the number of
US military "advisers" in Laos are 109
Army personnel and 127 Air Force, a
total of 236. This compares with a figure
of 241 given out about a year ago.. .
The US contends there are no "ground
combat forces." It says nothing officially
about hundreds of military men under
contract to the CIA who are 'assisting
Gen. Vang Pao'S?Erandestine army. of
/VIeo tribesmen and Laotians.
The CIA's contract airline, Air
America, is also highly visible to anyone
visiting Laos. At an airfield in Vientiane
last week a reporter could count more
than 20 Air America aircraft. They range
from cargo planes and ? C-47 transports
to small one-engine propeller-driven,
non-military aircraft.
. The Communists are estimated to con-
trol about one-third the population of
Laos, which totals three million.
? Each year in the dry season the com-
munist -forces advance markedly, only to
lose ground in the rainy season that starts
in May. Yet American officials concede'
that if the North Vietnamese decided to
Overrun Vientiane and the royal capital
of Luang Prabang, they could do so with ;
aei1001/63164.:_CIA-RDP80-01601R000700010001-6
The government is led
by Prince Souvanna Phou-
! ma. The Pathet Lao is led
by ? his half-brother
phanouvong. Many west-
emn diploinats and journal-
ists in Vientiane predict
negotiations between the
neutralist government, and
the Communists would
commence with an end to
- the American-bombing.
The US is also hopeful of
' negotiations, perhaps this
year. The bombing con-
tinues however, and some
US officials who are not di-
rectly involved in military
? operations suspect there
still are "free fire zones" in
northern Laos where any-
thing that moves is likely
to be gunned down. ? ,
In 1968 and 1969 the
bombing of the Plain. of
Jars reached into hundreds
of forties a day but now US
officials claim the sorties
are considerably less than
100 daily. (A, sortie is one
mission flown by one
; plane.)
? The clandestine nature
of the American operations
in Laos un for tunately
prompts some un-
American tactics to main-
tain secrecy.
Reps. McCloskey and ?
Waldie found This out
first-hand. .
. McCloskey, a Republican
who threatens to challenge
President Nixon in the
1972 primaries unless his
Southeast Asia policies are
Changed, knew before he
arrived here that a US In-
formation Agency em-
loyee had conducted a
survey of 216 Laotian refu-
gees showing that most had
left their homes primarily ,
because of US bombing.
During that dinner party
with Ambassador Godley,
McCloskey and Waldie
both say they asked the
ambassador and his staff
whether any reports, on
refugees attitudes exist.
"Their answer was, "No, ,
voritTnued
STATI NTL
STATINTL
new p7ITT-0,T
Approved For ReleA4215:404kgt4RDR80:016
WE ARE
RIGHT SMACK
IN THE MIDDLE OF
A HEROIN EPIDEMIC
This lethal powder?the "white death" ?has spread to all levels of American society, with the syringe becoming
as much apart of suburbia as the Saturday afternoon barbecue. There are half a million addicts walking
the streets right now. They will spend $15 million today feeding their habit. They'll get more than half this money
from crimes they'll commit in the big cities. One of every four of these addicts is a teenager, and for the 18-35
age group, heroin overdoses have become a major cause of death.
This is terrifying. But it isn't news. Every time you turn on the TV or pick up the newspaper you hear about heroin.
Senators rise regularly to read grim statistics into the Congressional Record. President Nixon himself has
spoken somberly about the way heroin is stalking our streets with "pandemic virulence."
Cut all this talk isn't going to change things. Neither is sending Henry Kissinger to Turkey to see what can be done
about the Middle East opium field. And the President probably knows it. The heroin problem is going to get
worse, with more young people becoming addicted and dying, until the U.S. gets out of Southeast Asia. Heroin and
the War are connected with a horrible symbiosis.
In its May issue, Ramparts magazine tells the shocking story of the New Opium War:
? how clandestine CIA involvement in the parapolitics of Southeast Asia has allowed this area to produce
80% of the world's opium, replacing the Middle East as the major source?of heroin.
o how a U.S.-sponsored network of anti-communists?Meo tribesmen in Laos, nationalist Chinese guerrillas
and Burmese border police?participate in the opium harvest, in its processing into heroin and transportatior
to checkpoints throughout Indochina and finally to the U.S.
O how the major figures in South Vietnam's government?from Diem and Madame Nhu in the past to
Nguyen Cao Ky today?have profited from the heroin traffic with tacit American support.
o how Saigon has become a major stop along this new heroin route, with up to 20% of some American
GI platoons coming home addicts and at least one soldier a day dying from overdoses.
"The New Opium War" is another example of how the war comes home, wrapped in lies and distortions and
aringing chaos with it. It is also another page in Ramparts coverage of the ever-deepening U.S. involvement in
southeast Asia. We began in 1966 (before opposition to the war was fashionable) with the expose of the joint
efforts of Michigan State University and the CIA to set up the Diem regime. We will continue until the killing is over./
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700010001-6 oont.inuod,
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700010001-6
If you want to know more about it, read
our May issue, on sale now. Or better yet,
take an introductory subscription: 10
issues for $4.75 (regular. price $7), which
? we will begin with our current issue
containing the opium story. Let us throw
in, free, a copy of "2, 3, Many Vietnams",
by the editors of Ramparts (Canfield
Press, $3.95). That makes the deal worth
about $12, but it's yours for $4.75,
saving you over 60%.
47
k
SEND ME 10 ISSUES/$4.75
zA
name
address
I city state zip
2054 UNIVERSITY AVE., BERKELEY, CA. 94704
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700010.001-6
Approved For ReleasVvei.
IR V.! I
4114 i rA CIA-RDP80-01
Bill P1amed to "IT-1N
earic
CIA
,u7ntf)':1.11,711:1CDTC.Z5
WASHINGTON ? (UPI)
Rep. Herman Padilla (D.,
N.Y.) said Saturday that he
plans to introduce legislation
this week to prohibit the
Central Intelligence Agency
from conducting military
operations in Laos.
' He also called for an end
"to, the intolerable surveil-
lance or. civilians by the FBI
and the defense establish-
ment and an end to the. Red-
baiting it has engendered.
He said, "We must make
sure that the Central Intelli-
gence Agency no longer can
run clandestine wars as it
has been doing for years in
Laos."
Bacilli? criticised President
?
17)
-Tr
STATINTL
Nixon for not listening to
Vietnam veterans who have
been demonstrating in Wash-
ington.
- "It would be-better that he
be here today," Badillo said,
"listening to you ? for you
.are the children of a new
American revolution ? a
revolution baptized with.
blood shed in Vietnam and
Chicago and Kent State and
Jackson ? a revolution that
will only -end when we are
out of Vietnam and that
must to this year."
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STATINTL
}jTjLiT
? Approved For Release 20(1/1401/iQ4:i9A-RDP80-01601
"Clikago 77" Veiermas Rey
Rallo Series for r-Pernoi
, "Chicago 7" member Rennie Davis, a leading
figure in the upcoming pro-Hanoi demonstrations in
the Nation's Capital, is supporting a new anti-
American project. The pro-Com mu nist,revolutionary
.has joined with Abbie Hoffman, another "Chicago
7" Member, and others to form radio WPAX in
New York. The group is preparing a series of pro-
grams for use by Radio Hanoi as an "alternative to
the programming of the Armed Forces Network."
Davis and his gang have already delivered four-
and-a-half hours of taped music and commentary
to the North Vietnamese delegation to the Paris
peace talks. The programs are scheduled to be
? broadcast in half-hour segments from Hanoi
three times daily.
In a letter to persons considered sympathetic to
WPAX, Hoffman said "the Armed Forces Network
is the voice of the Pentagon. In addition to censored
news., any music with references to peace, black
liberation, alternative culture or other 'controversial'
material is also banned."
"We have an obligation to fill this void," the letter
continued, "and assure that GIs have the opportu-
nity .to hear anothef opinion and have the proper
perspective."
WPAX will also have an advisory panel of some
50 persons, including" Dwight McDonald, literary
critic and staff writer for the New Yorker. Mc-
Donald, who teaches English at the University of
Massachusetts, told the Washington Evening Star?
which initially published the WPAX story?that he
was "definitely" a member of the panel.
According to John Giorno, a leader of WPAX,
the North Vietnamese approved the idea of the broad-
castS several months ago, after which WPAX was
organized to produce the programs. "They totally
dug it," Giorno said. "We got together the first pro-
grams and Abbie flew over with them. He arrived
'back March 24 and said we can do anything we want
to, as muCh as we want."
Giorno said in the first program, the "People's
Peace Treaty"?a "treaty" that calls. for the U.S.
to capitulate to Hanoi?was read and that Viet Nam
veterans signed it. That show was followed by Allen
Ginsberg's poetry. Giorno stressed Ginsberg's poetry
consisred- of his contention that the CIA sponsored
much of the opium trafTic out of Laos as a means of
controlling certain segments of the American popula-
? tion.
Other programs include such subjects as Women's
Liberation, the SUDDO.ied suouressi.oa 110 sal" vIcer.nem
Approved i-or Kelease zumiuz/u4 . uIA-RDP80-01601R000700010001-6
in the United States, legal advice for GIs, black
news and ex-GIs discussing the Army. Giorno main-
tains that Hanoi will broadcast the programs in
both AM and shortwave and will cable the WPAX
group when the shows start running.
At WPAX meetings, notes the Star reporter,
there is discussion of the Federal Treason Act and
the Trading With the Enemy Act, but the group feels
it can elude these laws since WPAX interprets them
to apply only to "declared wars."
"The way we've set up Giorno says,
"if they go after us for treason, they':i-e going to
have to do it on the grounds of free speech. If
they go after us it will be a bigger trial tn the
[Chicago 71 conspiracy trial."
An atmosphere of intrigue at these meetings is
created by such legal speculation and by the level of
cOntact with the Communists. The pro-Hanoi revo-
lutionaries say their latest talks have been with Mrs.
Nguyen Thi Binh, head of the Viet Cong delegation
in Paris, who is their printipal contact.
Giorno commented that some unnamed American
radio stations have expressed interest in? broadcast-
ing the shows and the group hopes that the shows
"will eventually be able to reach all of the three
million members of the armed forces."
Something akin to treason is, of eourse, afoot,
and one wonders what Robert Mardian, head of the
Internal Security division in the Justice Department,
plans to do about it?if anything. Mardian, it is
recalled, did virtually nothing to prevent revolu-
tionary groups from using HEW facilities when he
served as its general counsel.
sr.; ITL:7 yo7c.--211
Approved For Release 2001/10310419CIAWBPBOT
LETTER. FR.OM INDOCHINA
SAIGON,. APRIL 14
'TT may-be six or eight months before
'
: i any final assessment can be made
i
. L .of Operation Lam Son 719, the
-South Vietnamese invasion. of Laos,
supported by vast American air power,
which lasted from February 8th until
March 25th and was followed by brief
commando forays until early in April.
Nevertheless, even though this opera-
tion has produced more heated debate
than any other Indo-Chinese battle
since- the French fell into the trap of
Dien Bien Phu in the spring of 1954,
a few conclusions can be reached now.
The invasion failed to achieve any-
thing close to its maximum aims,_ for,
though it caused the 'death of a great
many South and North Vietnamese,
it did little?contrary to American
and South Vietnamese expectations?to
speed the end of the fighting, either
by forcing Hanoi to negotiate or by
assuring the 'success of the still incon-
clusive Vietnamization program. It
may, at most, have postponed some
major offensives that the Communists
had planned in South Vietnam over
the next few months. On the other
hand, at- least one big attack--in Kon-
turn Province, in the Central High-
lands?has been pressed during the
past fortnight, and there has been a no-
ticeable increase of terrorism through-
out the country. Costly as the Laotian
invasion was to Hanoi, it apparently
hardened the determination of the
North Vietnamese to continue fighting
throughout Indo-China. Moreover, it
led to a reaffirmation of Chinese and
- Russian pledges of assistance. Finally,
the operation was a political setback for
President Nguyen Van. Thieu, whose
ralection in October is now, for the
- first .time,.open to question. ,
The Americans, who are going all
out to uphold Thieu and make their
South Vietnamese allies feel "six feet
tall" as the monthly rate of American
trop withdrawals increases, have come
up. with the customary set of sangui-
nary Statistics, this time claiming a nine-
to-one "kill ratio" in favor of the Sai-
gon forces. If that is7belie.vable---and
even ?President Nixon, in his -television
interview ' of March-- 22nd, indicated
-that a five-to-one ratto'mlght be more
realisticit could be due only to the
prepOnderance Aof American bombers
and artillery. iltRi;tremied EoecRe
that if it had not been for this support
the results would have been disastrous
for the twenty-four thousand South
Vietnamese who were fighting deep in
unknown jungle territory against about
thirty-five thousand North Vietnam-
ese?a far more experienced force,
which was fully determined to protect
its lifeline to the South in the Ho Chi
Minh Trail. complex. The gruesome
game of body counts has long been the
bugaboo of correspondents in Vietnam,
and in this case the confusion has been
compounded by a flood of often con-
tradictory statements and assessments
emanating front Washington and Sai-
gon. Indeed, never in the past ten
years?not even during the chaotic
months before the overthrow of the
Ngo Dinh Diem regime, in 1963, or
during the Communist Tet offensive
at the beginninc, of 1968 and the May
and August offensives that followed?
have I witnessed such dissension as has
taken place between the news media
and the authorities, both American and
South Vietnamese, over the
invasion of Laos.
According to the latest
official American figures,
the losses of the South Viet-
namese?who for the most
part fought bravely and well
but lacked a cohesive com-
mand?were about fifteen
hundred dead, more than six
hundred missing, and fifty-
five hundred wounded; so
far there have been no esti-
mates of* how many of the
wounded have died or are
likely to die. Unofficially,
however, according to what
South Vietnamese sources
have told me, the numberof
men ? Missing and presumed
'dead is actually between a
thousand and -fifteen hun-
dred, and the number of
wounded is at least seven
thousand. Some of those list-
ed as missing are still strag-
gling back across the border,
but the majority, it is said,
either died of .their ,,voun(ls
in Laos or surrendered or
were captured by the North
Vietnamese. In their ? flight
from Laos, under extremely
heavy North Vietnamese at-
lease 20011103A040:u0lAgRDr804160ift000160010061
the-government is reluctant to admit--
and though American rescue helicop-
ters did remarkable work under the
mi )St hazardous on they
couldn't bring out all the wounded. (A
hundred and five helicopters were lost
in the Laotian operation, and' five hun-
dred and fifty-six were damaged; a
hundred and seventy-six Americans
were killed during those weeks, on both
sides of the border, and forty-two are
missing.) Each Vietnamese unit com-
mander reports on his own losses; so it
is difficult to come up with comprehen-
sive figures. The dependents of known
dead get full pension awards, while
those of the missing get payments for
only four years, and the Minister of
Veterans' Affairs, Pham Van Dong,
said to me, "I won't know for months
how much I have to pay to how
many."
The North Vietnamese assuredly
suffered heavier casualties, hut whether I
these were as high as Allied authorities
claimed can never be determint:d. It is
ad mittedly difficult for troops engaged
in bloods. fighting or in flight to count
the bodies of those killed by bombs, hut
if the given fi..t.ure of thirteen thousand !
five hundred dead is correct, and if-one
assumes, as Allied military officials do,
that twice as many North Vietnamese !
were wounded as were killed, then the -
total casualties come to about forty ;
thousand, or more than the number of
North Vietnamese that the same mili-
tary officials say were fighting in the
Laotian battle. There would seem to .
be more realism in the estimate that
from a third to a half of the thirty-three
North Vietnamese battalions engaged
were rendered "combat ineffective,"
and that it will be no easy task for
North Vietnam, which is suffering from I
a manpower shortage, to replace these I
lt)sses..AbOut a third ofthe North Viet-
namese losses were specialists?techni-
cians of one sort or another who direct-
ed the flow of traffic on the Trail?
and those men will be the most difficult
to replace. Nevertheless, the North
Vietnamese quickly sent in between
four thousand and. eight thousand re-
inforcements to repair the damage done
to the Trail, mostly by our 13-52 bomb-
ers, and 'within a fortnight after the in-
vasion -ended, the movement of trucks
south had been resumed at a more or
a6o the
abandoned many of t North Vietnamese battalion losses, at
wounded?something that
FAIRF.A.X SE2ITETEL
Approved For Releaie fitiT'lli0339/634 : CIA-RDP8V041-131611A-0
The Non-Sellirig of the Can -el Intelligence Agency
0_,
T,- STATINTL
By Bob Woodward
Sentinel reporter
"We have no public and Congressional committees. Helms is a Democrat but
relations department," Another informed govern- has been kept on as CIA direc-
said the telephone opera- ment official estimated that the tor by President Nixon. An
CIA has over 10.000 employes ' informed government source
tor at the Central Intel- in the U.S., several thousand said it is likely Helms will re-
ligence .Agency after abroad on the pa) roll, and main the director, and Nixon
answering a call with the spends well over 5500 million a has been pleased with his work.
year. though initial intentions were
simple statement of the
"We are characterized as
to keep the Janson ap-
number called, "351-
1100." the silent service of the seven- pointee on for one year after
only
- ment," the official spokesman Nixon took office.
said.
Telephone callers to the
CIA are quietly greeted by the
operator with the number, 351-
1100, instead of the agency
name because "operators
across the country could be
heard opening their keys" to
listen to conversations years
ago when the name was used
after a call was answered, the
spokesman said. .
The name on the CIA head-
quarters building in McLean, v
Va. was taken dov,a years ago
"during the Kennedy adminis-
7. -7 -e.
(7.1171L.a.
STATINTL
According to an agency
spokesman, the CIA has ?no
press relations, no public rela-
tions. Most of the time Y. e say,
No comment,' . and always
on the substance of intellig-
ence, the method and sources."
In Contrast to the 530 mil-
lion in Pentagon public rela-
tions spending reported in the
controversial CBS-TV docu-
mentary, "The Selling of the
Pentagon," the CIA does not
appear to be very much in the
public relations business.
Richard Helms, CIA direc-
Last week Helms gave his
first public speech in nearly five
years as head of the agency.
Speaking before the American
Society of News-paper Editors,
April 14, Helms said the CIA
was not an "invisible govern-
ment -- a law unto itself, en-
gaud in provocative, covert
activities repugnant to a demo-
cratic society, and subject to no
controls"
The law establishing the
agency in 1947, Helms said,
"pecifically forbids the. Cntral
tor, however, broke a five yearIntelligence Agency from hay-
tration because of too many
precedent last week and cave tourists," he remarked. ing any police sub,-ena or
lic contact with the CIA is gen- after traveling abroad are re- short. we do not taraet on
? e ,lay;-
his first public speech, but pub- enforcement powers . . . in
"Patriotic people" who call
erally confined to recruitment ferred to a downtown Washing-
of new employes and dealings ton, D.C. office to give reports,
with "patriotic people" who the spokesman said. He would
have traveled abroad, the not give the address of this off-
agency spokesman explained. ice.
The CIA "only receives 10 If a telephone caller insists
to 12 calls a day from the press, on giving information over the
students, free lance writers and telephone and not in persons,
public," a, spokesman said. He the CIA refuses, the spokes-
added, This is an open demo- man said. "We assume it's a
cratic society. When 1 canon- screwball," he added.
swer, I do." The spokesman A request for information
said he and his assistant are the on the CIA brought the follow-
only staff members who handle ing information in the next
these few, public inquiries, mail: a 32-page pamphlet of
New CIA employes are re? quotations from U.S. Presi-
-cruited at "200 to 300 universi- dents from George Washington
ties each year," he said. The to Richard M. Nixon on the
chief foreign. intelligence value of intelligence; a recruit-
agency runs no TV ads, no ra- ing brochure on the "-Tritellig- rectly called a recent Ramparts
dio ads and only an occasional ence Professions"; a small gen- magazine article alleging CIA
' printed advertisment, the eral description of the agency; involvement in the drug traffic
spokesman said. When objcc- and two magazine article. re- in Laos as such an "example."
tions are filed about campus prints, one an interview with a Asked about Helms preced-
recritment, the CIA moves to former CIA director, Admiral\.ent-breaking speech, a CIA
the nearest federal office.build- William F. Raborn, and an-, spokesman said it reflected "a
ing, he explained. , other asserting "aps and general concern that built up
He said he could not dis- gowns __ not cloaks and da- over the years. People have
close how many employes the gers -- hang in the guarded, been misled by the melodrama
CIA has or even discuss the halls of 'spy' headquarters, of spy stories. It was timely and
CIA budget since it is only to actually a great center of area he thoutitt is was in thi4660
American citizens."
Helms went on to outline
the specific Congressional and
Presidential controls to which
the CIA is subject. Emphasiz-
ing the restriction on CIA invo-
luement in either politics, for-
eign policy, or even answering-
its critics, Helms said:
"The nation must to a dc-
gree take it on faith that we'too
are honorable men devoted to
her service."
He attacked CIA critics
who take "advantage of the
traditional silence of those en'
gaged in intelligence (and) say
-thim.ts that are either vicious, or
just- plain silly." Helms indi-
be dealt v
1Presid4PirMktatt d160.6 2001/03/04 : CkAaRD aouoi6oi 700010001-6
The spokesman would'
neither confirm nor deny var-
ious newspaper speculations
that Helms gave the speech
because of recent attacks on
surveillance by the FBI which,
is often linked with the CIA.
Also, the CIA has been rather
widely charged with extensive
involvement in the Vietnam
war. In his speech Helms said,
"We cannot and must not take
sides. The role of intelligence in
policy formulation is limited to
providing facts -- the agreed
facts -- and the whole known
range of facts."
Approved For iiaiiiIiiidWstilgIticf-SiboilikRieRb
22 APRIL 1971
by Frank Browning and Banning Garrett
(Editor's note: The follovAg article has been
-made available to subscribers of College Press
Service prior to its release nationally because
of CPS's involvement in the story's inception.
Sandwiched bet veen the president's State
of the World message, in vhich he announcel
. an all-out campaign to halt the v.orld's opium
traffic, the .4Otian invasion, and .this spring's
. gro4.,,ing anti-itar protests, the story is an
explosive one. Sen. George McGovern and
Rep. Ronald Dellums are both pressing for
hearings in Congress on the U.S. government's
complicity isith %tor& opium trade, and
details on these and other subsequent
developments wit follow in other stories.)
"Mr. - President, the specter of heroin
addiction is haunting nearly every community.
in this nation." With these urgent words,
Senator Vance Hartke spoke up on March 2 in
support of a resolution on drug control being
considered in the U.S. Senate. Estimating that
:there are 500,000 heroin addicts in the U.S.,
he pointed out that nearly 20 per cent of
them are teenagers. The concern of Hartke
.and others is not misplaced. Heroin has
becon--. the major killer of young people
between 18 and 35, outpacing death from
? accidents, suicides or, cancer. It has also
become a major cause of crime: to sustain
. their habits, addicts. in_ the U.S. spend more
than $15-million a day, half of it coming from.
the 55 per cent of crime in the cities which
they commit and the annual 82.5 billion
worth of goods they steal.
Once safely isolated as part of the
destructive funkiness of the black ghetto,
heroin has suddenly spread out into Middle
America 11
'A(104ia F'15r ppage r61,63/04 :
suburbia a he Saturday ar ecue. his as
STATI NTL
STATINTL
gained it the attention it otherwise never .
would have had. President Nixon himself says
it is spreading with "pandemic virulence."
People are becoming aware that teenagers are
shooting up at lunchtime in schools . and
returning to classrooms to nod the day away.
But what they don't know--and what no one
is telling them--is that neither. the volcanic
erruption of addiction in this country nor the
crime S it causes would be possible without the
age-old international trade in opium (from.
which heroin js derived), or. that heroin
addiction?like inflation, unemployment, and
most of the other chaotic forces in American
society today?is directly related to the U.S.
war in Indochina.
The connection between war and opium in
Asia is as old as empire itself. But the
relationship has never been so symbiotic, so
intricate in its networks and so vast in its
implications. -Never before has the trail of
tragedy been so clearly marked as in the ,
present ? phase of U.S. -involvement in
Southeast Asia. For the international traffic
in opium has expanded in lockstep with the
expanding U.S. military'presence there, just as
heroin has stalked the same young people in
U.S. high schools who will also be called on to
fight that war. The ironies - that have
accompanied the war in Vietnam since its
onset are more poignant than before. At the
very moment that public officials are wringing
their hands over the heroin problem,
Washington's own Cold War crusade, replete
with clandestine activities that would seem
far-fetched even in a spy novel, continues to
play a major role in a process that has already
rerouted the opium traffic from the Middle
East to Southeast Asia and is every day
pkiiikbneff9lf-61k06071600110bintte
. . At the same time the government starts
?
STATI NTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA---RDP80-01601
DES MOINES, IOWA
TRIBUNE
E ? 113,781
CAPR2
Devastated Laos ?
The State Department is trying to knock down(
claims by Representative Paul N. McCloskey (Rep., ?
Calif.) that United States bombing has destroyed
"thousands of villages" in Laos and turned 700,000
Laotians into refugees ? but it has to admit a
considerable pa'rt of his charges. The 700,000, the
State Department maintains, is the total of all who
have been or are refugees, and only 266,862 are
refugees now.
As for villages, McCloskey interviewed 16 sepa-
rate groups of refugees who told him every house in
their village had been destroyed by American air
power. His "thousands" is simply a guess, from the
fact that Laos had 9,400 villages to start Viith.
The Air Force won't show him the photographs it
says show that the villages McCloskey said were
destroyed still exist.
Senator Edward Kennedy (Dem., Mass.) had his
subcommittee staff studying the question some
weeks ago. The staff estimated that civilian casu-
alties in Laos were running about 30,000 a year,
including 10,000 dead, mostly as a result of Ameri-
can bombing.
The New York Times reported in mithMarch on
the Meo tribe of the Laotian highlands, the
warlike group which the U.S. Central Intelligence
Agenz. organized into a clan -Millie army to
fight-The North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces
in Laos. This tribe is now nearing the end of its
mountains and the limits of its strength. The tribe
has had to abandon hill settlement after hill settle-
ment and has suffered dreadful casualties to fight-
ing men (who begin at age 12 and 13) and civilians.
Most. of their tribal homelands are lost or de-
stroyed.
The Meos and the other highland tribes have done
most of the fighting on both sides in Laos. The
ethnic Laos dislike fighting, and often shoot in the
air and advance or retreat (mostly retreat) on the
basis of the answering noise. They take seriously
the Buddhist law, "Thou shalt not kill."
Yet the Americans and the Vietnamese, North
and South, have ruthlessly extended their war to
their gentle land, and the Americans with their
tremendous fire power have been the most destruc-
tive.
The 1949 Geneva Convention on protection of civil-
ians in time of war forbids infliction of suffering,
brutality, collective penalties, pillage and reprisals
? against persons and property. It bans devastation
"as an end in itself or as a separate measure of
war," as distinct from devastation incidental to a ?
battle between armed forces.
The American way of war in the air all too often
breaks these international laws of war. Congress
has banned use of American ground forces in Laos.
This ban is evaded by the CIA on a small scale.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700010001-6
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2004-'1
"7-7 r-1
..,1)&1')]Li i
STATI NTL
By TAMMY ARBT:CKLE Andrew P. Guzowski, who is (In Washington, Robert J. with the press whatever mea-
Special to The Star the embassy spokesman in Vi- McCloskey, a deputy assistant sures AID is taking to prevent
. VIENTIANE ? Reps. Paul entiane, said permission was secretary Of state for press the loss of more U.S. funds on
N. McCloskey and Jerome refused because "the con- relations, said Monday that similar rice deals.
Waldie, who came here to gressmen do not have security McCloskey had declined op- Among other subjects the
learn more .about the Amen- clearance." portunities offered by the em- embassy is not anxious to dis-
can :role in Laos, found them- . In Laos, this puts a member bossy in Vientiane to eaamine cuss are opium dealing and
selves unable to . get docu- of Congress somewhat below the refugee situation. The the sales of US. supplies and
merits they sought or to visit the level of a street vendor. State Department spokesman weapons. .
Guzowski that any Asian, in- gr ess m an that a?anerican and evasions y e . y
eluding North Vietnamese bombers have destroyed Lao- here include:
agents, can enter Long Chen,- tian villages deliberately.) When Long Chen was
" 1.1 The difficulties ..-IcCloskey bombed mistakenly by U.S.
When it was pointed out to denied a charge by the con- Other samples fh of omissions
areas of the country they
wished.
McCloskey, the California
Republican who has threat-
mei to oppose President ianc- the apokearnan said,
on in it year's GOP prima- it's their country."
and Waldie had here in getting aircraft, a- spokesman here 36
ries on the Indochina issue,
information from the embassy hours later gave an account of
accused U.S. Ambassador G. The Major Reason have become typical of the damage by North Vietnamese
McMurtrie Godley of a "delib- The major reason for refus- last few years. artillery. He failed to mention
crate attempt - to keep Con- ing the congre.ssmen permis- False Informati the air strike.
on When U.S.-led guerrillas
.gress from k n o w i n g the sion to visit Long Chen is they'
facts." might discover that U.S. aft-
The embassy, for example, - were mauled by the North Vi-
He and Waldie, a Democrat cials were not honest in con- refuses to provide any infor- etnamese on the Bolovens Pla-
from California, -sought copies ,gressional testimony when mation about Americans killed teals in southern Lams in De-
af an embassy study wilicli they said bombing missions in in Laos. When Waldie asked cember, an embassy spokes-
blamed last year's movement Laos were approved by Lao- about threa specific recent man denied the story. When
of refugees from the Plain of clans or Meos ?.vlio were flyirg deaths, Guzowski said the mis- additional details were pro-
Jars on American bombing. in forwardair ?control nifs- sions in which the Americans duced, the spokesman was
were killed originated in Thai- forced to backtrack.
McCloskey, who was here sions.
In fact, both seats in the land and the embassy here
"Orientation" Missions
for three days, said U.S. offi- . .
small air control mission was not accountable for the
cials in Godley's presence atGuzowski has said Amen-
anAmericana embassy dinner denied the planes often_. are filled by deaths. "They arc not my
Americans," Guzowski said in cans have been killed en "or-
document existed.
When McCloskey went to in- answer to reporters' queries. ientiation missions" when, in
? -
. When McCloskey was able toThe embassy is willing to fact, they have died on bomb-
pinpoint the document, he tervie%v refugees at Ban Nga
Ga, 20 miles north of Vienti- permit false information to be hg missions; airdrops of rice
said, officials undertook "a de- ane, the embassy pronided two given the American public have turned out to be missions
liberate, conscious policy to cli- priests to act as "unbiased" \then it knows the information transporting Thai troops; the .
vert us." is false. The USIS here tapes description "light" casualties
He said Monteagle Stearns, interpreters.
The priests, Father Rauff Laos military briefings and was used for an engagement
the deputy thief of mission at and Father Matt Menger, are, provides them to U.S. Army in which 64 out of 110 men
the erabaasy, failed on three however, known locally for - briefers who relay whatever Participating were killed; ma-
-occasions -to respond to MC-jor actions have been de-
their staunch support of U.S. the Lao briefer says.
Closkey's request for theEmbassy actions. When, as a result of other scribed as a "few clashes took
? study.
Father Rauff, in his role as information, questions a r e Place."
- .
Substitution Charged an interpreter for McCloskey, raised about Lao official state- The embassy consistently
.at one point omitted to trans- merits passed on by the Amen- denies to the press use of
Then, according to Mc- late a villager's remarks cans, the U.S. briefers simply American transport facilities
Closkey, Stearns -substituted about "bombers coming every say, "Well, that's what the to cover the war, particularly
the afront page of the docu- day." general said and I'm not going in those areas of northeast
- anent. The original page, the And Father Menger was ov- to contradict him." Laos where Americans are in-
congressman said, showed the erheard to say, while Mc- There also are attempts to volved. '
origin of the study was a Cloak-ay was examining a child cover up the misuse of U.S. These air transport facilities
memo from Stearns to Nor- with a burned leg, "Thank funds. The embassy, for exam- ? Air America and Continen-
man Barnes, chief. of the Unit- God for the bombing. Without - pie, is buying another 13,000 tal 'Air Lines ? are ostensibly
ed States Information Service it this would not be a free metric tons of rice from south privately owned and under .
here. Stearns and Barnes Were country." Laos this year. contract to the U.S. govern-
two officials who said they hadIn the past, tog-ranking ment. They are the sole means
no knowledge of the study State Dept. Comments south Laotians would sell their of reaching battle areas - in
McCloskey was asking about. Despite the obstacles Mc- - surplus rice to the North Viet- northeast Laos.
McCloskey and Waldie also ClosIzey did find that, almost namese, then buy cheaper - "I see no reason why we
were refused permission -.fa without exception, refugees Thai rice and sell it at a high- should fly the press around,"
visit Long Chen, the village on said they had left their ail- en price to the Americans, says Guzowski.
the edge of the Plain of Jars lages because of U.S. bombing saying it was the south Laos Aircraft are available, how-
,j which as the headquarters of attacks, even though enemy rice. , . ever, when the embassy wants
t h e - CIA-directed guerrilla troops were not in the villages. A c c o r d i n g to Guzowski, to show off its aid programs.
army of Gen. Vang Pao's Meo McCloakey said, "The em- Charles Mann, the head of the to places where the U.S. in-
tribesmen and which serves as bassy Releasd decided to suppress this U.S. Agen m
cy for International volveent is not evident can
base. them. XR Oftgittido iiaTekrtcrs.
CIA AppavvecIFFor 200V03104 t'.?CV!?
a
I
? _
?
a s ircraf, are
THE' ST . LOUIS LOST - DISPATCH
Approved For Release 2001103414aQUIv=RDP80-01
rr
STATINTL
A
_ 1 71 r,,fr
_13_011D e, O.i Thee CIA
Last week Richard Helms in his first pub-
lic speech -since his 106B appointment as direc-
tor of the Central Intelligence Agency tried to
counter what he characterized as a "persistent
and growing body of criticism which questions
.the need and the propriety for a democratic
society to have a Central. Intelligence Agency."
He .attributed the criticism to an ."inherent
American distaste - for peacetime ? gathering of_
intelligence," and told his audience that the na-
tion must "take it on faith that we too are hon-
orable men devoted to her service."
H Mr._ lielms's analysis of information gath-
ered abroad is as incomplete .:Ind misleading as
his interpretation of what prompts criticism of
his agency here at home, then the country is
clearly in trouble. It is not the intelligence
gathering aspect of the CIA's operations that
has fed the growing body of criticism. What the
critics object to are covert paramilitaryoper-
ations around the globe, and they queStion
Whether the secrecy that is admittedly required
for some aspects of intelligence gathering should
be e:,:tended to cover a host of questionable and
frequently illegal actieeities under the pretext of
serving an undefined "national interest.''
In the years since it has become active in
covert operations the CIA has financed the inva-
sions of two cOuntri-es, Cuba and Guatemala, and
otherwise influenced the establishment and
overthrow of governments in a number of lands,
?
including Vietnam. It provided planes and mer-
cenary pilots to the Congo (some of the same
men it trained to invade Cuba) and for several
? years it-has financed and directed a mercenary
army in Laos in violation of our treaty commit-
ments. At the same time it has engaged in activ-
? ities that have more to do with propaganda than.
intelligence. It has subsidized magazines .and
publishing .companies and the operation of radio
stations which free advertising in this country
portrayed, as supported by private donations.
In addition there have been instances in re-:
cent years when the agency has apparently been,
successful in establishing for itself a place above
the law. Two examples are the _dismissal of a
slander suit against an agent on the ground
that, eVen though his statements were not sub-.
stantiated, he was acting under orders, and the
case of the Green Berets accused by the Army
of murdering a suspected Vietnamese double
agent, but never brought to trial because the
CIA refused to supply witnesses.
? Even assuming that Mr. Helms is correct in
his contention that the agency functions under
the tight control of the president, an assumption
which many knowledgable critics dispute, the .
fact remains that the agency's activities have
evaded the checks provided by the Constitution
and in doing so it has deceived the Americen
people. The issue, then, is not whether the men ,
in charge of the CIA are devoted, or even hon-
orable, and faith is not the answer to such
fundamental criticism. It was faith in the
efficacy of covert military and political manipu-
ton, after all, that propelled us into our tragic -?
involvement in Southeast Asia.
What is needed is a check on the presidential
fascination with Mr. Helms's "Department . of ?
Dirty Tricks," a fascination that has pervaded ?
the past four administrations. Congress is the
appropriate body to provide that check, even '
though at present it is not doing so. The super-
vision now supplied by a handful of key mem-
bers of Congress is, in the wordS or a recent.
Twentieth Century Fund study, "only sporadic
and largely ex post facto.", Fortunately there;
are efforts now underway to strengthen congres-
sional overview of the CIA. These efforts de-
serve ,the support of the American people.
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WALNUT CRFFK , CAL.
CONTRA COSTA TIL1ES
Approved For Release 2001/0?1b4Titlifet-R
E & S - 23,001
i;.
/-*-71'--1
-.4 -i i
-?.-- I -.--) ------,-----N\ 7-1. !---:,-'1 ,------,\ (-77.1
1 ! '
.....,e; L., _ _I 1 ;---.1 ,---..1 '---/ .4.------;*
people," Waldie said. *lie of structure t:-.iit 'A e
."And the only in.lication so? shouid leave as a e-lel tor
far of the motivation oi' teal- the South Vietnamese giivera-
r--------..,,
gees was the American bomb- ! ment, designed p r e c i s e I y
'ing."
i I' ) n/
he said.
/-''''\ F. '3 ;''' i !--, ! - . r'-'" "It' s possible tha t. froia tie mu the pattern o'1' a raral-
munist s o c i e t y," W.11?Ii_.
t i
t j one report on the fm ...?act of., stated.
".? '\ : bombing przictices, coi.n)led ..n
ii L. 1... . i ; with our n Cr` tile ow survey qif. k.,,ur objective t he re was
i fi for the riTht of a naii,.II
ilarlv e:r r
deL?ni7 .....ei -1-Moe- refue'ee camo we sled. .t ', .? , - ? \ .
c i i
ii-cventive/ that the samplin g
' neous," Waldie aeknowlek'a lishing i in s uriel
d ?
,
?
1 (.-.- i'i'?"? f nix
-?-4I''
.? F".
, Ar:Y! ..:2, an,3 :'-t.Cl N. ositey a . "But the contention of ores
the-? -
is ern'" rsCi.tri'tt .e o
' C i s
i
?
s -
- ' on equal to oily found in
.a communist state," he sai'.I.
'alS:, passiii: tile word ai...-)tuid American officials that all lhe -.
He said the pair found con-
_ re othcr coileressnica v t-.3 . evidence indicated that bimib-
i-cAt n a m siderable difference between
want to go to Vietnam that. tag was not a factor in refa- ..
."they're going to have to be gee motivation simply is n(?), .generals and lower echefori .
.
.moce aggrcssive than they true!,
soldiers over
'i what the U.S.
i
i.e. ? r have been in the past if they -, The pair also studied tlic, th the war.
n _1:i on," Waldie said. should do w ri(:
want to find out what's going 'province interrogation centers One second lieutenant i old
I o
I and determined after several them. "When we leave. it will
'
1 - "I went over there, With a iday J be up to the South Victmun-s_that they are un not:Dv
preconceived notion that We ;the army, as was inferreyese army to decide whether
. they want to win the war i?r
By PAT NEEBLE . should have been out of Viet- :but by the CIA.
lost it. They iii i, decide it's
? County Bureau nom long ago, and nothing I The centers can hold anv-
easier to lore it than to con- -
,saw changed that notion," lloody stispe;ted of being osse- ? .
tinue fightin7 and win it.
' A 10-day trip ferreting out .v,faicie said.
I elated with the Viet Co'tg or . He i.el. We 011`rht ' a
information on the Indochina "I am more convinced than
- !even of dissent against the hal .- e-- .
- ;leave ,and let the South Viet-
that there is nothing , .
war ? mostly without the ever Saigon government for 43 -
namese decide i,,,hat they
. :there for us, no reason to con- , ., .:. . ,
i cooperation of Americail lead- aa,l,s, more turning them
want to do with their coup-.
- , , Untie to have our _kids .killed
ers .-- lid -.1n t changed Rep. over to Vietnam police aft. ?
? and wounded over the he try," \Valdie said, - addina -r.
J . ..,
Jerome Waldie's feeling that said. - - :0
crovernment representaiives
. . - concur wholeheartedly." '
. . for sentencing. Most of the generals, he
? the United States should get - The Contra Costa congress-
, ?,. .i. . . "I am going to make a reo
0 added, felt the U.S.- should
'man said he felt the embassY
.. cut 'of \Vietnam now.
. . ?stay "as -long as necessary" '
0,vas helpful as well as "quite -omrnendation to the Sec!..et,li
'frank and outspoken" until - of State that this is no', th...e. to keep the North Vietnamese
??? The Antioch D e in o c r a t, '
along, with an Mateo Repub- :the two lawmakers asked for from defeating the South, and '
- lican Paul. McCloskey
:-returned to Washington this 'a report they had heard of on - would, not put a time limit on
the war._ .. -
.
i American bombing in. Laos.
.7 . weekend after a trip throtigh -.After "incredible efforts at
-!! the northern provinces of suppressing it," eventually it;
.?South Vietnam and into a ?was given to them.
Laotian refugee camp.
Waldie said, was confirmation several times changed itiner-
He said he and McCloskey -
/ ? . aries and went to a Laotian Among their f i n d i n g s,
that the antral. Intelligence refugee camp which had not
Agency is running the-war in been on the "recommended" . .
r- Laos, through the American list of the embassy. ?
? Embassy in Saigon,- and also "By talking to refugees and
operating "preventive deten- by discovery of the report mi-
tion" .camps in the Vietnam tially denied to exist, we fer. '
? provinces. .reted out, that in a country of .
'.:,? He said he is formulating 'only tizee million population,
- recommendatiAbbrinibdeFotcReleasee20301403/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000700010001-6
::.Actions of the C!A, pariicu- almost a quarter ot an tneir .
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C:jr.7 CAN tell when ha 1,7,-.211:s ia the
H door what? sort of a clay it's
tecn,"- says 121.7. Cynthia
"Sorne c.17,-ys he Las on I o:.7"1.
1 o tc c 712
I 1:11:,-.7 t:Intt \-,hat's
itt'st b..t. oven
ti 1..o:ne fro.n
0Ce 1:7:3 C th-_T
lee?Eit toll U.
Ar.d the:a days ITelms's job is defi-
nitely one c: Vie me: t
in 1.7r siliag ton.
StIccerclve 1:eZ cuts, L;a'ance of
sivairies and -;;re7.3 -n:res that
have iirrt ti2.2
have a% roc cod Us os,:e.: tions
has le-
ctly c.i.f.:are:I a fico mansge-
rnent PrIvestntion ir,to the inte
gence "co:nrnu,:ity," a.ty.-;:t
rmty long,:er and p.iove r?,.ore
difrivilt than ;.:7.en f,t'..spe':'?-.3
ESC,7.1.',3"e of I:le C;_7
to hide in 1.-2-2 bure:).U-
cratic thichets. Uc4h ?7::zon and i21s
principal foreign a.
covzi: net:on:21
securi:.y ,177ir1 e ocr!es,-,en-..renE
\ia:,uraztao7
_ ?
,
- -
to slace the was critoel ia
1C-17,72.is ;seal has. 'Leen to ;:can-
ageney cin,d restore it to re-
? specta:;ility. In fact, one c2 l!is ch!ef
pnecce-2aZie:Is hes ii?ean to erase the
? in- of 1_%:.1:07 as a man
1:?,OVC:i 5.2. I -2-77nh
:.-crs-2".:1,71y arc Cle w?e:ld to?-.12a.":e
policy A.71th ni:nister..-? orrolo
and ...?. ifn,
prete,-.:t of"si./...u.rity," -
va:-;ue :ears
rt.las "Invisile
empire," has r,c2-rietiine3
been calloci, he is a v,-.Ty visd
V.71211e he t:Ics to 17,cep his lunches
free for ,??orlz, fcr coca-
s:orally she-:is va at a reetaurant
witha friead for 112:1C:1: a light beer,
a co!cl plate, oaa eye cly,.ays on -the
the Ccc!."-...-Itrl, a
2-.,ear the
ere, i:he Pr cons to
seell, there is lihely to be less
if he? ol)served enter-
in- ; 1-:?:rirate hen-te.
iihes the aractive
wernea---yetlaz, Cr old---and they find
him a ch al'; ei;anier p---.to.er and
a geed dance:.
"kie's interest1ng?aad 1:1terested
in whut youi:e znying," s.;.:d Lydia
Ic'iatzen"c7iell, wife of the former Dem-
oa-;?atic Attorney C-Jaeral.
'Ee's well-
rend and he doesn't try to snstitute
.flirting for con-,?:-.2-asaion, that cid
Piince,on that r.Jn-k-: of
the colt:a-mists town tIse,?
Some of Cor1:1 that
he is toe close to the pre3s? oven
though most c.ree that he uses it,
with rare ria.e.lse, for Els
hs ag.ency's enas. Snceclisill:e the
frerluent meation of :Ieirris cad his
dscn vrife in the socrip columns
and society pages of the nation's
ccpItal
Yet, If he gives the apr.-earnr.ce of
insouciance?he is
rece,-;e. is the, 111:0
h1gh-vie1tag.,:. elentric barrier, just'
nea;_li the. surface. .1-leirns is r+ mass
of al-_,T-arent
cutvrardly re-La:zed,
alereriscd in the esse'r,tial yet fa2c1-.
acted by the tdihl. A former foreign
cci-.-es.por.lent,
he observes much and
Erenry F-issing 2r, are said to reLlrel
the con-imuni--,y as a miarol blessing:
intrinsically ini:,prt.2nt to the United
? St?stes but far tsr, h.g oral too prone
to-cure. dif;ae?eaces of opinion?
or, sometimes, no o12-don?behind
screen o woods.
Considered a cold-blcled neces-
sity in the Cold 1;7rr dlys, the agency
fool s,-...=.:;..113 to rna22y stude.kts,liberal
Intellectuals and Cc.-.;gress.:nen, to be
pnclernocratla, consffiratcri.11, rialster.
Inc revelations in recent years that
e g,en cy sus; cot f.
its activities in Sou:.i.e,st .c's,131A, the
ts3ey of rigs;
the U-2 fli;,?ilts; its secret f.unzling
throIh 'front.." fo2.221:2.:1'.10-15 or
National Student Assochtion plus
priivute cidtwni,?,7e,:-2-en's and law-
gLo--.1)3, aud,ZhcallY, t years
ago, the Ch,...-en c)a
53.-:AN7P-Ptiw2eNsu:Y.6%--mY
this, better than most. As tho first ca-
reer IP,telii;,aract: 0cox to leach the
STATI NTL
L-se. firs
0 ti 11,T3311:0 lv.VIA tiP81)-01601 R000700010001 -6
place?v,-hat e?ael-2. ,,vorninn
to a dinner and whose shoulder strap
T.7; ?7,7, -3.- 3
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By MORTON EONDItACEE So far, according to tire
Chien? Surt-Timeo Staff, the Pentagon has be,n
Top State Department and willing to stTply one of N;,.;?t.
officlo.lsI Ur's c?-Y-q!;;7--:;, 1Y-it ale
invitations to appear at Senate said such an arrangement
hearings on the condhion of would be "uiu?-.cc,ept.ble" to
- civilian. war victims in Lido- tho &:21'13t0r?
china. Kennedy staff rheml)ors said
Sen. Edward M.? Kennedy, the Pentagon's nttituda Eiplid.?-
D-Mass., had invited Defense ently refleTted unwillingness
Secretary Melvin R. Laird, to face questions on the hn-
.Deputy Defense Secretary Da- pact of U.S. military doctrine ?
vid R. Packard, Secretary of on the civilian populations.
State William P. Rogers and "We want 13 ask the Ponta-
U.S. AID administrator John gon to Efinc! 'lice fire zone'
Hannah to give testimony mitt and 'search and destroy' and
week, but all refused, learn whether the military
Kennedy's subccmthdittee on ever contemplated the eLect
refugees is the only standing these policies would have," a
congressional panel so far to staff member said. ?
schedule hearings in the. in- Another focus of the hoar-
eredsingly eploie issue of inJ is the continued use of" ;
U.S. responsibility for war vie- U.S. refugee-aid fudds for ;
tims. cluidestine -military ? opera- ;
T h e administration did tions in La.03 by the Central I
agree to testimony WedneyTh.y Intelilponce easy.
by . Ambassador William 1.!3. First #,.,:pc.,c(1, last year, the
\/ Colby, U.S. Civil operdtions Kennedy sta:f cialins to have '
, chief in Victnain, and assist- documents she7.-in,..f, that AID
ant AID administrator Robert has been unable to divorce it-
H. Neoter .rind, on Thursday, self from CIA ties.
by Monteagle Stearns, No. 2: If it develops this Is true
man in the U.S. Embassy in staff members said, Kennedy
Laos and ? Willard H. :,,Ieinecke, plqns to introduce legislation
Nooter's deputy. forcing an end to the clandes-
Kennedy declined to corn- tine relationship.
ment on the absence of top- "We also want to know," a
level officials because, his staff member- said, "why the
staff said, the senator was still U.S. government is increasing
hoping for an appearance by its aid for training national
G. Warren Nutter, assistant police in Vietnam when it is
Defense secretary for intern- decreasing .support for civilian
tional security affairs, war casualties, and refugees."
STATI NTL
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CIA footnotes
In his first public address since he became
director of the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) five years ago, Richard Helms defended
his organization before a luncheon meeting of
? 'newspaper editors Wednesday, and said that
the CIA is necessary for the survival of a
- democratic society. He asked the country "to
take it on faith that we, too, are honorable men
devoted to her service."
Helms did not attempt to clarify any fon-
dation for that faith, although he did note that
CIA intelligence played an important part in
determining the American success in the 152
Cuban missile crisis (thanks to "a number of
well-placed and courageous Russians who
helped us").
? Elsewhere in Washington on the same day,
-Sen. 'George Me-GoVern asked Helms to corn-
'nit on published reports that South Viet-
namese Vice-President Nguyen Cao Ky may be
involved in the opium trade in Southeast Asia.
He cited a recent article in Ramparts magazine
implicating the CIA in an international opium
business. The Ramparts article contended that
opium production and distribution in the Fertile
Triangle region of Burma, Northern Thailand,
and Laos is conducted with the knowledge of the
CIA, and that CIA operations there actually
. serve to protect opium supplies and facilitate
their movement.
Helms did not comment on the allegations;
.dpparently an admonition from the director
?'every five years that Americans must accept
the CIA "on faith" should be sufficient.
There might be more to it: that Helms should
offer a footnote to American diplomatic history
aftei? i-ident happened
Suggests a ponsible nreceient. Perhaps, in
another five years or so, the CIA director will
. emerge from his office once more, and renew
his request for an extension of public faith in his
.14e/icy. And then he Might add another footnote
-about how the CIA almost won that Vietnam
War all by itself.
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one such as the B-1 bomber and the MBT
tank.
Cermet issuns
There are other issues as well. Why clo wa
need over 400 major and some, 3,000 minor
bases sea red in eoma 31 countries around
the won. H; need for these bases, many
or them reduneent but held since World War
II, should be reviewed.
Why, a quarter of a century after World
War II, should the United States be provid-
. lag over 300,000 troops and $14 billion a
year to the NATO alliance? Our European al-
lies have a larger population than we do.
They are now as wealthy as we arc. They are
shouldering none of the costs of the Anon
war. Yet vs continue with this tremendous
outlay of military expenditures for the de,-
fortes of Europa.
We should cut our forces in NATO in half.
. - We should continue to provide the nuclear
Umbrelia? for the defense. of Europe. But
. the Eurepe:ms should provide necee; of the
manpower. It Is tit as to Europeanize NATO
as it is time to Victinan-Cze the Asian War. I/
the Europeans are unwilling to defend them-
selves aeainet a Russian attack in the center
of Europe, then there is no reason why we
&honed beor the major shtre of that burden.
How dees it wealeen us to review our bases
and to cpesstion why NATO should not be
Europeanized when, their economic strength
is as great as ours?
co:Nose:stoat
By reforming procurement, by reviewing
our commitments, by taking, a realistic view
of the live sian and Chinese threat, by doing
awey with unneeded and Gee:der:ping weap-
ons, and by limiting the cep:nisi:on of our
nuclear strategic terser, Ste could r:::`.ke great
savings in the defense bucleec without en-
dangering our security.
And ce real security Is based on a balance
between military and ciainestic eecds, and
between the strength of our weepons ;and
the strength of our ceconomy, in my view see
would in fact enhance our overall security.
If we persiet in the present military ex-
cesses we will weal-sea this country rather
than strenethen it.
We should reduce our military expendi-
tures rather than to increase them as our
Military needs in Asia decrease.
The charge of,"nco-lsolationism" hurled at
those who advocate reform is badly mis-
placed. In fact, if the railitery- fails to reform,
It may so endaeger its own credibility as to
bring about the very neo-isolationism it
claims to oppose.
instead of hurling epithets at those who
would reform the system, those who really
want us to remain strong and free should
urge the Pentagon to provide this country
with a leaner, stronger, and far lees costly,
more efficient military force.
- :
DRUG TRAFFIC IN SOUTHEAST
. ASIA . _
? Mr. McGOVERN, Mr. President, I ant
? iuo.reilvtly. concerned, about reports
that raoAers of U.S. Arrnec.1 Forces serv-
ing' in Indochina. are being afflicted with
hard drug addiction on an alarming
sealc, and that Seritheast. Asian grow-
ers and smugglers not only supply thcse
drugs but a lion's shaie of the illicit world
? supply as. well.
. In light of the grave implications for
our own society, I have written to Sec-
. retary of State William Rogers and Cell-
/ m tral Intelligence .Agency Director Rich-
ard Helms, asking for a thorough inves-
tigation of this matter. In addition, I
have asked for a report on diplomatic
Initietivee which have been undertalien
to end the vast procincion of epium in
the Fertile Triangle re.ilen cr22c1-eiliassin3'
paiis of .T.Illreene.,, northern Thailand, and
Laos,
I a.F.a unanimous consent that the let-
ter to which I ave referr.ed; a recent re-
port by Gloria Emer:T-on in tile New York
Times on tile availaility of heroin in
Vietnam; and a report in the current
issue of Ramparts magazine on the
Southeast Asian opium market ba
printed in the REctoae.
There being no objection, the items
were ordered to be printed in th,..? Rec-
Or.D, as ?
U.S. SENATE', Co:seenTT=. ore
Attercruerunc .som
Wash!nriton, D.C., April 13, 1971.
Hon. VirrainA7?7.
SCOPCItary of Slate,
U.S. Th.W./17n.,..7.t of .9/ate,
WC.Sil.11!fitO%, D.C.
DEAF: CIa. STCnETAP.Y: The trafilc in hard
/narcotics, the opium derivatives, is among
the most insielions and dendly threats to our
domestic sefety and well-being.
These drutee deetnoy 'hundreds Of thou-
sands of lives each "s r, and the number is
growing rapidly. Beyond that, hard drug ad-
diction authors e, vast arc-portion of all other
crime?es much as 00 p-:::cant in New York
City, for example?which Is committed by
users se-eking funds to sustain their habits.
A recent steicly in the District of Columbia
found that ,15 percent of a sampling of the
D.C. jail popniation we' odelicted to heroin.
This gene, at grave concern is now con lest
with the niol'e recant peoblern of hard drug
addiction ocquired by Baited States ser.ice-.
men re,terning freen Ine!,achina. The Com-
missioner of New York's Addiction Services
Agency ha a. eeetten to sae that,
"Most recent report s en drug addiction
and drug Lbeee do indicate that there is an
increase in these phenomena. among Ameri-
can serv!ceiren and Chase is very little doubt
th,lt a signiacently treater part of New Yerk
servicemen returning to civilian life have
been or are adnicted, cr have developed a
propensity to addiction."
Dr. Robert DePont, director of Wets:loins,-
ton, D.C.'s Narcodcs Treatment Administra-
tion, reports that his agency hes undertekon
a systematic study of the rcintionship be-
tween military service and heroin use. He
told rue recently that,
"Our earlier Investigations shoed that
about 23 percent of the heroin addict
patients in treat,nent with the Narcotics
Treatment Administratiern, and about 25 per-
cent of the heroin addicts admitted to the
D.C. jail, are veterans."
Last year the Veterans Administration
established -the treatment of drug depend-
ence as a spatial medical program, including
plans for 30 specialized units for the rehabil-
itation of drug dependent veterans. V.A.
Administrator Donald. Johnson has advised
me that his agency is not in a. position to
assess the true marmitude of title problem.
In his State of the World Maesaga, Presi-
dent Nixon quite properly singled out plans
to deal with the international sources of
supply of heroin as an essential, central ele-
ment in any serious effort to control this
vicious drug. He indicated that the Admin-
istration has worked ch.,:ely with a number
of governments, particulerly Turkey, France,
and Mexico, to seek an end to illicit produc-
tion and smuggling of narcotics.
On tha bosis of this background, I am deep-
ly disturbed by reports, inclecling those con-
tained ,in the current titer:a of Paanpr:rs
CCcga sine, that the -vast majority of all heroin
production Con.I.C:s not from Turkey, not free
France or Mexico, but from Southeast Asia,
and that U.S. policy and tt-yciieuLel, instead
inscouraging this traelo, hare aetnally
nseeiterl its growth.
I would very much appreciate your cent-
meets on the folloteine e-oinee raleed the
erne:red article:
CI.) The report that, according to the
Leased Nenions Commission on D:--C.;'.3 acid.
Nareotice, at least 80 percent of the world's
let0 tons of illicit ppium corms from South-
ease Asia. According to an Iranian I :)ort to
lfnited Nations seminar on the subject,
s:,.7.1C 33 percent of the world's illeeal supply
ce:ginates in the Fertile Tr angle region
stlech includes parts of Burma, northern
Thailand and Laos.
2) The report that Nationalist Chineee or
KeomIngtaeg forces operating in that reeien.
coetrol and pro fit it-cm the opium trade., :bet
these forces supplemeet their income by per-
fortnieg missions for the United Stares, and
thst the Burmese government has peotest:el
this activity both to the United States and
thy United Nations.
!,13) The report that opium 13 the basic
scarce of income for Meo tribesmen in Laos,
asef that General Vang aPro, commander cf
I.re).: counterinsurgency forces made tip of
Meo tribesmen and eupported by the 'Wilted
Senses, uses aircraft soppliod by this country
to transport opium from the surrounding
ares to the base of Long Cheng.
t.") The report that General Owtrie 1,,mhi-
itcnne of the Loyal Laotian Army exsocises
bread control over the opium traillo in Lacs,
including ownership of several "cookers" for
resfning it, and that he and other interested
parties transport raw OpiL1111 in espaipment
strt,plied by the United States military as-
sistance program.
;:5) The implication theit opium produc-
t:1m and collection in Lao i conductoci with
lbs knowleiii:te of Central Intelligeece?Ae.ency
particularly in the area sin:I:on:tee:le
L..7c.g Chang, and that CIA operetions there
ac.ually serve to prottio these suppliee and
fa:di:tate their moeerneat.
ti5) The report that h.ie,h Vietnamese ofil-
citIs, Including Vice Peesident Ky, have been
and may currently be involved in the trans-
pat of opium front the Feetlie Triangie re-
;tea to Saigon and In its distribution there.
Certainly then reports, along nith others .
in the article, warrant a thorough intenti-
gtion. Indeed, considering our determina-
'elen to end the menses of heroin addietion:
he this country. I will be surprised if such
ar investigation has not already been com-
pleted and if we are not currently involved
Is vigorous diplomatic efforts to close off this
z-mrce. Considering the number of incle-
pmdent sources which heve reported know-i-
e.:ere of vast opium production In the Fertile
Triangle region, it seems to me that it would
be impossible for it to eseape the attention
of U.S. agencies operating there.
Along with your comments on the points
lilted above I would, therfore, very much
ktpreciate a report on Initiatives the United
States has undertaken to cut off this major
coerce of opium steeply, Including act" re-
stictions on military 'assistance aimed at
ptaventing the use of American equipment in
cnlecting and transporting, this treaeherous
crmmodityr
Sincerely,
GEORGE' MCGOVERN'.
- ?
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prom' the New York Times, Feb. 25, 10711
Ors tee VurrNAm GET E:17{.0111 EASILY
. (By Gloria Emerson)
ZATGON, SOUTI-T. VrerreaeT, February 24.?It
is so easy to buy heroin frout peddlers in
Vietnam wherever there ars Americen troops
or convoys that a, tiny plestic vial CAT; be
ptechased for $3 outeida the heaciquerters
of an American general.
On the 15-mile Bienhoat highway, which
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Congressmen Criticizet
Embassy in rientiane
VIENTIANE, L a o s, April
14 (AP)?Two U.S. Congress-
men accused the U.S. Embassy
today of , hampering their
movements in Laos and trying
to conceal unclassified infor-
mation about the impact of
American bombing on Laotian
civilians. .
"It is clear it is the Nixon
administration and not the ,
Ipress that is distorting news
from Laos," said Rep. Paul N.
i McCloskey (R-Calif.), an oppo-
nent of the war who has said
he may challenge President
Nixon for the Republican pres-
idential nomination in 1972 if
, the President does not change
his war policies
? McCloskey and Rep. Jerome
'Waldie CD-Calif.) said U.S. Am-
bassador G. MeMurtrie Godley
refused to let them visit the
big base for Laotian tribal
fighters which the U.S. Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency oper-
ates at Long Cheng, near the
Plain of Jars.
..
Approved For For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700010001-6
Approved For Release
CIA Director Director Richard Helms (left) talks with
Newbold Noyes Jr., president of the American
?United Press International
Society of Newspaper Editors and editor Of The
Star, during the editors' conference yesterday.
=
, ,n ,
n ?
s?,
.? .
Idles
HernsTells New47iiien ?
By THOMAS B. BOSS British-,--CIA-Agent
Chien? Sun-Times ecrvice Helms was asked later if he
' The head of the Central Intelli- was referring to Col. Oleg V.
gence Agency says the CIA has Penkovsky, the Soviet military
penetrated the Soviet govern- intelligence official who served
ment with a "number of well- as an agent for both the CIA and
laced" Russian spies: British intelligence. Helms re-
:Richard M. Helms, in his first plied that his remarks covered
public speech in five years as Penkovksy and "others."
director of the CIA, yesterday Penkovsky was arrested Oct.
cited the spies' key role in the 22, 1962, at the height .of thd
1962 Cuban missile crisis and Cuban Missile crisis, and .execut-
implied that some of them still ed May 16, 1963. But the Soviet
are operating in the Soviet Un- government has made no public
Ion.
' By .making the claim at this
titre, Helms apparently sought
ta? serve notice to the Kremlin
that the United States has secret
Ways of checking on its good the Soviet mon.
faith'
Helms obtained clearance
i negotiations on
strategic weapons, the .Middlt from President Nixon before -ac-
East and other critical issues. cepting the invitation to speak
detect Russian missiles thebefore the annual convention of
Helms said the CIA was able
American Society of News-
0) in
Cuba in 1932 "thanks to-U-2 pho-,paper Editors.
tography ov
Helms' speech created a con
Sietll and
mention of additional spies in
the case.
Helms' speech thus left the
. implication that "other" CIA
agents remain in place inside
PRAY e Rtleltt612901/00-4'-'r
to a num
who pv0_ ren clamor s a
cpurageous Russians"
vided crucial details on Soviet Army and FBI ,"spying" on ci-
vilians. He went to great lengths
fie) insist that the -CIA has--no
domestic security role.
Helms acknowledged that the
CIA collects "foreign intelli-1
gence in this country" by tap-.
ping university experts and in-
terviev,ing persons who travel to
Communist countries.
Semantic Trinible.s -
"The trouble," he lamented,
"is that to those who insist on
seeing us as a pernicious and
pervasive secret government,
,our words 'interview' and 'hire'
translate 'into suborn, subvert
and seduce or something
'worse::
He denied as "viCio.us" a
'charge that the CIA is involved.
in 'world drug traffic. Sen.
George McGovern, D-SD de-
manded. yesterday that the CIA
and the State Department inves-
tigate allegations by Ramparts
magazine that the CIA facili-
tates the movement of opium
out of Southeast Asia.
Helms conceded, on the other
hand: "Our mission, in he eyes
of many thoughtful Americans,
may appear to be in conflict
with some of the traditions and
. . . _
ideals of a free society . As-
sertions are made that the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency is an
'invisible government ? a law
unto itself, engaged in prov.oca-.
tive covert activities repugnank
to a democratic society and sub-
ject to no controls.
It is difficult for me to agree!
, with this view, but I respect it.";
- - -
STATINTI:
IA-RDP80-01601R000700010001-6
Va.
J
THE NEW REPUBLIC
Approved For Releastonatin/04..: CIASFEOPISOTO1
MCO cj
Tragedy for the Meo tribes in ,Laos came unexpectedly
in the bright promise of the New Frontier: "Let every
nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we
shall pay any price, bear. any burden, meet any hard-
ship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the
survival and the sUcc'ess of liberty." Whether, in Janu-
ary 1961, John F. Kennedy had in mind supporting an
obscure former sergeant in the French army, a Meo
named Vang Pao, to hold back the Communists in the
hills north and east of the Mekong valley, preferably
all the way to the China border, is not known: But
Laos was much in the news at the time of Kennedy's
inauguration. In December 1960 Gen. Phoumi Nosavan
and Prince Boun Oum, in a bloody coup, had deposed
.the left-wing cabinet of Quinim Polsena and chased
away Capt. Kong Le and his neutralists. The coup
polarized factions and reopened the civil war; The
Soviet Union and the US accused each other of support-
ing contending factions, and Eisenhower reportedly re-
marked to Kennedy that Laos was then a most crucial
problem in foreign affairs. Now, a. decade later, the
Meo tribe has been decimated; an entire primitive
people is facing genocide. How did it happen?
In the first year of the Kennedy era, foreign service
officials from every department and agency, spurred
on by the attorney general, Robert F. Kennedy, were
dragooned into counterinsurgency courses at the For-
eign Service Institwe. The Pentagon's contribution
was the doctrine of "flexible response." The President
adopted. the Green Berets. The Meos with CIA arins
and radio training quickly became the secret toast of
the town. ? ?
But by 1962 there was concern that as the number
of Meo under arms reached the thousands there might
be a. shilry Communist reaction, and the US might then
.
have the task of caring for and feeding the.whole Meo
? population in Laos ? all oo,000. Of them. Averell
.Harriman, then assistant secretary of state for ?the
Far East, was apprehensive, but not enough to try. to
? stop the counterinsurgency delirium.. His s'uccessor,
Roger Hilsman, made it his business to approve the
introduction of each rifle and round of ammunition
into the Meo areas, determining which side of a given
rock the Moos were to choose on a mountain trail,
demonstrating his West Point training, World War II
guerrilla experience and Department of State control
over the operation.
'CIA enjoyed its paramilitary role: for once it was
safe from Pentagon "help" (read take-over). Overt,
aeknowledged intervention in Laos by the Pentagon
rWoUld have violated the 1954 Geneva Accords.' Clan-
destine help, on the other hand; violated only the spirit
of the agreement, and both sides were playing that
game. To this day the CIA has been able to maintain
operational Atifie6f6difdYIReclica4e)n2061kal04 : C IA-RDP80-01601 R000700010001 -6
munist pressures on the Meo increased and casualties
rose, so did the size of US support that flowed through
CIA. Well over 1o,00dof "our" Moos were under arms.
William P. Bundy .(now editor-designate cif Foreign t/
Affairs) succeeded Hilsrnan in 1964, and although he
catnapped through the briefings, he was, still the resi-
dent Laotian guerrilla'expert in the Capital. McGeorge
Bundy, in his fortress in the White House situation
room, scheduled briefings on the situation from return-
ing CIA officers, just in case President Johnson wanted
an encouraging word. Secretaries Rusk and McNamara
huddled over detail maps of Laos and on occasion
planned. tactiCal operations of .regular Lao army units
ancI'Meo guerrilla bands.
The effort to build a buffer against China through the
Meos pitted a primitive, tough people against the more
sophisticated North Vietnamese and their local sup-
porters, and we are now Witnessing the consequences.
Since 1960 "at least .40-50 percent of the men have
been killed and 25 percent of the women have fallen as
casualties of the war," says Senator Edlaiard Kennedy's
1970 report on refugees. Near the CIA-supported base
of Long Cheng, north and east of Vientiane, almost
zoo,000 Meos depend on air drops of rice (the main
task of the US AID mission) for survival. They cannot
return to their homes in the hills; the Communists are
there. And they cannot survive on the plains because
of climate and the competition from the more advanced
lowland people. The whole Moo tribe is one vast
refugee group.,
? What has this using of one Asian group to fight
another for US ends taught us? Very little. Indeed,
"let's you and him fight" has become formal US doc-
trine. ". . . We shall look to the nation directly
threatened," the President said last November 3, "to
assume the primary .responsibility of providing the
manpower for its defense." (i.e., the Moo nation.) And
the US, said Mr. Nixon, will furnish "military and
economic assitance when requested:" (i.e., the CIA, the
Department of State's chosen 'instrument for the Moo
operation.) The locals supply the bodies. ,
Sooner or later, the peoples in the Indochina penin-
sula will have to bind their wounds. In the meantime,
the Meo troops and their families fighting the North
Vietnamese are being pushed over the mountain wall
Into the Mekong valley, refugees of a torn, dying
culture. The question now is, as The New York Times
recently put it, "whether the time has come to move
the Mobs out" of the war while there are still enough
men left to assure the nation's survival." It's a grim
end to the first clear test of the logic of the Nixon
Doctrine. .
STATINT
? Approved For Release 2001/C13itfAi...1&-RDIttigbc9-1Afill
Erl\/.0Y GOD FY' ? The AID niisien scrvcs co viIiiain H. vcr lean, wflo
t?
for, ;7,1-Jollier branch of illc.
I /
I Air) tI
er
? .o?enr< Office, ?vilioli? the
V? (I I
lo?ot ;an a and air forte
la ail its foe!, borehs anti i.?:a??ilitni-
for some Ci A. operation.s, aroi ee.:: ? 11
? b ?
y aCCOUntS established
?the pattern of what the
. functions of the US. en-
voy to Lace would be. _
Sullivan came to Laos at
the end a 1064 and re-
cstAlislino-nt? knoe. n rim flacoore7.
?
? ?
tion as \\ ell as spin e Fits for ts
?
: .1 , li ?
fleet of -13-odd T-2S prop-driven
0 0, 1 f ort. ' i .
.
?
-..a, ,..:- r , ?fighter-bombers. ? ? :
:
. a
. . - . ? , ? . ' ApproVal ef Bombings
- I ..i.,.-ipI 1 1.,.....-\
. , But the major part of the Ameri
I te Ac -
'can e m
ffort consists of bobing b
I: y
: 1-? -? .1 ? t 1.i.J ) American planes mostly frorn Thai-
_ . .. . e . ? . .. . - . I land but also frora South Vietnailt
'
. - - Einci the 7th Fleet in the Gulf of Ton-
.: tY ARTHUR .T. riCh:ql?IEN ? kin. Godley found himself with the
Tin r r
rs Val wo .
. .
? : :function of approving all bombing
: .
- viEypIANE_____The u..s. R,?1?s,..:strikeis on Laos. Fie did thia 'himself
dor to Laos is Georg,' McMurtrie.m. c--.:-
p l- dclogated the approval to a
subordinate who became known as
. G?odlcY, genial New Yo.i.kor Yale ''''`I: the Bombing Offiaer. it could be
member of the Brook Club, perhairs. anyone in the embassy; ?most re-
Manhattan's mco.:t excllyjoe. ne pel, cently it'was a consular officer. The
sOnedly directs one of the most pi.i..?p2], i e. m
point s that thnbassador has the
.
vete wars being fought on the -lob- 1.1P1-? to ev,ei'lltie-, a
--and reilotted!..v
.' ': sometimes docs?the generals an
. i admirals. .
' ? It takes so much of his time and So absorbed i?,-, Godley,
egcrgy that .his fellow diplomats in, 53, in running the war? -
. . the Laotian capital complain 111,ey there is a ?huge map of
? rarely see him. The preident of the Laos on his office wall,
? Laotian National Assembly., 'Moot along with a photo. of the
- Sananikone; com plains that Godley ho m e in cooporstown,
never 'once has invited . him to hls- N.Y., to which he intends
house for dinner in the 1,', months lie 16 retire?that diplomatic
has been, here. 1-Jis 'diplomatic -rein- colleagues complain he
lions are almost exclusivly \vith .has little time for other ac-
neutralist Premier Prince:-..'ouvanna tiyity.
.Thoulna; a frequent teorns partner. Godley periodically vi-
GOdleY'S -War erfOrt. is flirefted sits bases like that of the
? from his air-cmlditioned. window- CIA at Long Chong, and to
less first-floor office in the.embassv. remote dirt airs trips
here igarost as many as two North where he confers at first
?Vietnamese divisions in the north.; hand with his attaches on
The re?af enemy is lianoi---v.?hat the the ground, and AID per-
Pat bet Lao do or say counts for sonnel keeping track of re-
ngthing -- and his motivation is., fugce movements and re-
' bluntly stated: questing supplies to be
. 1. don't likEi to see the Unitc flown in by the U.S-char-
States get ,beaten." . _ tered airline., Air America.
Y:....T.mpressivc Array of Power ? - And during last year's
unsuccessful . Communist
l'o- prevent that, Codley has a most siege of Long Cheng, the
illtriressive1.1'''''.3. or Pl1'.8ical re? v" ambassador w PS reoorted
irict personal ill'icrcl ion, s'ci ninth 50 to have aimed an, artillerythat Sen. Stuart Folnington CD-Mo.) piece himself. _
once remalIod hcl was acting As A major duty of the largo.
. .chief of sort. '''''d 'Perhaps it "tili. staff of attaches?which
be better to call him Proconsul God-' numbered only one in tile
Icy? ? ? .- '.? ?'1050s?is to keep track of
. eAside fv?m Olo 1-1:31.1111 PPiDel'il?-Cri? where friendly forces are
of American illiSiOiri OVerSS, sl.lch: operating . and this, . plus
a; the U.S. Information Service, the intelligence 'g a?t h e r e d
, Agency - for International Dcvelop- largely by American re-,
\\i/
Ageney. Godl inherited, a staff of termines the boinbing tar-
?24 military attaches; the nerve :en- gets:. ..:
ter of the American military efro?t . All this machinery was
? In Laos, both on the ground a'rai in developed by Godley's pro-
the air. - . -- . . - 4 e c e s IQ 5irribassador_ -
.?
- ? 4p-roved For Release 20d1103104r 7 GIA-RDP8
today.
?
?
American Embassy in
Bern during the World
War II years had familia-
rized him with undercover
operations.
- Later Service
mained -until 1009, four More importantly,.. Goa-
and one-lief years of'criti- ley'S later service in the
C a 1 importance to th e Congo, where he was de-
United States during .puty chief of mission and
which 'the Vietnam war c v e ntually ambassador,
was &rialating rapidly and had shown him what small
already spilling over into numbers of men using old
Laos. :but well-adapted weapons
? . :could do in an underdeve- ?
Beep17 Committed loped country.
By the end of 1061, the A friend who knew God-
U.S. was already .cleeply ley in the Congo in the
committal to the support years 1001-67 says he had
of Souunna Phouma's at his disposal a fleet of
government -and .was pro- U.S. Air Force C-130 trans-
victim,* hiresubstantial aid, ports. These were used to
mcludmg fii nancing a carry a .tiny force of
hack-up Paid to maintain mercenary troops onto the
the value of Laotian cur- airfield at Stanleyville on
rency. Solvannit Phourna .Nov. 24, 1964, to crush the
had alreailiv signified his leftist revolts flaring in
agreement to- air strikes the eastern Congo. -Cu-
by Ames ican planes 'ban T23 pilots hired by
.against North Vietnamese the CEA also played a vital 6
positions ar Laos, a verbal,
role at a time Amen. ?
understaniing that was to mi . policy had swung
remain de- sole basis for around from earlier
o, po,
such: strikis up to the pre- sition' to mercenaries in
.sent. ? ? K ? atallga to regard them as:
Th e MIationship be-
tween the prime- minister the most effective- means.
and ?the Inierican ambas- of holding the courifTY-
? natal: ?grav out of this si- together when the-Congo-
tuation Of-Laos' involunta- lose national a 4
. . rmv proved
ry invdhoment in the ? ? ? .
e
Vietnam war. The 'ambas- ineffecin? ? ' Godley was
that show on the
saclor was giVen-virtnally
running
spot, too, an experience
,a free hard insofar-, as: the
!applicatioz Of military that. helped mold his ex-
-force was concerned, but pressed 'opinions -a bout
this had to be applied .
within a lamework of of-
ficial
-Airefican support -Godley, fairly tall and
for the nattrality of Laos, husky or build, usually,
NVithout thrcing cancella- wears slaCks and a loose-
tion of file neutralizatio?. fitting- jacket lleftopen,
agreement that had been
, .
worked cat at Geneva in and puffs on a cigar while.
1002. The American am- on his aerial inspection ex-
bassador-tillus became the cursions. Fie also is (Ken-.
man, morithan the prime sionally seen on Vientiant
minister, who decided in outings sporting a buil
effect howmueh strain the Jacket from the A fri(al
neutrality. of _Lags eoul.d. days with portraits oi
stand. ?? ? ?Moise Tshombe nc
Godley,,arriving iii Vien- Joseph Mobutu on the.'
-tiane to tatte up-his post as front and back, respective:
?ambassadiir in July, 1060, 13%
was ideallY suited to re- ? While born in New York
place SuMan. City, Godley's family is .
His Nar.vy service in rooted in OiC0 County in
1039-0 Ind given him a upstate -New. tork. Godley
-military -.gfaffs are and his wife and while in the Con-.
0-0160IR000700010001-6 ? .?
grasp Of at the needsof is divoi.c:._:,12.11ff::::s first
subse.qi_Jelat service at the go in 1036 married Stearns'
?
. F01-21.Cf.T
AP:RIL 1._9T1
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01
STATINTL
LAOS: ANATOMY OF AN
AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT
By Roland /1. Paul
,P.rcidonr. Kennedy came to ?fad in 1961, lie was stat tied to
VV learn that almost- 703 American soldiers, more than half of o/linn,_
were members of the Special Forces, wr in Laos, wkile about 500 Soviet
troops were there providing logistics support to the local communist forces,
the Pate: Lao and their North Vietnamese allies.
?
Fearing the poesible consequences of such a confrontatien and. considering
Arnericeu intcrests in Laos to, be small, President Kennedy sought to dis-
eugaec. Nrce;otiaiions ensued at Vienna, at Geneva, in Lae!: and elsewhere.
The res it was the einhiguous compromise set forth in rather unambiguous
lene'neee in the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos and the Protocol to
that 1.);:elareti',u, signed by 13 ke mmunist and non-connennist countries in
July r.)1;:e, commonly known as tla: Geneva Accords of uy're.
Under the mantle of this agreement, the Laotians themselves established
a tripartite government composed of right-wing royalist elements under
Genera; Phowni Nosavan, neutralist elements under Prince.' Souvanna
Phouma and communist elements whose nominal leader was Prince Sou-
phanonvong? (Souvanna Phouma's half brother). The balance of power in
. the government was given to the neutralists, and their leader Souvanna
Plionnei became Prime Minister, a post he holds today.
The Geneva Accords themselves required Laos to disassothite herself
from all milit:!ry alliances, including SEATO, prohibited the introduction of
e,;.c.i:e: military ocrsonnel and civilians performing (Luasi-military functions
(except ;or Fri?ncli training inision), precluded th l,zildishment
foreien ..?y installations in Laos and forbade the use of Laotian
territ)re.- er.e.? wirh the lncernal affairs of another country. Pursuant
to rhi aereenier,-tti. Americans and Soviets withdrew their railizary per-
eoniiel. The North VT: ? ?arnese, however,?-Nij,ed to withdrew most of their
6,C?00-re'en fere:: i at then in Laos.
Neve etheless?1 rciateet: peace settled over :this somnolent "Land of the
iniion El Iia.' for -a.icut one year, to be. shattered in 1963 by an or-
chmge of asse Communist tlireat
8-52 bambinos "
Battles
20,000 NVA troops
above DMZ
Vientianc
OPERATION
DEWEY CANYON II
9,000 U.S. & 20,000 South
Vietnamese troops reopen
Khe Sanh cnid Lang Vet;
push to Lees border:
Uctorn
Roving
?DMZ
Dong Tia
\Quang Tri
A She. Volley
?
?"Danang
SAI\ICTU,,RY 604'
I H
2377, N'ei
s3r,stt,
SANCTUARY-
Rola
?
crtecv,
Bans n,
C. A.
I
..1"no?,rn
F.arn polirf Chnrn ?
Plinont?Pentl
Communists harass
truck traffic ,
60,000.,
NVA & Pathet Lao
? troops in southern Laos
Min TA RY REGIE)N'
Ii-
Sollr:
VIET
As&
7 FisHigok ,
/
18,000 South Vietnamese troops I
, drive against sanctuaries
-N1).i.,"- -0...?...2,,....5 4111TA R Y REG/ON Ill
''''.. S4ig" ?
C 1/A-RippApf94,qp 1 R000700010091 -_6, ICO rni
E Mup by V Puglni
?
Y.\
vicommizAppromedrEardRetelasea001103/OLV:41A-RDP8OIChl
last N.ovember of what kind of trouble- verbal screen for a direct ARVN assault
bn the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
For weeks as many as 1,000 South
Vietnamese rangers had been probing
deep into the panhandle to size up the
task of taking on the trail. Moreover, for
some time, 3,500 mercenaries known as
Jungle Tigers and trained in Laos by the
CIA have been venturing occasionally
into the trail area and Communist supply
depots in northern Cambodia.
The U.S. command not only slapped.
an embargo on news of Dewey Can-
yon,- it also imposed an:embargo on re-
porting the. fact that an embargo had
been imposed. In Washington only a
handful of top policyrnakers knew what
.
was up anyway'. This time, 'there was
none of the hour-by-hour agonizing at
Camp David that contributed to. the
tense atmosphere in Washington during
the Cambodian . foray. Nixon,. in fact,
left for a long weekend at Cancel Bay
in the Virgin Islands.
Abroad, particularly in Communist
capitals, speculation was presented as
fact. In Moscow, Soviet Premier Ale-
ksei Kosygin charged flatly that Amer-
ican and South Vietnamese troops NYCrC
involved in "an outrageous invasion"
of Laos. In the U.S., the response-was re-
markably temperate. About the angriest
reaction came from Democratic TPres-
idential Hopeful George McGovern,
who blasted the Administration for im-
posing "the longest news blackout of
the war."* Added he: "What a way to
run a war! What a way to manage a
free society!" The U.S. command in Sai-
gon defended the embargo as essential
to keeping the enemy guessing about al-
lied intentions..
The mildest reaction of all came from
the man whose country's sovereignty:
was violated by the supposed invasion.
In Vientiane, Laotian Premier Souvanna
Phouma was surprised by the invasion
stories--he had to call U.S. Ambassador
G. McMurtrie Godley to check them
out.; The Premier said he was opposed
to any foreign intervention but added
blandly: "We have no control over the
Ho Chi Minh Trail area. That is an af-
fair between the North VietnaMese and
the Americans."
By the time Nixon returned from
the Caribbean, the Dewey Canyon troops
were poised at the Laotian border. In
the Oval Office, the 'President met for
more than an hour with his top Na-
tiOnal Security Council advisers?Laird,
Sa:retary of State William Rogers, CTA
Director Richard Helms, Foreign Policy
Adviser Henry Kissinger and Admiral
Thomas Moorer, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs. Ellsworth Bunker, in Washington
for consultations, also sat in.
.Without a thrust into Laos and a
strike at the trail, Dewey Canyon II
did not seem to make much sense. The
expenditure of resources was enormous;
by week's end helicopter pilots had
logged 493 gunship attacks, 216 air cav-,
governments offer the only long-range
the long quiescent Communists could
be expected to stir up?and when. The
answer: Viet Nam's hour of maximum
danger would come late this year, with
.
the onset of the 1971-72 dry season. Ac-
cording to White House thinking, the
Communists would devote most of their
energies in the current dry season to re-
plenishing their men and supplies. Then,
next year, Hanoi's General Vo Nguyen
Giap would be able to rev up the war
from Map's sPhase II (small-unit guer-
rilla war) to' phase III (large-unit \var.-
fare). One -objective would be to hit the
Saigon regime at a time when the U.S.
was able to throw few troops to its sup-
port. The other objective, in this hy-
pothesis, would be to inflict a mortal
- political wound on Nixon by means of
Ter-style attacks, thus paving the way
for the election of a new President in-
clined to a hastier exit from South
Viet NMI. ?
Ranger Probes
To crimp the Communist prospects
for 1972, the allies would have to stem
the flow of menand supplies?especially
supplies?in 1971. Shortly after the turn
of the year, Nixon decided .to take ac-
tion. Just before: Defense Secretary Mel-
in Laird left on his three-day trip to
Saigon in early January, Nixon laid
down his general objectives.
In Saigon, Laird discussed Nixon's
? Worries with Abrams. The first signs
that something big was afoot conic in
mid-January, soon after Laird departed.
General Cao Van Vien, chairman of
the South Vietnamese Joint Chiefs of
,Staff, told his subordinates that there
would. be no more talking to the. press
..--particularly about operations in Mil-
itary Region T. Soon after, Abrams met
Vien .and Major General' Tran Van
Minh, the South Vietnamese air force
chief, to discus strategy. The three met
tiVice more hi the next two days.
After his last session with Vien
& Co., Abrams and white-haired U.S.
Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker swept
into ?President Thieu's Saigon: Palace
?brushing past a phalanx of startled
Vietnamese officials who had been wait-
ing to offer the President Tel holiday
?greetings. Not until four clays later, when
they were summoned to an urgent brief-
ing at MACV headquarters in Saigon,
did reporters .have any idea that some-
thing was afoot.
Intelligence officers ticked off indi-
cations of a .major Communist buildup,
including a flood of supplies in the Lao-
tian pipeline. According to the briefers,
90% of the mat6riel earmarked for
South Viet Nam was being shunted
into I Corps. The buildup obviously pre-
saged trouble in the coastal cities of
Hu6 and Danang. But MACV asserted
that it also posed a "serious threat" to
U.S. troop withdrawals and that a "pre-
emptive offensive" was planned with
"limited objectives." Few reporters in
?P RP 4P79P109,.Q.0170.ic ,;utlay.
In the first five days, the operation's
29,000 troops destroyed two trucks, ex-
ploded one ammunition storage. area
and found one 57-mm. recoilless
the mount for 'a mortar and a few
.ozen 105-mm. artillery shells.
Duying Time
Even so, U.S. commanders insisted
that the very spookiness of the over:-
ation had achieved solid results simply
by ? alarming the Communists. There
were reports that enemy troops had con-
centrated at key pOsitions along .the
trail to prepare defenses--and -made
tempting targets for extremely effective
air attacks. Merely by moving up ? to
the border, the Dewey Canyon II forc-
es may have knocked the Communists
off balance. -
Just as all actions were rated in terms
of body counts back in the war's Pleis-
tocene era, they are now gauged ? in
terms of buying time. Originally, it was
figured that the Cambodian foray would
"buy" no more than eight months of
freedom from significant enemy activity.
Now White House aides are saying that
in Military Region III (the Saigon area)
and IV (the Delta), where. war has all
but faded away, the buy may amount
to 18 months. The massive operation
that reopened Cambodia's vital Route
4 last month is judged to have bought
a month to six weeks of time for Phnom-
Penh. If ARVN troops were .to stage pe-
riodic raids on the Ho Chi Minh Trail
until the monsoon rains return in May,
the flow of supplies and Communist op-
erations in both South Viet Nam and
Cambodia Would be crippled for months.
In round figures, says Abrams, the trail
is worth a year, and smile strategists in-
sist it may be worth twice as much.
To many critics, Abrams' math does
not add up. Getting involved in wars
in Cambodia and Laos as well as South
Viet Nam could make U.S. withdrawal
more difficult, not easier. "By edging .
Cambodia closer to war than it had
been," says TIME Saigon J3ureau Chief
Jon Larsen, "we inevitably moved it
from a secondary concern to one al-
Most as intertwined with our interests
in Indochina . as South Viet Nam. The -
same will be true of Laos." Another
problem is that if ARVN is to be called
upon regularly for cavalry duty in Cam-
bodia, and possibly Laos as well, it
might be spread perilously thin. U.S.
air, artillery and logistic' support will
be needed to bolster ARVINZ's actions be-
yond its borders, even. if no U.S. ground
troops are sent in. Finally, .Abrams'
wider .war almost certainly means that
Laos and Cambodia Will be torn apart.
Quite aside from the human cost, it is Lin-
likely that any ne,utralist political fcirtze
?or neutralist government?will hac
much chance of surviving in these coun-
tries under these conditions. Yet some
critics believe that just such neutralist
alry missions, and 4,025 se'pagate lifts hope for a political settlement.
? Approved For Releasesf-titilidifoifi:itatkijikiti-ro-1601101Y07001611)6041s 6
iirce main
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700010001-6
combat areas are in mixed condition:
LAOS. As the struggle over the Ho Chi
Mirth Trail heated up, so did the "fot-
gotten war", in Laos, where some 65,000
Royal Lao troops and Meo tribesmen
have fought a seesaw seasonal struggle
for almost a quarter of a century. Tra-
ditionally, the non-Communist forces
have gained ground during the mon-
soons, when the Pathet Lao and North
Vietnamese regulars in Laos are unable
to move supplies. With the arrival of
the?current dry season, it was the Com-
.munists' turn to advance, as usual. The
80,000 Communist troops in Laos made
the most of it. Moving quickly, they cap-
tured Muong Phalane, routed govern-
ment troops from Muong Suoi on the
edge of the Plain of Jars, began to en-
circle Luang Prabang, the royal capital,
then marched on Low, Cheng, site of a
large CIA base and headquarters of Gen-
eral Vang Pao's weary army of Nleo Spe-
cial Forces. In the south the Bolovens
Plateau was under particular pressure.
Communist troops, in the words of a
U.S. official in. Vientjane, have been
"oozing westward" in recent weeks, in-
creasing their force level from nine bat-
talions to 13 or ? 14. A Soyth Viet-
namese drive into Laos might well cause
the Communists to step up their own
'Westward push.
There were several reasons for the Vig-
orous Communist advance. On one level,
it was a punitive jab at Souvanna Phou-
ma. The Premier is anxious to end the
Laotian fighting, which has forced an in-
credible number of refugees into U.S.-
Jun camps: 700,000, or 30% of the
population. But hard-liners on the right
threaten real trouble if Souvanna should
open serious peace talks with the Pa-
thet Lao or if he should suffer another
major defeat. "If Long Cheng or the Bo-
lovens Plateau falls," said one Laotian
? general, "Souvanna is finished." The
Communist advance was also a signal
to Abrams that if the U.S. menaced
the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the Pathet Lao
and the North Vietnamese would take
r .
over most of the rest of Laos.
Vientiane, the administrative capital,
is showing signs of nervousness. Last
week there was the rare sight of Royal
Lao troops and a pair of vintage Amer-
ican armored cars passing through the
city on the way to the airport. Said
one diplomat: "After that attack on
Phnom-Penh, you can never be sure."
CAMBODIA.. Last spring's drive on the
Communist sanctuaries was a short-term
Military success. But now Cambodia is
beginning to look like a long-term li-
ability, with 50,000 North Vietnamese
and Viet Cong troops roaming over
much of the country. Cambodian tore-
as were taking another beating last week,
this time in a battle with NVA regulars
at Saang, 18 miles south of the capital.
North Vietnamese units have begun
to return to the old Communist sanc-
tuaries in Kympong_citaincl 'ra ie
provinces, hfflH11/ Pf41136113AurPtiARAea
.ese border. COSVN, the Communist com-
mand post that President Nixon held
up. as the Grail of last spring's dam-
bodiim operation, is now said to be lo-
cated in Kratie. South .Viet Nam's Pres-
ident Thieu is worried enough about
the return of the Communists to his
own country to have set a limit of
20,000 Or so ARVN troops in Cambodia
at any one time. But that raises the ques-
tion of whether Premier Lon No!, even
with his army swollen to 160,000 men,
would be able to survive without more
substantial assistance from Saigon and
the U.S. Indeed, one of the objectives
of an effort to cut. the Ho Chi Minh
Trail would be to. relieve Communist
pressure on the Phnom-Penh regime.
Cambodia's students; intellectuals,
businessmen and bonzes still back the
"government of salvation," and the
army-, though poorly armed and un-'
dertrained, shows great spirit. Whether
that will be enough to hold off Com-
munist regulars is doubtful. As Cain-
Viet Nam's army is "on a fighting par
With U.S. troops."
Saigon's troops have replaced U.S.
-units along the:border areas and around
the capital itself. Except in Military Re-
gion I. there has been little in the way
of .enemy -"activity. Nevertheless, a new
cockiness prevails, and according to Sir
Robert Thompson, Nixon's favorite con-
sultant on counterinsurgency, ARVN is
doing very well indeed. "The fact that
you're able to keep withdrawing troops
at the current rate [about l,000 G.I.s
a month], that U.S. casualties are down
to Well under 50 a week, ? that even
South Vietnamese casualties are down
?this is the measure of it," says Thomp-
son. "The balance of power" has shifted
as between the enemy's capability and
the South Vietnamese capability."
Still, real Communist strength re-
maini the big question. Over the past
two years, say'pacification experts, the
JACK HARNETT
G.I.s
ERECTING TENT FRAMES AT QUANG TRI ARMY BASE
Backing ow- with guns blazing.
bodian Poet Makhali Mal ? writes of
her 7,000,000 countrymen, they are:
A people who do not weigh heavy
In the hollow of the palm of the
Mekong;
A people who do not have boats,
but pirogues;
A people who have, as fortresses,
Only temples in ruins;
A people who have, for an army,
Only their Thought and Faith.
SOUTH VIET NAM. Since Tet 1968, South
Viet Nam's armed forces have grown
from 730,000 men to a .well-equipped
force' of 1,100,000. All told, Saigoni
has more than 2,000,009 men Under
arms, or more than I I % of the pop-
ulation. Eventually, the South Vietnam-
ese air force is to be expanded* fo 50
_sguati-star_ wolitd rank it soy-
04 ,:vao hoURIDEb80 40 1
Wig
ARVN? Abrams likes to -tell visiting fire-
men in Saigon that 70% of South
Viet Cong "infrastructure" has been
whittled down from 128,000 active cad-
res to 62,000. Nevertheless, the Viet
Cons are still able to collect taxes, re-
cruit troops, and cut practically any
road in the country, at least temporarily.
Knowledgeable observers smile at on-
ward-and-upward statistics rating the se-
curity of South Viet Nam's towns and
hamlets. Solid assessments of enemy
strength are made difficult because the
Communists in North Viet Nam may
be deliberately lying low. Directives have
been intercepted ordering Viet Cong to
do nothing to make American com-
manders think twice about the wisdom
of pulling out.
In view of such directives, and
ARVN's growing strength, need the U.S.
really fear that Hanoi would pounce as
soon as the American forces were small
604E40007000100014ould the
U.S. really be able to protect its forc-
es?.Obviously, the Pentagon .insists that
the iisk would be tab great. But couldn't its floW of supplies, and must be plot-
tl U.S. set a date for total with- ting a major offensive that would en-
drawn!, say by cbristilas
Asrci Act') h
. uSUL 0'4)1601 R000700010001-6
tom. obtain fikiPPCIANLtaircufN:Ritc,c9,7,,tfry-syrtitfcgix7e7
the view that perhaps the Nixon strat-
egy is the only safe approach. As Ver-
mont's RepUblican ? Senator George
Aiken said last week: "As long as the
-trend is downward in Viet Nam,- as
long as U.S. forced don't go into Cam-
bodia or Laos;. most of the people up
here [in Congress] are saying: 'Let's
give Nixon a chance.' I think the Pres-
ident is on safe ground now." . t
That remains to be seen. Next year's
dry season may prove to be the most try-
ing test of theAdministration's strategy.
The North 'Vietnamese have been quiet
for long periods before, only .to erupt
in disruptive offensives such as Tet.
-U.S. analysts are convinced that Gen-
eral Giap is planning a _replay of 1968
for 1972. They are equally convinced
that General Abrams can head him off
at the pass?somewhere in Laos, per-
haps, or maybe Cambodia?or possibly
even in South Viet Nam.
to the beaches? In Paris the Communists
have hinted that they would arrange
such a safe-conduct, but only if the
U.S. sets a -firm date for withdrawal of
all trbops, not just ground combat troops.
It can be argued that no safe-con-
duct from Hanoi could be trusted?even
though it might be in Hanoi's interest
to keep it. A more convincing objec-
tion to the idea ,is that complete U.S.
withdrawal, including support forces,
would seriously undermine if not de-
stroy the Saigon regime. Thus it is like-
ly that Abrams' "cavalry" actions are
not necessary, primarily to protect U.S.
.troops but to bolster the Saigon regime
and assure its survival. If so, that could
be an entirely legitimate goal of U.S. pol-
icy (though its cost might be subject to
debate). But that is not the way the Ac!-
ministration presents the matter.
The Pentagon marshals massive sta-
tistics to prove that Hanoi is Increasing
The Generai
ic AnizAms has often summarized
. ? 'his tactical aims in the war as "tar-
? geting the enemy's system." He means
? that .U.S. forces should not .only seek
ont and fight Communist troops, but
also destroy the elaborate apparatus that
supports them-----rest camps, ammunition
caches, underground communication
centers -and especially supply lines.
Abrams believes that killing one man
with maps and plans is :worth killing
ten with rifles?because without the
maps and plans the ten ?vill not know
what to do. In massing -troops near the
Ho Chi Minh Trail last week, the U.S.
commander was.obeying his long-felt in-
stinct to strike at the very heart of
"the system."
- In the nearly three years since he
was named top officer in. Viet Nam, suc-
ceeding General William C. Westmore-
land (now the Army's Chief of Staff),
Abrams has presided over and shaped
fundamental changes in the day-today
tactics used to fight the Communists.
Where Westmoreland was a search-and-
destroy and .count-the-bodies man,
_Abrams proved to be an interdict-and-
weigh-the-rice man. Where West more-
p lima insisted on outnumbering the enemy
three or four to one with massive, tib mul-
io 1
r ace maneuvers, Abrams matched,
?
battalion against battalion and brigade
against brigade. If a unit made contact
with, the enemy, he hustled in rein-
forcements aboard helicopters?a tech-
nique that came to be known as "eagle
'flight" tactics.. He laced the cotmtt'y-,
side with small, defensible fire . bases.
Heavy fighting areas were -provided
with overlapping artillery support; .en-
'
abling units in ti-ouble to- radio for fire-
power instantl)'. ' ?
Abrams ordered commanders IC study
enemy hilbits metictilously, then. imitge
them. As a resit Approvelit,oralelease 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700010001-6
"The System?
ting paths through the jungle in the
hope of finding a hidden base, hospital
or supply trail. Says a commander who
supports Abrams' ideas fully: "Just fo-
cusing on knocking out men is illusory
?they will just send more men down.
But if you can get the system screwed
up, the enemy can be champing at the
bit to fight but unable to do anything." ?
That combination' has proved effective.
Along with AR \/'s growing capabilities
and the spread of the war into Cant-
bodia, Abrams' quick-strike taetics are
responsible for making South Viet Nam
much more secure from Communist at-
tack than in 1968.
Abrams works in the huge headquar-
ters building of ? MACV (Military As-
sistance Command, Viet Nam), next to
Saigon's airport. He is at work at 7:30
a.m. seven days a week. In his map-
lined office he dips regularly into- one
of the cigar humidors that surround
him. He confers three or four times a
week. with U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth
Bunker, three times with General Cao
Van Vien, the South Vietnamese chief
of staff, and even more often with his in-
telligence officer. Whenever he can, he
choppers to the 'field and once a month
flies to Bangkok. to visit his wife.
After leaving the office, Abrams of-
ten plays a game of badminton with an
aide and then retires to his modular -
housing unit 100 yards from the head-
quarters compound. He seldom attends
parties, and one of his aides claims he
has never seen the rumpled general in
his dress greens. After dinner, he some-
times reads, usually history; his last
books were two volumes of James T.
Flexner's biography of George Wash-
ington and biography
Drinker T3owen's
history of the 1787 Constitutional Con-
vention, Afiracle at Philadelphia. More
often, he si.vitches on his stereo, fre-
quently so loud that visitors have to
ask their host to turn down the volume
in order to hear him.
His taste in: music ruris from Wag-,
ner to Welk, but he is especially fond
of the classics, which may help explain'
why the Armed .Forces Radio Network
doubled its classical programming soon
after his promotion. Abrams often uses
musical terms and once managed to out-
line his whole battle plan for Viet Nairr
with a musical analogy. "A great con-
ductor will rehearse his orchestra until
all the members are skilled enough to
do a perfect .job. That's the way a mil-
itary operation should be regarded. An
air strike or a round of artillery must
come at an exact moment, just as in a
symphony one stroke of a drum must
come at an exact millisecond of time."
.0 Ott ti-rrf
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 :"CIA-RDP80-01601R000700010001-6
The Indispensable Lifeline
T HE current allied offensive got start-
' ed after military analysts warned that
the Communists were engaged in the
'greatest overland supply effort of the
Viet Nam War. Men and material were
being transported, they said, over the
route that had long since become a
kind of guerrillas' Appian Way in South-
east Asia: the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The
U.S. has been interdicting the trail since
1964, and last week completed its 122nd
consecutive day of intensive bombing.
The holocaust has frequently slowed
down the Communists but seems in-
capable of stopping them.
e The trail is like a 4,000-mile spider
web, a tangled maze of routes
ranging from . yard-wide sfoot-
paths to short sections of gravel-
paved highway two lanes wide.
The system threads westward out
of three North Vietnamese pass-
es (the Mu Gia, Ban Karai and
Ban Raving), which cut through
the Ann amese mountains, then
loops south and east for '200
miles, reaching a width of ? 50
ntiles at some points. Studded
with lumpy hillocks, the trail net-
work cuts through the precip-
itous terrain and 'dense, triple-
canopied jungle growth.
?
Traffic down the. trail always
:increases after the monsoon sea-
son ends in September or Oc-
tober. It reaches a peak from
February to April, the last months, when
supplies can leave the north and still
reach their destination before rains again
make the roads impassable .in May. This
year the trail's cargo has become more
vital than ever to the Communists. Since
last March, they have been denied the
use of the Cambodian port of Korn-
pong Som, where. some 75% of the
war material for all of South Viet Nam
used to be shipped by sea. Thus," except
for what they can forage, the some 400,-
000 Communist troops in southern Laos,
Cambodia and South Viet Nam are al-
most totally dependent on the trail for
their supplies and reinforcements.
Troop infiltration, which has run as
high as 17,000 a month in the current
dry season, is hardest to detect. Re-
cruits are marched single file along foot
trails at intervals of five yards, each wear-
ing camouflage greenery. The trip takes
between three and flee months with oc-
casional stops in primitive way stations
for rest and resupply. The attrition rate
due to disease, bombing and deseetion
runs as high as 15%; yet Hanoi keeps
sending replacements.
Truck traffic is equally relentless. Each
night a fleet of some 1,000 convoy
trucks rolls out from hiding placrs in
limestone caves and bunkers and moves
south. Each driver covers the same 15.
to .40-mile stretch of road again. and
again until he can negotiate it blind-
folded. There is a reason for that: head-
lights must be dimmed or even doused
for much of the trip because of ma-
rauding aircraft. At the end of his run,
to see and hear through darkness and
vegetation. Two gadgets that have re-
cently come to public a:tention in con-
gressional testimony:
0- Igloo White is an Air Force ground
sensor system modeled on the Navy's
acoustic submarine detectors. The sen-
sors are dropped during overflights and
either catch in tree branches or bury
themselves in the ground. Two main
types have been used: seismic, which de-
tect, ground movements caused by mov-
ing trucks and even marching soldiers,
and acoustic, which use tiny micro-
phones so sensitive that they can clear-
ly transmit human voices (several con-
versations have been picked up among
Communist troops discussing how to dis-
mantle the sensor). Information from
the sensors is relayed by planes
to ground-based monitors sta-
tioned in South Viet Nam, who
radio the coordinates to an air-
craft for bombing.
t. Pave Way is a targeting sys-
tem using the laser beam. Once
an object has been identified, an
aircraft equipped with Pave Way
can "fix" it with a brilliant laser
light, then release bombs that
are fitted with special light-seek-
ing devices. The bombs are au-
tomatically guided to the, laser-
illuminated target.
The net effect of this massive
effort, by the U.S. military's own
estimate, is to keep about half
of ? the Communists' supplies
from reaching the South. As a re-
sult of the air campaign, U.S.
commanders believe, the Communists
must tightly ration their ammunition,
which helps keep the level of fighting
down. Of course, the Communists have
the advantage most of the time of
being free to set their, own schedule .
for attack. "We make him pay a
price for every ton," says an Air'
Force Spokesman about the enemy.
"But he never runs out of roads. It
just drives you nuts."
The only way to eliminate traffic com-
pletely on the trail, military authorities
argue, is to cut it on the ground. That,
of course, may well be the ultimate
goal of Operation Dewey Canyon IL
The very .fact that a ground operation,
with all the risks it involves, is deemed
desirable by military experts is a trib-
ute to the Communists' herculean ef-
fort to keep the trail open as well as
an admission that even the most mod-
ern airpower has its limits.
HAUSE-INTEREOTO
COMMUNIST SOLDIER IN LAOTIAN W1LDEFNESS
a driver unloads his cargo at a transfer
point and heads back for more. Each sec-
tion, called a binh train (logistical sup-
port) system, is under a separate com-
mand. "The man who runs a binh tram
system is Mr. Greyhound," says a 'U.S.
Air Force officer. "He says 'Send t'lem
down' or 'Hold them.' " Shipping time
for any one load: about two months.
?
To cut off that antlike flow, the U.S.
has committed more than half of its air-
power in Indochina to missions over
the trail?about 380 sorties on an av-
erage day during the dry season. The
raids are conducted by fighter-bombers,
C-119 and C-130 gunships and giant B-
52 Stratofortresses. Often they Must
dodge fire from some 3,000 artillery em-
placements scattered along the trail. In
addition to pilot reconnaissance, the Air
Force is relying increasingly on an ar-
senal of electronic gadgetry developed
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000700010001-6
WASSIITUCW
? Approved For Release 20011O53/04 : C1A-RDP80-0160
STATINTL
PostCr.
recy
_ Ti ?
watching the other side violate Laos' ric;nt-ialitY: This is
So much twaddle.'?.
In. all likelihood we violated Laos' nentrality long be,.
for Hanoi did. We can't .be absolutely sure because
? most Of the half-way reliable information we have about
what goes on in that country COMO. from the other.
side. Washington has never come clean about the alle-
gations that the CIA has pulled two coups d'etat there v
and has twice given out completely fraudulent stories
that Laos was being -invaded by North Vietnam when
it wasn't. That was in 1959 and in 1961.
What is beyondedisptite is that in 1964---seven year's
ago?the United States began aerial -heavy bombard-
ment of Laos. The bast estimates hOld that .we've
dropped more tonnage on this poor (8,Untry than on
either North or South Vietnam. By 1968 we had a radar
base at Pa Thi in northern Laos for the purpose of guid-
ing our bombers on their 'runs into North Vietnam. The
current South Vietnamese invasion represents the third,
mercenary army we've had in there, the first being a
large force of Mao tribesmen and the sBcond the Thai
Army. .?
Trampled on and invaded by Vietnam, North and
South, Thailand, China and the United States, this.
? innocent country has been turned into the Belgium of
the Far East, debimated and ruined because it had the
misfortune to sit on strategically interesting terrain.
Decimated isn't too strong a word. The best figures we
have say that 600,000 people or one quarter of the Lao-
tian population have, been turned into refugees by our
bombardment. One hunched and fifty thousand were
turned into wandering, homeless wretches in '1969 ?
alone. (See The Indocijrc Story:by, the Committee of
? Concerned Asian Scholars, Bantam, 1970, $1.25.)
? He.ree is a description of what's been clone to a part
of the country that's nowhere near the Ho Chi Minh
trail and North Vietnam's line of, military supplies
southward: ". ? It is an agony difficult fcFn an out-
sider to imagine. America*n and Laotian of:OcialS esti-
mate that over the last 10 years 20 per cent of the peo-
ple of northeastern Laos have died in these refugee
marches. The verdant limestone mountains that seem
to have been lifted from, a delicate Chinese scroll are a
cemetery for 100000 peasants! Random air strikes are
always a threat; countless unexploded bombs lie scat-
tered half-buried in. the hills; exhaustion claims the
weaker marchers, epidemics, especially of measles, are
common; and, of course, there is never enough food.".
? ("The Laotian Tragedy; The Long March" by Carl
Strock, originally Printed hi The New Republic, quoted
here from Conflict in Indochina compiled by -Marvin
and Susan Gettleman and Lawrence and Carol Kaplan,
Random House, 1970, $8.95.) ?
This is the reason for the mystery. Shame. This Is
. the reason for embargoes on the news, for trying to
keep reporters and TV cameramen mit. Shame. They're
? ashamed and they don't want the world to know what-
'they've done. They try to hide it; order our soldiers not
..to talk, put them in Civilian clothes and wrap their dead
.bodiesi 'in, foreign insignias.
But the truth: will out and the truth is that our men
lare being ordered to commit acts too awful to be seen
:done ? in tile .unilorm.of our country.
A Comnimtary
?Nicholas von Hoffman
-
The Army is spending $3 million on prime-time TV
? /spots to sell young men on joining up. This may be the
' ultimate test of Madison Avenue's efficacy. Who knows,
maybe they can do it. If they teettld sell lung cancer why
,shouldn't they. be able to merchandise a bullet in the
lie?cl or loss of a log? ?
What might thvse ads contain? They could have Con-
?I 'doing a voice-over about pride in
the military unifOrm while the video shows us reruns
. of those;' American soldiers disguised as civilians sneak-
?? lug into Cambodia. Then they might cut to Melvin Laird
snickering about the incident at a press conference.
If it exists, there's another piece of film footage that
:Would go nicely with the pride in the uniform spiel:
,shots of the dead American soldier stuffed into a South
Vietnamese: uniform being bootlegged back across the
?border from Laos. ?
When the Russians invaded Czechoslovakia it was
o some 'days 'before. the Russian people were let in on it;
the same bolds for us l We had a better chance of learn-
? Ing what was going on by tuning in on a shortwave
? radio ..and dialing Hanoi . or Peking than Washington.
.The Pentagon had _embargoed its shame.
With Laos it has done so for years. The lying, the
misrepresenting, the playing cute with words and tech-
nical el,:pressions have been going on for 15 years. In
:the spring of 1959, when we'd already been in Laos for
? four years, Walter S. Robertson, Eisenhower's assistant
secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs, told a House
subcommittee that we were subsidizing the entire cost
of the Royal Laotian Army "for one sole reason, and
that. is .to try to keep this little country from being
taken over .by the Communists."
Ten years later William H. Sullivan, Nixon's deputy
i'assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific
affairs, told the &mat.? we were secretly bombing Laos
? in order to re-establish operation of the 1962 Gencet,a
agreement concerning that country's neutrality. -This
week's line is that we're doing it to save our boys' lives.
The impression Nixon seeks to give is we've ? only
started bombing and sending in our horde of armed
South Vietnamese. houseboys after years of patiently
?
?
?
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Bo
WASHINC.:11:07.i F.O_ST
Approved For Release 26111/113M047.7CIA-RDp8
STATINTL
ct46--ze
A A u
In
HA
JuA
Piaiies
fli
Hit Laos Post,
Sources Say
SAIGON, Feb. 14 (AP)?
American war planes mis-
takenly .bombed a U.S.
Central Intelligence Agen-
cy base in Laos today, caus-
ing heavy casualties to CIA-
backed guerrilla force
heccbquartered there, relia-
Ide sources reported. -
It was the second. mistaken
bombing reported in a. week
during air operations i a Laos.
I massed along the border for a
drive into Laos, Six men were
.. . .
and armored personnel car-iperiod," said Lt. Gen. Hoang
riers.
. - Xuan Lam, when questioned
killed and 51 wounded.
. .
. The situation at Long 1 A Saigon spokesman said by newsmen about the dura-
Cheng ,.', the keystone of Lao- Highway
' - 9 "is drivable but in- tion of South Vietnamese
Ulm defenses in the north cen- secure." Units in the field re- land operations in Laos. "We
tral section of the country, ap- ported that the highway was will stay until the Ito Chi
peered to be worsening. mined in several spots, further Minh Trail complex is com-
Vang Pao made an urgent endangering the armored col- pletely p a r a 1 y z e d." Lam's
trip to Vientiane to seek rein- umn. ? statement at Khesanh ap-
forcements for the garrison South Vietnamese spokes- peared to be contradictory to
but was reported to have been men in Quangtri, one. of the annouhcerhents by South Viet-
turned down by higher author- rear - operational bases, said namese President Thwu. He
:ities. . . - 343 North Vietnamese had has said the South Vietnamese.
:planned a Laotian campaign
called in after North Vietnam- UPI reported from Saigon
: the U.S. - bombers were been killed in the drive.
ese troops launched heavy that the commander of South Of "ltraited ditration.,"
rocket, mortar and ground as- Vietnamese forces in Laos
isaults against the base. Sonic said Sunday that his troops are
! of them drove through the prepared to stay there until
I perimeter. . the Ho Chi Minh Trail is shat-
Reports from Vientiane said tered. "It will not be a short
elements of at least two North
Vietnamese divisions, totaling
about 6,000 troops, have sur-
rounded Long Cheng,
Yang Pao is reported to
have about 6,000 Meo tribes-
men_ under his command in
the Long Cheng area plus two
Thai artillery batteries.
Yang Pao is -reported lobe
considering whether to make
a last ditch stand at Long
U.S. Air Force F-4 Phantom Cheng or to withdraw into the
fighter-bombers were trying to hills.
drive back a North Vietnam- In southern Laos, other U.S.
ese attack when their bombs bombers roamed across the
dropped on the CIA compound east-west axis of the Ho Chi
and airstrip at the Long Minh Trail attacking North
Cheng base, the sources said. Vietnamese mountain hideouts
The base, 78 miles northwest overlooking Highway 9 on the
of Vientiane, is the headquar- approaches to the town of Se-
ters; of Gen. yang Pao's CIA- pone.
backed guerrilla army. South Vietnamese head-
quarters said the main column
jThe informants told Asso-
ciated Press correspondent J. was within 12 miles of Senone,
T.. Wolkerstorfer in Vientiane 25 miles from the Vietnamese
?that the American barracks border. South Vietnamese re-
was burned down and at least
one CIA agent was wounded. connaissance teams have been
.
Other bombs reportedly moving in and out of the dev-
started fires in Long Chong astated town, and infantrymen
town. have ,been patrolling to the
' The U.S. Command in Sal- 'north and south to secure the
;gon acknowledged that a flight flanks.
of F-4 Phantoms dropped Associated Press cure-
bombs short of the intended spondent Michael Putzel re-
'enemy target. A spokesman ported frotn Quangtri in
northern South Vietnam that il
said there were casualties to
,"an unknown number of South Vietnamese convoys i
friendly troops." He said the were remaining south of the :
incident was under inVesti-
border, the third successive
gation.
day without a border crossing.
i
This led to speculation that
: Although the )
fighter-ho 1
111 " the North Vietnamese hild cut
era came from bases in Thai- highway 0 behind the advanc-
land, they are under the tacti- jug South Vietnamese tanks
cal control of the U.S: 7th Air
ForcC. in South Vietnam.
A week ago, a U.S.' Navy
fighter-bomber mistakenly
dropped scores of tiny liombs
the size of and ennades _on ?
South , _ vj. pOveclotpr Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP.80-01601R000700010001-6
r-----,
. :
----I ' ....?
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-
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at.?
,....,-. elg Chem' base is run by ',This is- the secon,l time in a
- rreo these Dire! e _
the CIA: It ps the headquarters year that sappers have entered
? 7 "? ' flown by : ?
, t Americans cr Laos; for two U.S. operations, one of the base. It is rocketed Ere:vont-
- "Otlier ai1j_.'.;.4sIstanco" was them intellig,ence gathering,. I, y also.
,t 'CaPOCT 101., a --UFS,C,L.6,ffiCial . cicI Long Clieui houses monitoring Each time Long Cheng is hit,
i assistaike v..iet-V0 U.S. An equipment f-er. listening., to Ila-
niorgOicio flee a,h(l Meoseldiers
Vo..c.0 F4 pianos. . ? not's. communications in?Wortli eft, -',7 ? families.
;1
FN rri
rtlit 1:-1`
- An American on the ground in
; (77' ril...;., . n Chug fired a varker
?;. .
t.,...I...I-':ll.,il ,1 .flare, causing one F4 to dro.d a
I. It...., 1..? ii f. ,..: 4 ii \-,1 :.?.? ?1- - e 1. - , - . T
ti, lz,Lik..A. of oomos on Long Chong
lin error.
, 33y TAVAIY ARSUC-ii.E ? I
sprcial io Y112 Star . . Patrols Pursue Sappers
?
VIENTIANE ---.1-4-nig elsing, lI The fighting ceased at 8:-10
the American lioatiartitcs in ia.m., with guerrilla patrols
northe.en Laos, has. 'peen badly pushing south after the. szLppors.
daimiged as ? a re salt 9f a North
Vietnamese sapper attack and a Sr 11 said the North Viet-
- mistitkerr bombardment by U.S. narn?,-sc. .,r,arel'...a.,t. . at,1,(IZI.,?,.,1:Prwf..iir,.c..
plates. :. ? . . apparently N.i.s on,...t,e L.,ciu
rr: :? , ? -.sively at the U.S. compound
...American and Lao o?,ektd_, vs,h,,,,e 20 Americans aro Eying.
'reporting yesterday's. incidents, ,The American houses, built of
Laos said the medical ware- stone and wood, went .up in
house t.,.as destroyed, a Thai dames-. Dc5troyed were the .of..
. artillery position overlotiking the ficers quarters', the American
`11'stril) \''''?'s ovelT1-111 mid a- La?. Club and the Air A.mericia Ns:.
1
-105 rain. howitzer was detroyed. tacwant.
vii"ses iqll. 11-yleCelltral iilleell,i,l, Tile American who was woand-
. .
glil.tele,geAr`: eil)la' compoundAmc.rleci-j,- ill'10-1:1"i-, ed NYOS hit by shrannel from. an
' toring equipment., ammunition 82 mm. mortar round.
and fuel dumps survived. - . The Americans sought shelter
Casualties are reported t6 be in a 'partially built bunker,
at least 30 dead and more film; Inc civilian casualties 21?Y)n-
100 wourAd. -casualties 0111:131 resulted from .the delayed
were civilians, and one Ano-A., action fuses on the bombs. The.
. can was reperrtcd wounded. Mcos in the village were net
aware that the bOrilb3 which had
."We don't know yet Who w:33 dropped
res..ponsPolti *for what darn n r;.e,"woulda U.S. Etabassy explede later, Pnd so were sur
-
when asked \vhether the damage. prised by Inc delayed action, -
was caused by the saopers. or Reinforcements Reported
Viotnarn end Laos. A veritable
As :the Lt'co quit Long Cheng,
forest of aeriala. rises from the the apilal, they .move south-
American compound at the endi. ea..,2,t, leaving the way op-,,n for
or Long Cheng's main airstdp. Hanoi to hit yang vieng and
I CIA "case officers" deal with vicntiane.
? rteillgees, recruit spies to re,iffn virtually certain that the
to enemy-held territory and run,,squabbling- and. inefficient Lao
f?r ar111111:i the Ceipm.vnists, unhappy Lao
a parachute factory
tees. .
eiviliaa; officials say, because
The second CIA operatio.a in- many, s:oldiers are tired and
various' benefit Projects Such enefals will not be able to stop
vol.,,es.running a purely thil,t-FY. jon't wantto fight for the genn
e,
operation. Military men working _is
for the agency lead teams on --- IlL._
ground sabotage missions iii
Laos and ci,on LAO
North Viet-
- n m.
An)cricans have ,loll cont-
. ;nand control, everyone :spoken
with, from Lao generals to army
radio operators, says.
The commander at. Lon,",. , 2
Cheng is the CIA Station'ohler, ? 17
not the leader bf the Moos, Gen.
I Van Pao, US. sources say.
I The -CIA apparently got into
' the war business because, the.
Johnson admiiiistration wanted
I to hide U.S.- involvement in the
Laotian war. This made it im-
nossible to use U.S. military .
who, Americans say, would need
more personnel.
American officials Jpere say
President Nixon continued to. use
the agcnck because toiput U.S.
the air strike, but it appeared per_OhS ict,t si.,011%. military forces into Laos would
that 'most of the casualties 're- . ens: ?., he. e,...-drary to his Indochina
N
suited from the bombing. a Champasssel, and Pit:1111.er -t-vithdrawal policy.
Souvanna Phounna say T,ao rein.
And the use of the CIA allowed -
- Mortars Launch Attack . forcemeuts are being sent to the admini3tration to stop sena-
Long Chong, but Lao sources tors worried of American in-
close to Souvanna deny this. veivernent from probins, too ?
They say the only available deeply.
troops belong to Gen. Kouprasith The fall of Long Cher.* would
and Gen. Bounplione, the 5th and plac-e. the U.S. in a difficUlt posi-
3rd Military region command..., r the U.S. command will
.ers. They are rivals for the soon he Iflan,cd by the Laotians for
to become vacant post of army the failure.
commander in chief, a job As the- U.S. leads, traiff: and
-which, in view of Sout'anna's pays' the and other-tribal
shaky position,_coulChlead,to Ike -troops at C7neng, the blame
, premiership. Because of this, would be niffic.tiit ?i?D Wiggit?. cut
-they are unwilling to commit of. ? ?
-By .5;30 a.m. the airstrip was troops. ? . Sunday's s.:poer attack proved .
cleared of ConmeuniA troops "Long Cheng is zm American just how deeply the North Viet--
and Tn.divehorcL730:`:3 WC{ off, affah? anyway," a Lao aurny if naTrlese haverat6d the
brinehri airoower be;.tr. t ficer said, reflecting the opinion Mao hill country and indicated
cr'nN-'latL':-Apiseoved'EcWRettiatelociliowo4 : 1A0 6paitgaifki5oo7oom 0001-6.
. ?
Officials gave this sequence
of events:,. -
The sapper attack began at 4
a.m. yesterday with "very ac-
curate" mortar shelling.
This was followed by an as-
sault by an estimated 130 North
Vietnamese. About :A minutes of
combat followed in which the
11,1co troops defending Long
Cheng, .according to U.S. offi-
cials,,"foughl-; very well."
Approved For Release 2091/03/04 :"CIA-RDP80S-Or461461)
01-liCAGO, ILL.
SU,N?TIMES
?
541,086
S 697,966
-
0
tj p tin 1
'o" L/
1771.1 .r/ 17 1
11 Li- 1' k?\ I.
U:11 Li CI
royal Laotian army, who sought to undermine.
neutralist Prince Souvanna Phouroa, then and
now the prime ministein
When President John F. Kennedy took of-
f ice in 1931, the general's troops were being -
routed by the Communist Pathet. Lao and the
North Vietnamese. The fall of Vientiane, the
capital, seemed imminent.
One of Kennedy's first Oficial acts was to
ask his military advisers to draw up a plan
for saving Laos. They recommended the in-
troduction of U.S. and, if possible, other for-
? eigintroops. But he could not get assurances
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff that U.S. forces
would be able to repel the Communists with-
out resort to tactical nuclear weapons. ?
And so, Kennedy shelved the military plan
- and launched- the diplomatic initiative that
led to the 1962. Geneva (Switzerland) accords, '
? establishing Laos asna neutral nation with a
coalition government, including the commu-
nists.
?
North Vietnam, however, quickly violated
the agreement and the United States followed
suit, .expanding its CIA and military oper-
ations, -
By 1959 the U.S. involvement was so deep
that Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), who con-
ducted the inquiry for the Foreign ? Relations
Committee,. expressed fear that the United .
States had become committed to Laos' sur-
But William H. Sullivan, ? deputy _assistant
secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific ".
.affairs, insisted: "Currently, we believe we
have no commitment in Laos. Our actions y
could be reversible today."
Symington retorted: "Don't let's get into a
square dance about it, a semantic square
to support Gen. Phourni Nosavan; chief of the. &rim"
????
-By Thomas B. Ross
. Sun-Times Bureau
WASHINGTON ? The U.S. involvement in
'
[Laos, farfrom being a new development .,..has
?a long-and costly history.? .
fn 'The State Department acknowledged, in
.heaVily censored testimony released last year
:by the Senate. Foreign Relations Committee,
that the United. States spent ,more than $1 bil-
? lion in. Laos between 1962 and 1969. Itnalso lost
A00 men, dead or missing, and 380 planes.
'Before that, it is reliably estimated, anoth-
er bo,If a billion dollars were expended in se-?
eret operations dating back to the French
?vithdrasval in 1954.
The ? U.S. government has consistently
sought to conceal, its role in Laos and the
Nixon administration has faithfully followed.
'the practice since the start of the incursion
into Laos last Monday.
. "There are no U.S. ground troops or 'ad-
111SerS being committed to the ARVN (South
Vietnamese army) operations in Laos," says
. White House press sec'retary Ronald L. Zieg-
ler.
The statement appears on quick reading to .
be all-inclusive, but en closer study turns out
Eto concede the possibility that U.S. military
? and paramilitary personnel may have been
"committed" to other operations in Laos.
V ?-? In fact, army Special Forces teams and
Central Intelligence Agency units have been '
PVIao?s?ror several years. Most have been
operating on the old battlefield in northern
Laos but sonttz.have been ? and evidently
still are ? in the imthecliate vicinity of the
South Vietnamese incursion.
The CIA has been involved in Laos since
the late 1950s. Its first major undertaking was
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rEa YOiK TIM4i3S -
? Approved For Release 200110p96: 9)!A-RDsPT8A0T-IM1
. ..Rockets Hit Laotian Base
VIENTIANE, Laos, Feb. .13
(AP)----Five enemy rockets hit
? Long Tieng during the night,
killing one Laotian and wound-
ing one.
Several buildings were dam-
aged at. the base, which is
supported by the United States
? Central Intelligence Agency
and is the headquarters of
Gen. Vans Pao's Meo guerrilla
'army.
Refugees continued to leave
. Long Tieng, but authoritative
sources said reports that 20,000
to 30,000 were fleeing the city
were greatly exaggerated.
?? They said refugees also were
'leaving Ban Na, Sam Thong and
other towns in the area south-
'west of the Plaine des :Tures,
with the total number of
refugees possibly approaching
- those figures.
Later reports told of ground
fighting and continued shelling
around Long Tieng during the
i
day. Long Tieng s 78 miles
north of Vientiane.
. Several planes of Air Amer-
ica, a private airline whose
principal client is the C.I.A.
took ground fire in the Long
? Tieng area. Pilots asked for
tactical air support from the
'United States Air Force. Some
pilots were said to be refusing
to fly into the area unless they
got such support.
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111"::Yrc
STATINTL :" ""--
Approved For Release 209110n :IMAIR
0
? 11 i 7 friTh f 10 ,r7A)
11
J
7
ft 11 11-.1 r 0
f7
? 7T12/1 CS3 . 7/1/,r
tJcy Cif>i
/hi of "7
(c) _
?fro -I J-71 r
By Peter A. Jay " Finally, there
lapse of the government's
. Washing:toil Post Forelvn S'orvIce
? .VIENTIANE, Feb. 13?In. hqes for peace talks?or at
Airport- least "talks about talks" that
Vientiane's Wattay
there is a small sign above could eventually. lead, to se-
Ilse immigration . Counter rio-us negotiation.ajAan end
toliostilities..Arthough pre-
. with this qi.Cotation front
dismissionsinst fall
' Buddha Ilaired n e v c r ' liniinarY
ceases . 'by haired at any ..g,hv'e rise to a flicker of opti-
'S.:ism about peace talks,
time . -: . Hatred 'ceases by
prOgress toward negotiation
'love.. This is the eternal
. ......, e. _- 1 ? 'has'halted in recent weeks.
law."
?
One ? of the clifficulties
. It is a .hopeful little- sign, '-
.,a ? peaceful .credo for a with the -war- in Laos, for
Buddhist people and
1 ii lt 1. 1 Ci Isi . diplomats as well as journal-
given: to war, 1 is that. it is all but im-
thoughtfully Written in Eno-' is:s,
possible to travel about the
lish and French, as well OS
country and find out first-
Lao.' But despite the Bud-
hand what is going on,
dha's eternal law, the war
So the capital serves as a
. goeS.on in Laos as ithas for.
whispering post, where in-
the past 10 years, and the
formation both solid and
.prospects for an end to it i.
1 is constantly traded
. lo.ol`s dimmer than they have s'i.a-'y
and the journalists buzzing
In some tune. from embassy to embassy
"I would go so far as to serve as crmss.pollenators of main at Long cheng, Air- to talk with King Savang
.say the situation is desper- Craft based there are flown vattubana, the figureh6.'d
rumor. - .
ate!" said an American offic-
ialvhd in. the past has tend- The conventional wisdom out at night. ruler whose forebears have
o . here is that the South Viet- Gen. Vang Pao asked the
ed .to ? put. a bright face on namese invasion of: the Ho Premier this week for re- occupied the throne since
4nOst events here. . ' Chi Minh Trail, mildly pro- inforcerne.nts f r o m the the 18th Century.
The troubles facing the tested by Loyal Laotian army,'a rag-- T.h e ambassador visited
, . Souvanna
nentralist. government ? ?I plic,iima, may actually have tag force, with an official the king . to warn him to
Prince S?uvanna Plmurna, strenothened the premier's strength of 56,000. There was
leave the city before the
In- the eyes of most diplo- - . : no . indication today how
hand.
mats here the last hope for ? _ main attack began; one
For most of the pressure much help, if any, he will re
'even a token stability - theory ran. But in true Lao-
Laosinon Sonvanna has come from &lye. ? . .
?, are at least threefold. .right-wing generals, most of . - It is generally believed in tian fashion, therer.'-was an
? .. There is, the border incur- equally popular'' counter-
slop.
from the southern Vientiane that Souvanna
?slon. A - Week ago, South provinces of Laos. who want could weather the loss of theory available: that the
. Vietnamese. t r o op a drove him to abandon his neutral- Long. Chomg, but that. aban- visit was not to warn the '
?Icross the frontier into the ist. position and to take a donmenti of the base would, king, but to reassure him
rtigged, misty
border ec'un7 stronger stand against the be a serious psychological that no attack was planned.
try Southeast of here to at- Communists. ? setback moth for the regular . Generally, the. projection
tack North Vietnamese sane-. But the recurrent talk of army and for the Meos, the offered by most resident
. tuary areas that had been a coup against Souvanna has tough tribesmen who for .diplomatic observers here
The been . muted slightly by the years have carried the brunt for Laos is simply more of
, there for - a decade. h
.?moYe brought the Vietnam border operation. . of the fighting in Laos. the same: a war that waxes
war directly and irrevocably"The generals feel the. The critical period for the and wanes with the mon.
Into Laos, which already ,
pressure has been taken off base is bet,,veen now and soon, but does not end.
had a war of its own. them a bit by the South Vi- the end of May, when the . "This is still a sideshow to
There is the deteriorating etnamese," said one for.eign iodzis begin in Laos and the the real war," a 'Western am-
military situation in the military observer, not air Pathet Lao haVe difficulty. bassader said, "If we left it
..noribern half of Laos:- American. "Of course,". he moving supplies. In the past, up to the Laotians, they'd ?
Ati.Ont 90 miles north of : added, "a coup is really ins- the ' government has man- end it. But until. the Viet-
. hee., the Communist Pathet 'possible unless the Amen- aged to retake a certain namese and 'tire Americans
.I.,a, and their North viet- cans support it, 'and they've amount of territory in the settle things, there's not
. narisese allies are massing made it crystal clear to the wet season that it lost dur- much hope for peace here."
.apihat the g,overnment out- generals that they won't." ing the dry. . o,...._. , .
post ofLong Cheng: ' , ?.A
me Americans are cora- ? ? Souvanna has long be Solir.anna Appeats -
Long Cheng, built and pie.tely committed to Son- lieved, his close a'seociat s
? - supported by the U.S. Cen- e' 1701. T al I., Fith PefF
vanna and believe that only say, that a . satisfactory ? ''' ''.
tra';. Intelligence Agbney, chaos could follow him. . agreement Could be reached VIENTIA7-i-E, Feb. 13 (AP)
? ha been the center of the. One source at the U.S. em- and r&sintained with the Pa- --Premier S o u v -a n is a
bassy, asked What he would thet Phourna?has.again called for:
.
0\ Ci war effort in Lao?led by his half
Laos. It is widely do if the 69-year-old premier brother, Prince SouphanOu- serious discussions with his
believed here that the 1)se.. sl' die or resign, von'o--if it were not for.the half brother, Pellet Lao
Mr curl, theApprome fair qc rytO -ettwecm,mlivh.wu?Pguit..ttt e.89411601R001170001010G1A -
leader Prince ?Souphanou-
' Will be lost tills year--if riptio?blutikcsi at_114.o,,t,,ligtholipt ,e- . enti-throvNt. ,-n n
? clm'ped. ? ??1 said..?? ,el.namese were considering .
- P ??411W-00.
is the col- ' "He's in a Churchillian leaving ....
nsood," said a friend of the Laos alone, they
the wall now, but he's de- can't titiloo\i?1'..bOiatiian dtihpeltTiaatsk 3C: ed..
prince. "He's got his back to
I think he's. enjoying it." ec et in, ttilt6s`e`WittLtilislei tramping
tai til \:-1 id:
ci ded to stand and fight, and
. The -fall of.. Long Cheng ; on the Ho Chi Minh Trail,
tue
should it 'occur, May have tplil?ces's'islircitlavseotolsoews,htee.ii).e, up and .
serious political implications
. - There -- Pre? indications north Laos .las. the likely
for Souvanna; .
States prepared to let the
that:the United--.-; -place."
. There has been inerease.d -
o. ? ?
ho\vever,
hase--the home of Gen. :skirmishing O: around the
tilla army of .Meo hill cows-
ciA. r Yal capital of Luang rra.
and speculation
equipped, and trained guer- e"tialle'
ang, 150 miles north of.Vi-
Vang Pao and his -
try tribesmen--be taken that the Pathet Lao might
attempt to take the old eitY
-.?
'..Tons' of equipment have and use. the vie;tors
without a last-ditch struggle. ..?oas a bar-
been removed, several thou- gaining point,in some subse-
sand civilians--the farnilii quent egotiation.
n
of the Meo soldiees?have high point several days ago
Thisconjeeture reached a
moved out, and only a hand.: when the Soviet ?ambass-adbr
flit of Americans now 're- travelled to Luang Prabang
-STATINTL
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edA Said To Ta
CIA Bose
Laotian Town Contained The United States is providing
Command Post Of
Meo Guerr 'Has
? --
Saigon, Feb. 12 (Reuter?The
Central Intelligence Agency cen-
ter for operations in Laos at
Long Cheng fell to the North
Vietnamese tonight in a signifi-
cant new escalation of the war namese troops. This could not
in Laos, reliable sources said be confirmed in Vientiane.
here. Sporadic shelling was report-
A substantial movement of
refugees from Long Cheng sig-
paled the fall of the town, which
is 60 miles north. of Vientiane,'I
the administrative capital.
Long Cheng, was the head-
quarters of the CIA-backed Meo
guerrillas of pro-government)
Gen. yang Pao.
The. nearby base and refugee
camp at Sam Thong fell to
North Vietnamese and pro-Corn
munist Pathet Lao troops last
year, but they later abandoned
it. ?
.More Serious
But the news today is regard-
ed by observers in Saigon as
'more serious, ? because of the
current incursion into southern
Laos by South. Vietnamese
. forces.
? There was little other infor-
mation here about the fall of the
town just south of the Plain of
Jars. The refugees began leaving
there five days ago.'
According to informed sources
in Vientiane, some women and
children still remained in Long
Cheng and stores were open.
About 40,000 people live in Long
Cheng and hamlets along the
valley.
The CIA turned the once quiet
town into a Meo base to direct
General yang Pao's operations
against the Communists.
air support against Communists
in the area but there were no
new reports in Vientiane today
of large-scale North Vietnamese
build-ups.
Earlier this week American
sources reported that Long
Cheng and the neighboring town
of Sam Thong were beseiged by
a large number of North Viet:
ed around a refugee center.
about 19 miles east of Long
Cheng Thursday night but there
were no reports of casualties,
according to military sources.
Small clashes were reported
elsewhere in the country be-
tween North Vietnamese and
-Laotian government troops, in-
cluding one near the highway
linking Vientiane with the royal
capital of Luang Prabang to the
northwest.
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STATI NTL
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... .. Ti .
' The -Vietnain war is in reality an Indochinese war, with Laos noli) receiving consideitble
attention. In the following article, Guardian staff correspondent Wilfred Burehett traces. '
. the Laotian struggle for litdependenee and self-detertnina.tion from 1955 to the present.;
. .. .
' By Wilfred Burchett
Paris
. ? Just 15 years ago, 1 was present ,at the birth of the
Nob -Lao liakSat (NLIIS), or Lao Patriotic Front.
'Looking back, I realize it Was ,an occasion .of?a?-!,ieat
historical importance. mfcca
f
had taken many days on horseback- froni..1.1tIke
Vietnamese frontier to arrive at &jungle clearing, deep in
Sam 'Neua prOvjmie, where there were freshly bUilt
baPaboo halls and hostels for meetings and housing
.. ?
: delegates. ?
At that period, the political expression of the Pathet
Lao armed forces was the Neo ?Lao ? Itsala (Free Laos
Front), which. ht:d been forme, in August 1945 to
organize an uprising against tne Japanese and the
remnants of.. the old French colonialist administration.
When the French staged their comeback into Indochina,
it was the. No Lao :Itsala that organized and 1;cd the
.? armed .resistance in .Laos: Side by side with the Viet-
namese ' arid Cambodian resistance, the - Vietminh and
Klurtv Issayak, the Neo Lao Itsala fought until the 1954
???Qoneva Agli-eements ended the 'fighting and guaranteed
.the independence of each of the three countries of
% ?.
' Indochina. -
?
. Becini\ing of U.S. activity
To -facilitate a ceasefire in Laos and a political
? settlement With t4 .government set up by the French in
Vientiane, the Pathet Lao armed forces were to with-
draw from their main basic areas and concentrate in the
twd northern provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Saly,
both bordering on North Vietnam. But in '1955, after a
visit by U.S. Secretary of 'State John Foster Dulles, the
right wing government in Vientiane under Katay violated.
the ceasefire agreements by attacking Sam Neua in an.
? attempt. to exterminate the Pathet ? Lao forces. This
. marked the beginning of attempts by successive U.S.-
backed right wing governments to physically destroy the
-forces of the Laotian revolution. ? ?
By the time we were 'unsaddling our ponies in the
first days -of January 1956 at the jungle congress site, it
was clear .that the pattern unfolding in Laos was
- following that of South Vietnam, where Ngo Dinh Diem
at U.S. behest had already torn up a major part of the
? Geneva- Agreements by refusing to hold the consultative
? .conference to. arrange the July 1956 nation-wide elec-
tions. It was in anticipation of 'tough times ahead that a
congress had been called to bro'aden the Neo Lao Itsala
into a' new body that. could encompass the broadest
? - ?? -- ?
? possible . sections of the Laotian people and mobilize
' . them for the tasks ahead. . . .........,
? Under the chairmanship of prince Souphanouvong, a
sturdy figure, deeply tanned from his 10 years of leading
:the armed struggle, delegates_ of the various political,
? religious, racial and social groups presented reports or
commented on the various documents that had been
..dr 19 6 t
?afted. It was on the night of Jan. 6, , an
?
unforgettable outdoor meeting in the light of flaming coups of the: CIA' and the local U.S'. puppets against
bamboo torches, that the formation of a now front, the neutralist regimes.
o Lao Ha' C., w ae (rpm it?41e,t4!1
?
spent in committee sessions, delegates wGrliang out the ? ? ? ?
best means ? of -implementing decisions. in ,their
areas. On Jan. 12 an appeal was approved at another,
plenary session. A glance at some of the points of that
1956 appeal testifies to the political Wisdom and
foresighfof Souphanouvong and his comrades.
? ? ? -
"E')E.'%a vou s ?. n.
"The United States imperialists and pro-U.S'. elements.
are considering signing a U.S.-Laos military.. pact...."
[The Katay government 'Was preparing tolign such a
pact, which would .have been a flagrant violation of the-
Geneva Agreements, but before this occurred, Katay was
replaced by prince Souvanna Phouma, in those days a
pro-French noutr-alist. France was vigorously opnosini2
an American takeover.] "In order to drag our country
into the aggressive SEATO bloc," continued the appeal,
"and to transform our country into a military base and
U.S. neo-colony, .they are preparing., to rekindle the
Indochina war and condemn us to slavery and poverty.
It is clear?fileir intentions are to sabotage peace and use
'Laotians to fight- Laotions' to achieve their bellicose
plans. U.S. imperialism and the pro-U.S. elements are the ,
most dangerous enemies of our nation at the oresent
time.
w???
"Under such circumstances, the immediate tasks for
the entire nation are:
? "To unite in a broad, national .united front to
strictly apply the Geneva Agreements; to promote peace,
-independence; democracy and national reunificatioit
. ? "To consolidate and expand our people's patriotic
forces an make of them ?a solid source, of support for our
people's political struggle. . ?
? "To seek the sympathy and support of peace-loving
people throughout the world."
The congress which set up the Lao Patriotic Front ?
elected a -central committee, headed by prince Sou-
?phanouvong. After the conclusion of the meetings,. the
delgates dispersed to the four corners of Laos to set up -
local branches of the NLIIS.
The ups and downs of the struggle that followed, the
agreements signed and tori 2 up by various U.S.. puppets
in Vientiane; the painstaking efforts of the NLI-IS leaders
to bring abortt lasting national reconciliation; the cloak-
'and-dagger U.S. intervention in Laos before the stage of
open- ar,ression?all, this has been discussed in detail and
? documented in my book, "The Second Indochina War,''
which also relates the story of the coups and 'counter-
616n/j)
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./
Key Biscayne, FM., Feb. 12 (Special)?The White House denied again today
that any American ground combat troops or advisers were involved in tl)Le, South Viet-
? namese invasion of Laos, but yefused to comment on whether there were-any'rclandes- -
tine United States intelligence operations going on in that country.
.?. "I'm not. going to discuss int,)..1-..-;.`: - . _
4igence operations" in Laos, said l 'etone when he was 'asked about and then follow another policy.".
-h.
,Presidcntial Press Seel:at:UT ir,011- i?dip and television reports from Ziegler said thathU.S. military '
?.a1d Ziegler. .."The operations . . . Saigon that U.S. troops had been officials in Salgonitwere ?investi-
. .
. do not apply to ARVN (South seen across the border in the gating the televiiiOnr and radio.
?'Vietnarnest, Army) operations in area of South Vietnamese opera- reports. But, he cfrefiasized, "We.
the southern panhandle (of Laos).
' They are not in any way relative Lions. ADO Radio re.porbid that are not stating poliey and then
the body of an American soldier
to s.outhern Laos." attempting to move through little .
wearing a South Vietnamese loopholes in that policy. Reports
?- ' Training the. Guerrillas uniform had been evacuated from that suggest the Contrary are
? ?:- There have long been rumors-7- Laos. A film report on CBS
I somewhat distorted. Our policy
showed U.S. troops being landed
frequently .denied by the Penta- ; has been settled and ,will -be fol-
. -gon and .the White House--that apparently inside Laos, to guard lowed all the way dowi tbc. line."
a downed helicopter.
Green Berets and CIA agents are
At the Sani time,.Ziogler read
. in Laos to train guerrillas of the Reports Are "Distorted" a little lecture to DCWSInen in'
Royal Lztos Army. In a Senate sub- "Films can always be mislead- connection with prgss reports
. committee report last week, Sen. in g," Ziegler said. "I have said on from Laos: "It is 1-16 justifiable
Edward M. Kennedy CD-Mass.) many occasions that there are no that those who can Communicate
'charged, and the State Depart, U.S. ground combat forces or ad- to the American .pecpple suggest
,ment did not entirely deny, that visors in the ARVN operations in that. the American government is
up to half the U.S refugee aid Laos. We would have no motiva- stating one policy and following
'funds 'for Li:os were, being spent tion to state that policy as cute- another."
:by the-CIA to train Laotian guer-
rillas. gorically as we have stated it, --Frank. Jackman
}3esides denying any involve-
ment of American ground combat
forces in Laos, the White House
said that the South Viet-
namese operations there posed
"absolutel no threat" to Cora-
-munist China. This was in re-
sponse to reports yesterday from
Vientiane that -Laotian Premier
;Souvanna Phourna feared Red
Chinese intervention if it ap-
peal-ed that South Vietnamese
troops might be on the verge of
cutting the Do Chi Minh Trail.
Ziegler's remarks on Laos
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5p12.1 to ri"Io New yirk TItuts
VIENTIANE, Laos, Feb. 12? thimonstrated yesterday by the
Laos declared a state of. emer- adoption . of a communiqu6i
gencyrtoday and transferred in- dealing with the incursion thiS ?
ternal security .matters from week into Laos by South
Viet-
the police to military. officers. namese 'troops. The com-
A Government statement said munique' was. in .roughlY the
that the change had'ilgNittriacle same terms as those used Mon-
because of "reent A?i;'-e.lop- day in a declaration by Pre-
meni:s.in the military sitnation." mier ? souvannaP11001 It
This: has been marked by The communiqu6 said - that
mounting pressure from Corn- the incursion had violated the
inunist troops in northern Laos, Geneva agreement of '1962,
Where the royal .capital of which called for no foreign
'Luang ?Prabang, and the *Sam troops in Laos, but said that
ThoO-Long Tieng area SO miles the incursion had been a con-
north of Vientiane are threat- sequence of continuous viola-
ened.? -tions by North Vietnamese
? Long Ticng is the base for an troops.
. rmy of irregulars that is main- The declaration of a state
tamed by the United States of emergency, signed by Prince
V Central Intelligence Agency. Souvanna Phouma, gave - Gen.
The order for an emergency, Quane Rathikoune, commander
decided upon at a Cabinet of the armed forces, the power.
meeting Yesterday, gives in-, to take measures necessary for
creased Powers to the military general security throughout La..
but falls short of martial law. os.
Oyer-all authority remains in A high Government source
,the hands of the civil autlipri.? said that the state of Mar-
;ties headed by the Premier, zency would increase'. disci-
'Prince Souvanna Phomna. pline arid facilitate mobilia
The order is believed to rep-,t10,1.
'resent a compromise between! The government order ecu-
the Premier. and more militantItioned the people against be-
civilians and military officers ing unduly excited by the move
who _think that his maintenance and said ,"events are not dra-
of .a neutralist stance and his 'natio."
sporadic peace negotiations
with the Communist-led Pathet
Lao have. weakened the Gov.
ernment's prosecution of the
War. ?
As a result of the compro-
mise,. observers.. here believe
that Government unity has
been improved at a. time of
crisis. The observers especially
- note that talk about a rightist
takeover has stopped.
:The unity of the cabinet was
STATINTL
? fe e? ?
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Sp,cial to. Thi Ni",7 Yak Tirr.,:s -.
VIENTIANE, Laos, Feb. 11---
With enemy forces threatenin
the Government strongpoints o
;Sam Thong and Long 'hong
20,000 to. 30,000 civilians BS
reported on the move from th
.. area near the Plaine des Jarres
: SO miles north of here.,
1 They are among the 223,000
,refugees being fed, clothed and
'T sheltered under the United
'States. aid program for Laos.
United States planes are drop-
ping supplies to the refugees
daily as they make their way
:in groups along mountain paths
to new home sites they have
picked in the mountains 1,5 to
25 miles south and southwest
Of Sam Thong and Long Tieng.
? Many made the, same trek
last year and then returned aft-
.
,' er the failure of an enemy drive;
, against the twin positions that
guard the _approaches to the
Vientiane plain.
'Tlje refugees are mainly old
' men, women and children of
, the Meo and other hill tribes.
YouhEr.,er men of the tribes are
at Long Tieng, Sam Thong and
surrounding posts in the Lao-
tian. forces of the Mco leader,
Mal: Gen. Vang Pao, whose
? ' speclal commando-type . units
are supported by guerrilla-war-
\I faro: vecialists of the Ameri-
can .Central intelligence Areii-
cy and supplie71 by. United
, States transport planes.
Arncrtcan aid sources here
say the refugee departure is
leisurely. Now experienced at
feeling a war zone, the evacu-
ees are leaving in good time
before the big attack comes.
But their departure, appar-
ently v,lt.h the advice of Gen-
eral yang Pao and his officers,
is regarded as indicative of
how serious i3 the threat to
Sam Thong and Long Tieng.
Several thousand North Vi-
etnamese and. pro-Communist
Pathet Lao forces are now at-
tacking outlyin,-- defenses of
the.P,vo mountain towns daily.
Soma points have fallen and
the environs of the two towns
have been shelled.
In normal times Long Tieng
has a population of ?around 30,-
000. Sam Thong is sOinewhat
smaller.
In response to :an appeal
from General yang Pao, rein-
forcements are being sent to
him from the Vientiane area,
according to?reliable sources
here, t and United ? States
and Laotian planes are step-
ping up the bombing of enemy
areas.
It was announced here to-
day that enemy forces threat-
ening Luang Prabang have cc-.
cupied another Government-
held ?strongpoint 18 miles north
f the royal capital.
TI.
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1.1?`
? 0 . 1 In the sciuth, government
Li oops are ilf:ogal to protect..
? it \Li .U.LJ Jowns ? in the Mbkong River'
1Valey, and Cann'Ot be released
' to aid Long Cheng.
The o lb o to lug back-
?
tIlii ii,
)1.
r/I\
. ?
? Cd
rr: .17
.1
By Peter. A. Jay
Washily;ton Pct l'oreizu ERIrvice
? are working on a.third in the..
VIENTIANE, Feb. 11?Prince Souvanna Phouma, the general direction of the Thai
premier of Laos, is telling diplomats here that he be-
border.
lieves it is highly possible.. that Communist Chinese
There is ;some anxiety that
troops 7..trill CIOSS his borcleEs f the. South Vietnamese the last segment will evontu...
appear to be on the verge of cutting the Ho Chi -Minh ally be extended to Pak Deng.,
.. ? . .
Trail. ._. , r_ ? .. , .a- point on the Mekong River ,
The premier has &lid he be- ? As explained by diplomatic: 25 miles from Thailand. ?
heves Chinese ? "ydlunteers" sources, the premier's theory- The present road goes from
is that the Pathet Lao might Ban Botene on the Chinese
could beLfin entering Laos in
. - . . call for such help if pressured border to Muong Sal, where it
face ,In. the next few 'months Hanoi.
orli ?
uround was provided ? by
officials in Washing-
,i1 .
ton: e.
The Chinese have. been.
.building roads in northern
Laos ,since the early 1960s.'
Since loop, they have 'corn..
? ,pleted two 40-mile segments of-
? all-weatlier, two-lane road and
and joining the 'Communist . American sourcos here see I. 1 direction
branches off to .the northeast
Jill the - of North Pathet Lao in .combat opera-. this scenario as farfetched and : nam and to the southwest, to-
, . . i?
Viet-
tion.s Souvanna's vievi, accord- Maintain that the situation in iward Thailand. :-
ing to diplomatic sources here Lao S is no worse than it was1 .
n year ago. The. estimate is that there ?
:repeated in particularly cm-
'' who held out real hope three __army ?
But one European diplCimat,
i Chinese working' on the road .
are currently more-than 10,000
engineering units With ?
have been expressed privately - ' -
1.
? on several occasions and we?
months ago for peace talks be-
phatic term this morning. , their own securRy forces and-
. Chinese troops are already tween the Vientiane govern- attached antiaircraft units. .
, in parts. of northern Liles eon- ment and the Pathet Lao, said; Peking' says it is working on
trolled by the Pathct Lao, but today ;
N that the future. now I the basis of a series of aid re-
I only. as security for construe- ,.,?,
looks ' very bleak., very seri- I quests made in 1961 and 1932
tion cre.ws building a roacl u"'"'"- - , made by Premier Souvanna.
1 south from China toward the - Although there is no sign of i
i Phouma and the rightist gen-
,
j Mekong River town of Pak it in Vientiane, a sleepily obli-,1
er?d Phoumi Nosavan during
. Bong. vious little capital, the ?forces .
trips to Peking. The Laotian
.? They lave never taken part. of Souvanna Phouma's govern-
i
in combat operations, as far as ment are now m tile most pie-
government has never repu-
: ?
'.Is known here. Their dolor so carious military position they diated those requests.
i : '
could cause a direct confroMa- have been in some years. 'Washington sources say the
r-. - ? r. . 1 f ? Chinese have never us-ed the.
tion with the United States? Less than 1 ., '
which provides air and logistc Vientiane, Pathet Lao and roads to move combat troops, .
support for the forces of Sou- North Vietnamese -forces have but that the North Viet-
vanna Phouna's neutralist gov- surrounded the key base or navese and the Pathet Lao.
ernmont: . Long Chong, the CIA oper..., /
hl ,_edone so.
? The prince' concern about..._ ? ......-
the Chinese, diphimatie . .
ated logistics center for the v
s.
anti-Communist g u e r r iii a
sources say, was increased
forces of Gen. Vang Pao. The
. base is not expected to last
after Chinese .diplomats here
tPckinc4 is unwilling .to stand out_the _next few weeks. quietly passed the -word that:
idly by while the Amerieans.
support the South Vietnamese'
move into the Ho Chi Minh
Trail. . . .
? Souvanna, who is faced With
a badly deteriorated military
situation in the northern part
of his country as well as the
South Vietnamese incursion in
the south, reportedly told dip-
lomats he did not think the
Chinese would go on the of-
fensive unlos the Pathet Lao
.-SS.I.ted 4 cal
? 1
proved, Ea
1%.
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_1 61) rip
A 01?(U)
By Murrey Mm-dee
washinzton post' Staff Write
The Nixon Administration
has easily surmounted the
first domestic political chal-
lenge to the allied thrust
s.into Laos. President Nixon,
by keeping his head down in.
public, has presented the
smallest possible target for
his opponents. ?
By maintaining that the
,U.S.- role in the cross-border
assault is. only a subsidiary
one, in the air, above the en-
trapping grip of ground
combat, the -administration
.sci far hs deflected its pres-
ently disorganized critics. ?
' But there are abundant
political targets in the mak-
ing in ? present U.S.
'even If the venturesome op-
eration hears out ? the mili-
tary success now being pro-
claiMed for it with possibly
risky prematurity.
.Through a bureaucratic
temptation to deny wher-
ever possible, rather than to
affirm, the administration
eappears to be headed into
an unnecessary running test
of its credibility on the rules
of restricted warfare in
Laos that it is pledged to
live with: the ban on Ameri-
? can "ground combat troops."
, At best, this can be only a
nit-picking, avoidable, se-
mantic hair-splitting contro-
versy about the definitions
of words. At worst, it is
.major duplicity.
'Bs, its failure to specify
with any common ;clarity
1,s/hat it interprets as permis-
sible activity for U.S.: mili-
tary personnel in Cambodia
--except after the fact?the.
administration invited suspi-
cion about everything it was
doing in Cambodia.
.For months the adminis-
tration played semantic
gamesmanship over "air in-
terdiction" vs: "close air
combat support," and "air-
borne coordinators" vs.
?
News. Analysis
? in about whether or not the ,naissance men, or other
per-
- administration isIdissem-
sound on the ground,
bling about its denNls that '
neither American '.'ground
combat troops" nor "advis-
ers" are present in Laos.
The denial that American
."advisers" are present in
Laos is simply untrue, and
:to deny it is probably more
carelessness than duplicity.
There are unquestionably
, American advisers in Labs
and their presence is not
!prohibited by law there, as
' it- is in. Thailand. President
Nixon publicly stated last
March 6 that there qlre 1,040
Americans in Laos, Military
and civilian, in "a military:
advisory or military training '
capacity . .
What the President did
not add, but what has been
widely reported, is that the
advisers are primarily Con-.
ti-al Intelligence Agency.
personnel, whose primary
job is supporting and super-
vising the clandestine army ? -
of Cen. Yang Pao.' ,
When U. S. officials pres-
ently say, as 'Secretary
Rogers .and other officials.
havc'. said recently, that
there are no U. S. "advisers"
in Laos, they re actually
referring to the area of the
"ground air coordinators,"
only to say finally, as De-
fense Secretary Melvin Ti.
Laird did on Jan. 20, that
the United States would.
supply whatever "air sup-
port that was needed" and
"I don't care to get into a
question of semantics on
'that.".
? Why did the administra-
tion not simply say "air sup-
port" in the beginning, and
avoid the debilitating dis-
pute? The private answer
given is that the administra-
tion had to "condition" the
public, and most impor-
tantly the Congress, to ac-
cept the gradual, cloaked,
transition to the policy Of
unlimited use of air power
anywhere in Indochina
which first Laird, and then
Secretary of State William
P. Rogers, publicly con-
firmed.
It was this evolution of
the uninhibited use of U.S.
air power in Indochina, it is
now said privately, which
enabled, and emboldened,
the administration to. au-
thorize the South Vietnam-
ese border-crossing assault
into Laos.
According to present, offi-
cial U.S. theology, "The cut-
rent Laos operation was
neither "troops" nor "ad-
visers"?
It is by no means extraor-
dinary ? to have Covert
personnel engaged in mili-
tary operations: What is un-
necessarily corrosive of the
adminisli'ation's credibility,
is to make sWeeping. dis-
claiiners that it cannot sus-
tam, only tti' end up in the-
position of strip-teaser dis-
carding on, Semantic cover-
ing at a tin.
-.1(
?
current South Vietnamese
border-ci?ossing, foray, but
failing to make the distine;
tion with operations else
where in Laos. -
But there are also other
U. S. personnel in the Laos
border-crossing zone, who,
.by current_ publicly impre-
cise definitions, are neither
ground troops nor advisers.
They are; as each day's prod-
ding by newsmen on the
scene makes official spokes-
men disclose, medical eva-
cuation personnel, helicop-
ter salvage personnel?and.:
others, still undisclosed. -
Are there also, newsmen
increasingly are demanding,
completely planned by tem
-1- - Special Forces agents or
South Vietnamese general other military or intelli-
staff." -Even if -that were get-tee personnel disguised in
true, the operation would South Vietnamese Uniforms?
never have moved beyond.
Are there American recoil-
an idle concept without the, -
support of massive U.S. air
power of every variety,?plus
major engineering, logistic
and artillery support.
And, it should be added,
intelligence and reconnais-
sance support as well. ? .
This is where the now-bur-
. geouirig new dispute comes ?
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YORK' fillr?>
Approved For Release 200f/631/64 {,"ItIA-RDP8fidiMb00
eacral Said to Ask for Rchtforeci.,ments
ade up mostly of Meo
Special to.Th-3 York Times are in
VIENTIANE, Leos, Feb. 10?
and other tribal groups. Anier-
concern incre.ased, here today
over the situation at Sam Thong
and Lopg Tieng, the two im-
portant Government positions
southweSt of Plaine des Jarres
that have conic under increas-
ing pressure from North Viet-
- namese and Laotian Communist
forces.
Gen. Vang Pao, commander
in- the area, flew from Long
Tieng today to Vientiane and
reportedly asked Premier Sou-
, vanna Thourna for reinforce-
merits. The United States Am-
- bassador George M. Godley, was
? also present at the meeting.
' Communist commando units
have taken several hilltop posts.
flanking the two strong-points,
which.are about 15 miles from
? each ther, and rocket fire has
blasted air strips at Sam 'thong
Mid the nearby post of Ban
Na. ? . . . ?
. General Vang Pao's forces
? _ ? ?
jean Central Intelligemee Agen
cy personnel have training and
advisory roles with the gen-
eral's troops, and United States
transport planes bring in sup-
plies daily for his units._
'there was unease among the
general's troops because of his
absence .for several days in
Bangkok, where he had taken
his wife for a stomach opera-
tion. The general returned. to
Long Tiong, yesterday by air
when aides reported the situa-
tion to him and urged his re-
turn. He left before his wife's
scheduled operation, according
to sources at. his headquarters
here.
With North Vietnamese and
Laotian Communist ? forces
threatening on most Laotian
fronts from Luang Prabang to
the Moven Plateau in the
south, other regional com-
manders are reluctant to spare
o AWES" :105Luong?
15-1:11:1?'1'. ?
/15F:
f % ?
1i ? ? 72>
.PPOi S
1. Vintmonr'0?.\)L ?
?/./ !Z?' , (/./('?...<
The New York Tfrne:i Fob. 11, 1771,
Clashes were iicreasing
near Long Tieng, (cross).
troops for the Sam Thong-Long
Tieng sector 80 air miles north
of Vientiane.
General yang Pao's tribal
units are weary from years of
fighting, and casualties have
been replaced with recruits that
knowledgeable sources say are
13 to 15 years of age. ,
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?
174 (?- V(?).! STATI NTL
S. Approved ForRelease 20011WeRfri;yRIA.-RDP80-0160
-
? ? ?.1 E ?? 11
f,
f; ? fi
1.'"" I ._.-
ft d tl (?,-;C.;:?)
A .
? 13y-TAMIVIY ARBUCKLE .: was shelled- on Sam Thong air-
.
? ? ? -?Special to The Stai. - strip.? ?
'VIENTIANE, Laos --Comm- North Vietnamese units have
nist forces launched a dawn at- infiltrated throughout the hills
tack against American comman- southwest of the Plain of Jars,.
does, Tuesday at Dakkao, 65 boxing tribes onto hilltops. -
miles north of here well in- Four government units cut off..
'formed military sources said. in Ban Na, North of Long Cheng
Affter 30 minutes of .sm all when its airstrip was closed by
arms -.combat the Red attack Red rockets, ? ? -
was .broken by. the arrival. of ?
Six Officers Shot -
'planes. - .
Merl; for CIA North Vietnamese slipped into
? T Pleun,-r one of Long
-alikao the base for Amen- Ta ? n
can coMina.ndo leaders, the Lao ?Chlen's elefe.nsive. Psition*)anti
military says.
shot six Meo officers at their
Tse he.. Americans are milltiary meal,
.including ? two of Cc
- mon issigned to the Central In vang Pao's most t 6trust e.d'
bat
telligence. Agency to load .tribes aides and Hang Dan,' ? . ? ?
in cora against North Viet-
.
' nafriese. troops in northern Laos Aineijean commancli.s
, Long Cheng seam to have made, .
? . and they reportedly cross into ?
a Mm? North Vietnam hill areas. mistake asking the M
fight from fixed positions, in-
to
said
U.S. Embassy spolicesman
i? stead of as guerillas th.2.3\leo's
said- rakka? was attacked favorite method of warfare.
platoon,s of Communists but
declined to give a :U.S. casualty ,-,,Ma-,I1Y of Vang raa's ?`ficer
figure or to say whether Amen-
s
Difterfy quarrel with the general,
cans were in action there.
?
apparently because they are los-
'
r . The i,amtae attack is part of ing, confidence in U.S. command-
' ,
,.... the pressure the North viotum.i. ers .Meo civilians are now aban-
doning Long Chong r,n,-.1 the Unit-
.' ese, zire ? putting on U.S, com-
manded,. tribesiueri around ti o ed States is building new, air
-U.S: base- at Long Chong.
- ? - Tribes PoN'ed In
"
Americans on logistic missions
are.. dail;i- ebming under fire on
airstrips_ around Long Chong.
One U.S, helicopter took a direct
hit with two,Amerieans injured
,a Caribou .transport
strips further. south .fltlt'Or Mueng
Ao.
Despite deep U.S. involvement
and hard daily fighting at Long
Cheng; thq U.S. Embassy rCuses
to allow corrrespomlents to use
U.S. aircraft which fly into Long
Cheng approximately once every
five minutes,
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vp,YDactiCID. - VATINTL
Approved For Release 2Q0j1401014CIA-RDP8
By TAMMY APBUCKLE
. sa0cial 10,511:i Skr
VIENTIANE, Laos --- Lao gov-
ernment troops are being rushed
today from Vientiane. Province
to reinforce the battered tribal
forces around Long Chong, 75
miles to the north. -
However, Gen. Yang Pao,
lead&r of the Meo forces, reports
those reinforcements are insuffi-
Cient.
? An estimated 20,000 civilians
are . trekking out of the Long
Chang area, U.S.. officials here
said today.
Rafugeo agency officials esti-
'
?
? .. Ion the Long Chong area, Com-
mate 6,000 of these people will munist forces launched a dawn
die from weakness and diseasc.attack against American eon-
on the the long marches south to. mandces Tuseday. at Palikao, CO
new bases in the Moo foothills, miles north of here, well in-
despite round the clock aid and . formed military SOUCCCS said,
airdrops cif meat and rice by the Atter 30 minutes of small
U.S. Agency for International arms combat the Red attack
Development.
Diplomatic sources in Vien-
tiane are not linking the as-
sault: on Long Chong, by some
5,000 North Vietnamese troops,
with the South Vietnamese in-
cursion into the southern Lao
panhandle: ? .
They say Hanoi has been pre-
paring an operation. on Long
Chong for months,
? -CIA Moves Equipment
:,ong Chong has been the con-
or of Laos activities for the U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency, but
the Americans have begun cvac- declined to ,dva a u.s. aamialty
?tiating to other airstrips the figure or to say Whet-112r Ameri?
equipment used to monitor 1-fa- cans were in action there,
not communications.
' The fall of Long Chong would ? Tribes 3:10-d In
moan the end of government The Pakkao attack is part of
presence in Mena'. Kiletlang the pressure the North Vietnain-
yrovince and, possibly, the end csa are putting en U.S. corn-
of the Moo forces, which have manded tribesmen around the
. U.S. bass at Long Chug.
combat troops 26 months ago to .
been decimated from 11,000
Just 4,060 now. Americans on logistic missions
are daily coming under fire on
. Long. Cheng is said to have no .airstrios around 'Long Chong.
InilitarY , strategic signific2nce lOne U.S. helicoptcr tool: a direct U.S. aircraft which fly into Long
'but diplomats say its loss Nvillte.
a psychological blow. rhit with two Americans injured Chang approximately once every
(while a U.S. Caribou transport five.minules. .
As part of the Red's pressure .
was broken by the arrival of
planes.
Pakkao is the base for Ameri-
can commando leaders, the Lao
military says. ?
These Americans arc military
men assigned to the Central In-
telligence Agency to lead tribn,
in combat against North Viet.-
aainese troops in northern Laos,
and they reportedly Cross into
North Vietnam hill areas.
A U.S. Embassy spokesman
said Pakkao was attacked by
Lao platoons of Communists but
was shelled on Sam Thong air-
strip, ?
. .
North Vietnamese units have
!nfiltratod throughout the hills
southwest of the .Plainof Jars',
toaing tribes onto hilltops. .
Four government units cut off
U) I-12n Na, North of Long Chong
when its airatrip was closed by
Red rockets,
Six Officers. Shot
North: Vietnamese slipped into
Ta Tam Blaring, one of Long
Chion's defensive positions, and
sVat. .Moo officers at their
-laical, including two of Oen.
Yang Pao's most trust 'e d
nicios,Lo and Hang Dana'.
Am er lean commanclers at
Long. Chong seem to have made
a mistake asking the Moo to
fight from fixed positieos, in-
stead of as guerillas the Moo's
favorite method of warfare.
Many of Yang Pro's officers
bitterly quarrel with the general,
apparently because they are los-
lug confidence in U.S. command-
ers Moo civilians are now aban-
doning Long Chonf!, and the Unit-
ed States is building new air
-strips further. south near Mueng
Ao.
Despite deep U.S. involvement
and hard daily fighting at Long
Cheng the U.S. Embassy refuses
to allow earrresnondents to use
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-STATINTL
. ? ?
Apii,rove Orlksateafte `2001M/0 IIA- D12.1811'41110:1R000i
".?
? ? .FEF,RUARY 10, 1971
t's
)
:JOHN
CROVVII
11
:1 11 11 11
LAMENTABLY, it has become the ac-
cepted procedure and the "in"
thing to attack the activitiels ? real
. and imagined --- of the Central,Intelti-
? gence Agency.
Politicians who tire of that other
popular sport ? denigrating the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation ? can al-
-ways fall back on attributing--all sorts
of dark doings to the CIA.
:* One Of our local worthies, in fact,
has attributed his brilliant victory in a
legal case to thp fact that he
? ealed the CIA and, according to him,
. 'the-case Vas. dropped to avoid CIA ern-
barrassment, That should be a land-
mark 'case for all aspiring, lawyers.
? .Get the CIA implicated and success is
assured.
? WITH THIS approach to the Central
?Intelligence Agency, the average citi-
zen might well be forgiven if he gets
the idea that the deadliest enemy fac-
ing the United Stales is something
called the CIA. It is an organization
that . is often villifieci and rarely
:praised.
Yet it -we did not have it or some-
i:thing identical ? our security and our
world. p9sition Would be in a soiv
' -state, if indeed, we existed at all:
1./' The Central Intelligence Agency
came into being in 1917 daring the
, -Democratic administration of Presi-
dent Harry Truman ..It came into being
-in recognition that the United States
and the Soviet Union were the domi-
nant powers in a world that was a jun-
gle and , would become progressively
more so. No longer was the United
States one of aft assortment of Seven
or more "first rate" powers. As the
leader of the Western world our global
vat
?
incciT
TesbNsibilitics were awesome, ?as they
-
still y?in.
Therefore we could 'no longer
blithely move about in such a world
with such responsibilities in the naive
hope that ail V,?ould turn out 'well. No
?a?.:
Ti
STATI NTL
No longer can we go on
the courtly prernise .That
one gent/omen 'd oesn't
read another gentleman's
in ?
longer could we go on the courtly
premise that one gentleman doesn't
read -another gentleman's mail.
BEING AN open and free society,?
our operating a covert intelligence or-
ganization is not a welcome one to
many of us. But it is a choice between
being dainty and being realistic. For-
tunately the choice was. for realism
and the Central Intelligence Agen6y
was organized as an .arm of govern-
ment. ' -
As noted earlier, there are those
who find great rewards in. attacking
the CIA. They vary. There are those
dreamy-eyed idealists who believe if we
were to destroy all our weapons, the
magnificent gesture of such an act
would lead the remainder of the world
to follow suit. At the other extreme
there are those who find it to the inter-
ests they serve to keep both the CIA
and the FBI under constant attack.
And in between those two extremes
we have ?different individuals and difa
fe.rent groups who are opposed in vary-
ing measures of intensity and for vary-
ing reasqns to the existence, of the CIA..
? RECENTLY Sen. Clifford Case of
New Jersey Saw fit to raise his arms
in holy horrot( (or feignedly so) be-
cause the CIA Was funding Radio.Frce.
?
Europe.
fail to see the cause for alarm.
?
- Consider the purpose of Radio Free
Europe, Consider what it accomplishes..
I can see a connection between it and
the CIA--- and jftsdifiably so. And I can
see whele Radio Free Europe serves a.
larger purpose. .Sen. Case must have
been hard pushed to get a headline,
and experience shows that any senator
can get, a headline by blasting the CIA.
. Consider the plight of poor Teddy
Kennedy. After exuding .confidence
and optimism that he would be re-
elected Senate majority whip, the sen-
ior , senator from Massachusetts went
down in abject defeat. So how do you
get -a headline and divert attention
from such ignominy?
? You attack the CIA, that's how, and
that is what Teddy did recently. With
righteous anger (or feignedly? so) he
accused the CIA of-diverting relief
money for. refugeeswin -Laos to forces
fighting the Commilnist invaders..
Bravo!
BECAUSE. the CIA of necessity en-
gages in covert operations, it is Te-
latively simple for politicians and.law-
yers to accuse the CIA of virtually any- .
thing they wish. For the CIA to either
confirm .or ?deny such accusatiohs
could place the organization in a dan-
gerous position. Its -operations are of
such a delicate nature that it cannot
afford to take public stands.
And for my part, I'm overjoyed wP
. have the CIA. Thank God for it.
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"c. 0 1--E.12 137)
t ... ...
1 r
''''''' -)0?1
-1 1
. By STAN CAIZTER ?
_Washington, reb. 9----South Vietnam's open, invasion
has shattered any last illusion that?despite the writtcj.i
guarantee of 14 nations---there is peace and neutrality in
Laos, a sleepy-looking land of three million people and one
thillion elephants where marijuana sells for a penny a
joint. ? -
Except for brief interludes, the Oregon-sized kingdom in the.
'heart of Indochina Peninsula has, in fact, been a battleground
during all itS 1,200 years of known history.
For the past nine Wars, there las
- ? been a myth of 'Laotian neutrality in
? 0
1,1c the fighting going on elsewhere in
Indochina. Dut it liar always been just
?,*,6 a fiction, despite the agreement signed
in Geneva on July 23, 1962, by the
? United States, the Soviet ljitioii, C(Ins-
-;;?; munist China, North and South Viet-
nam and nine other' .governments, to
"respect and observe in every way the
".
sovereignty, independence,' neutrality, unity and /territorial
integrity of the kingdom of Laos."
To il'erpc-2
. llo IVouldn't Sch.: Y-es
Since 1904, Souvanna Phouma has acquiesced in isseuhian-
bombing of the Ito Chi Trail and in intelligence-gatherir.g
ties. along the trail by Meo tribesmen recruited .by the CIA, ? but,e
has tried to preserve his neutralist image by refusing to acknowledge
that he gave his approval. ?
. The United States tried until recently to keell other American
activities in Laos secret. But a Senate subconunittee headed by S,71-1.
Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) charged last April that "Lens .of th?ct-14
sands" of Americans were involved in time Laotian war in air combat,
training, advisory, supply and intelligence. work. A CIA-direrd
clandestine army of 30;000 Meo tribesmen has done some of the
major fighting against the Communists in the Plain of Jars area.
The State Department refuses to say whether Souvanna I'hourna
also gave approval to the, South Vietnamese assault against Com-
munist supply lines in the panhandle. The premier issued a mild pro-
test about the invasion yesterday, but also said that it was the North
Vietnamese. who had first s jointed Laotian neutrality and territorial
integrity "in (!efiance of international law accords solemnly con-
cluded in 1062 at Geneva,"
It's a good bet that SOUValilla P11011)11a did give at least tacit
approval but does not .want to acknowledge it because this would
further weaken his political standing.
Cc:114d Uuke. Di;:citnce. to Most Lee iisns
Conceivably, the Communists could react to the assault. on their
supply lines on the Sotith by opening an. all-out offensive in
the more -populatednorthern part of Laos. But if this doesn't happen,
the South Vietnamese invasion of a sparsely populated, mountainous
part of their country will make little difference to. most Laotians.
Most of theni won't even know there has been an invasion. Tc-os,.
' The Communists, the Americans, the South Vietnamese awl as the late Bernard Fall pointed out in the book "Anatomy of a
the LaOtians all participated, until this week's invasion, in an odd Crisis," is a landlocked country of mountains, jungles and sn.all
conspiracy to perpetuate the neutrality myth. But the .fact is that villages\ almost completely isolated in narrow valleys with very
the Geneva accords were violated
?." by the Communists before the
jrik was dry---and by the Ameri-
ORTIS and South Vietnatnese soon
afterward. Until ,the publicly
announeCd South Vietnamese
thrust into the Laotian panhandle
with U.S.. air support, they all
denied they were doing it. -
One of the immediate require- .
meats ? in the 1962 accords was
that all foreign person,.
net leave the country within 75
clays of. the signing, except for
a small French training mission.
The International Control Com-
mission, composed of representa-
Poland, confirmed that all 666
U. S. military adyiserS left be-.
fore the deadline. But only 40
'North Vietnamese civilian advis-
ers were w th drawn through
commission checkpoints, leaving
about 6,000 North Vietnamese
troops in Laos. - ? - .
By the end of last year, the number of North Vietnamose
troops in the little country had increased to 70,000.
About 45,000 North Vietnamese troops guard the Ho Chi 1!..linK
Trail, the network of jungle-covered roads and tracks in the
eastern Laotian panhandle which is the Communist supply line
to South Vietnam and Cambodia; the remainder are helping
imligenous Laotian rebels called the Pathet Lao in a civil war
against the royal governinent.
Before the Geneva accords were signed, the three main Lao,
political groupings--rightist, neutralist and Communist--agreed to
end years of factional strife and open lighting by establi.Ing a
troika government under the premiership Of Pl'h1Qe Souvammma
P"111", it neutralist But the arrngemer'.. lr,ro]:c down the next
year, with the Communists leaving Vier: a resuming the
civil war ? centered around the Plain of Jors in the North. The .
cmvii war is .now in its 90th year. ? ?
Souvanna Phouma is still an avov,-ed neutralist. IT;ut- after the
Pall nit Lil.(?j:newed the civil War, with incrqsing aF,sLiance from
the North Vietnamese, he sought military assistance from the
United States. The U.S. gave it under cover of a large aid mission...
little feeling of national unity. What really counts in Laoth.n life
is what happens to their own clans in their valleys. Most Laotian's
are. content to eke out a meager living growing opium poppies and
corn.
- Some have begun growing other cash crops in recent. years,
however. At a. trade fair in?Vientiane a couple of years ago, smack
in the center of the exhibit!., there was a little W001.11). booth that
-advertied:' "Grass (marijuana)----five kip."
sc,w)L:
CAN:1,0DM.- \
At the pro-smiling' open mailet rate, 500 kip equals
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$TAT1NL
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ARDP80-01601 R000700010001-6
?1OFEL7I ?
Reds Affack
.CIA Rase hi Latis
Vientiane, Laos, Feb. 9 ('UPI)
?North Vietnamese troops and
Pathet .Lao guerrillas have
attacked government positions
around Long Cheng, an opera-
tions base for the United States
Central Intelligence Agency in
Laos, Laotian military spokesmen
said today.
The base also is headquarters
for the CIA-trained mercenary
army of Meo tribesmen.
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Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-R0116V-Mib
ST. LOUIS, MO..
PO5T-DIPAICH-
? E -- 333.224
S 5`,5S,C,13
FEB 1,9711
Fwd Divrer.i071 hi Law
For the second time in a month, the, Amu:l-
ean public has been given a shocking lesson
in how programs established to serve human-
itarian causes have been subverted for military
purposes: First, it was revealed that funds gen-
erated by the Food for Peace program have
been used by foreign countries to buy weapons. -
Now the General Accountir,g Office discloses /
. that the Central Intellieene3 Agency has been
financing paramilitary activities, in Laos with
furicth. intended to assist refugees.
- Of the $17,000,000 'provided by the Agency
for International Development for refugee aid
in Laos, Senator Ker2necly estimates that nearly
half was siphoned ct by the CIA for its opera
tion, which include, the. support of a guerrilla
army operating, . ag!.1-nfst the Pathet Lae and
North Vietnamese forces in the northern regions
of the _Country, For -:he Laotian .refugces, the
.results have been tra.zic. hefugee villages are
overcrowded and unsanitary and mortality rates
are as much as 250 per cent 'above "acceptable" .
standards pet by the AD. What
-
What are th3 consequmeeS of these perver-
?
eons? At home, they add to a feeling of distrust
In the Government, a smsation that despite:
soothing words to the contrary, the United
States, !Y continuing covcrt military assistance,
is enconraging chaos in an area of the world
that desperately needs f;tability. In Southeast
Asia, they 'add immeasurably to the human
misery for which this country is responsible.
Jhe Charade must be nded loth the Admit'-
,
,istration:,and Congress should insist that AID.
'funds for refugees a7.'e spent on refuoses and
not on further killing. Beyond the immediate.
;cases, however, a thorough .review of all foreign'
assistance programs is needed, to determine if
others are being -use,d as a front for the in-
telligence or military astablis:aments.
?
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.. 33y TAMMY ARBUCKLE
. .
, ? . Special to The Star,.
- VIENTIANE, Laos ----- The
United 'Antes today began ovac-
Itatin, its base at Long Chong,
75 miles north of here; as an
estimated 5,000 North Vietnam-
ese troops massed around it,
well-informed sources said.
; - The U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency, which uses Long Chong
as the center of its Laos opera-
tions, . has dismantled soni.e of
,
the monitoring equipment used
- :to spy on Hanoi's communic11-;
.':tions with Laos and North Viet-I
)1arrt. ..
. ?
The equipment has been clown.
to oilier ;secret airstrips.
Most of the Arlene:ins left in,
Lot g chiNig no longer sp4-IId
nights there. All Anal-lean corn-!
? inando leaders in charge of
guerrrilla teams have moved to? i
rakkao southeast of .long:
,Cheng. . ?
Long Cheng Hospital, with its ?
'American doctors, has been
---evacu'ated. Bedridden patients
. have been flown to Ban Son,
miles to the southwest and the
staff is expected to follow soon.
. Moo (len. \rang Pao's forces,
. which are under direct
?
command, arc reported?to be
tired and. suffering from battle
-casualties which decimated the
Meo fore from 11,CCO combat
troops to just under 4,000 in 20
months of fighting. s
"The North- Vietnamese are,
fresh, fit and well-armed and we
are tired," a government mili-
tary Man said, refe.ring to the
arrival of Hanoi's 312th Division
north of Long Cheng.
The 312th is a fresh :unit
brought to fight alongside Ha-
noi's 316th' Division which al-
ready was in the area.
Mortar Baritgcs
Hanoi troops are firing rocket.
and mortar barrages into posi-
tions-north of Long Chong.
Two nights :ago they pulver-
ized one post in four hours or
shelling, demonstrating that Tia--
noi has no ammunition short-
ages. -
The North Vietnamese troops,
Sunday, briefly probed along,
Skyline- Ridge, a position over-:
looking Long Cheng. .
Twenty of the North Vietnam,.
ese were killed in action and an .
American installation on Skyline
Ridge, which guides aircraft,
took a direct hit from .a rocket.
Civilians Leaving
Moo civilians around Long
Chon?,c, already are leaving as
the North Vietnamese conduct a
terror campaign. In one Meo vil-
lage, near Long Cheng, North
Vietnamese trc,iops ?reportedly
executed all the Moo mcii Mon-
day night.
This Hanoi military pressure,
t.he weakness of the Moo's, and
the start of hazy weather pm-
venting adequate U.S. air sup-
port, are believed to be thie rea-
sons the United. State.s apparent-
ly
is.retreating. ? .
. ?The fall of Long Chong, how-
ever, would likely have impor-
tant political consequences.
Lao generals have sad recent-
ly- that, if Long Cheng falls, they:
will make an official alliance
with the Thais, South Vietnam-
ese and Cambodians and crp.enlyi
reject: the stated Laos policy or
neutrality.
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STA-NNTL
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DES MOINES, IOWA
f i
, TRIBUNE
9 ATO
E ? 1.1:3781 .
Sprea.chn g \A/
The new joint invasion of Laos by South Vietnam
and the United States is to be "limited in time and
space", the State .Department promises ? and,
thanks to an act of Congress, it is further limited
for the United States to air power alone. -
- -But. at the same time, U.S. air action is to ? be
"unlimited in Indochina" -- and in the "hunted"
Laos action the United States is providing air trans- ;
'port for troops, medical evacuation by air, close air -
support and long-distance strategic bombing.
' So the limits are high, wide and hairy.
?,Yet. this' complicated co-operative effort must be
t
1: conducted without American "advisers" .on the
1 -ground in Laos. It is a fantastic situation, and it :
shows how badly the Pentagon or the White House
or both wanted to raid Laos.
The limit of space is the area 'between. the lath
-and 17th parallels. This means primarily. Route 9
and the ho Chi Minh trail connections to the north
arid south for about 35 miles each way. The limit of
time is secret.
Laos is the. country where military logic always
i tempted the United States .to intervention and where
(until now) the U.S.- has been relatively resistant.
Laos has been the major enemy channel for sci0-
lug - supplies and men into Vietnam, and Laos als-.9, ,
.has its own Communist guerrilla movement. T.1111- .
war ,there (and American help to the anti-Comma-
nist.side) is as old as the Vietnam i war, though.:
-:always smaller, but Americans have avoided gel, ?
. ting in very deep. ??
After all, Laos is a hopeless place to fight---almos.
toadless, almost all mountain forest like the &ea& ,
ful 'central highlands of Vietnam, entirely is .
'accessible by sea and only marginally accessible lky-
air. You can drop all the Weight of World War Ws, .
,.boinbs there and hardly hit anything -- and ?we rlidL
- ?
Furthermore, Laotians don't want to fight. The
-frincipal fighters on both sides in the Laotian rixit
war have been Mountain tribesmen chivvied mid
-bribed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (pc v-
the North Vietnamese roliTimrn-apparatchiks intlo
taking up arms;
The ethnic Lao are much more interested in
riuiring Buddhist merit by not killing. When enemy
forces came close to the royal capital recently, like
, king was busy supervising the decoration of a ?
temple with wall paintings of episodes :from the life
of 'Buddha.
President Nixon wants to save lives, too, but Be
. claims to be tougher and more "realistic" about it.
But isn't he out of touch with realitY in trying at Ike
same time to reduce American participation in ' -
Vietnam war by pulling out trolips and handing over
the -"ground combat role" to Vidnamesc---and ;f:fso
-trying to win the war for them by heavy air blows
and combined military expeditions :all over In-
&china'?
-
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. ? a ? . r"
Marilyn Berger
w.p_shinE:ton post Stat .
Since , 1902-, Washington,
SaigonnHanoi and Vientiane
? have:.been jollied in one of.
- the oddest international con-
..
;spiracles to protect the fie-
tion of, Laotian neutrality.
.That- faltering ???effort,
? which 'WaS more often ig- .
' . nored than observed, came
? to.. a complete halt Sunday
night With the announced
:invasion of that war-torn,
landlocked country. . ?
The . neutrality of Laos
was 'formalized in the 1932
declaration that grew out of
the 14-nation. Geneva Con-
ference. Laos, 'according to
paragraph 0 of the declara-
tion,- not allow any*, for
eign troops or military per-
sonnel to be introduced" in-
,
?, to the :country.
?Paragraph four ' of the
same."dcciorotion' stipulates
? that the Kingdom of Laos
"will not allow the establish-.
? ment Of any foreign military
base'. on Laotian territory,
.nor alldw any country to use
Laotian territory' for mili-
tary purposes or for the pm.-
- pos,cs of interference in the ?
- internal affairs of other
' countries, nor recognize the
protection of any alliance or
military coalition, including
SEATO." .
Despite t h e carefully
:'worded provisions, Laos --be- ?
came a principal thorough-
fare for the Vietnam war.
- In the view or the United'.
States, North Vietnam never
(-1
11
"c,"-'1 ("I'l Gi -
CTI ---2) ife.re (.. AD
t '
I /CI\ ?11-
1 A .1J,..ft \J.?_ ti* CA:, . l'?..?.,) 1
,1 ?kel.).1.- l?t_f 1.1,
'observed Laotian neutrality.
Although all foreign. trooPs
were required by the Ge-
neva agreements to leave
the :Country, the U.S.,-has?
said repeatedly that only le0
North 'Vietnamese civilian,
advis.ers . were willith'aWn?
through International Con-
trol - CoMmission,,. check- '
- ?
points. - ?
According to official U.S...
sources, this left 6,000 .North
Vietnamese troops in Laos
at the time. That number
has grown, according to offi-
cial estimates, to 70,000 in
all of Laos, with 50,000 in the
southern panhandle region.
Substantial Parts
The North Vietnamese
had occupied Substantial
parts of Laos, according to
official U.S. publications, in
violation, of the 1954: Geneva
agreements. The failure of
efforts to integrate Commu-
nist and anti-Communist fac-
tions that split the ebuntry
Politically and geogi aphi-
cally in a civil war: led to
the Geneva Conference of
1931-1902. .
By this time the U.S. was
already involved militarily.
Officially, Washington said
it provided tactical military
advisers to the Lao govern-
ment forces in 1991 to
counter a Communist mili-
tary throat led by a para-
ti-Coil commander, Kong'Lei
Unofficially, it became
known that U.S. involve-
ment went deeper. Roger
? Hilsman, who served in to-
State Department position:3
under *President Kennedy,
later wrote of extensive op-
erations by the CIA to or-
_ganize the country politi-
cally against the. Communist
Bat,lict Lel) tilld to set up a
Strong man in General
Phemini Nosavan. ? -
_Last April, a subcommit-
tee headed by Sen. Stuart
? Symington (D-M.9.) disclosed
? that ",tens of. thousands" of
Americans were involved in
the Laotian war in air com-
bat, in training, advisory,
supply and intelligence
? work, including the direc-
tion of a 63,000-man clandes-
tine army or Meo tribesmen,
. American involvement has
repertedly been linked to
prior violation of the Ge-
neva Accords by the North
? Vietnamese who were said
to arm, ? supply and direct
the Communist Pathet Lao
.and who Staked out the net-
work of jungle paths known
dls the Ito Chi Minh Trail.
- The North ? Vietnamese
presence in Laos remains
clandestine. it has been said.
that only a desire to 'main-
tain the 'fiction of the gist- ,
ence Of the 1,c,V-32 accords has
prevented Hanoi from tak-
ing over more territory, in-
cluding the royal capital of
Luang Prabang. -
U.S. "air interdiction" and
assistance to the Laotion
government was an open sec-
ret until President Nixon
disclosed some of the Ameri-
can operations, including air
comh.at, support in northern
Ins, on March 6, 1970, link-
ing ? thdm to a growth' of
North Vietnamese combat .
activities. ?
. .
Massive U.S. bombing Of
the trail area became vir-
tually routine after the'
bombing half over North.
Vietnam.
Muskie Complaint
The current South Viet-
namese invasion brought
into the open the so?called
secret war. Sen. Edmund S.
Muskic (D-Maine) yesterday
declared himself dissatisfied
with the explanation that
the North Vietnamese had
tacitly broken the 1062 Ge-
neva .Accords.
"This is a major new ef-
fort," Muskie said, "crossing
the borders into a neutral
state whose neutrality we
undertook to establish . ? .
To move from' the tacit to
the overt is a very serious
move ill' diplomacy."
The political aspects Of
the accord had - already
'fallen apart. Under the
agreement, a tin-cc-way coa-
lition was formed under.
neutralist Premier Souvanna
Phouma. Ills half-brother,
Prince Souphanouvong,-.
headed the Communist fac-
tion v.thich 'pulled out of the
coalition in 1903. ?
The .1962 agreements 'also
provided for unification of
Communist and non-Com-
munist areas but Laos con,
Untied to be geographically
divided along ideological
lines with ? the Communists
controlling FilorC than 00 p.er
cent of the territory and a
third of the population.
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Approved For Release 2001b3:164,:tIALADP80-01
FEB l'J71 STATINT
: ri n 0 11
-,,, .,,1
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_.
.. Li
il.'
- It !I V4I
- - -- - - -
, .,. _ . ..._ . .iii6relldnIs tried to make a don- \yarning and took 03 dead..
Vi.7,NTIAN.7.7, ?The South Vi- _ilocT,..,,I.,,,is::. r,:o.';.,..ion neer thc Liam ble; profit ..They .c.ontinued to sell This led some. Are,erleans to
???
: By TAl?3.11\n" Arll.BUCKI_,,'
etnamose incursion into the Pa 10L ,.:0 - v,iqoa .\\as overn:n by the Pak?ze ?surpins to the cnemy,believe that Korg WrIS r,110Wed to.
Coi M .ra ? So:;or'..e.
.1 U.S: s sa ?11-.e. neutral- Ile a ? rice in northeast Thai-I cial dealings.' .. -
'the Communists tv,:o v..eet:s ago. arid at the sa.nie thr,e purchasoli escape bcca,u.se of. his ceminer-i
in ac nbra ourecs y
- i
in the north sectOr of the Laos; II F.ts nt v?ng NI,...,ng 1-.,-.35?? CC'. r,.,iI.,-_:s land, elin-cinating the cic.thver}'' ?Militaxy R.cgion 4 Commander
Pan1121.1clle will 1101; Cul ?II tll':'"- 'north of here, refnsed . to zein? costs while; getting the. high Gen. ph:::,soijk, close T,[....0 as so_
N, ?i',1-,111;,,V1.,3'';r71 11;,(-';',,,,f,r,?11.11 101 force 3\ltiong Soul bc'e'anse they price of ?$13 per ton lion _ , at.....- c?-0, is aware of the, rice
'`?' '''''''" ---:'''''' Aillc'r?`-- had no winteri.:lothing it the passing off the Thai rice as .sur-:trfic but he believes Kong is
can sources here say. i .bitte.rly cold Plain of Jars arca. 1.:Jus from the south less greedy than other general
and 10,030 tons of riee.are being.; oc'it'ile,e, AInerici'n B?ccl'orcLI,:,r?ts The scheme earne a par't whe,n officers, therefore as Iang as lie
ho er, ha
wevd izi--'lled AID was iil fe rm ed of the plot in reMains in his post loss rice, will
This is b,,ca.use. between 7,000, - 1
' 5-,-,-,, !-I, i 7'-, -1-1).,.Anie.rioans say -.the ric,.1tral- reach the enemy than might, be
' I Sold to the ComiMlnists. bv IT,ar) w;arra cloVol'Ig In V,7,11,E4 Viag? an anonymous letter.
' Americans say these rice SPIes the case. ?
.. -
to the Reds have, helped save, the i\lidclici leVel AmeriCan Offi-
n's fur.t?''''''11- '' --.7""': --''' i'l Of cleerS sold tho warm cloth-
Lao positions. from Cornmunist clots apparently arc tiroc.I of tho
1
ply one North Vietnairic:_se ciivi-,. ?I, .,-. ,... .;., ,-,.,, ..,_ atta.ck. .. .:. .?:?.... dealings, bo clot They fail to
panhand.le, d:sguste,cI. Americans..
log to the local poepul:tion,'
sources . ealel_date. Tno. rico is: 1 .
? ? i aeir?er.lents 02..11.:.:e.l. ..?.,.1 1. L.C1.1;:lY,, 1.(en:l. Y.,Cing r;(:.F) Cor;lro.and.:;r of more interested in 3-nce:ley, shoidd
They point to.the record CIC en: see why U.S.-supported officials
. say. Tiii5 is enough rice to s.y,p-i. - ??j, smculd ,I.,..3.\., is.:11d the
r mu-lulu :.ri iii Ci 11,-1....12 . .... 1,...
-OM\ii is tr;oduce Cron'', .1_,-0,-' :',,-',t Elce is 5a':'.121'd In val-';'31's' ,,Nu---er -- -i.-vre ,?-? .? - "a ale Oct ly'ay 'With .fdi.1111, riallOi
'with food ? for one, 'year,: ? '-',..,. ,..-:...... ?3..1 , i,-.< ,11
,- - . - =?? . ? -01 t ?0 .,..?..,? ..,,., 41-', ., ,,,,,.? ., , ).?.,, ...f I LI. il....t, , 1,. V ..,(-