SECRET WAR MAKERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 174
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 29, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 14, 1971
• Content Type: NSPR

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TARINTLIM, PA.
VALLEY NEWS-DISPATCH
E - CIRC. N-A
1 4 19/1- - -
JUL
P
it'`.3 1-T e u
.DISTASTEFUL as it may be,
--the survival of any society,
totalitarian or free, depends. to
.some degree upon the quality and
-.quantity of iDformation it is abie. to
accumulate about the military
plans anti capabilities of potential
.advers-7,:ries. Fut a broad CIPSTA1
,__acparates the business of espionage
aud?those of diplotnatie
au-. C:9,111eripg or military op- era OTIS
and it is its routine clizegard of
:-...essential ? division that has
...,prom.,:,t4'd critics both in and out of
,-,-;government .to question .the
...activities of the Cent;?al
::-Iiiltelig.estee Agency.
As a matter of ordinary course, ?
the CIA.,J.eportesily meddles in
onriestic affairs of other conn.ries,.-
: np a coup here, shoring to a,
Tpathetie" government there
activities which are conducted
neWy.t. ? rnIA- mandate .nor
:.alowledge. The CIA ever. tiles
iar on what can only be presumed
be largely its own initiative.
me 5,00 Thai troops miller CIA
:faervision. are fighting in Laos, a
7:itcynntry ? whose ? neutrality this -'
government ostensibly respects. .
STATINTL
Senator Case has - R.r.i.efluced
legislation to ry:?ovent the CA from
. financing military eperations
,v7i.ic.,?,tit congressional arThoriza-
tion. Sen. Case says his purpose;
is to 'prevent the CIA ard the
Defense Department from raa%ing
,"end - runs around the Cooper?
Church and -Fil!bright amend-
ments," which prohibit the use of
--American groirA fc-Tces in Laos or.
,? Cambodia and the 1.U.:2- (r)i' Pentagon
funds to provide military npuert
to the governments of those na-
tions.
?
The case for the ? -measure, .
hawever, is not -confined to oar
clandestine activities in ,
Judo-
China, for there is no just cation
..for the CA to carry out Inititary .
o7...:?erations anywhere without.
angressiOnal approval.. The
ol?;tirnat-ed to 113 as much as
?e, billion dollars, is hidden among'
the routine budgets --of. various ;
f7.,qeral aencies. Espionage funds ?
may well, have to be kept- under ,
cover but Congress must insist that..
the 'CIA confine its activities to
gathering ?. information and not
mpand them to the point of making
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STATINTL
IrlsaiticaciT POS7
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k,
Laoticia
ces
Id t *Regain
cJ
Phalli of Jars
SAIGON, July 13 (AP)?A-
merican-backed Meo tribes-
men were reported today- to
have extended government
control over all of the rain-
swept Plain of Jars in north-
ern Laos. .
? The Laotian Defense Minis-
try in Vientiane said Moo spe-
cial forces met no significant
'resistance in a week-old opera-
tion to take the area from the
North Vietnamese and Pathet
Lao forces.
. U.S. B-52 and smaller tacii-
cal bombers struck inside
Laos, hitting at the Ho Chi.
Minh supply trail in the pan-
handle and also along Route 7
leading from North Vietnam
to the eastern edge of the
plain.
? Every year, the Meo forcPs,
trained, equipped and paid by i
the Central Intelligence
Agency, have moved on to the
plain during the summertime
rainy season only to be pushed
back by the North Vietnamese
and Pathet Lao during the dry
season, which starts in the
fall.
For the most part, the plain
has been Communist-held ter-
ritory since 1964.
[An official report issued
today said that North Viet-
namses soldiers massacred 51
civilians, mostly woman and
Children, and wiped out much
of an undefended village
'north-of the Plain of Jars, UPI'
reported from Saigon.
. [The slaughter was discov-
ered last Saturday by the
troops of Gen. yang Pao, mili-
tary sources said. Charred and
mutilated bodies of the villag-
ers were strewn around the
refugee village of Phou lila,
where 70 homes were found
gutted by fire, the sources
said.] .
Across South Vietnam, a
near-total combat lull ex-
tended through a ninth day
iand even U.S. air strikes were
heavily curtailed by tropical
storins.
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1).osl
14 'JUL 15,121
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,-.11:7a.et,E3 3-tar rl-te on tae wile-cm-0 .0/ --3,--
, -,.n if ir ? - ' ta.' ';IV T
....
By FIVoi..a. Lewis
. ,
..
'-. Al LAST the -facts Of the heroin ?\?als in. 'has testified that the only. thing that "win
. .
Indochina are trickling out. Many officials, save our men" from the tremendous drug
. and others, have been aware of them for a problem . in Vietnam is troop withdrawal.
But the supply r a3.
long thne. But the officials weren't very in outes-e organized now.The high-ranking, officials, and by no means
terested, and secrecy about the war th Laos ?
all the highest have PS yet 'been named, still
and _American clandestine operations made nave U.S. support and every prospect that
A extra hard for others to pinpoint the support will continue after most troops have
route of heroin from the mountaintop poppy
fields of Southeast Asia to American blood-
gone. So the heroin can be expected to fol-
? - ? ?-? -? low the GIs home, a continuing souvenir of-
/
v streams.
ti
The CIA, which has prime responsibility e Is?ar. . ?
for the Laotian war, long denied any knowl- . cst-s)
.. . . -.
edge of the drug traffic. Nowa has provided TWO developments have begun to bring
Congress; through the Bureau of Narcotics, into the open the relation Of , heroin and
/ with a report naming the sites of heroin re- the war. One is the huge increase in GI use
U fineries in Burma, Thailand and Laos. Fur-
,
in the past two Years, while the military
titer, the public report says that ''a senior were assiduously fighting marijuana and virs
Laotian officer may hold an ownership M- Wally ignorins the opium-heroin trade, The .,
:terest in some of these facilities." The offi- other is mounting public revulsion as each
'cer, named elsewhere, is Gen. Ouane Rathi- piece of news anpears here,
kone, chief of staff of the Laotian army, But the siniation isn't very ne?,v. Capt. 7
which exists entirely on U.S. subsidy. Army Robert Masaseo, the former Green Beret
units Provide a "military defense perimeter" who was aeeused of killing a double agent,
Ito guard the refineries. .tells of cessiping on the Cambodian border
, The report also confirms for the first time in the Parrot's Beak sector in Mat. "There
cin the record that Laotian air force planes was a big market, field there; people went
and Laotian and South Vietnamese commer- back and forth as though there were no hots
cial planes take the drugs on to markets, der. Thi..? mice of heroin was astonishing; for
- both the GI market in South Vietnam and ' $25 you could get what sells for $500,000 in .
international centers which ship to Europn the United States," he told me. "It was being
Air America, the CIA-operated airline in
and the United States. II does not mention bought by South Vietnamese soldiers, ob-
Laos and Vietnam. But there have long been viously flunkies for the higher-ups." , ...
On another occasion, he trailed 30 pounds
numerous reports that Air America's secret of pure opium broitght down the ilo Chi
flights supporting the Laotian war also Minh Trail by Pathet Lao Communists along
often transport opiUm wiht medical supplies and found they were
I Rep. Robert Steele of Connecticut, an ex- sold to South Vietnamese military and sent
CIA man himself, has named IMaj. Gen, Ngo on to Saigon. "I didnt pay much attention,"
Dzu who commands South Vietnam's Sec- :Marasco says; "that wasn't our concern."
oar! Military region as one large-scale or- It is time, late but not too late, for Ameri-
ganizer of the traffic. . , . , can intelligence which does know quite a lot
'about the drug traffic to make it their con-
THE opium, front which heroin is refined, cern. It is time to stop defoliating Vietnam-
is grown chiefly by Moo tribesmen who live es? fields and start defoliating poppy fields.
It is tune to stop subsidizing high Asian offi-
in what is called the "golden triangle" area
of western Burma, northern Thailand and cials who use American support to deal in
17- Laos. The CIA organized the Meo of Laos drugs with impunity.
John Ingersoll, director. of the Bureau of
into the Armee Clandestine and has accepted
responsibility for large numbers of them. Narcotics, has written Congress that "It is
Although it
probable that opium production in South-
-
normally denied having any ?
-awareness or interest in the drug trade east Asia will be brought under effective,
from time to time the CIA claimed progress control only with further political develop-
in persuading the Meo under its influence to ? meat in these countries:'
switch to food crops. Its own report now If that means that the United States can't
says that "in areas (in Laos) svhere the successfully fight , heroin and. Vietnamese
tribesmen have been encouraged to grow Communists at the same time because too
.corn, the poppies are planted among the many allies are on the side of heroin, it
coin, When the corn is cut the poppies con- s -muldn t be hard to choose the , N.VOTSt
thine to, grow? until -they too can be liar- enemy. There can be no national defense.
vested." even on this continent if the invasion of
Vice Adm. William C. Mack, Deputy A,s?: dt?ugs is not stopped.
.sistant Secretary of Defense for. Manpower,. ?3971 by Newsday.
Distributed by Los ,Anyeles Times Syndicato
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1),VEGY. VVID
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STATINTL
EvrroR
THE MIN WOW)
2o5
IRWNif.jPg 1001(
'valosE orqum WAR NOW?
From a third to a half of the returning S.PAsia
invasion veterans have .used or are addicted to
drugs. Traffic in opium is common among the gov-
ernment officials who are our puppets, according
to John Ingersoll, director of the Bureau of Nar-
cotics before the 'House Select Committee on
Crime on June 1st. "He said the heroin traffic is
costing the U.S. $3.5 billion a year," according to
1. F. Stone (June 14/71), and. that 173 .pounds of
opium were found a few weeks ago on a plane of
Air America, the CIA's airline operating illegally
in Laos.
Weapons supplied Chiang Kai Shek with our tax
money were exchanged for opium which was sold
to American soldiers in Vietnam with aid of a
top general in Laos, according to Rep. Paul C.
Rogers of Florida. Now, Senator Frank Church of
Idaho reports that the State Dept. is opposing Con-
gressional bills that would cut off aid to countries
that are sources of dope. Such laws would hurt
diplomatic relations, according to Washington.
If Nixon is riot in the dope business, you figure
it out. The morals of this administration are
straight from the gutter. And now Kissinger,
Laird, and Rogers are out pimping in the provin-
.ces of the empire. Nixinger policy will make us
a leper among nations. How stupid can the Repub-
licans get, LBJ included? ? .
PROFESSOR S.X., San Diego, Cal.
?/-
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YvV.,
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lIT PAUL ,
PI SP AT CH
1:60 292
1
- r.t
4
-RI 1 'r)
'kW? 33.O.P1.1b)iOan senators, .10hyi
Sherman Cooper of Kentecly and
Iford Case of New Jersey, have M.,'
irodneoi o-epar?y;:,:e hills to give, Con'
gross naJc C011t):01.
of the Cc:I-Ai:al Intelligence Agency. Li
the present state of puhlio opinion,
their propes:rls may have a better _
. chance of approyal than similar ef-
forts made in past years,
The CIA finances (from
money) and directs mercenary ar-
mies of hii.-ed Asian soicilelz in Laos
and has been aotive in ihe politierft
and military affairs of Conlbodia and
Thailand. it. has engaged in b?hind-
the-sec:v:3 operations in Forth v,e(,_
ham, Mat: ether poliiical intrigues it
may I;(,, iimpjrc!, cls,;.?.V:hcie in the
world ore. 1.11.',1).:=0.11 to ri."!CP)1:',C1.6 of
Congress to the public.
Sen. Cooper's bill would recinir.?, the
CIA to keep Congress more Nil): in-
fprme0. "to enable the Ccogcens to
better able to share nith the Es;ecu.-
tive Dep;,:alment its resesnsibilias 01
making witicinsii security policies."
Sen. Case is more specific. re
would 31m1t covert use of funds and
military equipment by the CLA for
supporting foreign troops in Laos or
r.
?
STATINTL
rA.fliout prior ppprov..3.1 by
Congress. Lie said his purpose is "to
place some ontsirie c.oitrcI on what
has lam the frec-vi-veelitig Hans
of the E-_::eciutive in one niflg
on foreign policy and even
lorcign.
roth Cooper and Cam atc, in es-
sence, trying to resiOYC 1.1)3t,
illnl!en.e. in foreign and
to restrict sce-f,A interveAtior!lso, The
CIA has I.Jgitimate junctions as on in-
telligence gni-tering agency, bid over
the years it has moved inn other
including the implemeoling of
its own recommenclotiens of into-L-11a- .
tion'?-.1l policy by biring, forr,ign aymies
to do ii bidding, a;-; ii Laos,
?
In the CIA, as in othcr 1-57snc?hes of
the Ey.oeuti-ve Department, the COO-
bination of paver, secrecy ar:d
cally unlinlitod bids has rftdined
the potentis?I for dangerous involve-
ments in foreign affairs. Co-,,,recs
should assert its right. to fu.11:r
edge of CIA operttior:s. As the 'Ponta-- ?
gen papers have shawn, too nnieb au-
thority in the liarrls of a fare men con-
stantly silided from public visit' end
aceountabilit.r is not suitcd to the .
democratic f01111 of ttovcImne
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.16.11.110
AKRON, OHIO .
BEACON JOURNAL
E - 175,468
S - 203,112
'41
611 k- [11 Ag)Li L
0
-1
[r*"
r-7-114
.
ft-b.,' }I k (TA E(e'
7-77,
STATINTL
"T71
e/
-.Admission that special mnmando
battalions, led by Americans, are eon-
ducting operations in northern Laos
-adds new elements of deception and il-
legality to the conduct of the war in
Indochina.
The operation is aimed at regaining
.control of the Plain of Jars and de-
stroying:, enemy food supplies and
Somc eight ba Lialions; of Thai,
Lao and Me() troops are involved. Lao-
tian sources say Americans arc lead-
ing the commando teams. American
aircraft are also involved,
This operatin is in direct viola-'
tion of the State Department's
pledge last Feb. 8 that no U. S.
ground forces (ir advisers ?would
cross into Laos.
The operation also violates provi-
sions of the Defense Department ap-
propriations-. bill which prohibited fi-
nancing by the U. S. of military opera-
tions in support of the Cambodian or
'Laotian governments except for ac-
tions to "promote the safe and orderly
disengagement of U. S. troops front
Southeast Asia or aid in the release of
U.S. prisoners of war."
? The secret Nvar in northern. Laos
also violates the Geneva neutrality pact
?,',962 endorsed by the United States.
At a time when the U. S. in moving
toward withdrawal o f U. S. troops
from Vietnam and negotiations at the
Paris peace talks appear to be closer
to a cease-fire than ever before, .the
operations in Laos are not only un7
-timely but foolhardy, Tiny could invet
an already 'delicate balance that holds
hope for. an end to the fight lug in Indo-
china- and the return of Americans, in-,
eluding prisoners of war, to their
homes.
It has been no ' secret :that Thai
''volunteers'' and Moo mercenaries,
trained by the CIA,..have lit-en fighting,
in Laos. Now American commando
leaders are admittedly -there.
When the Nixon admi&stration
pledged that no Inericaas world
be sent to Laos, we e> ported the
President to keep his word.
How can Mr. Nixon permit the "se-
cret" war in Laos to go on and hope to
retain the confidence of the American
people?
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S 107(10 ? CONGRESSIONAL
evidence presented is substantially the same
As that presented earlier.
Subaecion (c) permits a subsequent board
unlimited by previous findings or recom-
mendations only if fraudulent evidence sub-
mitted by the respondent formed the basis
in whole or in part for the findings of the
first board.
Section 964(s) prescribes the standards for
the types of discharges permitted.
Subsection (b) provides that a member
discharged for unsuitability may receive an
honorable or general discharge based upon
his military record considered in ehe light
or his mental and physical capabilities.
Subsection (c) authorizes an undesirable
discharge on the grounds of misconduct after
a Civil conviction for a crime involving nar-
cotics or sexual perversion, where State law
authorizes imprisonment for one year or
more; after conviction of a crime classified
as a felony under title 18, United States Code,
or the District of Columbia Code, or for
which the Uniform Code of Military Justice
authorizes the award of a punitive discharge;
or after conviction of a crime of sexual per-
version for which the respondent was adjudi-
cated a juvenile offender.
Subsection (d) authorizes a discharge for
misconduct for unauthorized absence of
more than one year or for fraud or misrepre-
son.tation at the time of enlistment which
If known at the time would have resulted in
the rejection of the member by the service.
Subsection (e) authorizes an undesirable
discharge on the grounds of unfitness based
upon frequent involvement with authorities,
sexual perversion, a pattern of shirking du-
ties, or a pattern of dishonorable failure to
pay debts. ? ?
Subsection (f) authorizes an undesirable
discharge on the grounds of security.
Subsection (g) permits the issuance of a
discharge other than undesirable% in cases
where the respondent has received a-personal
decoration by his service, or where other-
vise warranted by the facts of the case.
Subsection (h) prohibits the execution of
a discharge for misconduct for civil convic-
tion if an appeal is still pending unless the
Judge Advocate General of the service cer-
tifies that the appeal is frivolous or without
merit. If a discharge is executed prior to the
final disposition of the appeal and the ap-
peal later results in the member not having
been legally convicted of a felony, he must
receive all pay and benefits he would have
received if he was not so discharged. An
undesirable discharge so issued shall be
changed to a general or honorable discharge,
and a general discharge may be changed to
an honorable discharge if warranted by tha
individual's record.
Section 905 authorizes honorable or gen-
eral discharges based upon grounds other
than those prescribed in this chapter, as
prescribed by law or provided in regula-
tions issued by the Secretary of Defense.
Section 966 authorizes the Secretary of
Defense to issue regulations providing for the
review of discharge actions to determine that
all proceedings were fair and impartial and
that they were conducted consistent with the
provisions of the chapter. No decision on re-
view may be less favorable than the action
ordered by the discharge authority. Review
' by the Court of Military*, Appeals may be
obtained, No decision 'upon review by the
Court may be less favorable than the action
ordered by the discharge authority.
_ Section 3 conforms the table of chapters
of subtitle A, title 10, United States Code
to the changes made by the addition of
chapter 48.
Section 4(a) amends section 867 of title
.10 to provide for review by the Court of
Military Appeals of cases in which petition
for review is made under section 966(b).
Subsection (b) limits review of such cases
to Issues of law specified in the grant of re-
view or raised by the armed force.
Subsection (c) specifies that cases reviewed
by the Court of Military Appeals are to be
returned to the reviewing authority specified
by section 966(a) for further conaideratien or
action in accordance with the decision of the
court.
The other subsections of section 4 make
technical changes in accordance with these
provisions. -
Section 5 provides for the amendment of
section-367(b) (0) to authorize the represen-
tation by appellate military counsel of re-
spondents whose cases are before the Court
of Military Appeals.
Section 6 adds the definition of "respond-
ent" to section 801.
Section 7 makes section 266 of title 10, re-
lating to the composition of boards for ap-
pointment, promotion, demotion and invol-
untary release of Reserves, subject to the pro-
visions of chapter 48.
Section 8 amends section 1161 of title 10,
relating to dismissals of commissioned offi-
cers, to provide that no commissioned officer
may be discharged for reasons of misconduct,
unfitness, or security under conditions other
than honorable, except pursuant to chap-
ter 48.
Sections 9-11 amend sections 1161-1165 of
title 10 to make discharges under those pro-
visions subject to provisions of chapter 49.
Section 12 amends section 1166 of title 10
to require that in actions considering the
separation of regular warrant officers the bur-
den of justifying the separation is on the gov-
ernment.
Section 13 amends sections 3781, 3782,
3783 and 3785 of title 10 to require that in
the proceedings of selection boards, board
of inquiry, and boards of review considering
the removal of regular commissioned officers
because of substandard performance of duty,
the burden of justifying the removal is on
the government. All rights and procedures
set forth in chapter 48 govern these pro-
ceedings.
Sections 14-15 make similar changes with
respect to such boards considering the remov-
al of general officers.
Section 16-20 make similar changes in the
sections of title 10 concerning analogous pro-
ceedings in the Navy, Marine Corps, and the
Air Force.
Section 21 amends sections 321-323, and
325 of title 14, United States Code, to snake
similar changes in analogous proceedings in
the Coast Guard.
Section 22 provides that the amendments
made by the Act are to be effective on the
first day of the sixth calendar month follow-
ing the month in which it is enacted.
By Mr. CASE:
S. 2251. A bill to provide that the Presi-
dent notify Congress of his intention to
exercise certain special authorities under
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Re-
ferred to the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions.
NOTICE TO CONGRESS OF FOREIGN MILITARY OR
ECONOMIC ASS/STANCE TRANSFERS
Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I am today
introducing legislation which would re-
quire the President to give Congress ad-
vance notice of money transfers within
the foreign military and economic assist-
ance programs. -
..' I have long been concerned by the so-
called "flexibility" written into the For-
eign Assistance Act. The President now
has authority to shift large amounts of
money programed for one country to
another country, with the proviso that
he notify Congress within 30 days.
Thus, the law as presently written al-
lows the administration to make a sig-
nificant commitment to a foreign coun-
try witho
or the public in the debate.
Under this authority, the administra-
tion shifted nearly $100 million to the
Cambodia Government during 1970. The
largest portion of this transfer was made
before the 1910 elections, but Congress
was not notified until the end of No-
vember.
I firmly believe that such a large com-
mitment of U.S. Government funds to
Cambodia should have been widely dis-
cussed in advance, for it involved a sig-
nificant step toward our becoming en-
tangled in that country.
Then in December 19'10, the adminis-
tration came to Congress for a large sup-
plemental foreign aid appropriation, and
we were asked to vote money for those
other aid programs from which money
had been borrowed in order to send the
nearly $100 million to Cambodia.
Frankly, I was disturbed by the whole
process, and, that is why in December
I introduced with Senator SYMINGTON an
amendment requiring the President to
give the Congress advance notice of aid
increases in Cambodia. Happily, the
Case-Symington amendment was ac-
cepted by the Congress and then signed
into law by the President.
But in the case of Cambodia, almost
all the horses had escaped by the time we
got around to closing the barn door.
So in the future, I am proposing that
the President give the Congress 30 days
advance?or 10 days in case of an emer-
gency?before he shifts scheduled levels
of foreign military or economic assistance
funds to any country.
If decisions are to be made that affect
our country's foreign policy, let them be
made with full congressional and public
knowledge prior to the event?not 30
days after the fact.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the text of my bill be printed
in the RECORD. ?
There being no objection, the bill was
ordered to be printed in the REcORD, as
follows:
S. 2251
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That section
652 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
added by section 8 of the Special Foreign
Assistance Act of 1971, is amended to read as
follows:
"Sec. 652. Limitation Upon Exercise.. of
Special Authorities.?The President shall not
exercise any special authority granted to him
under section 506(a), 610(a), or 614(5) of
this Act unless the President, at least thirty
_ days (or 10 days if he certifies, in addition,
that the national interest requires it) prior
to the date he intends to exercise any such
authority, notifies the Speaker of the House
of _ Representatives and the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate in writing
of each such intended exercise, the section of
this Act under which such authority is to
be exercised, and the justification for, and the
extent of, the exercise of such authority.".
Sec. 2. The last sentence of section 506(a)
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is
repealed.
By Mr. CASE:
S. 2252. A bill limiting the total amount
of excess defense articles that all Gov-
ernment agencies may make available to
foreign countries;
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S 10744
Approved.FprEetIRMAIAMM agl,MK:08.041330AROD06001
clined to advertise publicly or used ads show-
ing only whites some "signal that minority
families were unwelcome."
The commission's criticism of the 235 pro-
gram was a followup salvo to a barrage aimed
at the program last year and earlier this year
by the House Banking and Currency Com-
mittee. The committee charged that the poor
? were being swindled by unscrupulous specu-
lators who unloaded rundown and frequently
unsafe. houses on them at inflated prices.
PLEDGE. MADE
, HUD Secretary George Romney pledged to
clean up the 235 program, and at one time
early in 1970 suspended purchases of existing
homes with FHA mortgage subsidies until
appraisal and inspection practices could -be
perfected to protect the low income buyers.
Later, Romney announced a series of new
rules were being put into effect to safe-
guard the poor against real estate specu-
lators trying to get rid of deteriorated houses
at prices- higher than they were worth.
Under the 235 program, the FHA not only
Insures long-term mortgages for poor fami-
lies seeking their own homes, but pays part
-of the interest charges to keep the payments
LAOS: SECRET SHAME
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, any-
one who believes in the Christian Ethie
can only read with sadness. and shame an
article entitled "Laos" written by II. D. S.
Greenway, and published in the July
Atlantic Monthly.
I would hope that every Senator
would read the article. I ask unanimous
? consent that it be printed in the PvEconD.
? There being no objection, the article
was 'ordered to be printed in the IlEcOaD,
'
as follows:
of them are children. One night, the Patlict
Lao and the North Vietnamese had come to
his village. The soldiers in a nearby govern-
ment outpost had detected no enemies 'in
the area: "So we went to be happy," the
village chief said.
"But at four o'clock in the morning we
were attacked. Before we knew it, they were
in the village shooting and the houses were
burning." Squatting down on his haunches,
the village chief described with his hands
in the dirt how the enemy had come and the
attack on the outpost?the short, sharp
explosions, the flames, the rifle fire, the
measured hammering of the fifty-calibers,
and then silence. Death had come in the ?
classic Indochina way: a small, isolated out-
post overrun in the night. It was a scene that
has been played a -thousand times in the last
twenty-five years of war.
The villagers escaped into the surround-
ing woods, and for two days they marched
over seine of the most impenetrable and in-
hospitable country on earth. "We were so
sorry to leave everything behind," the chief
said, "and the march was very difficult. We
walked two days, and the people cried and
cried over the mountains. Two people died;
one was an old person and the other was a
child." There was talk that the men might be
conscripted into Vang Pao's army, but the
chief did not know for sure, and he dld not
know what would happen to his people. "I
am afraid," he said.
"FOS WHAT 7"
At site 272 the Air America planes con-
tinue taking off and landing in a roar of
red dust, bringing rice, pigs, end ducks to
the refugees. But one senses the end of a
decade of American policy in Laos. Ten
years ago, when the Americans first began
to train and equip the Meo tribesmen, yang
Pao's guerrillas operated all over Northeast-
ern Laos?far behind enemy lines to the
borders of North Vietnam itself. Fewer than
two dozen American servicemen have been
killed in these mountains. Asians fight Asians.
But ten years Of costly, vainglorious offen-
sives and unremitting pressure from North
Vietnamese counteroffensives have pushed
the Mee) beyond their endurance. yang Pao's
lasses in the last three years have been. so
heavy that the Armee Clandestine is no
longer an exclusively Meo force. Almost half
their numbers are now made up of other
highland peoples. And in the last three or
four years, the Meo have been organized to
fight in battalion-sized units of over five
hundred men instead of small guerrilla units.
As a result, the slaughter has been mag-
nified. yang Pao's army can no longer hold
Long Chong alone, and by early April it
was reliably reported by Lao and American
sources that no fewer than five thousand
Thai troops had been flown in to bolster
the Long Cheng front. (The Thai govern-
ment still denies the presence of Thai troops
in Laos, but their presence is common knowl-
edge in Vietiane.)
For ten years the Meo people have been
running and dying, and today there are few
mountain ranges left into which to escape.
American officials estimate that fully 15 per-
cent of the 250,000 to 300,000 people in the
military region that makes up Northeast
Laos have died within the last three years.
LAOS
(By H. D. S. Greenway)
The spingtime in Laos is very dry. Save
for the brief Mango rains, the heat is un-
relieved, and shriveled green leaves lie like
dead frogs in the dusty roads. The sun is
dull red in the smoke and haze, for in the
springtime the hill people slash and burn
the brush off the hillsides. The pilots say
that the haze stretches all across the north-
ern marches of Southeast Asia from North
Vietnam across to Burma. The Air America
helicopters must pick their way carefully
among the fantastic limestone outcroppings
that rise like castles from the wooded hills
tumbling out of China. One realizes that the
misty mountains of the classical Chinese
landscape paintings were not the product of
artistic imaginations, but faithful reproduc-
tions of nature.
Here in these hills, fifty miles northeast
of Vientiane, there is an airstrip known to
the pilots as site 272. It is the center for
? American refugee relief in Northern Laos
and the fall-back point for Long Chong,
the secret CIA base twenty-five miles to the
? north. Long Cheng is the headquarters for
the Meo General yang Pao's "Armee Clande-
- stine," supported by the CIA. All this past
winter and spring the base has been under
siege by the North Vietnamese. The hill
peoples, the highland Lao and the Meo de-
pendents of Vang Pao's .army, have been
fleeing south by the thousands, pouring into
the hills and :valleys near site 272. They
make temporary bamboo shelters, and Air
? America drops rice to them, for they have
? no food. There is the despair of uncertainty.
? No one can tell them what their future will
be, Like Laos itself, they have long since
lost control of their own destiny.
In one such makeshift settlement the
? Village chief greets visitors with a -gold-
toothed smile. There are over nine hundred
people in his immediate area?four hundred
has ,become a Lawre ce f airalna figure to
the Moo, is hithself a casualty. Recovering
now from a serious heart attack, burdened
by overwork and worry during the last few
years of disasters, Buell said: "All of this
is difficult for its who have worked with
these ? people since the beginning. Some of
my boys are beginning to wonder, what was
it all for?"
? Some Americans are beginning to wonder
why, if there is to be an accommodation
now, we didn't encourage one ten years ago.
Perhaps the arming and supplying of guer-
rillas so close to the North Vietnamese bor-
der provoked greater North Vietnamese re-
taliation in an area that has nothing to do
with the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the war
In Vietnam. Although it is true that the Meo
had asked for arms in the first place, some
Americans argue that they were urged to
fight on for U.S. interests beyond their ca-
pacity and beyond anything that could be
considered in their owls interest.
"You know, over two thirds of the 170,000
people we are supporting in the Northeast
are refugees," said one American with many
years' experience. "Few have been perma-
nently located, and they are milling about
in limbo. Anthropologists call the Mee) a
seminomadic people, but before the war they
would move only when they ran out of land.
Normally, they might move only ten kilom-
eters or so, and they might take a year to
make the move. Put to be uprooted as they
are now is a great trauma for them.
"In these large refugee moves over the
last four or five years we have found that
about 10 or 15 percent die during the move
or just afterwards," the American said. One
always knew that the long marches were kill- -
era. When whole populations were on the
move, walking for days on end through the
mountains, one knew that the old, the weak,
and the very young died. But, said the Amer-
ican, experience showed that about the same
number of people died anyway even if they
had been carried out by plane or helicopter.
"We have American doctors waiting for them
with mosquito nets, malaria pills, penicillin,
the works. But they die anyway. It is the
move itself?the adjusting to a new area,
different food and water. Of course, part of
the problem is that, like all Southeast
Asians, a lot of these people are sick and
weak to begin with. But a lot of it is psycho-
somatic--bad phi [spirits]. Just the ;trauma
of moving kills them. They think they are go-
ing to-die, and they do."
Edgar Buell expressed the phenomenon a
little differently. "Just moving causes a kind
of sickness," he said. "I wouldn't go so far
as to say they die of a broken heart or any-
think like that, but, yes?you can just about
say that for a lot-of people, moving means
dying."
"TJI. LW THE SKY" .
The official Laotian and American 7an-
bassy position .is that the Long Cheng air-
strip must be held at all coats, but there is a
general realization that the game is almost
played out as far as the Meo are concerned.
Officials speak of an eventual accommoda-
tion with the Communists, and say that the
Armee Clandestine is all but finished 'as
an eflective fighting force.
Many of the Americans who have worked
with the Moo have become -profoundly dis-
illusioned. The senior USAID official in the
Northeast, Edgar Buell, the former Indiana
farmer known as "Pop," who in -ten years
In the summer of 1969, in what- may prove
to have been yang Pao's last successful of-
fensive, the Armee Clandestine, with Ameri-
can logistical and air support, captured the
Plain of Jars from the overextended North
Vietnamese. But some people thought that
the brilliantly executed offensive was a fool-
ish escalation of the conflict. By February
of 1970, Vang Pao had been pushed back off
the plain, with heavy losses.
The raid produced one of the biggest refu-
gee movements Of the Laotian war. Fifteen
thousand inhabitants from the Plain of Jars
were resttled in camps near Vientiane. The
last airplaneload left on the tenth of Febru-
ary, 1970. A silver C-130 with the American
markings painted over landed in a rooster
tall of dust on a: makeshift strip on the
western edge of the Plain of Jars. The last
terrified refugees- -it was their firsts plane
ride--.were herded aboard against the hurri-
can blast of the prop wash; nothing was left
behind except their dogs, forming in packs
and snarling, among the refuse of their en-
s
carnprnent.
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H 654.0 ' CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --HOUSE
TRII3UTE TO LEE TREVINO
(Mr. WHITE asked and was given per-
mission to address the House for I
minute 'and to revise and extend his
remarks.)
. Mr. WHITE. Mr. Speaker, I am sure
my colleagues would be surprised today,
- if I did not remind them that the No. 1
figure in sports, the man whose picture
appears on the cover of Time magazine
today, is a fellow Texan, and a fellow res-
ident of the Proudest City in America to-
day, El Paso, Tex. I can also say with
pride that Lee Trevino is a fellow veteran
of the Marine Corps.
Lee Trevino made golf history when
he won, in turn, within the space of 3
weeks, the United States Open, the
Canadian Open, and the British Open.
'He is also making history as a great
sportsman?a great, likeable human be-
ing. He likes to win, and affects no false
? modesty when he is successful. He does
not like to lose, but when he loses, he
- blames no one but himself.
Mr. Speaker, there had been comments
In the press about the behavior of the
British gallery, so, in his interview
following his victory, Lee took occasion
to comment on the good behavior of the
gallery.
' The golf world will talk foryears about
the calm courage of this great sportsman
who rallied from a double bogey on 17 to
? a birdie on 18, to win a one stroke victory
over a great competitor.
Lee Trevino is proud of his Mexican-
American heritage. He laughingly accepts
the title `Supermex" with the rich humor
that has opened ?a, new era in a game
that is sometimes considered "stuffy."
Today, it's everybody's game, and Lee
Trevino is everybody's hero.
?
(Mr. RARICK asked and was given
_ 'permission to address the House for 1
Minute and to revise and extend his
remarks.)
?
[Mr. RARICK addressed the House.
His remarks will appear in today's Ex-
tensions of Remarks.]
?
NEW PEACE OFFER IS FOR SENATE
_ DO VES
(Mr. DENNIS asked and was given
? permission to address the House for 1
minute, to revise and extend his re-
marks, and include extraneous matter.)
Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Speaker, we may be
hopeful that the allegedly new pro-
posals by the Vietcong actually contain
something new, but we must remember:
.? First, that this is a demand for the
? setting of a withdrawal date, "without
posing any condition"?a thing this
House has rejected and which a current
poll of my own district, rejects by ap-
proximately 80 percent; and
Second, that these proposals include
Provision for some sort of coalition ,gov-
eniment, pending elections?a thing al-
ways basically unacceptable to the United
States.
The allegedly new Vietcong proposals
seem to be directed at American doves?
particularly in the other body--at least
as much as they may indicate any intent
of serious negotiation.
I commend to the attention of my col-
leagues a recent column by William S.
White, which points up this situation,
and which I insert in the 1ZEcorut at this
point:
NEW PEACE OFFER IS FOR SENATE DOVES
(By William S. White)
WAsmxcroisr.?The North Vietnamese have
made another offer of peace in the Viet
Nam war that Is ostensibly directed to the
United States government, but is in reality
addressed to the doves in the Senate.
The Nixon administration does not dare to
brand this fresh Communist thrust for what
it is?a Communist demand for an uncondi-
tional surrender and a total abandonment
of the commitment of five American Presi-
dents to South Viet Nam.
IIERE ARE TWO REASONS
There are two reasons for this state of
affairs.
One is that the administration is bruised
from all too many encounters with its peace
critics here at home and knows that to spurn
this new Communist rubbish outright would
be to open itself to their old litany that
Washington is simply inflexible.
The other is that the President and his as-
sociates?not to mention John F. Kennedy,
Lyndon Johnson, Harry Truman and Dwight
Eisenhower as his predecessors?are under
siege by the Pentagon Papers pilfered by
Daniel Ellsberg to the point where all of
them have been or will be mada to appear
either foolish or against peace.
Moreover, there may be even a third reason
why the State Department Is acting as tho
there really might be some ounce of conces-
sion in these latest Communist proposals.
This government has been conducting some
highly sensitive contacts with certain third
party, and far from pro-American, nations?
meanwhile hoping that the identities of
these parties are not going to conic out, thus
requiring them to run for cover?and is con-
cerned to walk in the softest way possible on
every aspect of this whole business.
The Senate doves, meanwhile, are of course
delighted with North Viet Name suggestions.
For, like the doves, North Viet Nam is de-
manding that the United States fix a precise
date for the withdrawal of all American
forces from South Viet Nam. Given this and
an American abandonment of the anti-Com-
munist government in Saigon, Hanoi would,
so It says, open its cages and release the
American prisoners of war.
Precisely this.form of approach?let Wash-
ington promise a one-sided troop withdrawal
and then Hanoi surely would release our
men?already has been tried in the Senate
and knocked down when roll call time came,
All things considered, however, the doves un-
doubtedly have a better chance than ever
before?and they are not slow in grasping
the opportunity. -
THEY MAY TRY AGAIN
Sen. George McGovern [D., S.D.], a Demo-
catic Presidential aspirant from the far left,
and Sen. Mark Hatfield [R., Ore.], a maverick
Republican, .have already said they may have
a _go at. yet another resolution demanding
one-sided American withdrawal.
Just such a McGovern-Hatfield paper, set-
ting Dec, 31 as the deadline for vihat in fact
would be an unconditional American sur-
render, was defeated by 55 to 42 three weeks
ago. But a lot has happened in two weeks
to the administration and to the bipartisan
supporters of the war, all of It bad, and Mc- ?
Govern and Hatfield may Just have some-
thing this time.
If not, there are always Senators Frank
Church [D., Idaho], and John Sherman
Cooper [R., Ky.]. They, too, are making
ready to put In "end the-war" papers.
The net of it all is simply this: This gov-
ernment Is hanging on only by its fingernails
NTL
to its resolution not to run out on our
pledges to South Viet Nam and not to leave
there until the South Vietnamese have?some
chance of being able to defend themselves.
? THE WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
The SPEAKER. Under a previous
? order of the House the gentleman from
California (Mr. McCLosicsy) is recog-
nized for I hour.
Mr. McCLOSKEY asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks and to include extraneous
matter.)
. Mr. MeCLOSKEY. Mr. Speaker, a few
days ago I had the opportunity to read
a copy of a speech made on June 26, in
the city of Burlingame in my district, by
my colleague from California, the gen-
tleman from Santa Clara County, Mr.
GUBSER. The gentleman was kind enough
to title his speech, "Neo-McCarthyism
and the New Left," thereafter arguing
that the McCarthyism of the early 1950's
had become "McCloskeyism," and con-
cluding: "Neo-McCarthyism, now Mc-
Closkeyism, has served the cause of the
New Left." The thrust of the gentleman's
remarks was specific: in speeches about
Southeast Asia I had been guilty of libel-
ing the image of the United States with
"half truths and distortion," in particu-
lar with respect to the allegation that
the United States has been guilty of
first, "indiscriminate bombing of civil-
ians in Laos," and second, "war crimes
like those for which the Nuremberg trials
decreed the penalty of death."
Both my allegations and my col-
league's comments constitute serious
charges, and I have taken this special
order today, inviting the gentleman from
Santa Clara County to share in a dis-
cussion of the issues involved so that the
record of debate may be as complete as
possible on a matter of grave national
concern?U.S, policies and actions in the
destruction of rural villages in Laos and
Vietnam.
I think it regrettable when legislators,
each sincere in their beliefs, extend their'
disagreement to attacks on the personal
integrity of those with whom they. dis-
agree. The issues on which reasonable
minds differ today are too important to -
the Nation to be clouded by attacks on
the motives and veracity of those who
espouse opposing views-. We confuse the
merits of the issues when we lapse into
personal attacks on one another.
I believe this is why we have long had
-rule XIV in the House, requiring that a
Member, in speaking to the House:
"Shall confine himself to the question
under debate, avoiding, personality."
In earlier days, accusations of un-
truthfulness resulted in canings, fisti-
cuffs, and duels. These hardly add to the
legislative process, but sharp debate quite
often can. In precise cross-examination
and heated debate, I believe our demo-
cratic processes achieve the highest
chance of ascertaining truth, the most
elusive goal of all our deliberations. Un-
til his recent personal attacks, I had con-
sidered my colleague a friend; I hope we
can resume that friendship. He is an able
Member of Congress despite our disagree-
ment. I feel the Nation is particularly in-
debted to him for his leadership last year
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE - July 12, 1971
?
Corps merger with Action and discuss my
amendment.
In addition to hearing Mr. Blatchford,
Director of the Peace Corps, the corn-
mitee will take testimony from others
who ask to be heard. They are requested
to get in touch with Mr. Arthur M. Kuhl,
chief clerk of the committee.
The hearing will take place in public
at 10 a.m. in room 4221 in the New Sen-
ate Office Building.
NOTICE OF HEARINGS BY SUBCOM-
MITTEE ON CRIMINAL LAWS AND
PROCEDURES
Mr. McCLE'LLAN. Mr. President, I
should like to announce that the Sub-
committee on Criminal Laws and Proce-
dures will continue it.s series of hearings
on the recommendations of the National
Commission on Reform of the Federal
Criminal Laws on July 19 and 20, 1971.
The hearings will begin each day at 10:00
a.m. in Room 2228, New Senate Office
Building. Further information on the
hearings. can be obtained from the sub-
committee staff in room 2204, extension
53281.
\---7 ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS
LAOS?FURTHER U.S. MILITARY OP-
ERATIONS IN THIS SECRET WAR
? Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, sev-
eral recent news articles report a new,
? hitherto secret, military operation being
- conducted in Laos by irregular units un-
der the command of Gen. yang Pao,
commander of Military Region No. 2.
The first of these was a .story by Tammy
Arbuckle, published in the Washington
Star of July 7, and reprinted in the New
York Times Of July 8; also an article by
D.E. Ronk, published in the Washington
Post of July 8. As these reporters make
t clear, considerable American support has
been involved.
An article, by Marilyn Berger, pub-
lished-in the Washington Post of July 9,
reports the statements of 'U.S. and Lao
Officials on the operation, statements in-
dicating a certain amount of confusion
as to the respective responsibilities of the
Lao and U.S. Governments for the new
offensive.
Apparently this operation by Lao and
. Thai irregulars, whose costs are paid by
? U.S. funds appropriated by Congress, has
been under way since late June; but we
In the Congress, who have appropriated
the funds; have had to learn about it in
the press. In fact, had there been no
press reports, we might never have
learned about it. Indeed, as Mr. Arbuckle
reported in another article, published in
the Washington Star, American officials
In Laos did not acknowledge the true
scope of the operation until July 9. Mr.
? Arbuckle notes in his article of July 7:
?It Is ahnost unbelievable that after Sen-
ate censure and publication Of the Pentagon
documents, a U.S. mission in Laos should
? once again resort to secrecy, particularly
concerning a United States-run operation
Close to North Vietnam and China.
Surely we will all agree with that
' statement.
_ -
The press stories report that these
irregular units are being led by Ameri-
can military men in the employ of the
Central Intelligence Agency and that top
Lao military officers insist that the op-
eration is being coordinated by the
CIA. A State Department spokesman
has said that American are not actually
leading any of the forces in this opera-
tion. But he has admitted that we are
providing logistic and air support and
I am sure he would not deny that these
Irregular units are directed by U.S. Gov-
ernment officials.
Both Mr. Arbuckle and Mr. Ronk re-
port that American Embassy officials in
Vientia.nne put the responsibility for the
operation on Gen. yang Pao, saying that
he "is very much his own man." Mr.
Ronk adds that American sources say:
No matter what anyone says, he does
pretty much what he wants.
Knowing what I do know now about
our activities in Laos, this statement is
ridiculous on its face. We recruit and
train these irregular forces. We provide
'them with all their equipment and am-
munition. We transport them to battle
in American planes, as the press stories
make clear. It is further reported that
American engineers were involved in
clearing mines from landing strips on the
Plain and that U.S. Air Force crane heli-
copters were used to move heavy equip-
ment into forward areas.
Furthermore, it is inconceivable that
offensive actions of the magnitude de-
scribed could have been undertaken
without directtair support by U.S. fighter
bombers based in Thailand. It is, there-
fore disingenuous if not actually deceitful
to shift the blame on Gen. yang Pao so
as to absolve ourselves of any responsi-
bility for this military engagement.
Actually, if we were able to accept as
accurate the state ment that Gen. yang
Pao "does pretty much what he wants,"
we should be even, more disturbed;
because if this statement were true, it
would mean that, despite the enormous
U.S. involvement and participation in
this Laotian war, we cannot control ac-
tions on the part of local Lao military
commanders which risk causing a new
escalation of the lighting, the costs of
which fighting is borne by the United
States.
One might well ask also about what
additional risk arises from the involve-
ment of Thai troops in an operation of
this type and character. Given the fact
that the United States is committed by
treaty to the defense of Thailand, should
not the Congress seek assurance that
the use of U.S.-financed Thai troops
In Laos will not provoke a North
Vietnamese response that would result
In that Thailand commitment being in-
voked?
The risks inherent in this new offen-
sive, particularly the possibility that it
may undercut the tentative progress
which has been made toward talks, be-
tween.Priine Minister Souvanna and the
Pathet Lao looking toward a reestablish-
ment of the 1962 Accords, raise once
more the question: Just what are the
objectives of U.S. policy in Laos?
Do we intend to continue to prosecute
the war in northern Laos as an adjunct,
to the war in Vietnam, or do we support
with sincerity efforts toward a Laotian
political settlement?
One explanation could be that there
,iis disagreement within the executive
branch on our objectives in Laos. Would
it not be interesting to know, for exam-
ple, whether the principal farce behind
this new offensive was the Department
of State, or the influence of military
planners who view Indochina as one vast
American theater of operations.
We of Congress have a right to ques-
tion the wisdom of this latest Laotian
operation, and to deplore the secrecy
which surrounds it. We also have the
right to resent the high-handedness of
the executive branch in not consulting
Congress before undertaking a major
military operation with funds Congress
appropriated; an operation which may
seriously affect not only our interests
in Laos, but also in all of Indochina as
well as in Thailand.
I would earnestly hope that the Sen-
ate would bear this case in mind when
considering the amendment I have pro-
posed to the Defense authorization bill
that would limit the funds which can be
obligated or expended in Laos, exclusive
of air operations over the Ho Chi Minh
Trail area in southern Laos, to $200
million.
It is only through some control of the
funds it appropriates that the Congress
can have any real knowledge of, or ex-
ercise any restraint on, this dangerous
situation,
Also, I invite the attention of Sen-
ators to a brief news item, following
the summary of the Washington Star
report from Laos, in the July 8 issue of
the New York Times entitled "Cam-
bodian Plan Said To End." This report
quotes "United States sources" as saying
that the United States has abandoned
its secret program of training regular
Cambodian troops in Laos, but is con-
tinuing to train Cambodian guerrillas.
This is a program which has hereto-
fore been kept classified by the execu-
tive branch. Let us hope that its con-
firmation by U.S. seurces will end that
ban, and that knowledge of that portion
of the report on Laos by two members of
the staff of the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee which related to this subject will
no longer be withheld from the American
people.
While on the subject Of declassification,
the subcommittee staff was told by the
State Department this morning, specifi-
cally by Mr. Joseph Wolf, that the mem-
orandum to the Secretary of State on
the declassification of certain portions of
the June 7 closed session of the Senate on
Laos has not yet been acted on but is
still being considered. I remind Senators
that, as I have reported to them on both
June 30 and July '7, by Friday, June 25,
the specific points had been defined on
which there was disagreement between
representatives of the Foreign Relations
Committee and representatives of the
executive branch on the need for. con- -
tinned security classification. Over 2
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n
00/05/1JA gIEN41 Aj8osarv6Pr1smoo600
ongre8s sia-ro-oy
_
Sonie Want Information,
-
But House Voted To
Keep Status Quo
? By GENE GISHI
Washington Bureau of The Sun
Washington ? Does Congress
:-reany want to know everything
jhe United States government
...does?
On balance, the answer is
probably no, despite a renewed
drive in Congress to dislodge
'foreign policy secrets from the
executive branch..
Resolution Rejected
-In fact, the House last week
rejected, 261 to 118, a reso-
- lution asking the State Depart-
ment for documents related to
Depart-
'.
bombing and CIA opera-
tions in Laos.
Representative Joe D. Wag-
' gonner, Jr., (D., La.) said dur-
ing the debate: "There are
? some things that some people in;
;this country had better not know'
:for the security and future well-
;?:being of this country. Therefore,
;they [the administration) must
. keep some information from me
? and they must keep some infor-
mation front you for the benefit
.of the future security of this
country. It is better that infer-
' mation as a rule be overclassi-
fied than underclassified."
, Mr. Wagg,onner also ex-
pressed a wilely held view that
some members of Congress, if
given secret information, could
not resist the temptation of leak-
ing
f it "to the New York
-Times or some other whistle
blower."
The debate underscored a tac-
At assumption long held in Con-
gress that the country is better
;served if legisjators?except for
:a select few?are not told of
everything the United States has
'done or is currently doing in the
field of foreign affairs.
Being Challe 'teed
This assumption, however, is
now being challenged, unsuc-
cessfully in the case of the
House resolution asking for
more information n Laos.
But an even more sweeping
bill has been introduced in the
Senate by John Sherman Ceop-
er (R., Ky.), who wants to give
every member of Congress reg-
ular access to all intelligerce
/reports and Amrirmextfor
V for the executive branth. b;: the
CIA.
9
o nTa-u.
SENATOR COOPER RICHARD HELMS
Seeks more disclosures Knows all the secrets
Mr. Cooper is one of the mot Leverett Saltonstall, a Massa-
highly regarded members of the chusetts Republican, was quoted
Senate, and this is a factor of recently as saying when he was
some importance in its club-like Ia member of the Senate: "They
!atmosphere in which the success '[the CIA) do things I'd just a?s/
or failure of a hill can hirige on Soon not know about."
who its sponsor is. ; Richard Helms, Director of ;
I But Senator Cooper?a senior ICentral Intelligence, at least
once a year gives separate Intel-
Fgence briefings to small groups I
vithin the Armed Services and !
member of the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee?must get his
bill through the Armed Services
Committee, which together with both
committees in I
the Appropriations Committee ooth houses of Congress and '
has jurisdiction over the CIA. even to the full Senate Foreign
. And even without national secu.. Relations Committee, even
1 though it does not have direct
at committees instinctively re-
!
; rity considerations, congression-
s jurisdiction over the agency.
ist encroachment upon their
I
The annual briefings, accord-
areas of competence. ;
i The last time an attempt was
i made to break the. Armed Serv- consist of "around-the-world"
assessments of the United
ices Committee's lock on the
i States' military and intelligence
CIA was in 1966, when then Sen-
posture. Other special briefings
ator Eugene J. McCarthy (D.J might deal with such topics as
Minn.) made a comparatively
deployment and strength of
modest proposal to create a spe-
I Soviet nuclear missiles.
cial CIA committee, made up of
George H. Mahon (D., Texas), I
' representatives of Armed Serv- chairman of the House Appro
ices, Appropriations and the priations Committee, and F. Ed-
Foreign Relations committees. /ward Hebert (D., La.), chair-
'he late Senator Richard B. man of the house Armed Serv-
Russell (D., Ga.), then chair- ices Committee, said, as did
man of the Armed Services Senate sources, that Mr. Helm
Committee, blocked, the bill has never refused to answer F.,
from coming to a floor vote on a question during these briefings..
ing to congressional sources.
'procedural point, effectively
killing the measure.
The Coopee bill is not -likely to;
get far in the legislative process
either. Aside from the jurisdic-
tional problems, most members I member of his panel.
-
Thhi "I took it on my own respOnsi-!
erdiriP It?:P I T.cf 04100
Mr. Hebert said there was;
only one exception, when he in-
structed Mr. Helms not to an-1
swer a question put to him by a
4Cf Mg g
much. "aM0(14146aTIROOOS
na, of course, I won't tell you
what the question was."
"fia eeeeeo, E
tt,
Senate sources indicate tha
senators, too, impose a certain
amount of self-censorship during i
these intelligence briefings. One!
TATINTL
source said he has never heard0
a question pertaining to the so-
called "dirty tricks" aspect of
CIA operations.
"For example," he said,
"we've never asked, 'Mr.
Helms, how many people did /
you lose in your clandestine
service last year? f Maybe we
should ask it, but we never
have."
But it is virtually impossible
to ascertain precisely what even
the select few who attend CIA
briefings know about the agen-
cy's activities.
As Mr. Mahon, the Appropria-
tions chairman, notes, he picks
only those "who won't talk."
Then, he refused to say who
they are.
He said he was 00005ed to the
Cooper bill, saying, "If you give ,
it [CIA information) to every V
member of Congress it would be
like giving it to the New York
Times."
Chairman Hebert. of Armed
Services questioned the need to
know everything.
"I don't know everything," he
said, "and I'm not bitching
about it."
On the other side of the issue
-critics of the present system say
that congress had. deliberately I
remained ignorant to avoid re- I
sponsibility.
Representative Benjamin S.
Rosenthal (D., N.Y.) said dur-
ing the House debate last
week: "I fear Mr. Speaker, that
many of us did not want to know
all of the facts of our involve-
ment in Vietnam in 1965 or 1968
or even yesterday. I think that
the Congress_ has remained
much too long in self-imposed
insulation .. We feared that
more knowledge would mean
ore responsibility for us."
Others argued that the infor-
mation the House was seeking
was already well known to the -
enemy so it could not be' with-
held for national security rea-
sons. As the House vote indicat-
ed, they represented a minority
view.
For the moment, at least, the
e does not want to share
fully in. executive branch se-
crets.
Approved Fpr Release 2000/6iiIebii-RD080)-0i604000600170
1 2 JUL 1971
er-T, . 7.4
:1.),g,4.-11.,
Distasteful as it may be, the survival of any
society, totalitarian or free, depends to some
degree upon the quality and quantity of in-
formation it is able to accumulate about the
military plans and capabilities of potential ad-
versariez,?. but a broad chasm selx-irate:.; the busi--
?I1CSS. of espionage .and thoe of diplomatic
maneuvering or military operations and it 13 its
routine disregard of this essential division that
has prompted critics both in and out of Govern-
ment to question the activities of the Central
.Intelligence Agency.
As a matter of ordinary course, the CIA re-
portedly meddles in domestic affairs of other -
countries, setting up a coup here, shoring up
a "sympathetic" government there?activities
.which are conducted with neither public man-
dato nor knowledge. The CIA. even wages war
? on what can only be presumed to be largely its
own initiative. Some 5030 That troops under.
CIA supervision are fighting in Laos, a country
whose neutrality this Government ostensibly
respects.
Senator Case has introduced legislation to
prevent the CIA from financing military opera- V
tions without congressional authorization. Mr.
Case says his purpose is to prevent the CIA ;-..nd
the Defense Department from making "end
runs around the Cooper-Church and Ioulbright
amendments," which prohibit the use of Ameri-
can ground forces in Laos or Cambodia and the
use of Pentagon funds to provide military sup--
port. to the governments of those nations.
The case for .the measure, however, is not
confined to our clandestine activities. in -Indo-
china, for there is no justification for the CIA
..to carry out military operations anywhe:re
uish-
out congressional approval. Tha CIA budget,
:estimated to be as much as a billion dollars,' is
hidden among the routine budgets of various.,
,feder_al, agencies.. Espionage funds .may well
have, to be kept under cover but Congressi Must ?
:insist that the CIA confine its activities to
gathering information and not expand them to
.1
?thc. point of ..making war.
STATINTL
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W:afirkWii Ziaal
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?STATINTL
ongress Tui
Congress, in its continuing Vietnam-inspired
effort to break the Executive's near moreepoly ot
Vlentral Intelligence Agency. This is understand-
owers in foreign affairs, is now tackling the
able, and was to be expected, too. The agency's
powers are great?or so one suspects; no one
representing the public is really in a position to
know. Yet because it operates under virtually
absolute secrecy, it does not receive even that
Incomplete measure of public scrutiny which the
Defense and State Departments undergo.
The proposals in Congress affecting the CIA
fall into two categories. Those in the first category
start from the premise that the CIA is essentially
an operations agency and an ominous one, which
Is beyond public control and which must somehow
be restrained?for the good of American foreign
policy and for the health of the American demo-
cratic system alike.
v/ So Senator Case has introduced legislation to
prevent CIA from financing a second country's
military operations in a third country (e.g., Thais
In .Laos) and to impose on the agency the same
Limitations on disposing of "surplus" military
materiel as are already imposed on Defense. The
thrust of these provisions is to stop the Executive
from doing secretly what the Congress has for-
bidden it to do openly. Unquestionably they would
restrict Executive flexibility, since the government
would have to justify before a body not beholden
to it the particular actions it wishes to take. The
'advantage to the Executive would be that the
Congress would then have to share responsibility
for the actions undertaken. Since these actions
Involve making war and ensuring the security of
Americans, if not preserving their very lives, we
cannot see how a serious legislature can evade
attempts to bring them under proper control.
Senator McGovern's proposal that all CIA ex-
penditures and appropriations should appear in
the budget as a single line item is another matter.
ile -argues that taxpayers could then decide
whether they wanted to spend more or less on?
Intelligence than, say, education. We wonder,
though, whether a serious judgment on national
priorities, or on CIA's value and its needs, can be
based on knowing just its budget total. In that
figure, critics might have- a blunt instrument for
polemics but citizens Would not have the fine
Instrument required for analysis.
In the House, ? Congressman Badillo recently
offered an amendment to confine the CIA to
gathering and analyzing intelligence. This is the
traditional rallying cry, of those who feel, either
that the United States has no business running
secret operations or that operational duties warp
intelligence production. The amendment, unen-
forceable anyway under existing conditions, lost
172 to 46, but floor debate on it did bring out a
principal reason why concerned legislators despair
of the status quo: Earlier this year Hoyse Armed ..v7
Services chairman Hebert simply abolished the
10-man CIA oversight subcommittee and arrogated
complete responsibility to himself. Congressman
Badillo -is now seeking a way to reconstitute the
subcommittee. This is a useful sequence to keep
in mind when the agency's defenders claim, as
they regularly do, that CIA already is adequately
overseen by the Congress.
Between these proposals and Senator Cooper's,
however, lies a critical difference. Far from re-
garding CIA as an ominous operational agency
whose work must be checked, he regards it as an
essential and expert intelligence agency whose
"conclusions, facts and analyses" ought to -be dis-
tributed "fully and currently" to the germane
committees of Congress as well as to the Executive
Branch. He would amend the National Security
Act to that end. His proposal is, in our view, the
most interesting and far-reaching of the lot.
To Mr. Cooper, knowledge is not only power but
responsibility. A former ambassador, he accepts?
perhaps a bit too readily?that a large part of
national security policy is formulated on the basis
of information classified as secret. If the Congress
is to fulfill its responsibilities in the conduct of
foreign affairs, he says, then it must have available
the same information on which the Executive acts
?and not as a matter of discretion or chance but
of right. Otherwise Congress will find itself again
and again put off by an Executive saying, as was
said, for instance, in the ABM fight, "if you only
knew what we knew ..." Otherwise Congress will
forever be running to catch up with Executive
trains that have already left the station.
The Cooper proposal obviously raises sharp
questions of Executive privilege and of Executive ?
prerogative in foreign policymaking ? to leave
aside the issue of keeping classified information
secure. But they are questions which a responsible
Congress cannot ignore. We trust the Cooper
proposal willbecome a vehicle for debating them
in depth?and in public, too.
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STATINTL
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : dIA-RDP80-01601R00060017000
' FORT tiOiTFi,
?- .. it/1i"
7 ;
?
3.02,470
? .218,`,306
-
-
hous'Pa of Con,Te cr
,s to et the. ac.Tii_in-
r. ? ?
istra-Oon. to .give do:tallod
'formation . on .4'Irrierican undercover
operatiol-ls in Los and. 7istnam and,:
intelligenoo activhiss in gel-123:A::
Ti House has.rejnted five Iasi?,
lutibns by 12,731 -rdc'-'1-,,y
canf.p.rnia eiig r..pon .Setretry of:
State -1Villial".0 -CO,fr=1? to vr0v1310;
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mation..Thl.e is a ?the'iFic
? by 'Etin.
,
?
1-11',111,-,'11-2--; genc-,:;,
- .
lu
....Both of t1-.se
by men who are 2-...-c!ent .-
again::.t the ac7:n-iris.,..ti0-;.-1's
that. the
'2:su.7..c.le to .m'en1 hat
220 Va133mont for. the
-,'veal..
Fr_ i-"_1 :.,eem.
.27.tif;-1-11e:It.,t0
.Congreas, CL' there viU
be nip.::.cau.-?
cheering those to wl1cm, sucli
information he given. Sen. ii
Gravel o ..1,JaLka 17...s just d34strat,...
.-ed the inadvisability OVer
Secret docume.nts to 'ihe hO1C con-,
gross and expecting them .to, remain
confidential.. - .
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-pAILY ORID STATINTL
Approved For Release 2000/05/15.: 410-130119111601R000600170001-0
New U.S. offensive in Laos
VIENTIANE ? The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has launched ?
a new offensive against Lao patriotic forces in northern Laos and is im-
posing a "news blackout" on the whole operation, the Washington Eve-
ning Star and Washington Post reported on Thursday and Friday. The
U.S. newspapers' reports on the massive new attacks were confirmed in
radio broadcasts from Sam Neua, headquarters of the Lao Patriotic
Front.
The CIA's offensive began about a week ago and is focused on the
strategic Plain of Jars area in northern Laos. The Washington Post re-
ported that large forces of Meo tribesmen ? part of the "Secret Army"
led by Gen. yang Pao ? are taking part in the operation. Command is
vested in four of Vang Pao's junior officers since he is still recovering
from wounds and injuries suffered last year. However, actual direction
of the military operations is in the hands of CIA advisers.
It is known also that about 3,500 regular Thai Army troops are tak-
ing part in the offensive. The U.S. has admitted it has escalated its air
war on Laos in the last few days:
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ApproveKbEctrER0IpaSE2000/05/159 CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001
,
1 0 Wrj
E ? 279,608
? 333,807
Wiinc is
ro
"What we are doing in Laos is total-
ly inconsistent with our kind of socie-
ty." This is What a U.S. diplomat in Vi-
entiane, Laos, recently told a cone-
'spondent.
The official, who did not want to be
quoted by name, added: "We are
fighting a war by covert means and
an open society cannot tolerate that."
If this is correct, the administration
has much to answer for to the Ameri-
can public. The disclosures made so
far raise more questions than they an-
swer.
For example: Officially the public
has been told that the United States is
contributing $52 million a year to the
Laotians in (,.olionlie aell Unofficially,
it has been relaienhat $100 million
has been approved for military assist-
ance.
Tuesday, following a rare closed ses-
sion of the United States Senate to dis-
cuss our activity in Laos, different
senators put total expenditures at
$200 million, $250 million, and one
wont as high as $350 million.
Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., a for-
STATINTL
mer secretary of the air force, said he
told his Senate colleagues that "what
was actually going on in Laos was
quite different in some details than we
have been told."
One reported activity in Laos is the
financing of 4800 Thailand troops in
Laos by the U.S.. Central Intelligence'
A.gency. Another iT'riiitincial support
for Royal Laotian troops and irregu-
lars.
The Republican leader in the Senate,
Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, claimed
that nothing new had been. disclosed
.in the secret session of the Senate;
that the Thai troops are not mercenar-
ies; and ? the activity is justified be-
cause, "If Laos were to fall it would
greatly decrease the already slim
chances of successful negotiations
with the Communists who would then
have completely outflanked the rest of
Indochina."
He could be right on all counts, but
whY should the facts be kept from the
American people? The Communists
are certainly aware of much of what
we are doing in Laos. The American
public should know at least as much.
The secrecy on the part of the ad-
ministration raises the fear that the
United States may be enlarging opera-
tions in Laos when a majority of
Americans favor a withdrawal from
Indochina; that in winding down the
war in Vietnam, the administration is
at the same time increasing our in-
volvement in other Indochina nations
which would be contrary to laws
passed by Congress. Specifically a law
forbidding the use of U.S. funds' to
support foreign forces fighting for the
governments of Cambodia and Laos.
Sen. Symington has urged the ad-
ministration to approve release of the
transcript of the secret session as well
as a report on financing of Thai troops
in Laos. If our society is open and, as
administration supporter Scott said,
nothing new was disclose d, there
Ap71411pctioRtwavAtelyotilimiliSite0iA-RDP40+01601 ROO 06(1017610 QI iQ t the peo-
:8, funny business- going on?' -pie know. -
Approved For Release 2000/05/15: CIA-RDP80-01601R00060017000VIATINTL
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAIT
DESERT NEWS
7%1]
E 84,8)
vr-1,1r,
i.
I ?
r'77,
) f
\ (7-1," t
Lkdb1.
fr--1 e
"7 r !`. ?
?
i L,E1
IFA
If the Uniktd States, isn't careful; it can let itself get
dragged into Laos th:? same v,'ay it got dragged into Vietnam.
So it's undcn;larlable that the Senate wants to set a ceil-
ing $200 million bas been proposod? on. U.S, spending in
Laos.
And it's hard to ;.r.vallow the Pentagon's story that such a'
ceiling won't work bncause nobody knows exactly how Trnich.
American Money is hThig spent there.
Granted that precise figures are hard to come by toca.use
much of the money going into Laos is being funneled through
the Central Intelligence Agency -- and C1,s,.4:44iniding is prop-.
erly kept ;secret as a security matter. But the CIA ought to
know how much of its funds is going into Laos, 'and lumping
that amount in with overall spending in Laos could- be no
breach of security. .
Granted that keeping track of U.S.- spending in Laos.
Could involve complicated accounjng procedures that may '?
not be inexpcnsive. Bat the Pentagon ought toknow for its
own purposes how much the support of Laos is costing in
,American dollars as well as possibly in American lives.
Granted, too, that as more U.S. troops are brought home
from Southeast Asia, more U.S. funds will have to be sent ,
there to help replace thern. But this can't be an open-ended ar-
rangement, since America's treasure is not inexhaustible.
There's room for quarreling with the specific level of the
proposed ceiling, t.lready the U.S. is said to be spencliig some -
.$1.74 million a year more than the proposed limit of S200 mil- ?
lion.
. But tho Pentagon can't be handed a. blank check on Laos.
If the Defense Department really doesn't know hew much it is
,spending in LI-Jos or any other individual country in Southeast
Asia, that's- sufficient reason for setting a ceiling t6 find oute
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IMS11.1.11(.4"nN
Approved For Release 2000/Q5/150 91471197-180-01601R00060
0 rf' ! f ') IT ] 0 r''] 9 Tr]
ii, ,..?? ,. ... d .1. ,
o rril f fr?-;) co tiE'-) ic 1
i fi--) ., ,,,.t . .,,, .
\....1 ?,".:-....4 ...a?,_ v.....---.0 \.....,;., ,?a
r -
? By TAMMY ARBUCKLE . 1 Another five - battalions of
Special to The Star ? ! Thais, Lao and Meos are in the
? VIENTIANE _ U.S. officials new positions on the plain's
have admitted for the first time south rim. .
that large-scale operations are The U.S. admission to the op-
being conducted on the Plain of eration on the plain comes after
Jars in north Laos and three a 72-hour coverup. Asked about
battalions of special commandos -the missions, earlier claims that
are in control of two-thirds of commandos were only on the
the plain's area. south and west approaches to
"Hundreds of tons" of food, the plain, a U.S. Embassy offi-
ammunition, and arms have cial said, "That was a mis-
been found in caches on the take." Presumably, this also ap-
plain by 12-man commando plies to similar claim by State
teams, officials said yesterday. Department briefers in Wash-
Eighty percent of the caches ington.
contain food and the remainder Gen. Thongphanh Knoksy. the
arms, the sources said, mention- Lao military spokesman, tells
lag one item found-25 cases of the press here to ask the Amer
Vietnamese canned candy. leans about the operation. Top
Little Farming Noted Lao military officers insist the
The teams have seen no local operation is coordinated by the i
population to date, officials said, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency,
and this, coupled with the high Led by Americans
percentage of food in the caches, Lao military men say the
Indicates the 5,000 People who teams on the plain are led by
chose to remain with the Corn- Americans. In some cases on
munists during the 1959 evacua- some teams there are two
tion have not farmed on the Americans who the Mee say
plain in the past 18 months. .are "commando leaders" based
With no population to grow at Site 14 Pakkao, 10 miles
food, the Vietnamese were southeast of the main U.S. base
forced to bring in food to the at Long Chen. There are also
plain area. Hence, the large American military men in ad-
caches, U.S. officials reason. visory positions.
Commando teams have received It is relatively easy for report-
a few rounds of mortar fire but ers to find out about American
no contact by fire with Vietnam- team leaders from Meo and Lao
ese troops. military personnel in conversa-
U.S. officials insist the opera- tion. One must prefer these
Jon is small, with no intention to sources to State Departinnet
ccupy the plain. The sole ob- denials, particularly when the
jective is to destroy Communist U.S. Embassy in Vientiane takes
;upplies, slow Hanoi's next every step possible, first to cover,
fry-season offensive and Per" up these operations, particularly
haps relieve the pressure on the present ones on the plain,
Boum Long north of the plain, and, second, to prevent corre-
Me? troops there, encumbered spondents seeing the operations.
with 15,000 civilians, have been Thousands of Meos and Lao of
taking hundreds of rounds of the Laos hill populations see
shelling nightly, and at least 4-4 Americans engaged in military
civilians have been killed. pursuits in their mountains.
Even U.S. B52 strikes failed to Some of them . inform North
remove enemy gunners. The Vietnamese troops, making non-
/
, plain operation appears set to
. Air America --)lanes stacking up sense of embassy claims that
these operations should ha
continue for seine time with
hidden because of U.S. national
over 'commando bases near the security. The CIA has certainly
?Plain of- jars airstrip, known as run an efficient operation in
Lima 22, in the central plain. north Laos in many respects,
Commandos cleared land- but the fact that the agency is
Ing places for the first aircraft, operatilng in the area has in
ind 'U.S. engineers worked to itself become an excuse and a
clear mines from the regular tool to cover up the deep U.S.
airstrips. ? military and political involve-
ment in the area.
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STATINTL
12.12MacLE(ar-Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-R0P80-01601R000600170 STATI NTL
CHICAGO, ILL.
SUN-TIHES
- 536,103
S 709,12.3
'JUL 9 WI
w
?,;
, ,
(1 C.1?1.1 (f.j fi?-
i By John H. Avorill
Los Angeles Times Special
WASHINGTON ? The Nixon
, administration's feud with Sell-
? ate doves over the war in Laos
' escalated Thursday with a
L Pentagon claim that a S2.00-
-Million-a-year limit on U.S, aid
,? to Laos would infringe on the,
.
President's constitutional pow-
I ers.
- Disclosing the Defense De-
partment position, contained in
, n memorandum to the Senate
,. Armed Services . Committee,
; Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.)
i-. called the Pentagon arguments
!- intriguing and disturbing.
Strong opposition
i - In the memo, the Pentagon
! Strongly opposed legislation by
Symington that would Unlit-
, U.S. assistance to Laos to .900
i million, exclusive of funds
i spent for U.S. combat air oper-
ations over the lio Chi Minh
, Trail in southern Laos..
, - Although the administration,
i, acknowledges spending only
$52 million a year in economic -;
assistance to Laos, it has been ,
estimated that U.S. aid is run- .
,? 'ling at a rate of at least $350
, million a year.
A large portion of these .
i
)funds are. believed to be spent -
:
;by the Central Intelligence.
" Agency to finance clandestine
Thai troops .and Meo tribes-
k ,
!
men operating in Laos.
. '
Challenges them-. .
Symington challenged the !
; Pentagon arguments in a Sell-, .
. ;ate speech. .
-"The President, as command- .
? -, eerei n-c hief, ,has the con- I
stitutional authority to direct
military operations," Sym-
ington said, "but under our
system of checks and balances
he can do so only with the
funds authorized by the Con-
gress."
Symington's attack was the.
latest in a series of skirmishes
between the administration
and the Senate's anti-war bloc
over Laos,
Symington has chided. the
State Department for its delay
In authorizing release of the
transcript of the Senate's
closed-door session on Laos on
June 7. During that session,
Symington and others accused
the administration of con-
ducting illegal military Oper-
ations in Laos. -
A gloss-over -
Thursday, State Department
spokesman Charles W. Bray,
asked about the ,U.S. in-
volvement in a military offen-
sive in the Plain of Jars,
glossed over a split between
pJ
regular Laotian forces and the
CIA-supported Moos.
Bray said that the United
States was providing logistic
and. air support for tins oper-
ation "as we have in other op-
erations in Laos."
?
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STATINTL
NEW : N 0111CIffS
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VISZMIeweenz:ra
\ ?
. EXPOSE TEE CIA?
Several .attacks--on'the Central Intelligence Agenc,
(Richard.11elms, direcI-or) began Wednesday in the Senate
Sen. George McGovern (D-S.D.) urged that CIA fund.
. be reported in one line of th
federal budget, instead of being
masked as for decades past in:
other budget item.
Sen. John Sherman Cooper
(R-Ky.) introduced a bill to force. /
the CIA to furnish Congress regu-v
larly with intelligence inform.-
-tion hitherto given only to the
government's Executive branch.
The Cooper proposal, it seems
almost needless to say, got friend-
ly comments from Democratic
Sens. J. W. Fulbright (Ark.),
Mike Ma n sfi el d (Mont.), and
Stuart Symington (Mo.).
Sen. Clifford P. Case (1:-I,T.J.) premised to introduce
?bills to forbid the CI.A to sneak money to Thailand for Thai
troops fighting in Laos.
Some things which these and other CIA-baiters seem not
to have learned in all-the years of the agency's existence:
'The CIA is a big organization engaged in the difficult,
-dangerous, sometimes distasteful but utterly necessary
- work of espionage around the world. It has to be as secret
in its operations as is humanly possible if it is to be effec-
tive. And if the CIA cannot go on being at least as effective
in the future as it has been in the past, then God help the.
Richard Helms
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NEW YORK, N.Y.
POST
EVENING 7 623,245
WEEKEND - ?354,797
rdUE 1011.
-7-
_
Peq"
? The more the pot bubbles, the More
desperate the effort to keep the lid on.
? Day before yesterday the House tabled
. Rep. Pete McCloskey's resolution call-
ing for Congress to he given "the entire
truth" about American operations in
?. Laos; the rejection was on the ground
that it ."would not be compatible with
the public interest" to explore material
of such "a highly sensitive nature."
Almost as the House acted, or didn't
act, the cables were humming from
Vientiane with word of a secret com-
mando operation--flown in by U. S.
-aircraft., led by__ c4-\ "employes"?
against the Communists in the Plaine
des Jarres of northern Laos. [Paren-
.:
thetical paragraph: -"In Washington, ,
State Dept. officials said they were
checking the situation and had no im-
mediate comment."]
The next day--yesterday--the "sec-
rots"' were official. Gen. Thongphanh
of the Laotian Defense Ministry said of
the commando raids: "You should ask
the American Embassy. This is their
affair ? . . the [Laotian] government is
not responsible for this operation," The
American Embassy declined comment.
Not compatible, you. see, with in-
terest of the American public. As Gen
Maxwell Taylor says, there are some
things it is better for the people not to
know.
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RIMING= POST
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n cs,c
dr 11 ?
?kJ 09 a
Tin
e..) dia i
By Marilyn Berger
? 'Washinuton Post Staff Writer
Laotian government
said yesterday that a new of-
"ferisive on the Plain of Jars is
the responsibility of the U.S.
embassy, while American offi-
cials in Washington sought to
describe the 'action as a Lao-
tian operation,
.The unusual statement by a
Defense Ministry- spokesman
In Vientiane appeared to grow
,out of a feud within the Lao-
tian government over the con-
duct of military operations. 1
This statement came as Sen.
Stuart. Symington (D-Mo.) was
infoi ming the Senate that the
Pentagon was opposing his
amendment to limit U.S. mili-
0
-)Q 11(771 Tiq
Li
? State Department spoke.s-
man Charles W. Bray, asked
about U.S. involvement in the.
Plain of :Jars drive,, glossed
over the split between regular
Laotian forces and the ,.C1A-
. .
supported Meos.
"We . know that the Royal
Leo goverment is attempting
to improve its defensive ?posi;
tions by pushing the North
Vietnames forces out of high
ground to the west and to the
smith of the Plain of Jars."
Bray said. "These are the kind
of actions the Royal Lao gov-
ernment has traditionally un-
dertaken in the rainy. season
when the North Vietnamese
have difficutly in supplying
their forces, so that the Royal
Lao government will he in a
better position when the
North Vietnamese ,return to
tai-' assistance to Laos to $200 the offensive during the dry
million -during fiscal 1972. iseason Which begins in Nov-
The Associated Press re- lember" ? -
ported that Gen, Thongphanh
Bra said the United States
Knoksy, the Defense Ministry ?
was providing logistic and air
spokesman, said in Vientiane support for this operation "as
.1 that there was a new drive on
we have in other operations in
the. Plain of Jars by special Laos."
forces, but he declined to dis- Bray added that, contrary to
cuss detaila, "You should ask some news reports, "No Amer-
the. ...American ,...,embassy," jeans of any description are
f Thongphanh said. "This is leading any of the forces in
their affair." - this operation or any other op-
Andrew P. Guzowski, a 'U.S. eration in Laos," When ques-
tioned , however, he left open
comment. But, the AP re-
ported, it is no secret that the
Central Intelligence Agency
pays, equips and advises the
special forces . and the Meo
tribal army under. Gen. yang
_
!Pao, who is in command on
the Plain of Jars region with a
:base at Long -Chen.
Asked whether Yang Pao
had informed the Laotian gov-
;ernment about his operations,
alongpha.nh. replied, "No, the
:government is not responsible
for this operation." -
Analysts here indicated that
yang Pao, who reports (I.-
rectly to Laotian Premier Sou-
vanna Phouma and not to the
Ministry of Defense, had ap7
Parently hit a sensitive nerve.
The statement attributing the
military operation ? to the
United States was seen here
as the ministry's way of hit-
ting back.
the possibility that U.S. advis-
ers were involved. Other
American officials said that
U.S. advisers stayed at head7
quarters and did not go into
the field., - ?
U.S. officials here said that
Yang- Pao's forces have won
'control of the high points all
around the Plain of -Tars ex-
cept for the northeastern sec;
tion, making the plain untena-
ble for the North Vietnamese
and Pathei Lao. .
; Symington, .whose
Foreign Relations subcommit-
tee has put the spotlight .on
U.S. operations in Laos?both
acknowledged and covert?
yesterday read into the record
a Pentagon statement in oppo-
sition to his amendment to
limit spending in .Laos. That
statement said such a limit
"would substantially impair
our on-going operation in
Laos, operations which have
0
yenaroe ?
been undertaken at the re-
quest of the government of
Laos to assist it in resisting
military takcOver by North
Vietnam."
While Symington sought in
his amendment to put a ceil-
ing of $200 million on obliga-
tions or expenditures for mili-
tary and economic aid, Secre-
tary of State William P. Rog-
ers has said that the United
,,
States is spending 'in the
e neighborhood of $330 million, '
exclusive of the :cost of U.S.
bombing operations, in Laos.
The. . pentagon statement
said the Symington amend-
.ment "would intrude into mat-
ters properly-- Within the con-
stitutional authority of the
?President; as commander-in-
chief, to direct military opera-
tions 'in Southeast Asia."
e Symington called this an
"intriguing comment" in
which the TiePartment of De-
fense "would appear to be say-
ing that the respOnsibilities
the Congress has .under the
ConstitUtion to -raise and sup-
port armies does not mean
what it says." - ,
. The Pentagon aiso said the
.amendment could not be ad-
ministered by- the Executive
Branch- ? which, . according to
the statement, maintains rec-
ords for military assistance
service ? fon -Southeast Asia"
only on an estimate basis."
Symington called this a "dis-
turbing" practice. "How can
the. Ekecutive Branch be cer-
tain
that-expenditures do not
exceed ? obligations in each
country?" Symington asked.
? _Instead of being argu-
ment against his amendment,
Symington suggested that the
-admission_ ? of 'this ?practice
served-as -an argument for its
adoption. "It could well force
the Executive Branch to insti-
tute procedures which will
provile: an accurate account-
ing .":/" he said. . ; ?
:In - Vientiane,. :meanwhile,
Souvanna ? sent,' a, reply to
Prince- SoUphanouvong, head
,of the Pathct Lao, about the
latter's cease-fire proposal of
June 25. Souvanna proposed a.
.general cease-fire within a ra-.
STATINTL
dius. of 30 kilometers -(abont 20'
miles) around the' Plain of
Jars and discussions at the
plain to reach agreement on a
full cease-fire:,? ?
?
? Souphanouvong had pro-
posed a ?-- full' cease-fire that
would .include an end to the
American bombing. He sug-
gested me.etings alternately at
the Plain of Jars and in Vien-
tiane. ?
Informed sources here said
they did not expect Souphan-
ouvong to' accept Souvanna's
proposal but saidthat the
reply .would serve ? to keep the
exchanges going,'
.
. .
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111471 STATINTL
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-?By TAMMY ARBUCKLE'
Star Staff Viritar
VIENTIANE ? Spccial .secret
'army units under the U.S. Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, but
nominally controlled by Meo
General Yang Pao, are report-
ed hi virtual control of north-
astern, eastern, and southern
portions of the. Plain of Jars in
north Laos. ? - -
spokesman Gen. Thongplianh
Knoksy admitted yesterday that
friendly forces had reached the
area just south of Woodpeck-
er Ridge. The ridge overlooks
the northeast entrance to the
plain. . .
The general said ? teams ? were
roving over the Plain of Jars
'Searching ? for Vietmanese, and
Pathet Lao 'caches with some
'success. He said three quarters
:of the caches found are of food
and only one quarter are arms
'caches. These proportions are
directly opposite to the amounts
of food and arms caches found
when the government took the
plain in August 1ir69.
Gen. Thongphanh said he did
not believe the secret army
forces are strong enough to cut
Route 7 entering the Plain of
Jars as they did in 1969. Thong-
phalli] claimed the operation
was to prevent Communists at-
...
iI,' ' I,z) 1
1
tacking Bouam Long, just north
of the, plain, and concentrating
against the joint U.S. Moo base
at Long Chen.
? airpower, , according' to
other sources, is active in the
plain area and ?U.S. engineers
are working- on. strips southof
old . Meo' strongpoint Lima 22.
The U.S.. Air ? Force uses flying
crane helicopters to bring and
remove heavy equipment. ? .
Gen. Thongphanh declined to
give 'further information on the
Plain of Jars -operation. 'He di-
rented correspondents to ask the
U.S. Embassy. ? U.S. officials,
however, refused. to give infor-
mation.. One officials reply to
persistent press queries was."go
o hell.". '
In the picture of the opera-
tion . which appears, however,
five or six battalions, of clan-
destine army forces are placed
south and Southeast of the rim of
the Plain of Jars centered on
Banna .which Yang Pao's forces
Cr271 1.11 Jr711
took Tuesday. There and at oth-
er places near the rim, two spe-
cial battalions were fanning out
across the plain in teams
searching for caches. Well in-
searching for caches. ?
Well informed sources say
there is .no intention of taking
territory, only knocking out
enemy supply lines for a more
effective defense of Long Chen.
To hold the plain would be mili-
tarily and politically unwise.
Undoubtedly team sweeps is the
best plan. North Vietnamese
forces remain, cast of Long
Chen and if their supplies are
cut off Long Chen would be
in a -better military position.
However, informed military
sources fear Yang Poa will be
tempted to take the plain. This
may cause another severe 'de-
feat, such as in February when
Hanoi troops swept him from'
the plain. . -
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Perpetuation of American aid to Pakistan
Is not, in fact, likely to help persuade the
military regime there to move toward restora-
tion of genuine democratic government any
more than continuing, American support for
the Athens junta has helped restore demo-
cratic rights to the Greek people. It will,
? however, put the United States in the un-
tenable position of underwriting policies of
repression, which have led to the ruthless
and continuing slaughter of hundreds of
thousands of Bengalis in East Pakistan.
These policies have already driven more than
six million East Pakistanis into exile in
:India where their presence creates grave
political, social and economic tensions and a
rising threat of domestic and even interna-
tional conflict.
? President Vahya's recent proposals for res-
. toration of civilian rule offer little hope for
? significant change since they continue to
exclude the outlawed Awami League, the
party which won an overwhelming majority
of the votes in East Pakistan and an absolute
majority of the seats in the unconvened
National Assembly in last December's elec-
tions. Under these circumstances, can any-
- one In Washington explain how additional
military or developmental aid to Pakistan can
? he justified morally or in terms of this coun-
try's pragmatic self-interest in peaceful,
? democratic development on the Indian sub-
continent?
"THE WILD BLUE YONDER
OVER LAOS"
HON. MICHAEL J. HARRINGTON
? OF MASSACHUSETTS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, July S. 1971
Mr. HARRINGTON. Mr. -Speaker I
have just read an article detailing some
of the activities of the American Gov-
ernment in and over Laos. This latest
piece of writing comes from Fred Branf-
man and appears in the July 1971, issue
of Washington monthly magazine. Mr.
I3ranfman was in Laos from March of
1967 to February 1971, first with Inter-
' national Voluntary Services, and then
RS a writer, researching the bombing of
Laos on his own. He interviewed thou-
sands of refugees who lived under the
bombs, plus many American officials and
pilots. My interest in reading about the
effects of our bombing on the people and
land of Laos is tempered with a deep sad-
ness. I am saddened by the fact that I
aril forced to read in the press of this
Nation information my Government
claims is too sensitive for the American
public to be exposed to. Just as it is a
tragedy for this esteemed body to be
forced to rely on the newspapers of the
tTnted States to break the truth to us
about our present and past activities in
Vietnam, so it is equally troubling that
Members of Congress are forced to rely
on brave and tenacious members of the
press, such as Mr. Branfman, for our in-
formation on what our country is ac-
tually up to in Laos.
As long as the House of Representa-
,tives votes, as it did on Wednesday,
against being fully informed by the prop-.
er official sources as to what our actual
activities over Laos are, we will hz-ir1e to
continue to depend on persons such as
Mr. Branfman for the truth about our
Nation's continuing war upon that al-
4060400640611166
ready shattered little conntry of Laos. I
ask unanimous consent that Mr. Branf-
ma.n's article be printed in the RECORD.
'The Washington Monthly, July 2, 1971]
THE WILD BLUE YONDER OVER Laos
(By Fred Branfman)
War is no longer the despeiate annihilat-
ing struggle that it was.. . . It is a warfare of
limited aims. This is not to say that . . . the
conduct of war . . . has become less blood-
thirsty or more chivalrous. On the contrary.
.
But in a physical sense war involves very
small numbers of people, mostly highly
trained specialists. The fighting . . takes
place on the vague frontiers whose where-
abouts the average man can only guess at ...
George Orwell, 1984
Conventional land warfare, George Orwell
predicted, would inevitably give way to auto-
mated war as military technology developed.
The war in Indochina today appears to be
undergoing such a transformation.
Perhaps unaware of this, AmeriCans who
watch the war have not yet learned to look
up in the air. While most people believe that
bringing the troops home is synonymous with
getting out of Vietnam, ground troops are
becoming irrelevant to the war effort. The
real war has taken off. The skies are being
filled with American planes as the land is
emptied of its foot soldiers.
The Nixon Administration has accom-
plished massive aerial escalation, perhaps
more devastating than President Johnson's
troop buildups of 1965, with minimum public
notice or concern because the country still
thinks it is fighting with the Green Machine?
the ground army?of the 1060s. But the
war of the 1970s is that of the Blue Ma-
chine?U.S. air power?several thousand feet
above the grunts, climbing away from any
American agony. With the inexorable de-
velopment of American air technology, Indo-
china is already becoming Orwell's battlefield.
Since Nixon took office, and as ground
troops have been withdrawn, more than 2.7
million tons of bombs, by Pentagon estimate,
have been dropped on Indochina. This is
more American ordnance than was absorbed
by both the European ancl Pacific theaters
during World War II, plus the Korean war.
We are dropping six million pounds of bombs
a day, 4,000 pounds every minute.
The people underwent another war: the
air war. They learned another form of civil-
ization: the holes. We dug day and night, the
planes bombed day and. night. Our village
was filled- with bomb craters, the land made
barren. I grieved very much to see my village
in ruins, my animals vanished, my crops
destroyed. . . . Each day, news came about
such and such a village being bombed, more
and more deaths and wounded . . .---from
essay by teenage refugee, Laos
The bombing of Laos has doubled, erasing
whatever restrictions on striking civilian
targets that formerly existed, Hundreds, per-
haps thousands, of villages have been de-
stroyed. Tens of thousands of peasants have
been killed and wounded, hundreds of thou-
sands have been driven underground. The
Plain of Jars, formerly a thriving society
of some 50,000 people, has been leveled and
emptied of its inhabitants.
The Laos pattern has been repeated in
Cambodia. Numerous towns and villages
:lave already been decimated. As The Wash-
ington Post reported on January 21, 1971,
"the United States is now waging a full-dress
air war across Cambodia [that] now rivals
In scope, although not in intensity, the air
war in Laos."
The bombing of North Vietnam has also
resumed. By June 1, air raids had 6ccurre.d
on 43 days since the first of the year, an
average of twice a week. As Randy Floyd, a
Marine pilot who bombed North Vietnam 37
times, puts it, "Anywhere in North Vietnam
is basic-ally a free drop zone . . . if you
U-
y 8, 1971
'didn't find any particu ar targets you wantedI
to hit, the ri normally you'd just drop your STATINTL
bombs wherever you. wanted to." One may
or may not accept Hanoi Radio claims that
civilian targets are constantly struck. But all
infoemed American sources say that "pro-
tective reaction" strikes are going far be-
yond enemy missile sites.
During these escalations, there has been
a significant decrease or U.S. air activity
within South Vietnam, both because of the
slowdown in ground activity there and be-
cause some 500 aircraft have been trans-
ferred to the Vietnamese Air Force. Monthly
American air sorties have been about 70 per
cent lower this year in South Vietnam than
they were in 1968.
It is assumed, however, that should fight-
ing flare up again, American squadrons will
be returned from their present resting loca-
tions in Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Tai-
wan, or the United States?squadrons that
can be made operational in three clays, ac-
cording to a Seventh Air Force information
?Meer. Most Air Force personnel I inter-
viewed tended to minimize the importance
of the reductions in Vietnam itself.
In any event, more than 350,000 tons of
bombs-200.000 pounds every hour?will be
dropped before the end of the year. Clearly,
as they say out in Cam Ranh Bay, "The name
of the game is air."
There wasn't a night when we thought
we'd live until morning . . . never a morning
see thought we'd- survive until right. Did
our children cry? Oh, yes, and we did also.
I just stayeri in my cave. I didn't see the sun-
light for two years. What did I think about?
Oh, I used to repeat, "please don't let the
planes come, please don't let the planes
come, please don't let the planes come
?Refugee from the Plain of Jars
Many Americans believe that the pattern
of the war fought on the ground in Viet-
nam will spread to the other countries.
Actually, the opposite seems to be true. The
air war in Laos has beets going on for several
years, a concurrent experiment with the land
war in Vietnam. Neither experiment has
been successful in stopping guerrilla forces,
but at least the air war has a possibility for
surviving the domestic politics while at the
same time delaying communist takeovers
in Indochina. It is perhaps the only solution
for an Administration that wants to keep
from losing wars abroad and eh:atoms at
home.
The air war also involves a change in the
tactics of battle. If a guerrilla is a fish
among the sea of the people, the objective
of the land, war is to remove the fish. The
air war, however, drains the sea. It has para-
lysed the civilian populations. Vietnam is
net the future of Laos, but Laos may be the
future of the war all over Indochina. The
Era of the Blue Machine has arrived.
This is my daughter. Khamphong. She's
three years old. I was fishing in a stream
with all seven of my children on February
23, 1969. Suddenly jets came and dropped
anti-personnel bombs all around. Six of my
seven children were hit. See, you can still
feel many pellets in Khamphong's legs and
beck. There was no soldiers nearby?refugee
from Plain of Jars.
For the last two-and-a-half years, bomb-
ing has been the heart of U.S. policy; His-
torians may conic to date this era from
January 20, 1909. In it, war is waged pri-
marily through the aerial bombardment of
populated areas. Heavy bombing of civilian
targets has, of course, occurred during other
wars, and in the Vietnam war before 1060.
But in each of these cases, the bombing
pacers have also deployed large numbers of
pound troops, with the bombing seen as a
support effort.
What the Era of the Blue Machine means
Is no better illustrated than in portions of
Laos controlled by the Pathet Lao. Pathet
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- - ?. ?
By GENE 01S1li
?? Washington. Euriou of The Stin
? WaShington, July 7?The
House rejected. today a resolu-
tion asking the administration
for information about its mili-
tary operations in Laos, while in
the Senate two bills were intro-
duced to provide Congress with
.CIA information and greater
budgetary control over the agen-
cy.
The rejected House resolution
, was offered by Representative
Paul N. McCloskey, Jr. (R.,.
Calif.), , It would have directed
. the secretary of state, "to the
extent not incompatible with the
public interest," to turn over to
the House documents containing
policy instructions given to the
U.S. ambassador in Laos.
? The period covered by the res-
olution was from January 1,
? 1964, to June 21, 1971. Specific
information the resolution
sought pertained to:
' 1: Covert CIA operations in
' Laos. .
2. Thai and other foreign
armed forces . operations in
Laos.
3. U.S. bombing in the coun-
try, other than along the Viet-
nam-related Ho Chi Minh trail.
4. U.S. armed forces opera.
tions in Laos.
? 5? U.S. Agency for InternatiOn-
, al Development operations in
Laos connected with CIA or mil-
itary operations.
....e_The' House voted to table, or
lay aside permanently, the reso-
lution by a 261 to 113 vote. The
House Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee opposed the resolution on the
grounds that the information
? sought Was of a "highly sensi-
tive nature," that its disclosure
"would not be compatible with
the public interest-'and that the
administration already has pri-
vately briefed appropriate com-
mittees on the subject.
Cooper Proposal
I ? In the Senate, John Sherman
tz? Cooper (R., Ky.) introduced a
bill to require the CIA to give to
certain congressional commit-
tees all information, including
intelligence analyses, that the
agency gives to the executive
branch. Approved For R
ectei On 1 AaOS
- t
The' committees would be the
House and Senate Armed Serv-
ices Committees, the House For-
eign Affairs Committee and the
Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee.
These committees, in turn,
would be required to make
available the CIA information
that they receive to any mem-
ber of Congress who asks for it,
in accordance with rules and
procedures each committee may
establish.
? Senator Cooper's proposal is
drafted as an amendment to the
1947 National Security Act. Mr.
Cooper noted that the law does
not prohibit the CIA from giving,
intelligence information to Con-
gress,but it does not require the
agency to do so.
At present, the CIA reports ?
regularly to a small group of
senators and representatives
within the appropriations and
armed services commitee of
, both houses. But other members
of Congress are not given acceaf,
. .
o sinformation.
In introducing his bill, Senator
Cooper noted that Congress is
asked to support the adminis-
tration's foreign and national
curity decisions by providing ,
money for the deployment of
weapons, stationing American
troops abroad and sending them
into combat, and by approving
binding commitments to foreign
countries.
Such congressional approval,
he said, "should be given upon
the best information available to
both the executive and legisla-
tive branches." ?
Right To Secrecy
Senator Cooper said his bill
would not touch upon the consti-
tutional question of the govern-
ment's right to secrecy, which
was raised recently by the publi-
cation of the "top-secret" Penta-
gon papers. But he. said he be-
lieved that his bill, if enacted,
would "result in much declassi-
fication of information for the
Congress and the public as a
whole." - ?
Senator George S. McGovern
'(D., S.D.) introduced a bill to
propriations for the CIA to air'
pear as a single line in the exec-
utive .budget. The measure
would require the CIA to dis-
close only its total annual budg-
et.
? At present, CIA expenditures
are hidden in the budgets of
other agencies, and only a few
members of Congress?mem-
bers of small subcommittees:
? within the appropriation com-
mittees - of both houses?know
how mueh the CIA is spending.1
McGovern"s Complaint
believe that CIA funding is I
now so substantial," Senator
McGovern said, "that such a
single-line item for the agency
in the budget would not commu-
nicate usable information, to po-
tentia!adversaries."
Because Congress does not
know how much it is actually
appropriating for the CIA, he 1.
said, it cannot set priorities and I
balance expenditures' intelli-
gence operations with other do-'
mestic and defense needs.
Senator Clifford Case (R.
N.J.) said he will introduce to-
morrow three other bills, all de-
siged to restrict CIA activities
abroad. The bills, which Mr.
Case outlined last month, would
place congressional controls
over CIA military operations
abroad, including the hiring of
foreign mercenaries and the use
of U.S. surplus weapons.
In the House, several other
resolutions requesting more in-
formation were rejected by
voice vote after the roll-call on
the first McCloskey resolution.
Other resolutions, also offered
by . Mr. McCloskey, asked for
documents related to U.S. bomb-
ing operations in northern Laos,
together with aerial photographs
of 196 Laotian villages that Mr.
McCloskey says have been dam-
aged or destroyed by the
bombing, and documents per-
taininu to ,the U.S.-supported
pacification, program in South
Vietnam.
But the main fight was over
the first McCloskey resolution,
which its supporters said would
turn over to the House only in-
formation that already is well
STATINTL
Maiylaad ?? ,
? Opponents contended,. how-
e'er. that disclosure of the in-
format& could'endami,er na-;
tional security: - Reprosentative.
retcc 11. B. .Frelinglim?sen
? N.J.) kt-gued further lint if the
iinfo:anation were made avail-
able to members of Congress,
11-ierf might he those who WouU
1-1Lal:". it to the public. ? ? ?
On the roll-call. the 'Maryland
? delegation voted as follows: -
;Goodbe E. Byron (D..), Edward
A. Garmatz (D.! and William 0.
2ainsl the res-
Cilbort Gude (H.. Mr- I
enu D. Long (D.,. Parren J.1
iMitchell (D.) and Paul S., Sar-,
I banes (D.) voted. for it. ler,v-
irence J Hogan (H.) 'V.ras ni).C111.
LealSig.e26108edilitgir:eselnA14611584M1?661 W66001-70001-0
?
zp.s j-NCELES
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!AIL. 1;:r1
r ? ? -
1- OUSe. 1(:\;lea IY
irAiNtA/4 up.
. . ,
-1-k, ?
for s oah
BY THOMAS J. FOLEY
. Times Staff Writer
WASHINGTON ? The
House Wedne.sday
knocked down an .attempt-
by Rep. Pal N. feClos-
key ar,? (R-Calif.) to foree-,-
the State Department to
reveal -? details of secret.
operations in Laos.. .?
Men)f)ers voted 261. tn
:118 - against MeCloskey'S
i'i2so1ution of inquiry that
would have asked the
State Department to fur-
nish documents "compati-
''ble with the public inter-
s t" (OntaInm?olicy
guidelines to L.S. ambas,
-eadors in Laos over the
last seven ; and one-10f
years. ? ,
A short time later,: Mc-
Closkey and Deputy Un-
dersecretary of .State- Wil-
liam 13. Macomber Jr. en-
gaged in an exchange. at
House freedom of informa-
tion subcommittee hear-
ing when the congressman
-Sought to question Mac-
Othber on. the same sub-
. -ject, ?
Hearing
Fc C loskey's ; repeat ed-
quetions at-- the _.televised.
_hearing' about Laotian
Iv/ bOrnbing policies brought
a., reminder' from. Macom-
ber. that he .had appeared
.betore the subcommittee
.1.6 1(2:J1(y on State DePart--
ment-classification proce-
dt;treS. ?
didn't come up here to
engage In dis-
' cussion -With you, he told
McCloskey.
When McCloskey
re-
phracd _ the questions in
terms of whether Congress'
had the right to know.
about U.S. policy in Laos,
Macornbcr finally said
sharply:
"I'm not an expert on .
Laos, Pete, and I must Say,
this is the kind of thi:Ag
that makes it difficult to
cooperate with the legisla-:
five branch of govern-
ment. If you Want to use
television time to belabor
the Stat Department on
this, I suggest you wait
until you get somebody up
here who is prepared to
testify on Laos."
'Out of Order'
Rep. Frank Horton (R-
N.Y.)- called McCloskey
"out of order" for his ques-
tions. Sub co nunittee
Chairman William ....foor-
head (D-Pa.) said William
Sullivan, former U.S. am-
bassador to Laos, will teS-
tify later this month and
s?uggest!;:d that McCloskey
wait until then to ask his
que'stion.
McCloskey, who plans to
run against President Nix-
on In the 1972 GOP ,pres-
idential primaries, h a s
been seeking release of in-
formation on CIA and oth-
er government activities
in Laos since he made an
i1-day trip to Indochina
last April. ?
His resolution of inquiry
that the House turned
down is a seldom-used de-
vice designed to give the
.legislative braneh a' lever
to obtain information from
the executive branch. If
approved by the House,
t he department w o u id
have had 15 days to reply.
?
? Laos Bombing
? ' McCloskey told the
House the United States
has been involved in the
war in': Laos for seven
Years. He said mere bombs
have been dropped there
than on Germany in
World War H.
Noting that the anal
has held a secret sestio
on the Laotian war, M
Closkey 'said it was "incr
dible" that the Hens
should not also be in
formed.'
Red. Peter Frelingimys-
en (R-N.J.) replied that it
would be naive to 'think
that 4.35 members of the?
House could have access
to classified information
and that none of it would
be made public.
Meanwhile, in the Sell:-
ate: .
?Sen. John Sherman
Cooper (R-Ky.) introduced
legislation that would re-
quire the executive
branch to give appropriate
congressional committees
Central Intelligence Agen-
cy reports and analyses
now available only to the
_Administration.
?Sen. .George S. Mc-
-Govern (D-S.0.)* proposed
that t Ii e total amount
spent each year by the
CIA be made public:
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STATINTL
Coo
1'rE3 YpRic Timt5
E JUL 1971
er 'Pe lite '145P P6P.Ptit (a15.PA-PV0
?_" ?
By DAVID E. ROSENBAUM much better position to make
Speo44.1 ta The New York Times'
WASHINGTON, July - 7 ?
John Sherman Cooper of Ken-
tucky, one of the most in-
fluential Senators on foreign
Policy matters, introduced
legislation today that would
require the Central Intelligence
Agency to give detailed intelli-
gence information to Congress
regularly.
-? Mr. . Cooper, a Republican,
said ?that Congress needc-d this
kind of evaluation andanalysis,
now available only ecutive branch, to participate
In the formation of foreign
policy.
. Meanwhile, the House re-
jected a series of resolutions
demanding that the Nixon Ad-
ministration provide Congress
with additional information on
United. States operations in
Laos,
. Two other Senators also of-
fered proposals relating to
the C.I.A. 1
Senator George McGovern,
Democrat of South Dakota,- sug-
gested that exfeenditures and
appropriations for the intelli-
gence agency appear as a
single-line item in the budget.
Agency funds are now con-
cealed in . other items in the
budget.
Senator Clifford P. Case,. Re-
publican of New Jersey, said
he would offer measures that
would prohibit such C.I.A. activ-
? ites as the funding of Thai
troops to fight in Laos.
Senator Cooper emphasized
In a Senate speech that his
proposal was not aimed at any
C.I.A. operations, sources or
methods, but was ? "concerned
only with the end result ? the jority leader. "Anything John
facts and analyses of facts." Cooper says would be given
"Congress. would be in a the most serious consideration
by me," Mr. Mansfield said.
Regular Reports Asked
Senator Cooper's proposal
? would require the C.I.A.tomake
regular reports to the Senate
? Foreign Relations and Armed
Services Committees and to the
House Foreign Affairs and
Armed Services Committees.
The .agency would also be re-
quired to make special reports
in response to inquires by these
committees.
Mr. Cooper said that the
agency would have to decide
for itself what information to
present to hte committees, but
he specified that the data wool.
have to. be "full and current."
There are now ? "oversight".
committees in the House and
Senate, composed of senior
members of the Armed Services
and Appropriations Corn-
mittes, that review the C.I.A.
budget and operations. But
? ,these conrittees are not con-
Approved For Relitilailtagt41*esegg P80-01601R000600170001-0
. !gathers. -
.?
In the Hotise. debate today,.
;An fiqbt cam7t over a
judgments from a much more
informed and ?broader perspec-
tive than is now possible," he
said.
Senator Cooper, an aide said,
had been considering the legis-
lation for three years but dis-
closures in the Pentagon papers
on United States involvement
in Vietnam had now provided
an impetus.
The aide referred specifical-
ly to C.I.A. analyses during the
Johnson Administration that
to the ex- full-scale bombing of North
Vietnam would not be effective
in halting infiltration or break-
ing the will of Hanoi. -
Senator Cooper's proposal
was supported on the floor by
Senator J. W. Fulbright, Demo-
crat of Arkansas, the chairman
of the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, and Senator Stuart
Symington, Democrat of Mis-
souri, the only Senator belong-
ing to both the Foreign Rela-
tions and Armed_ Services Com-
mittees. -
Mr. Symington said that it
was "no secret that we on
various committees have not
been entirely satisfied with _the
intelligence information we
have obtained.
'If the proper committees
are not acquainted with what
we're doing," Mr. Symington
went on, "how we can func-
tion properly?"
Because Senator Cooper is
so influential, it seemed likel
that his proposal would bdthe
subject of hearings and, per-,
haps, floor debate this year.
A measure of the respect
said his views came from Mike
Mansfield of Montana, the ma-
documents dealing with opera-
tions of the United States mili-
tary and the C.I.A. in Laos
from 1061 to the present.
The resolution, which was
sponsored by ReprE.,Sentative
Paul N. McCloskey Jr., _Repub-
lican or California, was set
aside by: a vote Of 261 to 118.
Critics of the measure con-
tended that the information was
too .sensitive to be given to
Congress. ?
Following this vote, the
House, without 'ffate
A I 1-N L
STATI NT
?
' aside resolutions seeking in-
formation on bombing opera-
tions in northern Laos and or.
the Phoenix program, which is
designed to neutralize the ef-
fect of underground Vietcong
operations. Th House also set
aside a resolution ?seeking an-
other set of , the Pentagon
papers that the Administration.
made available to Congress last
week.
The supporters of the resolti-'.
tion were, for the most part,.
Democrats opposed to. the war:
I
1110. XU.W. TIML6
8 JUL 1971
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C, I. A. Aides Reported Leading
. Commando Raids in North Lelos,.
The Washington Star
VIENTIANE, Laos, July 7?
A secret operation involvin
commando raiders, some led by
employes of the Central Intel
ligence Agency, is reported un-
der way against the Com-
munist-held Plaine des Jarres
in northern Laos.
According to well-informed
sources, United States aircraft
have been landing on the plain,
and one C-123 transport was
stranded with its . American
crew there for a night.
The informants said the com-
mandos had penetrated as far
as an airstrip in the cast cen-
tral part of the plain called
Lima 22.
United States and Laotian of-
ficials here have refused to
comment on the reported op-
eration.
[In Washington, State De-
partment officials said they
. were checking the situation
and had no immediate com-
ment.]
? One American source said
privately that the Meo .leader,
Gen. Vang Pao, whose C.I.A.-
backed forces are based at
Long Tien, southwest of the
lain; was "strengthening and
Improving his defensive posi-
tion."
Some military sources sug-
;gested that the reported opera-
'tion was being conducted by
the Meo base of Bouam Long,
north of the plain.
Informants said two Thai
battalions and six Meo bat-
talions were involved. The
Pathet Lao radio said the oper-
ationwas being conducted by
three regiments of General
Vang Pao's forces.
In 1969, a joint' United
States-Laotian operation took
the plain from Communist
Ths New York Times July 8, 1971
troops briefly but this, led to
a large North Vietnamese coun-
terstroke, which drove the Meos
back and almost resulted in
the fall of Long Tieng.
. Cambodian Plan Said to End
PNOMPENH, Cambodia, July
7 (UPI)--The United States has
abandoned its secret program
of training regular Cambodian
troops on Laos, United States
sources said today, but is con-
tinuing to train Cambodian
guerrillas.
The sources said that the
program, financed by the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, ended
last month when a' 500-man
Cambodian army battalion
wound up a three-month train-
ing course in the Laotian pan-
handle.
STATINTL
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140.0-1. -,?_05'.!::::-.01;:L'LTCil.
Approved For Release-2000/05/15 ? CIA-RDP80-01601R0006001
JUL 1.)77
, ;:, 0 11
h
w_
D
cLA .1)ce
1 4?:\
i .
-I
,,
, il i, 1.,._), ,J t: (1,74(1,...../
..,,, .,..,...L. . ...___- -
...By RICHARD DUDIVIAN
Chief Washington Correspondent
of the Post-Dispatch
WASHINGTON, July 8? Sen-
ator John Sherman Cooper
(Rep), Kentucky, has obtained
strong bipartisan backing for a
proposal to require the Central
Intelligence Agency to report to
?Congress as well as to the Ex-
ecutive Branch.
Cooper, a moderate opponent
of the Vietnam War and of the
antiballistic missile system, in-
troduced his proposal yesterday
, as an amendment to the Nation-
-al Security Act of 1917, which
created the Department of De-
f en s e, the National Security
Council and the CIA.
Senators Stuart Symington
(D e m.), Missouri, J. William
Fulbright (D e m.), Arkansas,
and Jacob K. Javits (Rep.),
New York; announced their .
...
support for the measure On the.
Scea te floor. Fulbright spoke Or
-holding hearings on the propos-
al.
- Symington, chairman of a for- ?
eign relations subcommittee on
overseas commitments, told of
difficulties he had had in oh-
taming full information about
se cr et U.S. military prepara-
tions and operations abroad, in-
cluding the clandestine warfare
being conducted in Laos.
Symington noted that he was
a member of the Foreign Rela-
tions, Armed Services and Joint
Atomic Energy committees. He
said that his best information
had been obtained from the last
of these, attributing that fact to
a requirement in the Atomic
Energy Act that the Atomic En-
ergy _ Commission keen Con-
gress "Tully and currenry" in-
formed.
Cooper used that phrase in
his proposed amendment on the
IA. An aid said that Cooper'
had found CIA information gen-
/
erally reliable on such matters
as Soviet military preparedness
and the Indochina War but had
rioted that. it was rendered only
in response to specific ques-,
Cons. ,
,
Under his amendment, the
CIA would have to take the ini-
tiative in sending Congress its
analyses of problems of foreign
policy and national security.
The aid said that Cooper had
been considering such a mea-
sure, for several years. He said
the publication of the Pentagon
papers had demonstrated once
more the value of CIA reports
a n d probably had broadened
? support in Congress for a re-
quirement to make them availa-
ble.
In a Senate speech, Cooper
proposed that the CIA be re-
quired to make r egul a. r and
special reports to the House
A r in e d Services and Foreign
Affairs committees and to the
Senate Armed Services and
Foreign Relations committees.
Additional special reports could
be requested by the commit-
tees.
Any member of Congress orl
designated member of -his staff'
would have access to the infor-
mation. All such persons would
.be subject to security require-
ments such as those in the Ex-
ecutive Branch.
Cooper said that the best in-
formation should be available
to the Executive and Legisla-
tive branches as a basis for na-
tional decisions involving "vast
amounts of money, the deploy-
ment of weapons whose purpose
is to deter war yet can destroy
all life on earth, the stationing
of American troops in other
countries and their use in com-
bat, and binding commitments
to foreign nations."
Two other Senators offered
proposals relating to the CIA.
George S. McGovern (Dem.),
South Dakota, suggested that
expenditures and appropriations
for the intelligence agency ap-
pear as a sin,:le line item in the
budget. Agency funds now are
concealed in other items in the
budget.
Three bills were introduced
by Senator CI if f ord P. Case
(Rep.), New Jersey, to limit
covert use 'of funds and mili-
tary equipment_ by the .c)-?\ for
fielding foreign troops in Loos
o r elsewhere -without specific
approval by Congress.
Case said they were designed
:',`to place sonic outside control
!'oit what has been the free-
wheeling operation of the Exec-
utive Branch in carrying on for-
eign policy and even waging
foreign wars."
Meanwhile, .the House reject-
ed a proposal that the Adminis-
tration be required to tell it;
' John Sherman
Co a pr
what the military and CIA were
doing in Laos.
Dy a vote of 261 to 118, mem-
bers tabled -- and thus killed ?
a-t resolution introduced by Rep-
resentative Paul N. McCloskey
(Rep.), California, that would
have ordered the Secretary of
State to furnish the House. with
the policy guidelines given to
the U.S. ambassador in Laos.'
.The ambassador has responsi-
bility for overseeing the clan-
destine 'military operations in
Laos aimed at assisting the roy-
al Laotian government in its
struggle with the Pathet Lao..
Will B. Macomber Jr.,
deputy under secretary of state,
clashed yesterday with Mc-
Closkey over whether the De-
partment of State was directing
U.S. bombing attacks in Laos.
Macomber denied the allega-
tion and suggested that if Mc-
Closkey wanted to pursue the
issue he ought to invite an East
Asia expert from the State De-
partment to testify.
Tb e exchange occurred -as.
Macomber testified be 1 o r
House foreign affairs subcom-
mittee on ways to improve de-1
classification o f Governmentl,
records by the State Depart-1
ent.
.Macomber said 10 to 12
years' retention ought to be ad-)
equate to protect Government
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know about operations.
11
STATINTL
? 01/-illINIL
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00E1 W anes;.
- From News Dispatches
.) SAIGON, July 8 (Thursday)
..--American B-52 bombers re-
.sumed bombing* near the De-
militarized Zone in South
Vietnam last night and this
morning after having been
.kept away from the area for
-one day by rough weather
from Typhoon Harriet, mil-,
nary sources said.
But U.S. battle communi-
ques showed the lull in enemy
attacks against - American
ground forces continuing.
There have been no Com-
munist ground attacks on GIs:
anywhere in Vietnam since
just after midnight Monday,
when a rocket barrage killed
five American soldiers and
wounded more than 30 at the
;
.Danang air base.
Military sources said the ;
north Vietnamese army kept a
trickle of supplies moving '
down the trail system in Laos.
? But fewer then 200 truck
'movements were ? detected
Tuesday night compared with
well over 2,000 at the height
:of the dry season.
Meanwhile, military sources
said battlefield action in
South Vietnam dropped to one
of the lowest levels in the war
laSt week.
? News agencies reported
.these other developments:
? In Phom Penh, American
sources Said the United States
,had ended its secret program
of training regular Cambodian
troops in Laos, but are con-
tinuing to train Cambodian
U.S. Officials declined to say
-how many Cambodian troops
were trained by the CIA, but
other sources put the number
at "several thousand.".
3.A1
-- .0 ..
Raid
Capt. Ernest L. Medina,
accused of murdering ..102
South Vietnamese civilians in
the 1969 My lai massacre, flew
into the U.S. airbase at Bien-
Hoa near Saigon with his army
lawyer, Capt. Mark J. Kadish.
Maj. William Eckhardt, the
Army prosecutor at Medina's
court-martial set for July 26,
wanted to question two South
Vietnamese army sergeants in
connection with the case and
asked Medina and his attorney
to accompany him to South
Vietnam.
?In Paris, France indicated
today it played some kind of
behind-the-scenes role in
bringing about the latest Viet-
cong peace initiative on Viet-.
nam.
At the weekly cabinet meet-
ing Foreign Minister Maurice -
Schuman noted that the peace
formula presented by the Viet-
cong contained new elements
favorable to a solution of the
war.
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1Eilz
e
V-ECIUtnNiffiW Ora
,
1 p
ri?, ..) ,...-4,,ri 1..,r--Aiti
'3 V "
' t 14 A Cijia .?
?
? , By SHIRLEY ELDER
? 'Star Staff Writer
?
; Deputy Undersecretary of
State William B. Macomber Jr.
has declined to answer .insistent
questions from Rep. Paul N.
(13..e t e) McCloskey, R-Calif.,
about U.S. bombing in Laos.
? . ? Macomber told a House free-
doth of information hearing yes-
terday he knows little of what
ioes on in Laos.
He said he was invited to tes-
tify- about the State Depart-
ment's system of classifying
clocuments and any further ef-
fort to try and get him to talk
about Laos would further strain
relations between State and Con-
tress. ? .
? McCloskey has been hammer-
ifIg at what he feels is a calcu-
lated administration effort to
hide a clandestine war in Laos
from Congress and the public.
He said each bombing strike in
that country is personally con-
Wiled by the U.S. ambassador.
?
Rebuffed by House
: ? Earlier yesterday, McCloskey,
Iihti has vowed to oppose Presi-
dent Nixon's bid for re-election
next year if the war is not over,
was rebuffed by his own col-
-leagues in an information-gath-
' ering effort.
:.?? On a 261-118 vote, the House
.hilled a McCloskey resolution
"that would have directed the
secretary of state to tell Con-
Iress about U.S. involvement in
Laos..
? : Then, by voice votes, the
Mouse tabled similar resolutions
of inquiry seeking data about
-:Other U.S. activities throughout
Southeast Asia. ?
1.-Pne resolution sought copies
...of. the once-secret Pentagon pa-
pers, which already have been
;made available on a top security
'basis,' and another sought a re-
/ ;port of the so-called Phoenix
aspult against Viet Cong agents.
. ? .
? 7-Year War Claimed
McCloskey told the House that
the United States has been at
-war in Laos for seven years and
more bombs have been dropped
in that one country than were
rained on Nazi Germany.
But Rep. Peter H. B. Frelin-
ghuysen, R-N.J., argued that the
resolution was an unwise at-
tempt to obtain highly sensitive
'information.
Although Macomber, in his
testimony before the subcom-
mittee headed by Rep. William
Moorhead, D-Pa., declined to
talk about Laos, he agreed that
many State Department docu-
ments are over-classified.
Half of the approximately
400,000 documents accumulated
at State each year, he said, are
marked Top Secret, Secret of
Confidential.
- About 6,000 State Department
officers have authority to classi-
fy documents, Macomber said,
and some misuse that power to
simply limit distribution of the
papers involved.
He suggested there should be
some kind of automatic system
for declassifying documents aft-
cr. A period of time, perhaps 10
years.
A shorter declassification peri-
od?some have suggested two
years?would be unrealistic, Ma-
comber said, and just lead to
new and bigger bureaucratic
problems.
? -In the Senate, meanwhile, Sen.
John Sherman Cooper, R-Ky.,
introduced legislation reauiring
the Central Intellgence Agency !
to provide Congress- regularly
with detailed intelligence infor-i
'nation.
- Cooper said Congress needed
this kind of evaluation and anal-
ysis, now available only to the
executive branch, in order to
participate in the formation of
foreign policy.
Two other senators also sug-
gested proposals relating to the.
.CIA.
Sen. Geotge S. McGovern,
D-S.D., suggested that expendi-
tures and appropriations for the
intelligence agency appear as a
single line item in the budget.
Agency funds currently are con-
gealed in other budget items.
- Sen. Clifford P. Case, R-N.J.,
said he would offer Measuers
prohibiting such CIA activities
S the funding-of Thai troops to
?
fight in Laos. I
STAT I NT L
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? STATINTL
Lit
louse of (eseE,. kra,-A!yrves
. The House met at 12 o'clock noon..
' Rev.. James Clark Brown, the First
Congregational Church, San Francisco,
Calif., offered the following prayer:
? Let us pray.
Let us remember the words of our Lord
Jesus Christ when He said: "Those unto
whom much has been given, of them will
Much be required."
- 0 God, mighty, merciful, mysterious,
before whose judgments nations and
individuals rise and fall, inspire the
leaders and people of this land that we
May more faithfully know and do Thy
holy will. 0 God, there is a hunger in our
land; a hunger for moral heroes; for
Men and women whose passion is to bring
? Into being the kind of world where every
? privilege and dignity which is enjoyed by
the few may be made, available to be en-
joyed by all people. To that end, direct, ?
comfort, and guide Members of the Con-
gress.
"0 Thou, whose Spirit fast fashioned life,
Intending all creation Thy love to
. share,
Use us, 0 God, to do Thy work ?
Until the earth be fair."
Amen. -
?" THE JOURNAL
'The SPEAKER. The Chair has ex-
amined the Journal of the last day's pro-
ceedings and announces to the House
his approval thereof.
Without objection, the Journal stands
approved.
There was no objection. .
THE REVEREND JAMES CLARK
BROWN, OUR CHAPLAIN FOR TODAY
(Mr.. EDMONDSON asked and was
given permission to address the House
for 1 minute, and to revise and extend
his remarks.) .
. Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Speaker, I am
Proud today that our opening prayer has
been given by an Oklahoman whom I
have known for many years, a young man
Who grew up in Okmulgee County in the
city of Henryetta, and who once served
here in the House of Representatives as
one of the staff rendering faithful service
to. this country,
. Today James Clark Brown is minister
of the First Congregational Church of
San Francisco, and carrying. on there a
great ministry.'
Many Washingtonians will remember
him as the pastor for a number of. years
of the Cleveland Park Congregational
Church here in Washington, D.C. With
his wife, Verne, and their lovely children,.
David Edmond and Edith Louise, he Is
-"doing a great work in the State of Cali-
fornia. _ ? - ?
WEDNESDAY, JULY 7, 1971
? Again I say I am proud a.nd pleased
that that he could be with us today in a.
place he has always loved, te lead the
House of Representatives in -today's
devotions. ? ? . .
A SALUTE TO WADE LUCAS
(Mr. HENDERSON asked and was
? given permission to address the House
for 1 minute and to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. HENDERSON. Mr. Speaker,
scarcely a day goes by without our na-
tional news media publicizing a conflict
between Indians and civil authorities
over the title to Federal property, alleged
violations of legal or moral commitments
or other .basic differences of opinion.
It is refreshing to know that on Satur-
day of this week, Mr. Wade Lucas, a con-
stituent of mine will be visiting Niagara
Falls, N.Y., as a guest of the Tuscarora
Indians. While there, he will be made an
honorary chief and, with the authority of
Gov. Robert Scott of North Carolina, will
sign a formal peace treaty with the Tus-
carora Indian Nation.
I might add that Wade Lucas, unlike
so many "Honorary Chiefs" we see at
campaign time, is not a politician run-
ning for office and seeking to court, favor
with Indian voters. Instead, Wade is a
retired newspaperman with no aim or
purpose in mind other than to cement
a personal and official friendship with
these Indians which dates back to Me-
morial Day ; ore than 8 years ago when
he visited the.Tonawanda Reservation in
an official capacity as public information
officer for the State of North Carolina
under the adrrnnistration of Gov. Terry
Sanford.
The Tuscarora Indians of the Tona-
wanda. Reservation are a lot like many
other Americans of all races and creeds
throughout our Nation. They respond
warmly to a genuine show of friendship
and interest. Wade Lucas' longtime per-
sonal friendship with them is the kind
of "people to people" relationship which
will solve our international differences
if they are ever to be solved.
INTRODUCTION OF .LEGISLATION
INCREASING FEDERAL SHARE OF
EMPLOYEES' HEALTH BENEFITS
PRO GRAM
(Mr. WALDIE asked and was given
permission to address the House for 1
minute, to revise and extend his remarks
and include extraneous matter.)
Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Speaker, I am
pleased today to introduce a bill calling
for increasing the Government's share of
the Federal employees' health benefits
program.
Under the present cost-sharing system,
the Federal Government pays 40 percent
of the basic Cost of the health insurance
of Federal employees.
. This 40-percent figure was reached
only last year. The House of Representa-
tives had passed legislation calling for
increasing the Government share to 50
percent, but after considerable pressure
from the administration, including the
threat of a Presidential veto, House-
Senate conferees agreed to a reduced
figure.
Mr. Speaker, I believe that the attitude
of the administration may have changed
in the course of the past year. On Febru-
ary 18 of this year, President Nixon called
for private employers to provide 65 per-
cent of the cost of basic health insur-
ance coverage for employees as of July 1;
1973, and '75 percent of the total cost
3 years later.
The President based this appeal on
the need to spread health insurance cov-
erage to more of the Nation's citizens.
Mr. Speaker, I fully agree with the
President on this matter.
Further, I believe it to be fully con-
sistent and proper for the Federal Gov-
ernment to lead the way for the private
motor in meeting the President's goal of
'75 percent of the costs; for employees'
medical insurance.
I hope that the Retirement, Insurance,
and Health Benefits Subcommittee,
which I chair, will hold hearings on this
important legislation in the very near
future, and I am hopeful of administra-
tion support for this proposal, which in-
corporates the President's own sugges-
tions.
DIRECTING THE SECRETARY OF
STATE TO FURNISH TO THE
HOUSE CERTAIN INFORMATION
RESPECTING U.S'. OPERATIONS IN
?LAOS
Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Speaker, I call up
House Resolution 492 and ask for its
immediate consideration. ?
The Clerk read the resolution as fol-
lows: -
? H. RES. 492
Resolved, That the Secretary of State, to
the extent not incompatible with the public
interest, is directed to furnish to the House
of Representatives, not later than fifteen
days following the adoption of this resolu-
tion, any documents containing policy in-
structions or guidelines given to the United
States Ambassador in Laos for the purpose
of his administration of those operations con-
trolled or directed by the country team In
Laos, between January 1, 1964, and June 21,
1971, particularly with regard to?
(1) covert Central Intelligence Agency op-
erations in Laos;
(2) Thal and other foreign armed forces
operations in Laos;
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S 10508
would perform the function of governing the
local agencies, as the Farm Credit system now
operates.
? Another agency, the Rural Development:
Investment Equalization Administration,
would handle the subsidy end of this pro-
P ?
osal It would be handled separately to avoid
?' problems of getting loan and grant money
Mixed into the same financial pot.
? It has been alleged by those who claim that
industry will not move to rural America that
- it costs more money to operate away from the
population centers, and as a result, the
chance for a major dispersal of .industry is
doomed to failure.
. The sponsors of the Consolidated Farm and
Rural Development Act do not necessarily
? agree with.this conclusion, but a number of
States have proved that investment incen-
tives do draw industries.
? Rather than provide under-the-table or
backdoor subsidies, this legislation would
? make open subsidies available, but only un-
der stringent and controlled circumstances,
and this would be done on a national basis
rather than the state-by-state effort now go-
ing on.
It must be stressed that these would not be
relief payments to fieca'lly healthy industries,
' but they would be incentives to American
--industry to disperse.
There would be two kinds of subsidies:
: 1. Interest supplements: If a firm cannot
? pay his interest out of local earnings without
? dipping into its capital, the company can be
given an interest supplement by the Rural
Development Investment Equalization Ad-
ministration. Th?i payment could not bring
-the firm's interest level lower than one-per-
- cent.
. 2. Rural Development Capita! Augmenta-
tion Payments: If a community wanted to
- build a sewer system, a calculation would be
made of how much such a system would cost,
and then it would be determined how much
the people in the community could reason-
ably be expected to pay for it. The difference
between these two figures would be the Rural
Development Capital Augmentation payment.
The same formula could be used for develop-
ment of new industry, but again it must be
stressed that this procedure would be under
- strict controls so that this money would not
? be used for fly-by-night or doomed-to-fail
businesses.
THE REORGANIZATION
Under this bill farm and non-farm credit
- would come under a new Assistant Secretary
Of Agriculture. Under him, in two separate
agencies, would- be the Farm Development
Administration, which now handles all farm
credits (under the title Farmers Home Ad-
ministration) and tho Rural Enterprise and
Community Development Administration,
?, Which would handle all non-farm rural
credit.
The
? The new assistant secretary would be as-
signed to no other duties than to oversee
?? all rural credit. At present, the assistant
-. ? secretary handling this task, must also super-
vise a wide range of other activities.
?- The 19 members of the Rural Development
Credit Board would have five members ap-
pointed by the President of the United
-States; five nominated by the-President Pro
tempore of the Senate; and five nominated
after consideration of the recommendations
of the Speaker of the House.
? The Secretary of Agriculture would appoint
the same, person who is his representative
to the Farm Credit Board: The governor
of the Farm Credit Administration would be
another member of the board. The Execu-
. tive Director of the Rural Development
Credit Agency, and the Rural Development
Investment Equalization Administration
would sit on the board as ex-officio members.
- ?f.RfliVE
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. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENAT
the Congress better Informed on mat- by, the Committees on ArdiedSeric?and
ters relating to foreign policy and na-
Foreign Affairs,of the House of Representa-
tional security by providing dt with
tives and the Committees on Armed Services
-in-
telligence information obtained by the/Ind Foreign Relations of the Senate regard-
ing, intelligence information. collected by the STATINTL
Central Intelligence Agency and with
Agency concerning the relations of the tUnited
analysis of such information by such States to
agency. Referred jointly to the Commit- national security including full anmdatcteiris-etoit
for countries d
tees on Armed Services and Foreign Re- analysis by the Agency of such information.
lotions, by unanimous consent. "(h) Any intelligence information and any
Mr. COOPFR. Mr. President, the for- analysis thereof made available to any com-
mulation of sound foreign policy and na-
mittee of the Congress pursuant to subsection
tonal security policy requires that the
(g) of this section shall be made available
by such committee, in accordance with such
best and most accurate intelligence oh- rules as such committee may establish, to
tamable be provided to the legislative as any member of the Congress who requests
well as the executive branch of our Gov- such information and analysis. Such informa-
ernment. The approval by the Congress tion and analysis shall also be made available
of foreign policy and national security by any such committee, in accordance with
Policy, which are bound together, whose such rules as such committee may estab-
support involves vast amounts of money, lish, to any officer or employee of the House of
the deployment of weapons whese pur;-
Representatives or the Senate who has been
pose is to deter war, yet can destroy ll
(1) designated by a Member of Congress to
a
life on earth, the stationing of America.n and
2
e access()et
dteor such b th
chinformation and analysis,
y e conunittee con-
troops in other countries and their use earned to have thenecessary security clear-
in combat, and binding commitments to ance for such access."
foreign nations, should only be given
The bill would, as a matter of law, make
upon the best information available to '
both the executive and legislative available to the Congress, through its
appropriate committees, the same intel-
There has been much debate during b7anches. ? ligence, conclusions, facts, and analyses
the past several years concerning the re-
that are now available to the executive
spective powers of the Congress and the
Executive in the formulation of -foreign
policy and national security policy and
the authority to commit our Armed
Forces to war. We have experienced, un-
fortunately, confrontation between the
two branChes of our Government. It is
my belief that if both branches, execu-
tive and legislative, have access to the
same intelligence necessary for such
fateful decisions, the working relation-
ship between the Executive and the
Congress would be, on the whole, more
harmonious and more conducive to the
national interest. It would ? assure a
common understanding of. the, purposes
and merits of policies. It is of the great-
est importance to the support and trust
of the people. It is of the greatest im-
portance to the maintenance of our sys-
tem of government, with its separate
branches, held so tenuously together by
trust -and. reason.
It is reasonable, I submit, to contend
that the Congress, which must make its
decisions upon foreign and security pol-
icy, which is called upon to commit the
resources of the Nation, material and hu-
man, should have all the information
and intelligence available to discharge
properly and morally its responsibilities
to our Government and the people.
I send to the table a bill amending the
National Security Act of 1947, which, I
hope, would make it possible for the leg-
- islative branch to better carry out its
responsibilities.
I read the amendment at this point:.
branch. At the present time, the intel-
ligence information and analyses devel-
oped by the CIA and other intelligence
agencies of the Government are avail-
able only to the executive es a matter
of law. This bill would not, in any way,
affect the activities of the CIA, its sources
or methods, nor would it diminish in any
respect the authority of already existing
committees and oversight groups, which
supervise the intelligence collection ac?
tivities of the Government. My bill is
concerned only with the end result?the
facts and analyses of facts. It would, of
course, in no way inhibit the use by the
Congress of analyses and information
from sources outside the Government. It
is obvious that with the addition of intel-
ligence facts and their analyses, the Con-
gress would be in a much better position
to make judgments from a much more
informed and broader perspective than
is now possible.
The National Security Act of 1947
marked a major reorganization of the
executive branch: This reorganization
made it possible for the executive branch
to assume more effectively the responsi-
bilitieS of the United States in world af-
fairs and the maintenance of our own
national security. The National Security
Act of 1947 created the Department of
Defense and the united services as we
now know them.
Section 102 of the National Security
Act of 1947, established the Central In-
telligence Agency under a Director and
Deputy Director, appointed by the Presi-
To amend the National Security Act of dent, by and with the advice and consent
1947, as amended, to keep the Congress better of the Senate. Under the direction of the
informed on matters relating to foreign National Security Council, it was di-
policy and national security by providing. it rected to advise the National -Security
With intelligence information obtained by the Council on matters relating to national
Central Intelligence Agency and with analy- security and "to correlate and evaluate
sis of such information by ?uch agency. intelligence relating to national security,
That section 192 of the National Security and provide for the appropriate disse.mi-
Act of 1047, as amended (50 U.S.C. 403) , is nation of such intelligence within the
amended by adding at -the end thereof the
following new subsections: . Government using where appropriate
"(g) It shall also be the duty of the Af.,,ency exng agencies a.nd facilities."
r--- By Mr. COOPER: to inform fully and currently, by means of The languagedoes specifically
S. 2224. A bilv4citnFitibi e !al 'o of intelligence to the
Security Act of 194'7, as amen e , to -cep SgfrptENVolg frigniogozoloono WO/ tlifidoes not provide that
- '
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1.1 ff o
' "71:
- By TA?,IMY AriBUCKLE
?? Special to The Star
VIENTIANE L. The United
States has launched a new se-
cret operation against the Plain
of Jars, a Communist - held area
In. northern Laos, well - in-
formed sources say. "Comman-
do raiders, some led by Ameri-
can military men in CIA employ
have penetrated as far as Lima
?22, an air strip in the east cen-
tral plain.
U.S. aircraft are landing on
the . plain. An Air America C123
transport was stranded with its
American crew on the plain for
a night, according to \veil - in-
formed sources. U.S. officials,
however, refuse to discuss the
operation making it difficult to
assess the operation's exact
magnitude or objectives.
One American source claimed
'Moo Gen. - Vang Pao was
"strengthening and improving
his defensive position." Sources
.said Vang Pao took Ban Na,
key hill overlooking the plain
last Tuesday. Unfortunately this
claim of strengthening defenses
. does not jell with the U.S. pres-
ence on the plain or the exces-
sive secrecy cloaking the opera-
lion on the part of U.S. and Lao
officials.
Fraiight With Danger
To clear North Vietnamese
from the hills South of the plain
and establish positions on hill-
tops overlooking the plain would
be excellent, as it would give
. yang Pao's forces a breather
until the next dry season.
However, to go onto the plain
Is fraught with both military and
political danger.
In 1.969, a joint U.S. and Lao
, operation, About Face took the
plain from the Communists
briefly, but resulted in massive
:Hanoi- retaliation Which drove
CIA-led Meos back farther than
. ester before and almost resuted
In .the secret base of Long Chen
:falling. A new offensive could
Ornean that final end to feelers
..lor talks between the govern-
ilent and -Communists and lead
? to fresh Hanoi offensives Hanoi
has frequently made clear it will
riot tolerate a U.S. or govern-
jars and has stifficidit force to
push the corrupt, ill-managed
Lao forces off plain again when-
ever it wants. .
Some military sources have
suggested that the Plain of Jars
push is to relieve the pressure
on the Tao base of liouam Long,
north of the plain.. - ?
. When correspondents tried to
find what the operation was
about, Gen. Thongph Knoksy,
t h e government spokesman,
dodged into the corridors of
Lao-headquarters. U.S. officials
adamantly refuse to speak un-
less Thong Pun h speaks first.
It is almost unbelievable-that
after Senate censure and publi-
cation of the Pentagon docu-
ments' a U.S. mission in Laos
should once again resort to se-
crecy particularly concerning a -
U.S. run operation close to North
Vietnalu and China.
The operation previously re-
stilled in tough Communist retal-
iation and caused considerable
government and civilian loss in
1939. There can be no doubt the
operation is considerable in size. ,
The Pathet Lao radio which, al..'
though it is Communist., has
been most truthful to date On
Lao operations, says three.regi-
ments of Vang Pao's forces are
tnvolved. Vientiane military
sources say two Thai-battalions
and six Lao'1\leo battalions are
involved. U.S. air power is again
extremely active over the plain,
where Some 5,000 civilians are
still living. American embassy
officials are trying to blame
Vang Pao for the operation.
"yang Pao is very much his own
man, _three American officials
said separately.
As all three used the same
words, one can only assume
somebody told them to say this.
Yana' Pees' formes are advised,
paid: armed, clothed and some-
times led by CIA employes and
it is impossible for the general
to ?.do anything big without
Af-,;Zrican approval. Some mid-
dle-level Americans are already
having second thoughts.
They fear that if Yang Pao
finds no early Hanoi? opposition
he may continue to advance,
bringing the U.S. into a new
znent presence on the plain of northern Laos debacle.- ?5
STATI NTL
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ATLANTIC CITY, N.J.
JERSEY TIMES
JUL 2t97
WEEKLY - 497
Much has been said lately
about the effort of Congress to
reassert and redefine its author-
ity in the liold of foreign policy.
1 am much interested in this,
not as an exercise in congres-
sional self-aggrand.me.nt., but
as a Means of forcing our gov-
ernment to conduct foreign
policy in the open sc.) that the
PI-1ft may know what is going
on and have, the controlling,
voice in important. decisions.
Our recent history in South-
east Asia shows that wars ap-
proved by simply a handful of
presidential advisors may well
be not only unconstitutional but
relatively unsuccessfulz too. .?
'Like most AnlerieTanS, I have
been shocked by the. .cynical
Manipnlation of our political
proceues revealed in The New
York Times series on the or-
igins of the Vietnam War. I be-
lieve that our country should
not go to war as part of a care-
fully plotted scenario which in-
volves secret attacks on-' the
other side -- some apparently
With the aim of prevc*ing re-
taliation against us and .our
, . .
TM I do not mut to get into
an extended post mortem on
Vietnam. Our primary . task
should not he to ugage in re-
criminations or assign blame
but to bring an end to the war.
That is why last year, had this.
I voted for the llatteld-
McGovern proposal to set a def-
inite date for U. S. withdrawal
from Vietnam.
The. term "secret \Val." has
now come iota our national
vocabulary. We started off in
Vietnam operating in secret and
we are currently fighting a war
in -Laos in the same. way. We
are spending annually about
350 million on the ground in
Laos, not to .mention an esti-
mated $2 billion to tomb that
country of less than three mil-
lion people. AU this is done Nr,tt.ii-
out any real congressional or
public knowledge or approval.
? .., Successive ? administrations
have been able to carry. oi t_le
secret war in Laos, as they oid in Vietam, by tsa
thx.tt vast billion.dollar tre-astico
chest which Congress has ap-
propriated, but never controlled,
for discretionary intelligence
and. military programs. And it
has been the Central Intelli-
gence Agency.. (CIA) which has
1
been assii;ned?t"J'Z,-;',':.-y out the
\-
. administrations' policies suc-li
as the running of a `n,Cca-roari
,private army, and the funding or
........
STATINTL
Thai troops in Laos.
do not direct ?criticisin
against the CIA, for it has only
_wit following orders issued by.
several , l'resients. 1 simply
question whether a secret in-
Lelligence organization should be
assigned a .?var-making role
abroad.
This is why 1 have recently;
proposed thrc-o bills which would:
increase congTessional control
over certain CIA p10grams.1
These are:
1. A bill to extend all existing
limitations ?,on Defense Depart-
ment funding such as the pro-
ihhitiiiS against payment ef
mercenaries in Laos and the
Cooper-Church proviso s for
Cambodia to all U. S. govern-
ment agencies overseas, includ-
in,..; CIA.
1),. A bill to prohibit the fund-
ing, by any U. S: government
agency of foreign moreenaries.
operating out'side their countries
without specific congressional
authori?4.ion. I would hope this
would "eliminate the confusing
trail of Thais in Laos, Cambodi-
ans in Laos, and even Thais in
Cambodia.
3. A bill to extend eNisting
limitations on .the of mili-
tary surplus materiel to all guy-
erilmdnt 'abroad, in-
cluding
three proposals would
close soin.c: loopholes in. the law.
llut the e:::::as,tive.crot find ways
if it is sa nrth rfie solution
to the pi.ebiem. lies, lii i`,4ong
run, not in a tighter' drafting of
the law but in the acceptance by
the executive of Congress and,
the public as partners in the
conduct of the people's vital
business.
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ri
)(37-1 .1") cc'?' ,
I j L, Li L L,?,
?
rt0
. ? .
1.1 J ? \N \./
.By STLIZELS'il
?
? WASHINGTON, D.C., June 29----rte1). Joln E. Moss (D-Calif:) watned the Nixon
Administration today that government officials could be cited for ``contempt of Con-
ress" for refusing to furnish information on U.S. foreign policy decisions vital to the
Interests of the American people.
In a sbarp. exchange with an of-
ficial of the .Justice Department,
? Moss, during hearings before the
.Sub-ComMittee on Government
Operations took the confrontation
between Congress and the execu-
-tivel?ranch One step further.
Evidence that the U.S. has en-
gaged in 20 years of cold war by
a systematic policy of presiden-
tial deceit is spurring both Sena-
tors and Representatives toward a
Congressional crackdown on the
. executive branch. .
The immediate issue is Execu-
tive Branch secrecy but the
larger issue is the untold cost of
the cold war policy itself?hun-
dreds of thousands of dead. and
wounded GI's in two undeclared
wars and one trillion dollars in
taxpayer funds since World War
II. ?
-
? Plans shrouded in secrecy
The hearings before the Sub-
committee, sparked by the 47-vol-
ume Pentagon study on how the
U.S. gOt into the Indochina war,
Is revealing to. the people that the
government systematioally con?
cealed its policy aims. ?
? Rep. Moss told Assistant Attor-
ndy General William H. Rehn-
quist, that the use of "executive
privilege" has shrouded from the
people the foreign policy plans of
five consecutive administrations. -
He said that "executive privil-
ege," first claimed by President
Nixon in Exectith,T Order 1001,
is subject to be overrided by
Con-
gress.
.
Executive privilege,. he declar-
ed, "is e not a constitutional au-
thority. . . Congress is not with-
Out pciwer to punish for contempt
of Congress an official Who refuses
tci furnish information to Repre-
sentatives of the people."
Rehnquist admitted that "con-
gress could supersede Executive
Order ROI by passing 1gislation
stipulating rules for classification
.and declassification of secret in-
formation. But, he added the Pre-
sident would have to. decide whe-
ther or not the act was constitu-
tional. .?
Moss bridled at this suggestion
demanding, '.'The President? .Not
the ,.courts? Are you saying that
the President could suspend the
. _
Rehnquist flushed and correct-
..ed himself. The President, he saki,
could seek a ..ruling from the
courts on the constitutionality of
the measure.
. -
Meanwhile, Sen. Clifford Case'
(R-NJ)) accused the Nixon Ad-
ministration of "overt manipula-
tion or suppression" of a scientific
report that could lead to quick rati-
fication of a ban on underground
nuclear tests.
? Case said scientists have invent-
ed an instrument that can detect
explosions as low as 4.0 on the
Richter Seale, making unnecese
sary "on-site inspections" which
have been a stumbling block in
negotiations.
New findings suppressed
. Case said the findings were sup-
pressed because they "conflict
With entrenched interests or cause
the government embarrassment.,
. Case_ has . also taken 7steps to
prohibit the 'Central Intelligence
Agency from engaging in "secret
wars," such as the war in Laos.
? Hewitt shortly introduce a bill
denying any funds for CIA secret
wars: said his purpose is 'to
force "our government to conduct
foreign policy out in the open so
that the public may knew Ant is
going on .and have the controlling
voice in important decisions. The
Constitution does not give the Pre-
sident authority to declare. a se-.
? cret war.",
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in the future, it will be decided upon later
through consultation by the liaison personnel
of two sides."
1, "A Comment on the Statement of the
Communist Party of America," People's Daily,
? March 8, 1963. r
? vSpeech made by Chtao Kuan-hus?
Peiping's "vice. minister" of foreign affairs, at
a cocktail party hosted by the Yugoslav "em-
bassy" in Peiping on November 27, 1970. -
10 Mao Tse-tong, "On People's Democratic
Dictatorship," Selected Works (Foreign Lan-
guage, Peking, 1931) , Vol. IV, p. 41'5.
r The 13 "theories" include those of
?!limited sovereignty," "socialist big family,"
justified aggression," and "economic unity."
1,, Speech by Yugoslav "ambassador" to
Peiping at a cocktail party on November 27.
1970.
12 A dispatch filed by the Agence France
Presse from Belgrade on January 5, 1971.
? Yugoslavia and Albania were locked in a feud
over the question of Stalin. In 1958 the two
Sides exchanged charges d'affaires. Since the
Czech incident in 1938 the relations between
? the two countries have gradually improved.
20 "Revolutionary Storm of the Polish I'm-
pie," People's Daily, December 22, 1970.
NCNA clisPatch from Peiping on Decem-
ber 21; 1970.
'.'Welcome the Establishment of Diplo-
matic Relations Between China and Canada,"
editorial, People's Daily, October 14, 1970.
ttEdgar Snow, a pro-Communise American
journalist, and author of Red Star Over
China, in a telegram sent from Peiping to
Milan on February 3, 1971, mentioned some
production figures which he said had been
disclosed to him by Chou En-lai. For the last
ten years, the Chinese Communists have not
.revealed any production figures. The figures
revealed by Snow greatly exceed even the
most optimistic estimates made by the free
world.
? According to an Agence France Presser
,C
-011S10,25 0
2' NOEL dispatch from Peiping,. Novem-
ber 9, 1970, the, Paltiatani president arrived
mainland China on November 10 and
stayed there until November 14. ?
u "All Anti-U.S. Imperialism Forces in the
World Unite!" editorial, People's Daily, Janu-
ary 21, 1964.
2' An AP dispatch from London on Decem-
ber 9, 1970 disclosed that during the previous
year at least five Soviet trade officials, three
Polish foreign officials and several unidenti-
fied Communist delegates were ordered by the
British government to leave Britain.
"What Does the Conference of British
Commonwealth Prime Ministers Show,"
People's Daily, February 2, 1971.'
23 See NCNA report from Peiping on Febru-
ary 2, 1971, concerning the coup In Uganda.
30.A CNA dispatch from Hongkong, on Jan-
uary_ 30, 1971 cited some figures from an
article by Harvard economics professor con-
cerning the economic situation on mainland
during the past 10 years. He said 'that 'even
the highest estimate would put development
rate of Peiping's agricultural and industrial
production from 1957 to 1967 at an yearly rate
of only 3 to 3.5 per cent, while the economic
growth of the most of other Asian countries
has already reached the rate of 7 to 9 per
cent.
3, See note 25.
39 See news reports and statements Issued
by Peiping following its nuclear tests as well
as the editorial of the People's Daily, Au-
gust 1, 1970.
40 NCNA dispatch from Peiping on Decem-
ber 5, 1970. The diplomatic personnel were
"ambassadors" from Mattritarla and Mali
and the charge d'affaires from Guinea.
41 NCNA dispatch from Peiping on Janu-
ary 2, 1971.
NCNA dispatch from Peiping, Janu-
-ary 27, 1971.
?
dispatch from Peiping on October 25, 1970, an
NCNA correspondent wrote a long article CONGRESSMAN PAUL McCLOSKEY'S
pointing out that the Japanese are not satis-
fied with their pre-war imperialist status.
They are now trying to join the club of "su-
perpowers" consisting of "U.S. imperialism"
and "Soviet revisionism."
w Mao Tse-tung, "People of the World,
Unite and Defeat the U.S. Aggressors and
Their Running Dogs," Peking Review (special
issue, May 23, 19'70), p. 9.
?so This point was stressed by both Lin
Plao and Chou En-lai in their speechs during
the "National Day" celebrations on October
1, 1970. However, earlier on July 14, 1970
_
Chou in an interview with French correspon-
dents already pointed out that the time when
big countries can dominate the world had
already passed and could never return.
2% Speech by Ceylonese minister of trade at
ar reception on January 15, 1?71, in honor of
Pal Hsiang-kuo, Peiping's "minister" of for-
eign trade, who led a trade delegation to visit
Ceylon. -
' - ? 28 See the "Joint Communique Between the
People's Republic of China and the Islamic
? Republic of Pakistan," November 14, 1970.
''.The Chinese Communists opposed the ap-
. ? plication of r.principle of "peaceful coexist-
ence" to the relations between the "oppressed
? people and the oppressing people," between
"the oppressed country and, the oppressing
country," and between "the oppressed class
and the oppressing class:" (See "A Proposal
? Concerning the General Line of the Inter-
national COmmunist Movement," op. cit.)
Even while chanting the slogan of "peaceful
r-ealstence," the Communists never -forget
to stress the necessity to oppose the "aggres-
sive policy and war, policy of imperialism."
Actually, this is a united front tactic against
"Imperialism."
Peking Review, op cit., p. 16. -
? 2' Two dispatches filed by NCNA from Tokyo
on October 24, 1970.
TESTIMONY BEFORE ?THE SUB-
COMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PA-
CIFIC AFFAIRS
HON. DONALD W. RIEGLE, JR.
OF IvIICIIIGAN
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, July 1, 1971
Mr. RIEGLE. Mr. Speaker, yesterday,
our colleague from California (Mr. Mc-
CLosKEY) testified before the Subcom-
mittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs. His
testimony related to the need. for Con-
gress to be fully informed, and described
a series of incidents where the execu-
tive branch over the years, had withheld
Information from the Congress or delib-
erately deceived the Congress. While
reasonable minds may differ as to the
"course this Nation should now pursue
with respect to terminating our involve-
ment in Vietnam, I believe all of us can
?agree on the need for Congress to de-
mand that it be fully informed on all as-
pects of the situation in Southeast Asia.
For this reason, I am inserting in_ the
RECORD ME. McCloskey's testimony in
full:
STATEMENT Or. PAUL N.. INTcCr.osKar, JR., BE-
FORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE' ON ASIAN AND
PACIFIC AFFAIRS, HOUSE-COMMITTEE'ON FOR-
EIGN Arrants, JUNE 29, 1971
Mr, Chairman and Members of the Subcom-
mittee: I had hoped originally to testify be-
fore you today with respect to the Viet Nam
Disengagement Act of 1971, urging, the bone-
rmar July
fits of an end to our Involvement n anti over
Indochina by-December 31, 1971, Conditional
solely upon the. safe return of our prisoners
of war. Arguments favoring this view already
have been made by a number of our col-
- leagues, however, and accordingly, I would
like to limit my testimony today to an issue
which is equally important, the obligation of
the House to be fully informed by the Execu-
tive Branch on the great issues of foreign af-
fairs, and particularly the Intervention by
the United States in the affairs of foreign
nations, either by covert CIA-operated action
as In Laos or military Intervention as in Viet
Nam.
There . is ? reasonable disagreement in the
House over what our course of action in
Southeast Asia should be There should be no
disagreement, however, on our need to know,
and our right to know, all of the facts which
may bear on our ultimate decision.
? It is true that Congress Is not suited to
negotiation and clay-to-day decision making
in intelligence and military operations. We
do hold,- however, the sole constitutional
power, and. I might add, constitutional re-
sponsibility, for providing for the common
defense, declaring war, funding the standing
army, but for a period not to exceed two
years; we in the House of Representatives
who face our constituents every two years,
not four or S1E, must initiate the revenue
measures necessary to support the nation's
expenditures for -war ancl foreign operations
'of every, kind.
; All of these provisions were clearly intend-
ed by the framers of the Constitution to give
Congress the controlling decisions in matters
of war and peace. We make the laws; the
President as Commander-in-Chief only ex-
ecutes those laws.
If Congress is to make wise decisions, how-
ever, we must be fully informed. We cannot
authorize a war without complete informa-
tion; we should not permit a war to continue
without complete information.
The recent excerpts from the Pentagon
documents published in the New York Ti712CS
and other newspapers bring home to us most
forcefully that we have not met our consti-
tutional obligations to keep fully informed.
Who amongst the Members of the House were
aware,?for example, that country team mem-
bers in Viet Nam aicled and encouraged the
overthrow of Premier Diem in 1933?
Who amongst our Members knew the true
facts of U.S. military and covert activity in
and over Laos, and in the coastal waters of
North Viet Nam prior to the Tonkin Gulf
Incidents of early August, 1964? Or that dur-
ing October, 1964, prior to the re-election of
President Johnson over Senator Goldwater,
that
'Two of the teams (of U.S./South Vietnam-
ese agents operating' mettle North Viet
Nam) carried out successful actions during
October. One demolished a bridge,, the other
ambushed a North Vietnamese patrol."
(This quote was taken from -a State De-
partment memo, dated November 7, 1964.
for Assistant Secretary of State Bundy, and
Is noted at page 115107 of the Congressional
Record of June 14, 1971).
If these facts had been known to the Con-
gress, would it have affected subsequent votes
on appropriations for Viet Nam, or the ap-
proval of escalation of the war implicit in the
House appropriations process?
What' would have been the House's reac-
tion, for example, had we been fully in-
formed in March, 1965, before U.S. troops
were sent to Viet Nam, that our true goals
In Viet Nam were those described by Assist-
ant Secretary of Defense McNaughton in a
memo to Secretary McNamara in March,
1965:
"70%?To avoid a humiliating, U.S. defeat
(to our reputation as a guarantor).
"20%--To keep SVN (and then adjacent)
territory from Chinese hands.
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pommay.??=1.???elt
NEVI YORX 71173
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Following are texts , of key documents accompanying (
the Pentagon's study of the Vietnam, war, dealing with the Ad- klic
sue
'ministration of Pre.sident John F. Kennedy up to the events that
rk:013,
. brought the overthrow of President Ngo Dinh, Diem in 1963. nth
. Except where excupting is specified, the documents are printed ma
mo
, verbatim, with only unmistakable typographical errors corr.- (
1 ,
rectal. . inn,
? . ? ? - anc
S toit',._19-'c'---nri)0 '60
.1 ? t.
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"ReC'itriP
Cabiegrant from Ethridge Durbronn United States Ambassador in Saigon, me
to Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, Sept. 16, 1960. fer
I .
. ? ? ? ? - ? -
As indicated .our 493 and 533 Diem normal. Diem government.is in quite.
regime confronted by two separate but serious danger. Therefore, in my opinion
? related dangers. Danger from demon- prompt and even drastic action is called :
?strations or coup attempt in Saigon for. I am well aware that Diem has in
could *occur earlier; likely to be pre- past demonstrated astute judgment and ?
dominantly non-Communistic in origin has survived other serious crises. Pas-.
but Communists can be expected to sibly his judgment will prove superior
e endeavor infiltrate and exploit any such to ours this time, but I believe never-
attempt. Even more serious danger is theless we have 110 alternative but to ?
? gradual Viet Cong extension of control
over countryside which, if current Com-
munist progress continues, would mean
loss free Viet-nam ? to Communists.
? ; These two dangers are related because
'Communist successes in rural areas
embolden them to extend their activities
_
to Saigon and because non-Communist
temptation to engage in demonstrations
or coup is partly motivated by sincere
desire prevent Communist take-over in
Viet?nam. ?
? Essentially [word illegible] sets of
measures required to meet these two
' dangers. For Saigon danger essentially
political and psychological measures re-
quired. For countryside danger security
measures as well as political, psycho
logic:31,11nd 'economic measures needed.
? However both sets measures should be
carried out simultaneously and to some
extent individual steps will be aimed at
both dangers.
?. Security recommendations have been ;
made in our 539 and other messages,
Including formation internal security
council, centralized intelligence, etc.
This message therefore deals with our
poJiticlil and economic recommenda-
tions. I realize some Measures I am
recommending .are drastic and would be
most [word illegible] for an ambassador
to make under normal circumstances,
nut conditions here are by no means
?
give him our best judgment of what we
believe is required to preserve his gov-
ernment. While Diem obviously resented
my frank talks earlier this year and will
probably resent even more suggestions
outlined below, he has apparently acted
on some of our earlier suggestions and
might act on at least some of the
following: ?
'
1. I would -propose have frank and
friendly talk with Diem and explain our
serious concern about present situation
and his political position: I would toll
him that, while matters I am ? raising
deal primarily with internal affairs, I
would like to talk to him frankly and
try to be as helpful as I can be giving
him the considered judgment of myself
and some of his friends in Washington-
cnn appropriate measures to assist him
? in present serious situation. (Believe it
best not indicate talking under instruc-
tions.) I would particularly stress de-
sirability of actions' to broaden and
increase his [word illegible] support
prior to 1061 presidential elections re-
quired by constitution before end April.
I would propose following actions to
President: _
2. Psychological- shock effect is re-
quired to ?take initiative from Commu-
nist?propagandists as, well as non-Com-
munist oppositionists and convince
population government taking effective
? Approved For ReleaggiMIMA .5'441140* 1
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4. Permit National Assembly wider
legislative initiative and area of genuine
debate and bestow on it authority to
conduct, with appropriate publicity,
public investbsations of any department
of government with right to question
ROQ0640471004) President himself.
This step would Jaye three-fold pur-
pose: (A) find some mechanism for dis-
?1.0.111 ? n1,73
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J. A.i.11)k 000 "\f,?. .
S[..)2cks1 Coyrespe.n:-Ioni-
in In.do-Chirin.
.RECE,N. events. have again fticussed
? public attention on the Valley of,
Jars. Once ? this green valley framed
by a chain of rocky hills presented en
Idyllic scene: rice fields, peaceful vii-
lager: drowsing in the shade of coconut'
reduis, small flourishing towns, and scat-
? tered' oyer the fields the enormous
toughly fashioned stone jars marking
the burial places of an ancient civili7
zation. Now all of It has been reduced
to ashes. For many years under the
control of Olt:, *Laotian guerillas, the
Valley of Jams was the. target of mas-
sive strikes by the U.S. 13-52 super-
bombers,, of "total defeat bomb strike.s,"
to use Washington's lingo. Every B-52
strike meant 30 tons of bombs, a rain
of fire and iron, the total killing of
.hurnireds of Laotian peasants with their
wiVeS and children. Those who 'sur-
vived hid by day In deep bomb craters,
only emerging at night to bury their
dead. and find food. Carly this month
the Americans resumed their air raids
While simultaneously transport planes
Chartered by the CIA landed the cut-
throat rangers It had hired in the
Valley. The flames of war have flared
up with renewed force In the heart of
long-suffering Laos. ? ;'
Little Laos lies on a major strategic
crossroads of 'war-torn Indo-China, but
why has it again become the object of
Washington's criminal aggression at this
Particular ? moment? If the American
press Is to be believed, President Nixon
and his close assistants are not inclined
to. .challenge .public opinion and re-
Jed' out of band the new proposals put
forward by the patriotic forces of Viet.-
ham, which open the way to peaceful
settlement In 'all of Indo-China, not
only Vietnam. This peace programme
Is strongly supported by broad sections
of the American people /as.. well as
world 'public. opinion. Vet It Is report-,
e.cr from: Washington that the CIA he
submitted to President Nixon a spacial
C -1 I NA
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\-59
This
This drawing and those on pages 32 and 33
were (lone by people from the Plain of Jars,
Laos, depicting their life as it was during the
bombing of their villages by American planes.
They arc presently living in refugee
camps around the capital city of Vientiane.
The bombing continues. ?
A bomb hit the hole and people died inside it.
?by a man, age unknown
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, CENERAL LElt?INITZER
? . . ..a grim chart talk.
.. ...? . . - -?-: ?
By Chalmers M. Roberts
Washington Post Staff Writer
The year 1P02 bpened for
President Kennedy with the
:grim word that he had not
'done enough to save South
Vietnam.
. According to documents
'from the Pentagon study
Some-. of the projects
available to The Washington
listed,. such as defoliation
Post, the chairman of the -
Joint Chiefs of Staff .had were characterized as hay-
ing "all the earmarks of
prepared one of those
gimmicks .. that' cannot and
'Pentagon flip-chart talks for
will . not win the war .in
Mr.- Kennedy. Although
there is no direct evidence, South 'Vietnam." The docu-
ments do- not show that the
? it? seems a reasonable as- ?
?sumption that. the talk was President had yet commit-
'delivered. In any case, it is ted himself to "win the war"
. likely that. the dreary word but that was the clear premj
ise. The "commitment of US
reached the President.
units". in support of Presi-
? ? Gen. Lyman L. Lerrmitzer,
k then. the JCS Chairman, was dent Ngo Dinh Diem's
. ,
prepared to discuss China's forces in one form or an- ? On Jan. 20, -the 'State De- nist . aggression in SouthVietnam. . The immediate
- problem's - (things must be other- "should make it oh- partment came up with
. .
bad because wheat had been vious to the Vietnamese: and some.. SuggestiOnS. Deputy strategic imPOrtance of
..
Southeast Asia lies in the
the rest of the world that Under Secretary U.- Alexis
"(purchased from Canada and
States is commit-
d Sta
t
U
the. United Australia), the setup of the Johnson' suggested td Dep- political value that can ac- .
crue to the Free World
.
ted : to preventing Commu- uty Defense' Secretary- Ros-
16,500-man Vietcong military through a successful stand -,
nist domination of South well -Gilpatrie that if the
.: establishment and the li,slief in that area. Of equal im-
Vietnam, . and Southeast Vietnamese armed forces
: that ? North' Vietnam then portance is the psychologi-
: was running a training cen- Asia.' - .? . ? , wore, to be increased at the
cal impact that a firm posi- ?
: .ter near the city of Vinh Yet "all- of the recent ac time "we . would envisage
, "where pro-Vietcong 'South lions :we Jiave taken may rtrateg,,ic Plans made in Sal. tion by the United States i
'Vietnamese receive an 18- still . not: :be . sufficient to 'gon giving priority to areas will have on the countries of
i' month military course inter- stiffen the will, of the g,rov- to be cleared and. held and the World.--both free and
:
spersed with intensive Corn- ernmerit and the people of setting forth general meth-
communist. On the negative
\ munist political indoctrina- SVN sufficientlY? .th resist' ods to be used. We believe side, a United States politi-
tion." - Communist pressure and these. should 17e aecom7 cal and/or -military with-
"Two 600-man battalions .
win the war without the US plishbd by numerous small drawal from the Southeast
'
already have completed' committing. combat forces."
tactical actions planned and Asian area would have an
adverse psycholog,ical im- ,
training," saile#14iliFOr bill, .u.exiliiiiikia.,,ailaijie- executed by American and
mectin with the. Pi- Moves Lemitzer was to put spot to meet the local. situa- 1. i 9:,11A&ICI,PoRDIROOOftetrtR0001600104fll greater propor-. '
",talking paper ' r t le an. de fMt911F17.cutiii-Y . 0, a 1 I One fro which re- ..
A . -
?g . rin a' -
dent, "and another two bat- to..Mr. Kennedy. But a Na-
lio t-t-he moment." _ _ ?m
. . . . .. .... .. .
, t Try) 1
i
LT(rii-;? II11, iieti ,,i.J U-111)67 ,,,,Th fsr`si
talions began training in _ . .. -, - -
. . _.
tional Security Action I1leni - ? -
May, lf)61." Here were signs
1 orandum of Jan. 18, , nine . . -
1 Johnson wrote. that Stat'e
of danger. ;felt "OW' trainin& program -
- ' days later, 'shows that the ? '
President was focusing not f_.").i.s,A, 11, " (ArmV of the Re--
Then Lemnitzer, if he fol- . t
lowed the "talking paper" Vietnam) be based
prepared for him, was to on sending in combat forces l'u`-nc, of
primarily on the concept'
but on ebunterinsurgencY. ' quote the President to him- - --- ? ? ? - that the Vietnamese army:
self: He ,ordered establishment. will start winning - on the
"The President on 22 Nov of "a Special Group (Count- day when it ha S obtained
.
er-Insurgenc
ember 1961 authorized the ) to `assure the Confidence of (he Viet- -
y"
unity ,of effort and the use narnese" peasants. As :a spb.
Secretary of State to in- of all -available 'resources cifie example 1 suggest that
struet the US Ambassador with maximum effectiveness we . immediately seek Viet-
to resisting Vietnam to inform Presi- namese implementatitm of a
subversive insurgency and
: dent Diem that the U.S. Gov- policy of promptly giving a
related forms of indirect ag' sthall reward in rice %salt or
ernment ? was prep-arcd to gresston itis friendly conn-
,
money - - (commodities in
join the GVN (Government: tries.", The new grotip 'was which -the Vietcong nYe in
of South Vietnam) in a: to. be headed by (Sen. Max- short supply) to every per-
sharply increased effort to well Taylor. An annex to the son who gives information
avoid a further deteriora. memorandum listed . the to the army. Similarly, vii-
tion of the situation in SVN' "critiCal areas" assigned to iages which show determin a-
(South Vietnam)." Next; it - as :Labs, South Vietnam lion to resist the Vietcong
. were listed the military' an Thailand. , , should receive the promp-
: steps the President had ap- The same day Gen. Lem- t ,st possible support."
'
'proved less than two months nitzer sent a memorandum The Joint Chiefs were
:? earlier. to Brig. Gen. Edward Lans- coneerned with the larger
' One chart showed "ap- dale, who had been dealing view. Defense ? Secretary
proved and funded construe- with insurgencies for years, ? Robert S. 'McNamara sent
tion projects" including Sm- stating that "now a strong the ? President a men-loran- '
provements at airfields at case can be made for in- dum that illuminated their
Pleiku, Bienhoa and at Tan- creased direct participation frame of mind.
sonnhut (Saigon). Here was by US personnel in the plan- 'Entitled "The Strategic
the. commitment th'u:s far.. fling and supervision of Vi- Importance of the Southeast
But, the "talking paper" in-' etnamese counterinsurgency Asia Mainland," the Jan. 13
? (Heated, that _was not operiitions. Inherent in such paper was signed by Lent-,
enough. - : increased direct participa- nitzer for all the chiefs. ',It i
tion 'should be some assur- began this way: .
*ance of US support for "1. The United- States has
Diem personally." - clearly stated and demon- ,
Lemnitzer was responding stratcd that one .of its .unal-
td Lansdale's statement that ' terable objectives is the pm-
Diem was worried about a vention of - South Vietnam,
coup. against him and that. falling to communist aggres-
till? had made him reluctant' sion and :the subsequent loss
to let his field comthanders of' the remainder of the
"implement the taak fbree Southeast Asia mainland.
concent that was: an impor-
The military objective,
tant part of the over-all plan therefore, must be to take:
of operationsa?ainst the
. expeditiously all action
s - neeessary to defeat commu-
Vietcong." s =
oontinuptl
STATINTL
TEE ATLANTIC 1.101Ir.OHLY.
Approved For Release 2000/9j5 94-RDP80-01601R000
LAOS
11Th fl T)
COIMD
i..17,7r7r1:=Ff7=2."=',
-6?kriNTL
them, for they have no food. There is was an old person and the other was ..
the despair of uncertainty. No one a child." There was talk that the men
can tell them what their future will might be conscripted into Vang Pao's .
? The springtime in Laos is very dry. be. Like Laos itself, they have long army, but the chief did not know for
Save for the .brief Mango rains, the since lost control of their own des- sure, and he did not know what
_..
heat is unrelieved, and shriveled tiny.- would happen to his people. "I am
green leaves lie like dead frogs in the In one such makeshift settlement afraid," he said.
dusty roads. The sun is dull red in the village chief greets visitors with a ?
the smoke ancl haze, for in the' gold-toothed smile. There are over ?
burn the brush off the hillsides. The diate area?four hundred of them At site 272 the Air America planes
pilots .say that the haze stretches all are children. One night, the Pathet cOntinue taking off and landing in a
across the northern marches of Lao and the North Vietnamese had roar of red dust, bringing rice, pigs,
. village. - h- 1 l'er- in a and ducks to the refugees. But one
.
springtime the hill people slash and nine hundred people in his imme-
?
For \\That?"
'Southeast Asia from North Vietnam
across to Burma. The Air America
helicopters must pick their way care-
fully among the fantastic limestone
outcroppings that rise like castles
from the wooded hills tumbling out
of China. One realizes that the misty
mountains of the classical Chinese
_landscape paintings were not the
product of artistic imaginations, but
faithful reproductions of nature.
*Here in these hills, fifty miles
-:northeast of Vientiane, there is an
airstrip known to the pilots as site
272. It is the center for American
refugee relief in Northern Laos and
come to his
nearby government outpost had de- senses the. end of a decade of Amen-
tected no enemies in the area: "So we .can policy in Laos. Ten years ago,
went to bed. happy," the village chief when the Americans first began to
said. train and equip the Mc? tribesmen,
"But at four o'clock in the morning Vang Pao's guerrillas operated all over
we were attacked. Before we knew it, Northeastern Laos?far behind enemy
they were in the village shooting and lines to the borders of North Viet-
the houses .were burning." Squatting nam itself. Fewer than two dozen
down on his haunches, the village chief American servicemen have been
described with his hands in the dirt killed in these mountains. Asians
how the enemy had come and the at- fight Asians. But ten years of costly, .
tack on the outpost?the short, sharp vainglorious offensives and unremit-
explosions, the flames, the rifle fire, the ting pressure from North Vietnamese
measured hammering of the fifty- counteroffensives have pushed the
calibers, and then silence. Death had Meo beyond their endurance. Vang
in I last three years
the fall-back point for Long Cheng, come in the classic Indochina way: a ao sos
Jthe secret CIA base twenty-five miles small, isolated outpost overrun in the have been so heavy that the Armee
to the north. Long Chen; is the night. It was a scene that has: been Clandestine is no longer an ex-
headquarters for the Meo General played a thousand times in the last elusively. Meo force. Almost half
Vang Pao's "Arm6e Clandestine,' I twenty-five years of \var. their numbers are now made up of
supported by the. CIA. All this past The villagers escaped into the sur- other highland peoples. And in the.
- winter and spring the base has been rounding woods, and for two days last three or four years, the Meo have
under siege by the North Vietnam- they marched over some of the most been organized to .fight in battalion-
ese. The hill , peoples, the highland impenetrable and inhospitable coun- sized units of over five hundred men
Lao and the Meo dependents of try on earth. "We were so sorry to instpd of small guerrilla units. As a
Vang Pao's army, have been fleeing leave everything behind," the chief result, the slaughter has been magni-
south by the thousands, pouring into said, "and. the march was very ciilfi- fied. Vang Pao's army can no longer
the hills and valleys near- site 272. cult. We walked two days, and the hOld Long Cheng alone, and by early
.
They make temporary bamtioo shel- people cried and cried over the April it Was reliably reported by Lao
tens, and Air America drops rice to mountains. Two people died; one and American sources that no fewer
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oont.":
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 :.CIA -RDP80 -01601R000600170001 -0
4.
'
-4k? l'* '?.
_,,. ?,,N ',... Ki- ,i-i I r? , ?.',A
1 ? 1;;-j". .?. _ v ._,,,, f ..\ S^-,-a 1 r-, , ,-
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V V
-.
?cs \A \,:,'. All 4117710471T/1,77YE All/iLYSIS OF AS141.1 AFF/11S
. .
LETTER. Co. Tokyo }long hong \Vashington Lo:-,? Ange
.,,/ ---.....---7----7-- ?
--------
? STATINTL
NuSITATIN01
29 June 1971
Dear- Sir:
THE C.I.A. IN ASIA (II): No intelligence operation in Asia is as well-
heeled as that. of the U.S. .Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.).
The annual working budget of the C.I.A. runs over US$600 million.
Thatust? a starter.
The agena spends far more than that in Asia alone if you count the cost
of some of the "borrowed" from othtr r. S. Government agencies. For
instance:
--U.S. Air Force planes are used to monitor foreign nuclear tests and ?
collect air samples. The agency,. ,while having its own cryptographers, draws
on the Army's .corps of 100,000 code specialists and eavesdroppers to tap
Asian communications.
---C.I.A. specialists often operate off U.S. Navy ships in the Pacific,
usually involved in electronic surveillance.
. ---The agency also is privy to information from the Defense Intelligence
Agency (D.I.A.) which has a substantial operation of its own in Asia.
The D.I.A. spends from its own budget more than US$1 billion a year
flying reconnaisance planes and keeping satellites aloft.
Those satellites anew C.I.A. analysts to know more---from photographs.
.taken 130 miles up---about China's topography than do the Chinese themselves:
---The U.S. State Department's intelligence section also feeds a considerable
amount of cofidential data it collects through its embassies, consulates
and travellqg diplomats to the Th..I.S includes information gathered
by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I.) the Justice Department
and the U.S. Treasury (Secret Service) often attached to diplomatic missions
abroad.
The C.I:A. also works closely with the' intelligence services and police
forces of the countries considered AMericar7-71lies in Asia, exchanging
information with them.
Where des all the C.I.A. money go?
It funnels out in myriad direction's: To pay for the agency's overt
intelligence gathering actiVities, to-finance "dirty tricks" and other
clandestine capers, to prop up ousted or failing politicians and to pay for
"disinformation" and other psychological, warfare ploys.
Despite the C.I.A.'s oft-deserved sinister image, a good deal of its
funds are expended on open intelligence gathering operations.
These go for ?subscriptions to newspapers, periodicals and other publications
and salariesfOr those who must scan them for intelligence tidbits.
It is estimated that more than. 507. of the C.J..A.'s world-wide intelligence
.input comes from such overt sources. ?(An estimated 357. comes from electronic
.spying and less than 157. from JAMES BOND-type,-cloak-and-dagger operations.)
An exception is Asia.
A greater amount of. the C.I.A. funds expended in Asia go into covert
activities..,
STATINTL
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(FOR SUBSCRIBERS ONLY ON A CONFIDENTIAL BASIS.
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION./
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-2-
C.I.A. "bagmen" ride regular circuits in Asia making monthly payoffs
to informers, subsidizing "friendly" politicians or now-outsted political
leaders who onte served U.S, interests, or dropping off funds to under-Write
businesses-used as Covers for agents..
In Indo-China, some of thee "bagmen" move around with hardly any
attempt to hide what they are up to. In places like Djakarta or Hong Kong
.or Tokyo, more sophistication is attached to the game.
C.I.A. funding 'activities in' Asia cover a wide and varied scope.
Despite a pledge by President Nixon to remove the C.I.A. from such
'activities, it is still engaged in supportim, foundationst institutes and
other ostensible research oranilations and stud grouos.
-----Quite a few Asian students are enjoying educational opportunities as
a result of C.I.A.-supplied "scholarships", sometimes without the students'
knowing where the money originates.
It's no secret that more than a few of those young American Ph.D.
candidates doing sociological studies in the jungles of the southern Philippines
or the highlands of Malaysia are full-time agents.
Another activity falls under the category of "disinformation" or
counter-intelligence and ranges from the spreading of rumors to the under-
writing of publications in local languages, both aimed at swaying opinion
in a certain direction.
That grey-haired Thai scholar ensconced in a small but comfortable .
Bangkok house writing a book on the historical reasons why Thais should stand
firmly against Communism might well have more than a publisher bank-roiling
his effort.
Gathering'documents o1.tical and otherwise, also accounts' for some of
the C.I.A.'s large expenditures in Asia.
More than a few Canton-Macao ferry crew members pocketed healthy- sums /
during the Cultural Revolution by selling Red Guard and other documents to cl
C.I.A. agents.
And then there are, the covert and quasi-covert, Military or para-military
operations financed by the C.I.A., including the 25,000-man force in Laos-"
once known as the "opium army"---commanded by Meo tribesman Gen. VANG PAO and
advised by 1511-175 C.I.A.. men, and the continuing C.I.A. supply of arms and
ammunition to Tibetan rebels who .make Periodiej'raids on Chinese Communist
troops in Tibet.
As is the usual practice, funds come bV circuitous routes.
Nearly half of all American aid earmarked for war refugees in Laos is
in fact C.I.A. funds beinb sorplied to CV.e Vanb Pao forces.
And then 'there's that shadowy airline known as Air America, which someone
once described as the worldr-s-mmOst shot at airline" and which is partically
funded by C.I.A. money.
' With millions of dollars to work with, the C.I.A.'s hand is felt in taa
and many ways.
Next: The C.I.A. In Asia (III)---Modus Operandi.
BIRTHDAY GREETINGS TO:
(1) The Communist Party of China (50on July 1), the largest political
party in the world.
(2) Ourselves, THE ASIA LETTER, (7 'this week),, the best and most
informative publication specializing in Asian affairs.
DESPITE THE PURGES during the past few years, the Chinese Communist Party
still is by far the world's largest political party.
As theParty celebrates the 50th anniversary of its 1 July 1921 founding,
however ,Prtc"liesd refirTerffSPANTNIA %IWIDAP- 91WWW0870903- larirtual.
destruction of the Party organization during the Cultural Revolution.
STATINTL
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GOLDSBORO, N.C.
NEWS-ARGUS
JUN 29 1Dii]
E - 16,034
S - 16,322
Pnce. 1T9/7 TG -
O a-eg
Whether the Pentagon papers
contain anything that might jeopardize
national security remains a topic of
international debate.
But there can be little debate over
the impropriety of a story printed
Sunday by the Philadelphia Bulletin
and the Seattle Times.
The newspapers reported that the
Central Intelligence..Agency is sending
Laotian hill tribesmen on spying
missions from Laps into Communist
China.
Their purpose ? is to obtain in-
formation as to troop movements and
political developments.
. Publication of a story informing an
avowed enemy of this country of such
activity, it seems to us, is a reckless
from of irresponsible journalism.
It could jeopardize the acquisition
of intelligence information necessary
to competent planning. It could
jeopardize the lives of intelligence
agents. .
If the-two newspapers regard this
as some colossal "scoop", it wasn't big
enough to justify the potential cost.
?
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?
NEW BRUNswirK N.
NE1,7,1 AprIroved:Fpr Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00
nos
JUN 29 19:11
:E 50,927
'S ? 52,421
r,f2,
has ICY
?not go to war as a part of a
ic a r ef ul 1 y plotted scenario
Which involves secret attacks
On tht,'' other side ? some ap-
parently with the aim of pro-
- yoking retaliation against us end
our allies. -
But I do not want to get into
an extended past mortem on
Vietnam. Our primary task
? should not he to engage in' re-
criminations or assign blame,
. but to bring' an end to the
war. That is why last year,
i and this year, I voted for the
IHatfield-McGovern proposal to
, set a ' definite date for 'U.S.
withdrawal from Vietnam.
The term "secret war" has
'110\V come into our national vo-
cabulary. We started off in
Vietnam operating in secret,
'and we are currently fighting
i a war in Laos in the same way.
' We are spending annually
: about $300 million on the
' ground in Laos, not to mention
? an estimated $2 billion to bomb
Lthat country of less than 3 mu-
lion people. All this is done with-
out any real Congressional or
; pnblic knowledge or approval.
Successive administrations
;.have been able to carry on the
?secret war in Laos, as they
did earlier in Vietnam by use
1
i of ? that vast billion dollar treas-
ure chest which Congress has
! appropriated, but never con-
trolled, for discretionary intel-
ligence and military programs.
. And it has been the Central In-,
' telligeneo. _Agettcya_(OA) -Wiii-EN'
'has' been assigned to 'carry out -
the administrations' policies ?
such as the running of a 30,000
? man private army and the
funding of Thai troops in Laos.
I do not direct criticism
? against the CIA, for it has only i
been following orders issued, by,.
several Presidents. I simply? _
question whether a secret intel--
ligence organization should be
assigned .a war-making role "
. abroad.
: . . Three Proposals
! This is why I have recently
;
' proposed three hills which ?
j would increase Congressional ,
control over certain CIA pro-7
; grams. These are:
a 1. A bill to extend all exist-
ing limitations on Defense De-
partment funding such as the ?
, prohibitions against payment of
! mercenaries in Laos and the
, By SEN. CLIFFORD P. CASE
, Much has been said lately
about the effort of Congress to
;reassert and redefine its au-
thority in the field of foreign
! I am much -interested in this,
not as an exercise in congres-
:'sional self-aggrandizement, but
as a means of forcing our gov-
? irnment to conduct foreign fol.-.
.!icy in the open so that the
..public may know what is going
con'and the controlling
'sioice in important decisions.
Our recent history .in South-
east Asia shows that wars ap-
proved by simply a handful of
presidential advisers may well
be not only unconstitutional but
relatively unsuccessful, too.
_Shocked
01/-illINIL
2. A bill to prohibit the fund-
ing of any U.S. government
agency of foreign mercenaries
operating outside their countries
without specific Congressional -
authorization, I would hope this
would eliminate the confusing
trail of Thais in Laos, Cambo-
dians in Laos, and even Thaisa
in Cambodia.
3. A bill to extend existing
limitations on the use of mili-
tary surplus material to all
government agencies abroad,
including CIA.
My three -proposals would ?
close some loopholes in the
law. But the Executive can
find ways to skirt almost any
prohibition, if it is so inclined.
The solution to the problem
lies, in the long run, not in a ?
tighter 'drafting of the law but
in the acceptance by the Exec-
utive of Congress and the pub- -
lic as partners in the conduct
of the peoples' vital busir ?
Like most Americans, I have Cooper - Church provisos for ,
teen shocked by the cynical Cambodia to 'all. U.S. 'govern- '
manipulation of our political ment agencies overseas, includ- !
processes revealed in Tao New :
, big CIA. ?
. York Times seripabbtcAirrFOr Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0
gins of the Vietnam'War, be-
lieve that our country should ,
BAtxol CW
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2 8 JUN 1971
CIA Is Rep :Ma
.1 ?
Send tag Liaoblart3
? To Spy In China
'Philadelphia, 'June 27 (i11---The
Philadelphia Sunday Builetin
has quoted "qualified sources"
as saying the Central Intelli-
gel-lee Agency has been sending
reconnaissance teams from Laos
into China to obtain information
on, troop movements, political
deilelopments and other data.
"Those forays," the Bulletin
said in a copyright story, "in-
volve sending reconnaissance
teams from northern Laos as
much as several hundred miles
;into seuthern China's Yunnan
province."
The newspaper said the -
sources reported that United
States officials in Vientiane,
Laos, discounted any potential.
threat to slowly improving rola:
tions between Washington and.
Pel(ing.
The members of the intelli-
gence teams, the Bulletin said,
are native hill tribesmen of the
same ethnic stock prevalent in .
southern China. .
"They have been recruited,
.cequipped and trained by the CIA
to infiltrate Chinese territory
and obtain information on troop
movements, political develop-
ments and other data."
.Officials at CIA headquarters
in McLean, Va., declined any ?7
comment on the story, as did
American Embassy officials in
Vientiane, the newspaper report-
ed.
The Bulletin said its sources
reported U.S. authorities believe
local security needs and the in-
telligence value of such opera-
tions justify their continuation.
;1
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---------
STATINTL
STATINTL
encogon _
To see the conflict and our part' in it
as a tragedy 'without villains, war crimes
'without criminals, lies without liars, es-
pouses ?and promulgates a view of pro-
cess, roles and motives that is not only
? grossly mistaken but which underwrites
deceits that have served a succession of
; Presidents.
?Daniel Ellsberg
.v THE issues were momentous, the sit-
uation unprecedented. The most mas-
sive leak of secret documents in U.S.
history had suddenly exposed the sen-
sitive inner processes whereby the John-
"son Administration had abruptly esca-
lated the nation's most unpopular?and
unsuccessful--war. The Nixon Govern-
ment, battling stubbornly to withdraw
from that war at its own deliberate
pace, took the historic step of seeking
to suppress articles before- publication,
and threatened criminal action against
TIME
/1 964-50pitRi)1601 R000600
upers:
I11,719 -
that the. Government 'was fighting so
fiercely to protect. Those records af-
forded a rare insight into how high of-
ficials make decisions affecting the lives
of millions as well as the fate of na-
tions. The view, however constricted or
incomplete, was deeply disconcerting.
The records revealed a dismaying de-
gree of miscalculation, bureaucratic ar-,
rogance and deception. The revelations
severely damaged the reputations of
some officials, enhanced those of a few,
and so angered Senate Majority Lead-
er Mike Mansfield--a long-patient Dem-
ocrat whose own party was hurt most
?that he promised to conduct a Sen-
ate investigation of Government decision
making.
The sensational affair began quietly
with the dull thud of the 486-page Sun-
day New York Times arriving on door-
steps and in newsrooms. A dry Page
One headiine----VIETNAM ARCHIVE: PEN-
John Mitchell charged that the Times's
disclosures would cause "irreparable in- !
jury to the defense of the United States"
and obtained a temporary restraining
order to stop the series after three in-
stallments, worldwide attention was in-
evitably assured.
A Study Ignored
The Times had obviously turned up
a big story (see PnEss). Daniel Ells-
berg, a former Pentagon analyst and su-
perhawk-turned-superdove, apparently
had felt so concerned about his in-
volvement in the Viet Nam tragedy
that he had somehow conveyed about
40 volumes of an extraordinary Pen-
tagon history of the war to the news-
paper. Included were 4,000 pages of
documents, 3,000 pages of analysis and
2.5 million words?all classified as se-
cret, top secret or top secret-sensitive.
The study was begun in 1967 by Sec-
JULY 1965: JOHNSON DISCUSSING VIET NAM POLICY BEFORE TELEVISION SPEECH
Always.tho secret option, another notch, hut never victory.
the nation's most eminent newspaper. T..kooN STUDY TRACES 3 DECADES OF retary .of Defense Robert McNamara,
The dramatic collision between the GROWING u.s. iNvoLvEmENT--was fol- who had become disillusioned by the fu-
Nixon Administration and first the New lowed by six pages of deliberately low- tility of the war and wanted future his-
York Times, then the Washington Post, key prose and column after gray col- torians to be able to determine what
. raised in a new and spectacular form umn of official cables-, memorandums had gone wrong. For more than a year,
-the unresolved constitutional questions and position papers. The mass of ma- 35 researchers, including Ellsberg,- Rand
about the Government's right to keep terial seemed to repel readers and even Corporation experts, civilians and uni- ?
? its planning papers secret and the con- other newsmen. Nearly a day went by be- formed Pentagon personnel, worked out
Ilictino right of a free sress to inform fore the networks and wire services of an office adjoining McNamara's. With
the public IAIMVP43?14rnclreFOIRPISffic200PA5/15td. Qiiik-litlaPaOhOti6n$R00000117Ct01044, they were able to obtain
' tioned (see story -page 17). Yet, even action was to refrain from comment so Pentagon documents dating back to
ar-
-__-.rnore fundamental, ..the legal_ battle ..fo, _as_not..to..give_the_series any greater "ex- ,_guments within the Truman Adminis-
-4 tl,,t ??11-,,,,, A ttnrnow nonr-rn1 trnt inn nn whether the IT.S. should hell)
STAT I NT L
SI.V.,th'ET JOURNAL
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8 JUN 1971
W orld-Wide
? CIA reconnaissance teams from Laos have
been sent into Communist China to obtain in-
formation on troop movements, political devel-
opments and other data, the Philadelphia Sun-
day Bulletin said. The intelligence team mem-
bers are native tribesmen of the same ethnic
stock as is prevalent in southern China, the
paper said, quoting "qualified sources." The
sources said U.S. officials in Vientiane, Laos,
discounted any potential threat the operations
pose to slowly improving U.S.-China relations.
CIA officials declined any comment.
?
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V4,W-fc.i14:2'1
Approved For Release 2000/05115: - 1601R00060
STATINTL
-
1'1 A [ I _."5) FT ,
L 12 ?
? F') 1.1'`' (7i) !.7"s (;.isj (714 rrn u t="
, ,.,? r-,4
1 ?
AssociatfA Press
The Central Intelligence Agen-
cy has been sending Laotian hill
tribesmen on spying missions
from Laos into Communist
,China to obtain information on
troop movements and political
developments, according., to a re-
port published by the Philadel-
phia Bulletin and the Seattle
Times.
"Those forays involve'sending
reconnaissance teams from
northern Laos as much as. sever-
al- hundred miles into Southern
'Vliina's Yunnan Province," said
a top:,?tright, story written by Ar-
nold Abram, published by the
two newspapers yesterday, ?
The dispatch, as published in
The Bulletin, said ualifieci.
soiirces reported that U.S. offi-
z
dials in Laos discounted any po-
tential threat the o:jeations may
post to slowly improving rela-
tions . between Washington and
Peking.
'They believe this threat is
small, according to reliable
sources, because the operatio,--.s
are not commando raids or sab-
otage efforts and Americans do
not participate in them, the
Bulletin said.
Native. hill ,tribeS'inen_ are of
the same ethnic stock as found
in southern China. 'They have
been recruited, equipped and
trained .by the CIA to infiltrate
Chinese territory and obtain in-
formation on troop movements,
political developments and other
data," the Bulletin said. ...-
Abrams said his sources claim
such intelligence missions have
long been known to Chinese au-
thorities and that several teams
have been captured in recent
years.
"Consequently, American offi-
cials reason that Peking will
continue to tolerate these terri-
;
torail incursions as long as they
are conducted solely to gather
intelligence.''
Officials at CIA headquarters
in McLean, Va., declined any
comment on the story, as did.
American Embassy officials in
Vientiane., the Bulletin said.. 1
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-0160.1k00
PEILADFLPHIA, PA.
DULLETIN
E - 640,783
S - 681,831
' JUN 2 7 10`
dil,.... ???
'-'"'1?? AiLlail*"9i .-, ? ?-,, ' 0.:: argely -discount a,ny potential
/.,? 0 ????:-,-. -v 1 i'-?, T A. IVI, ' ' ' ? - '
....?11-'1: .;`7,...1, - threat .the operations. pose to
.. ..
iy:.- .-7%???
----- --77-Prir,317 , c,'? alm'ily improving relations be-
tween Washington and Pelting.'
. -
STATINTL
A
7
???"" ? these operations. ?-nuaified
' ,
sources report, howeVer, that
? U. S. authorities believe Io ii
?
?
security - need's and . the intel--
about the road's potential aS
supply route for ? Communist-
led guerrilla forces in northern
-
beeline value such opera - Thailand. ?
?? t'f 11
%. ions jus i_y American officials privately
-110'51rPIT ?
? ? _1011, ? . ?
? ivioreover, U. S...atithorities
believe this threat is
PrnInery;,
t.)?? . small, according ? to . relia ble
sources, because the opera-.
tions are not commando raids
or sabotage efforts and Ameri-
. . .
,Reds AVItire
?
/no
- 4, ?
- ? MI 7", ? .
? ?
fi,-% ,,,7;v
i(?J
- .
a
By ARNOLD ABRAMS , ethnic stock prevalent in
southern China. .They., have
: Special .to he ..bulletin
been recruited, equipped arid
. 0.mi Thn ..ElIctin .Co. . . trained by the CIA to infiltrate
VientianenLaos---intelligence, Chinese territory 'and obtain
operations that penetrate deep information on troop move-.
:into China have been directed merits, political - developments.
from here for years by the an other data.
, Central -intelligence 'Agency u.s..11.?,??,t.-1??11,-
..t.nd are continuing. . - ...... ?
. [A- Bulletin inquiry at the
. .
n ?These forays involve sending Central Intelligence. Agency
. reconnaissance . teams from headquarters in McLean, Va.
northern Laos as much as brought this .response; "The structing a roaa network lead-
-several hundred: Miles into CIA never comments .a.bout. inn toward the Thai border.
."Southern China's Yunnan - news ? stories .? ?: Thai
concerning its . . .isturoed
Province. . . ' ? - operations. "J ' . . .
.. . s D .
The team-- members ? are as- American embassy officials -Thai authorities repeatedly'
i five hill tribesmen of the -same , iii Vientiane ..refu,s4.=._to discuss have expressed deco concern
. .. . _.....
?
? '1
'
p n4r-''./ A rilk
cans do not participate direct-
ly in them. ? ?
? ?
Sources note, in addition,
that such intelligence missions ?
have long been known to
Chinese authorities; several
voice 'similar concern. While
conceding that Chinese forces
in Laos have not been acting
hostile, they insist the project
must be kept under scrutiny.
Peking's construction proj-
ect originally was requested
by the tripartite government
established in- Laos with the
signing of the lt.n2 Geneva Ac-
cord. While technically. still
existent, the cealition was?
abandoned in 39D- by Com-
munist. Pathet Lao represcnta-
tives.
ironically, while American
teams have been captured in, officials privately fret about
recent e -
Chinese intentions in Laos,
yars. . ?
Pd-ring a pingpong difilnmacy
Consequently, ?Hi:
. has .prompted positive reac????
dials reason that Peking will tiOn -from the leader of this
continue to tolerate these ter4. ration's neutralist govern-.
ritorial incursions as long as me.nt.
In an interview, Prime Mie-
rather
are conducted solely to.
ister.Souvanna Phourna stres-
vather intelligence.
-sed China's historically no:lag-
Verse. Threats Elsewhere - .? -
igiessive attitude toward Laos.
U. S. authorities also be- Prince Souvanna noted that
lieve that, if the Chinese want the -unhappy history of this
an excuse. to reverse the landlocked 'kingdom includes
friendly trend of their ping- invasions by neighboring
pong diplomacy, they can .do Thais, Cambodians, Burmesc.
better than focusing on these and Vietnamese ???-?-? but not by
operations, ,the Chinese. ? --?
"We're still fighting in Viet-
nam, we have a military prcs-
. . ence on Taiwan,- and we are
k 1-1 rice. cs? standing by our treaty corn-
mitments to Chiang Kai-shek,"
? observes one sourcia close to
U. S. policy-makin'g levels. "If
the Chinese are looking for
something ? to whip us with,
any one of those three will
do." ?
In Laos; American officials'
major security concern about
the Chinese stems from a Pe-
king road-building project in
t le north. An estimated 14,-
00 Chinese, including several
thousand soldiers, are con-
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IN I L
GWEN CITY , N.Y.<
NEWSDAYBV751 FliKlielease 2000/05/15.: CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-
E ? 427,270
7:1
riebt17.3-Welni,CI.Q
Newslay Map by. Philip Di0(116i0
Chinese Communists aro building a road ne.twork, inditafed by the dotted
line, in norihern!Laos toward Thailand. At the same fitne, intelligence +earns
trained and financed by the CIA are entering Yunnan Province. in China.;
. -
.pk Arnoil Abrams -.
...14.1.ewsciay Special Correspondent
1 .
, ' Vientiane,- Laos?The recent thaw in Sino-Ameri-
. an relations has not halted U.S.-directed intelligence
operations that Penetrate . deep into Communist
hinese territory. . ? ? - ??-? ? . - --. - - .--
.:Those operatiOns, which have been conducted for
Nears here by the Central Intelligence Agency, send
rtpconnaissance teams from nothern Laos as far as
Eleveral hundred Miles into southern China's Yunnan
-..
A3rovince. , ... .
-.I.' The agents are native hill tribesmen of the same
. Alinic..stoek prevalent in southern China. They have
v/t
:een-recruited, equipped and trained by tho CIL:to'
infiltrate Chinese territory and obtain information on.
in:x:9 movements, political developments and other
Pertinent security matters. ,
American embassy offieials in Vientiane refuse to
discuss the intelligence operations. Qualified- sources
report, however, that U.S. authorities belieVe that
local security needs and the intelligence value ofsuch
Opera tions j us tifiNIPEIMtli tE00. Reiettre,200019545
authorities largely discount any potential threat. that
the operations may pose to the slowly improving
relations between Washington and Peking. -
American officials believe that any such threat is?
small, according to reliable sources, because the oper-
ations are not commando raids or sabotage efforts,
and Americans do not participate directly in them.
The missions supplement activities of the Laotian
government's so-called secret army, which has been
covertly directed and supported by the CIA for the
Past decade.
Informed sources add, moreover, that the intelli-
gence missions have long been known to Chinese
authorities; several teams have been captured in re-
pent year. Consequently, American officials reason
that Peking will continue to tolerate the territorial
:incursions as long as they are conducted solely to
gathar information and do not pose a direct security
ithrea%. .
U.S. authorities also believe that if the Chinese
Want an excuse to reverse the friendly trend of their
cliR !pail rthM,M, 11.9A2AV-Tnth all f0C1.1. -
jite 1*,:i 145$1a- IMIhWAISIUS-VIV ti It /11Th g in Viet-
qoatinue d
NT AGRI F S N.
-Nap-re:wed -r-Dr Release 2000/05/15.; CIA-RDP80-01601R000600
GAZETTE
E ? 35,280
S ? 35,969
JUN 25 107i
?
STATINTL
By JACK BELL ;
Garmett News Service
WASHINGTON ? President
Nixon is making a tragic mistake
In his assessment that the use. of
'drugs by U.S. servicemen in
Vietnam is "by no means a majoi.
part of the American narcotics
problem", as he said in his drug
abuse control message to
Congress.
. The 'accelerated movement of-
, the bored or seared "grants" into
? the legion of thoae who smoke or
? snort herion strikes at the heart '
- of the narcotics cancer of the
future, if not of the present.
:a What happens to those young
? amen when they come home-
hooked with a habit they can
stand off for $5 a day in Saigon,
r where the dope is pure and
cheap? They will find the price of
7 their habit has gone up to $100 a
? day in the United States, where,
the drug is so cut that to get any
a charge from it they will have to
? I pump it directly into their blood.
, ?
; CHAIRMAN Vance Hartite, D-
l Ind., of ? the &nate Veterans
Affairs Committee, estimates
7 there are more than 375,000 men
? ? ? ?
re tuff from Vietnam now
looking for jobs. Almost none of
them ?and those who arejoining
them weekly are likely to latch
on to any payroll check that
would support an addict's habit.
The addiet will turn naturally to
crime.
Nobody really knows how
many uniformed young Ameri-
cans in Southeast Asia are
mortgaging their future lives by
using dangerous drugs. Only Fe-
cently and belatedly has offi- ,
cialdom become grudgingly
alarmed at the Spread of this
menace.
Rep. Seymour Mb e ro ,R-N.Y.,
who bought heroin easily on the
streets of Saigon to demonstrate ,
its availability, estimates there
are 00,000 users of the drug in
uniform. This works out close to
one quarter of the U.S. troops ?
in the war zone.
Reps. Morgan F. Murphy, D-
n., and Robert H. Steele, R-
Conn., who made their own in-
vestigation in Vietnam, think
30,000 to 40,000 have a serious
heroin habit.
- I
NIXON'S new program is
aimed primarily at reducing the
number of GI addicts who will
come home untreated and at
providing folowup treabnent for -
them. Urine tests will be given all
returning veterans. Detected
addicts will be put, through a
seven-day course of
detoxification in Vietnam,
followed ? by three weeks .of ?
treatment at home.
, ?
This is all very well as far as it
goes. But, it does nothing for the
thousands of addicts who still
.have time to serve in Vietnam.
Steele's suggeslion that all U.S.
servicemen be tested at least
once a month ought . to be ?
'followed.
Nixon.has promised to attack
the narcotics supply on an inter-
national plane. He is having some
success in Turkey, where the
government is struggling to
..cohtrol the growing of opium
poppies. Smuggled opium from
Turkey is said to be the source of
three-fourths of the heroin en-
tering this country.
THIS progress in Europe,
however, has not been matched
in Asia. . There, the friendly
countries of Burma, Laos and
Thailand produce about 700 tons
of opium annually, about half of
the world's illicit output.
Production of the raw drug and
its refining is carried on in the
"Golden Triangle" border area
that feeds heroin into South
Vietnam. There it is Sold on the
streets ? often by children -- to
American servicemen. The
Nixon administration has put the
screws on Saigon's President
Nguyen Van Thieu to crack down,
on the traffic. But this fails to get
at The supply..
? a
Discussions with the govern-
ments of Burma, Laos and.
Thailand are not going to get very
far. Unfortunately, these
governments have very little"
clout in the Mekong River
tn-
border area, where irregular
."armies" and Chinese buy the
!,opiurn crops, run the refineries
and transport heroin.
?
. ?
0
.71 .71
.1 ti h
?
CIL CD it I;
The U.S. Central Intelligence',
Agency, under fire for its
para-
military activities in Laos,i
knows about these operations.
What would be wrong if it were!
commissioned to buy up the
opium harvest of the area at
premium prices? Opium has le_i
gitirnate medical uses and the.;
project would not be a total loss. I
This would be no more costly;
nor fantastic in its concept than,
the CIA's equipping, training and
transporting troops that won ,one
revolution (Guatemala) and lost,
another (Cuba). And if it could be .
carried out, it might salvage
great many twisted lives among;
the Americans who remain in
South Vietnam.
? , ??
Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600170001-0
. WASIMGTOIT POn
Approved For Release 2000/05/fp 4 CAtifpfr40-01601 R000
STATINT
The News Bushiess
'W 661.[RevelintRons99 f(11)Zr Jim)
!,_. T,
?THE continuing storm over.publication of .
-secret Pentagon papers contains lessons for
all of us in the news business and for the
country and the government as well.
The newspapers are learning from this,
episode and from the national loss of memo-
ry that has occurred since 1964 that their
.Impact on public opinion in the United States
Is tragically limited. The substance and in
- some cases the precise details of virtually
everything The Washington Post and The.
.New York Times have printed from the Pen-
tagon papers is ancient history. It was near-
ly all published while it was happening. And
it was largely a futile enterprise; neither the
public nor the-congressional politicians were
listening.
? The government is learning something,
too. It is learning that policy is poorly com-
municated and public opinion is poorly
shaped by proxy. All through the early'
- 1960s, government officials were anonymous-
ly "leaking" their fears and "options" for
Vietnam through the press as a substitute
? for public candor and direct communication
with the people. This produced considerable
support for the government's zig-zag policies
by most of the major newspapers, including.
The Post and The Times. But newspaper
editorials are not necessarily the voice of
the people, and newspapers, as is now evi-
dent, are inadequate instruments for public
education,
. What tile public and politicians could
learn from this experience is that if they
sit there asleep in the back row while their
? destinies ere being debated, they are In a
poor position when the slumber ends to cry
foul and search for ? scapegoats. ?
6-4-9 ?
THE FACTS of this particular case are
. that The Post and The Times and other
large IlOWS organizations published: thou-
sands of stories, editorials and essays in
- 1901 describing the deteriorating military and
political situation in Vietnam?just as it
was described in the official memoranda.
and cables in the Pentagon papers. The vari-
ous options' and contigency plans being put
before- the President at that time were re-
ported-. repeatedly and accurately?as they
are now reported hi the official papers,
. The growing combat role of American
forces was laid out in impressive detail on
front. pages all over the country?the first
use's of napalm against suspected enemy
..villages, the commitment of U.S. helicopters
- 'and crewmen to the battlefields, the recon-
naissance, bombing and strafing missions of
? US. aircraft in South Vietnam end Laos,
the 'U.S. role in the training and transport
pf. South Vietnamese raiding parties into
North Vietnam, the participation of U.S.
'advisers and Special Forces teams in major
battles, the use of U.S. troops in perimeter
: defense at military bases. The circumstances
of the TonkinAWO?fd-iti 43bl-414164Se-11)0
prior raids by ,e?outa ldjetnarnese forces
_against North Vietnamese territory,, were_
By Richard iirwoocI
?
reported accurately at the time. The pos-
sibi1itie:,1 of U.S. air raids on North Vietnam
were reported and discussed in the press
repeatedly far in advance of the event. U.S.
casualty lists and the new funerals at'Ar-
lington National Cemetery received increas-
ing prominence in the news as the war
revved up in 1964.
"Today," one of our correspondents wrote
? in February, 1964, "there are 15,500 military
personnel in South Vietnam; some 275 Amer-
icans have died, about 100 of them in com-
bat, but there has been no outcry what-
soever at home for pulling out our, troops.
"rhis attitude, one hopes, is an expression
of maturing American opinion, of a willing-
ness to face pp to wars that are neither
'won' nor 'lost'; to accept the fact that the
,Korean War was the first of what probably
will be a host of 'mean, frustrating and-
uerve-wracking wars,' the term Secretary
of State Dean Rusk applied last April to ?
the Is,trug,gle in South Vietnam."
c?-f-E3
FOLLOWING the Gulf of Tonkin
inci-
dents Time Times editoralize.d: "United
States determination to assure the inde-
pendence of South Vietnarin if ever doubt-
ed before, cannot be doubted now by the
Communists to the north or their .allies."
A few days later The Times said: 'rho
Americans went into Vietnam in 1954 to
fill the vacuum left by the French and to
contain the advance of communism in that
part of Southeast Asia. The motives are
exemplary and every American ? can be
proud of them, but the crucial questions
are: Can it be. done? . . Is this war neces-
sary?"
These readings of "mature" and "united"
American opinion toward the war were
probably wrong. What the evidence from
that time suggests is that despite, the pre-
occupation of the newspapers and of the ?
government with Vietnam, the public was
both ill-informed and not greatly interested.
The Gallup Poll in May, 1964, reported that
63 per cent of the American people had no
opinion about the war or how it was going
or what the United States should do. .The
reason for that, Gallup explained, was that
this 63 per cent were paying no attention to
developments in Southeast Asia; neither the
newspapers nor the government had gotten
their attention. Six months later, when the
war fever in Washington and in the press
was rising, the Council on Foreign Relations
reported the results of another poll, One
in four adult Americans, the council found,
was not even aware that, a war was going on
in Southeast Asia,
What had they been told by the press? If
Met' CiAaRDP ?,1140t66CHROGOM017?0001 -0
haul been told in February that Secretary
Rnsleewas._.saying., that ,,retaliation- against -
?
JLJL
eei." ?? ,
0
1, giiro T.;
- ? L., -0,-,
STATINTL
_______Approx0341-F-9r-Release 2000/05/15.: CIA-RDP80-01601R000600
CLEVELAND, 01110
PLAIN DEALER
MIN 2)r, Ic?--j 1
14 - 409,414 7
? S - 545,032
.",,-?1Pip-iAl
By Michael Morrow
0 Dispatch pews Service Iniernotional
VIENTIANE, Laos ? U.S..
intelligence, operations in-
clude the sending of armed
Laotian reconnaissance
t earns into China from
northern Laos. Teams are
reported to have gone as far
as 200 miles into China, dis-
patched froni a secret CIA
outpost. 15 minutes' flying
' time north of the Laotian
opium center of }Joliet Sal.
According to sources dose
to the Central Intelligence
'Agency, and confirmed by
Western diplomatic sources
in ?Vientiane, the CIA is
sending out hill tribesmen
armed with American weap-
tons:. a_ thre.e,pound radio
with a range of 400 miles
and equipment to tap
' Chinese telegraph lines,
. watch roads . and do other
'tyPes of intelligence gather-
ing.
"There is -always a team
. in China,'.!accordingto
. sources close to the CIA.'
Staging area for the oper-.
ation is a small, Luritain-
Valley - airstrip called Nam
Lieu (also known as Nam
Yu). The strip, which one
Air America pilot describes
as ."difficult as hell to get
i n.t. o," is surrounded by
'Mountains. It is serviced by
both Air America and Conti-
nental 'Air Service and is
also away-station for opium
traders from northern Laos
and Burma enroute to drug
factories at Houei SaL
, . ..
eD U R.I N G 1968, five
Chinese functionaries,
caught up in the purges of
the cultural revolution de-
fected to a Nam Lieu trecon-
naissance 'team. They were
treatedwell by the Ameri-
cans for a time but eventu-
ally were turned over to the
Royal Laotian government.
0
py 4771 rin) 04 ? ..1 1"71
71174
41 ci.Ly
According to sources close
to the CIA, the five were
thrown into a 12 by 12 by 12
loot pit exposed to the ele-
ments. They were eventual-
ly executed.
Like most CIA operations
in Laos, the one out of Nam
Lieu is directed from a
headquarters at Udorn Air
Base in northeastern Thai-
land. There are sever al
Americans at Nam Lieu,
however, including CIA and
military intelligence person-
nel. Source close to the CIA
report the number has in-
creased recently from 4 to
more than 10.
In addition to activities in-
side China, the Nam Lieu
Americans also help direct
a joint operation of "SGU"
(Special Guerilla Units) and.
the Thai army at Xieng
Lem south of Houtei Sat on
the Lao-Thai border. They
also run intelligence gather-
- Ing missions, on a road
being built by the Chinese
g o-v e r n in e n t (under an
agreement reached with the
now defunct coalition gov-
ernment of Laos) in the
same .vicinity. '
UNTIL MID-SEPTEM-
BER of last year, the Nam
Lieu, operation was headed
by a tough-and-tumble vet-
er an guerrilla organizer '
named Anthony. (Tony) Poe.
-Poe is a legendary figure in
Laos known best for his dis-
like of journalists, disregard
for orders and radio codes,
capacity for Lao whisky and
expertise a t. clandestine
guerrilla operations.
Poe was removed almost
.immediately after an article
last - September by Dispatch
News Service International
on the Nam Lieu operations, ?
ostensibly because the arti-!
de "blew his cover." Ac-
cording to sources close to
the CIA, however, this rea-:.
son was an 'excuse used by
the Am eric a nEmbassy
here to get rid of Poe;
whose dashing style has
been a source of long-term
,friction with members of the
American Mission in Laos,
including A in bassador
McMurtrie Godley.
As for the missions into
China, howeve r, sources
close to the CIA and West-
ern diplomatic sources both
'report that to their know-
ledge they continue.
Since leaving Nam Lieu
? Poe bas spent most of his
.time at Udorn Air Base, al-
though one source reports
Poe continues to do "odd
jobs" on the Thai-Cambodi-
an ? border. Those who know
him say he is unhappy away
from Nam Lieu.
POE - IS AN ex-Marine
noncommissioned officer,
wounded at Iwo Jima, who
remained in Asia after
,World War II. In the 1950s
he helped organize CIA-
,rained Tibetan insurgents,
:escorting them to Colorado
:for training and going back
:with them into Tibet.
Later he worked ,in the
Thai-Cambodian bord
area with the Khmer Serai ?
anti-Slhanouk gui iiIi re.-
ceivinn assistance 1; ora, the
Cl.'. and other parts of-
Thailand. I ie has been
and out of Laos sihe bofore ?
the Geneva a?neerds uf lf.)(.;2
and was one .of tne
Americans involved in arm-
ing and training paramili-;
tary groups in Laos.
Poe is considered ? stub-
born and- brusque, some- r
times going into fits of an-
ger over the radio, his life-
line with the outside world.
He is said to prefer working
with hill tribes to working
with Americans and looks
down on most Anierican op-
erations because of their
heavy reliance on American
personnel. ?
He has been wounded at;
least once during his career
in Laos and reportedly a
price has been put on his
headby the Pathet Lao. He
is perhaps the only Amen-
cart legally married to a
woman of the hill tribes.
L.A. Times/Washington Post Service
e.20.00105/154-GIA-RDP80.-01601R000600170001-0
S 9552 Approved For R
? -
? initiated to solve problems of interven-
tion on the high seas in cases of oil pol-
lution casualties and the civil liabilities'
for oil pollution damage. International
conventions on those subjects are now
? before the Senate for its advice and con-
' " sent to ratification.
However, previous efforts have con-
? - centrated on action after the pollution
_ casualty has occurred. What is needed
how is action to prevent casualties. And
that is what Senator 1VIAcNus0N's bill is
.? designed to accomplish. It is a tough bill,
? that goes to the root of the problems?
construction, maintenance, and opera-
-
-
tion of tankers and other vessels carry-
ing certain liquid cargoes in bulk, and
regulation of the movement of all vessels
'and placement of structures in navigable
waters of the United States. These are
essential actions that we must take, par-
, - ticularly in the face of the rapidly in-
creating amount of ocean transport of
- liquid cargoes in bulk.
At the same time, it is important that
other countries join us in applying
-.equally stringent regulations on con-
struction, maintenance, and operation of
vessels, and on their movement in inter-
national commerce, The problems are of
. international magnitude. And while
strong domestic legislation such as the
Magnuson bill will contribute enormous-
ly to their solution, the problems can-
not be solved unilaterally by-the United
?-States. International agreement is CSSC11-
. tial, and I urge that immediate. steps be
taken by the United States to strengthen
our efforts to reach agreement in IMCO
on these important problems. And to
strengthen our international negotia-
tions, I urge passage of the Magnuson
. bill and swift establishment of its en-
forcement, particularly in those areas?
such as vessel traffic control systems?
? where we are lagging behind other coun-
tries.:
ATR.1,
INCREASED CONGRESSIONAL
- CONTROL OVER CIA
Mr. CASE, Mr. President, much has
been said lately about the efforts of Con-
gress to reassert and redefine its author-
ity in the .field of foreign policy. For
myself, I am scarcely at all interested in
? this as an exercise in congressional self-
-- aggrandizement. I am very much inter-
ested in it as a means of forcing our Gov-
.- eminent to conduct foreign policy in the
open so that the public may know what is
going- on and have the controlling voice
In important decisions.
In a moment I shall mention briefly
several measures I shall soon be propos-
e Ing to allow Congress to exercise in-
creased control over certain Central
Intelligence Agenpy?CIA?and Defense
Department programs.
My purpose is to place some outside
control on what has been the freewheel-
ing operation of the executive branch in
carrying on foreign policy and even wag-
ing foreign wars.
? To be perfectly honest, our system has
gotten out of whack, and it is time to
restore a better balance.
The Constitution does not give the
President authority to declare a secret
war, and I do not accept that there are
any precedents in our history 'which
would penApprioved tEor-Release 2
e V .7 I V.119iiil
Moreover, our recent history in South- issued by several Presidents. I simp y
east Asia shows that .wars approved by question whether a secret intelligence
simply a handful of Presidential advisers organization should be assigned a war-
may well be not only unconstitutional, making role abroad. Certainly this was
but relatively unsuccessful; too. not the intent of Congress when itSTATINTL
originally voted to establish CIA.
. So I come to my three proposals to
limit the Executive's authority to wage
asSecret war. These are not all-inclusive,
but they are an attempt -to get at the
questions of the circumvention of con-
gressional intent and the hiring of mer-
cenaries. The specific proposals are:
First, a bill to extend the limitations
which now apply to. the use by the De-
fense Department of its funds overseas to
all U.S. Government agencies, including
CIA. This would prevent the circumven-
tion of congressional intent in the fund-
ing of activities such as the Thai troops
in Laos through CIA rather than through
more open Government agencies. It -
would also eliminate the possiblity that
the Cooper-Church prohibitions against
the use of American troops or advisers
in Cambodia could -he skirted by using
CIA personnel.
Second, a bill to prohibit the funding
by any U.S. Government agency of mili-
tary operations by any country outside its
borders without specific congressional
authorization. This would eliminate the
confusing trail of Thais in Laos. Cam-
bodians in Laos, and even Thais in Cam- ?
bodia. It would not affect the present
programs for U.S. payments to Koreans,
Thais, and Filipinos in Vietnam, since
Congress has specifically voted money
for these troops. My bill would, how-
ever, require the administration to in-
form the Congress., on a confidential
basis, if necessary, of the details of any ?
argreements with foreign governments to.
finance their military operations abroad.
I would hope this would prevent our Gov-
' ernment ? from offering lavish induce-
ments to foreign governments in return
for the use of -their troops. As you may
remember, it was revealed last year
that the U.S. Government in sonic cases
had been secretly- paying Koreans and
prevented it from being made known to Thais in Vietnam higher levels of corn-
the public. bat. pay than were being paid to Ameri-
Even today, the Government tries to can troops fighting in the same country.
maintain a thick veil of secrecy over TI ? id, b' ll t l .t; g 't
some of its programs in Laos. Every so
tions on the use by the Defense Depart-
often news trickles out in driblets as an ment of surplus military materiel to all
Depart-
energetic newspaperman digs out a story Government agencies. I make this pro-
or a government official leaks out a reve- posal because of reports I have received
lotion. ur-
after they have somehow gotten into the
Hut essentially, we are only told things of the relatively unrestricted use of s
plus materiel by_ CIA. I have no Means
of verifying these reports, but if they are
public realm, despite the $350-odd mil- untrue, my bill would not interfere with
lion in taxpayers' funds which are- be-
any existing Government programs. ?
ing spent annually in Laos, to say noth-
The three proposals I have outlined
ing of the estimated $2 billion annual
cost of U.S. air activity over Laos. would serve to plug some loopholes in
the law. Of course they would by no
Successive administrations- have been
- means close them all. The Executive can
able to carry on the secret war in Laos,
find ways to skirt almost any prohibi-
as they did earlier in Vietnam, by use
t
of that vast billion dollar treasure chest than if it is so inclined. The solution to
which Congress has appropriated, but the problem lies, in the long run, not
in a tighter drafting of the law but in
never controlled, for discretionary Intel-
the acceptance by the Executive of .Con-
ligence and military programs. And the
ge
U.S. Government agency assigned to car-
ress and the public as partners in thconduct of the peoples' vital business.
rying out the administrations' policies
such as the running of the 30,000 man Our country was founded on the prin-
Secret Anny?Arm6e Clandestine?gond ciples of democracy, and the essence of
the funding of Thai troops has usually a democracy is the participation of the
been the CIA. people and their representatives in the
I do not direct criticism against the decisions which affect their very nation-
OONCI5M5taledA4RDR8 090 diliAtROGO6 001100114,4 ? ? -
Like most Americans, I was shocked
by the cynical manipulation of our po-
litical processes revealed in the New York
Times' account of the McNamara study
on the origins of the Vietnam war. I
believe that our country should not go to
War as part of- a carefully plotted sce-
nario which involves secret attacks on
the other side?some apparently with
the aim of provoking retaliation against
us and our allies. This approach has no
place in our open society. ?
I do not want to get into an extended
postmortem on Vietnam,- however. Our
primary task Should not be to engage in
recriminations or assign blame, but to
bring the war to an end. That is why,
last year and earlier this week, I voted
for the Ilatfield-McGovern proposal to
set a definite date for U.S.. withdrawal
from Vietnam.
The Vietnam- war, at least during the
last several years, has been waged essen-
tially in the open. The same cannot be
said for the war in neighboring Laos. A
top American diplomat was quoted re--
cently by the Washington Star saying:
What we are doing here in Laos is totally
inconsistent with our kind of society. We are
fighting a war by covert means and an open
society cannot tolerate that.
I agree with this diplomat's appraisal
and consequently I have done everything
I can to bring the facts on the war in
Laos before the American public.
For example, I stated several weeks
ago that there apparently was an agree-
ment between the U.S. and Thai Gov,
ernments for the financing and support
through CIA of thousands of Thai troops
in Laos. Only when the administration
became aware of my speech did the Sen-
ate receive any kind of explanation of
what was going on. And the explanation
was incomplete and partially inaccurate
despite its secret classification which
NEVIswEEK
2 1 JU1.1 .
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a
". Li1:::: INA t7I Pr..7 f g=i l'. 0: C i.?-i7EN'L Vialthlg the Fulbright- amendment. It
?
----._._.7:--------__._--
was, in fact, simple, enough for Adminis-
? T ho Nui:-So-S.ecre,,; War tration spokesmen. to point out that the
amendment also contained a clause stat-
? ? For good reason, the U.S. military in-
that nothing . in the amendment
volvement in Laos has often been called, lug
should be construed as prohibiting mili-
; the "secret war." Unlike Vietnam, wllere
tar)' actions designed to insure a "safe
, most of the American military role is out
and orderly withdrawal from Southeast
: in the open, the U.S. activities in Laos?
Asia or to aid in the release of Ameri-
', a supposedly neutral country ?have nee -
cans held as prisoners of war"?a loop-
, cssarily been obscured by successive Ad-
bole if ever there was one.
:ministrations. And withequally good
As a whole, the Senate treated Sym-
reason, Congress from time to time has
ington's secret session with a massive
? grown uncomfortable over the lack of
-yawn, and as it rambled on, inure and
elearcut information about Laos--a rest -
more legislators rose and strolled out of
lessness that was manifested once again
the chamber. "I must say that I heard
last week in a rare secret session of the
nothing yesterday that I had not heard /
, Senate Republican leader Hugh v
United States Senate.
The meeting was called by Sen. Stuart before,
Scott reported the day after the three-
Symington, chairman of a subcommittee
and-a-half-hour meeting. "I believe that
on national commitments basing his
what we had was a rather lengthy tem-
charges Tiartly on a report compiled by
pest in our ancient and honorable teapot."
two stibeommittee aides who recently" And Sen. J. \yilliam Fulbright summed
visited Indochina, Symington contended up Symington s performance with the oh-
that the U.S. is spending far more money servation: "It was very disappointing that
in Laos than the $52 million a year voted the Senate as a whole ... [was] not more
by Congress in economic aid and the mterested in it. They are apparently
estimated $90 million allotted for military reluctant to be interested even as to the
assistance. The real figure, claimed the [acts of what is going on in Laos."
y cloves
'
Missouri senator, was Closer to $100 iii-
The whole experience left man
. lion a year, with the differenceg wondering what had happened to the
comin
? from secret Central Intelligence A"e"ct'v "no more Vietnams" movement. The an-
funds not controlled by Congress'. S);-- swer to that question seemed to be that,
mington also pointed out that B-52s are as long as President Nixon continued to
bombing Communist forces in northern wind the war clown visibly by withdraw-
Laos an'C't that the U.S. is supporting Thai Mg U.S. troops from Indochina, few sen-
troops fighting there. The latter program, ators of either the hawkish or dovish per-
the senator charged, was a breach of the suasion were disposed to question what
l
Fulbright amendment to this year's de- -ie did in the invisible" sector of the
fense appropriations bill prohibiting the conflict.use of Congressionally approved mon C)'
for the funding of "mercenaries" in Laos
or Cambodia. "1 have been hoodwinked,"
...?. Symington thundered. "I don't want to
serve as a figurehead, and I don't want
to be in the Senate if we write laws that
are flouted."
Loophole: Unfortunately for the doves,
there was little new in the information
put forth at the session. That the 13-52s1
have been bombing northern Laos has
been common knov71cdge?even to sena-
. torsi-for some time. That the CIA is sup-
porting Thai mercenaries at enormous
cost has also been discovered and redis-
covered. And it was not so easy to estab-
lish thijt- the Nixon Administration was
STATI NTL
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STATINTL
"BtatfaMO_RE
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e a -6 or
lie- said he. has also received
reports that the CIA has rola-
Vin -a g tr-7 77:4),-rs-r 1-1 tively unrestricted use of sur-
U U4/ ' V, Si/ (Lif Li
t., . plus arms in its covert military
operations. ,
g. Only Following Orders
Ori T, 'L-,( Iry 1z, ...
lr 11 do not direct criticism
?- against the CIA," Mr. Case said,
1
' "for it has only been following
CIA ti roYa
Case Seeks o Prevent Secret 'Wars .Founit
S T orders issued by several Presi-
0 , dents. I simply question whether
? By Agency Behind Congress's Back
a secret intelligence organiza-
.
By GENE OISHI
Washington Burcau of , The Sun ..
? ?
Foreign Mercenaries
The House, in fact, also reject-
ed by a 172-to-16 vete an amend-
ment similar to what Senator
Case is proposing. The defeated
amendment would have prevent-
ed the CIA from using Defense
Department funds for conduct-
ing "paramilitary" opertions or
hiring foreign mercenaries to
fight in Vietnam, Cambodia,
Laos and Thailand..
. Washington, June 19?Senator
Clifford P. Case (R., N.J.) an-
nounced today that he. intends to
'Introduce legislation to prevent
the CIA from secretly engaging
in military operations. -
The legislation will be drafted I
as amendments to the foreign
aid authorization bill, which is
expected to reach the Senate I
floor next month. The series of
amendments would:
1. Extend congressional re-
strictions on the use of Defense ,
Department funds overseas to
all government agencies, includ- '
ing the CIA.
Specific Authorization
2. Prohibit any U.S. govern-
ment agency from financing
military operations abroad with-
out specific congreSsional au-
thorization.
3. Extend the existing limita-
tions on the. use by the Defense
Department of surplus arms to
all government agencies.
-Mr. Case said he did not be-
lieve his proposal would com-
pletely cut off the executive
branch's ability to wage secret
wars, but said he was approach-
ing the matter "piecemeal" be-
cause he did not believe Con-
gress was ready to pass more
comprehensive legislation.
- The reluctance of Congress to
assert its full authority was de-
monstrated, he said, by ?the 'de-
feat in both houses earlier this
week of legislation to impose a
deadline for total withdrawal of.
forces from Indochina.
? Representative F. Edward He-
bert (11, La.), chairman of the
House Armed Services Commit-
tee,
opposed the amendment,
saying its enactment would be
"very dangerous to the security
of our country."
Mr. Hebert, as chairman of
the Armed Services Committee,
is one of a handful of congress-
men who have access to infor-
mation pertaining to the CIA.
While all CIA operations are
officially secret, there have
been numerous newspaper re-
ports as well as statements by
congressmen and senators on
the agency's operations in South-
east Asia.
The most publicized activity
of the CIA has been its opera-
tions in Laos, where the agency
reportedly has equipped and
trained a secret army of Meo
tribesme nand now is supporting
Thai mercenaries. to fight there.
Without disclosing. his sources,
Mr. Case also suggested that the
, CIA is financing Cambodian
troops in Laos as well as Thai
troops in Cambodia. ?
STATINTL
tion should be assigned a war-
making role abroad. Certainly.
this was not the intent or Con-
gress when it originally voted to
establish the CIA.
The rationale behind secret
military and paramilitary oper-
ations is that the United States
should have some means of mili-
tarily protecting its interests
abroad, short of engaging in
open warfare.
Mr. Case said that while he
agreed that secret operations
might in certain instances ba.
useful he felt they were incom-
patible with "an open system of
government."
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LOS ? AKELES TIMES
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?
I
-2 0 JUN 1971
d
p 4C B u ge_t_
+.1,27.- The' CIA . budget, esti-
lnated. to, run annually
anywhere from $500 mil-
lion to $1 billion, is hidden
? .ameng the budgets of Va-.
?rio u s departments 'and'
:only key Members of Con-
gress are aware of its mag-,
.11itude. and the purposes
.for which it is intended.
.' :In his speech; Case de-
. ? (...???,3 ..-...,,,, ., .._.., i A elbie l' w 7 ill,l'''t\
o o
111 6:Ai [1 6 IL / . LI .,..! k.t. 1.i V J1.1
?- : :: ?????? .. ....,1, - ..:. - - - -:1-. -... ' ?
Case's Move Pronnte,c1 by i)isc,..losure Spy'
? ?
Agency Is Phiancing 'Operations in Laos.
-;?????'...?-?' .Wi i01-T1,.1 -II. AVT.TMLL
e.
- ? - ., . c
Tim :s Staff Virila ? . ? . -
_
.scribed his proposals as "a
, ? - . ? . ? . .. _ _.. _. .
. .. WA SIIINtITON L--. In ..a. : Both amendments were means of forcing our gov-
move to end ..clandestine' enacted into law last year. ' ernment to conduct fo-
U.S. military involvement The - first, sponsored: .by . reign policy in the open so
In Laos, Sen. Clifford P. Sens. John Sherman Coop- that the public may know
. Case' (fl-N.J.) .p r-o posed or (R - Ky.) and Frank . what is .going on and have
legislation Saturday to bar Church (D-Ida.), prohibits ? the controlling" voice in i
.the 'Central -. Intelligence the use of U.S. ground important decisions." :
Agency from financing combat forces in ?Lao s . or ? . .Tobe -perfectly, frank,"
military operations' in any Cambodia. . .' LT-zef:e_,I .
? Case, continued, "our sys-
: . , .
country without congres- - The second, by Sen. J. tem has -- gotten out of
- o-
. sional -authorization. W iI liam Fulbright (D-
whack and it is time t re-
.
Case's proposal w a s Ark.), prohibits use of store a better balance. .he
prompted by disclosures Pentagon funds " Constitution does not give
to sup-
.
'that the CIA is financing port Vietnamese'or other the President authority to
and supeiwising the use of free-world forces , in ac-. declare a ;secret war arid.I
? between 4,500 and 5,000 tions designed to provide do not accept that there ?
ments of Cambodia and 'history which would per-
'are any precedents flour
That troops against Corn- military support and as-
)
Itinlst forces in Laos.
? r:?-"I do not direct criticism - sistance to the- govern-
:_ :
rnit him now to do so:" ? - -
. , - ...- ? ..
_. i.g?ainst the CIA, for it has Laos. ^ : . ?. :Dovish Comm! t tco?
only been following orders Fulbright contends the ' It .has been disclosed in
- .issued by several Piesi- U.S. financing of Thai recent Weeks ? that the
dents," Case said: -. ' " ? troops in Laos is a N'iota- United States is spending
?-?? "I s I in Ply-. q n .es Lion tion of his amendment. Al- at, least. $350 million an-
whether a secret intelli- ? though the 'State Depart-- nually. in Military and eco-
* pence organization -should rnent reluctantly acknowl- . nomie assistance' to the ?
? be assigned a war-making .edge.d Thai troops are in :royal Laotian ,,,,bernment.
role abroad. Certainly this Laos, it denied any viola- This presumably includes
vas not the intent of Con- .tion of the Pulbright 016. cost of financing the
gross when it originally. amendment on grounds ,That mercenaries. The Ad- .
voted to establish t,h c the . That troop program . ministration acknowledg-
*
CIA.". ? was inherited from the. . es spending only $52 roil-
.Case, who has become an Kennedy Administration. ' lion in Laos and that for
!bore asingy outspoken .With his proPosed ? economic .assistance.
&Ric of U.S. involvement amendments, Case said he . By attaching his amend-.
in Indochina, advanced his hopes to prevent the CIA . ments? to the foreign aid
proposal in a speech be- from claiming exemption *bill, Case 'would put. them
fore the New Jersey Press f r o m? the Fulb right within jurisdiction of the
Assn. at, Spring Lake, N.J. amendment. Since Fut- predominantly dovish Fe-
The text was released bright's amendment ap- reign Relations Commit-
here. ? :plies specifically to De- tee rather than the lia,--
? ? An an interview, Case fense Department appro: kish Senate Armed Servi-
iatd he planned tOOffer.hiS priations Case .proposed .ces Committee, which has
legislation as amendments that the :Fulbright ban be jurisdiction over the' CIA..
to P' the Administration's: broadened to include all Case said, however, that,
.foreign aid bill pending be-: funds and all government he might' offer his propo- ?
fore the Senate I''?ereIgri? agencies -----. including the :" sals as amendments to the
Relations Committee, of. CIA: _ - ? Armed Service - Commit-.
Which Case is a :senioi."-
. ,
rnember. "
.-..i. .
?.-- . NO End Runs ?
My Purpos"e," he said,
to prevent the CIA and
the Defense , . ?
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:around the Cooper-Chtkreh
a n d Fulbright a in e n cl-
STATINTL
TRENTON, N.J.
TIMES
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TIMES?ADVERTISER
S ? 102,422
r. - JUN 2 0 Igri
OII-kI IINIL
By KNIGHT KIPLINGER
'limes Washington Bureau
WASHINGTON ? Sen. Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.) charg-
ed yesterday that .the Nixon administration is conducting
.4 CIA-funded "secret war in Laos," the extent and cost
of which is unknown to Congress and the American public
-
7. The Senator made the charge while announcing plans to
Introduce three bills to "limit the executive's authority to
wage a secret war" overseas without congressional
e. approval.
One bill would extend .to Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) activities similar, requirements of congressional
approval that now exist for Defense Department spending
:overseas.
TheSecond bill, a broader version of the first, would '
:prohibit funding by an U.S. government agency of. the
military operations of a foreign nation- without. congres-
sional approval.
- A third proposed bill would extend to all government ?
.agencies present limitations on the use of surplus mill-.
tary material by. the Defense Department.
:% Case made the announcements in a brief. speech before'
a meeting of the New Jersey Press Association at Spring
lake.
? As. A Preventative
He said he hopes his bills will "prevent our government
From offering lavish inducements to foreign, governments
tfor the use of their troops" as mercenaries.
;In a? speech on the Senate floor May 20, Case said that
the CIA is currently paying for the military operations of
silaout 4,000-6,000 troops from Thailand operating in Laos.
In the same speech, which focused national attention on
:U.S. policy .of funding Asian mercenaries, Case said CIA
'operations in Laos are a "Widening of American involve- ?
Inent in Southeast Asia" and are a violation of the .
.Cooper-Church Ameridment.
oThe briefing, Case said Saturday, s as ncomp
and partially inaccurate, despite its secret classification
which prevented it from, being made known to the.,
public."
He continued, 'Even -today the government tries to
maintain a thick veil of secrecy over some of its
programs in Laos." ?
The senator told the New Jersey Press audience he was
."shocked, by the cynical manipulation of our. political
processes revealed in fhe New York Times account of the _
McNamara study of the origins of the Vietnam War."
He said he believes the United States "should not go to
war as part of a carefully plotted scenario which involves
secret attacks on the other side ? some apparently with
the aim of provoking retaliations _against us and our
allies.
The "secret attacks" to which Case referred were the
August, :1.964, raids on North Vietnamese islands, revealed
by the Pentagon study to have been executed by South ?
Vietnam on the orders of U.S. officials in Saigon,
Tonkin Story
The raids provoked North Vietnamese attacks on a U.S.
ship in the gulf of Tonkin, which were used by. the.,
-.Johnson administration as a rationale for requesting. the
carte blanche powers that Congress extended in the Gulf
of Tonkin resolution. ?
The truthfulness of the government account of the Gulf -
of Tonkin incident has long been disputed, with many
- authorities charging that the second of two alleged North
Vietnamese attacks never occured, but was later fabri-
cated.
-Case and 97 Senate colleagues, including all the major.
opponents of the war policy in subsequent years, voted
for the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. The .only two negative
votes were cast by Sen. .Wayne Morse (D-Oregon) and.
Sen. Ernest Gruening (D.-Alaska), who were later defeat-
ed in reelection bids.
? '
:The. Cooper-Church legislation prohibits .U.S. payment.
for the use of mercenaries in Laos or Cambodia, except
:to protect ;U.S. troops as they withdraw or to aid in the
;release of American POWs.
.The senator has charged that covert CIA funding has
Fenabled the adininistration to circumvent Congress' de--
? -1
!trees -against broadening the war. ? . ? .1
rCase estimated that nearly $2.5 billion of U.S. money is I
,being spent annually in ground and air operations ill;
Secret Briefing .
. Soon after Case's May speech, the Nixon administration-
isent officials up to Capitol for an unusual- closed-door"
;:briefing of the entire Senate on the subject of operations
Laos.
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STAT I NT L
SHINC T0'41 POST
080-01601R0006
f,/ ? ? -!1.-
14 1 as e ?? di
_
? ? By Bernard D. Nossiter ? j ? tee in February 1968. Chairman FuThright asked
WashiNgton Post Staff Wiiter . News /A CilyS I g
. The Commitlee was cx- Wheeler whether in the pe?
e A eernParison of the John. :feirCeg-IdEet?witlraggreSSIVe 'ploring the on of the Hod around July 1964 the ,
;son administration's public , attack . . . " .1'011.kin Gulf Resolution, the military had recommended
remarks with the material Thus, the last two pare.- :authority :on which the extending the war to the
, graphs, although still avoid- Johnson regime relied to en- !north by bombing or other :
that has - been published : log the full truth, soften the ; large the war. Sen. William
'means.
.1rem the Pentagon's private impact of the first and pat- ' Fulbright (D-Ark.), the.. Gen. Wheeler replied:
.1 study of the Vietnam war entleefalsearagraPh. chairman, was attempting to "I don't believe so, Mr. !
. 0 Chairman. I think that the
discloses a public record in late November ' discover whether the admin- ;
? istration had decided well in ? proper answer would be ?
marked by half-truths, care- 1964 the Am inistration's - ton ? ?
z advance .of the August inci-
t
Most circle,' ' according to dents in the Tonkin Gulf to telllalt therei g e ilc ea evtrievri were ecse(rdtealine t ell-
Jul ambiguities, and mislead- .
:
lug and reients rather than flatfooted deceptive state- published material, agreed ask Congress for a broad I but to the best of my knowl-
' - ? - .
i. "ined ac? grant of authority The diae edge and belief during that
i.untruths. to adopt a determ
' gue went like this: period there was no thought
What appears at first .' tion Program" aimed at put- lo
The Chairman: Mr. Secre- of extending the war into
:glance to be the grossest ting preSsure on Hanoi end tary did you see the contin- the North in the sense of
misstatement in public ire-
raising South Vietnamese gency draft of what became our participation in such ac- !
?
quently turns out, on close ?
'examination, to contain a lions, activities."
morale. A draft position the Southeast Asle. resolu- ?
paper of Nov. 2,
q Chnts a . tion befere it was ready? : Then, for the record, the i
phrase or word that saves it Secretary McNamara: ,Mr. Pentagon supplied an inser- .
from the label "lie." tworphaSe bombing program ? ? I es. 1 .
.1 Chairman, ? 1 Lac in the
1965, according to the pub- tion:
For example, on April 1, as a key element in this newspaper a few weeks ago "We have identified no
, plan?possible r e p r i s a 1 there had been such a con- such recommendation. A
[
lished documents, President . ..
treee, against North Viet. ting,ency . draft. I don't be- check of the records of the '
f Johnson secretly made a - ' " ' ? lieve I ever saw it .. , But I Joint Chiefs of Staff is con-
'fateful decision, ordering the.: nein and A U.S. readiness to
can't testify absolutely that Waling." .
' 3,500 Marines in Vietnam to conduct sustained bombing ?I didn't. My memory is not
shift from a static defense of against the North. . clear On that. ?
the base at Danang to offen- At a press conference on -;
sive actions. This was the be- -
ginning of an offensive coin- Nov.. 28, a prescient reporter
Ni
at role for U.S. ground asked the President: EX.Centie
.: troops. ' "Is expansion of the Viet-
Committee ? top brass sent McNamara a
The fir Commist public hint of nam war into Laos or North e
lengthy memo saying:
, this change came on June 8 Vietnam a live possibility at
'when a State Department this point?" ' - 'In fact, the Executive "Accordingly, the Joint
spokesman said that "Ameri- Mr. Johnson, in a lengthy Committee of the National
. ' Chiefs of Staff consider that
? - ' ? - . Security Council ? which
:Can forces 'would be availa- reply, allowed that his top
? the United States must
ble for combat support." advisers were then meeting, - included McNamara ? had
The next day, the White but in the operative part of
:decided after its meetings make ready to conduct In-
House put out a statement his response said: .
:on May 24 and 25, 1964 to creasingly bolder actions in
Assertin .seek a Congressional resolu- : Southeast Asia to: .
: g:
"I anticipate that there
' will be no dramatic an- tion authorizing "all meas- '.?. . . . h. Conduct aerial
"There has been no ' , .- ures" to assist South Viet- -
nouncement (emphasis add- bombing of key North Viet-
bat
'change in the mission of ? nam. Thus, 11,1cNamara and
Cd) to come out of these nam targets, . using U.S. re- ;
United States ground com? . the others had approved a
meetings except in the form
bat units in 'Vietnam in re- ' - draft of the Tonkin Gulf res- sources under. Vietnamese
of your speculation." :-
cent' days or -weeks. The
President has issued no This was literally true but olution nearly ten weeks be- i cover, and with the Viet- '-'
'
fore the attack on the Amer-
, nameSe openly assuming '
substantively misleading. No
order of any kind in this re- ,. ? jean destroyers in those wa- -
. sponsibility for the actions
re-
dramatic announcement was
In fact, published records
? show, as early as Jan. 22,
1964 ? six months before"
the period about which Ful-
' bright, was inquiring ? the
gard to Gen.
recently or 'at any other made but the meetings all
-time.".. but sealed the dramatic dc.
This appear mi
s to be the lie ' ? en to launch the two-
direct. But the statement ?has? bombing program
1' that began in February.
'continued: l
'The primary miesion of y madeAdministration leaders saw the draft and it is con-
;?.
:these troop Is to secure and rare outrieht mis- ceivable that he approved
safeguard important .mill- statements about the crucial the substance without read-
events in the 20 months up lag all the language. Moreo-
'tary Installations like the to July 1965 when, as the al- - ver, he tells the committee
? airbase at Danang. They ready published Pentagon that his memory isn't .clear
'have the associate.d., mission documents say, the United , on the crucial point and he
of activelY patrolling and se- States entered into an open- won't "absolutely" deny hay-
curing action in and near ended commitment and an ing seen it.
'the areas thus safeguarded." Asian land war. At the same hearing, Gen.
. "If help is requested by Perhaps Defense Secre-: 'Earle Wheeler, chairman ot
appropriate Vietnamese'tr Pobert McNamara the Jount 'Chiefs of Staff,
commanders, Gen. West-
moreland also has authority
Within the assAPPrOliellbF
to employ these troops in
support of Vietnamese
ters. -
Even here, McNamara's
choice of words to the Sen-
ate Committee is artful. He
says he didn't believe he
"j. Commit U.S. forces as !
necessary in direct actions
against North Vietnam ...". t
Wheeler was stretching
the truth to say the Chiefs
harbored "no thought" of
extending the war North.
On the other hand, he could
argue that a proposal "to '
make ready" northward ac-
tions is less than a recom-
mendation and that he .1
equates "thought" with an .
: unqualified proposal.
The gap between public !
came as close as any to corn- skirted perilously close to ,oratory and private belief is
't?alsification in his tes- untruth. ? Whether he, strikingly illustrated by Mr.
rt Pylsifib2a001/05/15nntelAaRlanatal 601 R013615010171101(20's State of the Union
Foreign Relations, Commit- higher semantics, - J a rcss on Jan. 4, 1965..
STAT I NT L
FAR EASTEM ECONOMIC REVIEW
Y
Approved F.9r Release 2000/05AR :kblik-Ri5IT60-01601,R0006
Chop of bile
BY ARNOLD ABRAMS
Vientiane: The thaw in Sinn-American
relations has not halted .US-directed
;intelligence operations which penetrate
ideep into Chinese territory. These
operations, whicli have been conducted
for years by the CIA (Central Int elli-
'sena Agency), involve the sending of
reconnaissance team& from northern
Laos as far as several hundied miles into
southern China's ?Yunnan province.
Team members are native hill tribesmen
:whose ethnic stock ? Meo ? is pre-
valent in southernShina.
? ? The tribesmen have been recruited,
equipped and trained by the CIA to in-
filtrate Chinese territory and obtain in.
formation on troop movements, politi-
-eeeeeee
turalavo..4
. -- ? - ? ?
-Chinre,e authorities have known for
some- time about. the mise,ions; several
teams have been captured in recent ;
, years.
Curt sequently, Michelin Officials
reason that Peking will continue to
tolerate such territorial incursions as
long as they are conducted solely for
intelligence-gathering purposes and do
not pose a. direct security threat. US
authorities also believe that, if the
Chinese want an excuse to reverse the
friendly trend, they can do better than
- simply focus on these operations.
"Americans are still fighting in Viet-
nam, they have a military presence on
Taiwan, and they are standing by their
'Peaty commitments to Chiang Kai-
Ade:: obsefves one source close to the
US einbassy here. "If the Chinese are
looking for something-to whip them
witheany one of those three will do."
In Laos, American officials' mejor
security concern about the Chinese
stems from a Peking road-building pro:
pet in the north. An estimated 14,000
Chinese personnel, including several
thousand soldiers standing guard and
manning ar4i-aircraft batteries, are con-
structing a route leading toward the
Thai border.
Thai authorities repeatedly have ex-
pressed deep concern about the road's
potent la as a supply Jim for commu-
nist-led guerilla forces in northern Thai-
land. American officials privately voice
. similar concern. While coneeding that
Chinese forces in Laos have not shown
g ? hostility, they insist the construction
project must be kept under closest
a ? scrutiny.
The Peking project originally was re-
quested by the tripartite government,
established in Laos with the signing of
the 1962 Geneva Accord, which col-
lapsed in 1963.
Ironically, while Amer-jean officials
fret about Chinese intentions in Laos,
Peking's new diplomacy has prompted a
positive reaction from the leader of this
nation's neutralist government. In a
recent interview, Prime Minister Souvan-
na Phounia stressed China's historically
non-aggressive attitude toward Laos'.
The 70-year-old prince noted that the
.unhappy history of this landlocked
kingdom is replete with tales of invasion
by neighbouring Thais, Cambodians,
. Burmese and Vietnamese ? but not by.
Souvanna Phouma:, Strussing China's non-
? aggrossh/17 ottitu.do towards Laos.
cal developments and other pertinent
security data. American embassy offi-
dals in Vientiane refuse to discuss these
? Opera lions, but qualified eouices report
fliat the officials believe local security
needs and the intellieence value of such
?operations justify their continuation.
American authorities largely discount
:any potential threat these operations
:pose to slowly improving relations be-
tween 1Vashington and Peking. They be-
.lieve this !bleat is small because the
:operations are not commando reids or
possible Sin -American r pproc
would restrain further North Vietnam-.
CSC aggression in Laos.
Altlionep otivanna Phuuma is still
said to harbour private fears about
Peking's fonerange designs on this
region, his current public stance marks a
depaiture limn the position he assumed
earlier this year, prior to the US-sup-
- ported South Vietnamese invasion of his
country. Then, he warned that the allied
move might prompt open intervention
by Peking in the Indochina war. Now,
his tune is different. Like everyone else, -
he can only guess about the intentions
of China's leaders.
FacAtil rioweving
BY A CORRESPONDENT
Vientiane: Asia's latest opium war Is
hotting up. East of the Annamite moun-
tains, the US military is reported to be
reeling:linder the effects of heroin, and
in Saigon US leaders have been pressing
the government into a series of emer-
gency measures to stop the flow of sup-
plies ? including a mass:transfer of cus-
toms agents from Ton Scin Nitta airport,
the centre of large scale trafficking, and
sweeps through the city to arrest sus-
pected peddlers.
A widely publicised amnesty-cure
programme has been offered addicted
soldiers. All chemists and known ped-
dling centres have been placed "off
limits" and medical tests instituted to
detect addicts among homeward bound
troops.
But these measures are preliminary
iskirmishes in the great \var. The pro-
' blem of stamping out or otherwise con-
trolling opium can ()illy be solved by an
international campaign of which Laos is
already feeling the impact. An American
narcotics investigator is in Vientiane
tracing the legend that heroin is pro-
duced in Laos and seeking information
to map out strategy in the war against
Opiates. Early this month Laotian !Ia..;
timed police were pressured into a gen-
eral round-up of Vientiane's opium den
Operators, must of whom have a licence
front the Laotian eovernment. More
than 120 operators were held for ques-
tioning.
But Laotians find it difficult to take
seriously a campaign which conflicts
with local customs, tolerances and eco-
sabotar effort and Amelareeedo not wilily. The opium den operators were
oarovea Q Kelease 4134p1 s4' li`ii:1660600170001-0
paeticinate direay tnem..eforeover, - tat una s' a i e, coup el wit a
_ _ - coctinued
....1111 11
STATINTL
Release 2000/ 0170
. June. , CONGRESS]: NAL ,RECORD -- HOUSE
\..--.AMENDMF.NT OrFERED BY MR.
M BATALLO -
.. - r. BADILLO. Mr. Chairman, I offer
an amendment.
?-? . The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. BADILLO: Page
. ? .. 7, line 4, before the quotation marks alsert
the following new sentence: "Nothing in
clause (A) or (B) of the first sentence of
? this paragraph or in the immediately pre-
ceding sentence shall be construed to au-
thorize the use of any of such funds by the
Central Intelligence Agency (or by any
._ agency or person operating on behalf of
' the Central Intelligence Agency) to engage,
- in any manner or to any extent, in the or-
ganization, supervision, or conduct of any
?. military or paramilitary operation of any
? kind in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, or Thai-
-? land (Including any operation of the kind
' commonly called 'guerilla warfare' opera-
, ? ? tion) which?will be executed by forces com-
posed in whole or in part of (i) mercenaries,
. (ii) regular or irregular personnel of any
- ,-? armed force of any foreign nation. or area,
.. or (ill) personnel other than those listed in
clause (I) or (Ii) who are under arms and
_ -are indigenous to any foreign country or
i rea."
'
Mr. BADILLO. Mr. Chairman, this is a
? very specific amendment limiting the
- ? . activities of the Central Intelligence
Agency to the gathering of intelligence,
and specifically prohibiting the Central
Intelligence Agency from conducting
guerrilla operations in Southeast Asia.
. The necessity for the -amendment arises
- because the enabling act which created
- the Central Intelligence Agency pro-
vides that the CIA may perform "such
other functions and ,duties related to in-
telligence and affecting national security
as the National Security Council may
from time to time direct."
There has been clear evidence from
news accounts over the years, which I
am sure all of you have read, that the
Central Intelligence Agency is conduct-
ing guerrilla operations in Laos and
Cambodia. This last week, as you know,
the Senate had a secret session involv-
ing our activities in Laos and Senator
- _SYMINGTON in the CONGRESSIONAL Rae-
Cal) indicated as follows:
In the case of Laos one is unable to cite
a figure for the total cost of this war to the
United States. First, because what the United
' States is doing, and the cost of what we
are doing, continues to be cloaked with of-
? ficial - secrecy by the executive branch.
- Second, one cannot cite a figure for the
total cost to us of the war in Laos because,
it must -be said in all frankness, neither
: you, nor I, nor any Other Member of Con-
gress is in position to know what those
costs actually are. ?
Yesterday, my colleague the gentle-
man from California (Mr. WALDIE),
questioned the chairman of the commit-
tee as to whether this bill specifically
-.included funds for the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, and the chairman an-
e ? swered that it does. The chairman also
refused to say what the amounts were.
. and said that only he and the ranking
. -minority member of the committee knew.
? The gentleman from California Mr.
WALDIE) also asked the charmain as fol-
lows:
What is the purpose of the CIA activity
in Laos?
The chairman answered as follows:
. Mr. HEBERT. The activity of the CIA in
East and everywhere is the gathering of In-
telligence for the protection and security of
the United States.
- If that is the understanding Of the
activities of the CIA by the chairman,
then he should be in aupport, of this
amendment, because all I am saying is
that that should be precisely the activity
of the Central Intelligence Agency, to
gather information, and not to engage
In guerrilla activities. But because we
do not know exactly what funds are
available either in this body or in the
Senate, and we do not know exactly to
what purpose they are being put, this
amendment is prepared so that we can
be sure that the activities are limited.
I seek only to insure that the activities
of the Central Intelligence Agency be
limited to those specified in the law,
and that is to the gathering of intelli-
gence. Certainly after the recent disclos-
ures it becomes all the more important
that we insure that the agencies of the
executive department comply with the
mandates of the Congres.s.. ?
Even before the New York Times pub-
lished parts of the Pentagon study of. our
involvement in the Vietnam war, it had
become apparent that the CIA had liter-
ally been running the entire military op-
eration in Laos, including the hiring,
training, and leading of a mercenary
army of Thais and Meo tribesmen and
the tactical control of an air war which
has made the Laotian people refugees in
their own land. ?. , .
As early as 196,1, the CIA recruited
Thai pilots to fly planes with markings
of the Royal Laotian Government
against Communist forces hi Laos and
there is evidence these Thai pilots are
still flying missions in Laos, under CIA
control and supervision. Reliable esti-
mates given recently to the Senate indi-
cate that the CIA currently is -paying
about 5,000 Thais to fight in Laos.
Enactment of this amendment is neC-
cessary if Congress is to regain some
measure of meaningful control and over
sight in the field of foreign affairs. Re-
gardless of how individual Members
might feel about the recent articles in
the New York Times, it is clear that the
nature and extent of our involvement in
Southeast Asia has repeatedly been hid-
den from and misrepresented to the
American people and their elected Re-
presentatives. I strongly suspect that the
pattern of subterfuge and outright mis-
representation continues. This amend-
ment represents a step toward squaring
with the American people. I urge its
adoption.
- Mr. LEGGETT, Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield for a question?
Mr. BADILLO. I yield to the gentleman
from Calif ornia.
Mr. LEGGETT. Would the amendment
preclude the CIA from supporting such
things as have been reported in national
magazines, such as the pay for person-
nel in the Saigon Police Force, which
police force is being used, of course, for
campaign purposes to support the Thieu
government in Southeast Asia?
Mr. BADILLO. Yes it would, because
it would seek to limit the Central Intel-
ligence Agency to the gathering of Intel-
61/AIINIL
by the Congress. Specifically it exclude:3.MM,
the support of activities commonly called
guerrilla warfare, support of Merce-
naries; support of regular or irregular
personnel of any armed forces of any
foreign nation or area within Southeast
Asia.
Mr. CO-NYE,RS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield? -
Mr. BADILLO. I yield to the gentleman
from Michigan.
Mr. CONYERS. I want to commend the
precision with which the gentleman has
formulated this amendment.. I believe it
is an exceedingly, important one. I ap-
plaud his courage and support him.
Mr. BADILLO. I thank the gentleman
very much.
(Mr. BADILLO asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in
opposition to the amendment.
The gentleman's amendment seeks to
place a restriction upon the use of any
funds authorized in this proposed act for
military or paramilitary operations in
Southeast Asia organized or supervised
by the Central Intelligence Agency.
ThraeCentral Intelligence Agency was
established by the National Security Act.
It functions under the National Security
Council under the President of the Unit-
ed States. It initiates no activities of
its own without direction from the Presi-
dent and/or the National Security Coun-
cil.
I do not propose to debate on the floor
of the I-louse the activities or functions
of the Central Intelligence Agency. I
will state categorically that the intelli-
gence activities conducted by our Gov-
ernment are essential to the security of
this Nation.
The amendment offered by the gentle-
man from New York, as I read it, seeks
to prohibit the Central Intelligence
Agency from organizing, supervising, or
conducting any so-called military or
paramilitary operation of any kind in
Southeast Asia which would be executed
by mercenaries, regular or irregular per-
sonnel of any armed force of any foreign
nation or area, or any other personnel of
a foreign nation. I will not go into the
ramifications of such a restriction should.
it-be enacted. I will merely tell the House
-that in my opinion, as well meaning as
this amendment may be, it is very dan-
gerous to the security of our country.
Secrecy is one of the prices we must pay
for survival. Today, there seems to be a
penchant for exposing Government
secrets which wittingly or unwittingly
give aid and comfort to the enemy.
The amendment offered by the gentle-
man from -New York would seriously
restrict our intelligence activities in
Southeast- Asia and would certainly most
seriously affect, and perhaps even pre- -
vent, the further withdrawal of U.S.
troops from Vietnam.
I am not going to expand upon my
statement any further.
I urge the House to overwhelmingly
defeat this a,mendment.
Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Chairman, I move to
strike the requisite number of words. .
(Mr. WALDIE asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his I'd-
all sections of' ?the world in Laos, the Middle loPonce gladdv itkeigigeras 26s filkijitiag diat
Approved For Release 200 7 5/1 : A- - 1 0 0 1-0
STAll
-
,
S 9320 Approved FOr-Re ea
In the end, millions of Americans go with-
out adequate medical care. They cannot af-
ford it. The' are afraid it will break them.
Or they cannot find a doctor. Sonic of them
die. Others are left destitute_ And most
of them fall victim to needless pain and need-
less suffering. They are your parents or
mine?your children or mine?our friends
and our fellow citizens.
The disaster we call medical services makes
most Americans forgotten Americans. It be-
trays each of them and all of us. Our system
of medical care is in fact a system of medi-
cal neglect. It is in the deepest sense un-
American.
? Despite our power and our strength, de-
spite our trillion dollar G.N.P., we have let
young people die before their time and old
people die when there was some precious
time left. How will history judge us, a coun-
try which was first in the wealth of its re-
sources, but far from first in the health of
its people? And more importantly, how will
we judge ourselves in those quiet, inner mo-
ments, when we remember that what finally
counts is not how much we have, but what
we are?
It is time for us to do more until we have
done enough to sustain and enhance the
health of our nation.
Countless medical students and some doc-
tors have already answered the call to a new
kind of service, In the early 1990s, student
health organizations from Los Angeles to
Boston pioneered concepts for comprehen-
sive health care. In the summer of 1967, stu-
dents like you joined together in New York
City to found the student health project of
the South Bronx. Their historic initiative
was a sign of a new generation's determina-
tion to make medicine work for people.
'But the young and the concerned in the
the medical profession cannot do the whole
job alone. Your voice-s have been heard?and
sometimes even heeded. But your own efforts
will take too long. And the results will be
too uncertain. The only certainty is that en-
trenched and established forces will oppose
you every step of the way. We cannot wait
or gamble on the outcome. Human life and
human health hang in the balance.
Four decades after organized medicine al-
most adopted a report favoring uniform fi-
nancing for medical services?four decades
and a hundred million illnesses too late?
we must enact a medical bill of rights for
all Americans. The Constitution commits our
country to .protect political freedom. Now,
by legislation, the Congress must commit
America to protect the physical health which
alone makes possible the exercise of liberty.
The first medical right of all Americans is
care within their means. Admission to a hos-
pital or a doctor's office should depend on
the state of an individual's health, not the
size of his wallet. And we cannot depend on
reform on half-way measures and half-
hearted compromise. A right to medical care
.which left the burden of cost on the poor
and the near poor would mock its own pur-
pose. The only sure security is federally
funded universal health insurance. That Is
our best hope for the future?and a pri-
ority' goal in 1971.
We must take the dollar sign out of medi-
cal care. We must destroy the financial bar-
rier between deprived 'people and essential
medical services. We must end the terrible
choice so many Americans face between los-
ing their health and losing their savings.
The second medical right of all Americans
Is care within their reach. Even if we guar-
anteed the payment of health costs, millions
of our citizens could not find sufficient medi-
cal services. The system is not only inequit-
able?it is also undermanned and inefficient.
It is on the verge of collapse. The Nation must
now respond with Federal financial incen-
tives that will Insure real reform.
?
There are not enough doctors. I3u.t Federal
Incentives can persuade medical schools to
follow Einstein's lead and expand their en-
rollment. New schools can be created and
sustained by Federal loans and grants. And
Federal funds must also be provided to help
medical students who should have something
better than money to worry about. A pro-
gram of scholarship aid must include all who
are in need?and it must encourage minority
students who intend to return to the old
neighborhoods. -
Yet the number of doctors is not the
whole answer. If we produce 50,000 additional
physicians and plug them Into the current
structure, our efforts for reform will certainly
'fail. Some of the health manpower legislation
now before the Congress would do just that--
and the result would be too many more doc-
tors serving too few people at too high a cost.
Here, too, Congress must set up financial
incentives that can move medicine in a new
direction. We must encourage a shift from a
system dependent on the individual doctor
to a system built around the concept of the
health team, composed of primary care phy-
sicians and other medical professionals.
Teams would allow us to allocate medical re-
sources with maximum efficiency and to
maximum effect. They would employ para-
professionals to relieve nurses and doctors
from routine, time-consuming tasks. They
would gather together diverse skills?from
internists to pediatricians?and patients
would deal with the team, not just a single
physician. Einstein has experimented with
the health team concept. The Federal Gov-
ernment must make Einstein's experiment
national policy.
And health teams must be sufficient in dis-
tribution as well as in number. Federal.
bonuses must make it worthwhile to prac-
tice in the inner city and in rural America.
Medical care cannot reach people unless peo-
ple can reach doctors. And people must have
more than geographic reach. A health team
should also be subject to the reach of loca
influence.
Location incentives for health service
must be designed to create responsive, per-
sonal structures'. It was never right?and
it is no longer possible?to satisfy Americans
with distant, impersonal medical care. The
system must respect everyone's identity?:
and sacriffice no one's dignity. And we must
always remember that it is easier for a
patient to reach a health team that he -
knows?than a shining new medical center
walled off from surrounding rural poverty or
a nearby urban ghetto.
The third medical right of all Americans
is care with,in their needs. The present
health insurance system is heavily biased
toward high-cost hospital treatment and
against preventive health care. That is in-
credibly expensive--amid incredibly insensi-
tive to the real needs of people. It has filled
hospitals with patients who should not be
there and would be better off elsewhere. A
new national health program must reverse
the old priorities. It must guarantee a ranee
of medical services, comprehensive in scope,
preventive in emphasis, and restricted_ only
by the scope of scientific knowledge.
America's concern_ over the quality of
health care has reached a high water mark
in 1971. You are graduating from medical
school at a time when the whole medical
profession may be profoundly altered. You
should welcome change?and work for
change. Only in the context of a medical bill
of rights for every American, can each of you
truly and in the most literal sense profess
your profession--which is nothing more and
nothing less than the protection of human
life.
And that requires not just a medical bill
of rights, but a social bill Of rights. The real
cure for lead poisoning is not hospital care,
but decent housing. The most effective treat-
ment for malnutrition is adequate food.
And the besf guarantee of good health is a
physically and emotionally health environ-
ment.
As health professionals, you must commit -
yourselves to total health care. And total '
care Includes virtually everything that de-STATINTI
termines whether we are sick or well. You
cannot confine -yourselves to the technical
skills you have learned here. You must also
practice the fundamental human concern of
a school like Einstein.
You must speak out for a fair arid sensible -
medical care system.
You must stand up for social progress and
for people--whether they are your patients
or migrant workers two thousand miles away.
You can cure individuals--and you must
help America build a compassionate society.
It will take time. There will be setbacks
ad frustrations and defeats. But men and
women who come from Einstein have good
reason to believe that we can finally fashion
a country that is great enough to be good. --
You have seen in your own lives what a dif-
ference one school can make. Now all of you
have a chance to make a real difference in -
the lives of others.
The practice you choose and the practices
you follow may not change our country over-
night. But you can remind' us by example of
Aristotle's ancient truth: "Health of mind
and body is so fundamental to the good life
that if we believe men have any personal
rights at all as 'human beings, they have an
absolute moral right to the measure of good
health that society is able to give them."
That is our challenge and our chance. Two
thousand years after Aristotle wrote, we must
secure a medical bill of rights for our own
people. We can wait no longer--in health care
or in society. In our individual lives and in
our national life, whatever we can do, and
whatever we dream we can do, we must begin
now.
THE CIA FIGHTS ILLEGAL DRUG
TRAFFIC
Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, earlier
this year I had the pleasure of addressing
an ROTC group who was in the audience,
questioned me in regard to certain 'alle-
gations made in Ramparts magazine that
the Central Intelligence Agency encour-
aged the opium traffickers of Indochina.
I doubt that such allegations have been
given credence by many Americans, but
apparently Mr. Ginsberg either believed
them to be true, or chose to pretend that
he believed them. But because I do not
take such serious charges against our
Government lightly, and believe that
none of us should allow unjust criticism
of our Government to stand -
lenged, I recently asked the Bureau of ?
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to set
the record straight on these accusations. -
Bureau Director John Ingersoll replied'
this week, -and his remarks are timely in
view of the major initiatives President
Nixon is expected to announce today to
help deal with the illegal -drug problem.
Mr. President, Mr. Ingersoll has re-
ported to me that the CIA is his Bureau's
strongest ally in identifying foreign
sources and routes of illegal trade in
narcotics. I ask unanimous consent that
his letter of June 15 be printed, in the
RECOltD, followed by a report on recent
trends in the illicit narcotics market in
Southeast Asia, and my telegram of
May 11 which was printed in the final
spring semester edition of the University
of "Wyoming student newspaper, the
Branding Iron. . _
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Mr.
\T XE. Can the gentleman tell
me in what portion of the bill those funds
are contained? ?
. Mr. IIEDERT. No, I cannot tell the
,
. gentlemen that.
Mr. WALD-LE. Is it available so that a
Member of this House of Representa-
tives can go to the committee and ex-
amine the classified. documents involving
? the amount of money available for the
Central Intelligence Agency in tins bill?
Mr. HEBERT. No, sir, it is not. The
chairman takes the full responsibility
of not discussing the matter further.
Mr. WALDIE. So whatever those sums
are and, to whatever purpose they will
be put, that is' only known to the chair-.
'man of the committee?
: .
Mr. IIfilBERT. It is known to the chair-
man. and the ranking minority member
of the committee. This is a policy which
_ has prevailed throughout the years in all
administrations.
Mr. WALDIE. *S.'es. Mr. Chairman, I
think I understand the policy that no
other member of the committee knows
that information: . . -
. Mr. 1-T11113EilT. That is correct..
Mr. WALDIE. May I ask this question?
In title IV there is a prohibition against
using any of the moneys appropriated in
this bill for the payment of free world .
' forces serving in Laos. Are there any
funds being appropriated by this bill for
the payment of any forces in Laos?
_ Mr. IIft',ERT. No, there is not any
? provision for the payment of those forces.
The only moneys that are involved in
this bill are those providing for the in-
telligence -agencies of this country.
, May I make a further correction, I do
not want to mislead anybody by saying
that the chairman and the ranking
Minority member know about these
funds and only them, because the entire
committee is briefed by the CIA on its
functions. So I do not want to have that
misconception carried away that the
Members of the committee do not know
of the activities of the CIA and of the
other intelligence agencies, this we do
know. This year, for the first time in the
history of the committee, at the chair-
? man's request, the CIA was invited to
7 appear before the entire committee. Its
- . director, Mr. Helms, appeared and sub-
jected himself to all kinds of questions
. and all the questions were answered by
the director, Mr. Helms. ?
Mr. WALDIE. May I ask the chairman
.
one final question? .
What is the purpose of the CIA activity
111Laos? .
. .
? Mr. Ilki:IERT. The activity of the CIA
In all sections of the world, in Laos, the
. Middle East and everywhere is the
- gathering of intelligence for the pro-
tection and security of the United
States.
Mr. WALDIE. I thank the gentleman.
. Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I yield to
the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. (Hon-
CATE).
,(Mr. HUNG= asked and was given
. . permission to revise and extend his re-; that in essence my construction would
Marks.) . be meaningless and then it came out
? Mr. HUNGATE. Mr. Chairman, we will for it. - ?
.
- seen be called upon to vote on the Nodal-
Whalen amenAwi.osidanftovcritaai-e
Apprillill.2000/05/15 : C
STAT I NT L ?CONG111SSIONAL
sion of the McGovern-Hatfield amend-
ment. Since I fear there may have 1..;e2-11
a considerable amount of high-paessure,
oversimplific.ation of this .problem,
I believe the following editorial in the
Washington Post is illuminating:
coNssass VOMS ON THE WAR
The McGovern-Hattleld and Nedzi-Whalen
amendments, v.-hich are to be voted on today
in the Senate and House respectively, would
not "end the war" or automatically retrieve
the American POW's or guarantee the safe
exit of American forces or, least of all, as-
sure a Vietnamese reconciliation. Any such
claim promises more than either amendment
can deliver and invites further frustration
and disillusionment. Not only does fulfil-
ment of claims like these lie to a great extent
In other than American hands. But the Amer-
ican system of Government gives the Presi-
dent broad authority to conduct a war. It is
Idle to pee tent while the fighting goes on that
Congress can remove that authority; in fact,
McGovern-Hatfield explicitly concedes the
point.
So it is misleading the public to talk of
these proposed congressional ? restraints' in
terms of a "date certain" for our withdrawal,
however comforting and convenient that
piece of shorthand may be to supporters of
both measures; Vietnam has given us enough
deceptive shorthand, and also enough easy?
and offensive?sales pitches--
-
My colleagues, as you-are well aware, I
voted in favor of fixing December 31,
1971, as the date for withdrawal of all
U.S. troops from Southeast Asia. I have
voted three times this year to end the
draft on June 30, 1971, in the belief that
if wars in Southeast Asia can be fought
with volunteers, they Will prove they have
the popular support of the American peo-
ple. If they cannot, and I would assume
this one cannot be fought with volun-
teers since 80 percent of combat troops
are draftees, then the President could
come to Congress and ask us for troops
a-nd prove his justification for the request.
Then we could restore to Congress a
meaningful voice in foreign-policy.
? However, since a majority of this Con-
gress sees fit to draft our young men and
ship them halfway around the world to
fight 10,000 miles from home, I find it
diflicult to vote against funds to provide
them with supplies, equipment, arms and
ammunition they need to defend them-
selves and our country's position, even
though we might not have selected their
mission in Southeast Asia. As one who
served in the combat infantry in Werld
War II, would consider it irresponsible
to send a draftee into a combat zone
Without providing him with all the sup-
port those fortunate enough to stay at
home can provide.
' Therefore Mr. Chairman, I must op-
pose the Nedai-Whalen amendment. -
Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
, Mr. IITINGATE. I yield to the gentle-
man.
Mr. NEDZI. Did the Washington Post
editorial recommend voting for or
against?
Mr. MENIGATE. The Washington
Post wrote these very skillful lines, I
thought, with which I sgree and found
I think it is very much like the story
7, 2. ? ,. i __
imamm.
the House and spea riang P:",)011' mill- ?
ales, and another Member said I heard -25X1 A
you speak and I cannot tell where you
stand. Can you tell me whether you are
for or against it? The guy speaking said--
I watched the gentleman when he came In
this House and raised his hand and took tile
oath to become a Member and I said, "There
is a man, and no ' matter how long he IS
hare, he will never know what's going on."
Mr. GUBSEIZ. Mr. Chairman; will the
gentleman yield? ?
Mr. HUNGATE. I yield tot-lie gentle-
.
m an. ?
Mr. GUBSER. Would you not summa-
rize the Washington Post editorial this
way?that they gave all the reasons for
voting against Nedzi-Whalen Ill order to
justify their point that you ought to
vote for it.?
Mr. HUNGATE. The gentleman's point
seems accurate to me.
Mr. WHALV.N. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. HUNGATE. I.yield td the gentle-
man.
Mr. WHALEN. I would just like to read
for the RECOTtn the editorial's conclusion.
'The. amendments as written are by and
large thoughtful and - responsible, though
limited. A wise Congress would enact them,
and a wise President would welcome them
as reinforcement of his own policy and his
own concern for the Nation.
Mr. HUNGATE. I appreciate the gen-
tleman's contribution, but I would say as
to the expression "a wise Congress," I
presume its wisdom will be revealed in
the future hours today.
Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. HUNGATE. I yield to the gentle-
Man.
Mr. ARENDS. When you must make
a decision on what the Woshington Post
article sets forth as to whether this is a
wise Congress or , not?that is. a far
stretch of imagination.
Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1
minute to the gentlewoman from New
York (Mrs. A-ewe) .
The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman
from New York is recognized.
Mrs. ABZU(L Mr. Chairman, We have
all been very concerned about the shock-
ing revelation in the last few days, that
there have been secret military and polit-
ical decisions by our Government with-
out the consent or knowledge of this
great body. These d n
ecisios were all the
y indicate that
Lu aria was con-
y lies and de-
iscussion that
debate between
ommittee, Mr.
more shocking because the
Government policy on Vie
structed and conducted b
ceptions. There was a d
took place earlier in the
two members of your c
Chairman, in -which they suggested that
ing the needs
ble for inspec-
this House.
classified material concern
of our defense wa.s availa
tion to the Members of
n inquiry was
Subsequent to this a
made of you, Yr.. Chairman., by the
ia (Mr. War,
rmation avail-
and you
ailable for in-
her the Armed
e House.
ir, is this: Is
gentleman from Cialiforn
ma) with respect to info
able concerning the CIA,
eaten that it was not av
sPcction by Members of eit
Services Committee or th
My question to. you, s
classified material concerning the needs
( se and the matters about
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By Richard E. Ward
'1;571 c)
Ij
;
As nas been previously noted by the Symington subcomittee,'
Second of two articles - ' the lid of U.S. official secrecy conceals little that is not known by
A rare secret session of the Senate was held at the request of ' informed journalists or "the other side." Certainly the Pathet Lao
Sen. Start Symington (D-Mo.) June 7 to hear a report on U.S. knows what is happening in Laos. They are obviously fully aware /
clandestine- activities in Laos. Following the 'session, Senators of the bombings by the'Air Force as well as the army of CA
Symington Vic] J.W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) openly charged that the programs. Although no reliable figure had been released on U.S.
use. of Thai mercenaries, just admitted that same day by the State spending on its Laotian programs, the 'Pathet .Lao accurately
Department which calls them "volunteers," was violating congres- estimated it last summer as greater than $300 million (again apart
'sional restrictions on U.S. operations in Laos. . .. from bombing).
? Some -details of the nearly 31/2-hour closed door meeting were Number of -11-.,ai 'a:04,s crowing
given in the June 8 Washington Post M an article by Spencer Rich-
. Concerning the use of Thai troops, the Pathet Lao stated last
Who reported:.
a Year that they numbered about 1000 during the Johnson
?Symington, who revealed that the administration wants S3/4 ? ?
administration (a figuge that has recently been corroborated in
million for military and economic programs in Laos for the 1972 .
$2 billion- the press and by Sen. Fulbright)and that the increase- in Thai
fiscal year (a figure which does not include the forces was undertaken by Nixon. However, according to ft:Lc'
estimated costs of bombing), said that he wanted the Senate to Pathet Lao, the number of Thai troops now exceeds the' 4800,.
know the details of "the secret war" before appropriating funds
forit.
?Of the request, Si 20 million is said to be ea, ??-. ed for
funding CIA operations in Northern Laos, including the use of
Meo mercenaries from Laos as well as at least 4800 Thai troops.
? ?A major issue in the secret debate centered upon whether the
;use of Thai forces Was in contravention of the 1970 Fulbright
amendment to the 1971 Defense Appropriations Act, signed into
Jaw by President Nixon Jan. 11 this year. The amendment barred
? use of Defense Department funds to support what the Pentagon
calls "free world forces" in actions "designed to provide military'.
support and assistance to the government of Cambodia or Laos."
?The massive bombing of NOrthern Laos, which has nothing
:to do with the movement of supplies from North Vietnam to the
South or Cambodia, was questioned by several senators, including
Fulbright and Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.). ?
i Nixon the lawbreaker
; After the Senate meeting, Rich reported' that Syming,tOn
stated: "My personal opinion is...that the law has been
contravened. The amendment said you couldn't spend money to
train and put people of foreign .governments into Laos or into
Cambodia.". That was also Fulbright's view. State Department '
sources later said, according to Rich, "that the Thais being used
aren't recruited on a government-to-government basis, but were
individuals recruited from the borderside Thai population."
The Post report obviously left out many details of. the Senate
discussion, assuming the legislative body got a full account of
U.S. activities. Symington's disclosures were based on a report by
two staff members of his subcommittee of the Foreign Relations
committee, James Lowenstein and Richard Morse, who had
?
recently made an inquiry into Laos. - '. activities in Northern Laos lacked constitutional authority, which
'
?
? Reportedly the. Symington subcomittee now has a relatively' seemed to be implicitly saying that the U.S. was conductinia war
? .accurate account of U.S. activities in Laos that is more complete r
against the Laotian people without a declaration of War o
authoiit y.
than was provided by the administiation at secret hearings m congressional
October 1969, release'd after "security" deletions by the adminis- .
g?
Li
tration in April 1970. What might be called the battle of Laos in
, ?
Washington, concerns tile attempt by antiwar senators to get U.S. Among the facts to emerge from the recent congre sional
activities in .Laos itself into the public record. Initially and
debate is the acceleration of U.S. bombing in Laos, or rather, of
perhaps still, 'some senators' have been reacting against the the liberated zone since the autumn of last year, and the
administration's deception of themselves alon with the public,
increased use of B-52s, a plane whose bombing reaches the peak
However, the issue of Laos is now being put forward to g
of indiscriminate destructiveness. The step-up in P.-52 acti\lity in
administration policy in Indochina as a whole because it oppose
Laos has largely coincided with the accelerated "protective
clearly reveals the White House aim of maintaining?if not so
reaction strikes" being carried out against North Vietnam, and it
? expanding?the war, This point remains clouded during discus-
.
is quite possible that one of the real purposes of these attacks is
:
.sions focusing on Vietnam because troopan effort to prevent the DRV from utilizing its potent aerial
withdrawals are still'
figure. used by Fui bright.
In April of this year, Prince. Souphanouvong, head of the Lao
Patriotic Front (Pathet Lao), charged that the number of Thai
troops was being augmented by the U.S. Shortly after this,
George W. Ashworth reported in the April 17 Christian Science..
Monitor: "Nixon administration officials have hammered out an
agreement with the government of Thailand for sharply increased.
use of Thai forces in Laos."
Thai troops were previously used in the ill-fated U.S.-backed
attempt to hold the Plain of Jars, which ended in an important
Pathet Lao victory in February 1970. Presumably the losses then
were .an element leading to the more formalized agreement for
use of Thai troops. Bangkok may relinquish some of its
sovereignty to Washington, but not Without a price.
Thai "volunteer" troops used in South Vietnam were given a
bonus 1)/ the U.S. considerably augmenting their regular pay
while Bangkok received military hardware and Other considera-
tions from the Johnson administration to agree to use of Thais in
Vietnam. There is no reason to assume that Bangkok's price has
gone down, more likely it is up. Confirming this, a Senate source
has noted that the cost of the mercenaries was high. Symington
on June 7 referred to both regular and irregular Thai troops:being.
used in Laos, so it is possible that part of the deal with Bangkok e
involves freedom for the CIA to recruit directly in Thailand.'"
Taking all evidence into account, Thai troops in Laos may now
number 10,000 or higher.
Senators Symington and Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.)
attacked administration activitiesin Laos in statements issued
day before the secret debate. Symington emphasized the adminis-
tration furtiveness while Kennedy charged that U.S. military
?
used by the AprotvedoFdtReleasec2000005/15 !ICIAIROPif620icdocilksolobg0011111doil0i':'hbors'
aims of U.S. policy.
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MERCURY
JUN 16 Weil
? 25,483
Stroll() indictriient
Long 'after the last American has
,
''been withdrawn from Indochina, the
,t-United States will still be facing the con-
Lsequences of .its participation in that
_theater in terms of human misery.
[ Hundreds of thousands of wounded,
':.many with permanently crippling in-
Juries, will remind generations yet un-
burn of, the cost,America paid.
. Perhaps more destructive, in terms,
of human lives, are the thousands return-
ing from Machina with sound limbs but
bodies hooked on narcotics. .Reports of
drug usage by American . servicemen
serving in Vietnam have appeared al-
:most frem the beginning of the involve-
ment. But the full extent of addiction
on drugs such as heroin has not been
revealed until recently. -
A report prepared by two congress-
men who toured Indochina and prepared
their findings on drug usage for the
-House Foreign Affairs Committee re-
/veals how widespread the problem has
become. The study by Rep. Robert
.Steele of Connecticut and Rep. Morgan
F. Murphy of Illinois backs up earlier
allegations by the House Armed Services
? 'Committee on widespread corruption
;among Asian officials in drug traffic.
"In Laos, government armed forces
1
STATINTL
are major wholesalers . of opium and ?
heroin and have been directly involved
in large scale smuggling .activity," the
two congressmen reported. .
"Reliable sources rep6rt that at least ,
two highranking Laotian officials,mili-
tary and governmental, including the !
chief of the Loatian _general staff, are :
deeply involved in -smuggling activity,"
they said. - I
`1.11 Thailand, a former diplomat and
member of one of .the most __respected
Thai families is reported to be one of .
the key figures in the opium, morphine ,
base and heroin Operations in that coun-
try and throughout Southeast Asia."
South Vietnamese and Laotian Air.
Force planes are used to Move the illicit
cargo into South Vietnam, Steele and
Murphy charged. They also said there-
' is evidence some of the narcotics are
being shipped by diplomatic pouch on
Air America, a CIA-backed -airline.
Steele estitiTAtes as many as 20 .per-
cent of Americans in Vietnam have used
heroin. If only half the charges made
by this latest study are true ? and thus
far no part of the report has been re-
futed ? it. is a damaging' indictment of
the allies America has paid such a high,
price to defend in Southeast Asia.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? Extensions of Remarks
ment in Veterans' Administratign hospi-
tals.
The VA has made plans to provide 30
special units to cue for narcotics vic-
tims by July 1972, with five units already
In operation capable of treating 200 ad-
dicts each. Yet those dishonorably dis-
charged prior to the enlightened Pen-
tagon policy still ? cannot receive VA
treatment.
? Therefore, I am introdcing today .a bill
which would authorize the Administrator
.or Veterans' Affairs to provide care and
-treatment for ceraain former Members of
. the Armed Forces addicted to narcotic
s? drugs. The "certain" members are those
- who Viere discharged dishonorably, be-
cause of drug addiction.
I believe it Is importantfor the Armed
- Forces to assert national leadership in
Identifying drug abusers, and once recog-
nized, insure that treatment and re-
habilitation are available to all who have
served their country. This is no less im-
portant for those addicts now serving on
active- duty who are now receiving treat-
. merit as it is for those who were treated
punitively in being released dishonorably
from the Army. Military leadership in
handling the drug problem would be a
distinct contribution toward the abate-
' meat of this national tragedy.
The bill which I am introducing today
provides the possibility of treatment for
. thousands who have been sent home with
an addiction which is all too often sup-
ported by regular 'criminal activity. It
Is madness to allow the military to return
' addicts to civilian life and not provide
. for their treatment.
OPIUM TRAFFIC IN INDOCHINA
HON. JEROME 11. WALD1E
OF CALIFORNIA
. IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, June 15, 1971
Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Speaker, I would
. like .to include in the RECORD a neWs ar-
ticle on the recent testimony of John E.
Ingersoll, Director of the Bureau of Nar-
? 'cotie:s and Dangerous Drugs, before the
House Select Committee on Crime (lur-
ing hearings on the importation of opium
Into the United States. The article was
written by Tom Foley and appeared in
the Los Angeles 'nines on June 3.
Mr. Foley's coverage of the proceed-
ings of that day are excellent and de-
scribe some of the startling findings we
? learned on the involvement of the gov-
ernments and some high officials in many
? Southeast Asia countries in illegal drug
traffic.
I commend this article AO the atten-
tion of all who have an interest in this
? subject.
(From the Los Angeles Times, June 3, 10711
- ASIAN OFFICIALS PROTECT HERoisz SAr,I1, PANEL
? TOLD?THEY MAY PROFIT FROM SUPPLYING
DRUGS TO U.S. SOLDIERS, NARCOTICS CHIEF
SAYs
(By Thomas J. Foley)
have an interest in heroin traffic to American
servicemen in Vietnam.
In testimony before the House Crime
Committee, ,l`ohn E. Ingersoll, director of the
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs,
also said Heroin had been unwittingly
smuggled into South Vietnam on airplanes
of the CIA-operated Air America. CI
Committee Chairman Claude Pepper (D-
Fla.) and other members urged the Ad-
ministration to take a stronger stand with
foreign friendly governments to force a halt
to illicit drug traffic.
These included Turkey and France, which
respectively grow and process the overwhelm-
ing amount of the Opium smuggled into the
United States as heroin.
RIGHT TO ASK AID
"We're committed to risk our own cities
In a nuclear war if any French city is at-
tacked by the Communists," Pepper said,
"and we have the right not only to ask but
to demand that the French take emergency
action to help us."
Ingersoll, who recently returned from dis-
cussions with Southeast Asia leaders on the
heroin problem, said he doubted that any
policy-making officials of the countries?
Thailand, Laos and South Vietnam?are in-
volved in the illicit drug traffic.
Burma, Thailand and Laos account for
about CO percent of the world's opium pro-
duction, he said.
But he told newsmen after the hearing
that many lower-lever officials, including
members of the South Vietnamese Legisla-
ture, deal in opium. He said some legislators
have friends in President Nguyen Van Thieu's
cabinet.
Ingersoll told, the committee that heroin
refineries were under control of insurgents in
Burma and Thailand but that those in Laos
are protected by elements of the royal
Laotian armed forces.
RAMPARTS DISCLOSURES
He said that while management and own-
ership of the Laotian refineries appear to be
primarily in the hands of ethanic Chinese
citizens of that nation, l'some reports sug-
gest" that a senior Laotian air force officer
may have an ownership Interest in some of
the plants.
When Rep. Jerome R. Waldie (D-Calif.)
noted that Ramparts magazine had identi-
fied the official as Gen. Ouane Rathiqoune,
Ingersoll replied that "general speculation"
conceded, this. -
Ingersoll denied, one contention of the
Ramparts article. It maintained that rem-
nants of Chiang Hai-shek's Kuomintang
army left in the area are involved in heroin
production and are in the employ of the CIA
for operations on the China mainland.
But Ingersoll conceded that Air America
planes had been used in the past for smug-
gling heroin?just as regular commercial
airliners have been used to smuggle It into
the United States.
He told newsmen later that 80 .kilograms
were seized on an Air America plane at the
huge Tan -Son Hut Air Base outside Saigon
only three or four weeks ago. -
During the hearing, Waidie also asked
Ingersoll about a Ramparts report that the
secret CIA base of Long Chong, used to sup-
port the U.S.-paid Moo tribesmen, was a dis-
tribution point for heroin to be shipped into
South Vietnam.
Ingersoll said he had not heard of that.
However, he later said he had discussed the
general illicit drug problem with CIA Direc-
tor Diehard Helms. He said Helms denied the
CIA was involved in any way, and that he
believed him.
"The Mao tribesmen are something else,"
Ingersoll said, "but I don't blame the CIA
WAsurricTorr.?The government's chief for what the tribesmen do.
narcotics enforcement officer said Weducs- 5003 CIA -SECURITY
day that officials of friendly Southeast Asia Waidie said CIA security was apparently
fume 15, 1971
ploy 'used he flies anc facilities for the illicit .
traffic."
clam by congressmen of U.S. efforts to getSTATINTL
The narcotics chief sought to allay criti-
the cooperation of the Asian governments to g
crack down on the drug traffic.
He said the United States had virtually no
leverage over the Burma government, since '
the last existing aid program is being phased
out. The opium-growing area in Thailand is
In the hands of insurgents, Ingersoll said,
but the Bangkok government is taking steps
to try to control it.
He said Laotian officials were "most respon-
sive" even though seine high-ranking offi-
cials were involved.
VIETNAM SMUtGLING
Ingersoll said the Saigon government had
taken several steps to crack down on the
smuggling, including a shakeup of its cus-
toms officials, an increase in the size of its
central pollee force dealing with the problem
and the appointment of a special task force
by President Thieu.
He also said he WEIS assigning three addi-
tional agents to the Far East and that the
Defense Department hacl placed off limits
,areas of open heroin dealing.
A SYMBOLIC FLAG CEREMONY
HON. FRANK HORTON
OF NEVI YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
? Tuesday, June 15, 1971.
Mr. HOR,TON. Mr. Speaker, during
these times, when, on one hand, the pa-
triotism of seine of our Nation's finest
leaders is questioned; and when, on the
other, it is often scorned to be patriotic,
we must stop to.. consider what, the flag
and patriotism actually mean.
Sunday, in Rochester, N.Y., in my con-
gressional district, I attended a flag cere-
mony at the Rochester Polish People's
Home. It was the first flag raising at the
home. I would like to share the ceremony
with my colleagues for it vividly made the
significance of the flag clear to all who
attended.
Mr. Ray GaAs, pre.sident of the home,
introduced the guests, who represented
local, county, .State, and Federal legis-
lative bodies, as well as the Polish-Amer-
ican and American Legion Posts.
Officials included Rochester Mayor
Stephen May, State Assemblyman Ray-
mond Lill, City Councilman Urban Kress,
Monroe County Legislators Nicholas San-
taro and Sam Poppick. ?
County Judge Arthur Curran also at-
tended. Judge Curran was especially
aware of the value of the flag. He re-
cently received the flag from the coffin
of his son, a marine, who was killed in
Japan.
Also present were James O'Grady, com-
mander of the Michalski Post; Joseph
Zabuchek, commander of the Pulaski
Post; Joseph DeMeis, commander of the
Monroe County American Legion Post;
and Edmund R. Przysinda, president of
Hudson Avenue Area Association.
During the ceremony, I presented a flag
which had flown over the Capitol to Mr.
? Gatz. It was blessed by Father Pietrzys
kowski and raised by Mr. Cats. County
Commander DeMeis led the Pledge of
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensloils of Remarks
Jun.15, 1971 ,
Our world Is made up of individuals, and. His humane Spirit pervades all who know (which remained la the SP.Iite place for five
I. think that in the. Individual is where any hint Let me offer my warmest thanks for ' years while men were rotated) WaS OVerl'1113. .
land of a change or solution must start. It his derroted Service and wish himcon- hen North Vietnameae tanks broke through
can't stop there, though, because it inust
timed personal fulfillment in the future. the neutralist Lao troops.
eventually reach the top. For example, if a
' Following this. attack, In which at least
person is happy he won't mind separating hi ---'''' .....??????,lb en.,15_ V.Tes. u........ .4130 Thais were killed, Bangkok insisted on
h
away some aving Thai troops protect the Thal gun-
garbage for recycling, giving
his food or money, thinking of the oth ners. Thai gunners also were sent to Long .
party before be demands more rights THAIS "VOLUNTEERS" IN LAOS !Chong, further south, but this time several
throws a bomb. If he is happy he will have hundred--some sources say COO?Thal infan-
-a concern for other' people. If everyone did . HON. JEROra rt. WAIDIE trymen were sent to inotect the artillery.
his individual part in helping to solve such Part of these units now are at Fire BaS0
major problems', and took down just one oF CALIFORNIA Zebra northeast of Long Chen.
brick that wall would be gone in no time. IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Recently That troops have served on the
That is a lot of if's. How can a person be . Bolovens Plateau in southern Laos P.Ild on
happy so he will want to do his part? As Titesdall, June 15, 1971 . operations against Route Seven, the main
I've already said, happiness means different 2v7tr. WALDIE, Mr. Speaker, I would Hanoi resupply route to its troops in north-
things to different people, but a. full stom- ,,, , , ? , ,., ?
.tia.0 to include in the 1-,riCoite Ft second em LaC'3.- -
soh, a roof over one's head, and a feeling e. 1,,, , Tammy All troops under American control who
article by Arbuckle on his recent
of acceptance and security among one's peers need 'medical help are sent to Thailand di-
findings in Southeast ASia, which ap-
usually helps. For those of us who arelucky rectly, American officials say, so Thais have
enough to have these. things already, happi- Pe-axed June 7th in the Washington no worries if they ere sick or wounded.
ness should be helping others to find them, livening Star. 00
. The Communist Lao radio claims over 3
also. Happiness is contagious, and even if I believe it sheds further lig lit Ori the Thais have been killed in action in Laos, but
you can't give a person what he needs most, military interests and activities Of the American officials say it's less than 200.
a smile or a hello can sometimes mean just Thai Army in Laos and the correspond- The Thal role, according to U.S. officials is
Medias much. Then maybe he will pass that smile . m to make up for heavy losses among, the Medi
- g role of the United States. .
on to another perion. tribesmen of (len. Vang Pao, who have been
Sometimes I have to stop to think, and The article follows: fighting since 1960 against the North Viet-
assure myself that WC, the people of this Tams IN I_,-'iOS IDENTIFIED AS REGULARS namese, suffering in the last three years over
8000 killed in action.
planet, are not going ' backwards?or be-- (By Tammy Arbuckle) ,
coming more violent, egotistical, and antag-
VIENTIANE,- LAOS.--DOSPite official state- The Lao army claims it's under strength
istie. I alwa?es manage to convince my- fala unable to substantially help yang Pao
on
meats that the Thai forces serving in TAROS
ugh somethnes it ap- because it's spread the length of Laos, fac-
self that we aren't altho are volunteers wtihout official sanction from
pears that way because it's always the nega- the Bangkok government, informed sources in the enemy. This claim, however, is sits-
pears
and liceo say they are regular Thai army troops.
not the positive things that we hear pect. Hundreds of unemployed young men
roam around Vientiane in motorbikes.
about. The number of people who truly care
The sources said the troops sent here keep
? When Con. Koupraisith Abhay, the Vientiane
about other people is growing, and man is
their Thai army rank and salary as well as
d his concern over a wider military boss, tried to conscript them, ho
beginning to sprea
the salary paid by the Americans,
Lao-
circle of humanity. We ususlly care about . Some Thai units come hole in a group, said found they are the sons of influential Lao-
d friends and we want them to tians who protested conscription and forced
our family an
the sources, addling that Thailand's 9-10th
he years go by there are Ir-ouprasith to cease his activities.
be happy, but as t
Battalion' presently is garrisoned on Hill 1663
and more of us who care about the Also, several thousand Lao troops are not
snore
west of Ban Na on the southwest rim of
people in our city, state, county, and world the Plain of Jars in northern Lacs. gainfully employed but act as bodyguards,
individuals. By caring, I mean wanting Thechauffeurs, office personnel or are building
as Thais are sent to Laos on temporary
each person to be happy and secure amid, detachment for six months or E4 year, the new vill RS for Lao officers.
wanting this bad enough to do something sources said. There are cases where units are Despite all this, it may be said that Laos
still is woefully short of manpower as well
about it. If each inhabitant of this earth
formed from Thais of- different units who
he rest of mankind as inch..as good field officers and some military dis-
cared about t have volunteered for certain duties in Laos,
duals our brick wall would disappear, and eipline. Therefore, Lao needs help from its
vi
the sources said. However, these units re-
destroy it before it crushes ethnic neighbors, the Thais.
I hope that we can
main part of the Thai army on loan to the
us.The Lao however, don't want their neigh-
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, the sources
I'd- just like to see everyone here really said. - bors in the western provinces .of Champas-
happy and able to show it. Sometime--try ? are and Sayaboury, which the Thais covet
The only voluntary aspect of their duty is
saying 111 to someone you don't know?take nor in Mekong River towns v.there the Thai
that Thai soldiers are anxious for assignment
propensity for the spoils of war may match
off the mask for awhile?really feel the
to Laos because of the financial benefits,
that of Saigon troops in Cambodia. There
smile you arc giving everyone?forget your Officials of the United States and Thailand -
problems--make someone else happy?anctif fore, they are in the mountains of northern
governments insist That troops in Laos,
you can't do that at least you can be happy. Laos where the Thais can do the most fight-
numbering at least 3,200, are volunteers.
In and the least mischief.
Well, I know what I can do to make every-
Thai officials, in particular, claim the troops _
one happy now?that is to end this speech have no official sanction from Bangkok.
so that we can all get out of this wind. Have (Even the number of troops is in dispute.
a happy day tomorrow! and make It happy As a result of U.S. -Senate inquiries into the
? for someone else too. The world is only what operation, the figure of 4,800 troops presently
we make it?so let's make it happy! is given in Washington as the number , of
Thai troops on duty in Laos.)
. The Lao military attributes the official Thai
..--..........,,,,..,.......___
' ? position to corruption. They say only certain
? ANNIVERSARY -CONGRATULATIONS members of the Thai government are pocket-
. r TO FATHER WALSH lug payments from the 'United States, So the ? OF NEW YORK
.. I
? - entire Thai cabinet may no-b be informed N THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
- noN. PETER W. RODIN?, ilk. of the entire U.S. arranements for Thais to
light In Laos, - Tuesday , June 15, 1971
?
? .. OF' mw JERSEY , Thai troops have been fighting in Laos Mr. HORTON. Mr. Speaker, during
since late 1964. The first Thai unit in Laos
IN THE HOUSE or IlLPRESEI.VTATIV.ES these times of protest by our Nation's
- . was a battery of 155min howiters based near
Tuesday, J7411C 15, 1971 Ban Khay village in the Plain of Jars. outh, the very philosophies upon which
? . Thai officers 'and men then were sent sopa- this country was established are being
Mr. RODIN?. Mr. Speaker, congratu- rErfely to guerilla units run by the CIA. tlileStioned. At Urn es, a?nti-American
l latiOnS are in order for Father Gerald On Feb. 1, 1967, a reporter met one of sentiments and acts seem to overshadow
W. Walsh who celebrated the 25th an- these Tlitis at NAM Bac, Lao fortress. 40 positive feelnigs for this country and our
niversary of Ms ordination to the Holy miles southwest at Dien Pion Phu. The Thai leader's goals.
Priesthood on June 1, 1071. Father Walsh seta he was a captain in the Thai army and There is little doubt that we must do
I to St. Mary's Church in Nutley, . came fr?111 Thzulgkok' What we can to . barer respect for and
N.J. where be had spent his early priest- Air Arnericz.n in civilian clothes was cons-
Understandi ng of this echo try among
manding his mat and v.`riS responsible for
hood to perform a special mass with St. peopl-e of all a.ges, especially among our
payment, he said.
Mary's pastor, Msgr. John J. Feeley. There v.rere at least 20 That with the cap- youth.
? Father Walsh is an ardent contributor thin at Nam Bac and Site 217. Concerned about the destiny of this
I io both his parish and his community, On June 25, 1939, the That Artillery unit country and about the young people who
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HORTON PRAISES MRS. DONALD
LOETZER FOR ? HER AFFIRMA-
TION OF AMERICA
HON. FRANK HORTON --
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AKRON, OHO
DEACON JOURNAL
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,(rY
. ? By JAMES NeCARTNET ?
. Beacon Journnl Vhshinglon FIvreou
? WASHINGTON ? Secret. studies of U. S: involvement in
Vietnam have confirmed -- in spades -- the worst suspicions
anYbody in this town ever voiced about government lying.
T h e so-called Pentagon papers
show that the Johnson administration
? literally talked peace and planned war
in 1964 ? the year of decision.
They show that officials led the
-public deliberately and ?carefully into
war ? without leliing what they were
doing,
They show that U. S. involvement
in . the war was?planned ? orchestrated
by U. S. officials over a long period
of time.
All this is laid out In meticulous
detail in ti-e 7,000-page. analysis, ex-
cerpts of which have been made public
the the New York Times.
L.r.......
Barry Coldwater
?": 'NIOST SKO(..TINC is' the careful documentation of be-
'.hind-the-scenes ? war planning in 1961 while Lyndon Baines
Johnson was campaigning for re-election as a "peace" candi-
date against Barry Goldwater.
The studies say that a..!!,E,,eneral consensus" was reached
at the White Bouse as early as Sept. 7, 1934, that air attack's
probably would have to be launched against North Vietnam.
s Yet long after the Sept. 7 meeting ? LBJ was Specifi-
cally disCouraging the notion that the U. S. had any Tian to
.enlarge the war. ?
In a campaign speech on Sept. 28 in Manchester, N. II.,
he said: "As far as I am concerned, I want to be very
-
cautious and careful, and use it (bombing) only as a last
resort ? when I start dropping bombs around that are likely
to involve American boys in a war in Asia with seven
hundred million Chinese.
"So just for the moment, I have not thought that we were
ready for American boys to do the fighting for Asian boys."
THE "SECEET WAR" had been going on for months
with no '.nnouncement at all to the public. ?
, A major phase of the "secret ?.var" had begun on Feb. 1,
1964. The studies describe it as "an elaborate program of
eovert military operation against the state of North Viet-.
nam."
The operation included:
ATTACKS by 25 to 40 U. S. fighter-bombers in Laos, most
-
flown by CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) pilots.
U-2 SPY-PLANE flights over North Vietnam.
KIDNAPPINGS of North Vietnamese citizens.
PARACHUTE' DROPS by sabotage and psychological
warfare teams.
COMMANDO ,RAIDS to blow up bridges.
BOMBARDMENT of North Vietnamese coastal installa-
tions from the sea. ? ?
The Pentagon papers ? prepared three years ago by a
team of 30 to 40 government officials and vivate histc:lans ?
say that the war, actually was slowed down so LIU could run
as a "peace candidate." Officials were agreed on the need of
military operations', against North Vietnam but held back
on open action because of the election campaign.
VIE U. S. ELECTION was considered a "tactical" prob-
lem which prevented the start of bombing in the North..
The studies say action was delayed because LBJ "was in
.
the midst of an election campaign in which he was presenting
himself as the candidate of reason and.restraint." .
"Trigger-happy" Barry Goldwater at the time was pub-
licly advocating full-scale bombing of North Vietnam.
THE STUDIES convey an impression: say the Times,
"that the war was . . . considered less important for what it
meant to the South Vietnamese than for what it meant to the
position of the U. S. in the Nvorld."
One secret Memo said that 70 pct. of the U. S. objective
in Vietnam was "to avoid a humiliating U. S. defeat," 20 pct.
to keep South Vietnam out of .Chinese hands, and 10 pct. to
bring a better life to the South Vietnamese.
? The U. S. has consistently taken the public position that it
wants a negotiated peace in Southeast Asia ? a position still
taken by the Nixon administration.
The studies indicate that behind the scenes, officials did
not want negotiations with the Communists in 1904 and often
pursued policies deliberately designed to discourage negotia-
tions. ?
What's the real truth now? ?
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NEVV YORK, June 14 --
fr-.7
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L
?
of the World Bank, had corn-
missioned the study in June, 1967.
Despite President Nixon's About 25 to 30 Pentagon experts
helped craft the report, along with
feeble denials, official some figures in the academic
Washington is in a tailspin world, according to the Times:
over publication of top se- The revelations come shortly
cret Pentagon documents before a key vote Wednesday in
revealing massive govern-
the Senate on the amendment to
set the date for withdrawal from
,ment deception to sell the the war, sponsored by .Senators
American people on 'U.S. George McGovern (D-SD) and
'aggression in Vietnam. Mark Hatfield (R-Ore.). -
Impact on the government at The McGovern-Hatfield meas-
home and abroad was regarded by ure would order withdrawal of all
most political observers as meal- U.S. forces from Vietnam by the
culable; In another country, such end of the year.
revelations would have. brought Tracing the steady escalation
down a government. :of -. the war -- beginning with
Repercussions of the exposure President Truman's. -support to
of systematic lying to the Amen- the French colonialists in 1950 --
can people by a succession of the Pentagon document also re-
American presidents to carry on veals details of the C1A-run war
an imperial aggressive policy in Laos. On this score, Sen. Stuart
were not clear as of today, but Symington (D-Mo) in a- televised
that official Washington is in a NEC interview yesterday termed
state of alarm was evident. De- the revelations "startling."
tense secretary Melvin Laird Senator Symington apparently
Called for a Justice Dc.partment had missed the series of exclusive
Investigation of the "leak." article in the Daily World in June,
The New York Times yesterday 1970, by co-editor John Pittrnan,
and today published -- apparently the only American newsman to
after some soul-searching in its have visited the liberated areas
editorial sanctum ---- detailed of Laos.
stories on and excerpts from a . Pittrnan'S first article, pub-
40-volume, 7,000-page Pentagon lished more than a year ago in the
report on the origin and develop- Daily World, are today corrobor-
ment of the war.. ated by the secret Pentagon study.
Commissioned in 1937 Other . facts that emerned from
tary of Defense James For Mc m er R.e,sf.Q uke EeA-F
Robert S. ItIMHfinVae,Mea -Kuv80-01601R000600170001-0 Na ugh-
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o President Truman gave mili-
tary aid to France in her colonial
war against the Vietminh and
"set" U.S. policy.
o President Eisenhower sought
to support the puppet South Viet-
nam regime, undermine the Dem-
ocratic Republic of North Viet-
nam (North Vietnam) led by Ho
Chi Minh, and helped upset the
1934 Geneva settlement. ?
o President Kennedy moved
from his inherited "limited-risk
gamble": to a "broad commit-
ment" to back the South Vietnam-
ese puppet rcgime:? --
Johnson deceived voters
* President Johnson stepped up
covert warfare against North
Vietnam and began planninp; in
the spring of 1.964 to .wage an
overt war against Hanoi. In his
lection campaign that year,
when he ran against Sen. Barry
Goldwater. the Republican can-
didate, Johnson sought to reassure
the Anierican people of hi;-; peace-
ful intentions.
o Long before the Tonkin Gulf
resolution. was adopted by the
Senate in 'August, 1934. the John-
son Administration was planning
provocative .moves to create a
justification for escalating the
war and for heavy bombing at-
tacks on North Vietnam. In fact.
the term "provoking" appears in
a number of the official memoran-
da - made public. Assistant Sccre-
'V
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E - 427,270
31111 1. 5 1971!-
? . ? ?...errals.:6eszni4-4
were -deploy,ed on ambush patrols- alm
B 3, Donald Kirk the Ho Chi Minh Trail network, ov
Newsclay Speciat Correspondent ? 'which North Vietnam sends men an
? Vientiane, Laos?The U.S. Central material through southern Laos
te 1 lig en ce Agency has armed, 'South Vietn ' or ia.
jt
TrocrT).-1
? . ? - ,,?-? 0 .71 ????'i
0
et.
to.
-equipped and helped to train a 2,000 "They go on foot in groups rang,in
man .guerrilla foroe on and near the up to 18 or 20 men," an experience
,Communist-controlled Bolovens Pla-
teau in sotithern Laos.
Highly informed sources here report
that the CIA has built Up the force,
compased mainly of local tribesmen, in
the past: year in re-sponse to the threat
'posed by North. Vietnamese troops,
who Overran the Bolovens a month ago
..and now are menacing the Mekong
-River, loWlands.
Acording to those sources, the CIA
? :Is trgining tribesmen in half a dozen
'centers west of the plateau. from Sayan-
1-akhet Pakse, IN-yrnilitary and corn!.
? inercial towns-on the Mekong still held
STATINTL
g The Central Intelligence Agency
d avoids much as passible an appear-
ance of direct involvement in the op-
eration. "it's done by remote control,"-
d an American said, explaining the CIA's
e , relationship to the guerrilla units. "The
I-. direct commanders are Royal Lao Army
d officers. The Americans are well in
3 the background." CIA operatives, in
y fact, work out of offices in Savanna.-
d khet and Pakse ostensibly run by the
z civilian U.S. Agency for International
Development ,(AIQ),;rhe official CIA
I cover is the Research Management
Bureau to which CIA -personnel are
often assigned. Research Management
headquarters for Laos is on. the main
g AID compound here. ?
CIA operatives also participate di-
rectly it: certain training and ambueh
missions, according to some informants.
Analysts said that a "hard core".
of one-time Special Forces officers, un-
til recently aseigned by the CIA to
train the Meo army in the North, has
moved to southern Laos to assist in
forming the Special Guerrilla Units.
The CIA, besides, is reported to be
training Cambodian and Thai guer-
rillas to penetrate regions controlled
by North Vietnamese troops in North-
ern and Northeastern Cambodia. One
such camp purportedly,is on an island
in the Mekong River south of Pakse.
-A -bitter irony in the creation or
guerrilla units in Laos, however, is the
ittlc. appreciation shown there by the.
lowland Lao, who view all tribal mem-
bers as racial, social and intellectual
inferiors. In southern Laos, for in-.
stance, Lao refer to tribesmen, regard-
;ess or their tribal affiliation, as
"kha." "The word meant 'slave'
an American in Pakse said.
almost as bad as calling a black.
man a 'nigger.' `kha' are the only
people fighting on our side beyond the
Mekong River valley, but the Lao don't.
give a damn as long as they don't have
to do the _fighting themselves."
. military source said. "They carry clay
.more mines and other weapons, estab
lish themselves in likely places an
wait for something to come. They'r
supposed to ambush trucks and .co
umns." The various sources admitte
that they were uncertain of the succes
of such expeditions. "Sometimes the
really do well," one analyst said. "An
sometimes they sit around for a weet
and hit nothing.. Other times it's_ hair
to get accurate reports on just wha
they do hit."
Officials estimated that "a dozen
teams of guerrillas were generally
., vide - the basic training,
by Lao troops. Lao Army othflfeice.srosmper'"es..-. posted on?the trail network all the time.
said, but CIA operatives advise them
Still other teams ambush North Viet-
: and supply _arms and ammunition pamese trocees further .west, where the
,- daily. . , . Communists are attempting to solidify
- ?
The sources compared the buildup in -
? their gains on the nolovens Plateau and
.. southern Laos of the Special Guerrilla enlarge their road. system.
i
Unit Battalions, as they . are known, One 'prime inducement for joining a
,. with the formation a decade ago of a Special Guerrilla Unit-i5 the pay, which
_ -',, much larger force of Meo tribesmen in is considerably higher than that granted
' the north, The .Meo anny, after reach-. to Lao army soldiers and astronomical
.ing peak strength of 40,000 men in the compared to the subsistence income on
-rIaid 1960s, has dwindled to approxi- which most tribesmen manage to live.
.' :mat* 6,000 after suffering a series of The sources Said that the average was
...crushing defeats at the hands of North around $30 a month when the guerrillas
. Vietnamese troops. Informed. sources were engaged in full-time field opera-
- here and in Pakse indicated. that the tions. That figure compares with an
.1-10:=:: clandestine battalions' ? Would ne average Laotian per capita income of.
itte-mpt to nfront- the North Viet- approximately $65 a year. \ - _
liamese directly?or to recapture _._ Another inducement is the assigning
- ground lost to the enemy on the Bob- of Jecruits to the regions where they
? 'yens Plateau. Unlike the Mew in the- were born and have lived all their lives.
;nOrth, the southern tribesmen special- "They're fighting for their ancestral
ize entirely in hit-and-run guerrilla lands," an official said. "They know the-
tactics aimed at harassing and frustrat- terrain, and they're highly motivated."
Ing the .Communists in regions never . Other Sources, however, noted that
.pdnetrated by regular Lao troops. - tribesmen tend to desert quite frequent-
' 'e "These-guerrilla units are much mo413' and return to their homes and visit
-.aggressive than the Lao . soldiers," an Iriends and relatives. "There isn't too
'American official said. 'They kilow much can be done about desertions or
.the jungle: They're bush/nen: They can long leaves," a military analyst said. .
. operate with a pocketful Of bullets and They have a way of coming and go-
:a pocketful of rice." The official said ing when they please." Lao officials?.
,that the guerrillas, drawn 'almost en- and their CIA advisers?attempt to lin-
.:tirely from two tribes on the Bolovens, bue some sense of national spirit into
.th.e Lo. Ven and the Nghia Huen, often g u err i I la s during their training.
_ _ _. ? .. ... ? There's not that much you can tell
them about jungle fighting," one source
_ said, "But you can try to _propaaaredize
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-7/
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nACKENSAdlt' ? N J
R4CORD ?
,dijA1 i-
El
8 -.144,254 4
8 -.164,o48
. ? Sm. Clifford Case is tli.stlirl3ed, ane rightly -so,
ARA the paw,a of the Central IntOligence
tg havehicolleagues f_:-En;vaie,A,,,
My:dolly incerAng Mr. Case is the subterfugki by
timh all the manbcrs of the Senate, including those
tlr: Foreign Affairs and Appropriatips. Committcses, 1::(pt in the dark on the United States ft-
ita'oing of me-A:cu.:ales fighting in Laos.
It
searrc, that a tight lithe Senate watchdog sub-
cOmmitte was privy for more than a year to the
feet that QA. funds were being paid to the Timis but
rewor tom their eolictpzacs. This watchdog group
was appointed oyigimlly to OVE.:i';;ee CIA 1.1Sf-; 'of funds
that are never spscifid in the agency's budget.
The CIA is a curious organism whose intelligence
activities have a considerable effect on United States
foreign policy. Often the ogemT acts as a govern-
rant within a government. It gathers intelligence
tInta, digests it, and uses the conclusions to mount
operation or its own, sometimes without consulta-
tion even with. the military. Its operation phase is
not divorced from its gathering of data. There is;
therefore,no cheek on whether the operations being
carried out are consistent with the data gat.1-:,z-.Ted or
STATINTL ?
0
??,7-
rii (tf
ya.
? t
even wheflicr 'they are hi the inter,:a of U.S. global
- To curb this almost limitlessiceway ths congers,-
sikal watchdoggroup .was appointed in 1.SEi. Tha
committee hats met o4 three times in the past two
years. li'ar' from being watchdogs, the corornnac,, ?
member appear to. have become coconspirators, a (
role never intended.
Sen. Case's, Te!oint is well taken. There is room for
secrecy in a. democracy when the defense of the na-
tion is at stake. There is little rtgAil for a kind of
secrecy that not only. doesn't trust. the elected Con? :
gross of the United States but causes individual
memhers to keep sccretFi from one another.
If the public doesn't have a right to know what
the CIA is doing, its elected representatives should
he presumed to be patriotie,:enough to know and
keep the information to themselves, unless.. what.. ?
they discover 'runs -counter to the established policy -
and law of this country. In the..easc or. the Thai mer-
cenaries this was information that concerned .the:
conduct of the war in Indochina. Congress did not
d.,-clarc this war. Its ini-Jr.hers should at least have
th7: right of access to. inforrop.tim on how and foe
what rea3ons it is 1.?:e. ing cilytumzed.
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Approved For Release 2000/05/155. CIUK41410P130-01601R0007
?
Li ?.\\-v \N?) .L. A.\
-)11:17'
, , v?."
? Following are texts of key documents accompanying the
Pentagon's study of the Vietnam war, covering the opening of
the sustained bombing campaign against Nor,th Vietnam, in,the
first half of 1965. Except where excerpt ;ng is indicated, the
documents are printed verbatim, with only unmistakable typo-
0aphical errors corrected.
1.11A.ci
Advo
and
etter ,From Rostovv Fai
vorng
Comr.nitillei-it of -Troops by
Personal latter from Walt W. Rostow,.cltoirinan of the State Department's.
Polley Planning Council, to Secretary McNamara, Nov. 16, 1964, "Military Dis-
positions and Politica( Signals."
a, Following on our conversation of last
night I am concerned that too much
thought is being given to the actual
damage we do in the North, not enough
thought .to the signal .we wish to send.
The signal consists of three parts:
aai a) damage to the North is now to be
inflicted because they are violating the
1954 and 1962 accords; ?
b) we are ready and able to go much
further than our initial act of damage;
C) we are ready and able to meet any
level of escalation they might Mount in
response, if they are so -minded.
Four points follow.
? 1.-I am convinced that we should not
?? go forward into .the next stage without
a US ground force commitment of some
;kind:
a. The withdrawal of those ground
forces could be a critically important
apart of our diplomatic bargaining posi-
tion. Ground forces can sit during a con-
ference more easily than we can main-
tain a series of mounting air and naval
:pressures.
. .
b. We must make clear that counter
? escalation' by. the Communists will run
directly into US strength on the ground;
, and, therefore the possibility of radically
.1y extending their position on the ground
at the cost of air and naval damage
?alone, is ruled out.
c. There is a marginal possibility that
in attacking the airfield they were think?
'.
lug two moves ahead; namely, they
might be planning a pre-emptive ground
force response to an expected US retali-
ation for the Bien Hoa attack.
The first critical' military action
against North Vietnam should be de-
signed merely to install the principle
? - that they will, from the present forward, without raising seriously the fear in
.be vulnerable, to rciA06.14,?6416tacfr61. tkei0k#Migitikyl.V. t400101,_. tit46
7 , ? 0 0400 the belief ly,that
.north for continued Viaalations for tne 1, a au, YllrTst irreversib in
1954 and 1962 Accords. In bther words, Delta, in 'China, or seek any other ob- their favor in South Vietnam, they might
we would signal a shift from the prin- jective than the re-installation of the
sponse. This means that the initial use
of force in the north should be as lim-
ited and as unsang,minary as possible. It
'is the installation of the principle that
we are initially interested in, not tit
for tat.,
3. But 6ur force dispositions to ac-
company an initial retaliatory move
against the north should send three
further signals lucidly:
a, that we arc putting in place -a'
capacity subsequently to step up direct
and naval pressure on the north, if that
should be required; ?
' a b. that we are prepared to face down
'any forni of escalation North Vietnam
.might mount on the gromid; and
. . .
-C. that we are putting forces into
place to exact retaliation directly against
Communist China, if Peiping should join
in an escalatory response from Hanoi.
The latter could take the, form of in-
creased aircraft on Formosa plus, per-
haps, a carrier force sitting- off China
?distinguished from the force in the
South China Sea.
4. The launching of this track, almost
certainly, will require the President to
explain to our own people and to the
world our intentions and objectives. This
will also be perhaps the most persuasive
form of communication with Ho and
Mao. In addition, I am inclined to think
the most direct .communication we can
mount (perhaps via Vientiane and War-
saw) is desirable, as opposed to the use
of cut-outs. They should feel they now
confront an MU who has made up his
mind. Contrary to an anxiety expressed
at an earlier stage,. I believe it quite
possible to communicate the limits as
well as the seriousness of our intentions
Alemc
_ ? .
,,,Nov. 23, 1:
"to -the- Crum
I leave
CIAP and
in early D
Oil Southe
therefore,
observatio
ready corn
.1. We
?minds -a ouL
appreciation of the view ,in Hanoi and
'Peiping of the Southeast Asia problem.
I agree almost .completely with SNIE
10-3-64 of October 9. Here are the criti-
cal passages:. ?
"While they will seek to exploit and
encourage the deteriorating situation in
Saigon, they probably will avoid actions
that would .in their view unduly in-
crease the chances of a major US re-
sponse against North Vietnam (DRV) or
Communist China. We are almost cer-
tain that both Hanoi and Peiping are
anxious not to become involved in the
kind of war in which the great weight
of superior US weaponry could be
brought against them. Even if Hanoi and
Peiping estimated that the US would not
use nuclear weapons against them, they
could not be sure of this.....
"In the face of new US pressures
against the DRV,, further actions by
Hanoi and Peiping would be based to a
;considerable extent on their estimate of
US intentions, i.e., whether the US was
actually determined to increase its pres-
sures as necessary. Their estimates on.
this point are probably uncertain, but
we believe that fear of provoking severe
'measures by. the US would lead them to
temper their responses with a good deal
of caution. ..., / -
"If despite Communist efforts, the. US
attacks continued, I fanors leaders would
have to ask themselves whether it was
not better, to suspend their support of
Viet Gong military action rather than
suffer the destruction of theirmajor
military facilities and the industrial sec-
STATINTL
nfrag,,
1.1Eig GRK. r,e? DI ES
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1
''? \
ri..i, .,,
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Yr k 4 v -
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... ?,... i ..-,,..i ,e.e. ee '
- 'Following are texts of key documents from the Pentagon's
Wlistary of the Vietnam war, covering events of August, 19646'
to February, 1965, the period in which, the bombing of North
Vietnam was planned. Except where excerpting is specified, the
documents are printed verbatim, with only unmistakable typo;
graphical errors correted.
Ros1P C-11)1 I-nssy in Labs
, to hall
.011-Search-and .RPc'Tce 7:11:01-1/-'s '
?
? : . ? ?
. . .
Cablegram from Secretary of State Dean Rush to the United States
Embassy in ?Vientiane,.Laos, Aug. 26,-1964. A copy of this message .was. sent
to the Commander in Chief, Pacific. , ,
?
. 7
and that stn.
precondition
fe:rence. Quel
ritorial gains
.vided they c
practice two
equilibrium
? no longer ii.
. Lao witluira
'Lion to lsl-n
fact though
curred to So
is also touc
Butler (.
Souvanna
PDJ withdi
evitably ins
gains and
arrangc.s.men
present fa
? .; ' division. I
be desirable in wider picture. On other
side, we naturally recognize T-28 opera-
tions are vital both for their military
and psychological effects in Laos and as
negotiating card in support of
Souvanna's ?position. Request your view
whether balance of above factors would
call for some reduction in scale of op-
erations and-or dropping of some of
better-defended targets. (Possible exten-
sion T-28 operations to Panhandle would
be separate issue and will be covered
by septel.)
On central problem our understand-
ing is that Thai pilots fly missions
strictly controlled by your Air Com-
mand Center with [word illegible) in
effective control, but that this not -true
of Lao pilots. We have impression latter
not really under any kind of firm con-
trol,
Request your -evaluation and reconi-
mendations as to future scope T-28 op-
erations ? and your comments as ?
to whether our impressions present con-
trol structure correct. and whether steps
could be taken to tighten this.
- - We agree with your assessment of
Importance SAR operations that Air
- America Pilots can play critically im-
portant role, and SAR efforts should not
_
discriminate between rescuin?,.. Amen-
= cans, Thais and Lao. You are also hei e-
= by granted as requested discretionary
? authority to use AA pilots in T-28's
- for sArt operations when you consider
7this indispensable rpt indispensable to
:success of operation and with under-
_standing that you will seek advance
Washington authorization wherever sit-
-ration permits.
At same time, we believe time has
coma to review scope and control ar-
rangements for T-28 operations extend-
ing into future.- Such a review is especi-
ally indicated View fact that these op-
'
orations more or less automatically im-
pose demands for use of 'US personnel
SAR operations. Moreover, increased
-AA capability clearly means possibilities
of loss somewhat increased, and. each
loss with accompanying SAR operations
involves chance of escalation from one
action to another in ways that may not
Rtisk Query to
?
lenti an e iddin o ss
On Desirabilit Cease ireLaos
? ? ? ?-?
Cablegrant from Secretary of State flush to the Wtiled States Embasv:
in Laos, Aug. 7, 1964. Copies were also sent, Ivith a request for comment, to
the American missions in London, Paris, Saigon, Bangkok, Ottawa, New Delid,.
Moscow, Pnompenh and Ilong Kong, and to the Pacific command and the.
mission at the United Nations.
..
? . -
. . .,
,
. .... ? - -. ... . .? . : . ? _ .. . ,
I. As pointed out in your 219, our that recent RI.G.:neceSses :tad reported '
objective in Laos is to stabilize the situa- low PL morale may lead to some escala- .
Con again, if possible within framework tion from Communist side, which we do
of the 19 Geneva settlement. Essen- ! not now wish to have to deal with. ' ?
tial to stabilization would be estalllish- 2. Until now, Souvanna's and our po- '
ment or militafy equiliAPPriNAUmpr rceiett..'21)?"511151i'L A41FS3P8?t-b
try. Moreover,- we have some concern. from 'areas seized in I'DJ since May 15
would require Pathet Lau withdrawal
were to be
'best be don
it might be usea by bouvanna as mai-gam-
-Ing counter in obtaining satisfaction on
his other condition that he attend con?
;femme as head of Laotian Government.
Remaining condition would be cease-
fire. While under present conditions
cease-fire might not be of net advantage
to Souvanna----we, are thinking primarily
of T-28 operations---Pathet Lao would
no doubt insist on it. If so, Souvanna
could. press for effective ICC policing of
cease-fire. Latter could be of hnportance
in upcoming period. .
? 3. Above is written- with thought in
enind that Polish proposals [one word il-
legible] effectively collapsed and that
pressures continue for Geneva [word-il-
legible) conference and will no doubt
be intensified by current crisis brought
on by DRy. naval attacks. Conference on
Laos might be useful safety valve for
these generalized- pressures while at
same time providing some deterrent to
escalation of hostilities on that part of
,the "front." We would insist that con,.
'ference be limited to Laos and believe.
that it could in fact be s6 limited, if
necessary by b ur withdrawing from the
conference room if any other subject
brought pp, as we did in 1961-62. Side
discussions on other topics could not be
avoided but we see no 'great difficulty
with this; venue for informal corridor
discussion with PL, DRV, and Chicoms
could be valuable at this juncture.
4. In censidering'fbiS course of action, -
key initial question is of course whether
Souvanna himself is prepared to drop
his withdrawal precOnciition and wheth-
er, if he did, he could maintain himself
in power in Vientiane. We gather that
answer to first question is probably yes
but we are much more dubious about
1601R000600170001-0
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-AlikitiP80-01601R0006001700011111==
i4 JUN 1971
Hanoi Spreads Out .
Despite its proximity to the main
theater of operations in Indochina, the
13olovens Plateau in southern Laos long
remained one of the war zone's most
tranquil oases. For years, a spirit of ao-
commodation between the highlanders
and the local Communists kept the lush,
coffee-rich region comparatively peace-
ful. And even the presence of a few
bands of U.S.-sponsored guerrillas did
not drag the plateau into the larger con-
flict. Last month, however, in a series of
well-coordinated attacks, Communist bat-
talions suddenly swept into the area,
forcing Laotian units into a hasty retreat
and taking full command of the plateau.
And by last week, the North Vietnamese
were busily carving out storage areas in
the plateau's deep, dark gullies and
building new roads that seemed destined
to become part of the growing Ho Chi
Mini' Trail network.
'The effort to expand their north-south
supply system seemed to be at the root
of the North Vietnamese thrust. Since
the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville
(now Kompong Som) was closed to Com-
munist ships early last year, Hanoi has
had to rely almost exclusively on trails
through the Laotian panhandle to supply
its forces in South Vietnam and Cambo-
dia. And four months ago, the U.S.-sup-
ported South Vietnamese invasion of
southern Laos placed an added strain on
Hanoi's narrow logistical pipeline. For
, although the operation by no means
succeeded in wiping out the durable
Ho Chi Minh Trail, it did momentarily
disrupt the eastern portion of the intri-
cate n etwork? an d sparked apprehension
in Hanoi that the South Vietnamese
might come back again and again.
Rout: Confronted by that fear?and
the fast-approaching monsoon season?
the North Vietnamese had little alterna-
tive but to expand the trail westward.
Using firepower and manpower that have
long been more than a match for even
the best units of the woefully weak Royal
Laotian Army, the Communists routed
some thirteen Laotian battalions that
/were guarding the approaches to the
13olovens Plateau. Even the CIA-trained
Jungle Tiger mercenaries were no match
for the advancing Communists. In less
than a day of heavy fighting, the North
Vietnamese captured the key city of
Pak Song. They also gained firm control
over Routes 23 and 16, leading from the
eastern trails to the Mekong River, and
over other open roads to the south.
For the time being at least, few ob-
servers expected the North Viet'namese
to push any farther. In order to take the
strategic Mekong River towns of Pakse
and Savannakhet, the Communists would
have to fight through stiff Laotian fortifi-
cations?and might risk a tough .reaction
from the neighboring Thais. And with
the plateau and the provincial capitals of
Attopeu and Saravane (both seized last
year) under North Vietnamese com-
mand, IIanoi seemed to have achieved
its primary goal: securing reliable supply
lines to its forces in the south.
Hot Water: Yet despite the Commu-
nists' apparently limited objectives, the
latest North Vietnamese thrust has
caused unusual reverberations in the
sleepy Laotian capital of Vientiane. Even
the politically sure-footed Laotian Prime
Minister, Prince Souvanna Phouma, has
found himself in hot water. In the wake
of the fighting, a powerful group of right-
NORTH,,
VIETNAM
THAILAND
Bakst
Champassako
@
pakSciq
otovevs?
PLATEAU
. Allopeu
CAMBODIA
MILES
Fens, & Liurlso, tz
Southern Laos: Expanding the trail
wing generals and politicians urged the
neutralist Prince to "get tough" with Ha-
noi. Instead of trying to placate these
power brokers, however, Souvanna is-
sued his most conciliatory plea yet for
peace negotiations with the pro-Commu-
nist Pathet Lao.
Souvanna's policy of quiet moderation
has left him at odds with Prince Bonn
Oum, the influential head of the Chain-
passak family, which owns virtually all of
southern Laos. An ardent neutralist in
the past, Bonn Own was reported to be
outraged over the North Vietnamese
take-over of his plateau. In fact, some
observers believed that the loss of his
private "plantation" might just push B011n
Oum into joining with the generals to
oust Souvanna. That still appeared to be
only a distant possibility. But even be-
fore the North Vietnamese launched
their wide-ran
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some time, but if the Bolovens falls, Sou-
valuta Phouma is finished."
14 AN 197i
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. "! ? I
.\"7 ...., _ .. ,.. ,, . ,.. ? :.:1
TI \ 6n ',) ,e, i ?ri
. \t' t..1).11 IA ..' d
. .
. ? ?
. , .... .
By Murrey Mauler . . ' A M- Kona): Security A.ctic)n
. and Chalmers 1\1. Ttoberts ? Memioranclum of March 17
- 1064, presumably the result of
wastalo.,:t0,-, Post soul Writers
It was charged by then Sen,
17N c? ? (D-Ore..) that the
'1i n. ! 7- SOUth iititinEno. attacks on
k' i '`--\. North Viettraroc.:!se fooces in
the Gulf of Tonkin caused the
? 11 Tri Ci ..:1 .11 North Vietnamese to lire upon
1, on 1 t
; t..ol .-1 o 6 .? .. ..-7- U.S. destroyers Maddox and C.
11 -4 ; _ i -
2,0
0.,,.j.i ,l,j1n7,.) .1._ J.i..lLoL JL-_)- :-.?__.) 11 - \f' \'-i Tn rner Joy. McNamara, ia
. . J Ng, told the Senate commit:-
.. ? , tee, however, that it was
action"- then was "preinatUre.' "monstrous" to insinuate that
Mr. Johnson offered as one the United Slates "induced
re: ,son that Stateinent that the incident" t,...s on
"we expect " E'llor'dew" be" to take retaliatory action. The
tween the Chinese and Soviet retaliatory action was the: .
planned for major A 110 iii hticod aims and the basis for Cornitnniist parties and action- oimling rounds. of U.S. bomb-
military action tigainst North its militarY plannim-t. A cable against the North will be more ,in,,, attaas upon North Vint-
Vietnam nearly five months be- sent three days later by the predicable after than before a nam.
fore the lf.l64. Tonkin Gulf in- President to Henry Cabot showdown." , Aceordin to the information
?
cident, according to secret goy; Lodge, then the. American am- The President also told) disclosed 'hy the Times, the
offline:at documents made. pub- bass odor in saigon, ill Inca- Lodge that part of Ids job Plan 34-A operations against
lie yesterday by The Now ork.nate5 his intent L011:1;. - then was "knocking dcoon the the North during 1,N1 ranged
Times. i The memorandum says that idea of neutralintion" of Viet- froot u..2 spy plane nults to v
These plans were made, the ' "we seek an iodependent Don- Dain, an idea advanced by parachuting sabotage z-nd psy_
documents Show, at a ' time Communist. South Vietnam then French President Chrodes! Choi agical warfare) teams into
when tile UnitediStates al- but md? h,et require that it deGaulic, "wherever it rears' the North Vietnamese citizens,
IC' ClY Was directing clandes- !serve as a Western base or as its ugly bead and on this point sea-launched conunando raids
tine sabotage operations in the a member of a 1 \Testern alli- I think that notinaLt 3S lilOrt,' 011 l'ail and highway bridges
North. lance. South Vietnar:1 must be important than to stop neutral- and bombardment of. coastal
Two months before the at-, free, however, to accept out- . i
'tack on two American destron side assistance as required to 1St l'ik wherever w'-' c'll by installations by PT boat:-.
whatever means we can.
ers in 'the Gulf of Tonkin On maintain its security." The resulting conliimency These attacks Were de-
Aug. 2 and 4, li)64, the achnin- Bepeating language from a yoaiming is shown in several, scribed as being under the
Mcnimara T.,gernoninclurn. of '.: Saigon control of Gen. Paul -.1-?..
istraGon sent zi Can dip- ciocuments. But i)oltaliter;,sci(:,.ortcrili 1).1-3:Lill.iitEiv.in.s; then ehtaf of the us.
secret rciission to liaeol Whefe : (language in Pale- drawn in '.! as Dec. 21, 1.9i13, a inemorali.- will-. fISSiStr.:nee command,
lomat, J. Blair seaborn, 011 a Much 16 to the President z ments also show,
?
Pro_ turn , from a memorai?-,a)lum to. joint pkinning by the
mier Phalli Van Do1U-i, that nin 'McNamara on Jan. ).:_, 1Troni 1
delft: Johnson South Vietnamese who carried
he is 'quoted as telling chum from McNamara to Presi-;
the event of escalation (of t h'e ! tliC chairman of filer., ..:oint 1 "plans for covert action into
referred t?! out the oprationS themselves'
war) the gl'ealCSt COVastation ors , ,
' Chiefs of sc iff Gen -P. o,xv,,,,.,11 North Vietnam" that "present .or with "hired persoimel." ,
Would result for the D.R.v. JJ. '-i.'IYJor) the National Se- a wide variety or sabotage al .-id . Yvon before tlie,-.0 covert op- l
(North Vietnam) itself." -- ellritY C011lItjl (10ClIrtlellt. re-
p3ychological. opciration S." tilld: er a lions begzin, however, the
.. jt Nw., the ,i: 0 nk. iii incident. fleets the prevailing belief in shmild "provhie maximum Joint Chiefs of Staff Were
pressure with minimum risk." 1
) reported recomracmcling "in-
creasingly bolder actions" in-
cluding "aerial bombing of
key North Vietnamese tar-
gets" and use of "United
States forces as necessary in.
direct actions against North
Vietnam."
- presidential decision, set out
The Johnson administration both thc) administration's po-
STATINTL
_called totally unpro\oked by what President Eisenhower
the achninistiodion-----vohich led had cal,ted the "domino effect Th cla
" is ndes tine pr CJ 'fl
Congress on Aug. 7, 1.961, to of the loss of ?Scmt-11 Vietnam era
' became "Option Plan 3 1-
Unless the objective is A," launched on Feb. 1, 1534.
achieved in South Vietnam, it
It was described in a National
says, "almost all of Southeast Security memorandum .the
Asia will probably fall uner next month as "a modest 'coy-
Communist. dominance" or ae- ert" program operated by
commodate to Communism. South Vietnamese (and a few
The Philippines, it was Chinese Nationalist)---a pre-
judged, "would become shaky" gram so limited that it is un-
and "the threat to lndia on likely to have any significant
the west, Australia and New effect ..."
Zealand to the South, and Tai. one source yesterday said,
wan, Korea, and Japan to the
ht. in retrospect, that these covert,l
north would- be greatl.y
. operations were in fact "very
creased."
Ibled under the direction of , N modest--and highly unsuccess-
f.,ine policy decision, , then,
1 ' was to "prepare immediately fill-'' But theY can to have
I then Secretary of Defense I .
McNamara. profound significance in the
Robert S.
The' to be in a position on 72 hours'
bulk of the documents dis- Tonkin Gulf incident. Mc-
closed thus far by the Times notice to initiate toe full
C\rell ill VG3 testi-
range Of IAtotian and Carob?. Namm'a,
are of military origin but in- molly reexatnining the 1961
dian 'border control actions' "
elude some 'White noose i lid a S Well as "the 'retaliatory ae- Touldn affair, professed to
epartment papers that lrnon, little abmit the plan
State D 34-
tions' against North Vietnam
reached the PentaL-ton. Other and to be in a position on 30 A operations. Ill'e toll Senate
documents Wr n
ee oly alluded days' notice to initiate the pro- Foreign Relations Committee
to or quoted from in the IlOWS- gram of `graduated overt mill- Chairman J. W. FUlbright (1)-
.p''S story. Ark.) that they were carried
ipel
tory pressure' against North
out by South Vietnamese
Vietnam . . ." against the North, "utilixing to
- The President's cable to
some degree U.S. equipment.".
Lodge says that "our planning
"I can't describe the exact
r actionacnqns_t the North is
Approved For lecase,200g/05/156411A-
, -
ogrotinds?thato-"overt--military
pass a resolution declaring
that the United States was
"prepared, as the President di-
rects, Etc) 'take all necessary
steps, including the use of
Armed force," to.. assist South
Vietnam. It was on this resolu-
tion that President Johnson
subsequently leaned heavily to
widen the war,
'The documents are part of a
mulli-volumeci. collection of
,recorcis and comments assem-
RurtiefitiTopfhttivratiftti
yrighc, a_Lnouga e
happy to try to obta!n- the in-
formation 10)- you."
After the August, 1f)61, Gulf
of Tonkin breakthrough to
more open -U.S. involvement
in the fighting, the published
documentation shows recom-
mendations for considerably
expanded covert operations
against the North.
A memorandum prepared
for Assistant Secretary of
State William P. Bundy shows
that part of the clandestine
operations against the North
wore suspended immediately
"after the first Tonkin Gulf in-
cident" on Aug. 2, 1961, but
that "successful maritime and
airborne operations" Were car-
ried out in October.
The documents discuss clan-
destine operations carried out
not only from South Vietnam
but from Laos, against North
Vietnam and against enemy-
bi-
cbare[,s. of 1..,?os. 01-,!?. (lout_
STATI NTL
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CaUMBUS , OHIO -
DISPATCH
E 223,673
? 318,040
JU 131971
Oversight of CIA Ik Vilal
MERICANS are fully aware
1-1- their government, like
every other nation, has an in-
telligence gathering apparatus
and while the whole business
of spying is inherently evil, it
: is necessary.
The primary U.S. spy group
is called the Central Intelli-
gence Agency and it operates
pretty much in the dark as it
eeks to provide its own unique
- 'kind of shield against any
threat to this nation's security.
f' Because of the very nature of
' ? the spy business, the CIA
-writes its own rules and laws
and they very well may be in
conflict with established stat-
utes and mores.
. -
EVEN THOUGH the CIA
-nocessarily must operate in its
own shadowy sphere, it re-
quires financing. That comes
from the American taxpayer,
yet these funds are entirely
secret, being seeded here and
-there in various departments of
the federal budget.
Congress does attempt to
'maintain some contact with the
CIA's doings through a little-
known Senate watchdog sub-
committee established in 1955.
But thiS panel has met only
three times in the last two
years and not once So far in
?
1971.
A RECENT closed door ses-
sion of the entire Senate delved
into the doings of. the CIA in
Indochina. It was then re-
waled the CIA, using Amen-,
can tax money, had been fi-
nancing 4,800 mercenaries
from Thailand to cross their ,
border and fight Laotian and
North Vietnam C o in munist
troops in Laos.
Sen. Clifford Case of New
Jersey is incensed by the rev-
elation, contending this activ-
ity is not only a violation of a
1970 congressional ban against
such incursions but is an ex-
ample of the CIA "setting ma-
jor policy."
? THE INCURSION aspect of
the Thai-Laos operation is
nothing new on the CIA
agenda. Witness history's re-
cording of such places as the
Bay of.Pigs and an earliei. bit
of action in Guatemala.
But if the CIA is "setting
major policy" by its Indochina
program, then ,Americans are
faced with a touchy problem.
It well could be a case Of one
government agency creating a '
new "front" in one part of
Indochina while the President
is making a concerted effort to
extract the American presence
from another, Vietnam. .
AN OVERSIGHT of the CIA:
is necessary. Its secrecy must'
be protected.. But it cannot be
permitted to "set policy" while'
carrying out its intelligence-'
gathering duties. Policy must
be established by duly elected
and appointed officials operat-
ing clearly in the open.
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S-7 I rA I I I NI I L
HousTAlprend For Keiease 2000/05/15-: CIA-RDP80-0160i R000600
el-111?Ni=
E ? 2N,L1e 319?:11 r
S ? 333,807
? ?
??":"
BY MILES BENSON
Q1971, Newhouse News Service
Washington?When the Sen-
ate barred its doors, Monday
and sat down to hear details
of how the United States was
financing mercen'ary 'Thai
.troops fighting in Laos, it was
..the first most senators had
.? heard about the operation.
? But a privileged handful ap-
parently had known all about
t.it for more than a year. They
just never had told their col-
leagues.
This incenses Sen. Clifford
i P. Case, R-N.J., who 'feels his
T. colleagues k e op too many
"major policy" secrets from
t each other?and from the pub-
lic.
? Watchdog Panel
The "insiders" were mem-
hers of a little-lmown subcom-
mittee set up in 1955 to act as
a watchdog over activities of
the Central Intelligence Agen-
? ty. The conisinittee has net
I only three times in the last
two years. It is the CIA that
has been financing 4800 Thai
mercenaries?the State De-
partment calls them "volun-
teers"?in violation of a 1970
congressional ban, critics con-
tend.
tThe secrecy surrounding the
[-operation was defended by
j Sen. Henry M. Jackson, D-
t Wash., who argues that if all
; the other senators knew of it,
tit would not have been a se-
i?cret..
I But Case insists such a ma-
jor policy move should be
public business.
Burying Information .
Case 'challenges the useful-
--ness of the CIA commiittee,
saying that it "serves as a
means for burying informa-
tion rather than bringing it
out into the open."
?
And it'd .no-t just the CIA
committee, Case contends,
that is guilty of such "institu-
tionalized secrecy." Another
. special panel operating the
same way, he charges, is the
Joint Committee on Atomic
. Energy.
" "Sen. Stuart Symington, D-
Mo., for instance, never knew
anything about the location of
' missiles around the world un-
til he got on that committee,
and he was startled by the in-
formation he got," Case de-
clared.
The AEC committee is giv-
en access to classified infor-
mation on the location and
power of nuclear warheads
the United States keeps at the
: ready around the world. .
? -
"The point is that informa-
tion on major policy ought to
be public information," Case
said. "And the public's- partic-
ipation in these matters,
through their representatives
in Congress, is the real goal
i? we are seeking."
Prior to the closed Senate
session on Laos, Case doubted.
1 that even the CIA oversight
! commitee had been informed
of the mercenary operations.
Case's criticism of the CIA
:?and AEC committees is count-
ered by Jackson, who served
on both panels: Ile says they;
-work so well that he wants
another one set up to oversee:
the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation, a Proposal he has been
quietly pushing:
"These committees were set
, up on the theory that certain
; Sensitive things should be on a
'need-to-know' basis," he said..
. "If you let everybody know, .
ther is no longer a secret."
-
.1,
Asked if the CIA committee
had been informed of the CIA
support for Thai mercenaries
in Laos, Jackson replied:,
"Yes, we were told. They :
have kept us currently ,in;
formed,"
The CIA oversight subconi=
mittee, chaired by Sen. Johti
Stennis, D-Miss., who also
heads the p a r eu t Sonat
Armed Service Committee,
has yet to meet this year. It ,
last met March 20, 1970. It
also sat Jan. 30, 1970. In 1960
j it met only once, on Feb. 21f,
At each of the three ineetings
? the only witness was ? CIA.
Director Richard Helms.' The
committee met twice in 1958-
? and five times in 1067. ?
Besides Stennis and Jack"-
son, other members of the
committee are Symington, Pe
terII. Dominick, R-Colo., and
Barry M. Goldwater, R-Ayer'
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.E.F100:
. 1E11 YORT) TIMES
- Approved For Release 2000/0g/425.:JithA-VOP8AT146-61M00600
" ? ters of Congress as to whether forces from 'Indocbiaa,
ne point, in a t;
American bornbitic; is not con-
At o letter
-; tributing to the Lflow of refu- Senator Edward_ M. Kennedy,
g cos. They now total at least the State Department argued
700,000 Laotians out of a pop- that the president's authority to
ulat.ion of fewer than 3 million. engage in a war In northern
0 On White House orders go.- Laos was based upon Mr. Nixon's
Ing beck to the -F;(,,i?inady? and: p.Owers as Commander-in.- Chief
Johnson Administrations, the, o take reasonable "measures"
y -yr -i- ? 7. 0 1 Central Intelligence 11,- ? to carry out the withdrawal of
VV ar, vy been supporting a' ir`x)Ps'
? " ff State De-
ht 0 ID JO,
How I o
Fight
?
- force of at least 30,000 mountain ? But tliat was no rmramIlitarY t Alto justifi- '
.-? tribesmen. With the Meo tribes- cation?-
- men decimated by heavy- fight- pnrtment for the recruitment Dill.
.. the Thai "volunteers." Rathz-x,
ing in the past two years, Th.,is,
- nov,,, numbering 4,g,00, have ,4,.its justification WaS that the
- been recruited ' with United Nixon Administration had inher!
., States financial assistance to ited . a . program' "initiated". by
the Kennedy Administration and
which 'evolver in the two sue-
ending' Administrations. Since:
this program of - "volunteers"
was already in effect, the de;
pertinent argued, it was ' _ not
banned ' by the Fulbright amend,
ment? ? . .
Legislative 1.-Iayrnal;:ev
The more the State Depart-
ment weaved and bobbed with
its legal justifications, the more
apparent it was that the _Execu-
tive Branch was on the- defen.:
sive about continuing surrepti-
tious military activities in
Northern Laos. And now .Senator
Symington is about to throw his; ,
legislative haymaker. He plans
to introduce this week an amend-
ment to the Defense Procure-
ment Bill?an amendment stipu-
lating that no more.. 'than.
to the Senate the fast detailed,S200-million can be spent. an- ,
"aro recruited in Thailand," giv-
comprehensive report on how en "special ,rivil,ges" for goint, madly for military and econorn-
the United States got involved to Laos and "are under the in ic activities in Laos without .
in a clandestine war in Laos mediate tactical command of, Congressional consent. I - ?
without the knowledge, much' Thai officers." . . ? With that limit, virtually ? all
less the consent, of Congress. -,... - The Laos iSsue is. becoming the secret. military activities '
. Out of the Symington report . would have to come to an end,.
emerged these principal facts another test ease?.fn the foreign-?
Win or lose With his amend-
about the American involvement policy power struggle between-
at
me
in. a war . between the Royal too Executive Branch and. the , Senator Symington will
? have forced the secret war out :
i .
? Laotian Government on the one Senate. What bought ti-us issue
Into the , open ? and that - has .
_side and the pro -Communist to ,a head wa.s the into
Thai ,.\,ohint,cers,,_an been one of his objectives 'ever '
Pathet- Lab and North Vietnam; or - tin
: since an Athbassador said he '
eso troops on the other: - - .action that may violate the spa-
couldn't visit.Laos. , '?
? : 0 The. United States is spend: it, if not the letter, of an "anti- - ?JOHN W.. FINNEY.
log at least $350-million annual-' mercenary" amendment by Sea-
ly .in:.military- and economic as: : ator Eulbright that was in-
?sistance to the Royal Laotian corported into this year's Defense
forces.. Tbe,. Administration. has ' Appropriations Bill.
publicly _ acknowledged 'only The Fulbright amendment pro-
some $52- million in . economic vides that no defense funds can
aid.
. . ' he used 'Ito support Vietnamese
' , . ?
? ..0 For nearly -10 years,- Amnri- , or ether free-world forces in
can . planes based in Thailand; actions designed to provide
have been providing combat air military support and assistance
support in northern Laos. In the' to the Governments of Cam-
past year, increasing reliance bodia or Laos." The amendment
-has been placed on the satura- contains an escape clause that
tion tactics of 33-52 bombers,' says that such support is Per-
raising a question in some guar-. missible if required to insure the
'safe withdrawal of American _
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. , .
0017Y-)CY
WASHINGTON?Senator Stn-- supplement the Paramilitary
art Symington of Missouri, who force. '
has something of the single; ? Th,'-' SYminglon report was
mindedness of the bulldog Inas. cnoiTh to force. a 'public ac-
cot of Yale, his alma mater, hIkowledgement by tbeT,' State Dc-
'likes - to recall how be wanted partraent that the United States .
to go to Laos in 1955, only to was giving support to some
be blocked by the American "ethnic Laotians" from Thailand
Ambassador in Vientiane._ The and "some Thais" who were
Ambassador, it seems, did not fighting in Laos. But the way
want a Senator poking around the State Department described
in the clandestine war that that it, they were just "volunteers"
the United States was waging ?the department took deep uin-
there. ? . brage at use of the word "mer-
: . Senator Symington eventually cenaries"---who were in Lao: at
got to Laos a couple of years "the request" of Prime Minister
later, and in the past two years Souvanna Fhotima. ?
he has sent staff investigators Fulbright's Comments
from his Senate Foreign Rcla- "A misrepresentation of the
-Cons su'ocormnittee to that iso- faets,,, sputtered senator J. W.
late(' Indochinese country. Last Fulbright, chairman of the Sen-
- week, before an unusual secret ate Foreign Relations Commit-
session, Mr. Symington presented tee, The "volunteers," he said,
Approved For Release 2000/05/1154. CIN-RtIP80-01601R00060p
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