U.S. EXPANDING WAR AGAIN IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000700020001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 99
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 29, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 31, 1971
• Content Type: NSPR

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Approved For Release 20011,0:3/,g#.:: A-RDP80-016
L I_ T ` r EJ r ~_, t Li t.! ;\` t.. 51 L_1 1tJtl. 1L J~,_ L.t_i i Lilt, !,a~;
Secretary of Defense Melvin R. 'LardS
public c':ai:ils of splendid progress of the Lon
Nol regime in Cambodia were iitcrally exploded
.by the daring com_nanc_o raid which c.estroyed
Phnom Pea:?'s w:iole air force tact week.
Exploded at the sal ]e time v,'cre some-official
myths:' about U.S. lxt'.iGy in Ca2:1100di~.
One of the main pur:;os o; Laud's
'Souti'cast AS'a?l 1=a7 ` as to wit. , the
Car:bo'..an C?"; r, to no a U.S. ii_._erY llf_o
that was being o.fic I y C':e C!. Until las.
week, I~aSl1!'1 i0`] claimed It had ? ilvi ?^ up
h _xon i?.S`'
to a state_ e ?f al Cte by i t I.
spring Shortly a `tei the b ;~i ".n_ 1 of U
invasion of Ca i? bodia: "Fl:1CI1 we come c.it,
..',I S.?.).
our logistical sup1,0_ and -O, rt w !1 . O
;come out." "Rut as Alvin Shuster obser': cd in
the Jan. 20 New Yor:.
Viet1i&::?ese r :?`.f lited and so Ai: cric.a11 air
support. _.?e 3lait:,. or t ""vat support, 'hoiiavc:,
rein^inc'd' a mystery-:?ntil the last fesr days."
Last press called
ettei?. _:on to the CC:1 ___.J' '? use- 0: U.S. aircra f t
in Cambodia, ~irr^_Siliii~,i0_] invente l the store
that it was merely solved i'._ "i1?terd i.C'':i01?
Iaids" against ''No: il'_ ~JICLIIa se on t eir , ay
to South Victr.^.l'_. This t"Cn, and `ra _ati as
stepped-up U.S. involvement in combat-support
operations, Cooper, said: "I certainly think it iS
a Violation of the Si rit Of the
a( ciirg during a C' S ^'V i lterv:e\v, teta.t in
effect the law itself was being violated in
CaI?]bOCiia, CfLIrCI ,....CC, on .__..^ day that
the U.S. air war in Ct nbocl?a had gone far
beyond "a limiters one w`rich we vivre told
represented o!r pc'_ cp, to ge a .., e_' and
"Cy ila rCiCr
iI] tt`?.e Jan. 22 ''iJ ash; ^:1 'OSt.
Ma rder' coa'ln-td'I: said on
vy'cclnesday [Jan. 201, that if the administration
coos to do sO it '._se Can is ^ '.y add. ground
GO: ^,1'.1.". iC tt 7 1S _ ? ?, Cesar k an e cu,' teams.
`II that occurs,' C C+ilrcih, aloLlia tie
clear intent of Congress. .... This would be
+ 1
very e--;GUS brc-:c11 of :. ? f.__,`.,:.
1,
OI'i?_ .dl' t_'_.. Coo;= hurch a n1Cndment
Cambodian forces, but .that provision' c,'
d.ro?nee; in the final version durir`c, the
Set?ate ':louse conference on ti:e measure,
primarily because of V,hite House
Evidelitiy the V/kite Flo': se told the
Congressional - connferees that the U.S.
Operations vlcl'c Of a 1nited na tu:re.
STATINTL
On it werC G11L'.1iiR_sd L:_? it . Jan. 20 press ,J?
cc7;fcre.:lc^ VJilen L^' Ci COi?CCC.-' t1?8L fl?C U.S.
Novi t:-at it is c'cal tits v-c-, lre is q1 itc
hae, boon Lai?' ?.^d :JO? is CCni._iC C to is 'CC L!S^. r
of its Cc7i?00(11:^. e? Cl1tt':Cn+_, 1^~iSi8'on :'/as ..n _:4 JEIl. ! I by
V.- of v.l c mcill' ,^,rs ct .'-c 7'ol1?'b .
II (''1 - ??J^ . t:lre to +.,
i . r r
0. I me.-S to "pro ec ll: .rJC: St^?CS aS
i"eo iS_: :i?C ?S VJi LI prS i'e01 C:.._ O:?
,. er sea Comb.- L s11)pG,~~t f
statemer :s, s a it it was . a. mater Of v ryli'._...ry C% 7raii.Cr_S
< +? +> 1+ cMbod;a." i~Se.]o.. 11J, \.i1_:?.TC:i =0. Cooper
It \ s scl"naI?tics, of co:r- c, but a I'eCJ
es^a a t o:i o is a R%c caL'cd for ,t s t li _ 0 ri
of Itel:'ion: Cc1:;, o \~1 ,o.,, c_ i.
:, s. (..o' o tls _
c ma! 1 P l s rnoc:atic
Il S co -,h t- )v t t 1: co )` _s 1 _ (i Ili Fi0 z~s r:C1:1JCTS,
a.',.?p of
C zvo. Ca CG S' on s':ins 1-1t Glii (,:
v/lil'ai'? F. Ryan of f :-c.1'! 170;.1 O Llced a
hai?and J u tried to GIS`,l: cave fact is at a
1 1'eSOl?lilOri C rl i::' for t,ld `iT; ;accn:.a halt of all
new escalatiol: .vas I'll pro ress by l:]s:stm;; that r-.. t,
+ L 1 ~c ~asLP_sl
it was e ~Iy part of thte Nixon eoct:in1, oir: slue acons by
i. t ^ Ci?^.Ji?aiaili:~i t e eo .,ti, Jf. aiic Jc.. of all U.S.
S7eC,C?f ?....CCi ?t S&V.ar' f'Ves iii Vie a..ra] ?.i:C;
prolnoti:l " ..irl ITC ii of il^ L J;?S F
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STATINTL
t c '1 i0 CO1inll"Ltce Ci}ti'!7 C1
tll l11`( of thc' I.S., co lll'lit-
j1t `crc(` t';' r1L - 1 Cf C C SS 11]}i'y
o' i1 ~'1 .v' r), i. }ltnl It 111 'CC rll l1 e rc
tr t at tI 1' VC l i'l] P a% .T? nll .11~" tU h p null-
CX4 tlfi ' l :i.lil4f dC taiy-aid to 1'11,1111 at a Ii1-h
lOVi'1 SIll,} `tCon"re' lie-
s 1t}lout t (I! t ;ir' i ll ^rt IICVCCl t}7't. SLtC'i 2:C! S1 S
?in ~ Cil ,15 -: -by I'1Lai1S
[Jof redtirai. ns iii `the r 'ular
STATINTL
Approved FierltR?Ieas i2OQ 4 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R0007000.20001-5
which it 11a?l tpp rovCd."
 Approved For Release 20019 i84 ?-60k-RDP80-016
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E`!ed i th r h o ' hif c )+3 I.5 rfjgift Y r7, Id ,it ';t
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the csidniit. Am= .r i)PJJic+r, hus : i l& r.7L:?` ih.;
Yrt'ri,2j 1';2Ca lilt J'i:"lii.'?; it so'i'C:'.S O this ch'u f1ev.?r
tfr e':'f1`?`:.iri (? f~iifi'ii: ?:?Y: .:I'f. in VM', Oy, GJE?.ic??'i,.'.&.f
.dCCilet's in FPiiiicor in Iior& Kc'n- 7f;i is
FjIE's!E'Si iii G? L'!'t ii' %P.ffCiB'?? #End rianu3iG.?fi'nli."
Ey3O1i it GHEr
:BEIRU'i', Lebanolt I - leave just '1'he movement of l1 groin fl onl southern
spent five months exploring the world- 1rancc: to the United States was once
wide pip;ailie s clown which the ilneil liar- dornhiateci by the American Mafia;' But
cotics dru f; ti affic flow s. In the course of a 3101.1i the Corsican heroin rnanufacfttrers
round-the orid trip 1 found that with no have so muchtosell that they 111cet all the
i'sp-ecial entree to underworld circles it
wes'possible, with time a.
.every. ))Id 7rillogalctru;.
cr+' a?r;i is i,'~ i)E'i;iCii? I
In Afll tnistan Pi?kistan and 'l has
6,- r Of land, I came easily to the point of pun- ,
Chase for opiuni. III Laos I could have .
bwghtltbyt.llesIllallplaneload. c ciriyr m e ;digs is #agt ::`:i,nt
t'ei;e ul~nfi
Sometimes the;t, ~, 'ifficultiesof ... ts? extensive l+?Q2.,
`OICI1 Sellers suspected me of being all out of Kok. . 1
undercover narcotics agent or a police
officer. Bu t, ?,.i th only a little more effort, I
could have bought opium in Judea, Tur- 1-1af ia's requirements and have plenty to
key an Mexico. spare. addition, they sell to Cuban,
~In Hong Kong I need walk but a few Americas, Negro, and Puerto Rican buy-
sc7 ps from the Christian Science Monitor "hg rings who have newly set up shop
' office to get the distinctive scent of smok- around Marseille, as `h'ell as to "indepeIld-
ing opium from the neighborhood vendor. cnt" purchasers.
In Beirut a Western diplomat offered As for hashish and m al'ijuana, I could
inc introductions to cocaine sellers in a havebougi;t this as easily as toothpaste or
number of nightclubs. ,
o _ c.,nuy throughout much of Asia, i'1 slid-
. Second-gr tae heroin, In small doses else East, and parts of Mexico. In Afghani.
Vas easily obtainable m Mexico and Hong Stan, hashish sellers distribute pamphlets
Kong. But in Marseille.I co?rld have advertising their own special brands.
bought top-grade heroin by. the lit (2.2 Hospitable policemen offer hippies a puff
pOunds), It. would have iaken an advance of "flash."
payment of $3,000 and several days' Isola- In Nepal, hashish pole's cheaper than
tion in a hotel room while the sellers tobacco. In Pakistan, a police officer. op.
checked iii,-, out. If they were s ltisfied, I posed. to the narcotics traffic told 111e lie
could have been reasonably sure ' of had sold a kilo of hash i ,il'o ma1-~e n'oli^y
beach in Irong Kong. T1iiere the pushers
are trying to proposition American child-
),oil from the international school nearby.
American schools in Bangkok, Thai-
land and Ankara, 'f urkey, have encoun-
tered similar problems.
A lea ding Italian psychologist says 30
percent of young people between 11 and 22
in Roln Aare using sole kind of drug. Use
of stimulants IS so serious in Sweden that
the Swedish Government is in the fore-
front of a campaign for strict new interna
tional controls. Deaths from heroin use;
have startled France.
-'Even the Soviet. Union has admitted
some "hefts of narcotic drugs from phar-
macies'end hospitals." The Soviets say
illicit traffic poses "no problems" in their
country. Other sources says Soviet offi-
cials are quietly concei'n?ed about the
Smuggled inflow of drugs from the.W'est.
Pei)-,pills are in vogue with some Czc-
choslo, lcia.ti youths. The Prague weekly
Kvety says drug addiction in the capital is
reaching alarming proportions. Some
addicts have been getting high on cactus
extract stolen from Prague's i>otanical
gardens.
In countries like '.turkey and Lebanon,
the narcotics seller is often an informer,
to, pal ticul arlY upon small tim or ama-
eninu. 'iil8 w1tl1 Yd k110 Of 1) 11'^ her S
Il. 1' 1 '
sl itlznl and t do of 4Xft#lL.l as~~46 '/~ = DP80-11601 R000700020001-5.
the s_..ti yn.1 .ic clogs ^ e,,,,,?ss~:, in"
how Ever, that the transaction would have anllihetarnines, the barbiturates, the hat-
been'compl'eted without my ever n eetin r 17Jrinn~r7,c -- fha f7 ct arinrl 'nn thn
 Approved For Release 20011 /Q4(: :1A-RDP80
STATINTL
By 'J" ilP.iY IBU'CJlL E, operation, lC j i ; only the Co?1-
Fpeciat to ih S:ar iminist version available. The
VIEN i T.,N_G U.S. an Lao, Co:nnlun is cin m fr, c? cl
forces have conipleted what ap-
pears to be a ma for operation
against the main. Will Vict-
namese supply area in northern
Laos, the Panban Valley, in
what well-infol?JnCl sources here
See, as an alteiupt to stave off
new Hanoi offensives in northern
Laos.
710 Valley, ace( rdlil ' to r iii-
tary sources, is full of military
Supplies b:'ought. by trucks Corn-
ing clown Laos Routes 6 and 7
from North Vietnam and the
To& are preparing to move
these supplies to th nir forces on
the southern edge of the Plain of
Jars.
Reels Give Only Version
These forces threaten the joint
U.S.-Lao base area of Long
Chien 75 miles nor east of here.
. Neither Lao nor U.S. solaces
here are willing to discuss the
tion, started sovc'al'i'1C'. Ies azo,
in olved strikes by, the U.S. Air
Force and Lao troops flown in
66 flights'' of American h:li-
copters. 'Ihe Pallet Lao radio
called the operation "nltilt ibat-
talionc'+( .
The attack was mado near
B nn '1'ha village north of
Bonbon, the Reds say. Parthaci
is st the north junction of routes
6 and 7 aniticeast of )peas. Lao
Si'atar'y sources say they are
not discussing the operation pub-
licly as a matter of "high poli-
ties." Diplomats believe Ohs
means the Lao z overnrlent
fears the CoiInunists will use
the Banban op: ation as an ex
ctae to break ON already dead
locked talks with Premier Scm-
vanna Pilcnlr.z.
Diplomats concede the possi-
ble military n essily of Me op
oration but view the inning ns
pcc as lore es some )lope for
ne? oaat.iorl remained.
Poz'ts to Control
The fact the Operation mys
launched, -, diplomats say, incii-
catcs Lao generals run the gose
erninent., riot Sonvalina Phouma.
i4Sil.itary ? sources say Hanoi
trucks still are moving along Rt.
. .
7, most of them tlr iNg U.S. air
strikes aid ground sari ccs led by
U.S, acivisa's.
Tire milclary believe that once
snffietent supplies reach 11anoi's
troops on the south edge of the
plain they will launch new at
tac's to d toy tribal
gr.arrill s
in the CIA's priva to army. Such
an attack is predicted for Febru-
cry or when heat, dust,
mache and hare hamper U.S. air
strikes. No results of the Ban-
ban strive are available, as the
U.S. military here keeps silent
and correspn:?ienis are har'redl
from areas of U.S. military ac-~
tivi' y.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000700020001-5
 Approved For Release 2001]1p4o -RDP80; 01
l~.
i Nov', lie e c';ay.r;dy.e,.c; the G, con Be-
Sta conc. ponc7cat of The Christian Science Ilfonitor ;rots are being pllascd out Of Vietnam and
bins F i?-vo ;, Tu'6' !cut back in strength. From a peak strength
Tile star, Of the Special Forces seems very much on tilled to drop to some\? he CS between 5,010
the rise again, and 7S_00 Men? dependin s Upon -how tCJll711
the John F, Kennedy Center for Military Assistance,
has emerged from a period of at least partial eclipse
with berets intact and prospects excellent.
The raid on the North Vietnamese prison camp at
Son Tay helped focus of icial favor on the Green Berets
once a.," in, after a. long period in which they were most
often thought of, unfavorably, in connection with the
alleged slaying of a supposed double agent in \'ieinam.
In the wale of Son Tay, a certain air of relief and
Cori deuce is evident here, In a ratter of weeks, Grccil
Wets have been publicly decorated by the WAWA and Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird has made a
ltrip here to ,give out more awards. -
One senior officer here put it this way: "It is )list
this sort of thing that helps bring spirits up. People
-who might have been thinking of going back into the
;regular Army or getting out might l;ovr pause and cle-
cide to stick it out longer with the idea that another
bik-of adieu alight come along "
Although Son Tay failed to yield any American pris-
oners, it brought very much to offleial attention the
usefulne :> of Special Forces units in some extraordi-
nary situations.
With. their varied talents, the Berets provide the ad
minisrcetion with a broader scope of possible responses
to =ary needs. At a time a,h:,n military capabilities.
are rapidly, they help keep options open.
'.i'hvy i t 0-o the current
scene for several other
rer;, hs:
f'.. Ii ?rl.\C?;l dectrin spells out rather clearly what'
are at :w 1c too administration's intentions as to the
sort r j help` friendly rations in Asia can expect, With,
some d1gerences, the same concepts can -- and pos-
Pos-
y }vi --- b c i
sibly app~ied generally to nations in L', pc-
Called "Aird e:or'ld." As Ter, Nixon sees it, Am; rieaas
Will provide supplies and advice when national-security
Interests : ;cite to dictate It, but no American fighting
men. The:'e are circumstances where help could legi-
cally be ;van primarily by Green Berets, as has been
the casC1.i c,inc 1I:Si^nec, in t a rl-
o The i .rrny itself liar never been completely happy
with the Green Ber ts, with their different garb, ways,
and-doctrhie, but there is a growing realization in the
Pentagon that they may be a riot-very- .ostly way to be
ready when the White 1louse ss.al;s the Pent- gon to gel
something done.
0 Because they are an elite unit with a certain
att_c.ction for young men with a bent for something
YWCA, the Green Berets are being vi wed favorably
as way to at.tract.volunteree's.
The advent of I1 volunteer Army is viewed in the
Pentagon with a certain degree of trepicletion. Use
Green Berets are strictly volunteer, welcomed by those
who have faced the grim statistics showing how very
fc\v youlii mil are wi11ing1ir join the Array in combat
roles today,
total of about L5, million at the peal. of the
war to between ^0,000 and 000,0':;0, accord-
ing to current in lications. Thins Special
Forces -?_anp ower losses appear likely to.
he less severe titan those of the whole
Army in terms 6f-percentages.
At pre.`','ent, there .i e six Special Forces
groups. Two are at ` Fort Bragg. The 5th
is in Vietnam, and the 1st is in G?:iiiawa-
The 0til is' in Panama, 'and On 10th is di-
vided bet;=Teen Fort Dev:-ns, Mass., and
Europe. There are also four groups ,in the
reserve forces:
A group varies in size, but it averages
around 1,500 nlen. Special Forces of icers
say that one group can form the cadre for
41,?~, divisions. -
If the administration decides it is in the
security interests of the United States to
help out in Asia within limits, it may be
that the Special Forces and experts in war
of national liberation might be nr>.n-for-n?an
the most valuable commodities in the
fense establishment.
CI'A tiers Ytciad
The Green Berets and the Central Intel-
ligeL-ce Agency t'rot'?keci often in consort in
Laos and in Vietnam. At first in Vietnam,
the Special Forces units carried out a broad
range of v.-hat are often called counter-
MS11rgenCVtasks. As Army involvement ex-
pandcd, however, the Green Beret' field
narrowed.
The Berets have found themselves con
centrating in recent years upon training the
Vietnamese special force and. of Canlbo-
dians, 'montagnards, and other groups to
help with border defenses. The civilian ir-
regular defense-greulp camps have been op-
erated under- the aegis of the Berets.
Many elements, of the Army have long
resented the Green Beret relationship With
the Central Intelligence Ageneyk and the
Berets are treated v,ith a certain wariness.
It is significant that a man whose cre-
dentials are well based in the regular Array
is always named to head the school and
center at Fort Bragg.
- But, because' the Berets are the Army's
main experts in guerrilla warfare, intelli-
grace missions, and direct Llllllateral spe-
cial operations, such as the attack at Son
Tay, it appears that there will always be a
place for them. -
STATINTL
? f
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 STATINTL
Apprroved For Release `C~170/ti4 CtA-RDP80-01601 R
2G D E C
By Mark Frankl6nd
Londoe Obmver
PARSE,' Laos, Dec. 19-
From the back seat of an
ancient Laot''an air force
fighter-bomber, Paksie Site
,`twenty-two does not look
much of a place to fight
over: a dirt.l anding strip, the
outlines of defensive posi-
tions, some ` huts covered
with yellow-brown dust. Yet
At is around PS-22 that one,
of the most important battles
of the Indochina war is
likely to be fought.
For several years Anieri-
cans have used Site 22 and
other places like it on the
edge of the Bolovens Plateau
T\'eres, Analysis
to spy 011' and sabotage the
North Vietnamese trail sys-
'tetn in the mountains that
;start a few miles to the'~east.
This U.S. operation has been
I a nuisance to Hanoi, but
,more or less a tolerable one.
The situation today, how-
ever, is quite different. The
odertlirow of Cambodian
Head of State Prince Noro-
dom Sihanouk in March and
the loss of the port of Sihan-
oukville (renamed Kompong
Som) for North Vietnamese
supplies has at least doubled
the importance of the Ho
Chi Minh trail to Hanoi.
The North Vietnamese are
expanding the trail system
to the west, but cannot do so
easily as long as American-
led guerrillas remain on the
Bolovens Plateau.
. A few hundred yards cast
of Site 22, the plateau ends
in an abrupt fall of about
3,000 feet to the Mekong
River. The fast flowing and
treacherous river curves
around the plateau's edge
and into Communist-con-
trolled Northern Cambodia.
But Americans have mined
the river, greatly hampering
North V,ictnamese attempts
to develop the upper reaches
of the Mekong into a new
supply route.
The American sites also
limit the extent to which the
Communists can infiltrate
south across the Bolovens
Plateau itself. It is doubtful
that the two government-
controlled towns on the
plateau could hold out if the
sites were destroyed.
A few months ago the
Communists created panic
in Pak Song, larger of the
two, just by sending in mes.
sengers to announce that an
attack was imminent.
Two weeks ago the North
Vietnamese tried and failed
to take Site 22, which is also
a supply and training center
for other outposts. It is as-
sumed they will try again
and that next time they
might succeed.
This puts the Americans
in something of a spot, be-
cause guerrilla sites on Bolo-
vens Plateau belong to
- Washington's half-b i l l i o n
dollar a year secret war in
Laos. Special guerrilla units
The armee clandestine, as
the American-led guerrilla
force is known here, is
scarcely clandestine any
more. It has been written
about by reporters and in-.
vestigated by senators.
There are even people who
claim to have seen some of
its football teams wearing
shirts with the initials AC.
But since the CIA is,' by
American standards, any-
how, a secret organization
and its agents have under
the Geneva agreements no
more right to be in Laos
than the North Vietnamese,
the battle for Bolovens is
hidden in clouds of official
discretion.
It is only since the North
Vietnamese threat to Bolo-
vens developed that the
regular Laotian army has
had anything to do with the
guerrilla sites.
But the Lao army is being
pushed into the Bolovens
battle by Hanoi's increased
pressure and American vul-
nerability: special guerrilla
units were never meant for
defensive warfare. It was a
regular Lao infantry bat-
talion which helped to save
Site 22 two weeks ago and
had a very rough time of it.
The Lao army is getting
near the end of its human
resources. Its recruits in-
oil Bolovens Plateau and elude teen-agers.
elsewhere are trained and / The effort the Lao army is
led by the Central Intelli- being asked to make . on
gence Agency. Bolovens is wid,-ly ihumt;iit.
Accountants from the CIA to be hopeie. s. Almost
arrive regularly at the sites everyone says. "the North
in helicopters to pay the Vietnamese can take the
Laotian guerrillas three Bolovens she;; 'it they're
times as much as. ordinary ready to pay the price"--and
Lao soldiers get. it is assuirrd they are.
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 TF11 ECONOMIST
Approved, For Release 20 /b PRJI DP80-
tLaos
``1 ho wv r for
sout
FROM OUR CO:RRESPOND'_-NT IN LAOS
The North Vietnamese seem to be set
for an attempt to tighten their grip
on southern Laos. Such a move would
protect their one remaining supply
corridor into Cambodia and the
bottom half of South Vietnam.
Their interest centres on the vast
Bolovens plateau which rises between
the Mekong river and the. South
Vietnamese border. The Kong river,
which runs along the plateau's eastern
flank, as well as the vehicle trails
across the plateau itself, are useful
supply lines into Cambodia and sup-
plement the more - important trails
farther east. The. Bolovens plateau
is extremely fertile and could feed two
or three communist divisions.
But guerrillas belonging to the
operated from a score of sites around
the northern, and. eastern fringes of
the plateau for several years. They
have been used to gather intelligence
and to sabotage the communist trails.
They are also well placed to harass
traffic down the Kong river. This
winter the North Vietnamese said they
were going to knock out these sites.
They have already captured four bases
on the eastern rim, one near Attopeu.
But -a fortnight ago three North
Vietnamese battalions attacked Site 22,
a major training and supply centre. It
seems . that they. were unaware that
the government had reinforced this
base with- a regular infantry battalion
from Pakse. ,. The' communists were
driven off, and suffered heavy
casualties. The Laotians say the enemy
lost more than 300 ` men, but they
concede that 29 of their own men
were killed, and 66 wounded. These
figures add up to a big battle by
Laotian standards.
It is generally accepted in Pakse
that the 'communists will strike again.
-Visibility from the air will get worse
over the plateau from month to month
as the smoke haze grows. The veterans
of the " secret army " are not trained
to fight defensively, and the Laotian
army in the south has had trouble in
finding new recruits and Js taking in
boys of 14 . and '15. Pathet Lao
propaganda claims that the com-
munists will , take the two small towns
of Pak Song and Houei Kong on the
directed and paid by the American
Central Intelligence Agency, have
~Saravane
THAILAND Pak Song
plateau before the dry season is out.
The North Vietnamese seem try
believe that their military needs out.
weigh the political dangers of a
heightened offensive. Some observers
in Vientiane thought that -the Pathe#
Lao were.reluctant to attack Attopeu
and Saravane earlier this year because
neither fell into the communist or
neutral zones defined by the 1962
Geneva agreements. But the North
Vietnamese judged-the argument goes
on-that both towns had to be taken
to give them secure access to Route 23
and other roads needed to bring more
supplies down' from the north.
All this could mean the beginning of
a new chapter in the Laotian war. In
the 'old days, the battle for the trails
in southern Laos was mainly left to
American air power and the " secret
army." In the past, Prince Souvanna
Phouma, the Laotian prime minister,
has spoken of this war for the trails
as something separate from the Laotian
war, and implied .that the latter could
be settled without bothering about the
former. But at Site 22 regular govern-
ment troops played a major. part for
the first time in this "secret war."
The Laotians can hardly sit back aiid
watch the Pathet Lao and the North.
Vietnamese take over the -Bolovens
plateau. That would leave the `govern-
meat controlling little in .the south
except the town of Pakse.
But what can the Laotians do about'
it ? They could send in regular troops
to attack the trail network at its
most vulnerable point : to the south-
west of where the two Vietnams , and
Laos meet: Some South Vietnamese
generals would very much like to help,
with that. One senior Laotian minister
declared that any such move would
'mean " political suicide " for Laos. But
the prospect in the south as things
stand now is slow strangulation unless
the government holds its bases.
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 F,. rlMA
"Nina government E, tt ;liens st .ioned (in iloi'OvI
eastern Burma near the border viiul People's Cbin;l
ware' forced to abandon a Taroc area . . . near t;
frontier" recently, :'rot Jea n-Claycla Ponlonti for Le
Moncie Since 1232, he said, "shir rili-Illnu has cone 0.
virtually without resp)ite... The regular army (is]
cornpoced of 140,000 batt!e-hardened veterans equipped
by the U.S." .'. Michael Morro'.v reported recently
from Laos: "Burmese border officials at theTh.ai-Burma
'border nordl`,,ast of here claim there is pErmanent CIA
'intelligent catl;e;in activity' ming on in Burma near
the Chinese and Laaao borders. 'tl/hito Chinese' ;ucrri!ias
(remnants of Chian E~ .1 #h+":!:'S army forced out of
China) nurabaririy 2000 men armed with i:1.1, t,'-2 and
M-16 rifles are also said by the to be active in
the same area".... Mi.,Lcracj in Cull-i-3 is Le-,Cord,
to the test census: c8 i'i of' the v.ornerl and 44% of the
rlc n call n-1-mar L. d noi-'r.'r write.
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1,17
(J J
STATINTL
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 Approved For Release 200~ 19?(O t~ `QIA-RDP80-01601 R000
STATI NTL
10
New View of Laos
To the Editor-
t, `Princess Souvanna Phouma's letter
of Dec. 5 contains a number of serious
factual errors which should be cor-
rected before they add confusion to
the, already complex Laotian situa.tion.
She arguca that white Phoullli Nosa-
Van and Prince Soul : have
been belligerent, Prince Souvanna
Phouma has upheld the Laotian tradi-
tion of nonviolence. Since Nov. 1, 1968,
the United States Air Force has con-
ductcd between 20,000 and 30,000
bombing sorties throughout Laos,
making it one of the most heavily
bombed nations in the history of war-
fare. Yet it is Souvanna Phounia who
permitted the bombing to begin in
1964, has allowed it to continue, and
even denies that it is happening.
It is this massive bombing of homes
and tillages which has forced over
600,000 refugees to flee to government
camps, not the continued presence of
Noi th Vietnamese troops. -
'The Princess argues that the 1982
Geneva Accords broke clown because
Soupilanouvong kept North Vietnam-
ese. troops in Laos. In fact, the agree-
rnnts broke down over the issue of
Air America's arms flights to the
C.I.A.'s secret army, which was coil-
ducting operations behind the
Pathet oLao cease-fire line.
Nor is it true that Souvanna Phoul la
has never allowed foreign troops to
fight on Lao soil. There are currently
over 5,000 regular Thai Government
troops in Cha.mpassak and Savaboury
Provinces, some 1,500 Cambodian sol-
diers in Clianlpassak, and an unknown
number of "r-Aired" U.S. Green herets
,advising the C.I.A.'s secret aridly.
The. Princess says that Souphanou?-
vong can end the war Simply by taking
the Cabinet post which awaits him in
Vientiane. However, after his electoral
Victory in 1953, SOllphonOUVOrig was
arrested without cause and held for a
year until ha barely avoided execution
by escaping from prison.
o ?,12 C% ~.l...~
Merit sd:th good cause after two of his
political allies in the Government were,
Pssns striated in Vientiane.
Al.r:asD W. McCoy
;New Haven, bee. 5, 1970
The ouihor is a doctoral student in the
Asian ITistory progr-can at Yale, end
national coord.inntor of the Committee
of Concerned Asian Scholars.
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 J[1W i:;7I STATINTL
3L ) -\ f
1, y
lies an f{ 1}~ S,{ y~;Si fo example, have had cfilliculty gan-
Q700020 GIt-5'lhieh is critical
a yast`c.PrrlcTftP`941 rYr}h001?11bh1 17Cy !(rltl'~NrR I1 n1 tIA-~i tic RSQcI~Vi~ &
the U.S. to aiding other countries if war broke out. More of the supersonic transport; the Justice Department claims
often than not, details of the commitments were kept secret that the report is a "presidential document" and thus net sub-
- -.. - . . . . . .. [ -._ 1 I-....- i)...-..., n I;.,- ..r .. - , t iron ~i ;, ,,, t it l';'
Jt CONFLICT almost as old as dcmperatic government it-
Self raging anew in Washington these days. The
issue is the accessibility of information about Government op-
erations. This conflict often pits the President and the. Ex-
ectitive Branch against Congress, regulatory agencies against
consumer interests, bureaucrats against environmentalists,
Congress against the voter, the courts against the bar and,
at tinges, the news media against all of them. At its highest lev-
;els, the pitch of the argument is tuned by public dis-
quietude over the war in Southeast Asia, and by public
''concern lest new foreign undertakings, veiled in secrecy,
lead to new military commitments, if not to new wars.
A 'current cliche from the political lexicon-"the people's
right to' know"--marks the battlefield but does not exactly il-
luminate it. This lofty phrase was first used a quarter of a cen-
tury ago by the late Kent Cooper, then executive director
of the Associated Press. "It means," he explained, "that the
Government may not, and the newspapers and broadcasters
should riot, by any method whatever, curb delivery of any in-
formation essential to the public welfare and enlightenment."
The. Constitution, as it happens, does not provide for any
such right. The courts, moreover, have never interpreted the.
First Amendment---which prohibits Congress from abridging
freedom of speech or the press--as requiring the Gov-
.ernment to slake unlimited disclosures about its activities.
delicate Activities. Indeed, an uncurbed "right to know"
collides dramatically with what might be called "the right
not to }:now." Ever since governments were first conceived
by man, public officials have argued that certain delicate ac-
tivities of the state were best conducted in secrecy--intel-
ligcnce operations, for instance, or diplomatic dealings. In
,the U.S., specifhc provisions for secrecy have quite often
been enacted by Congress, as in the acts establishing the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency and the Atomic Energy Com-
nhission. Congress has also allowed business enterprises the
right to hold inviolate their trade secrets, processes and
many other internal , operations.
In addition, the courts have upheld the validity of legal stric-
tures concerning the substantial privacy of federal income
tax returns, the raw investigatory files of the rut, testimony
given to federal grand juries, the confidential nature of the
doctor-patient relationship, and a host of other matters.
More often than not, Presidents have been able to shield
their personal subordinates and the internal papers of their
Administrations from investigation by either Congress or
the press on the grounds of "executive privilege."
Many historians, philosophers and journalists agree that
there have to be certain checks on the unlimited right of
the public to knowledge about its government. Clinton -Ros-
siter, a leading historian of the presidency, counted executive
secrecy in diplomacy an essential prerogative of a President.
Columnist Walter Lippnlann, in his classic The Public l'hi=
losophv, observed that only within an ideal society, where
laws of rational order prevail, is there "sure and sufficient
ground for the freedom to ' speak and to publish." Even
James Russell Wiggins, former editor of the Washington
Yost and an articulate spokesman for press freedom, takes
no unlimited view of "the right to know." While decrying
the proliferation .of governmental secrecy, he writes: "We
can give up a lit(lc. freedom without surrendering all of it.
We can 'have a little secrecy without having a Government
that is altogether secret. Each added measure of secrecy, how-
ever, measurably diminishes our freedom."
Secret Details. The question arises whether or not too
many pleasures of secrecy have been imposed upon the con-
duct of public affairs in America. A case in point is the ex-
traordinary number of military and diplomatic agreements
ti, IT S h s m'ld''in recent 'ears with in assortment of al-
m'en or equally inquisitive congressional investigators.
Consider l los. It is no secret any longer that the U.S. is
today deeply involved in an undeclared war there, allied
with the supposedly neutralist government of Prince Sou-
vanna Phouma against the North Vietnamese and the Pa-
thet Lao. Yet only after Senator Stuart Synhington's For-
eign Relations Subcommittee looked into the platter, against
the wishes of the State Department, did the American pub-
lie learn in detail how U.S. aircraft based in Thailand were
bombing northern Laos, then CiA was guiding the operatiorYx
of A?Ico tribesmen, and the U.S. was providing millions in rnil-
itai:y assistance to Souvanna Phouma--all clear violations
of the 1962 Geneva accords on Laotian neutrality.
Among the. reasons for secrecy about Taos advanced by
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William Sullivan was
that the U.S. wanted to avoid forcing .the Russians into tak-
ing "official" coguizance, of activities about which they
knew only unofficially. Plaintively, Senator Symington sug_
gested that the U.S. public had a valid interest in knowing
what was going on in Laos, since "we could run into the
sank kind of escalation as we did in Viet Nam."
Symington's subcommittee also uncovered, for the first.
time, details of secret agreements with Ethiopia dating back
.to 1960, under which the U.S. has armed a 40,000-man
army at a cost to the American taxpayer of $159 million. Al-
though the extent of U.S. arms assistance to Emperor
Haile Selassie is still cloaked by security, State Department
offcials admit that U.S. bombs inc] ammunition have been
used against insurgent rebels and that U.S. military advisers
supervise the training of Ethiopian troops. In defense of
this agreement, Assistant Secretary of State David New-
som told the subcommittee that disclosures about Ethiopia
had not been made because of "the great sensitivity" of the
Emperor. Presumably, in State Department thinking, the
"sensitivity" of the American public and Congress to this
major diplomatic undertaking was of lesser importance.
Too Much "Exdis." Occasionally, the Government's con-
cern for secrecy affects riot only the public's right to know
but its own efficiency of operatio.n. When officials of the
Water Pollution Control Administration flew to New Or-
leans recently to investigate a fire on an offshore oil chilling
platform in the Gulf of Mexico, they discovered that the rel-
evant papers had been locked up by the Interior -De-
partment's Geological Survey, which was responsible for
supervising the drilling. A recent study of the State Dc-
partment's operations found that too'many reports from-the
field were being marked "exclusive" or "no distribution"
("Exdis" and "Niodis" in State lingo). As a result, so much cur-
rent information is restricted to senior officials that the judg-
ment of their subordinates is often irrelevant or out of date.
Information gathered at the taxpayers' expense is often
kept secret for no better reason than apathy or red tape.
When Dr. J.R. Rhine of Duke University, the noted expert
on parapsychology, was asked recently to undertake some re-
search for the Department of Defense, he agreed----but at
the same time inquired why an 1#-year-old study of his on
the training of dogs to detect land mines had never been
made public. Apparently, no one had bothered to declassify
the material. A more pressing case of bureaucratic inep-
titude involves the Atomic Energy Commission, which holds
literally thousands of research papers and reports in clas-
sified storage. The material cannot be released because the
commission cannot hire the personnel needed to declassify it
-even though the reports would be of significaricc for tile
peaceful development of atomic energy.
The -Government's predilection to do as much as possible
in secrecy also affects domestic issues of fairly direct con-
cern to the taxpayer. Environmentalists opposcd to devcl-
 Approved For Release 2001/61164 ":
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P'
101Y. 'J.'t1O yi;J y A l3f:UCi=i,i?,
Special fu Ti!c Star
VII N'T J.A.NE --- `Talks ainlcd
at negoti tioiis b tw en Pletnhev
Souvainm Phouma, Laos rightist
and .Laos Coiiiiilttnists have vir-
tually collapsed, high ra.Ilking of-
ficials.hei'c say..
sees no
hope of talks taking place in til2
immediate future,'' a top Laos
official said. '
'!'he Pa,, )el Lao radio has
called the convers atio,is
b tv, e ,i
the Pathet Lao envoy, Prince
Soul: Vongsali, and ionvauina
an Inip~ISSG.
Diplomats say the reason the
STATI NTL
/
game," a dielornat said. "They
offer So lvaima ti n carrot of
settlement. then whenip him
over the Bead with military nc-
tion." )l led of -ohs coiltrihl ig
to the in reared tennpa of fi ;11t?.
into, ii1 ). em; arec now, part of ill'!
Fi'i1lIlllp," c''ploin.ais Say, as the
. talks collaps .
the ii(:us desperat:ly NS'-:nt to
nes to #;1.-'.'l; diem
political protection for.snnctu-
ario;l no , buildi:. u) on th 'i o
Chi Mirnhin the Scalp Laos
p_,.rihaildle to 'support the Viet? '
n;nn. and Cambodia offensives.
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ing Laos ml it ry rC`}ohs as al-
most. ~, arlord ."
Diplo;,lats? point out, however,
the Cor,iiinulisis their.
own attacl'S . ngeii st Souvailna
and l on -le. in 1963 which bcipad
destroy h,ao; iloutrali y. Diplo-
mats support. the I,ao position
that it bo_lhll-IL halt should be
linked to North. Vietnamese
v,atthcb~awal. Past euj?::rit:nce has
proven, dipl:=!:~mi.ls say, IiCCii;
will bvAld up supplies if thai-c. is
an uticondit.iona
1 honln;' h?-tc,
infiltrate troops to strong posi.-
tiorn and attack if tc Ns fail.
Carr(it and S kick
Hit's the old Carrot' a.ii stick
talks arc failing are (A) Com-
niumst. insistence that:,Souvahna
send a pleilijiot ntiary iil.his own
ii,mie and not as pi-ll_r;e minister
becausd they say the Lao gov-'
eniliilent. is illegal, (B.) Commu-
nist in sisteiice on. a U. S.. bomb-
ing.'halt in northern Leos, (C.)
The .position of llardcore rightist
cabinet members tinter which
Souvanna Iiialkes no concessions,
particularly on Lao insistence on
North Vietnainee troop with-
drawal linked to iiily bombing
halt, and (D.) the increased
tempo of L eeo fighting in the past
19 clays.
C1; hn Supported
Diplomats admit the Comniti..
nist contention Soavan;la 1111011-
ma is not the premier followinf
The U.S. is well. aware of this.
\Vit:Ih tight colirol thrcnhi the
supply of L,;() ar,ns and tltc
U.S.-co m anded tribal' special.
formes bailing the haunt of fight-
ing whil, the royal army ci ne'
Virtually nothing, the U.S. is in,
position to prevent Souva Tina
Illakingt concessions.
Lao officials alc riot ruling out
the possibility the U.S. or S aigoii
V,1111 sh-il c- a111sc the present
No Chi 11'Iiih Trail buildup.,
CiA's Private : f ly
U.S. or Soitth. Vietilt~.mesQ
strikes against the lto Chi Dainll
Trail. would u.xtouljtedii' be to
the U.S. t;civant' ` ebxoceed a estimates fofevenI" ihe > military attaches
 13ALTD111^ SUit
STATINTL-
Approved Foi
co I I.
Voris Out, Se ISToa
>vy GENE 01S11I
ftYashington aurcou of The 5i n]
Washington, Sept. 26-The
vIeo tribe of Laos, which the
United States molded into an
anti-Communist guerrilla force,
has been decimated and demor-
alized'after more than ten years
of fighting, according to Senate
investigators.
? The tribe numbered 400,000
members in 1950 but about half
of the men and a quarter of the
women and children have died
In the clandestine war in Laos.
Report By Subcommittee
This is one of the findings con-
tained in a staff report which
. Many Fear Risks
"Some observers feel," the re-
port said, "that many Mco
would probably prefer the risks
of accommodation with the Pa-
thet Lao and North Vietnamese
to the continued loss of life and
limb in a conflict, which, for
them ,'is endless."
A history of the Meo involve-
ment in the war was given last
May at a subcommittee hearing
by Ronald J. Rickenbach, a for-
mer official of the Agency for
International Development
(AID) who served in Laos.
When the North Vietnamese
began moving into northern
Laos in the late 1950's, he said,
the Meo, who have historically
been suspicious of outsider=s,
port paints a grim picture of the' saw their cause as. an effort to
Truman toll of the war in Viet- protect their highland home
.persons have been made home
less, according to staff investi-
gators.
The report was written by
Dale S. de Haan and Jerry M.
Tinker, staff members of the
;refugee subcommittee, who re-
cently completed a three-week
field study of the refugee prob-
lem in Indochina.
In releasing the report, Sena-
tor Edward M. Kennedy, the
said it
subcommittee chairman
t
,
was part of the subcommittees ?advising and funneling aid to thj
continuing effort "to docume,it guerrilla forces.
the devastating impact of the In the process,' Mr. Ricken-
Indochina war on the civilian bath said, the Meo and the other
population." bill tribe guerrillas "became un-
500,000 In South Vietnam witting pawns of the U.S.," serv-
The report states that more'ing the greater American inter-
than 500,000 refugees remain on est of countering the 'North Viet-
the . books in South Vietnam namese presence In Laos and
alone, with thousands more thereby' hindering their war ef-
being made homeless. by the fort in South Vietnam.
war every month. "Declination" Of Tribe
In Laos, .the refugee popula- Mr. de Haan and Mr. Tinker
tion is reaching the 300,000 of the subcommittee staff say in
or Internat
ona
Development
s
mark, while in less than six their report that "the cost to the total public health budget for
months the war in Cambodia Moo for this service has been
has created nearly a million ref- nothing short of the decimation 1.-Laos went toward financing the
ugees in. addition to the estimat-of their tribe." ? iparamilitary operations of the
ed 400,000 ethnic Vietnamese The tribe, the report states, CIA. T
who have been made homeless,' repeatedly has been driven out No Improvement
the report said. of its mountain villages in the in South Vietnam, the invest!-
As for the hill tribes of La& Jwaves of offensives and coon- gators reported, the refugee
which were armed and trained ter-offenses staged in Northern problem has not improved and,
first by the U.S. Special Forces Laos by government and Co- if anything, has eorsened, par.-
and later by the Central Inte,li Laos by government and Com- titularly in view of the influx of
gence Agency, the report states: munist forces almost annually 200,000 ethnic Vietnames from
"After long years of fleeing and since. 1962. Cambodia.
fighting, of moving and dying, "U.S. AID officials estimate, According to the report, most
their ranks today are demoral the report says, that during a , of the "successes" in the reset-
Ized and tragically thin." Yong mcve,.such as last spring's tlement programs have been ac-'
the Senate subcommittee on ref-
ugees released today. The re-
Guerrilla Force Formed
At this point, Mr. Rickenbach
said, Special Forces teams be-
gan arming, resupplying and ad-
vising the Meo along with the
other hill tribes, the Lao Teung
anti thecYao. What resulted, he
said, was , an anti-North Viet-
namese guerrilla force in north-
ern Laos.
After the 1962 Geneva ac-
cords, which banned overt U.S.
military involvement in Laos,
I evacuation from the hills along
the Plain of Jars, one out of
1 'every family of five (lies en
route."
"They Have Had It'."
The report also included a re-?
cent. internal memorandum of
the U.S. mission in Vientiane,
the administrative capital of
Laos.
The memorandum states in
part: "We must recognize that
in as much as a great measure
of tile effectiveness of the mili-
tary force lies ,'in its fighting
heart and its numbers, as well
as leadership and equipment,
the Moos and Lao Teung are no
longer the military asset they
were in the past . . . In other
words, they have been used to
the hilt and as many of them
are expressing-they have had
it!"
The memo recommends a
reassessment of U.S. plicy to-
ward the hill tribes. It suggests
that in the future humanitarian
factors ought to predominate
over military considerations.
"We could, in effect," the
memo states, "give them a fond
thanks for their services and
cast them adrift to shift for
themselves, faced with the spec-'
for ? of starvation and-or being'
absorbed (with increasing bitter
i n t o Communist-dominated i
areas. This, of course, would not
be humanitarian or strategically
sound considering U.S. objec-
tives in Laos." - The subcommittee staff report
states that another aspect of the
reclassification of certain
groups of refugees as having'
been resettled.
About 300;000 refugees. the re-
port says, have been statistical-
ly resettled by the U.S. mission
in Saigon, but their actual condi-
tion remains. the same.
As for civilian casualties in
the Vietnam war, the report
says, nearly 5,000 persons a
month foil.victinl to the war last
year, according to government
hospital records alone.
But this figure does not in-
clude persons treated at private
hospitals, rural dispensaries,
Special Forces and Viet Cong
hospitals, nor those who are
killed outright or die before they
reached a treatment facility.
If these additional numbers
were added, the report said, the
total civilian casualties over the
past year would be about 150;
000, including as many as 35,000
deaths. These figures
bring the total civilian
ties since 1965 to more
million, including 300,000
the report said.
would
casual-
than a
deaths,
refugee problem in Laos is that
until relatively' recently, the
U.S. aid program was essential=
ly a cover fo the CIA.
According to the subcommit-
tee's findings, the report says,
about 50 per cent of the Agency
f
i
l
'
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WASH
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5 11C'~r a~ ?-? ~
'By TAMI\IY ARBUCKLE
Special to The Star
VIENTIANE - Special Lao
guerrilla units have captured a
strategic mountain position on
the edge of the Bolovens Plateau
An southern Laos after three
days of fierce fighting.
The victory yesterday gives
government forces control of the
area. overlooking the provincial
capital of Attopeu and threatens
to cut Hanoi's Sekhoag River
Infiltration and supply route to
Cambodia.
Y) L
volved in the earlier phase of the during Hanoi's dry season of
attack, according to military fensive this year. Until yester-
sources. day, the offensive failed against
Advisers mostly have civilian stubborn North Vietnamese op-
status and are employed by the position. Gen. Men Vangpao's-
repulsed in a at-
Central Intelligence Agency. forces were
They are stationed on airstrips tempt to take the key position.
on eastern edge of the plateau o Man Na on the run of the,
where they run guerrilla teams Plain of Jars in North Laos this
into the Ho Chi Minh Trail area week.
under instructions from the Packed by U.S: air support
agency's Mekhong substation in Vangpao reached the hill over-
the town of Pakse. looking ran Na. Then a North
Part of the assault on the hill Vietnamese infantry counter at-
is General Lao rainy season of- tack sent his force reeling with
fensive to retake ground lost "moderate" casualties.
,The hill, called Royal Moun-
tain, was taken wit r the aid of
daily attacks by U.S. jets and
Lao piston-engined dive bomb-
ers.
Heavy Casualties
Casualties were reported
heavy on both sides. Lao guerril-
la units numbered about E00
men. L
"Artillery pieces up there can
.hell anything that moves,'' gov-
ernment sources boasted.
The capture of Royal Moun-
tain is the first Lao victory s nce
the government quietly launched
an offensive against the Corninu-
ists a month ago.
Government casualties from
the battle began arriving here
last night.
Drive Was Halted
Friday, the Lao guerrillas
were stopped 1,000 yards short
of their objective by North Viet-
namese troops in machine gun
nests and bunkers. The North
Vietnamese had foiled air
strikes dodging over the plateau
edge then returning to positions
during infantry assaults. "De-
layed action bombs were used to
crater the area" and aided in
the final victory, sources said.
Ten U.S.. advisers were in-
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 Approved For Release 2001 /03f1d4S lAL DP80-01601
'It' is a regrettable fact that
the problems of the people are
as overwhelming today as they
have been in the past and in
some ways even more so," he
said.
The staff study found that well
over 500,000 refugees remain on.
the books in South Vietnam,
while thousands more are falling
victim to the war every month.
The report said at .least three
million refugees,' not "on the
books" also remain in camps or
urban slums to which they
moved in recent years.
In 1969, the study asserted the
U.S. mission in Saigon "under-
took a deliberate campaign .. .
to eliminate the refugee prob-
lem by systematically classify-
ing it out of existence."
The report said that many ref-
ugees were "statistically reset-
tled" while remaining in their
old conditions.
In Laos, the report -asserted,
officially recognized refugees
approach 300,000 but ."low prior-
ity" attached to refugee prob-
lenis by the United States has
limited efforts to deal with the
in Cambodia, Kennedy sat roblem.
thousands of persons live in ' p Its findings asserted that the
squalor and filth in over- "formal" United States refugee
crowded refugee centers, while program has been a principal'
hospitals and dispensaries are "cover" for CIA-sponsored para-
over-burdened with thousands of military activities rather than
civilian war casualties. directed primarily at social or
"The situation is growing so, economic problems.
critical in Cambodia. that inter- 'And, in Cambodia, the study
national relief agencies in Gene- -Ifound that an official Cambodian;
"With the spreading of war
into Cambodia, fear has now
f ripped almost the entire popu-
ation of Indochina, vastly in-
creasing human misery, the flow
of refugees, and the occurrence
of civilian war casualties," he
said.
Kennedy, chairman of the Sen-
ate subcommittee on Refugees,
called for greater efforts to help
war victims yesterday as he re-
]eased a report by staff mem-
bers who recently visited Cam-
bodia, Laos and South Vietnam.
The report, prepared by Dale
S. de Haan, subcommittee coun-
sel, and Jerry M. Tinker, a con-
sultant, called for high priority
United Nations' actions to alle-
viate refugee and civilian cas-
ualty problems.
d
10 51 yi'i 2 O rr~~ ~ C L{'J
iF S,I
s E.~ r
_4 % e '6 4 0-
Ell
By DANA BULLEN
Star SLa(( writer
Sen. Edward M. Kennedy,
D-Mass., warned yesterday that
the plight of refugees in Inclo-
china is critical and criticized
the United States for a "busi-
ness-as-usual attitude toward
the problem.
va are now preparing for the view of "unconcern" over rcfu-
possibility of famine next year, _____,,,_I gee problems is shared by U.S.
are not planting this year's rice
crop due to the insecurity of the
countryside," he said.
` In Laos, Kennedy said satura-'
tionbombings and forced evacu-
ations have helped create "un-
told agony" for hundreds of
thousands of villagers. He said
his subcommittee was "dis-
'tressed" by a "continued lack of
urgency or active concern" by
Washington and Saigon for the
.social well-being. of South Viet-
namese.
"A business-as-usual attitude
,continues to pervade much of
our view of what needs to be
done, and a false sense of opti-
mism pervades much of our
view on what has been done,"
Kennedy said.
STATINTL
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 2 G SEP ivro
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By
20 people had. been killed by ~U.S.
said the village spokesman
'
,
s of six erts on Lacs
Ltj
cs oa: re Adjacent to some flooded ricefields, Sam Neua, capital of- the mines,whi!e working in their fields..
.province of the same name, !ay below us as we climbed one of the Under CIA-directed programs, agents also try to recruit spies
mountains completely surrounding the town on the way to a or "volunteers" for service with Van-, Pao. A man of 48 related
village of the Meo minority. that he had been lured to leave in 1967 by promises of high pay
The valley was a scene of pastoral beauty. But what looked and an important position Instead of traveling by a promised
like buildings, from a distance were oily empty shells in a ghost helicopter, he found himself on a forced march with about 40
town, remnants of the destruction wrought by Barrel Role, the similar "volunteers" with insufficient food, water and' clothing.
code narrie of the U.S.'program of indiscriminate bombing of the They were then held at a base that was occasionally visited by
?no:theru part of the liberated zone of Laos, which is still Americans. One man who' tried. to leave was shot.. After three
.trnacknowiedged publicly by Washington. months,, the jungle march resumed, but Pathet Lao attacks
More has been known about U.S. activities among the Moo diminished the number of guards and most of the 40 men used
1J who inhabit mountain uplands. Since the 1950s, the CIA, U.S. the opportunity to flee,'
Army Special Forces, U.S. Agency for International ueveiopriLei " .
(AID) and .other American agencies have energetically tried to merie n a'+:tlS
!promote Meo separation:. c ~f A former AID refugee relief officer. in Laos, Ronald J.
tiii rating from st national ,a in the lath century, the r; co Rickenback, has explained the consequences of U.S. protection
aiz or:e of the princippaal nattonionaal niinoritiitias of Laos. In attempting
o testifying that they have been merely American
Ri
h
f
c
e
t
o
, to:foster a bogus nationalism anion the Moo who coriprise about pawns
. At a May 7 hearing of the Senate Subcommittee on
.
of the three million Laotian population; American agents licc1~ Rickenback
shave made vague promises aboutestablishing,a separate ,,,1e0 Refugees, whose transcript was 'just publi,
C4li41try if talc prop e ,Led thei is,lves to tiC U.S. stated:
"In the late 1950s we began to arrn, resupply and advise.th
'Gen Vang Pao's mcicenary'army was recruited fro-,ii the IN' leg
nd their hill tribe peers the Lao Tiicung, and the Yao..
M
a
eo, U.S, intervention.
rid, it ;.as ~cn one of the n:, i,l vc!tic!es of tae
What recalled was the anti htorth Vietnamese guerrilla forces of
But 'there are, reliable repo: is that n:aity o. Van.- .,no's droops But Laos.
have been forcibly.presscd into the army: 'initially this program was masterminded under the auspices
~'' ..of the U.S.' Special Forces `white star' teams that were attached
=~r ~?_.ob -zi from ":"o? ~ directly to field units and coordinated guerrilla activities.
ol, )respite its c!aiLls of being the protector of the 'Lilco, the.U.S y
'Then
'has forciSly uprooted them from liberated areas and moved large , after the restrictions placed on overt U: S, military
numbers into the other zone. M?co areas have also been tite target involvement, in Laos by the Geneva Accords of 1962, the role of
of. U.S. aircraft. According to 'published estimates by U.S. advising the guerrilla forces fell under the operational wing of the
officials, about 100,000 Moos have lost their lives from CIA. It was also at this time that AID became directly and
ssible, with time
and money, to bony every major illegal drug.
In Afghnnistan, Pakistan, and 'i'hailuncl,
I carne cagily to the point of purchase for
opium. In Laos I could have bought it by
the small planeload.
Sometimes th re v,'ere difficulties when
sellers sung: ated me of being an undercover
narcotics agent or a pence officer. But with
only a Iit11e mote (,`fort, I could have bought
opium In India, Turkey, and Mexico. In
Hong Kong I need walk but a few steps from
my office to get the diet.inetive scent of
smoking opium from the neighborhood
vendor.
In Beirut a Western diplomat oficrocl me
introductions to cocaine sellers in a number
of nightclubs.
Second-grade heroin in small doses was
easily obtained in Mexico and Kona Kong.
But in MassolIle I could have bought top-
grade heroin by the kilo (2.2 pound). It
would have taken an advance payment of
$3,000 and several days isolation in a hotel
room while the sellers checked me out. If
they were sates led, I could have been reason-
ably sure of emerg'ng with a kilo of pure
heroin. So skillful and careful are the traf-
fickers, however, that the transaction would
have been completed without my ever meet-
ing the deliverer,
The movement of heroin from southern
France to the United States was once domi-
nated by the American Mafia. But now the
Corsican heroin manufacturers have so much
to sell that they meet all the MaCia's require-
ments and have plenty to spare. Sri in addi-
tion, they sell to Cuban, American Negro,
and Puerto Rican buying rings who have
newly set up sh p around Marseille, as well
as to "independent" purchasers.
As for ha hish and marijuana, I could have
bought this as easily as toothpaste or candy
throughout much of Asia, the Middle East,
and parts of Mexico. In Afghanistan, hashish
sellers distribute pamphlets advertising their
own special brands. Hospitable policalnele
offer foreign hippies P. puff of "hash." In
Nep.l, hashl.sh comes cheaper than tobacco.
In Pakistan, a police officer opposed to the
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 THE I +1 YORK Tfl. LS MAGAZINE
Approved For Release 2001%6Mc_`C-~ 0,DP80-0
STATINTL
By S? UMUR`t;' S`i r-17i CrTOi1
case belying any real interest '6riOur I do not refer to the conceal-
WASHINGTON. part for achieving, through the cur- ment of military details which
XECUTIVE secrecy surrounding rent SALT talks, a permanent peace could aid the enemy, nor t
the conduct of our foreign by means of an agreement about the the publication of the precis
endangering not only the welfare and American public should 'know and un- frustrate their successful con
prosperity of the United States but derstand as fully as possible the im- summation. I do refer, how
and most significantly, the
lications of our current worldwide ever, to the continuing failure'
also
,
p
national security. military deployment and the foreign to reveal, explain or justify
This is a conclusion I have reached policy commitments which this de- the true dimensions of our ac.
slowly, reluctantly, and from the ployment presumably enforces. Yet tivities abroad, dimensions
which are far better known by
unique vantage point of having been
,a. Pentagon official and now being
the only member of either branch of
Congress to sit on both the Foreign
Relations and- Armed Services Com-
mittees.
The practice of either editing or
STUAI T SYMINGION (D., Mo.) has
been a member of the U. S. Senate
since 1952.
:wholly withholding military informa-
tion from Congress and the public is
-not new; the present Administration
Is no better or worse than its prede-
cessors. In recent years, the need for
-immediate reaction to a possible
nuclear attack has made it necessary.
.to transfer more authority to the
executive branch, but this additional
-authority has apparently been carried
.over Into the conventional military
and foreign policy field. As a result,
key foreign policy activities have not
been properly debated in Congress,
for we simply have not known
enough to play our traditional and
constitutional role in the formulation
of foreign policy and the direction
of the country.
A particularly heavy veil of secrecy
has been drawn over one especially
'important and dangerous aspect of
the foreign/military policy field: the
production and deployment overseas
of United States nuclear weapons.
-While some secrecy in the nuclear
the public in this country often
knows less than much of the rest of
the world. As a ranking Republican
on the Foreign Relations Committee
observed recently, "Our problem is,
that we don't take the Hong Kong
My personal feeling of alarm began
to stir in 1963, with the defense
budget mounting toward 580-billion,
and keen awareness based on per-
sonal experience that high cost and
duplication are characteristic of our
enormous military presence
abroad. (Today, we have over-
seas more than 1,000,000 men
d
-field is justified, much of it is a
carry-over from the past and deserves
the most searching review within the
Government as well as more public
disclosure 'and debate.
. No one seriously concerned about
-the future can deny that our current
os
p ?.
worldwide military posture w..u t kings inciuennt. to
Interpreted by a possible enemy-in- cies; secrecy which has now for military rather than domes-
clews` I o n any- se 200 V4 iouw "WI VII OG70Oe2o u~
necessary
examination.
ready deep concern about ex- to issues w
ecutive branch secrecy sur- at survival (even more than
rounding much of our foreign mere prosperity and the ques-
policy and the military under- tion of whether so much of
~h-mld he spent
create and then dominate for
.eign policy responses.
our adversaries than by the
American public-and in some
cases, by the American Con-
gress.
As recent evidence, last
month, for the first time in
the history of the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee, an
ambassador refused to testify
about United States activities
in a country in which we are
waging war, unless specific
regulations laid down by the
State Department were ad-
hered to, including retention
by the executive branch only
of any written record..
m ubres an
some 384 facP
Accordingly, rather than
Accordingly
3,000 minor installations,
along with 300,000 at sea.) At agreeing to state's stipulation
that the written record of the
best, an examination of this testimony of G. McMurtrie
vast military position could Godley, the United States Am-
point up waste and ineffi- bassador to Laos -where he
ciency; at worst, it presents- directs all military as well as
because of its high dollar cost political activities-not be re-
issues its direct dla to tamed by the committee, the
issues of war r and pions eace-a committee elected to receive a
serious present danger to the briefing from the Ambassador,
continued vitality of our free with no record being kept on
and democratic institutions. either side.
IT was against this back- Publicity, I know, may be
ground that the Senate For- occasionally inconvenient to
eign Relations Committee de- those who supervise the func-
cided to undertake a study of tioning of a bureaucracy. The
just what this nation's foreign "system" works more smooth-
policy commitments are. Sena- ly if unexposed to question-
tor Fulbright asked me . to ing. But public disclosure is a
serve as head of the new sub- truly vital safeguard against
committee and we began work government adoption of posi-
in February, 1969. tions and policies of unknown
Seventeen months of in- and potentially dangerous im-
vestigating confirmed our al- plications. And when it comes
hich involve actua
~~
C:.) rI v J 27y: .3'"!
 8 A. U$)2 1,.970
-.Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP8
6, Z,
TILE SECOND Iiti'DOCIIINAI 1VAR, by Wilfred Burchett;
Are iv York: International Publishers, 1970; $5.9-5 cloth,
$1.95 paper.
sort in Laos and Vietnam, but because it revealed?so clearly the
For at least twenty -years, Wilfred Burchett has been
meaning of our policies in Southeast Asia: seeking no wider war
bird-dogging the depredations of the U.S. (and lessor Western
there is no way for us to avoid an ever-wider war. In mid-April
powers)' 'in the I`ar East. His name first came to be known to
Premier- Pham Van Doug characterized U.S, support of Lou No
Americans during the Korean War, a war that to almost all
Americans then (as still) was a contest between the forces of light
as "probably the major blunder of the U.S.A. in the Indochinese
(ours), and of darkness (theirs). If there were any American
War, but a blunder that had to be made."
we acted in South Viet
nam, when we created and
journalists-dt:cept 1;F-"Stone, ~vn,0S1 "fiidden'llistory of tlh TKorean War" is better reading with eveiy passing year-who saw
supported Diem and his successors up to Tlhieu-Ky. 'Thus vie
that war for what it was, I've forgotten their names.
acted in Laos when, preaching coalition governments but
Burcliett, as a man of the Left, was assiduously ignored or put overthrowing
each one that existed almost from the moment of
down' in this country during that war, except in the National
, we made it clear that only one form of government
its - birth, for V-1110 could believe that Americans would kill and could
survive in Laos, a government that would allow the U.S. to
'die for anything but a cause most just?
use Laos as a combination -aircra ft carrier, radar station, invasion
'Jr. the intervening years Burcliett has stood fast, nor-except
route, and pretext for continuing the Indochina War-as, in one
to live out its logical implications-has U.S. foreign policy way or another
another, we have used 1 hah l::nd, as we now use Cambodia,
as we will use any other country that gets in the way of our
changed. W hat has changed is the belief that if the U.S, is doing
"civilizing' mission.
it ?1 must be OX. Indeed, and especially among the young, it is
ir.,,_.asingly believed that if the U.S. is doing it, it must be wrongn . Burchctt tones
its through the cast of characters and political
.So, over the past few years, one sees Burchett quoted, eve
forces in Laos and Cambodia, and makes Clem as familiar and
ucrstandable' as those in Vietnam have become for the careful
interviewed, in the "straight press." Ile- is a commanding ur,
reader. We watch as prince Souphcnouvong moves
authority, because of his close knowledge of both events and -,,on newspaper
from being a bright and patriotic en ineer to becoming; the
in the Asian theater; so much so that it is not uncorh;tmon for
undeniable and courageous leader of the independence forces of
those preparing to meet with, say, the North. Vietnamese or the
Laos; and as Souvanna P}houma moves from being a charming aid
NLF, to meet first with Burchett for a knowledgeable briefing.
ntly decent Laotian to becoming a pimp for the CIA. (So
This has been true for Western diplomats (secretly, of course) and apparently
far has the gone that when we spoke to him in early April of 1970
journalists, as \vcil. as movement types. B,uicl:ctt knows
he was able to say that anyone killed by American bombs in Laos
more than any other journalist about what's what, when there's a
was North Vietnamese; just as the Pentagon says that anyone
war going on in the, Far East,
killed by American bombs in South Vietnam is ipso facto "V.C.")
Al! that shows up in this, the latest of his many books on the
Neither Laos nor Cambodia has the kind or the degree of
struggle for Southeast Asia. That struggle has taken on the name
economic or strategic reality or potential possessed by Vietnam;
of "the war in Vietnam" for all toss all f,inericars. But from its
but they are contiguous to Vietnam, and to Thailand, and to
inception it has been a struggle for control over Southeast Asia
China. In their deep pasts, all these countries have found their
and thus fought out in different ways throughout the entirety of
destinies moving rhythmically with each other, if in changing
Indochina.
tempos. And as each month passes, it appears that the U.S, will
see to it that the future will be even more of the same.
The public war came to be fought in Vietnam, but only, because there it could not be kept secret, after the nature and
Burchctt shows why and how this is so, and he shows also ]low
scope of our involvement became impossible to hide. What is
very fierce and strong is the determination of the Lao,
truly remarkable is that the enormity of American intervention in
Cambodian and -Vietnamese peoples to see that whatever
Laos and Cambodia has remained so well-concealed until very
and whatever separate destinies they may have, that
recently. common
they will be destinies presided over by themselves, not by
This small book serves the important purpose of telling tike
outsiders.
story of Laos and Cambodia, with the war in Vietnam proper
Phut if it is true that the Indochinese peoples will never be
brought in only when-as is frequently so--that part of the story
defeated by Americans and their clients in Southeast Asia, it is
is necessary if the whole story is to be comprehended.
equally clear that the war will never be ended, unless, as Mr.
The U.S entered the lists in Indochina when it was French eq
Agnew has correctly said, we end it here at home. For the
Indochina, and it entered to preserve Indochina (not just South
generation of American destruction. in Indochina has proved
Vietnam) as a Western outpost, And so, from thle beginning, our
beyond a shred of doubt that there are no ends we will not go
intervention in the politics and the warfare of Laos, Cambodia
to-so long as the American people put up with it-to avoid
and Vietnanh was undifferentiated. Conditions in the three parts
of Indochina differed; but our intentions were unitary-and all defeat in Southeast Asia.
this is dOCtli i IliCt .CLI'R F s ` 1/03/04 : GIA-IBS,l j ? q '6 ~~~ gq79 ~iQ 4A -
rsit a;:d has
The boo era CS wOlcvc.s, as it ca s scpar 0 wit l ? d r > > r. 4,1 U.i:;.
Cambodia and Laos. The first level is almost primer-like in its. recently returned fro>ra vint to Laoscnd;v'ort/: V?'ctLani.
quality, . it treats the early history of both countries.
Unfortunately, given the almost systematic ignorance of almost
all Americans on those two societies-to mention no others---a
primer treatment is all too appropriate. But as Jurchett moves
into the period since World War [1, the level moves swiftly toward
a type and amount of information and analysis that is hard to
match, in sophistication or familiarity.
The Amei scan war against Indochina is no mista'.ce, of course;
but 'w;ir 'vie cannot win, which is to say that our policies
tlicI'C -iioliticaland military, have come out to a series of blunders
piled oil blunders, one series interacting with the others, all taken
together pushing its deeper into the mire, while increasing the
resistance of those we would destroy.
Our-support of the Lon Not regime in Cambodia, and the
necessary invasion that followed that sanport, brought forth the
kind of opposition it did in the U.S. (and the world) not because
it i as new, or more egregious than previous actions of he same
,
l
 Approved For Release V.f NIMO CIA-RDP8aT04-G1MR0
Ny I i.ilii .rr.J .i. 1'ra~~-~5 ?.
Gucrdi sn Srrrf f eorres;ondent
(I }rs; of ,7 scrics on Laos)
t i 1 i t ~=
;j j
_ w 4., a-. mow. ~:f
The guards were there. to protect us from a possible encountcr
. with commando units of cn, t
~i
land Pao's special forces who arc
In 17-June as the late afternoon sun was reflected from flooded f re CtAflyi se
liberated zone perfor mine; n;issions for
a
c U S
ti
.c ricef fields in a valley far below the winding mountain road, I entered but have been e:lsnt witcd in secrete
r + but what the I.Ahet Lao told us is consistent with the 1umitd
Sam Neum province, stronghold of il.e Lao Patriotic Front (Neo Lao information in the American press and
Iiak Sat), commonly known as the Pathet Lao. in South Vietnam, with similar U.S. programs
Travelling t; rough this area, known to the Pathet Lao and its Comman lin the s-I
neutralist allies as the liberated 'LOIiC, I met and s )o?ce wit, the, ,. ,i g cone Military district and nom}mall y
1 1 l e jursc.lcon of the Vientiane government Gen. Van Pro l es
soldiers, peasants, medical workers, students and officlags, actually inctepenLient of Vientiane, being advised S and
including prince Souphanouvong, whose "office" is inside a maintained directly by the CIA.
mountain cavern. According to the Pathet Lao, unit s of Vary P V
Allowed to photograph freely, the climate and American brought into the liberated zone, by o no's forces are
bombing imposed the main limitations on the trip. It was the sometimes succeed in establishing J,rountain bAmericanaseshelicoptarc ers aed
rainy' season and some roads had already become mud bogs. With for s
pyb ing o ", which used
a little more raid. we cod 1 1 and rcconnalssance, for assassinating Paillet Lao
]d become stranded for weeks, said the cadges, for recruiting agents and encouraging separatist tCJiLie11CICS
Laotians, which was probably no exzg,geration since unimproved among the minorities, esvecially the Meo. Vang Pao hi
earth road predomin td. mself, like
most of his 17,000 troops, belongs to t: 1e R'lca minari,y.
U.S. 1)IrhnCS fieiv overhead daily although there vivre no attach Within
Laos our party was enlarged to ireltlclc guides, an
in lily vicinity. once leaflets were dropped. The massage on on-, interpre ter, a coo;; and a doctor. The latter was a young woman,
of t}r )Il promis d the bearer safe conducts if he reach,-01 the lines carrying a big of medical SUppire,, who each day asl:e (1 if 1'i felt
of the other ?,one. Iowever, there v:e.e nu serous fresh bomb rich and gave as chlOroq;;ine to prevent malaria, Which is:tilt
craters where I travelled, confirming Laotian atements that U.S
l
. preva
ent in thet
coun"
bombings occurred up to vCral times a IJi0i1t11 in J? Our intcrpratcr was a ?; rilal Inan Of ~,
these .Teas. wearing a Ail & Wesson revolver, who li 1 f,,: \
}a tSl:ill r 1"iidCrStOUL. rir::S,! and
The i athet Lao could not let us take the rich Or going lnto aye, s spoke i rench end Russia 11,? having studied in Moscow for five'
where the.bombing occurred with much greiter frequency,
Most r^ , years .fled Slnl:3kn; the }yCCC in VicllAral.e.
of the territory I was mountainous. There were
During extensive ecnvcrs3iivns, Sisana Sts".r1e, core, User and
jungle-covered mountains, whose rounded slopes merge into l;aclt
member of the Lao Patriotic Fro)!, central colnJnittcc, outlined
Other; here travel is difficult and often possible on?y by footpath.
the I atllet Lao V-V/ of the War, Speaking in I'rcilc 1, l a st ;icL}
Nonetheless, some of these slopes are inhabited by Meg or other that besides trying to check the growth f
minority peoples, w,ia cultivate rice, maize, beans and other g o .Lao revo
forces, Y,'.e United states is treating Laos as a strafe,-ic pawn. T T he
crops by their mountainside villages.. Nixon administration,, explained Sisanc, is trying to use Laos to
There was also another sort of mountain, a stark, rocky save the situation in South Vietnam and Cambodia, hoping to
outcropping, rising fairly abruptly from the plain or plateau, occupy all of southern Laos to r,1..tile a corridor between Thailand
somewhat like a mesa of the American southwest but Surrounded
and South Vietnam.
and often covered by heavy ac;,et, lion.
Sisal;o obs-eerved that the Nixon administration had intensified
Deep within these n:csa-h::c formations, I saw that ti.e Patllet t
Lao have Cn13r iCd natural caves into huge CaverllS ShC1tc;Ii117 tile V/a I, 1:1CICaSIn~, the bombing in the liberated :,.one. C, There were
hospitals, workshops, headquarters of their leaders, and even the 400 to $CO American sorties per day at the end of 1963, he told
hostel lodging foreign journalists. There are thousands of these us; since 1969 the daily total has been 600 to 700, so:mctt;ncs as
many, as 1000.
mountains, each suitable for the construction of a cavern nearly
invulnerable to American bombs because its destruction would the Sialso stated that the Johnson beratedration had used
require leveling a mountain. Our hostel occasionally reverberated t, `on Vientiane- troops to attack the liberated zone, where. s
with the sound of dynamite blasting out a new cavern r.c: rby. A also `Thad now relics on the special forces of Val:g Pan and is
score or so workers outside loaded newly blasted rock onto the also 1 L...landi pus the war, while using the Vientiane troops in
trucks, rear for such purposes as pacification.
The resulting installations can be relatively complex wit}I Actually. U.S. aircraft have been systematically bombing the
-walled resulting
concrete
although the be rely cave Tike character is liberated zone since May 1964. Disguised for years under the
nev;r lost. Some of the caves have cornh;;afed metal or plastic name of "armed reconnaissance," these raids were only officially
Sheeting overhead to deflect , dripping wa.er. VJithir. these caves, acknowledged by Washington publicly last year, and then
sometimes sheltered from the outside by as much as ten described as attacks against military targets or North Vietnamese
solid rock, I gained the im pression that moisture, not bombs,lwas focs.
In the tov'vji of Sala Neua, once the largest population center
the main enemy, of the province, there used to be about 20,000 p^
arsons Gvir,;t In
Starting out from Patol, there were four of i's in the the town and adjacent villa-BS. Of the villages, hardly a trace Il,iw
Soviet-built jeep fitted with heavy-treaded Chinese tires. Besides remains, the jungle already having reclaimed their sites. Iodi>
all ttali,n correspondent and myself, there was a Victl:amcse
not a Sold lives in t}te [owl:; not a single c(v;cflin` in it was 51--- l
driver and a Pathet Lao guide. At the Laotian border ceeci:not it t
t by the American banlbir.3. It is a completely dead city; only
I,It,iCt Lao soldier 1 1oYt, o b Joined p 1
je *'1,/, tls.e I s tt
app _S~ll d Il n?.S rl )ll:llil. 1 t,':
to a jeep dr ~ 70"77 }[f~JTi ~i~, VV"".
.ls `,I no ,rue Ion was more thorough than any I had srcn in \viue
guar` Who numbered more than a dozen once during a two-hour travels in Nortil Vietnam. Laos is a small country of ::bout t?ln?\?
climb lip a mountain path to a loco Village, million t)covlc..^.vastntinn n-i i cr2ln rnn n~r,1,l~ to ';?,n, t?:?n'i in
 I/
BLUFFTFLD, W.VA.
Approved For I sdl4' 'O 4YYCIA-RDP80-01601
E - 5,552 STATINTL
AUG 8 1970
f. ,
Cambodia
in. spite of the administration's well publicized
moves to.reduce American troop commitments in South=
past Asia, certain. disturbing aspects of. the situation
, Pave not been satisfactorily explained. The reference
s to what is going on in Laos and Cambodia, which
t. tend? to Xundermine heartening action elsewhere.
i Troop withdrawals are steadily under way in South
.Vietnam and can be expected to continue; the admid=
"Istratioii has tomrnitted itself to deadlines. In South
ores:; the announced pullout of troops: appears likely
to die made, even in the face of objections by'the Seoul
;government;
A distdrbing situation continues, however, in both
much of ar attempt to hide the C s anti ities th
h
roug
,
its Air Ainerica operations. Television network news:'
inen have filmed Air America planes supplying Amer:
kan-paid troops. Support for an army of perhaps as;
many as 10,000 is reportedly being .financed by the
CIA. There semis little doubt that. the Central Intel-'
ligence Agency not only is functioning in Laos, but
enjoys behind-the-scenes administration support.
In Cambodia, it now is clear that United States air-
1 ..>.al ., _.. ..iri._ _ ~, ~,. .. .
Anse Department offers half-hearted denials of thi,
,
fiewshieni oh the seerie report that U. S. planes are cal=
to tilt supply lines. Most such "interdiction missions' 4
$eenid occur close to where Cambodian troops happen
o be iri trouble.
There is nothing new about contradictions between
pf`fcial policy positions and what is reported by news
men. In the past, such discrepancies have for the most'
tart worked to the disadvantage of long-range Anieri.
On interests. The benefit of troop withdrawals frori'
Louth Vietnam aril South Korea may be n
llifi
d
u
e
, or at
>thy rate made less significant; by contiriued involve
Y
f
ierit in Laos and Cambodia:
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 STATINTL
Apprwzreth'FoT Rate e 2 /03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601
NEWS AUG 8 1970
E - 9,526
In Laos And Cambodia
In spite of the administration's well
publicized moves to reduce American
troop commitments in Southeast Asia,
certain disturbing aspects of the situa-
tion have not been satisfactorily explain-
ed. The reference is to what is going on
,in Laos and Cambodia, which tends to
undermine heartening action elsewhere.
Troop withdrawals are steadily under
way in South Vietnam and can be expect-
ed to continue; the administration has
committed itself to deadlines. In South
Korea, the announced pullout of troops
appears likely to be made, even in the
face of objections by the Seoul govern-
ment.
A disturbing situation continues, how-
ever, in both Laos and Cambodia. In the
former, there is no longer much of an
r/' attempt to hide the CIA's activities
through its Air America operations. Tel-
evision network newsmen have filmed
Air America planes supplying American-
paid troops. Support for an army of per-
haps as many as 10,000" is reportedly
being financed by the CIA. There seems
little doubt that the Central Intelligence
Agency not only is functioning in Laos,
but enjoys behind-the-scenes administra-,
tion support.
In Cambodia, it now is clear that Uni-
ted States aircraft are aiding the Cam
bodian army. Though the Defense De-.
partment offers half-hearted denials of
this, newsmen on the scene report that
U. S. planes are carrying out more than
their officially sanctioned missions to cut,
supply lines. Most such "interdiction
missions" seem to occur close to where
Cambodian troops happen to be in
trouble.
There is nothing new about contradic-
tions between official policy positions
and what is reported by newsmen. In
the past, such discrepancies have for the
most part worked to the advantage of
long-range American interests. The ben-
efit of troop withdrawals from South
Vietnam and South Korea may be nul-
lified, or at any rate made less signifi-
cant, by continued involvement in Laos
and Cambodia.
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 5 AUG 3 97Q STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-R 80-01601 R00
. I TERPRETWE REPORT
By JAMES DOYLE
Star Staff Writer
A year ago the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee an-
nounced it would conduct a
series of "country-by-country
hearings" on U.S. commit-
ments abroad.
The aim, Sen. Stuart Sy-
mington said at the time, was
"to present the American peo-
ple with as much detail as
security will permit" on the
subject of how we get commit-
ted to entangling alliances.
The hearings proceeded
-`smoothly at first. They were
held in executive session so
that all concerned could speak
freely and in detail, as the
committee members insisted,
about U.S. arrangements with
,foreign powers.
The C e n t r a I Intelligence
Agency witnesses were al-
lowed to come and go without
being identified, and their tes-
timony was kept secret in its
entirety.
Much Deleted
But when it came- time-to
release the remainder of the
testimony on various coun-
tries, the State Department
took a broad view of what is in
the national security.
In the case of Laos, for in-
stance, the government delet-
-ed much testimony about the
r-Zh
711
F
cost and techniques of our sup-
port for regular and irregular
Laotian forces, matters which
were being discussed fully in
the press through the dispatch-
es of American correspondents
in Vientiane.
Committee Counsel Walter
H. Pincus alluded to some of
these deleted areas of testimo-
ny in a letter to Symington
when the cleansed transcript
was released.
"Though the possibility ex-
ists that this information
might be embarrassing either
to past administrations, pres-
ent government officials or to
other governments, this does
not, per se, imply harm to our
national security and therefore
automatically necessitate dele-
tion," Pincus said.
The real effect he noted, was
to deny the public information
needed to judge the govern-
ment's actions, and a cavalier
disregard for Congress.
Fuller Record
It may not be possible to
evaluate the government's
performance fully in the case
of the Laos hearings, because
the information remains se-
cret. But in the most recent
case, concerning American
commitments to Spain, the
is fuller.
For more than a week the
controlled press in Spain has
been debating the merits of
the pending new agreement
between that country and the
United;. States on the use of
mill taiy bases there.
The S p a n i s h legislative
body, the Cortes, has been
briefed on the agreement by
Spain's foreign minister. And
American correspondents in
Madrid have supplied to the
American press some of the
details of how many jet fight-
ers and other military items
Spain will receive in return for
a renewal of the air base leas-
es.
But the State Department
has refused to comment on the
subject and has indirectly crit-
icized Sen. J. William Ful-
bright, D-Ark., for using the
reports from Spain to call for
public disclosure of the ar-
rangement.
Wait for Completion?
"We understand the rules of
the committee require confi-
dentiality of executive ses-
sions," a State Department
spokesman has said. "We in-
tend to respect that and there-
fore believe it would be most
inappropriate to have a public
discussion of this matter at
this time."
But the rules of the commit-
tee were adopted because the
State Department would have
refused to tender the informa-
tion at all in public session.
And if this is not a proper time
for a public discussion of a
pending military agreement,
the critics ask, must the coun-
try wait until the agreement is
concluded and it is too late for
reaction to have an effect?
The Constitution gave Con-
gress a full role in the formu-
lation of foregin policy, but the
executive branch has denied
Congress the information to
perform its role, Fulbright and
fellow critics maintain. -
Through the use of executive
.agreements, the investment of
military aid and the construc-
tion of American bases, the
United States has committed
itself to the support and de-
fense of governments through-
out Asia and Europe.
Why, Fulbright asks, does
Spain, "a country at war with
no one whose territory borders
on two allies," need 36 Phan-
tom jets, five destroyers, two
submarines, four mineswee-
pers, three landing craft and
unnumbered helicopters, tanks
and armored personnel car-
riers?
Oen reason he suggests is so
the Franco dictatorship can be
secure against a future inter-
nal crisis. That is also an ef-
fect of similar aid to Greece
and South Vietnam.
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 i?v'SJ=S.?.wY~.i~l~~'i.rvt ia.~t
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 - CIA- ?p~$ 1~~~F M
RCS ,
P2 TO'
o n u9 r fl F,
(r I r.1~ t? r f 6-~ (;rV_ i~ ~1 ~~ L ! F ~s I1 't U . bl 4r+;,mo t ': s~ `::!0
4 d
A f ! TOURS CAYES
then the daily total has been
600 tg 700, sometimes as many
as 1,000.
(R.achnad E. Ward; ; a enlarged /natural caves into In mid-June I was in the
University of Chicago graclu, hugle caverns, sheltering hos- town of Sam Neua once the
ate and U.S: Army veteran, pitals, worl,shons, headquar- largest population 'center of
the returned to the United tens of their leaders, and even the province in Northern Laos.
,States after travel in r\'oith a hostel lodging foreign jour- There used to be about 20,000
Vietn4i2ii and Communist- nalists. There was the occa- persons living in the town and
controlled parts of Laos from sional sound of iiyraznite adjacent villages. 'T'oday not a
May 22 throuc h June. It was blasting out a new cavcrn soul lives in tine town; not a
his second trip since 1965 to nearby. A score or so workers single dwelling in it was
North Vietnam. A specialist outside loaded ne%aly blasted spared by the American bomb-
on Indochina, Ward says that rock onto trucks, ing. It is a completely dead
he is not a Communist but "an Some of the installations City'" only some walls and
tpendevt leftist^"~~_ were relatively complex with empty shells of buildings re-
concrete-walled rooms, al main.
ty RICHARD E. WARD though the Spartan cavelike The destruction was more
(written for L711i) character was never lost. thorough than any I had seen
IN SAIt 1~TEtIA PROVINCE, Some of the caves had corrur- in North Vietnam,
gated metal or plastic sheeting
Laos - Traveling for eight Most of the population of
overhead to deflect dripping
days in this region, called the Sam Neua sun vived, having
water. Within these caves,
Liberated Zone by the Com- gone into the jungle when the
sometimes sheltered from the
inunist Pathet Lao, I met and. planes carne. the mayor said
outside by as much as 10
spoke n ith soldiers, peasants, that villages along the roads to
yards of solid rock,
medical workers, students and the tovnn suffered even more
moisture-not bombs-was the
officials, including Prince Sou during the heavy daily at-
Plain enemy.
hanouvon , whose headquar-- m tacks.
Starting out from Hanoi,
ern are inside a, huoe mourn Pathet Lao soldiers and
there were four of us in the
{gin redoubt, members of the Lao civilian
Soviet-bui?t jeep -fitted with
I was allowed to take photo militia were responsible for
heavy-treaded Chinese tires:
graphs freely, even in the cav- the defense of Sam 1Ncua Pro,;-
An Italian correspondent, a Vi-
ern of Souphanouvong, which ince. The North Vietnamese
etnamese driver and a Pathet
Is his permanent cuarters- presence, which Was not hid-
Lao guide. At the border
Other Pathet Lao officials oc den from me, appeared main-
checkpoint, a Pathet Lao sol-
oupy their ov,n separate caves ly confinced to provi'ing aid)
dier with a carbine joined us.
ScAttered through the prov_ such as in road building.
In Laos we shifted to a jeep
Thee. In the Cenlrcrtlnitie , drat I
driven by a Lao and we were
s U.S, planes flew overhead saw, there was no evidence of
never without guards, who
daily although there were no V1etnarnesa intervention in the
numbered more than a dozen
attacks in my vicinity. once social or aanization. The Lao-
once during a two-hour climb
beaflets were draped. The tians make no secret of Viet-
Inessaoe on on-z of them nrom> up a mountain path to a ?oleo namese assistance, but clearly
village.
Ised the bearer safe conduct if appeared to he directing the
Our guide said the guards
he reached the zone controlled affairs of their own country-
were to protect us from a pos-
byy the Vientiane government Dawned P laves Claimed
sible encounter with units of
of,Prenni.er Souvanna Phouma. From Mays 17, 1964 to mid-
Gen. Vang Pao's US.-assisted
There were, however, nu- June, 1970, about 1,;,00 U.S-
forces which are frequently
merous fresh bomb craters aircraft were shot down in
sent into the Pathet Lao zone.
where I traveled, supporting Laos, the Pathet Lao claim,
Commanding the second
Laotian statements that Amer- Some U.S. pilots have been
military district and nominally
icon bombings had occurred captured but I gained the im-
under the jurisdiction of the
up to several times a month in presaion that the number
Vientiane, being advised and
these areas. The Pathet Laa beh g held is not. v
very large-
Syould thej
not take us into areas maintained Pathet Lao officials admit that
mare Nvl?ere bombing frequently. had occurred. U.S. C e n t r a l I.nteilloence the United States often rescue
Agency.
Most t of of the downed pilots who managed to
our party added
e territory I saw Within Laos parachute.
an interpreter, a cook and a
Was jun led mountains, Asked about American pilots
phsyician-a young Laotian
sparsely inhabited by the Moo, held in Laos, Sisana Sisane
woman who carried a bag of
a Laotian minarity? said they were being treated
medical supplies.
There was another sort of well, that Prince Souphartou-
Tells of Bombing Rise
mottntairt, a stark and rocky vong insisted on this, and that
In an interview, Sisane
outcropping rising fairly aU they were receiving double or
Sis-
raptly from the plain or pla-? ane, a composer and member triple the food rations allotted
teau, somewhat like a mesa of of the Pathet Lao Central Laotians.
She,nAmerican Southwest but Committee, ^said_ the United However, the Pathet Lao
"y tieAvppy~? For Relele 2001/03/04: CIA-R>~t9"A1t4~
Deep s tU tm a`~le'ast nine of ere were 400 to oOO Ashen- identify them or alloy- any ex-
these mesa-like formations can air sorties per day at the change of mail. Present c a di-
that I saw the Pathet Lao have end of 1903, he said, and sinrp + -
D20001-5
 The hearings brought out, for ex- their equipment, and showing them
mile, that the "Free World Forces" ? how to do thin s But as
I 6 properly.
of 'T'hailand, Korea, and the Philip- far as the coinhat sorties arc con- '?
pines that had "volunteered" to fight corned, target directions, they do
in Vietnam-bearing . witness, we not.
were told, to the importance they Senator Symington. Where do our
too attached to an independent pilots and their pilots get instruc-
South Vietnam-were having their tions as to what to hit?
id b the United States. All Colonel Tyrrell. As to what they
way paid are hitting?
three countries, in fact, resisted send- Senator' Symington. As to what to
ing troops to Vietnam until the hit?
bomb the North; invade Cambodia. United States agreed to buy their Colonel Tyrrell. Their targets are
, AUGUST A.Y f 0
Approved For Release 20013AQ ,4-RDP8~T61 ' kO
WASHINGTON
.made with various nations, in secrecy,
ad hoc, without regard to their impli-
Mr. Paul. Do they [American air
attach(?s in lain] have great in(lu-
ence with respect to the day-today
operation of the Laotian Air Force?
Colonel Tyrrell (Air Force Atta-
ch. in Vientiane, 1.101). Well, as
far as assistinir them, maintaining
cations or to the all-but-natural law
A key reason for President Nixon's that one connnitmcnt leads to an.
! decision to invade Cambodia, ac other. it is a record of deception of
cording to a number of government the American public.
Ing unglued in Cambodia, and :is .111
the Connnunisls were being iroubte-
some, and as the Lon Nol govern-
mcnt was asking for help, Mr. Nixon
felt impelled to do something.
At some point the pressures mount,
and the impulse says, do something:
send advisers to Vietnam; send the
Marines to'the Dominican Republic;
send more troops to Vietnam and
we are becoming more "intricated'..government said that one reason we Senator Symington. Your people
put it, "intricated." They worry that '' rangements were made, in secret, our ed
drawals, it is also becoming, as they', government officials. After these ar- ac 1 ] s a g .
and at this time targets are Bevel-
is trying to extricate itself from fringe benefits in weapons for the mander and his staff and members
Southeast Asia through troop with-." governments and private gain for of our staff and ARMA [Army At-
t 1 A t ff sit in on these mcetin s I
that even though the United States payment of the troops, included center, and the military region com-
Some officials here are concerned presence there. The price, beyond generated at the joint operations
was that we could not let down our Colonel Tyrrell. Yes, sir; they are.
, rwuu i at?ATci-l-?w rawa?wu a "uv. -. - o.-....... _ _?;;. twn W1311UOi. . ? ? -
tating record over the last year and Following, for example, is a col ^ Mr. Paul. Do American aircraft
-. 1...1r 1r ,uv at ;t enler(u',l :,ftnr rosamimitiik v - A?.,... --l- . ,wl- Aver Nnr/hwm
(Dem., Arkansas), at the rather loose was running a military-assistance pro- event, speaking mainly of Northern
use of the term "commitment" to jus- gram in Laos, supporting and train- Laos, not the trail?
tify what the executive branch ing a large Laotian irregular force. Colonel Tyrrell. Is it a rare event?
wanted to do in foreign policy. A They had not known the extent of Mr. Paul. Yes. staff of two able men-Walter Pincus, American military participation in Colonel Tyrrell. Well, I believe
since I returned to Laos in June of
an Investigative reporter, and Roland the bombing by the Laotians them-'-; last rear we have had tour defolia-1
Symington and J. William Fulbright They had not known that the CIA` (; Mr. Paul. Is defoliation a rare j
committee, headed by Senator Stuart men and supplies over the Ho Cht tion types also flown by American;
Symington (Dem., Missouri), grew Minh Trail into Vietnam, was also aircraft over Laos?
out of a concern on the part of a., taking place, heavily, in northern Colonel Tyrrell. Yes, sir; on occa-
number of senators - particularly Laos as part of the Laotian war. sion
DV, 11d5 m d l 111UIlllllalcu ill ilGala1160 iilc .1.1.w?O uwav.aa.u suss' .-w --'?--' -- --- -----
by the Senate Subcommittee on hearings that the American bombing considerable amount of testimony
United States Security Agreements in Laos,' which had been portrayed with respect to strikes of the bomb-
and Commitments Abroad. The sub- as interdiction of the movement of ing types. Are there other Rights
such as reconnaissance and defolia-;
n
t
nations' destinies .the United States ing the public into one of self-delu- in Laos:
can become. and how it can become sion as well. Mr. Paul. Now, with respect to
0o public tree worm antes. It appears mat even
the government began to believe And then the hearing brought out
t icated" in other this turnip the exercise of deceiv- the versatility of the secret bombing
h
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. ~ ~ ? o'oa ~itsuea
 Approved For Release 2001/0 j/q4jucIj jtDP80-01
STATINTL
The M"ashhk ;t6 Z
Seen go
By Jack Anderson.
At an all-day session so se-
cret that- no transcript was
C/ I
Department insisted, that only
one transcript be made, that it
be kept under lock at the de-
partment and that the short-
Murtrie Godley told the Sen-'hand tapes be destroyed.
ate Foreign Relations Commit- Chairman J. W. Fulbright
tee last week that he could . (D Ark) and Senator Stuart
foresee no end to the "hidden Symington, (D-Mo.) protested
war" in. Laos. - vigorously. This would set a
This remote Buddhist king- precedent, they contended,
dom, beloved by its gentle that would erode the cominit-
neonle as the Land of fhe Mil-, tee's right to question U.S. of-
Parasol,' has been devastated cited to keep no transcript at John Cooper (R-Ky.) had Vietnam probably had the rnil-
hv a wa,? r, , .,,~ ,:,~ +~ + ,,~ _ all but to treat the hearing as ,,tea ,.,..+ itarv nowcr twi ennr,ncr T,ins
tion. Any acknowleclgernent! an informal briefing. year, barring the use of Amer-
would be a diplomatic embar-I The bluff, affable Godley ac- scan ground troops in Laos.
'rassment to Washington, Mos- knowledged that the U.S. was He asked Godley whether the
cow anti Hanoi, alike, alli paying almost all the bills, amendment had been violated.
bound by a 1962 Geneva pact; military and civil alike, inj The ambassador rep 1 i e d
to uphold Laotian neutrality. Laos. Between $25 million and that no ground troops had
Yet Godley reported behind $35 million, he said, goes to been requested by the Royal
closed doors that the fighting support the Royal Lao govern- Lao government and that none
already has made refugees of ment. This helps to cover even i had been introduced.
700,000 luckless Laotians, peo the palace expenses of King He acknowledged, however,
This is nearly one-third of the' civil war. _'-were"hi""' planned. (,oafey saict there
occasion ally, he said,
nation's 2.6 million nonulation. I The lvwp American rnM Prv, - ..-.. was ?no planned reduction, no
went, has a poor battle record. American lives in South Viet-
He was much more proud of (ham.
the CIA-subsidized guerrilla
army of Meo tribesmen, led by
General Vang Pao, a foul-
mouthed. former sergeant in
the French army. The U.S.
Hampering l.ial.toi
Church asked why the
North Vietnamese, if they
were suffering such damaging
has more control over Van blows in Laos, didn't simply
Pao's 14,000-man army, which take over the country. -He
veterans now on the CIA pay 00,000 regular troolis who
roll. 1 haven't been committed be-
Senator Church recalled an! yond North Vietnam's borders.
cited, unhappy war to the . any military operations. He as-
tune of half-a-million dollars aj sured the senators that Pre-
year. An aggrieved Senatorlmier Souvanna Phouma not
Frank Church (D - Idaho)) only ' sanctioned the devasta-
pointed out that the cost of de-1 tion that has been wreaked
i
Hassle Over Secrecy
The hearing opened with a
30-minute hassle over the se-
crecy restrictions. The State
Poor Battle Record
Godley admitted that the
Royal Lao army, despite all
its expensive American equip-
got the 700,000 figure out of -'--6 """' ..
quickly settle back to their
Godley. When senators ex-Ii\
pressed their shock, the am - peaceful ways-if only the
said he regretted the Americans Vietnamese amees and the-
bassador
nd
heavy suffering of the Laotian, would go home and
leave them alone.
people but. claimed this saved 0 ,1970, Bell-Mcclure Syndicate, Inc.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000700026001-5
villages were supposed to be
empty and civilians were
) i t f
11 1-l1 d B t
but suggested that the U.S.
would make it too costly.
Church asked how long the
strange war in Laos was likely
to last.
Unless a settlement for all.
Indochina should be worked
out in Paris, Godley replied,
he foresaw no end to the fight-
ing.
Pressing, Church asked
day to Godley said he was,
fired up with enthusiasm. One
;
nee cr n en Iona y I e . U senator described him as "ex-
he admitted that civilian cas- hilarated" over the experience
ualties are higher than the of running the war in Laos.
li
ld
e
wor
r
a
zes. I Meanwhile, the pLao-
struction in Laos was close to upon his poor country but had; Fulbright asked for the passive
oth people, more than most.
$500 per capita - five timesl sought even more air raids number of refugees the war:
__ . .. . ? g
 THE J30U_1_,. REPU1.1r.
m e r_': a ..n 1oI :r
lakes It in Laos
:, ." . BY JOHN IVEISMAN
LOS /i:;
3 0 JUL13/O
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80Sd1QW1
Approved For
MISTER. POP; The Ad-
ventures of a Peaceful
/ Man in a Small War by
Don A. Schanche (David
McKay; illustrated. $7.05).
The specter of American
imperialism is never a
pretty image to conjure
up, and despite protesta-
There is a whole lot
a b op t our involvement
with Southeast Asia that
we cannot he proud of.
Robert Kirsch,. Times book
Crltic,'Is on vacation. Today's
guest columnist is John Weis-
man, a regular book reviewer
for Calendar magazine.
.tions from the Nixon Ad-
ministration, a 1 o t of
people have been doing
Force embarrassing con-
juring these days.
Yet there is another side
to the American story;. one
that should make us all
prouder to be Yankees. It's
"Mister Pop," the story of
Edgar ' Buell, a retired
farmer from Indiana who,
to "get away from it all,"
found himself a job as'an
agricultural adviser in
Laos, for $65 a month.
Learned Mao
Unlike most American
a d v 1 sers in Indochina,
Buell didn't live in .an air-
conditioned headquarters,
venturing among the
people' once or twice a
month doling out funds to
the., local bureaucrats to
squander on the black
market. The tough little
man from Indiana learned
to speak Meo, the local La-
otian dialect, and truly got
to know the "folks" in the
backwoods.
He ate chicken brains
With them, drank their lo-
cal brand of rotgut rice
whiskey, walked and
-stank with them. He wore
week's growth of stubbly,
gray beard on his face, and
suffered from malaria and
jungle pneumonia. B u t
more than just. existing on
the same level as the Meo
tribesmen; Buell gained
universal respect by being
one of the few Americans
to keep his word to the
people. And to do so, he
fought with the policies of
the CIA, OSS, AID and
other alphabetically or-
tented .s e c r e t organiza-
tions that represented U.S.
"interests" in Laos. Ile of-
ten went unarmed into
Pathet Lao-held territory,
trusting that he, a peace-
ful man, would be protect-
ed by "his" tribesmen.
And he was.
Laotian Title
In short, he earned a
hundred times over his ho-
norific Laotian title of
"Tan Pop," which, roughly
translated, means "grand-
father who descends from
above."
Don Schanche's book is a
fast-moving, well-written
account of Pop Buell's ex-
periences in Laos.
Schanche brings Buell to
life, following his treks
through the wild back-
country, eavesdropping on
m i n o-r conversations,
drinking bouts and a lot of
hard, country cussin'.
Buell emerges as the
kind of American folk-
hero that we need more of
these days. A pragmatist
who trades in opium when
e 'has- to, the American
grandfather who cared
enough about human -be-
-fngs. to act out his con-
cerns, brings a kind of hu-
manism to the American
character we haven't seen
much of in recent years.
In his unique person-to-
person dealings with the
Laotians, "M i n t e r Pop"
makes his own small step
,10p~,~00070002
ward for .mankincL.
0001-5
 Approved For Release 2001/ Coq DP~~~0FII6r0~R0(
~'~4
Illegal Actions
To the Editor;
Recently the United States
Ambassador to Laos testified
' about military activities in that
country before the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee. Sev-
eral Senators afterward ex-
pressed shock and dismay over
What they had heard about our ,
country's involvement there.
But the American public was
not permitted to hear a single
detail because the Administra-
'`tion had forbidden any record
of the hearing to be made or
disclosed.
A day or two later, on July
23, the Columbia Broadcasting
System did, however, disclose
in a regular news program
some of what the Ambassador
must have been talking about.
.From movie film made by an
airplane mechanic formerly em-
ployed by Air America, it
showed large-scale training, lo-
gistical, and deadly combat
operations in Laos conducted
by mercenaries-Americans and
others-in the pay, directly or
indirectly, of the which
also exclusively funds Air Anier-
lea through a. straw Delaware
corporation. These operations
are not ordinarily reported in
our news media, it was ex-
plained, because newsmen and
photographers are not welcome
in neighborhoods where they
are going on.
Is there some authority on
Constitutional law who can ex-
plain under what provision of
the United. States Constitution,
: an agency of our Government
Conducts military operations in
a foreign "neutral" country out'
of sight of, and unaccountable
-to, the public whose taxes pay
for them?
It is the illegality, moral
enormity, and total secrecy of,
actions like these, which we,
..Show no more intention of dis
continuing than of revealing,
that discount virtually to zero
all professions by spokesmen
of our Government, including
the highest, that we are sincere-
ly seeking "an honorable
, Peace" in Indochina.
L. H. BUTTERFIELD'
Cambridge, Mass., July 24, 1970
The writer, a historian, edited
The Adams Papers.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000700020001-5
 Approved For Release 2001/gjFjOLC ;RDP$fXTIWPILRO
-There. he is again."
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP8O-01601 R000700020001-5
 Approved For Releast00s
A
VEiT TO LAOS'
A Special Sujp ile rent:
601
STATINTL
T ' _ - ' ' - _ - Cultural Center, whose air-conditioned
Aware of the presence of' the CIA 'i
eading room -is well stocked with
current newspapers and magazines
1970, with two friends, Douglas Dowd
and Richard Fernandez, expecting to
take the International Control Commis-
sion plane to Hanoi the following day.
The Indian bureaucrat in charge of the
weekly ICC flight immediately in-
formed us, however, that this was not
to be. The DRV delegation had re-
turned from Pnompenh to. Hanoi on
the previous flight after the sacking of
the Embassy by Cambodian troops
(disguised as civilians), and the flight
we intended to take was completely
occupied by passengers scheduled for
the preceding week. Efforts by the
DRV and-,_ American embassies were
unavailing, and, after exploring various
farfetched schemes, we decided, at first
without much enthusiasm, to stay in
`Vientiane and try our luck a week later.
Vientiane is a . small town, and
within hours we had met quite a few
members of the Western community-
3 journalists, former IVS'workers in Laos
and South Vietnam, and other resi-
dents. Thr9ugh these contacts, we were
able to meet urban Laotians of various
sympathies and opinions, and with
interesting personal histories on both
sides of the civil war. We were also that houses the Lao Ministry of Infor- ;I Oum, there seems to be little that is
able to spend several days in the j' mation? where one office was identi- productive in the country. After dec-
countryside near Vientiane, visiting a 1;
traditional Lao village and, several
times, a refugee camp, in the company
of a Lao-speaking American who is a
leading specialist on contemporary
Laos. Officials of the Lao, American,
North Vietnamese, and other govern-
ments were also helpful with informa-
tion, and I was fortunate to obtain
access to a large collection of docu-
mentary
material accumulated by resi-
dents of Vientiane over the past few
years. Many of the correspondents,
both French and American, had much
to say, not only about Laos brit also
about their experiences in other parts
of Southeast Asia. Unfortunately, most
of the people with whom I spoke
are Paris. French plays and lectures
Laos. on Inc the taxi from Mekong the passed airport by to our-
the from
hotel airfield of Air America, a theoretically advertised on posters. On another
private company that has an exclusive ~orner is Vientiane's best bookstore,
which sells French books and journals.
pilots, said to be largely former Air he contrast between the Lao Minis-
Force personnel, were living' in our try of Information and the French
hotel. If you happen to be up at 6 Cultural Center gives a certain insight
A.M.; you can see them setting off for
, an nature Laotian a society.
their- day's work, presumably, flying in to
of
supplies to the guerrilla forces of the the tiny Lao elite, Vientiane has many
CfA's army in Laos, the Clandestine'
Army led by the Meo. General Vang attractions: plenty of commodities, a
variety of good restaurants,. some cul-
tural activities (in our hotel a placard
scattered throughout Northern Laos, announced -a reading of Rosencrantz
but many of their bases are reported and Guildenstern are Dead), the re-
to have been overrun. These bases were sources of the French Cultural Center.
used not only for guerrilla actions in
An American can live in the suburbs,'
the Pathet Lao-controlled territory, but complete with well-tended lawns, or in
also as advanced navigational posts for. a pleasant villa rented from a ?rich. the bombardment of North Vietnam
Laotian, and can commute to the huge
and for rescue of downed American USAID compound with its PX and
pilots. There are said to be hundreds other facilities.
of small dirt strips'in Northern Laos for For the Lao, however, there is
Air America and other CIA operations. { nothing. Virtually everything is owned
After watching Air America parade by outsiders, -by the Thai, Chinese,.
by on my first morning in Vientiane, I Vietnamese. Apart from several cig-
decided to try to find out something arette factories (Chinese-owned), lum-
about the town. Behind the hotel I? ~,ber, and tin mines, one of which is
came across the ramshackle building i owned by the right-wing Prince Boun
fled as the Bureau of Tourism. No one ades of French colonialism and years
there spoke English or even French. In of extensive American aid, "in 1960
another office of the Ministry, how- the country had no railways, two
ever, I did find someone who could doctors, three engineers and 700 tele-
understand my bad French. I explained phones."2 In 1963 the value of the'l
that I wanted a map of Vientiane, but country's imports ? was forty times that ti
was told that I was in the wrong of its exports:
place-the American Embassy might Economic development has been
have such things. I left by way of the reading room of the Ministry, where
several people sat in the already in-,
tense heat, waving away the flies and'
looking' through the several Lao and,
French newspapers scattered on the l
virtually non-existent and the at=
tempts by the Americans to stabi--
use a right-wing and pro-Western
regime by lavish aid programmes
led merely to corruption, inflation
and new gradients of wealth with-.
in the country and so played into:
tables: ! the hands of the extreme left, the
Across the street stand} the modern' Pathet Lao.3
seven-story building of the ? French
In 1968, 93 percent of the exports
(most forcefully, the Laotians) do not ! 1 were tin, wood, and coffee, while 71
wish to be idgltfibft sFc p'I 4 ase 2001/03/04 :CIA-RDP80-1d60dd 0071NQ Of)IW6e) were
be especially dis~rcet in citing sources I food, gasoline, and vehicles.4
' . ,
of Information.. a. , l
QOI1tirnR
 T WAS?' GTON POST
Approved For Release 2001903i0#y: R 19V
WN
Ministration Trap P'eared by nove"s
'.On Foreign Relations C0111113-ittee
"BY Murrey Marder
Washineton Post Staff writer
r' The S e n a t e Foreign
Relations Committee balked
'sharply Tuesday at what its
dovish members claim is a
blatant attempt by the
Nixon administration to
?erode Its power to question
U.S. officials.
. Senate Democratic leader
Mike Mansfield said yester-
-day that "grave constitu-
tional questions" arise from
stringent rules invoked by
t the State Department for
Tuesday's testimony by C.
`McMurtrie Godley, U.S. am-
?.bassador to Laos.
At issue is a strong suspi-
cion among some committee
members that the adminis-
tration was trying to trap
them in a damaging prece-
'dent. Only part of the se-
quence has been publicly
disclosed so far.
On May 27, for the first
time, the ? committee hesi-
tantly deferred to the State
Department's insistence
upon unusual ground rules
fora briefing on American
nuclear . weapon deploy-
ments around the world.
The State Department
l agreed to provide the wit-
ness, Ronald I. Spiers, direc-
tor of the Bureau of Politi-
co-Military Affairs. But
David M. Abshire, assistant
secretary of state for con-
gressional relations, wrote
that Secretary of State Wil-
11am P. Rogers wanted spe-
cial precautions to protect
Spiers' secret testimony.
. State. called for the spe-
cial arrangements used for
re efving confidential infor-
tion from Central Intelli-
~~~ee!Ll Bence Agency Director Rich-
ard, Helms. This means that
'only one transcript would be
-made of the testimony, it
Would be retained in the lx-
-ecutive Branch, and the
committee could examine it
only upon request.
Chairman J. W. Fulbright
(D-Ark.) wrote Rogers on
May 27 that the committee
agreed because of the ex-
traordinary secret nature of
the information. "But,"
wrote Fulbright, "this is not
a precedent for further
briefings on this subject or
any other subject"
The nuclear information
was especially desired by
Sen. Stuart Symington's (D-
Mo.) subcommittee on U.S.
s e c u r i t y commitments
abroad. The Spiers testi-
mony remains highly classi-
fied; Symington subse-
quently said publicly only
that "we have (nuclear)
weapons not a' foot from the
Soviet Union."
Symington's subcommit-
tee for months has sought to
question Ambassador God-
ley on U.S. commitments in
Laos. Last April, after a six-
month struggle with the Ex-
ecutive Branch, the subcom-
mittee released a highly cen-
sored transcript on U.S. ac-
tivity in Laos with Godley's
testimony still to come.
The Laos hearings showed
that beginning in 1964, the
United States secretly began
major, direct military in-
volvement in the Laotian
war.
All Details
Deleted from that tran-
script were all details on
CIA financing of an army of
Meo tribesmen. But in the
case of Laos and other hear-
ings, committee sources pro-
test that not only "secrets"
are censored, but also facts
that would only embarrass
U.S. officials or conflict
with U.S. claims.
On July 20, Abshire wrote
Symington that Ambassador
Godley could testify only
with special ground rules, to
avoid prejudicing "impor-
tant discussions" in prospect
for negotiations between the
Royal Lao government and
the pro-Communist Pathet
Lao.
Abshire offered two
choices:
It must be under-
stood that only one tran-
script will be made (of God-
ley's testimony), the tapes
estroyed, and the tran-
script retained by the
(State) Department."
As an alternative, Abshire
suggested, "no transcript of
Godley's testimony" would.
be made.
Initially, the subcommit-
tee indicated it would take
the first option - one
State-retained transcript.
But when 'subcommittee
members assembled Tues-
day, the more they thought
about that, the worse they
thought of it - as they re-
called Fulbright's earlier
,never-again letter.
Progressive Eroding
To avoid being drawn Into
what they saw as a progres-
sive eroding pattern, the
subcommittee m e m b e r s
technically shelved the God-
ley hearing, and labeled his
all-day testimony a "brief-
ing."
Fulbright protested after-
ward that "I have no doubt
he administration's real in-
tent was to neutralize, if not
destroy, the influence of the
Committee on,Foreign Rela-
tions." Fulbright claimed
Godley actually provided no,
"substantive, significant"
new information. Symington'
challenged abuse of the pub-
lic's "right to know." Mans-
field saw it yesterday as a
"grave . constitutional ques-
tion." He said "We can't op-
erate on the basis of the
State Department, or any,
department, laying down the
terms of the hearing."
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601'R000700020001-5
 STATINT
18 JULY 1970
roved. For Release 200131Q : CIA-RQP80-01
7
6 U J t9, U v CJ l/::1 ii u V-,Jj 1~Tj,LJ f
By Richard C. Ward
Guardian st` jf correspondent
Hanoi
As we approached the Gialam airport near Hanoi, the
bright green ricefields interspersed with squares of
j flooded fields and the wide, muddy Red River all
- - - --
-- as
cult
o beli
e th
t
.v
r?'. -
?
-??---
?
a
neatly 1 ` P
five nears had nassed since T hart previousl
i
d ., . t'"'. / /. ,
y v
ewe
. D
i
destination after a long voyage. J iaa t
In Au
u
t 1965
I h
s
,
ad come to Hanoi with the first
g
group of Americans to travel, in the zones of North
Vietnam under U.S. attack. At that time most of the
press of the western world echoed White House and
Pentagon briefings: the U.S. was bombing nothing but
"military targets" and not seeking a wider war; and
Hanoi would surely conic to terms with the U.S. or
succumb to the U.S. bombings which were steadily being
escalated in scope and intensity.
While Lyndon Johnson was lying to the world that
the U.S. was destroying nothing but "concrete and
steel," I had seen numerous demolished homes, hospitals
and similar "military targets." In these attacks, many
civilians had been killed and others, some of whom I
Interviewed, had been seriously wounded or maimed for
life. (Guardian readers, of course, knew of these things
from the reports of Wilfred Burchett.)
To anyone who visited North Vietnam during the millenial fight of the Vietnamese people for independ-
.S. attacks, it was clear that the U.S
was seeking a
.
Military. victory in South Vietnam by isolating it, after
"forcing the North to. its knees, and that the attacks
against civilians were a deliberate part of this policy.
After returning from Vietnam in 1965 I- wrote: "The
people of the Democratic Republic of. Vietnam are now
defending their own country and the achievements-of
their revolution. Thus 'the U.S. is confronting the
deepest loyalties of the Vietnamese.... There is no -
evidence that either cessation of the bombing or more
Intensive bombing will stop the North's assistance to the
NLF. When I was in Vietnam there were no illusions as
to the strength of the U.S. forces. The people recognize
that the struggle will be difficult and possibly very long,
they recognize that Hanoi and other major industrial
centers may be bombed.... Realizing all the hardships
,that confront them the Vietnamese face the future with
confidence.
"Vietnamese base .this confidence in the ultimate
outcome of the war on the fact that their struggle has
the support of-the overwhelming mass of the people." I
emphasized that the strength of the Vietnamese was
rooted in the popular character of the war, in which the
revolutionary society was able to mobilize the resistance
of the whole people and I concluded that the U.S. could
never succeed in? Vietnam.
'Met with skepticism
This report was viewed with skepticism by most
persons I knew. Then many people in the antiwar
movement seemed to believe that Vietnam was another
Spain, a good cause doomed to defeat and that U.S.
strength would eventually be decisive. Of course, our
movement
has come far since 1965 and now most
j
y~ ~qp ericans by Am.the warl e sttlntr! ti~i~SvyOFe:~Trl~etfr~r`a~eTig~ e91 n conic c, pass.
Yet there are. still some who fear that Washington
might try some desperate new escalation that just might
turn the tide. There is ample reason to suspect new acts
of aggression by the Nixon administration, which-has
already invaded Cambodia, intensified the war in Laos
and stepped up "pacification" and repression in South
Vietnam. But the lesson of history is that by these acts
prolonging the war, the U.S. like France before, will
only bring upon itself humiliating defeats.
In the present situation, it is necessary to understand
the other side of the picture, . actually the most
important one, the history of the heroic Vietnamese
resistance.
Today, when anyone with the slightest sense of
'humanity recognizes the justness of the Vietnamese
ence, of the long Vietnamese revolutionary- struggle-
against imperialism, which is perhaps the greatest epic of
all human history.
During five weeks in North Vietnam and in the
liberated zone of Laos, I traveled extensively, talked.
with leaders at the highest level, officials, fighters,
intellectuals, workers and peasants, trying; to gain as
complete a picture as possible of the Vietnamese
resistance and the struggles of the other Indochinese
peoples.
In Vietnam, I traveled through the province of Thanh
Hoa, whose coastal lowlands contain rich ricefields, the
scene of heavy fighting during U.S. bombing. Since I had
,visited Thanh Hoa in 1965, the provincial capital of the
same name had been virtually levelled by U.S. bombing.
The wanton destruction was even greater at the city .of
Vinh; more than halfway between Hanoi and the 17th
'.
parallel-.
U .S. strategy d3fcatcd
Despite the widespread devastation left by U.S.
attacks, which I expected to see, I also anticipated that
the people themselves would have exhibited the effects
of the bombings. But the U.S. attempt to disrupt the
economy had totally failed; agricultural production, the
mainstay of the economy, had been maintained, even
augmented in some regions during the U.S. attacks. In
Vietnam, there was nothing comparable to that mass
starvation and malnutrition suffered by the people of
Europe during and after World War II, even though the
tonnage of bombs dropped on the North alone exceeded
the bombing of all Europe.
I was stro:r-;!y impressed by the health and vigor of
the people of North Vietnam, particularly the youth in
 Approved For Release 201' OVA TINA-RDP80-016
12 JUL 1970
P boats have recently been)
turned over to the South Viet
Allies May ay Use Guerrillas namese by the United States.
They now operate primarily in
? river and canals that cnss-
?. 1"o it Foes Supply Lanes cross the Mekong Delta area
in South Vietnam.
Roles Sometimes Reversed
By WILLIAM BEECIIER
Special to 1710 Vew York ?rinui
SAIGON, South Vietnam, placed sources in South Vict-
July 11 - Allied strategists nam, Cambodia and Laos, indi-
are planning to use the enemy's cote serious consideration of
own tactic-guerrilla warfare- the following allied counter-
to try to frustrate North Viet- moves:
ry 9 IA- --A- .,F o.._-11 oA
"None of us feel that these
steps will close the enemy's
new routes to logistics traffic,"
said one ranking American
planner. "But they will make
it very cos+.ly for the enemy
and make it difficult for him
to compensate for what he has
,of the American special rorces
I who . learned their .trade in
{ South Vietnam. ;
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001:/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R0007000200?1.5
II"gulill-Imuc UL;LIVILIC:) III - ---"--
lternate supply route for its southern Laos to ambush"and In the early stages of the
forces in Cambodia and south- harass North Vietnamese truck war here'the enemy was the
ern parts of South Vietnam.' parks, transshipment centers master of guerrilla warfare
Since the fall of Prince Nor- and barge and sampan move- while the United States, with
ments along the Sc Kong. These its slow-moving infantry divi-
Chief om of Sihanouk State on on Cambodia s operations would be carried out sions, tanks and artillery,
Ch March 18 by Kha tribesmen and Lao- 7hrashed about in search of
rand the allied incursion into l trained by the Central/the elusiye foe.
But in some aspects of what
munist sanctuary I
C
f
A
d
t
lli
ormer
om
gency an
a
gence
n
e
areas along the Cambodian- ready operating from bases in' has become the Indochina war,
?Vietnamese border, North Viet-! the Boloven-Plateau in south- the roles have at times been
nam has taken several steps to, ern Laos. reversed.
p gFormation of similar irreg- In Laos, for instance, Ameri-
;o en a new route for ammuni-' can sources in Vientiane say
ular forces in northeast Cam-
lion, weapons and food. the war has been "North Viet-
'; The first step, on April 29, ources in Vto conduct comarable
actions. Pr sumably namized" over the last two
was to seize the town of At-. the guerrilla units - would be years. More and more, unaggres-
topeu, in southern Laos, com- from among soldiers of Cam- sive local Communist troops
'mandin the upper reaches of bodian extraction who were of the Pathet Lao movement
g have been relegated to the mis-
trained by- the United States
ion of supplying and support-
uth
hi
h fl
h
S
K
w
c
ows so
s
e
e
t
ong,SSpecial Forces in South Viet- l in two conventional North
west into the Mekong River.) nam a and nd are currently ly fighting ng g
Since then, North Vietnamese) for the Lon Nol Government Vietnamese divisions, the 312th
and Vietcong troops have tak-. around Pnompenh. There are and 316th.
3,000 such trpops With their tanks and artil?
en a number of towns and vil now roughly lery, these divisions have been
lager along the Se Kong and in Cambodia from whom volun- bound to the roads in Laos,
leer guerrilla fighters could be
further south along the Mekong drawn. while Meo and Laotian guer-
River in Cambodia. gEmployment of such special rillas serving under Maj. Gen.
United States, Laotian and units to provide detailed radio Vang Pao, trained and sup-
Cambodian officials, in an of-I reports for American bombers ported by the American C.I.A.,
based in South Vietnam and have been the principal oppo-
fort to prevent this waterborne nent in northern Laos, protect-
route from becoming a success-' Thailand when lucrative tar- ing the approaches to Vien
ful substitute fqr land routes gets are spotted by small teams tiane and Luang Prabang.
closer to the Vietnamese bor- of trail-watchers. Other guerrilla forces have
ders with Laos and Cambodia' gExtension of South Viet- operated against the North Viet
namese river patrol activities namese complex of roads ,and
land the former sea route pro-, up the Mekong River at least trails in southern Laos, known
viding access through the Cam-I to Kratie in Cambodia and per- as the Ho Chi Minh Trail, to
bodian coastline, have been de-, haps as far" north as Stung-, call in American bomber
veloping plans on it number treng, only about 30 miles from ( strikes and to stage hit-and-
of possible actions. the Laotian border. Scores, o! run attacks against logistical
? ReCent lnteryiews. with well, l ?beavily armed " D?trol units. Many of the Central
In- Agency specialists in
 Approved For Release 20 G 4 P80-0160
-11July 70
STATINTL
? Rushed to Pressi'
.. ~~.. a '.~:.J~?.?-ia? i?y; :~I,? ..j I. ?.`. .
econd ~~dcrs~i~a~1''~r
400...
by WILFRED G. BURCHETT.
Another great book of reportage, responding
to the urgent need to understand the npw
tined b Nixon's Invasion
h
e war op Y
stage of t
of Cambodia.
Out of his rich knowledge gained as an on-the-spot;
reporter for over 25 years, 'Burchett shows how the CIA .
? '<
.maneuvered the coup which overthrew Sihanouk, and-,
then provided, its own Special Forces to sustain the ".~.'.
puppet regime in Cambodia.
He was there when the Summit Meeting of the' ?-
Indochinese Peoples (Vietnamese, Laotians. and Cam
bodians) setup a program and a new strategy of unity in
; the war; and when the new Government of National
Unity. for Cambodia'. was formed. 11e shows why
Approved For Reiease 20Q1103104. C1A-R.1 P80-01601:R000700020001-5
C4 n6 di4 4W
Dontinued
 "$ J:' ~ 5 'M S
A
roved For Release 2001/03/0 i-DP80-016018000
1
of 0 JUL 1970
credibility
STA
the Governi'nent
TINTL
1W D. J. it. BfUCICNI',11
The Administration was making so much .very day, it seems, something comes to
noise in San Clemente last week that the na- Might which illustrates the terrible need for
tion might not have been able to hear what 'much better public articulation of foreign,
was happening in Washington. Presumably policy, and there is still enough hidden to
that was, in part, the reason for all those re- furnish revelations for a long time.
ports, briefings and discussions on the Cam Among many opponents of the war there
hodian venture which went up from the is a tendency to mindless moralizing and ex-
Western White House like ponderous rock-, pressions of personal superiority, a tenden-
ets; they tended to drown out the thunder cy to assume that all decision-makers ai?e
from Capitol Hill where the Senate am wicked and that the system does not work..
proved the Cooper-Church amendment, the On the other side, perhaps even In the White
clear sense of which was a warning to the House, there seems to be some contempt for
President not to try any more precipitous that part of the system called Congress..
ventures on his own authority. Some in the Such posturing is a symptom of the disease
White House staff might have felt it desira- that cripples up.
-ble, then, to demonstrate that there is still a 1
President.
We must expect more such demonstra-' In Congress there is at least a little hope
lions in the future; in a sense, they are built for something much. better, On the House
into the President's position. He had the side there have been hearings for several
chance when he first took office to end weeks on a bill that would limit the Pres-
the war in Indochina,?but he did not take ident's military authority. The Senate
that chance. It is important to the nation Foreign Relations Committee is preparing
that his viability as leader survive during public hearings on a better bill, offered by
his term; and it is apparent now that expla- Sen. Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.) which would re-
nation and justification are to be the vehicles quire Congressional review of any Presiden-
of that leadership. tial commitment of troops within 3C days.
The Cooper-Church amendment may The concept of systematic, automatic Con-
never become law anyway; it faces a long,, gressional review is important. Debate, such
and probably destructive discussion In the as that over the Cooper-Church amendment,
House. But it represents the first time in our; is not enough; in-depth committee work,
history that either side of Congress has at. and staff work, is needed. In the past Con-
tempted to discipline the Commander-in- gress has been, and it ' could be again, the
Chief during a war. ? best means of the public articulation of na-
. yF
u ol?led r. Fen b US
1
10 t ' 'I a 4: CIA-RDP8Q-01601 10007000.20001-5
gQy
tional policy.
In that sense, the hearings on the Javits
The Senate has been moving in that direc-,' bill could be as important as any legislation
Lion since last autumn when it began to they produce. One would even hope they
place geographical limits on the funds in ; would be televised, whole, and live. Con-
some military spending, measures. Now that gress has a pretty strong case for asking for
movement has reached a critical junction. It equal time npw and the Javits bill is not a
can lead to some systematic changes in the . bad vehicle to move the. nation towards
way foreign policy is made and conducted. much fuller public discussion of policy and.
Or it could become a power struggle be. its consequences.
tween two branches of government. And it There is no guarantee of wisdom from the
is not hard to imagine a situation in which a public if it gets much more deeply involved
President could seriously compromise Con- in open consideration of foreign policy, but
gress in such a struggle; it is not even hard there is not much apparent wisdom In the
to imagine a President creating an advan- 0 present method either.' The object of the
tageous situation of that kind, just to save struggle over foreign'policy now should be
his own skin. ? not to decide who has power over this or
There must be some way to restore the' that, ? but whether the government of the
value of reason to political discourse in thin `,United States can be made credible again to
nation; such a restoration is vital in the area its own people, responsive and responsible
of foreign policy. There have been too many to thein.:?~
shocks recently for people to absorb without I
1 a loss of trust: in a brief time we have all J
found out that the Central Intelligence.
Agency has been controlling and paying for
a big army in Laos, that some of our foreign
aid programs have peculiar purposes, that
Southeast Asian allied forces in Vietnam are
? gon another $100 million to shore up the re-
game there.
 NEW YORK TIMES STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03Y :7Offr-RDP8O-01601
/~ ers. The only political solace Vietnam. If the authority is that tain' 'emergency actions;' but
Senate Acts ; for the Administration was that broad, then the question arises then specifying that such mili-
rb
To Curb
? al of all American forces from .Cooper-Chu rch amendment on. _ -JOHN,W.PINNP-
Nixon on Cambodia, thus submerging the. the grounds he was only acting
The day is now gone when 'mander in Chief, the President
\age- Jar' the President can go to war on . may choose to ignore the re-
the basis of some. ambiguous strictions in the Cooper-Church
WASHINGTON The Sen-
ate has taken what may prove
to be a historic step in redres-
sing the balance of warmaking
powers between the Presidency
and the Congress, in an era of
undeclared wars.
After 34 days of often con-
fusing constitutional debate, the
Senate last week adopted by a
vote of 58-37 the Cooper-
Church amendment that would
restrict the 'President's au-
thority to use funds for future
military operations in Cambodia.
Using the power of the purse-
strings-the ultimate power of
Congress-the amendment spe-
cified that after July 1 the Pres-
ident, in the absence of Con-
gressional approval, could not
retain American troops In Cam-
bodia, provide military advisers
or hire mercenaries for the
Cambodian Government, or sup-
ply air support for Cambodian
forces.
Significant Step
Never before during the
course of a shooting war had
either branch of Congress so
attempted to place restrictions
on the warmaking powers of the
President as Commander in
Chief. The vote marked a sig-
nificant step in Congressional
reassertion of the powers that
in the past three decades, large-
ly through Congressional ac.
quiescence. have gravitated to
the executive branch.
In all probability, the Cooper-
Church amendment will never
become law. It still must be
approved by the House, and
from the start the Administra-
tion has relied on the more
hawkish House to save it from
the leash of a preponderantly
dovish Senate. Nevertheless, the
Senate's action will have lasting
political force even If not fol-
lowed In the House, thus bring
Ing about some readjustment In
the warmaking powers on a
Passage of the amendment -- ---- """ ..,,,,"'.""'?
President Nixon cited in justl- Senator dacol> K,' lavits of represented a serious rebuff to ills o t vc -
President Aapro &ftr P419keA ', i no 1, ~, U000400020001-5
to order the Cambodian inter- retying to justify a continued that the ' President as Com-~
vention without so much as con- .Amcrican.??rtiditary presence irn mander, in- Chief, may take cer-;
culfinn with Cnnnressinnnl lead.
Congressional resolution that is, amendment. In his conversatid'ft
used to justify decisions made with three television commen-
or not yet made by the Com- tators Wednesday night, Mr. Nix-
mander in Chief. War by am-, on refused to say categorically
bivalent resolutions went out' that he would not reintroduce
the Congressional window with American troops to Cambodia
the bitter experience over the but emphasized "We do not
1964 Gulf of Tonkin resolution, plan on it." But if heldid send
which was repealed by the Sen- troops back to Cambodia, he
ate 10 days ago during the would do so at considerable po-
constitutional debate. litical risk.
Also gone is the day when
the President can fight an un-
declared war on the basis of
'consultations with a few man-
darins in Congress. In fact, it
was a reaction against the past
practice of war by consultation
that led to, the Cooper-Church
amendment.
The President may have told
a privileged few in Congress that
the Central Intelligence Agency
was financing a mercenary
army in Laos, that the Air
Force was bombing in northern
Laos in support of the Royal
Laotian Government, that munif-
icent allowances' were being
paid to Thai, South Korean and
Philippine troops sent to South
Vietnam. But these actions came
as a surprise to the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee, which
is why the committee decided
to impose prohibitions when it
came to Cambodia. If the pro-,
hibitions are ,to be lifted, It will
be only by consulting Congress
as a whole and openly, . r
Imprecise Definitions
In redefining the division of
warmaking powers, the Cooper-
Church amendment is admitted
ly imprecise. In its operative
sections, it lays down specific.
prohibitions on the President;
but then In its statement of
principles, it reaffirms the. con
stitutional powers of the Com-
mander in Chief, including his,
.power to take steps to protect
the 'lives UI" tinier can troops.
"wherever deployed." To that
extent, the . amendment en-
shrines a principle that is in -
creasingly being invoked by the.
cign military action.
The Cooper - Church amend-
ment is part of an evolutionary
process In which the Senate has
been engaged for over a year.
Preceding it last year was the
National Commitments Resolu-
tion calling upon the President
not to engage .in foreign hos-
tilities without the affirmative
pproval of Congress, Then last
December, the Senate incor-
porated an amendment in the
Defense Appropriations,Bill spec-
ifying that no funds were to
be used by the President to in-
troduce ground troops into Laos
or Thailand. That amendment
was accepted by the Admin.
istration with no complaints
that. it was tying the hands of
the Commander in Chief. It was
only when Senators John Sher-
man Cooper, Republican of Ken-
tucky, and Frank Church, Demo-
crat of Idaho, presented their.
amendment that such com-
plaints were voiced by the
executive branch.
From the standpoint of the
.Cooper - Church forces, their
amendment does not tie the
hands of the President, but rath.,
,er, as Senator Church put it at
one point In the debate, "helps
.to untie the knots by which
Congress has shackled Its own
powers."
In essence, the Senate has
told the President that his pow-
ers as Commander in Chief are
not unlimited, to be defined as
he sees fit. The next step in
this evolutionary process will be
an attempt by the Foreign Re=
lations Committee to define by
law how the President may use
his authority as Commander in
Chief in the absence of adecla.
ration of war by Congress
 Approved For Release 2 l J?0 I8IA-RDP80-01601 R000
STATINTL
Despite almost irnpossible conditions,
STOL Circraft fly. constantly in Laos.
As told to:
Alex I3a.rtimo
By II. F. Harper
Lot in Siivvi al Del, il s Ovi STOLs And ' t
SCANNING THE VAST void and
barren Plain of'?Jarrs in the rugged
and mountainous terrain of northern
Laos, Pilot . Jim. Cutler. spotted a
brilliant flash on a hilltop.. ?7,000
feet below the wing of his STOL
Pilatus Porter.
A T-28 attack boniber:of the Laotian
Air Force wheeled in, belching a fiery
trail of rockets; then dropped a load of
250-pound high explosive bombs onto
a concentration of advancing North
Vietnamese troops moving towards
the strate-'ic town of Sam Thong, an
.'American refugee center and hospital.
Two Huey helicopters hovered over
an area with sparse trees anal then
settled on the parched red earth. Out
-of the:underbrush scrambled a rash of
olive drab figures in beclr?a ggled array
fatigue uniforms, firing as they ran for
the helicopter.
Jim Cutler shrugged.
Approve e#oUR&&eai r~ 0rW DjtQ4
Air America l lacy bopter? loads .fuel for
use by S7Ol'.s in forvrard combat zones.
down there. Look at 'ern scramble out
of there.' Wish we could help them,
but business as usual I guess." .
The loudspeaker overhead crackled,
then blared:
"Tango 1, this is Tango 2. How do
you read me?" .
"Go ahead Tango 2. 1 read you?fivc-
by-five," Jim replied. .
"Got a hot mission for you at Site
62. Go in and evacuate Gencral? Van
Pao. His forward position is about to
.be overrun by the `bad griys' (North
Vietnamese),' and we can't afford to
lose the- little tiger, the only General
in Laos winning this `secret war'."
"Look buster, you've got to be
kidding;. ;I finfslied my combat mis-
sioris in Korea. I play it cool from now
on.''
"Tango I., there's $1,000 bonus in
,the pot for this one!"
4 ~f'#~~17~'fl020001-5