CIA REPORT STARTED HIJACK ROW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000500190001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 29, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 5, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

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Approved Forki-ity401(5gi CIA-RDP80-
F.- :. .. ....
. . ,
,...7
. ?-... Heir' Franz ' Josef. Strauss
Vetie?., went even further to allege that
? ...rairJ. A- Li !; the actual' date of 30 October
. ?m-- ? ?; .4
had been. set. But it is recog-
.- ? ???-??? _nised that ? Herr Strauss, who is
ISL
1r II- rh
.... k., 4..i . elections, may simply' be con-
involVed. in the present German
. -.cerried.with a possible electoral
I --It;.... -,i ?-'? oil ''' "c"*VI 7charges of collusion .-? . ' ;.
fl a advantage by .. repeating ..the
' ill il '4,-,i.", i
a 7 - Novel theless, sharp questions
?
: . . -. - - . ?
,
are being asked in Jerusalem. If
? .
by COLIN LEGUM.?:. ,,, there was some.' kind of .warn-
. .. . . .
? .. ..
Ing - Why.. were :no . ?adequate
security :.precautions taken,
ISRAEliis -Still not -prepared- to
especially ?on Lufthansa - flights
accept West ?Germany's angry '
- denials -of having -been involved operating out of Damascus and
in a secret deal with the Black Beirut, t, Arab
tg%?eroirtitllaja centresocorsaia
iis.
the hijackin" of a Lufthansa
September org,anisation- 'before o t
.tions? How did the weapons get
'aircraft last t'SuadaY. The hi- on board the?Lufthansa plane?
jacking led to the release .of -According to a Spanish journ-
three Arab prisoners 'held after alist; who was one of the three
the Munich killings during the non-Arab passengers in the hi-
Olympic Games. .?..- . ---.. ; jacked aircraft, there were nine
It transpires that the crucial bombs ' as big as bottles', eight
element in the bitter ? -con- hand grenades and three pistols.
i.oversy about alleged collusion -- - Reports from Beirut indicate
between. Bonn .and the Black the possibility .'of rapidly-
September group is a secret improving German-Arab rela-
report made by agents of the tions, but Arab' ?-sources, tie-
,XJS -Central Intelligence Agency nounce the ' collusion ' 'story as
IM. _They reportedly leaked 'a typical piece of Israeli fabri-
'the story of an alleged secret cation.' ? - ? .i.: .., .. . .._
. ....
meeting held in Rome before .
the -"hijacking between certain
high-- officials from Bonn and
, Bled.; September leaders. It is
. on the basis of this report that
'much of the circumstantial evi-
? dence'has been built tip in sup-
port of the collusion theory. .
' Prominent Israeli security
and .political figures take very
.s-eriOuslythe possibility of some
' kind of a secret deal. But the
?,Minister' ' of ..Transport, . Mr
:Shimon 'Peres,has said he did
not believe Chancellor Willy
..Brandt's ? Government 'would
'involve itself in .` so foul a deed.'
The -Israelis have noted in
'Particular the statement of the
West German Minister of Trans-
.-port :that the authorities had
jreceived warnings that a strike
.was being planned in the .latter
part of, October- to secure, the
..relea.se, o-. the., ? three .. Arab
;prisonerS.''. .- .._
Approved For Release 2001/03/04,: CIA-RDP80-01601R000500190001-9
Approved For ReleasesiNNWEIA-RDP80-01
I c
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GEHLEN: Spy of the Century
by E. H. Cookridge
Random House, 402 pp., $10
OMNI
THE GENERAL WAS A SPY:
The Truth About General Gehlen
and His Spy Ring
by Heinz Mime and Hermann Zoning
translated from the German
by Richard Barry
Coward, McCann & Geoghegan,
347 pp., $10
THE SERVICE:
.The Memoirs of General
Reinhard Gehlen
translated from the German
by David Irving
World, 386 pp., $10
GEHLEN: Master Spy of the Century
by Charles Whiting
Ballantine, 274 pp., $1.25
Reviewed by Robert G. Deiodorler
In the perilous Cold War times of
eighteen to twenty years ago, few per-
sons privy to the ways of international
circles?least of them Reinhard Gehlen
himself?could have foreseen the twi-
light that was to fall over his later
career. Gehlen's triumphs in the late
1940s and early 1950s, particularly his
artful lifting of vital Soviet secrets, put
him at the top of his profession. A
slight, vain, driven man, methodical
and single-minded, Gehlen was the re-
markably reliable and productive
leader of an espionage structure he
hired out lii St to the United States and
then to his own West German govern-
ment. That was a world more clearly
divided than now between friend and
foe, and Gehlen seemed to some an
epic figure, concealed behind the high,
heavily patrolled walls of his head-
quarters at Pullach, a few miles front
Munich. However, when the Cold War
began to thaw, when his network was
breached by the Communists, when
new technology reelaced people, Gchlen
was brought down from his under-
cover heights.
Son of a solid, middle-class Prussian
Gehlen, like his father, went
into the German army and slowly
climbed up through the chain of com-
mand. If he was an unimpressive-look-
ing little man, with thin lips, jugged
ears, and a pale, cardboard complexion,
he was also willing to work sixteen
painstaking hours a day to fill in the
daydream his vanity kept spinning.
Gehlen, who was a general staff officer
Robert G. Deindorfer has written three
books on the subject of intelligence the
during the Second World War, was
named head of Fronde Heere Ost
(Foreign Armies East), the German
staff's intelligence unit on the Eastern
Front. With a card file for a mind and
a passion for detail, he soon formed
a successful network of agents on both
sides of the battle lines. His evalua-
tions of Soviet strength were so ac-
curate that they finally did him in.
Toward the end of the war, as the Rus-
sian armies rolled westward, Hitler
angrily relieved Gehlen of his com-
mand, not because his intelligence fore-
casts weren't accurate?they.were?but
because mournful estimates of over-
powering Russian strength were too
hard for the tormented, ever-optimistic
Hitler to bear.
In the circumstances this created,
Gehlen demonstrated a flair for the
self-serving long view. Germany was
doomed, no doubt of it.. Beyond the
defeat, though, he saw an increasing
tension between the U.S.S.R. and its
Western allies once the postwar house-
keeping in Europe commenced. He ad-
vised his better agents in the denied
area. to stay where they were, packed
up .forty crates of microfilm in
on the Soviet Union, and scuttled
into Bavaria to bury the treasure and
await the advancing Americans, who
seemed as the most promising market.
For a while, after Gehlen had given
himself up, he was submerged in the
great wash of prisoners of war. When
his unique background came to the at-
tention of U.S. military intelligence of-
ficers, however, he was flown to Wash-
ington. In a matter of months he made
an agreement to pull together an
American-funded, German-manned in-
telligence service, with the help of his
voluminous files, his dormant agents
and networks, and an intimate knowl-
edge of the Russians. .
Gehlen and his people got ? on to the
job immediatelY, with an annual
budget variously reported to be from
$.6 million to $20 million. With the col-
laboration of German soldiers still
prisoners in the Soviet Union and a
host of refugees streaming into West-
ern Europe, not to mention some
former Abwehr and SS officers, Gehlen
built an enormous service just as the
breach between the Soviet Union and
the United States began to widen.
"The Org," as the Gehlen organiza-
tion \vas known, developed right out of
the craft books: agents, subagents and
cutouts, dead drops, codes,. and safe
houses?the whole sealed off with a
watertight compartmentalization for
the obvious reason of security. All over
Europe Gehlen agents masqueraded as
escapees recruited in the sprawling
refugee camps of Austria and Germany
?for a flat price of $100 a day, plus a
fluctuating bonus afterwards if they.
managed to get back out safely. Among
the notable successes were the penetra-
tion of East Germany's government
and early warnings on Soviet jet and
missile development; on uprisings in
East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and
Hungary; on important political vibra-
tions in Moscow; on Soviet troop
strength, and even on the hostility be-
tween Russia and China. According to
people who ought to know, The Org
supplied upwards of 70 per cent of the
intelligence data from the Soviet orbit
for the United States, NATO, and
SHAPE. Under the circumstances an
East German newspaper was moved to
offer an improbable tribute in the slim-
mer of 1953: "The Gehlen .Organization
has hitherto scored certain successes
in the recruitment of agents in the Ger-
man Democratic Republic." .
In 1956 the apparatus, except for
some ex-SS and ex-Nazi personnel who
were phased out for political reasons,
became the Bundesoachrichtendienst
most recent of which is Secret Service? businessmen, tax advisers, and employ-
Thirty-three CcniAppromediFor Releasea00,14034011P:CSAQRDP80-01601R00050019011
si1-9 ?
Approved For Release 200MI3AO4 sCIALIRSF'80-0
3.1. JUNE 1972
Sehlibn's
&Ted- sh1N
? Me
THE SERVICE: SERVICE: The Memoirs of General Rein-
hard Gehlen. Translated by David Irving.
World. $10.
By K. S. Giniger
A week or two before the European..phae
of World War 11 came to its formal close, I
was at an airbase in Eschwege, Germany, as
an intelligence officer. Watching for a special
reconnaissance mission to return to base, I
was surprised to- see a German Junkers
' transport flying in low from the east, wheels
down for a landing. Our antiaircraft batteries
were surprised, too, or asleep, because none
fired at the enemy aircraft.
The plane was permitted to land, un-
harmed, but armed soldiers surrounded the
occupants as they dismounted from the craft
and took them into custody. We learned on
interrogation that they were high-ranking
'German officers from the Russian front and
had come to volunteer their services to us in
what they were convinced would be our ap-
proaching war with the Russians.
Just about that same time, General Rein-
hard Gehlen, who had been in charge of Ger-
man intelligence in the east, was busy trans-
porting two .truckloads of his files and his
staff to a hideout on the Austrian border
about 300 miles to the south. His idea was
exactly the same. And his extensive files on
the Soviets gave him a bit more bargaining
-power than his fellow officers to the north.
HIS MEMOIRS tell the story of how he par-
layed his convictions about the inevitability of
Allied-Soviet conflict and his small staff and
collection of file cabinets into an intelligence
empirs which first operated as a European
.branch of the CIA and then became the official
foreign intelligence service of the new Feder-
al Republic of Germany. And, although 27
years have passed since that armed conflict
with the Soviets was a matter of days, he has
not changed his opinion about "the ultimate
clash with the United States of America." But
now, he, writes, it won't come until 19S0 after
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the Russians have eliminated China as a
world power.
General Gehlen's book Is a work of self-
justification rather than the spy thriller the
advance notices promised (will the real Mar-
tin Bormann please stand up?). But they are
worth reading as a lesson in the very real
problems of intelligence chiefs.
Allen Dulles once said to me that the publi-
cation of the Gehlen memoirs would com-
promise security, but there Is nothing in this
book that compromises anything except its
author. And one of Dulles' British count-
erparts, Major General Sir Kenneth Strong,
told me at the same time that such a publica-
tion would do no harm because most of what
;Rehle.n coul &tell us_ wa s
BUT THESE MEMOIRS do reveal the un-
compromising nature of its author's anti.-
Communist convictions.
In the same exchanges of correspondence
and views, Gehlen himself said that ho could
not publish because what he would say could
only expose him and his family to real dan-
ger of vengeancv apparently his dislike for
the "Ostpolitilt" of Ihe' present German gov-
ernment of Willy Brandt has prompted him to
take this risk, if risk it is.
In his introduction, George Bailey calls the
General "a specialist in the salvaging and
safeguarding of institutions." Ho certainly
salvaged and safeguarded the one Institution
he created. It Is unfortunate that too much of
Gehlen's own book, unlike the others on the
dame subject, is devoted less to that inztitu-
tion, the Gehlen "Org," than to the currently
unfashionable ideas behind its creation.
? -
IC. S. Giniger is president of Consolidated
130012 Publishers.
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Approved For Release zu
IBOOKS IN BRIEF
Gehlen?Spy of the Century
By E. H. Cookridge
Random House, 402 pp., $10
HATE-LOVE
OF SPOOKERY
WALTER DARNELL JACOBS
Our age does not know just how to
assess the professional spy. He is some-
how outside the broader circles of gen-
tlemen. He is worthy of respect for his
skills and valor but worthy of disdain
for the unsavoriness of his calling. He
is a source of popular entertainment so
long as he is presented in the most shal-
low and unreal parody. We know we
? need him but most of us wish that we
didn't.
Cookridge's assessment of Reinhard
Gehlen is 'subject to all these conflicts.
Cookridge, himself a person with some
professional spookery in his back-
ground, sees in Gehlen the outstanding
spy of this century. He recognizes all
the skills that Gehlen possesses and
marvels at all (well, nearly all) of the
exploits that Gehlen brought off. Still,
.Cookridge writes about his subject with
an animus which has scarcely been
equaled since Trotsky wrote Stalin's
biography or Gore Vidal described a
night with Richard Nixon.
EHLEN HAS BEEN a director in es-
pionage and intelligence rather than an
operator or agent. He has served Hitler,
Truman, Eisenhower, Adenauer, Erhard
and Kiesinger. He provided Hitler with
accurate combdt and political intelli-
gence on the USSR during World War
IL He then served the United States
from his base in the Pullacher Forst,
collecting information inside the Soviet
bloc when most Western agencies were
unable either to penetrate or maintain
sources there. When the Federal Re-
public was created; Gehlen became
head of the West German Intelligence
Service (BND) and . created a world-
wide system for Bonn that was also
used to some extent by the United
States .and NATO. Before his retire-
ment in 1968 Gehlen warned that the
IA-RDP80
STATI NT
but nobody listened.
This series of accomplishments is fit-
tingly admired by Cookridge. He ad-
mires, too, Gehlen's ability to work
with the Egyptian apparatus and, at
almost the same time, to cooperate with
the Israelis. He even has some grudging
appreciation for ?Gehlen's operations in
France against the Algerian separatists
before 1958.
What generates Cookridge's hate-love
of Gehlen is something other than a
squeamishness at Gehlen's ability to,
switch sides (Hitler to CIA to Bonn) qy
to serve both sides (Israel and Egypt).
In Cookridge's code the professional
spy is expected to be prepared to serve
whomever he must in the style of the
good British civil servant who can serve
Lab or Lib or Tory and do the same
competent professional job.
No, the cause of Cookridge's dislike
of Gehlen is the fact that the great
German spy has lived a life marked
by a single-minded application to and
entrancement by the Soviet Union.
Whether Gehlen found his "subject" in
the Soviet Union, as Cookridge asserts,
or deduced from study and observa-
tion that the USSR was at the center
of twentieth-century allairs; as events
would. seem to argue, is a question for
speculation only. Gehlen became the
"spy .of the century" because he was
? able to supply more essential elements
of information about the USSR than
any of his contemporaries.
"Spy of the century" or not, Gehlen
remains a most. controversial figure
even in retirement. The value of Cook-
ridge's work is to take that controversy
out of the pages of the sensationalist
and reflex liberal press of Germany and
the United States and place it almost
inside the arena of scholarly research.
He makes a reasonable attempt at meet-
ing the standards of respectable re-
search but is handicapped, not only by
his feelings of aversion toward Gehlen
the person but also by the nature of
available sources, which are not entirely
those of the political historian, but are,
rather, concealed and often dissembled.
And even though Cookridge places too
much reliance on secondary sources and
some questionable polemics (e.g., Wise
and Ross), he produces a work that
advances knowledge about espionage in
general and about the 'great one, Gehlen.
Still, it is far from a definitive. study.
Because of the nature of the subject,
hensiveness?the rble of the Gehlen
papers..We now have the Gehlen auto- ,
biography in German and it is soon to
appear in an expanded English version.
Cookridge ridicules the German edition
.as self-serving and lacking in documen-
tation. He fails to find therein prom-
ised sensational disclosures about the
Borrnann matter. The Gehlen papers,
nevertheless; deserve more weight than
Cookridge is. willing to assign them.
Gehlen's version, in either language edi-
tion, is perforce a major input in any
understanding of Gehlen the spy and
Gehlen the man.
Cookridge's is an outstanding effort
to contribute to the understanding of
Gehlen as a director of. espionage. It is
pettiness perhaps to have expected more
of a contribution to an understanding
of Gehlen as a man?or as an imperial
friend who has told us so much about
the nature and capabilities of the Soviet
Union. STATINTL
? ?
Soviet Union wyypec4511-aa-
a r erffelttast30/001/09VNY:VPAIRIEFP80-01601R000500190001-9
to use force agai s zec oslova la? duced. Cookridge, however, sees the
main lacuna in his attempt at compre-
wavammia?????
Approved For ReleaseitIOM/CliFeleRr6F8V-01
1 JUN 1972
our rrfazn IPtIELB22.
The Service: The Memoirs of
General Reinhard Gehlen
translated by David Irving.
World, 400 pp., $10.00
The General Was a Spy
by -Heinz Hahne and Hermann Zoning,
translated by Richard Barry. -
Coward, McCann & Geoghegan,
347 pp., $10.00
Gehlen, Spy of the Century ?
by E. H. Cookridge.
Random House, 402 pp., $10.00
Neal Aicherson
When the Third Reich fell, the Allies
were able to make use of a lot of Nazi
junk. Like the telex machines in the
Reuters office in Berlin, which up to a
'year or two ago still preserved a special
'key with the double lightning-flash of
.the SS, much of Hitler's furniture
:served the conquerors' purposes until
'equipment built for new requirements
.could be introduced. General Gehlen
,was such a piece of junk..Unfortunate-
'1y, he stayed in service for another
k twenty-three years. Long after his
espionage machinery 'had become ob-
sojett and unreliable, the Gehlen keys
continued to tap out the only message
they knew: Bolshevik Russia is the
merciless arch-enemy of human civiliza?
tion, only a tight-wing authoritarian
.state can resist the Red Terror, anyone
who doubts either of the above propo-
.:sitions is a "Staatsfeind."
Reinhard Gehlen a small and reti-
centman_s_vithjy_g_sa;_was the head.
of Fremde Ifeere Ost (Foreign Armies
East), the German military intelligence
service on the eastern front during
World War 11. After the war, he sold.
himself, his men, and his files to the
?Americans on the condition that he be
allowed to operate autonomously. In
1955 the "Gehlen Organization" was
transferred to the Federal Republic
under the name of "Bundesnachricht-
endienst" (BND). From then until he
was pushed into retirement in 1968,
after a long series of scandals and
official complaints, Gehlen ran a West
German espionage service* with
branches and agents all over tha world.
That is the framework. Within it lies a
Bosch landscape of swarming, terrify-
ing, terrified figures: an armed para-
chutist fleeing from Soviet patrols in
Lithuania, a double traitor feasting on
smuggled, lobsters, ssApprovechfor
subversion squads to enter socialist
Hungadr, and a swan carrying packets
s
of information under its wings across a m
Berlin lake. A woman opens her legs to
Russian officers in Vienna; another is in
led to the guillotine in East Germany
se
Ifor ? high treason. Everywhere, men Gevh7
!looking over their shoulders are touting like
folders of secrets for dog-eared wads of ians
money. All these were Gehlen's crea- gallc
tures. Somehow, looking back on this
landscape in his memoirs, he can say:
"11.1y own view was that in the long
run only he who fights with a spotless
shield will triumph."
?
Such is Gehlen's.v- iew of'himself. His
memoirs were sold in advance for a
gigantic sum to the right-wing Springer
newspaper chain for serialization, but
proved to be so eccentric, and indeed
so dull, that the Springer journalists
were obliged to pad them out with
apologetic notes. Their most startling
page claimed that Bormann was a
Soviet spy and escaped to the Russians
after the fall of Berlin, a claim for
which Gehlen advances no real evi-
dence whatever. Gehlen, to the anguish
of the Springer press, denies or ignores
most' of the really sensational anec-
dotes about his postwar activities.
Instead, he delivers interminable whin-
Him
PUTS,
right
estal
liber
previ
'11
Ame
pictt
In a
plain
that
was
calle
the
Thes
cou
sive'
word
suspi
A
but
ing discourses about the internal bu- hims?
reaucracy, of the BND in its head- was a political idiot. His broad appreci-
quarters at Pullach, near Munich, and ations, 'colored by fascism and sheer
about its budget grievances, crankiness, were worthless. For a time,
But Gehlen's memoirs, though utter- no doubt, they were the appreciations
ly unreliable and at times deliberately that the State Department and later
misleading, retain some historical inter_ Chancellor Adenhuer wished to hear.
est. In the first place, they tell us But when the cold war began to
something about Gehlen's world out- diminish, governments became im-
look. Secondly, they confirm beyond Patient with Gehlen's morbid view of
doubt the disgraceful unconstitutional the Red threat. He sank into self-pity,
campaign waged by Gehlen and his comforted only by episodes like the
men against the Social Democrats and escalation of the Vietnam war (al-
their :`Ostpolitik," the patient effort to though, as he writes, even there the
dismantle the cold war, ramparts of Americans were too squeamish: "our
legal fiction and paranoia which sepa_ own blitz campaign in France taught
rated West Germany from Eastern us that a massive and crushing use of
Europe. ? . force always costs less casualties").
Gehlzn's own politics, as revealed :in' The BND' carried on a . determined
rear-guard action against the Ostpolitik,
before. and after Gehlen's own retire-
ment, and a large section of the
memoirs is devoted to the "illusions
Germans. Consider this passage, in and unsound judgements" of Social
which Gehlen is describing the life of Democrat politicians who do not real-
the Soviet population under Nazi occu_ ize that Russia "understands the word
pa tion: 'co-existence' in a purely offensive
After twentk years of arbitrary sense." It is rumored in Bonn that the
injustice and terror, the re-estab- BND recently played a part in subvert-
ealiffationa-RbiZIOID it 0/FtEr008010400004 -9
, lies in chancellor Brandt's governing
liberty, justice and the sanctity of
property united -habitant
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araa ???? ? ??ala al. SI CI. ,Col
this book, remain those of a moderate
Nazi. There is, for instance, the charac-
teristic blindness to the torments and
feelings of any people other than the
lishment o
RAkeaae
Approved For Release 209NORM9AFRATE80-01601
MAY 1972
Gehlen Faces Prosecution-
The West German pros!. reports that
Reinhard Gehten, former President of
the Federal Intelligeace Service (13HDI
has been charged with receiving a huge
bribe, an offence which carries a penalty
of five years hard labour.
A complaint flied with the public pro-
seculor's office In Munich charges that
when he was at the head of the BHD.
Gehien received from the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency a bribe of 230,000
marks, with which he acquired the luxury
villa In Berg am Starnberger See In Ba-
varia where he now lives. The evidence
submitted includes documents from the
land registry office and the testimony
of seven witnesses. The complaint men-
tions as a witness the present CIA di-
rector Richard Helms.
That Gehlen had bought his villa with
money received from the CIA was first
reported by the Hamburg weekly Der
Spiegel in Its Issue Ho. 12 for 1971. But
it took more than a year for the charges
against Adenauer's one-time "favour-
-Ite" to be flied with the prosecutor's
??office.
Tr-
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REPUBLIC
1,1111MTATILITI_
ase zuwilCa/OArROWRIVINTOP
F 11811).
ur Man bub STATINTL
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Gehlen: Spy of the Century
by E. H. Cookkiidge
(Random House; $10)
The'General Was a Spy
by Heinz Hohne and Hermann Zolling
(Coward, McCann & Geoghegan; $8.95).
A year before Winston Churchill's "Iron .
Curtain" speech in Fulton, Missouri,
which formally stated the theme of Act I
of the Cold War, a prologue was being
written and played backstage in Europe
by Americans and Germans. They had
already identified Soviet Communism
as Enemy Number One, not primarily
because Russia had Eastern Europe in
its grip, but because Soviet Commu-
nism was satanic and was set on con-
quering the world. And as Hugh Trevor-
Roper remarks in his introduction to
The General Was a Spy, "it is legitimate
to use Beelzebub to drive out Satan."
Beelzebub was -willing. Both these spy
stories describe how and why, with the
collapse of the German armies, ' the
Americans recruited Hitler's Chief of
Intelligence .against the Soviet Union
and underwrote his postwar espionage
operations.
Reinhard Gehlen was a professional,
an experiensed, single-minded anti-
Communist with exceptional contacts.
Those who hired him were not of the
breed of Henry Stimson, who once said
quaintly that gentlemen don't read
other people's mail. They were what
came to be called realists, and they
dominated US foreign policy for the
next quarter of a century. The US gov-
ernment secretly financed General Geh-
len to the amount of $200 million, and
when he finally left his American super-
visors and went to work directly for the
Bonn government, Mr. Cookbridge tells
us, Allen Dulles gave him "a golden
handshake in appreciation of the great
work he had done for CIA; a gratuity of
250,000 marks had .been authorized.
Dulles added the not entirely seriously
meant condition that Gehlen should
use the money to buy a fine house
clandestine tips on Eastern Europe and
the USSR. Toward the end, it learned
that much of the information was use-
less; and it learned something more
disturbing: the Gehlen organization had
been penetrated by the Soviets. By the
early '60s, Washington's interest had
cooled.
The General Was a Spy is drawn from a
series of articles written by two German
journalists for Der Spiegel. Ge/t/en: Spy
of the Century is the product of a Euro-
pean educated British journalist who
was himself an intelligence agent in
World War H and was imprisoned by
the Gestapo. Hohne and Zolling offer a
more detailed and dispassionate ac-
count and focus more sharply on the
intricacies of the postwar intelligence
network inside Germany; they are less
revealing than Cookbridge, however,
on. the 'American involvement and on
the Nazi backgrounds of Gehlen's
associates.
Gehlen served any master who served
his purpose, which was the undermin-
ing and the destruction of Communism.
When it could no longer be doubted
that the German armies were defeated,
Gehlen turned to the Werewolfs, the
young terrorists who were to carry on
after Hitler's collapse. The Werewolf
project had been discussed at one of
Gehlen's last meetings with the Fuhrer,
whom Gehlen found "most charming."
They had also discussed Hitler's order
that "gramophone records with sound
effects of combat noise and rolling tanks
. . . be distributed to front line com-
mands and played from dugouts as near
as possible to the Soviet lines." Hitler
was mad, Gehlen was not. Yet Gehlen
accepted this-order, as all the others,
knowing it was too late to stave off
somewhere in the Bavarian mountains." l disast fl
Aktiti&Vrant
For the $200 A/marl-Qv:MI F.PerbwiefilesciitAiKot `arsert unielt Ftift0
there
mowntains of paper and thousands of nothing to desert. from. He played no
part, in any German plot against the
Nazi leaders. He waited until the end
and then escaped to Bavaria, in early
1945, taking with him files he knew
would interest the Americans ?to whom
he intended to surrender at a price. He
met with Brigadier General Edwin L.
Sibert, senior intelligence 'officer of the
American Zone, who (report Hohne and
Zolling) "while fighting was still in
progress in France . . . had been pre-
'pared to make use of Adolf Hitler's
officers in the cause of 'American strat-
egy" and who "had a most excellent
impression of him [Gehlen] at once."
Sibert promptly took up with General
Bedell Smith, US chief of staff, Gehlen's
proposal to set up a German intelligence
service "financed by the US and directed
against the Soviet Union." Bedell Smith
"okayed" 'the project, according to
Hohne and Zolling, but did not inform
Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander,
who had forbidden fraternization with
Germans. After lengthy interrogation
in Germany, Gehlen was flown to
Washington.
Though friendship with Moscow was
then 'official US policy, Cookbridge
points out, Gehlen knew that "many
generals, above all General George V.
Strong, the chief of G-2 army intelli-
gence, and Sibert, were very far from
regarding the Soviet Union as a future
ally. In fact, a vastly different vision was
taking place .at the? Third Army head-
quarters at Bad Toelz, near where he
[Gehlen] had buried his ... files. There
General Patton was dreaming of rearm-
ing a couple of Waffen SS divisions to
incorporate them into his Third Army
and 'lead them against the' Reds."'
Said Patton: "We're going to have to
fight them sooner or later. Why not now
while our army is intact and we can
kick the Red army back into Russia? We
can do it with my Germans. . . . They
hate those Red bastards." %
That, of course, went way beyond
anything Gehlen's captors had in mind.
They wanted information; Gehlen had
it. So, says Cookbridge, they treated
him with great courtesy, "wooing him
like a wayward lass who can bring a .
large dowry to offset the blemishes of
her past. ... Gehlen bargained his way
into the gray dawn of Cold War espio-
nage, conceding or compromising on
some points, using pressures near to
'blackmail to gain others. It says much
for his shrewdness, self-assurance and
persistence that he was able to take on
-0411611:00)050 0140004)- ran k-
ing American experts." They agreed to
covertly' subsidize "an autonomous .
STATINTL
mEw yORK 1IMES
Approved For Releasei%otopett : CIA-RDP80
The General Was a Spy
The Truth About General Gehlen and His Spy Ring.
By Heinz Hahne and Hermann Zoning.
Translated by Richard Barry from the German "Pullach Intern."
With an Introduction by Hugh Trevor-Roper and a Preface
to the American Edition by Andrew Tully.
illustrated. 347 pp. New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan. $10.
Gehlen
Spy of the Century.
By E. H. Cookridge.
Illustrated. 402 pp. New York: Random House. $10.
By CHRISTOPHER FELIX
The Chief, Foreign Output Evaluation;
Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington, D.C. (By safe hand to
Langley.)
Dear Chief:
. Lest it be supposed that my report
violates the Agency's charter by en-
gaging in operations within the Unit-
ed States, let me hasten to point out
that, except for Andrew Tully's Pref-
ace to the Milne and Zolling book
(and for our reputation, of course),
the paper, print, and bindings are the
only things American involved here.
E. H. Cookridge is a British subject:
his book was first published in Eng-
land. Heinz Hahne and Hermann
Zolling are Germans: Their book is
an elaboration of 15 articles pub-
lished in West Germany's Der Spiegel
magazine in the spring of 1971, which
were highly critical of Gen. Rein-
hard Gehlen's direction of the Federal
Intelligence Service. .
Both books tell? the same story:
General Gehlen, a German officer
since 1920, wartime head of F.H.O.
(Fremde Heere Ost?Foreign Armies
East), the intelligence section of the
German General Staff concerned
with Eastern Europe, surrendered at
war's end to the Americans with the
offer . to put himself, his files, staff
and networks at their disposal. After
some fencing, the offer was accepted,
and the Gehlen organization was ul-
timately installed in a compound at
Pullach, near Munich. In 1949 Amer-
support and supervision was
transferred from the United States
Army to the recently formed C.I.A.
In 1956 the Gehlen organization be-
came the B.N.D. (Bundesnachrichten-
dienst), the West German Federal in-
telligence service, and Gehlen its
"President." Long a favorite of Chan-
cellor Adenauer, who referred to him
as "my dear Generd Gehlen," the
General and his B.N.D. suffered set-
backs in the 1960's, notably the rev-
elation that one of Gehlen's trusted
deputies, a former S.S. officer, was a
Christopher Felix is the pseudonym
of a 'former American diplomat and
Intelligence officer. He is the author
Df "A Short Course in the Secret
War." "Three Cornered Cover" by
qr. Felix (with George Marton) will
re published this fall.
longtime Soviet agent, and the
B.N.D.'s involvement in the famous
November, 1962, Der Spiegel affair.
The latter added the enmity of Franz-
Josef Strauss, the West German De-
fense Minister whose Bavarian C.S.U.
(Christian Socialist party) was an es-
sential prop of Christian Democratic
rule, to the existing hostility of many
Social Democrats.
In 1968 Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger,
reportedly under some pressure from
his Socialist partners in the "grand
coalition," did not extend Gehlen's ex-
emption from mandatory retirement.
Gehlen's place, as president of the
B.N.D., was taken by Gen. Gerhard
Wessel, a former associate of Gehlen,
but no longer his friend. In 1970,
under the Brandt Government, a So-
cial Democratic party official was in-
stalled in the B.N.D. as Vice Presi-
dent, former S.S. and Gestapo per-
sonnel were removed, and B.N.D. de-
partment heads were replaced, sev-
eral by Slcial Democrats.
Although the story is the same in
both books ? down to a striking
idcntity (and abundance) of detail?
their approach differs. Cookridge,
whose 13th book on secret opera-
tions this is, writes as the "expert."
Nevertheless, he .cannot avoid signs
of regret at the apparent decline in
later years of Gehlen's organization;
the General is, after all, the hero of
his book. In fact, at his hands Gehlen
Hlihne (author of "The Order of the
Death's Head," 1970, and "Codeword:
Direktor," reviewed on P. 40 in this
issue) and Zolling, on the other hand,
while recognizing Gehlen's accom-
plishments (and even defending him
on occasion ? not without flashes
of national pride) are partisan. The
B.N.D. under Gehlen, they plainly
feel, let Germany down. "The Fed-
eral Republic," they write at the out-
set, "requires an efficient secret serv-
ice if it is not to be exposed to un-
necessary external dangei-s"; and
their major charge against Geh-
len is that from 1958 on, he and the
B.N.D. were no longer efficient.
Their opinion of the Gehlen or-
ganization for most of the years be-
fore that seems revealed in their fre-
quent use of the phrase, "the Amer-
icans and their German minions at
Pullach." This attitude, if understand-
able in the. middle 1950's, carries a
different weight nearly two decades
later.
The German authors are severe
about Gehlen's use of former Nazis
and about his organization's "inordi-
nate influence on government deci-
sions with no controlling authority"
to restrain it ? given postwar West
German history, that is a slap at
Adenauer in particular and German
Christian Democratic Governments in
general.
The decline of the B.N.D. ("that
secret service which was once re-
garded as the best in Europe," they
add nostalgically but inconsis-
tently, since they place its apogee in
the period when Adenauer dom-
inated and Gehlen & Co. were still
"minions" of the Americans) they at-
tribute variously to Gehlen's miscon-
ceptions and uncurbed powers, to the
German tradition of regarding intel-
ligence as falling almost exclusively
in the domain of the military (they
do have a good short essay on the
U
Approvedease
F 0 rzsi on the 2w89065.16 a: turA-. R
0
i??
arktfagiNA?YitOpi-9
itontintiOa
J
Approved For Release &401iAtielE.: CIA-RDP80-
'GESTAPO LEADER IN BOLIVIA?
STATI NTL
Nozioloator ore quarry fowl
By RICHARD H. BOYCE
- Scripps-Howard Staff Writer
PARIS ? Beate Klarsfeld has returned to
Paris from Bolivia convinced that an escaped
Nazi war criminal is living there.
Mrs. Klarsfeld's remarkable tale involves
the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, the
International Red Cross, and the govern-
ments of France, Bolivia and West Germany.-
A German married to a Frenchman, Mrs.
Klarsfeld is a self-appointed Nazi-hunter who
first made headlines five years ago when she
publicly slapped then-West German Chancellor
..Kurt Georg Kiesinger and called him a Nazi.
- Two years ago she was linked to an attempt
to kidnap a suspected Nazi in Cologne, West
Germany, which failed.
-HUNTS GESTAPO OFFICER
Since then she has concentrated on digging
iup information she says proves that a man
calling himslef Klaus Altmann, now living in
Bolivia, is in reality Klais Barbie, a Nazi Ge-
stapo officer stationed in Lyons, France, dur-
ing th World War II occupation.
In 1947 a French court convicted Barbie, in
. absentia, of having torture-murdered 4,342
Frenchmen, of sending another 7,591 to Nazi
gas chambers, and of jailing 14,311 French
resistance fighters.
- IMPRESSIVE RESULTS
Mrs. Klarsfeld, who now lives in Paris, has.
disclosed to newsmen the results of her inves-
tigations, which were aided by the French and
German government. They are impressive:
. ' ? Pictures of the two men show a striking
:resemblance.';- -J; ---0 - - ? ? - ? - -
? Their fingerprints appear tote the same.
. . . . . .... . . ..
? Their birth dates are the same. Both were
married on the same date.
? Their- wives have the same names and
birth dates.
? Both men have the same number of child-
ren, born on exactly the same dates.
OBTAINS DOCUMENTS
Mrs. Klarsfeld says she got from the Inter-
national Red Cross the fingerprints, identity
card, photographs and travel authorizations it
provided to a man calling himself Karl Hart-
mann who travelled from Rome to South
America in 1951.
These, Mrs. Klarsfeld says, prove thru the
same similarities that Barbie fled Europe as
Hartmann, then changed his name again to
Altmann when he got to Bolivia.
Mrs. Klarsfeld charges further, and says
German records prove, that Barbie worked for
West German intelligence after the war, and
that he gave the CIA names of Frenchmen
who collaborated with the Germans during the
German occupation of France.
REFUSES INTERVIEW
Earlier this month, Mrs. Klarsfeld went to
Bolivia with her documents to confront Alt-
mann, but he declined to see her.
French President Georges Pompidou
wrote Bolivian President Hugo Banzer asking
Altmann be extradicted. Banzer replied that
Bolivian courts would decide the matter.
Mrs. Klarsfeld's activities and charges have
stirred a wave of strong feeling in France,
where wartime resistance heroes are, as Mr.
PompidOt; WrOte_ to Mr., ,Banzer, "revered by
'the' entire-cOlintry."' ' 1
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601R000500190001-9
STATINTL
Approved For Release 200143/04 : CIA-RDP80-1111111111.
THE LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH MAGAZINE STATINTL
14 Jan 1972
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, r
ll
The Biggest Secret Service in the World.
An analysis of the work of the Central
Intelligence Agency begins on page 10.
The compiler of this three-part report
is E. H. Coolcridge (left), who is the
author of 16 books on espionage. Re-
cruited into the British Secret Service
on graduating from the University of
Vienna in 1934, he has spent his
time ever since in intelligence work,
or writing about it. "I am in the
position of the dumb blonde in Holly-
wood films. Once you are it you
cannot stop. I am tired of writing
about spies." But his network of
contacts built up over the years is
unique; and ensures that he will be
0 The Daily Telegraph 1972. Published by The Daily Telegraph Limited. 135 Fleet Street. London, EC4P4E
Long Lane. Liverpool L9 78G. ip a week, if delivered. Not to be sold separately horn The Daily Telegrapt
The Daily Telegraph nor its agents accepts. liability for loss or damage to colour transparencies or env 0th
STATINTL
. Approved For Release 2001/03/04.: CIA-RDP80-01601R000500190001-9
STATtNTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-0
DIE WELT
2 OCTOBER 19/1
1 11
-1- 0 o?
r-A (11-ris n i'r(114-1- (Fp
kJ. y o
,rs'n,-1?-? 45-N II5 ? Y\77 v. '1" t der 0
1-!1j1.21)J10.11161.21',
_
flfin ft, ? (1 ?II 11
"411 :72" 15)6-.--).
LA
? ? I
Nadi dein Urteil *Reinhard Gehlens, des ehemaligen BND.-Chels,
hat der Bundesnachrichtendienst heute nicht mar -den ?ihm zu-
?kommenden Platz im Staate". Er ftihrt daftir ein Symptoth an: In
.anderen Landern wire einer Mission wie der des Staatssekretlirs
,Egon Bahr zur Anbalmung der Ostpolitik. Willy Brandts eine Vor-
kThrung durch eine geeignete Personlichkeit des Nachrichtendienstes
Vorausgegangen. Mit, deutlich erkennbar kritischer Absicht stelit
?Gehlen der Situation des BND in der Bundesrepublik die Position
des Auslandsnathrichtendienstes. .(CIA) in den USA -gegenliber.
Offen spricht er von personalpolitischen ?Fehlentwicklungen". Ftir
den Chef des Bundesnachrichtendienstes.verlangt er aus langjiihriger
personlicher Erfahrung ein Hochstmag an Ermessensfreiheit; die fach-
. lithe Leitung des Dienstes masse ausschlialich in seiner Handlieeen.
Andererseits verweist er den BND-Chef auf sein ?spezifisches. Bent fs-
risiko". In der Reihe der Vorabdrucke aus Gehlens IVIemoiren (?Der
Dienst", v. rfase &Koehler Verlag, Mainz/Wiesbaden) veroffentlichen
wir heute Passagen, die einen Vergleich der staatspolitischen Ein-?
ordnung der Geheimdienste in der Bundesrepublik und in den Ver-
. .
einigten ?Staaten erm5glielien. Der Bei trag unseres Redaktions-
mitgliedes Rudolf Strauth vermittelt ergiinzende Informationen.
Erv,? 0.4
111,
? exthsiv km (k7
- ?01111
likL7tilloll
Die endgilltige i/bernahme der Orga-
?nisation (Clemeint 1st dietbernahme der
?Organisation Gehlen" als ?Bundesnach-
.richtendienst" in deutsche Kompetenz
am 1. April 1956, die Red.) konnte auf
zweierlei Weise durchgeftihrt Ave:clen.?
Sic konnte entweder (lurch em n Gesetz
erwirkt oder auf Grund der Organisa-
tionsgewalt der Bundesregierung, gemit13
Artikel EG des Grundge.setzes verfilgt
werden. Beide Wege. waren .innerhalb
der Bundesregierung, in den damit be
faBten Ausschtissen des- ,Bundestages,
sowie auch in Besprechungen mit mir
und meinen engsten Mitarbeitern.eror-.
tert wordcn. ? . .?
Ein Gesetz hatte zwar den zuldinfti-
gen Bunuesnaenricntenutimst fest in-
nerhalb der Bundesverwaltung veran-
kcrt, m8gliche Zweideutigkeiten und
Unklarheiten von vornherein bese.itigt,
andererseits aber auch Regierung und
Parlament vie schliefflich auch den
Dienst in seiner Bewegungsmoglichkeit
'crhcblich cingeblet... ?
In tbereinstimmung mit der Opposi-
tion, deren 1\litwirkung meiner Ansicht.
nach auch unbecling,t erforderlich war,
entschlo6 sich die Bundesregierung zur
zweiten LOsung. Sic beschloB am ?
21.Februar 1956 die Bilduna diner
Dienststelle ?Bundesnaclrrichten-
.dienst", die dem Buncleskanzleramt an-
gegliedert 1,verden sollte. Die tberfilh-
rung der Organisation in den Dundes-
? nachrichtendienst sollte mit dem Beginn
des Rechnungsjahres 1956/57, also am
1.April l956, nach Weisung des
Approved For For Release 2001/03/04:: CIA-RDP80401'6012R000500190001-9
)2t.).;3:r_a [LIZ S
Approved For Release 2661`101t00*: CV?TRIAIRI3R:
P:rP To
cirro:r.ti Qp.I;EF-7nric.'1'1.1ief
1.:)1.104t?lo,Lt.,
World Publishing Company has acquired
world rights, including all book and
serial rights and excluding only German-
language rights, to the memoirs of
General Reinhard Gchlen, German
chief of Wehrmacht intelligence on the
Eastern Front during World War II and
then head of the clandestine Buro
Gehlen which operated in Vt'est Ger-
many, secretly financed by the Central
Intelligence Agency from the war's end
until 1956 (PH, Currents, September
20). World plans publication in May of
1972. From 1956 until his retirement in
May, 1968, General Gehlen was chief
of the official .West German Intelligence
service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst.
He was one of the most influential,
feared, brilliant, mysterious and suc-
cessful figures in the history of espionage.
- The publication of General Gehlen's
memoirs will release a vast amount of
information previously unavailable
about World War 11 and the cold tt'ar
period that followed it. The publishers
believe, on the bas'is of their current
knowledge of the manuscript's contents,
that the whole histoHography of World
War 11 will have to be substantially
revised after its publication. Gehlen's
revelation that Reichsleiter Martin
'Bormann was a Soviet spy during World
War II, a disclosure which has aroused
intense Interest in the world press, is
only an example of the extraordinary -
nature of the material the book will
offer.
World's purchase of the rights to
General Gehlen's memoirs culminates
several years of interest and pursuit by
James 0. Wade, editor-in-chief of the
adult department of World Publishing
and formerly senior editor of the Mac-
millan Company, where he conunis-
sioned a still unpublished biography of
the general. Last month, Mr. Wade ?
learned that previous arrangements for
publication of the memoirs, understood
to have been final, had been cancelled.
Mr. Wade immediately reported this
news to Peter V. Ritner, vice-president
and director of World's general pub-
lishing division. Mr. Ritner, _publisher
of "Inside the Third Reich" (Macmillan)
by Gehlen's wartime colleague, Albert
Speer, went to Germany to look into
the situation personally. He spent a
day in Mainz in the company of George
Bailey?an old friend, ABC correspon-
dent and former American intelligence
officerreviewing parts of the manu-
script and assuring himself that it. was
both authentic and sensational.
.From Volker Hansen, head of 'lase
und Kohler Verlag, the German pub-
invasion would all; how Gehlen, a close.
personal friend of General Moshe
Dayan, helped build the Israeli intel-
ligence organization Shcroot Yediot
lisher acting as general agent for the (SI AI); how the CIA was restrained.
property, Mr. Ritner obtained a two_ from interfering with the anti-Come
week option. Approaches were made to munist coup in Indonesia that ended
the slaughter of 600,000 Indonesian
other publishers and media, with the
result that by September 7, an offer "Communists"; why former West Ger-
well in excess of S400,000 had been made man intelligence chief Otto John may
to the German publisher. have "defected" to the East; how Bonn
In West Germany, Conrad Ahlers, a had five days advance warning of
government spokesman in Bonn, told Israel's "surprise" attack on the Arabs
in the Six Day War of June, 1967, three
con-
fidential information in the memoirs
newsmen that any disclosure of con-
weeks advance notice of the building of
would violate West German law. As a the Berlin Wall, and six weeks advance
result, a great deal of material falling notice of the Soviet intervention in
.into this category has had to be deleted Czechoslovakia.
from the Hase und Kohler Verlag text The German publisher, Volker Han-
and from all other forms of publication S'en, is the son of a World War II officer
in the German language, including who was a close associate of Gehlen's
serialization in the newspaper Die Welt, in the Wchrmacht. (Gchlen's uncle ran
which, having paid a record equivalent a publishing h? 'e in Germany before
of S250,000 for serialization rights, the war, and (iehlen's father ran its .
published the first installment of the Breslau branch). Gcblen and Hansen's
memoirs on September 10. father were both in communication with
West Gcrmah law cannot, however, Canaris, StaufTenberg and the other
control what is published in other officers who were planning to assassinate
Hitler, and Galen warned Stauffenberg
languages outside ; of the country.
General Galen has consequently in_ that the plot would fail. (What really
sisted on many additions to the English_ happened during the plot of July 20 is
n
language version over what can be also covered i the memoirs.)
published in Germany and has further After the war, Hansen's father spent
insisted, as a point of his contract ;with II years in a Russian prison Camp.
World, that all translations into other When he returned to Germany he picked
languages be made from the full and up the threads of his life, and one of the
old friends he looked up was Gehlen.
definitive text that will comprise World's
English-language version. !Hansen senior and I lansen junior spent
While General Gehlen's knowledge :years convincing Gehlen to write the;
and authority may go unquestioned, story of his career.
recent articles that picked up the Bor- General Gehlen has also expressed his
mann story have suggested that he may intention to make himself available for
have mixed motives in releasing his promotional appearances and interviews
book for publication, even though they in the United States upon the book's
have failed to suggest any substantial publication. World plans publication in
motive that thight distort his telling of May' of 1972.
the myriad facts uniquely at his disposal.
It has been known for some time, for
example, that Gehlen's organization
operated illegally in West Genitally
after the war, with secret financing from
the American Government through the
CIA, and it has -been -? surmised that
Washington kept the arrangement secret
out of embarrassment over the need to
employ the 4000 men with whom Gehlen
staffed his Miro, most of whom were
former Nazis who worked under the SS
or Gestapo, but who were nonetheless
the only men qualified to conduct
espionage and security operations in this
area of the cold war. Hitherto, the
matter has been taken lightly by the
press, possibly because sufficient evi-
.dence was publicly unavailable. General
Gehlen's memoirs now provide that
evidence. ?
The book also shows how the Amer-
ican government knew the Bay of Pigs
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Approved For Release 204/93/1142: CIA-RDP80701601
sept, Ti
STATINTL -
Am 25. September setzt die WELT e.s.hlasiv? den VoFabdruck- von ?Auszilaen P:vta
den Memoiren?des chemalig.en Gehetinalcnstelicfs Generalinajor Reinhold Geh-
len fort. Aus dicsern Anlafi veroffentlicht die WELT eine harm: Serie von Stich-
? woriern fiber ausii,naisehe und dgene mtclarichica- und Spionageabwehrdienste.
CIA
Zn Beginn des Zweite.n \\Mil:dogs
besafien die USA keine Spionageorga-
nisation, sondem lediglich den kleinen
Nachrichtenclienst G-2 des Deems,
cin winzigcs Marine-Gegenstile.k. Of-
fiC'e, of Naval Intelligence (ONI) und
tins bcdeutungslosc Corps of Intelli-
gence Police (spRer: Counter Intelli-
gence Corps ? CIC).
Nadi Krier,?seintritt wurden die
Dienste der hoiden TeilstreithrHte
erweitert, zuclem cntstancli das. ?Office
of Strategic Services (OSS) fb's die
&Mu-I-dung strateg,ischer Nnehrichten
und filr Sonciereinsatze ?(Sabotageakte,
Unterstiitzung verbancleter Partisa-
:nen).
OSS wurde in der Euphoric der or-
ten Naqhkriegszeit aufgelost. Mit Bc-'
ginn kieS Kalten Krieges wurcle ein
?Nationaler Sicherheitsrat" gegriinclet,
wurden clic Nachrichtenclienstc der
?Streitkr;ifte dem.. Verteidigungsmini-
stcr unterstellt:und entstand mit Dif-
ligung beider Parteien iin Kongrefl am
IC. September 1947 die Central Intel-
ligence Agency (CIA). ?-:-
Ihre Aufgaben sind: Deratung dos
,,Nationalen Sicherhcitsrats" mid 'des
Priisidenten an Hand des von ihr be-
.- schafften Materials in Fragen der na-
? tionalen Sicherheit, Nachrie.hten-Aus-
wertung und Information der Regie.
rung, allgerneine Nachrichtent5tigkeit
(soweit sie nlcht Aufgabe anderer
Dienststellen. 1st) unci _Privileg
der CIA ? Geheimaktionen und Ge-
beimoperationen.
Besonclers hiergegen hat skit mehr-
fach die- Kritik von Gegnern der je-
weils herrsche.nclen US-Regicrung ge-
richtet, die ? mar oder weniger be-
wiescn '-- der CIA direkte
Dinmi-
schung in die Innenpolitik fremdcr
Lander (Iran, Guatemala, Domintica-
nische Republik .unci andere),
Infiltra-
tion nationaler unci internationaler
Organisationen und Einrichtungen
sowie falsche, oder unzuroichende. In-
formation der Regierung (ctwa beim
Pinsk() in der Schweine-Bucht) vor-
warren, Versthndliellemeise bat Ilter-
auf die CIA nicht mit einer Gegenauf-
rpchnung ihrer Erfolt;c geantworiet.
Siimtiiche Geheirndienste der US71.?
? .
erhielten 1903 zusarnmen clrel
den Dollar. Die Zahl der CIA-Ange-
.hOrigen (ohne ausilinclische ?Agenten)
schlitzte darnals din Experte ? auf -twa
-50 000.
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? .
k C'E.t.7;CiTi"..t. 0 t r;
STATI NTL
vinced that the Will Create an!e_[ _ - -Hits is the reason given by
international sensation." ?
German publishing sources why
Mr. Levin said the authen-
German newspaper serial
ticity of the manuscript had .
---, f t ...
11,1 s wet e ac_ono..0 y . 1,...
a py i CIY t net' ij 0 7.,) E E.': :,-,'. been verb-it-3d by Peter Ritner,
?In ?--
-Welt, whose ?owner, Axel
. I 1 ; r editor , with .
,
?Companv; a sTSIdi-ary 61 -the.hlp of Georg Bailey, an author Springer is an influential critic
connected with united,of the Brandt government.. Die
By HENRY rATT.IONT Times Mirror -Company of Los;forrnerly Welt is reported to have paid
A *manuscript described as Angeles, and Avon Books, a pa-!States military intelligence in V
$250,000 for the serial rights.
le memoirs of Gen. Reinherd per'oack. publisher owned by the Germany, when the two men .. .
,, Week-
lest
Hearst Corporation. The pub-I visited Mainz late last month., u io r
:ehlen, former head of the, mar, Chancellor Brandt's
lishira house of William Collins Two years ago, Mr. Ritner,
German intelligence sere-of LOndon is lo known to than working for the Maemil-
spo m
kesan, said in an iriterview
s ,
0, asserts that Martin ror-'hm,e offered $10D,000 for then lan Company, was the editor from Bonn yesterday that the
iann, Bitter 's top ,lieutenanteBritish rights. - - of Albert Speer's "Inside the Government had not been
las a Soviet agent during,i The announcement would beTh
o ird Reich," a best seller aware of the impending s,er?ia.li-
-
Vorld War H. : .
? Ithe first public aelmowledg-ithat is said to have contributed zation of the Gehlen memoirs.
1,to General Gehlen s ' decision to ho', 'ever he said that high of-
It also says that after theimeat or at least six rficliths of ficials had known abmit the
' - ? - -- - !secret neootiations- for the pub cc his own memoirs.
iar. Dr)rinann became 'all acialliontien of the books that an The report that thc general existence of an alle,g,ed Gehlen
?iser on GermanPlicS in the themseles resemble an wrote a book Was specially manuscript" and were iii esti
,,y episode
e
of his gating whether there had been
lcn?iet Union and that he died l The announcement, would beis-urPrising because
Oe
here less than three years ano.!the first public achnowledg gendary record of anonym- any violation of laws restrain-
-
years he shunned in,. tug former civil servants from
These assertions about thelinent of the existence of ?the(itY- For
?. ?
teryiews and public statements revealing state secrets.
;razi leader who was last seen' ' - -
,Gehlen memoirs and the nego-
The plan to rush the menu-
'tiations, which have included:
caving Eitler's 'molter in Der- soerct trips by United States?.despite a reputation as' the script into print . coincided
in in 1945, are contained in a n d British publishers to Gcr i'm h
an sl built West Ger- with the publication of a criti-
orthcoming book that Generalmany
a-
and an almost clande-;,many's intelligence apparatus tat Golden biography written
3ehlen is said to have written sti?e typ.c:setting operation by, into the world's most effective by Heinz Hahne, an editor of
;ince his retirement in la38. the coservative Hamburg- anti-Communist espionage ro. a-
,., ? the Hamburg weekly' news
The book is repo ted .to be n
ner., mzigazine Der Spiegel,. which
snaper Die Welt, which, work.
;oionianding, offers ? approeclp?plans to begin serializing the General Gehlen, t
w.lo m,,e. supports C a. cellor Branclt.
h-ri
ng SI-million for world pub-:t., ""' The Hama book will be issued
his reputation as an analyst ofl
ication rights, following at:000k on Sept. 10.
ACCC7diug to information as.
Soviet strateav on tbe Russian ? in Ge manyon Sept. 19, and
.east.six months of secret nealcembled from publishers hereifront, -went miderground as thei an English translation is to be
goiations that in themselves; published here next year by
and in Vlf:Ct Ci.7r-nr:Inv, the' war ended to surrender with,
:esemble an episode of iner- : Coward, T:TcCann, Geoghegan.
IGehlen memoirs. Wel'e first. of-. his entire staff to Gen. George:
aational intrigue. 1 In offering the book by
fered for sale eafto. this year S. Patton's Third Army with an
The ine.moirs discount pi.e? bv Volltr:r Hansen:director of: offer to cooperate with -the Gehlen to prospective foreign
'reious .accounts of Bormann's! . : publishers, Mr. Hansen is un-
ate, which.presomed him eitherlyear_oi
?Hass & Konler, a small, 152-1
d publishing house in victors. create, Ic'ie.r.stood to have made the
:o have died outside Hitler's,,----? o , ... ? .:.: ? - In 1947, the newly '" ,o int that neither Mr. llohne
mnh.er M Berlin or to -be hid-oot.inz El.o.-,,n to, books on Central Intelligence Agency au ' -
f
ng in South Incrica. Imilitary subjects. Mr. Hansen, ?chorized? him to establish a nor the author o another forth-
coming Golden biography, E. H.
In fact, the memoirs say - iwhose father was a German in- full-scale German intellieence
_P_,,, A Cookridge, have interviewed
- ' dslt ''i -nee officer do tog World oraani7ntin ohich h-, so- e
:he Russi.ans closed in on the ny'-elie---;-,:-`" - " ' '-' --.` ''' ' a' " ' ' d" -" the former intelligence chief
milker, the Nazi leader crossed' "a' '''' said he held power o; largely with professionals from -nor seen his memoirs.
.heir lines and gained sanctu- attorney for Lieneral Gehlert. the disbanded S.S. security . - ,
portion of the te
? it
try in the Soviet Union. The Over to, last tr,to m , 1 W
,,
' ' service and the ehrmacht in- ? memoirs; including t of the
ng the accounti
nformation is attributed to a several United States and Brit- telligence agencies. .of the Bormann case, was dis-
;cries of "unimpeachable" re- ish publishers went to Mainz, People who say they are fa- tributed by Mr. Hansen as evi-
ehlen's agents in the Soviet as rnall
')orts, presumably f General where they were allowed to see rniliar with the 69-year-old gen- deuce that General ?Gehleu's
l
as three chapters or eral's thinking say fear of re- inion. The last report, which the 12-chapter manuscript. Re- .'prisals ag ali
,ainst his family o book would contain important
>rought word of the death and hitherto unpublished mate-
!ante n 1969.,
quests to visit General Gehlen :a distaste to have his views rials.
,
at his home in Bavaria were used in internal West German
i The memoirs say that the
turned down on the ground that 'political controversies explain
The account of Bormann's
iouble role is one of man in y de- he wished to reina secluded.'
this continued reluctancerevelatioos about Born the to re- man Hitler named as his suc-
dhe reminiscences of General ever,
the negotiations. How-eleeive visitors. .
ails of East-West intrigue in
cessor, "offer the key to one
--,
the publishers were told ,'
If this has indee
1 d been Gen- of the roost enigmatic cases of
iehlen, who was chief intelli- the general intended to make ieral Gehlen's attitude, informa-
" ?
;once officer of the Wehrmacht public appearances to promote; ition about the manuscript that of
century.The author says that he first
to the Russian front and was the book after its publicatiom ,
!became available in recent days heard .suspicions voiced about
ecruited a w
fter the ar by Unit- Mr. Ilansen's refusal to dis- indicates a drastic ch an o
F-r ge. if
:d States intelligence. He even- close the full text combineclr lin addition to describing wa Bormann in a private conversa-
r-
ually became director of the With the unavailability
o- Its titne and later intelligen tion in 1941 with Adm. W
ce oper- .
Itmdes Nachrichten - ?Dienst, author led to some speoulation 'ations, it contains a detai helm Canaris, head of the Nazi
lee counter-espionage service, who
Vest Germany's secret service. about whether the memoirs lad?
analysis of Soviet political arc' ?
The existence of the mem- actually been written by Gen- -military goals for the next tO was executed for his role in theto July, i 1944,. plot to assassinate
eral Gehlen. ?
iirs?and negotiations for their decades as well as an urgent
,y
But publishing sources, both Hitler. '
:ale by a small West German plea- for a' Western military
>ublishing house ----- became .here and in West Gerrn4nY, 'as". buildup to contaia Comm Accoi?ding to the memoirs,unist -
although Borrnann was believed
sert that they have confirmc:d x en.10,1
mown here during the-last few to have tics to Die Rote 1(a-,
the reliability of the - material -
lays as an outline and portions The argument for a tougher
through people close to the in pone,- a famous Soviet espion-
)f the text were obtained from policy of containment sngg,ests
. . telligeoce community of both ?ago cell in Nazi Germany, VIC
,,,N era publish.. e , r ,.... that the publication of the ?Nazi leader was never placed
An announce.ment is expected c"ntrl?es- memoirs is certain to be wel- .under surveillance for fear that
1\tartin P. Levin, chairman of
his week that bids fo'r the corned by the foes of 'Vest Ger-
, he. board of World PuNishing, he would use his influence
vorld rights to the manuscripc t ? ' man Chancellor Wino Brandt's with Hitler to destroy the in-
iut.side Germany ?said: "We are -totally con-
EAAlitOeCrif Ciitaf361b* g -_ II)1114'. i Ostpolitik, his policy to im- 601
aade by the Werld )`- -'!'-1- baatt? ientic. ,e are- --e?u;rry-coli-1 4e1"erAlitotOttir-vaii
. o . R000500190001-9
. . .....?
k
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DAVIT
6 ia.viar, 19-(1
f.--- ?,-, -,-, 0 ...4_ ? i_7' rt
NC.161Y0 jr; -Lf_.0: riireoLti7Ini: .
..._._ -
?
.7- ?
WASHINGTON ? F o r in e-r;
American staffers ..Of Radio Free'
Europe (RFT) are prepared to.
testify in Congress that they had
to sign an 'oath refir;ing to divulge:
multimillion dollar Central In-
telligence Agency, (CIA) bank-I
rolling of REF. on penalty of a;
maximum $10,003 fine and 10-year?
prison sentence. .. ?
This and ? other cliMosures,'
sources. ,close to Sen. Clifford P.
Case cautioned today, could
seriously cm!). arpss the Nixon
administration if it decides to take
an:uncooperative approach to the
Senate Foreign Religions Cord-.
mittee hearings, .scheduled to
begin on April 23.
, By JOIE)" Py WALLACH
. News American
? ?Yashington tureau
CASE lIAS s?pearheadod a
Senate drive to strip FIFE of what
he charg,ed in a recent sp.eech
were subsidies of "several hun-
dred million dollars" from "se-
cret" CIA funds which, the New
Jersey. Republican contended,
have for 20 years made up almost
the entire REF, budget.
In an attempt to force Ed-7 and
McSor)w-bearning Radio Liberty
(RI.) to quit the pretense .of acting
a's "private" organisations relying
solely on voluntary contributions,
Case introduced legislation in
February .to have both propagan-
da agencies funded through direct, ?
acknowledged congressioor,1 ap-
propriations. ?
Case has announced his inten-
tion to call to testify leading ad-
ministration officials reportedly
including Secretary of State
William P. Rogers, ?Secretary of
Defense Melvin Laird and CIA
Director Richard Helms.
'allow the U. S. g,overnnient,
!whenever. convenient, to deny
1 Congressional sources stress
that funding the corporation would
not involve any new money since
Ithe government already is footing
i the bill. It would alloiv transfer-
rine the $,33 million annual subsidy
1 from secret CIA coffers to the
open, congressional appropriation,
:process.
I
I ,
'ME AD: P.Ti
,1iNISI:.ON review
? .
is considered so sensitive that the i
IWhite Mousa has ordered it take I
place in the supersecret "Forty!
!Committee," also kro,.vn is the'
!..
Covc.;:t .!!.c.:1:-1 Group."
Although chaired by National
Security Council chief Dr. Henry
Kissinger; the mechanislii is u.or.d i
only when a subject is considered;
too hot' to go to the President
through regular SO channels. I
The Chief Executive is known
to have had personal ties :to sev-I
i eial of ?RFE's most prominent;
Ibackers and to have strong f&I-I
Iings about RFE's ii1portance in
jEurope.
ICase's bill, which proposed t
amending the Information . and'
r
Education Act to provide funds for'
I
FIFE, has attracted bipartisan I
,
'support from several senators,
I
I including. Harold Hughes, D-Iowa, ?
,
association with RYE policies.
ADMINISTRATMN.is ex-
amining a series of options rang-
ing from fighting to maintain the
status quo, which could turn the
hearings into a parade of dis-
closures about the .extent of CIA
involvement, .to congressional.
ftinding, in -much the same man,: I
net- as the Voice of America I
F(VOA) is financed.
The'most workable compromise
now appears to be setting up a
public corporation to run FIFE.
The carporatiApproveddRp
by Congre.sS tut' would retain a
semi-private character that would .
STATINTL
divUlges-the. iliformation. he be-
comes liable for the -maximum
i-un'ahment under Section 73.3 (D),
I Title 10, of the U. S. Code.
This section prosecribes penal-
ties up to $10,000 aorl l0 years in
? prison, for?lite l:cornmunication of
I classified information' by govern-
. ment officer or employee." ?
Jacob K. Javits, It-N. Y. and J.
William Fulbright, D-Ark.
They are pre.pared.to press the
issue as an example of the toss of
-congressional .control over ? U. S.
foreign policy.
CASE WAS understood to be
ready. to call former RFEstaffers.
to testify that the CIA regularly
assigned agents to two-year tours
oI duty at FIFE headquarters in
Munich, and that they mas-
queraded as acredited iiews cor- ?
respondents on information-
gathering missions all over V
Eastern Europe.
Other American erhployees %%.ere
sooner or later.rcquiied to sign a ?-
paper making them privy to the. ?
CEA connection, sourCes. doe ?
Case disclosed. ?
The .document, they said, infor-
med the Americans that FIFE; was
??
rtaapitosii.aitust,k..1.,L/
14,344 CIA-RDP80-01601R000500190001--9
cially" inform,_sd and that if he
. .
Approved For Releias,e,gprityo*m : CIA-R
2 5 R
STATI NTL
7
? r
V
BONN, Germany (AP) --
West Germany's intelligence
service is again in the center of
a public debate.
The controversy was set off
when Der Spiegel charged that
this country's equivalent of the
Central Intelligence Agency has
become an inefficient bureauc-
racy that Chancellor Willy
Brandt doesn't tru:,-t.
The news magazine's claims
have resulted in a series of deni-
als and counte': claims.
Shice it caii,2 into being, the
intelligence s'e:vice's role has
been to colieel. Liforrintion about
foreign countrir-:s. During the
cold v'ar it &ece!iltraccl on East
Europe and opi;eyed a high re-
gard among eth..e? WC stern intel-
ligence agenq.,..
But in an e:;:i:iHation of its
operaCons drr.o, the past two
years Der ,S1.:ele::! ;Hd:
c. The servi;!e. felics for infor-
mation and more on the
Swiss nev..spai,er Nete Zuercher
Zeitung than on its m. a agents.
? An official in charge of as-
signing ager.s regularly con-
sults an r.strolv,cr.
e BraedL's office las clemzridecl
and 1.,:!coived t.c nanics and
code names of all i!, East
?Europe, thus se. ie.:sly endan-
gering their security.
Der Spiegel said. the service
failed to predict last Deeeml,cr's
troubles in Poland, so
had no warning th9.t a k'
ship change there was imml.ent
when he left for Warsaw to sign
the Polish- German treaty on
Dec. 6.-
The former defense and fi-
nance minister, Franz Josef
Strauss, said the demand for
agents' tames neutralized the
oper at ion in East Europe.
Strauss heads the Christian So-
cial Union, which, with the
Christian Democrats, fornis the
opposition.
The government . countered
with a denial that Brandt's of-
lice ever asked for the agents'
names.
Government spokesman Con-
rad AhleJ-s also denied a Spiegel
claim that the West German'
service has lost the confidence
of allied services like the CIA
and the :British Secret Service.
"The exact opposite is true," he
said.
The Bundesnachrichtendienst,
or federal intelligence service, is
no stranger to controversy.
It came to life as the Organi-
zation Gehlen in the service of
the United States while Germa-
ny was still under occupation.
Lt. Gen. Reinhard Gehlen,
chief of the Gentian general
staff's military intelligence on
the Eastern. front during World
War II surrendered to the Unit-
ed 'Sates in the Nvar's final
months and started to work for
his captors.
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's
fleTiglin,g West German govern-
ment took over the service when
the occupation ended.
Gehlen retired in 1968. Bis'suc-
cessor, Lt. Gen. Kurt \Vessel, is
an associate from World War
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.STATINTL
Approved For Release 2111011030tmCIA-R
21 11.411CH 1971 ?
V,1031 Gerrilny
r
.1
la -
L? r,
0
SPYING has long been a reward-
ing occupation in divided Ger- ?
many, but now West Germany's
intelligence service is complain-
ing of political interference:. :
The Federal Inteille.ence Ser-
vice, BND, has becn reared in
the tradition of anti-Communist
espionage. Many of its officers
worked in the Nazi Warritneht's
intelligence service on the Rus-
sian Croat. But since Chancellor
Willy Brandt began developing
his actpolitik?his pursuit of
better relations with Communist
Eastern Europe ? things have
changed. Airing 'their problems
itt the news-magazine Der Spie-
gel. BNI) oilicers that,. as 'a
result, morale and ?-,iciency in
the 5,500-man service have
started to nosedive.
It is said that the Social Demo-
cratic Government in Bonn has
been trying to get th.e ,West
German espionage C'ILT- under
its political control. 1..:1 Yc3r
the SPD appointed one of its
officials as vice-president of
BND. Since then. says Der Spie-
gel. there has been a clesjiiie in
co-operation between West Ger-
many's spies and both the
American- CIA and Britain's
Secret Intelligence Service (SIS).
Allegedly, Western Allied
agents now swpect that their
German counterparts are being
influenced by :political bias into
ga..hering -w orthless intelligence
reports on Eastern Europe. And
for -a long time the West Gee-
mans have provided NATO with
much of its information, on the
East.
It is cilso &aimed that Brandt's
Chancellery has called for and
obtained lists df names of
I3ND's intel!igeree operative's.
One BND official is quoted as
saying that .no other intelligence
service has ever been in ?:.* a
situation. Name, or our
agents.' be says, ,` are Collected
from the safes ? at 'BND head-
-quarters outside Munich and
sent to Bonn?the veyry place
where hundreds of Eastern spies
are on, the loose.'
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