NO BREAK IN THE CODE WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000400050001-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 25, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 2, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

TAB LONDON NEW SCIENTIST
.c\r\ c,?
Approved For Release 200&dt/n11:3C9R-RDP80-01601R9090q0901:0-0
No break in the code war 0 3
The business of Intercepting and interpreting the radio transmissions of potential enemies grows steadily
more sophisticated, more expensive
John Marriott Last week, senior officers of all NATO nations up before transmission is decyphered at the
Is the pen name or a met for a three day conference at the SHAPE headquarters. Using modern on-line cypher
retired RN officer who headquarters near Brussels to discuss a machines, this work Is nowhere near as
writes on defence subject which is commanding increasing laborious as it sounds.
matters for British, attention?electronic warfare. In the words The traffic arriving at the headquarters is
European and US of General Sir Walter Walker, who has just subjected to two processes: traffic analysis
periodicals relinquished the command of NATO's and cryptanalysis. The former is a method
Northern Area,. "In a limited aggression of gleaning intelligence from the scrutiny of
situation, the skilled use of electronic war- traffic paSsed, without necessarily knowing
fare by Soviet forces could be an overwhelm- its contents, and the latter is actual cypher
ing factor in deciding the outcome of the breaking. The very volume of traffic alone
-battle." Interception of enemy transmissions may indicate that something is happening, or
is one of the key elements in electronic war- about to happen; but apart from this, move
fare. ments of units can often be deduced simply'
When the Second World War began, by the manner in which a signal is routed.
Britain's own intercept organisation, which Suppose that a warship, whose call sign is
had done excellent work during the First ABC, is heard regularly working a Black Sea
World War, had dwindled . to practically shore station. Suddenly she is not heard for
nothing. However, the principles were well two weeks; then she is ?nee again picked up,
known and it was not long before Britain had by another listening post, calling a Vladivos-
established listening posts all over the world. tok shore station and thereafter she is heard'
Perhaps because the techniques had not been working this station regularly. Obviously she
kept alive, Britain's cyphers were singularly has moved from the Mediterranean area to
insecure and German intelligence Was able eastern Russia. The ship could of course
to break them with little difficulty. At the change her call sign, but even then it is
same time, British cryptographers were able sometimes possible to recognise a ship's
to read many of the German secret messages actual transmitter. Transmitters, like type-
-so honours were about even, writers, often have small characteristics un-
By 1943, Britain had. built up an efficient noticeable to the human senses but instantly
intercept organisation, known as the 'Y' detectable by electronic analysis.
service. It consisted of a large number of Another useful method of recognising a
intercept stations, a direction finding net ? 'particular unit, so long as the morse code is
(directed primarily against the U boats) and still with us, is by "fingerprinting" its. opera-
a headquarters situated in a stately home at tors?most of whom have certain peculiari-
? Bletchley Park, Buckinghamshire. The 'Y' ties, one perhaps making his dashes slightly
service grew apace, and by the end of the too short, another hurrying over certain
war no less than 25 000 persons were letters and so on. By recording messages and
employed on this work. analysing them by means of an oscilloscope it
? The generic term for the business today is is possible to note these idiosyncracies. This
Signal Intelligence (Sigint). This is divided useful give-away is, however, gradually being
.. into two halves?Communication Intelligence lost as morse code is replaced by teletype
(Comint) and Electronic Intelligence (Elint). and data transmissions generally.
The basis of successful cryptanalysis is to
have the maximum possible amount of traffic The unbreakable codes
to work on. Comint organisations, therefore, A modern cypher, working on the one time
endeavour to intercept as much enemy 'signal principle, is virtually unbreakable. The
traffic as possible. This may mean establishing simplest form of "one timing" is to code-up
listening stations close to an enemy border the message from a code book into num-
(or in the air) to intercept frequencies which bered groups. These groups are then sub-
travel over line of sight paths such as VHF, tracted from (or added to) a recyphering
UHF and microwave, or in good receiving table of similar groups, but the groups so
sites at strategic points around the world to used are never used more than once. This
intercept high frequency communications, system has now been replaced by machines
The listening stations themselves can vary which do the entire process automatically. In
between huge receiving complexes, with fact, it is possible to type out the message
perhaps 1'00 or more receivers together with en c/air and the machine will produce the
their associated forest of aerials; a UHF encyphered version as fast as one can type,
receiver in a jeep or on top of a haystack, the one time recyphering tables being fed
and receivers in aircraft or satellites, into the machine on tape, which is then des-
? The intercepted traffic must, of course, be troyed to ensure that it is never used again.
got back quickly to a central headquarters for A refinement is to put the process on-line,
id'ate analysis __. Hence Comint organisa;olevRoothemmencyphered version produced on
SethWIMINEIblifirthemiAkIRDIRRO
ApProyed 4.4
Oeisedourlype transmitter as
equipped with their own cyphers. The ?raw it is producen.
Intercepted traffic which has been cyphered-- What is the situation today? Nobody out-
YORK nrY,'S
1 7 AB 1971
Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601 Rooplcymowt-,.k ,
- WASHINGTON, Aug. 10 ?
Many United .States military
planners, looking to the pos-
sible results of change in Wash-
ington's policy on China, be-
lieve that a withdrawal of
American forces and instal-la.;
tions from Taiwan would not
'substantially weaken this coun-
try's strategic position, in the
Far East.
Senior military men inter-
viewed here said that while
:they would rather not see a
sudden reduction in forces on
the Nationalist-held island,
they foresaw no dire conse-
quences if political . decisions
called for withdrawal as urged.
by Peking,
Premier Chou En-lad of China,
in meetings with visiting jour-
nalists .and .scholars in recent
weeks, has insisted that the
American military presence
Tnust be removed from Taiwan
if Washington wards more nor-
mal -relations with Peking.
Nigh American officials have
avoided public comment on the
demand, But late last month,
Secretary of Defense Melvin it.
Laird, when asked about the
military value of American
forces on Taiwan, answered:
"If we are going to perform
adequately and carry forward
oil...the Nixon doctrine of part-
nership, strength and showing
a willingness to negotiate, now
LI [lot the time to take unilat-
eral actions in withdrawing or
in lessening the credibility of
our deterrent."
' Advantages Outlined :
G?tillo Fat,ei,-;.g?0 ,Loss.,3een,
Ira a, 21: Taiworg
1.1j/ WILLIA14 EEC
'
5pcc13.1 t TM Nf,?: Yee,: :Conn'
(Stores of tactical nuclear
weapons for use against China
in the event of a major war.
Vietnam radionts Cited
On the first factor, military
planners say that as the United
States continues to reduce its
troops mid activity in South
Vietnam, the need for repair
and resupply facilities dimin-
ishes.
Of the fewer than 9,000
United States military person-
nel stationed on Taiwan, about
two-thirds are involved in the
repair and supply effort. Tliirty-
three C-130 transports, based
at Ching Chuan Hang Air Base,
fly regular resupply missions to
South Vietnam and Thailand.
The Taiwan Defense com-
mand, which is manned by
about 200 Americans from all
services, works out contingency
plans with Taipei under the
195/ iinztual security treaty.
.Military sources ray that if
it becomes necessary to reduce
this command to a handful of
men, they could be based in the
United States Embassy, with
the others transferred. to Pacific
command headquarters in Hon-
olulu. These men could shuttle
baek and worth to Taipei as
direct consultations were re-
quired.
The planners say that con-
tingency plans do not include
the use of American ground
troops in any defense of Tai-
wain, United States military in-
volvement, should it become
necessary, would be primarily
those of ships and planes of
the Seventh )dleet, . together
with Air Force planes from the
Philippines and Guam.. :
The Military assistance and
Advisory Group, which helps
train Nationalist soldiers in us-
ing American equipment, num-
bers 300 to 400 men, This
group, too, could be sharply
reduced if necessary, officials
say.
The United States maintains
a substantial eavesdropping
and cryptographic effort cen-
tered at Shulinko 13ase
While sources are reluctant to
discuss this intelligence activ-
ity, some have suggested that
the information it develops?
on such matters as the move-
ment of troops and air units
within China--has not been all
,that valuable.' -
Release 2000/08/16:
n Nonetheless, military plan-
ners are assessing the impli-
cations of a force reduction on
Taiwan if it should be or-
dered. In their view, Taiwan
currently- offers these principal
advantages:
clExcellent repair facilities
for tanks and trucks used in
Vietnam and a relative-1y close
supply base for the Indochina
war.
ciA relatively small headquar-
ters to develop joint contin-
gency plans for the defense of
Taiwan under the mutual
defense treaty between the
Nationalist Government and
the United States.
? lExtensive communications-
intelligence facilities to eaves-
drop on military communica-
tions on ina.miand China. .
Approved FOr
More useful, they say, las
been information on the radar
frequencies air defense facili-
ties for use in the event of
war. Pentagon sources said this
.sort of. inforMat ion could be oh-
tained just es easily from elec-
tronic intelligence planes and
ships Operating from interna-
tional waters and air space.
. Overflight Yialte.c1
Reconnaissance flights over
mainland China were termi-
nated in July to avoid any
,incident that could interfere
.with President Nixon's planned
;visit to China. The most valu-
able intelligence - information,
however, comes front recon-
naissance satellite missions,
which are continuing.
Experts say China has been
very skillful in hiding military
construction from reconnais-
sance cameras. Railroad. spur
lines to missile sites were clev-
erly camouflaged, they say, that
it was difficult to confirm
China's first deployment of op-
erational medium-range lois-
tiles last summer.
Tactical nuclear weapons,
primarily nuclear bombs with
about three times the force of
those dropped on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, are the most
controversial aspect of the
*American military presence on
Taiwan.
Three Y-4 fighter-bombers
able to carry nuclear bombs are
based at Taidan Air Base, on
detached duty from the Philip-
pines.
Military planners say that in
the unlikely event of a major
war with . China, Washington
would probably not want to use
Minuteman or Titan missiles
fired from the United States
since they would have to pass
-over-Soviet territory on the way
Ito China.
Weapons-to-Leave Oleinavin
I. The bulk of nuclear weapons
that might be employed, they
say, are Polaris missiles on sub-
marines in the Pacific, bombs
stored aboard Seventh. Fleet-
carriers and tactical nuclear
weapons on Guam and in the
Philippines, Taiwan anti South
Korea. Additional weapons On
Okinawa are to be. removed be-
fore the island reverts to Japa-
nese control.
"Taiwan, in offect, is an un-
sinkable aircraft carrier 100
CIA-RDP80-01601 R000400050001-5
miles from China," one general
said. 'We'd like to keep some
weapons there."
But he and other military
officials acknowledged that if
the White House decided other-
wise, greater reliance could be
placed on 1:-52 bombers oper-
ating .from Guam..
eN.
NEW REPUBLIO
Approved For Release 2000/0871611LCIAIRDP80-01601R0000001301:115f--
-0 c
C sop ,
Code Cracking
The specter has been raised of a massive breach in
the nation's communications security as a consequence
of the' publkation by newspapers of top-secret, offi-
cial documents from the McNamara study of the Viet-
ram war. Mr. Joseph Alsop, _for example, finds that
."the quantity of 'plain text' published in the Times
is already so great that the government cryptographers
now consider as compromised all the secret messages
sent in the same period over the same types of coding
machines,"
One can defer to Mr. Alsop's familiarity with confi-
dential information, without accepting his' judgment
on cryptography. Communications security in the
US has progressed considerably since World War II.
The old "code wheel" machines, popular at post
World War II consulates and for low-level Navy ship
messages, invited "cracking" in the traditional sense,
because they used the same code base every day.
Enough messages and skilled cryptographers could
break the system. Today, all secret messages are sent
by high-speed equipment, and the code is not break-
able. The principle in use is that of the "one-time
pad" ? used up and destroyed page by -page. Secret.
texts are enciphered with a one-time, random selected
code to produce the coded message. It is this that is
transmitted. If you have the answer in hand, as Mr.
Alsop poinfs out, you could find the original "one
time" letters. But it is only good for that one message.
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Approved For Release 2000/08ti6r. ellkiRpP80-016011R0010400600101-5
c 3. 2.
. ? 2 2 JUN 197 r? 3 c c cl.rf ? t t-c?
p S ?
Former Cryptograph er .Leaks
? ... ... ? ..?
-BY ALFRED L. 3VIALANta; Ja. - ?
1.
? . ? A prime example of the long?winded:vari
1.-
he govonment' s effortt o stop publication

of the Vietnam war documents is based in
?
large part ? on the fact that the material is
classified information. Accordingly, the argu-
ment runs, its publication is highly detrimen-
T.tal to T.J.S. interests. Indeed, there has even
been: criticism that the published material
could enable an enemy to break U.S. codes,
?
Maybe so. ?
But pardon a former cryptographer if he
experiences a twinge of skepticism about the
government arguments. During the early and
mid-1950s/this writer served its a so-called top
secret control officer attached to the staff of
the top U.S. naval command for the eastern
Atlantic,? the Mediterranean and Europe. The
job chiefly involved enciphering, deciphering
and carefully disseminating classified mes-
sages to and from the command.
It was an exciting time?because the com-
mand happened to be located in London,
which in those clays was a wonderfully fasci-
nating and absurdly inexpensive place for a
young American naval officer, with his
sought-after 'U.S. dollars, to live. The job it-
self, however, top secret messages and all,
was strictly dullsville. The reason simply was
that with one or two rare exceptions, the clas-
sified messages flying back and forth between
Washington and London and London and
other places were trivial, long-winded and
generally boring.
For the most part, they would have pro-
duced a big yawn on the face of any enemy
managing to sneak a peak.
A few illustrations from those London clays
would hardly jeopardize national security in
1071 and might just shed some light .on the
current charges against The New York Times
and The Washington Post.
Perhaps the most remarkable message,
:for its insignificance, that springs to mind ac-
tually involved The New York Tines. The.
precise phraseology cannot :be recalled, but
the content will never be forgotten: A notice
..from Washington to the London command in-
?,forming it that Mr. Hanson Baldwin, military
,affairs ed.itor of the Times, was planning a
trip to London and elsewhere in the area,, and
..please be nice to him. ? ?
7.sIt
? . . .
? Another memorable classified correspon-
dence occurred shortly before a change of '
:. command at the London'headquarters. There,
was an exchange of coded messages between.
?:: the Incoming and outgoing admirals (each
had four stars) to discuss whether or not they
should retain each other's stewards. (These,
. .. were sailors, black or Filipino, who per-..
? ? formed domestic-type :work for admirals and
% other high-ranking officers; the. jobs included
i? . cleaning shoes, waiting on table, making beds.
- and so on.) ? . :
------,:-.:,. - ----A0provedT-OrRe I e
ety of classified message was a weekly report
to Washington, encoded and often classified
"secret,? 'yet usually composed wholly of ex-
cerpts from local newspapers. Often, ?a cryp-
tographer would have the task of putting Into
?code an editorial that had appeared three or
four daysNearlie.r in the ManeheSter Guardian
or London Times. Sometimes the weekly re-
ports to be encoded would run half a dozen
single-spaced typewritten pages.
The fondness for classifying, messages that
Involved Such things as the abilities of. a par-
ticular admiral's steward or the travels of
Hanson Balwin, it appears on reflection, was
not only stupid, making unnecessary work for,:
cryptographers among other things, but also
somewhat dangerous.
The danger can be illustrated by recount-
ing events in the message center during the
1050 Suez Canal crisis. Because so many mes-
sages were transmitted in code during the
heat of the crisis, and therefore required
? extra time to handle,"many reports were not
_being routed to the propenpeople in anything
like a reasonable period. During the peak of
the crisis, when the message flow was ex-
tremely heavy, many Messages designated
for "priority" handling were being &pi-
phered two days after receipt. Some "rou-
tine" and "deferred". reports were not han-
died for more than a week after receipt.
Even some urgent messages were not
.clecoded for many hours. (The highest desig-
? nation?"flash"?was supposed to be reserved
for enemy contact reports and never to be in
code on the ground that the urgency woula
allow no time for cryptographic handling.
During the Suez crisis, however, "flash" was
frequently used?in code and not involving
enemy contact?as a means of trying to ram
a report through the traffic jam at the London
message center.)
. In a year and a half of top-secret message
work, handling dozens of classified reports.
daily, this writer can recall only one message
that seemed truly vital. It was a report from
sources in Turkey during the early stages of
the Suez crisis, when British and French
? forces were staging at Cyprus. It stated that
"unidentified" jet bombers had overflown
Turkish airspace, heading toward Cyprus. (A
subsequent message reported that the planes
had turned around and headed back to the
northeast, a maneuver that personnel in the
message center at the time felt may have
averted World War HI.) - ?
The criticism in recent clays that the publi-
cation of the Vietnam papers may somehow
endanger U.S. codes may have validity, but
just where that validity lies- is 'difficult to
fathom.
Even a decade and a half ago, codes bc-
a grAl 01R000400050001-5.:
arrie-zu,
came ,11,14solikaitghp ip.,y4(415
gn4y%-?
._sender-and -receiver-At-is-Impossible to ima:g:
Me how the publication of the Vietnam papers
T
MT:IS:U.41 SCIKIC.2 M01.1ITOII cVs
Approved For Releasjai/20tqfp/p1[16 : CIA-RDP8O-R1_601 Ropo40005000i -5
t ? ?c) "
?6
By George 'George W. Ashworth
- Staff correspone.entof
The Christian, Science Monitor
Washington
? Disclosure of portions of the Pentagon's
war record has raised several security is-
sues 'that go far beyond the war,
Because the issue is Vietnam, the very
controversy of that war and the way it was
started. has tended to overshadow so far
the possible security implications of the dis-
closures in the New York Times,
But officials here see these .potential dif-
ficulties:
O Some of the material used was original-
ly encoded, at least several items being sent
in very classified and closely held forms.
?Disclosures of these messages in 'their un-
coded form could serve to help .other inter-
ested nations decipher other messages of
the period that might so far have eluded
translation.'
Beyond that, the information made avail-
able could serve to give a great deal of in-
formation about U.S. procedures in cryp-
tography.
o The .intelligence material disclosed,
while not particularly sensitive now in
? terms of national security, could serve over-.
? seas analysts interested in studying how
U.S. intelligence operates, and give better
insight into methods, procedures, weak-
nesses, and strengths.
O Some officials believe that the disclo-
sures tend to weaken expectations by other
countries that confidences exchanged with
officials of the U.S. will remain respected.
0 The disclosures may tend to weaken
still further respect by the press for security
classifications imposed by the U.S. Govern-
rnent. The present trend, reinforced.by the.
New York Times series, is for media orga-
nizations or individuals to be their own
arbiters oVer whether something classified
by the U.S. government should remain
privileged.
? Although top-secret and secret material
is supposed to be closely held and limited
.only to those with requisite clearances and
whatis called "need to know," materials of
a classified nature have often in the past
.been shared by government officials with
?representatives of the news media.
Normally Speaking, this practice has
largely been carried out at the highest gov-
ernment levels in order to help the press
understand various situations more fully.
It is usually understood that this material
should.not be publicly disseminated because
of its nature. -
Approved For Release
I\LiIJt, y-oc)--
?
Howevein the" mu's? of. the Vietnam war
there has been a general loosening of long-
standing security practices. More and more,.
persons who- disagree either with the war
or with other persons in government have
felt more free to release mAterial damaging
,to those with whom they disagree.
This tendency has been compounded by an
increasing government willingness, as many
officials see it, to classify excessively. Some
of the most mundane material is routinely
classified. And it is not uncommon for classi-
fications to be given merely to lend impor-
tance. This is particularly true of study
papers.
? ?
CanRdian involvement.
As a result, a cloud of classification hangs
over a great deal of material of.interest to
the public and perhaps Of no great advant-
age to any national enemy. It is often said
jestingly here that a great deal of classified
material is secret only from the American
.people.
Thus the willingness- to classify widely,
and the accompanying growth of disrespect
for classification, have caused problems
for the last administration s well as the
current one.. ?
Of particular concern now are American
relations with foreign countries in the wake
of the New York Times disclosures.
Already the Canadians are having an in-
ternal argument over the fact that a Cana,
dian diplomat serving on the International
Control Commission carried notes. from
Washington to Hanoi in 1964.
As one source here put it, "The stories
have just about finished the Canadians as
intermediaries, as well as weakening their
faith in us."
The question of governmental privacy has
been raised before by other nations dealing
with the United States. Just as there are
allied nations that, the U.S. will not trust
with really important secrets, other nations
now are 'making- it very clear that they do
not believe the U.S. can be trusted with pri-
vate matters. This viewpoint has been par-
ticUlarly evident lately in relations with the
government of Thailand. ?
If governments cannot trust each other,
relations become both more difficult and
more potentially dangerous..
^
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?
?ciSovZo-l's cran _
Q._ tcl
0 6- t5,01. ik3Q-011\1 5
0 0 -
ITIW)
{UPI)?Government officials seem more. dis-
turbed about diplomatic end espionage conse-
quences from publication by The New York
Times of the secret Vietnam war history than
by the facts revealed.
Of particular concern to many officials is
the possibility that extensive publication of
? diplomatic and military cable texts might al-
low the Soviet Union to crack the code of other
- U.S. communications transmitted during the
early ligiOs.
- "You may rest assured that no one is read-
ing this series any more closely than the So-
viet Embassy," one official said. ?
Others said the series had Produced few sur-
prises.
"If The Times had not printed all those
texts," one official said, "very little might
have been done. Stories about the study ? by
0
themselves ? would p?obably not have caused,
much reaction." ?
. ?
The Times, however, 'accoMpanied the three
installments with numerous texts of ?high-level
memos and cables. Many were messages be-
tween Washington and Saigon or other U.S.
diplmatoic and military outposts in nidochir,.9...
In each case the sender, receiver and date
of the message were given just before the text.
No one knows how many of these messages,
transmitted in code, may have been intercept-
ed by the Soviet Union; Security experts at the
Pentagon and elsewhere operate on the as-
sumption that any Of them might have, been
intercepted. ? ,
They also assume that even the most sophis-.
floated code may be broken by a cryptanalyst
who obtains a "plaintext," or decoded version,
of messages sent in that code. Once a code:
pattern is deciphered, 'other coded messages
sent during that period ? perhaps to entirely
different areas and on entirely different sub-
jects ? might be read. ?
For these reasons, verbailm texts of diplo-
matic and military messages are almost never ;
released 'andthis is why The Times' printing
of the texts generated concern.
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