SECRET VIET STUDY FOR NIXON STIRS FUROR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000300350073-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 73
• Publication Date: April 26, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

j BOSTON, MASS.
GLOBE Approved For RIease 2001/03 W- RDP80-01
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;P ti 2 1972
I Secret Viet study for Nixon sti 's .:..r
By S. J. Micciche
Globe Washington Bureau
happened in Vietnam up to
1 1969 (when the survey was
'.pieted).
WASHINGTON-President Nix-
on's war policy in Vietnam might be
construed 'as "malfeasance in office"
for ignoring National Security Coun-
cil (NSC) advice given to him three
years ago, Sen. Mike Gravel (D-Alas-
ka) declared yesterday.
Thwarted in his effort to make
public all of a 500-page NSC memo-
randum in his possession since last
December, Gravel said that from his
study of the documents he believes
the United States is pursuing an
Indochina policy of a "pitiful giant
acting petulantly . . . committing
.murdei and genocide."
Gravel's memorandum is a ? copy
of a study made for President Nixon
a month after his inauguration in
1969, ? and contains high-level gov-
ernment opinions on the situation in
Indochina at that time and prospects
for the future.
Gravel said in effect that the
memorandum showed the Nixon pol-
icy of Vietnamization would not
work without the continued presence
of American forces in Vietnam. The
document itself contained estimates
of the time required for completion
of Vietnamization as from 8.3 to 14.4
years, dating from 1969,
early ?achieve that gobs.
com- -In sharp debate over the"validity
some of these differences
.have become public knowledge-
especially with the publication last
year of the Pentagon Papers, which
carried the war history up to 1968-
the newly revealed study reveals how
these diverging viewpoints were ex-
tended from the Johnson into the
Nixon Administration.
Two broad schools of assessments
emerged among the policy planners.
In the first group, more optimistic
and "hawkish," were the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the US military
command in Vietnam, the comman-
der in chief of. Pacific forces and the
American Embassy ' in Vietnam,
headed by Ambassador Ellsworth
Bunker.
Often conflicting with the judg-
ment of those advisers was a second
group, composed of the Office. of the
Secretary of Defense, the State. De-
partment. and the Central Intelli-)
gence Agency (CIA).
The first group, the summary of
the study says, generally took "a
hopeful view of current and future
prospects in. Vietnam," with State,
Defense and the CIA "decidedly
more skeptical about the present and
pessimistic about the future."
These are some of the major dis-
closures in the summary:
-"Sound analysis" of the effec-
tiveness of American B52 bomber
strikes against enemy forces was
Published excerpts regarding the. rated "impossible" to achieve; but,
memorandum requested by Mn. Nix "the consensus is that some strikes
on on the day after his inaugural are are very effective, some clearly
"very accurate ... but the only way wasted, and a majority with indc-
far objective analysis.is to read it all," terminate outcome." B52s had been
th Viet-
So
t
i
i
t t
arge
s
u
ns
n
said Gravel. used aga
nam during the Johnson Adminis
The NSC report contains the re- tration; they are currently being
SnOnses of the State and Defense conducted for the first time against
departments and the Central Intelli- the heartland of North Vietnam, and
genre Agency to 28 questions pre- under a different strategic rationale.
-In early 1969, the optimists
pureed by Presidential adviser Henry concluded that on the basis of pro-
"Kissinger on the effect of bombing in grams then in existence, it would
Vietnam and the overall Indochina take "8.3 years" more to pacify the
policy. remaining contested and Viet Cong-
Tl d fl t d 1 d'ffer- controlled population of South Viet-
of the "domino theory"-the conse-
quences of a communist takeover in
Vietnam - military strategists gen-
erally accepted that principle, but
most civilian' experts concluded that
while Cambodia and Laos might be
endangered fairly quickly, the loss
of Vietnam "would not necessarily
unhinge the rest of Asia."
-On Soviet and Chinese military
aid to North Vietnam, the Joint
Chiefs and the US military command
in Saigon said that "if all imports by
sea were denied and land routes
through Laos and Cambodia at-
tacked vigorously," North Vietnam
"could not obtain enough war sup-
plies to continue," But the CIA and
the Office of the Secretary of De-
fense, "in total disagreement," con-
cluded that "overland `routes from
China alone" could supply North
Vietnam with sustaining war ma-
terial, "even with an unlimited
bombing campaign."
President Nixon's subsequent ac-
tions in Vietnam have been more in
accord with the assessments reached
by the pessimists in this study, al-
though his public explanations of his
actions have reflected more of what
the optimists were claiming in 1969.
In the 'process, the President has
cut US forces in South Vietnam from
over a half million at-the time he
took office to about 80,000 today.
While the National Security
Council memorandum discloses sharp
disagreements three years ago on the
effectiveness of US bombing of
North Vietnam, the current battle-
field situation in Vietnam is much
different from the situation in early
1969 and US airpower is being ap-
plied in different ways.
In contrast to the guerrilla attacks
or hit-and-run actions by larger units
which have dominated the enemy's
strategy in the past, the current com-
nnunist offensive is much more like a
conventional battle, with tanks,'artil-
lery and massed troops concentra-
tions standing and fighting.
Thus, it is reasoned officially,
bombing now is more important,-
1, a vice ne CC e s Tarp narn. The pessimists estimated it
ences between the military and civil- ake "13.4 ears" more to
ian buA ddf 1n0 e 2p15W1)03/04: Wears" more R000300350073~9=~r i tl 'd
from pes h fists in assessing w at a
 SUN-TILXpproved For tFelease 200110$ f .1 RDP8
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By Morton Kondracke
and Thomas B. Ross
Sun-Times Bureau
WASIIINGTON--President Nixon was giv-
en unanimous advice by his top advisers
r.hortly after taking office in 1969 that South
Vietnam could not stand up to the North Viet-
atamese without the indefinite presence of a
large U.S. force.
Secret White House documents, which were
made available to The Sun-Times Tuesday,
indicate complete agreement among both mil-
itary and civilian experts that Mr. Nixon's
Vietnamization program could not reach the
goal of total U.S. withdrawal if North Viet-
nant re-entered the war in a direct way as it
did in its current offensive.
The documents are incorporated in a 500-
bage National Security Study Memorandum I
(NSSM 1), compiled by,H~enry A. xissinger,
the President's natignal security adviser; in
February, 1969, from detailed questions to all
the top agencies dealing with the war, in-
eluding the State Department, the Defense
'Department, the Central Intc lligence agency
and.the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Skepticism on Vietrianlization
"All agencies agree," the study concluded,
"that RVNAP (Republic of Vietnam Armed
Forces) could not, either now or even when
fully modernized, handle both the VC (Viet
Cong) and a sizable level of NVA (North Viet-
namese Army) forces with U.S. combat sup-
port in the form of air, helicopter, artillery,
logistics and some ground forces."
Kissinger's summary asserts that there
were "very substantial differences of opinion
within the U.S. government on many aspects
.of the Vietnam situation."
But on the prospects for what Mater became
known as Vietnamization, a careful analysis
of the lengthy section on. the program showed
unanimous skepticism about the South Viet-
namese army ever making it totally on its
own.
Military appraslal of RVNAF
Top military leaders-the most optimistic.
of all in dealing with allied prospects in Viet-
nam --- trade no declaration that total U.S.
Withdrawal would ever be possible.
In a top-secret 'paragraph of its response
to Kissinger's questions, the Pentagon said
that " radual U.S. troop reduction might be
possible, given South Vietnam's "gradually
improving its capabilities and effectiven.ess."
The most the military foresaw, however,
was withdrawal of bob U.S. division during
mid-summer 1969. "Reduction of other U.S.
forces should be possible," according to the,
Pentagon. "The numbers and timing depend
upon progress of (South Vietnamese) modern-
ization, improvements in effectiveness and a
drastic reduction in the . . . desertion rate."
At the time that the response was written,
however, the combined opinion of the com-
mander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in Washington, and the com-
mander of the U.S. forces in the Pacific, was
as follows:
"The RVNAF (South Vietnamese armed
forces), with their present structure and de-
gree of combat readiness, are inadequate to
handle a sizeable level of North Vietnamese
Army forces.
"The RVNAF simply are not capable of at-
taining the level of self-sufficiency and over-
whelming superiority that would he required
to counter combined Viet Cong insurgency
and North Vietnamese Army main force of-
fensives."
In response to another question, the mili-
tary told Kissinger that "by 1972, the planned
Phase 11 (modernized) RVNAF will be ade-
quate to handle the Viet Cong insurgency if
-the Viet Cong are not ra-inforced and sup-
ported by the North Vietnamese Army."
Thus the military apfiEared to be indicating
that after three years of modernization, South
Vietnam's forces would not be capable of re-
sisting just the kind of North Vietnamese as-
sault that Hanoi hunched last month.
Other agencies were less optimistic yet. A
State Department response said that "a re-
cent CIA meniora:ndum concluded that it
would be at least two years and perhaps
longer, before the ARVN (Army of the Re-
public of Vietnam) would become an effective
fihting force. The estimate of two years de'-
t,
on achievement of favorable psy-
chological conditions during, that time, an
achievement considered unli'hely. We believe
that the CIA estimate is not overly pessi-
mistic."
south. Vietnamese deficiencies
To still another question, the State Depart-
tnent told Kissinger that North Vietnamese
involvement would mean providing South
Vietnam with "sufficient combat support to
make up for its deficiencies until the entire
modernization and self-sufficiency program
was completed."
Despite generally-gloomy estimates of Sai-
gon's capability, President Nixon decided to
gradually withdraw U.S. forces and. turn over
the fighting to the South Vietnamese. He had
promised in the 1988 election campaign that
he had a "plan to end the war."
Gradual withdrawal appeared to be work-
ing, especially in domestic political terms.
Despite some setbacks, notably a North `'et-
namese rout of Saigon forces in Laos last
year, the President could declare that the
ARVN could "flack' it."
Then, last month, the President's Viet-
namization policy was called into questioir on
just the grounds that his advisers had warned
about in 1969--the massive intervention of
North Vietnamese troops into South Vietnam,
'Modest impact' of renewed bombing
The President's reaction to the North Viet-
namese invasion was the resumption of large-
scale bombing of the north that had been dis-
continue([ in 1968 by former President Lyndon
B. Johnson. Other parts of NSSM 1, as has
beerr previously reported, indicate that bomb-
ing had only modest impact on North Viet-
namese capabilities,
The CIA's answers to Kissinger's questions
raised serious doubts about the willingi ess of
the South Vietnamese army to fight. It esti-
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SUN-TIMES
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WASHINGTON -._ Following are excerpts from National Se-
curity Study Memorandum I (NSSM-1), the secret 1969 Viet-
nam War document prepared at the request of presidential
adviser Henry A. Kissinger. The excerpts are drawn from the
responses of several agencies to questions drafted by Kis-
singer.
(1) Question (No.12): To what extent-could RVNAF (Repub-
lic of Vietnam Armed Forces, South Vietnam) - as it is now
-handle the VC (Viet Cong( ... without U.S. combat support
if all NVA (North Vietnamese Army) units were with-
drawn?
The JCS (American Joint Chiefs of Staff), CINCPAC (Com-
mander of U.S. forces in the Pacific) and COidUSMACV (U.S.
Commander in Vietnam) estimate that it is highly probable
that Republic of %ietnam Armed Forces (RVN.AF), as it ex-
ists today, adequately supported by U.S. artillery, engineer,
tactical air, helicopter, and naval assets, Is capable of han-
dling'the Viet Con.;.
Without U.S. combat support and when opposing Viet Cong
main and local force units, the RVNAF would ha-e to reduce
the number of offensivo'operations and adopt more of a defens-
ive posture. This would result in loss of control 15y. the Govern-
z.nent of Vietnam (GVN) over substantial rural areas.
Preconditioned answer
The above response is predicated upon two assumptions:
first, there exists an internal environment characterized by a
workable economy, a relatively secure civilian populace and a
functioning government. Secondly, the North Vietnamese army
forces have withdrawn to North Vietnam and terminated
external support to Viet Cong forces. Otherwise, if external
support fron the north were to continue, it is visualized that
filler personnel would infiltrate In ever increasing numbers to
counter any substantial. RVNAF success.
This could result in a prolongation of the conflict unless
substantial Free World. Military Assistance Force presence
were either continued or re-established.
It is highly probable that the RVNAF, as it exists today,
adequately supported by U.S. artillery engineer., tactical air,
helicopter and naval assets is capable of (1) making substan-
tial progress in the elimination of Viet Cong main and local
force units, including those with northern fillers; (2) making
sustained progress in a reduction of the Viet Cong threat al-
thou;h elimination would require a prolonged period of time
(3) achieving favorable results in a shor,:,r time frame, if
northern fillers are withdrawn.
Reduced offense
It is estimated that without U.S. combat support and oppos-
of offensive operations and adopt a more defensive posture; (2)
consolidate some forces and redeploy them within major popu-
lated areas (3) lose control over substantial rural areas
(4) retain ... control over major populated areas.
However, OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense) consid-
ers that if all northerners withdraw, the Viet Cong effort in the
South may collapse, thus such a complete withdrawal may he
unlikely....
RVNAF's capability against VC forces with NVA fillers, is
closely associated with time....
The impact of ... expansion and modernization is just now
being felt. The second phase of the modernization .. - is to
develop a balanced force capable of copin, with the internal
VC threat, but despite acceleration, goals will not be met
before the end of FY 72 (July, 1972)... .
To what extent could the RVNAF - as it is now -- also
handle a sizable level of NVA forces?
Could not cope
Today's RVNAF, without full support of U.S. combat forces
could not cope with a sizable level of NVA forces.
Should the present PVNAF be reinforced with U.S. air and
artillery support, their capability of defense would be im-
proved, but not to the extent of being able to cope with the
type and complexity of combat imposed by major NVA in-
v'olvetnent.
The posture of the present RVNAF would be further
strengthened if ... backed up by major U.S. ground force
elements.
The RVNAF, with their present structure and degree of
combat readiness, are inadequate to handle a sizable level of
North Vietnamese army forces. The RVNAF are simply not:
capable of attaining the level of self-sufficiency and over-
whelming force superiority that would be required to counter
combined Viet Cong insurgency and North Vietnamese army
main force offensives. Some of the RVNAF would necessarily
have to be redeployed to concentrate defenses in and around
critical population centers and installations, thus abdicating a
greater extent of rural areas to Viet Cong-NVA control.
Gradual Improvement
(Top Secret) Although the question does not consider gradu-
al U.S. troop reduction, the most likely and feasible scenario
would be RVNAF gradually improving its capabilities and
effectiveness. Associated would be a phased reduction of U.S.
forces., - < - - . ,
o;nt.inued
Inc, Vici rovF FW6rd 2 i'fO3tMWrs CIA-RDP80-01601 R000300350073-4
 (MACV) co1A rested. FFOtuR61e9 e2? y 13/04 - QIA-RDP8a=01601 R00030A350073
removing one division from South Vietnam uring nil-sum- (5) - oi'ov: ing are excerpts rant cssmger s summary of he
mer 1969. He and U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker dis- agencies' responses to sis questions:
cussed this with President Thieu and were met, with a favor-
able response. Vietnam impact on Southeast Asia
In addition,,reductien of other U.S. forces should be possible THLR is CONTINUES to be a sharp debate between and
in the near future. c The numbers and liming depend upon prog ''-vithin a,;?ncies about t^e effect of the outcome in Vietnam oti.
other na ons. The inost recent NIE on this subject (NIE 50-68)
ress of RV FAF' dernization ... improvements in effective- tended to downgrade the so-called "domino theory." It states
Hess of RVNAF and a drasde reduction in G)e PVNAF desert- that a settlement which would permit the Communists to take
tion rare. control of the government in South Vietnam, not immediately
The JCS, CINCPAC and COMUSMACV consider that by 1972 but within a year of two, would be likely to brine Cambodia
the planned Phase li RVNAF will be adequate to handle the and Laos into Hanoi's orbit at a fairly early state, but that
Viet-Cong insurgency if the Viet Cong are not re-inforced and that development would not :necessarily unhinge the rest of
supported by the North Vietnamese Army.... Asia.
Reforms needed The NIE dissenters believe than an unfavorable settlement
Without major reforms within the RVNAF command and would stimulate the Communists to become more active else-
selection system however, it is unlikely that the RVNAF as where and that it will be difficult to resist making some ac-
presently organized and led will ever constitute an effective commodation to the pressure than generated.' They believe, in
political or military counter to the Viet Cong. Moreover, as the contrast to the estimate, these adjustments would be relative-
GVN's major presence in the countryside, the RVNAF as ly small and insensitive to subsequent U.S. policy.
presently constituted will only continue to widen the gap ... Both the majority and the dissenters reject the view that an
between the government and the rural population. unfavorable settlement in Vietnam will inevitably be followed
Thus, any. program of priority changes must have as its by Communist takeovers outside Indochina.
primary purpose the provision of an interval during which Moscow and Peking influence
maximum pressure can be exerted on the GVN to make the There is general governmental agreement on this question.
necessary organizational and political changes commensurate
with the assumption of a larger role in the political struggle Peking opposes negotiations while Moscow prefers an early
negotiated settlement on terms as favorable as possible to
and the war. Hanoi. 'either Peking nor Moscow have exerted heavy pres-
sure Question No. 10a: What differences of opinion exist (b3= sure ou Hanoi and for various reasons they are unlikely to. do
tween agencies) on RVNAF readiness? so, although their militaary and economic assistance give them.
The State Department's reply read: important leverage. (-IA notes that "in competing for In-
A recent CIA memorandum concluded that it would be at luence Peking and Mcs.cow tend to cancel out each other."
least two ye=ars; and perhaps longer, before the AKV'N (Army
of South Vietnam) would become an effective fighting force.
The estimate of two years depended on achievement of favor-
able psychological conditions during that tinge, an achieve-
ment considered unlikely.
Not confident
We believe that the CIA estimate is not overly pessimistic.
ARVN effectiveness has certainly improved as a result of
better training, greater firepower and inspiration provided by
the presence of U. S. forces ... (but) we believe that the more
crucial problems - leadership, morale, discipline and training
- are long-term and highly complex and we are not confident
The enemy
(Questions 5-10)
Under current rules of engagement, the enemy's manpower
pool and infiltration capabilities can outlast allied attrition
efforts indefinitely.
The major issues
If the i967-1968 pacification rate is sustained, the first inter-
pretarion implies that it will take 8.3 years to pacify the 4.15
million contested and VC population of December, 1968; the
second s iew implies pacification success in 13.4 years.
that significant improvement in all these fields will be accom- The presen situation
plished during the next year or so. No agemicy clearly forecasts a "victory" over the Commu-.
(3) Question No. 11: To what extent could RVNAF handle gists, and all acknowledge the manifold problems facing the
the VC ... with or without U.S. combat support ... if all NVA DVN as we withdraws. however, b1ACV-JCS stress the reed
units were withdrawn? The State Department replied: for continued U.S. suport. OSD and State believe that only a
Assuming all U.S. and NVA forces were withdrawn from compromise settlement is possible and emphasize GVN self-
South Vietnam, the RVNAF alone should be able to cope with reliance. CIA states that progress in SVN has been sufficiently
the remaining VC. If NVA personnel remained in VC units as slow and fragile that substantial U.S. disengagement in the
fillers, the relevant balance would be more difficult to assess. next few years could jeopardize all recent gains.
Under these circumstances, it would probably be necessary to
provide the RVNAF with sufficient U.S. combat support to Alternative campaign
make tip for its deficiencies until the entire modernization and All agencies agree that Chinese and Soviet aid has provided
self-sufficiency program was completed.
Dim prospects
(4) The State Department's Bureau of intelligence and Re-
search added the following remarks to the above answer:
. We do not believe that RVNAF will he able to eradicate
VC political-military apparatus or to reduce significantly the
level of the insurgency. Indeed, these objectives, as well as
the resolution of complex and deeply rooted RVNAF defi-
almost. all the war materiel used by Hanoi. However, OSD-CIA
and MACV-JCS disagree over whether the flow of aid could be
reduced enough to make a difference in South Vietnam. If all
imports by sea were denied and land routes through Laos and
Camb odiat attacked vigorously, the MACV-JCS find that NVN
could not obtain enough war supplies to continue. In total
disagreement, OSD and CIA believe that the overland routes
from China alone could provide NVN enough material to carry
on, even w?ith'an unlimited bombing campaign.
ciencies are realistically possible only in the long-terns con-
-
text.
The presence of substantial numbers of NVA fillers in VC
traits, in the 1`ifft e~s t , Ar~~ nt Me
vr1R~104 : CIA-RDP80-01601 R000300350073-4
tend to nega o r2'
term, prospects. for the RVNAF.
 STATINTL
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chICAGO, ILL. 4.v--? .. . .. _.
Fear of Damage .:. ' r immunity so he could declas 'rockets, the North Vietnamese'
TRIBUNE 4Asked why he thought Griffin I sift' the Pentagon papers and are now presenting "individual
767,793
S - 1,016,275
-._,'R. 2 O .1972
ravel
objected to his reading it into make them public last summer. I targets which were rarely avail-:
the Congressional ..Record Only Course Open able in earlier years," Bray,
Gravel replied: "I have legal problems," he said.
"I think he blocked for very ff explained, saying these were The North Vietnamese, he~
partisan reasons T thinly than I .mostly his case b e f a r e the commented, are much more
=" know-and they've been told by
the White House-that this ? is
probably the most damaging
piece of evidence and informa-
tion and facts against Richard
,Nixon since he's taken office.
Tells New
"And it shows in my mind-
and I think that will be the
judgment of the American peo-
ple to make, but I won't use
the word-but I think some
could construe this as malfea-
sance in office."
Gravel charged that the Pres-
? BY PHILIP WARDEN
tChitiso Tribune Press Serricel
WASHINGTON, April 25 -
iSen. Mike Gravel fD._ Alaskal
on o
e
cp
n -
jgenc
today accused President Nixon Agency and the Defense De- Altho there was talk of pos-
,of possible "malfeasance in of- partment that daily bombing of siblc censure of Gravel for
five" for not conducting the North Vietnamese targets would violating both the classified
Viet Nam war the way some fail to achieve its objective. 1 documents laws and Senate
advisers recommended. i rules, Sen. William B. Saxbe
Gravel defied federal classi- A Strategic Error ' ' [R., Ohio], an advocate of
The new bombing' of the censure, said he. d o u b t e d
rules to divulge, partly' on the North ordered by the President whether such a move would
Senate: floor and partly at a to stop the current Communist be attempted. He speculated
drive into South Viet Nam and id
C
press conference, some of the that a censure move wou
breaking off of peace negotia-
contents' of a 1969 National be defeated on a straight party-
~___. tions in Paris, Gravel said,
There were no tears in Gra-
,vel's eyes today. On the night
last summer when he read por-
tions of the secret Pentagon
;papers on Viet Nam, 'Gravel
:cried.
t Senate OK Denied
Gravel first attempted today
.to induce the Senate to allow
him to publish the near-500-
page memorandum in the Con-
gressional Record. He asked
..the unanimous consent of the
four senators in the chamber.
Sen.. Robert P. Griffin [R. print the complete text of the
Mi
h
c
] the acting minrity
.,o leader, objected.
Gravel then asked unanimous
United States Supreme Court! heavily dependent on logistic
connected with the release of and re-supply operations,
the Pentagon papers and his "which by their very nature are
claim to immunity. accessible to retaliation from
Gravel told the press con- the air."
ference that once the Presi-
dent renewed the bombing of
North Viet Nam and termi-
nated the Paris peace talks,
North Viet Nam had to start a
new offensive.
"They could only. undertak
the offensive~beeause they had
nothing to lose," Gravel said.
"It would take a fool not to
ident refused to accept the opin-
i
f th
C
t...,1
11
Gravel asked Sen. William
lb
A
ht [D
h
k]
_
rlg
.,
r
u
anman
, c
~llg portions of the secret; of the Foreign Relations Com-
:memorandum. Again Griffin mittee, to call a meeting of his
objected. Gravel proceeded to committee so Gravel could get
read his speech, including ' the committee to print the doc-
quotations direct from t h e ument and thereby circumvent
memorandum. Griffin listened , Griffin. Fuibright reportedly
but did not voice new objec- rejected Gravel's proposal.
tions.. ' Gravel said he would not call
Gravel told newsmen he ob- his subcommittee on
u b 1 i c
,
p
. tamed the secret document in . buildings and grounds into ex- tanks heavy artillery and
;randum on Viet Nam.,
consent to make a speech quot- i
F
"has forced the offensive now
taking place."
"The President had only one
concern,".Gravel told the Sen-
ate. "The one, foremost con-
cern of all was to save face."
Gravel said hundreds of thou-
sands of men have died as, a
result of the President's desire
to save face.
"It is reminiscent of some of
the dictators and monarchs of
the past," he said.
Gravel has reserved 15 nlin-
utes of time in the Senate for
Thursday in a new attempt to
I gressional Record.
"Gravel is not the most im-
portant thing, even tho he
might disagree," Saxbe said in
an interview. "The most im-
portant thing. is to get the Sen-
ate to police its membership."
At the Sate Department to-
day, a spokesman said Gravel's
criticism of the renewed bomb-
ing in North Viet Nam was not
valid because the present mili-
tary stiuation differs substan-
tiall:- from the situation three
years ago when the National
Security Council memorandum
11 was prepared.
"What the North Vietnamese
Army has faced us with is
something quite different from I
,what was essentially 'small-,
scale, guerrilla warfare,"
Charles W. Bray, a State De-
partmer.t press officer said.
Bray also noted that judg-1
ments regarding the effective-
ness of air bombing in the past j
have been "mixed and not
categorical."
By using more conventional
including
c o in b a t devices
December. He . said ' it was traordinary session, as he did ground-to-air anti - a i r c r aft
"classified secret." when. he wanted congressional
Approved For Release 2001/03/04': CIA-RD,P80-01601 R000300350073-4
 T11ILY S7ORL?
Approved for Release 2001/%,
04pRCJYkRDP1F&.OItM
U
By TIM WHEELER
WASHINGTON, April 25-Senator Mike Gravel (D-Alaska) defied President Nixon
today and read on the U.S. Senate floor portions of a secret White House memo which
explodes as a hoax Nixon's so-called "peace plan" that won him election in 1968.
. However, Senate minority whip, The memo says that the CIA and no time after taking office did
Robert ;Griffin (R-Mich) franti-
Defense Department had told Ni '
cally maneuvered to gag Gravel Richard Nixon consider scrious-
from inserting the full text of the xon in 1969 that his Vietnamization ly getting out of Vietnam or of
memo in the Congressional Re- policy would never work, that negotiating with the Nortb Viet-
cord. saturation bombings of civi- namese for an end to the war.
cord.
The memo, written by Nixon's lian populations was futile, that Instead of accepting the "pes-
adviser, Henry Kissinger, and the South Vietnamese population simistic" conclusions of the CIA
would never be pacified, short of reported in the memo, Nixon, he
titled curity "Responses Se- total annihilation carried out over said, "ignored NSSM-1's evalua-
y Study udy Memorandum 1" more than a decade, and that the tion and persisted in the funda
(uary,-"19) 69.was completed in P'eb- South Vietnamese puppet govern- mental policies of his predeces-
?T. ment is "chancy at best." sor-propping up our client re-
ruTrhe. memo told Nixon that it -
would take 8.5 to 13.4 years to The Washington Post devoted gime in Saigon.
complete "pacification" of South two full pages and two columns "In spite of the heaviest bomb-
Vietnam and that liberation forces on its front page to reprinting log campaign in history conduct
wele capable of outlasting U.S. vast portions of the memo, in ed upon Laos and the lio Chi
aggression indefinitely. defiance of an executive order Minh trail, the Communist side
No U.S. victory seen which establishes the system of has been able to mount a mas-
'.' -
The report said, in no uncertain government classification of doe- sive new offensive. . . Bombing held vain
terms, that the U.S. could not win uments.
a military victory, nor could it The Senate floor was all but Gravel quoted a section of the
win a political victory. deserted but the galleries were memo in .which civilian experts
It said that South Vietnamese jammed with citizens, including in the Pentagon informed Nixon
armed forces "could not either reporters, as Sen. Griffin, his that "the external supply require-
now or even when fully modern- voice cold with-fury, threatened ments VC/NVA (Vietcong/North
ized handle both the VC and a size- to call the Senate into closed Vietnam Army) forces in South
able level of NVA (North Vietna- session to keep the American Vietnam are so small... that it
mese Army) forces without U.S. people from learning the contents is unlikely any air interdiction
combat support in the form ofair, of the memo. campaign can reduce it below
helicopters, artillery logistics and But Gravel read portions 'of the required levels ... the en-
some ground forces." the document anyway. The peo- emy can continue to push suffi-
The.South Vietnamese faced "sev- ple, he charged, "now know that cient supplies th}?ough."
ere motivation, leadership and de- he, President Nixon, never had The State Department intelli-
sertion problems" and had an an- ' a plan to end the war. Instead gence wing is recorded as stat-
nual desertion rate of ;"i4 percent he adopted a. policy that would ing, "Our interdiction efforts in
of their strength, the memo de- indefinitely maintain the Ameri- Laos do not appear to have weak-
Glared. can military presence in Viet- ened in any major way Commu-
Press shown memo nam ... and the result is now nist capabilities to wage an ag-
Gravel displayed the book length clear for all to see, with the gressive and protracted cam--
memo to reporters at a Senate war raging at a level as intense paign in South Vietnam..."
press conference but he refrained and as destructive as any time And the CIA added glumly,
from releasing the full document, before." "Almost four years of air war
explaining that Nixon supporters Gravel accused Nixon of "com in North Vietnam have shown
are threatening to censure him' mitting genocide in Vietnam." as did the Korean war-that al-
for his bold action. "The consequences of his pol- though air strikes will. destroy
He vowed, nevertheless, to re- icy will be the killing and maim- .:. they cannot successfully in-
lease "every stitch of paper I ing of hundreds of thousands of terdict the flow of supplies."
have" so that the American peo- human beings," he told reporters. The portions of the memo re-
ple can judge the facts for them- Nixon intention exposed printed by the Washington Post
selves. Gravel said that a study of the reveal that Nixon was, told b
Approved For Rel "g2Oe ki'fl~31 es C$AtRC)P8O-Ot60AdRU,6QQ0Q35t00,i3-4
 2,6ApR197Z
Approved For Release 2001/63/04: CIA INPUT6-16
1969 STUDY SHOWS
WAR POLICY SPLIT
joint Chiefs Urged Renewed
Bombing but Other Units
Doubted Effectiveness
By TAD SZULC
Special to The NOW York Times
WASHINGTON, April 25 -
Ellsworth Bunker, United States
Ambassador in Saigon, pre-
dicted in . a White House study I
on Vietnam policy at the out-
set of the Nixon Administration
that North Vietnam's military
prospects were so bleak that
Hanoi would "make significant
1concessions" at the Paris peace
negotiations.
i
0
f St
he Jo
nt
a11, "'j' "-?.... '""to obtain the best conditions,
111" o
the same study, unsuccessfully; basis for National Security ?
urged the President to resume Study Memorandum No. 1. we think the prospects on the
at once the bombing campaign Summary Published ground are bleak enough for
Defense is a 'term used to d e -
against the southern art of A summary of the memoran- them so that they will, in the j
g part snake significant conces- scribe Melvin K. Laird, the See-
North Vietnam, which had been dub relating the agreements is (in terms' of their own] retary, and his personal staff.
halted late in 1968 by the John- and disagreements within the io withdrawal) to get us out. The study thus suggested a con-
Administration, was, published
son Administration. this morning in The Washington. The National Security Study flict between Secretary Laird
The full text of the study, Post. Details of the study were Memorandum No. 1, which con- and the uniformed Joint Chiefs
known as National Security also published in this eek's sists of 548 pages, was the first of Staff-
Study issue of Newsweek ma off nearly 150 studies that have While the systematic bomb-
Study Memorandum No. 1 and< gazine? been conducted during the ing of North Vietnam was
classified "secret," was ob- The full text emphasized the Nixon Administration under the halted in November, 1968,
tamed by The New York TimesC depth sens}on and the among extent the of the agencies. direction of Mr. Kissinger. Each under the "understanding" that
'today. Its disclosure came aslOne such disclosure was that of the huge memorandums has led Paris to the peace new talks, United nited of the
States
the North Vietnamese were. the Joint Chiefs made a strong, examined the implications of a ,Paris including E.52 bomb-
such foreign-policy question, b
pressing a,large-scale offensive plea for new bombings in the
face of criticism of the earlierjuch as the relations of the: ers, continued raiding the Laos
M. South Vietnam arid after the U red States with the Com-I infiltration trails.
President had ordered a re- oiair operations by the Central oil Market, or with the white This is why critics of the Stat Hewed bombing effort against . Intp Department and Agency, the the civilian regimes of Southern Africa. current bombing of North Viet-
North Vietnam. , I office of the Secretary of Accord and Discord ; nam, related to is new
In the study, which was cob Defense, offensive, believe that that the con-
Although all the memoran- clusions reached by a majority
piled early in 1969, the Joint. The text of the study also dums ? are classified as secret, of the Government agencies in
Chiefs said they believed that aishowed the following: the nature of the first study, 1969 remain timely.
gTltere was general agree- as an exhaustive review of the The State Department, reply-
determined and immediate to. ment among the Government Vietnam situation, has been ing to Senator Gravel's re-
sumptlon of the bombing "would agencies on the gradual im- previously published. marks, rejected today any at-
;Ussure almost total interdiction provement in the South Viet- The summary section of the, tempts to equate the pre-1969
of truck and water-borne move. namese armed forces. They Vietnam-policy study, - report- bombings with the present sit-,
ment of supplies into the de- concurred that Saigon's troops.edly drafted by Mr. Kissinger, uation.
militarized zone and : Laos." probably. could cope with an said that the responses "show The department's spokesman,'
They contended that the bomb- offensive mounted by Vietcong agreement on some matters as Charles W. Bray 3d, said that
iErtg had been effective. well as very substantial differ- "the analysis of the effect of
But most of the other Gov- forces, but not if they were ences of opinion within the bombings covers a situation at
!ernment agencies contributing substantially reinforced by a different time and different
U.S. Government," including "
'40 the study warned Mr. Nixon North Vietnamese army troops.: "sharpest differences" in inteci"What thesNorth Vietnamese
that the record of strategic and cIT'here was general agree-i,preting available data.
? tactical bombing in Indochina ;}gent that it was not out ofi! The summa said that the Army has now faced us with,"
weakness" that Hanoi agreed!1 n' he said, is something quite
over previous disagreements "are reflected in different from what was essen-
that an air strategy showed strategy had :failed to negotiate with the United. )two schools in the Government tially a small-scale and guer-
to achieve conclusive results. States in Paris. The State De-; with wit x generally consistent morn- rills warfare. In adopting much
^Excerpts from the full study, ea rrtmonteemphasized Soviet 4ef-' bershi'
f th
o
e earlier bombing or North Vietnam, were made public thiiss
~
i morning ~bf~k ft
Gravel, De
t
r
df2lf
1 a
t?i
The opening of today's Senate elective and carefully tuned t,nbassy in`.Saigon, "and takes a
session. =
The Republican leadership,)
however, blocked an attempt,
by Senator Gravel to place 50,
pages of the secret study in.
1sail ivll. - opefnl vle* ~'f icUr nfvartd fu-
9The C.I.A. cited the differ. aura prospects in Vietnam,"
ences in estimates of total eng The second school, it added
emy? strength between itselfPusually includes the office of
d
h
an
. t
e Defense intelligencelthe Secretary of Defense, the
Gravel said these documents agency, on the one hand, and C.I.A. and,-to a lesser extent,
demonstrated that ng entitfie Commander in Chief, Pa- the State Department and "is
Nixon "is today pursuing a Icific, Adm. John F. McCain Jr.,, decidedly moral more skeptical about
policy which he knows will not' in Saigon on the other. The! about the present and pessimistic
the future.
work, but which is intended C.I.A. warned that these differ-I
solely to enable him to save, ,. On the question of bombing
ences may become of major]
f
a'litil i
The recommendations and pocamportance if develop-
conclusions by military, into,-;menu in Paris should lead to
t
h
filtration trails and North Viet-
nam, the summary said that the
an greme
on t
e phased, ligence and foreign affairs) withdrawal of North Vhasec I United States command in Sai-
a
agencies and bureaus of the mese troops, which intelligence) St ff aond theeone Joint land the
Government contained in the might be required to confirm' State Department, the C.hA;
study were in response to 28 or monitor." and the office of the Secretary.
questions submitted to them cThe United States Embassy of Defense on the other, "fun-
Jan. 21, 1969, the day after in Saigon, in a report signed by Idamentally disagree over wheth-
President Nixon's inauguration, Ambassador Bunker, predicted er our bombing campaign either
by Henry A. Kissinger, the that "once Hanoi is convinced; prior to or after November
White House adviser for na- that the new Administration is i(1968) has .reduced the enemy's
tional security. . not going to 'quit' in Vietnamlthroughput of supplies so. that
Mr. Nixon had asked Mr. Kis- or give the game away forlthe enemy in South Vietnam,
from singer the for the effects of study, the bombranging free" at the Paris talks, "we:receives less than he needs
-
ing to Hanoi's motives in agree- would expect renewal of 'serf- there.'
Saigon co
It said that
pe
ch
ing to the Paris peace ous' talks."
tions the previous year. Thei m and the ucce "feel the
The embassy report said that, bombing mbing has succeeded, while
detailed responses, received while North Vietnam would try i
h
C
A
1963, and said that "the Rus-' ,y ,11~1uuGa UIt J1111it,aiv naalaL-
Iance Command, Vietnam; Corn-
skins. can us y r n rr~{~i~t~ }tffry6p ~
1
EAa~l;l tfi
ez'tI
'
"s
'
the State Department, t
e
..
and the Secretary of Defense's
office "think it has failed."
The office of the Secretary of
03003 .007 .4 ----
 NNTT
%H...., TN N
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 iClAfaR:[ b0-160T'f R0
. Excerpt I s From 1969 National
It is generally agreed that a feasible
method for analyzing Arc Light effec-
tiveness has not yet been devised. Field
commanders are lavish in their praise.
COMUSMACV recently stated that Arc
Light was his strategic reserve and had
the equivalent combat punch of two di-
visions. No one has been able to quan-
titatively support such claims (or dis-
prove them). I-lard evidence on the ef-
fectiveness of the Arc Light program is
difficult to find. Certainly some strikes
are highly effective. Some are clearly
wasted. The majority have an undeter-
mined impact,
The J.C.S. estimate that 41,250 enemy
were killed in 1968 by all in-country
B-52 strikes. This is an average of 2.5
enemy killed per sortie.
Office of the Secretary of Defense
estimates of enemy killed by Arc Light
are much lower than those of the J.C.S.
.If this average enemy casualty rate
is extrapolated to include all 13-52
strikes, Are Light apparently has killed
of Vietnam War Requested by Nixon.
nPectdr to Ths New York Times
WASHINGTON, April 25-Following are excerpts from National
Security Study Memorandum 1, the 548-page study of the Vietnam war
ordered by Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's adviser on national
:security, at the request of the President on Jan. 21, 1969. The document
was made available to The New York Times, which supplied the head-
ings that appear on the excerpts.
Bombing of North Vietnam
$270-million in 1965, $455-million in
1966 and $650-million in 1967. With the
Almost four years of air war in North restricted bombings of the heavily de-
Vietnam have shown-as did the Korean fended northern part of the country in
war-that, although air strikes will de- 1968, military aid deliveries were re-
stroy transport facilities, equipment and duced. At least 75 per cent of total mili-
tary aid since 1965 has been for air de-
supplies, they cannot successfully inter- fense.
diet the flow of supplies because much North Vietnam's air defenses signifi--
of the damage can frequently be repaired cantly reduced the effectveness of the
within hours. U. S. bombing, resulted directly or in-
The major effects of the bombing of directly in the loss of almost 1,100 U. S.
North Vietnam were extensive damage aircraft and provided a psychological
to the transport ? network, widespread boost to, morale. Before 1965, the Soviet
economic disruption, greatly increased Union had provided North Vietnam with
manpower requirements and the prob. only ground forces equipment, transport
lems of maintaining the morale of the and trainer aircraft and small naval
'people in the face of personal hardships patrol craft, while China had provided
and deprivation. Hanoi was able to cope M1G-15/17 jet fighters, motor gunboats
effectively with each of these strains, and ground forces equipment. Since'
so that the air war did not seriously early 1965, the U.S.S.R. has provided
affect the flow of men and supplies to North Vietnam with most of its air de=
Communist forces in Laos and South fense systems, including surface-to-air
Vietnam. Nor did it significantly erode missiles, jet fighters, a radar network
North Vietnam's military defense capa- and antiaircraft artillery. Chinese mili-
bility or Hanoi's determination to per- tary aid since 1965, much smaller than
sist in the war. Material losses resulting that from the U.S.S.R., has been impor
from the bombing were, for the most tant primarily in building up North Viet-
part, offset by increased imports from nam's ground forces including equip
Communist countries. ping Communist ground forces in South
Communist military and economic aid
to North Vietnam to a large extent off-
set the physical destruction and the dis-
ruptive effects of the U.S. bombing and
were instrumental in maintaining the
morale of the people. Communist coun-
tries provided all of the weapons;
enough food, consumer goods and mate-
rials to compensate for the domestic
output, and most of the equipment and
materials to maintain the transport sys-
tem. Without Communist aid, most of it
from the Soviet Union and China-par-
ticularly given the pressures generated
by the bombing-the Vietnamese Com-
munists would have been unable to sus-
tain the war in both South and North
Vietnam on anything like the levels ac-
tually engaged in during the past three
years.
The amount of Communist economic
aid delivered annually has grown from
a yearly average of less than $100-mil-
Vietnam with the AK-47 assault rifle, the
107-rim. rocket and other new weapons.
All of the war-essential imports could
be brought into North Vietnam over rail
lines or roads from China in the event
that imports by sea were successfully
denied. The disruption to imports, if sea-
borne imports were cut off, would be
widespread but temporary. Within two
or three months North Vietnam and its
allies would be able to implement alter-
native procedures for maintaining the
flow of essential economic and military
imports. The uninterrupted capacities of
the railroad, highway and river connec-
tions with China are about 16,000 tons
per day, more than two and a half times
the 6,300 tons per day of total imports
ecurity?$;dy
Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that"
resumption of an interdiction campaign
similar to that carried out in Route
Package I between July and 1 Novem-
ber 1968 would assure almost total inter-
diction of truck and waterborne move-'
ment of supplies into the demilitarized
zone and Laos. Naval blockade offshore
and interdiction of Region Package II to'
Thanhhoa would further enhance this ef-
fort.
Commitment of B-52 forces following
heavy and unrestricted suppression of
defenses by fighters, could reduce the
amount of time to accomplish the above.
There is not sufficient data available
at this time on either the cost or the
effectiveness of an air campaign against
these land lines to reach a firm conclu-
sion as to the chances of isolating NVN
from her neighbors. Past. attempts to
cut rail, road and water networks in
NVN have met with considerable diffi-
culties. It has been estimated that a
minimum of 6,000 attack sorties per
month would be required against the
two rail lines from China. Even at this
level of effort, the North Vietnamese
could continue to use the rail lines to
shuttle supplies if they were willing td
devote sufficient manpower to repair
and transshipment operations.
It is not possible to give a definitive
amount to the question of how much
war-essential imports could come into
NVN if' sea imports are. denied and a
lion through 1964, to $150-million in capacity of over 9,000 tons a day. Eight strong air campaign is initiated. ,
1965, $275-million in 1966, $370-million ~ primary highway routes cross the China The act of sealing off the enemy's
in 1967 an d,, $460 million it 196g,_,Tl e er,,4 bin c %5A Cambodian su U18 lines must be con-
value of G6!?iProtV trio AXQ1ei t , Wf l da -l 0-0i1,601a R GO 3f0073.4Plan
creased'from an average of less than the Red River flows out of China and to prevent supplies from reaching en-
$15-million a near during 1954-64 to, has a capacity averaging 1,500 tons per emv forces in the Republic of Vietnam... c:?:
overland and by sea in 1963, when the
volume reached an all-time high.
Two principal rail lines connect Hanoi
with Communist China, with a combined
 approximately 17,000 enemy sine 1965 deter Hanoi from political-and military
(3.9 pe rbtaedeIoy asle 280 /0>3 0h> CvlA,5--RE) R~1J-~t16 R00030035 073-4 ,
Will cans ,000 deaths in 1969, theory, there was an 'upper limit to . ? ?
'North Vietnam's capacity simultaneous=` Enemy, c~pC? bi11t1 s
State Department ly to continue the defense of the North State and the big-unit war in the South. The: Department
There'was a good deal more evidence bombing undoubtedly pushed Hanoi' Should the Communists decide to risk
on the nature of the strain produced closer to that limit, but it was not pos-. heavy losses, the capability
by the bombing than on their signifi- sibie to determine precisely (1) where Y have the cance. U.S. intelligence indications, in. the limit lay and (2) how far from it to launch large-scale offensives es in one
l
. e
uding, inter alia, the observations of Hanoi was at.any given time. Hanoi's
travelers to North Vietnam, the opin-
ions of the Hanoi diplomatic commu- decisions to change from protracted war
pity (notably the Canadians and Brit- to the Tet offensive and then to nego-
ish), North Vietnamese public radio tiations may be seen as indications it
broadcasts, aerial photography and the was viously approaching that limit, but it reserve
reserve
testimony of NVN P.O.W.'s In South capucity a at still h that had time.
Vietnam, of fishermen captured off the capac.
coast of North Vietnam and of the
Spanish repatriates-all underscored the Glossary
fact that the U.S. bombing was a mat- ARC LIGHT-Code name for B?52 bombing
ter of concern to the North. This evi- C.I.A.-Central Intelligence Agencyy
dence indicated that it was clearly hav- CINCPAC-Commander in Chief, Pacific
lag an impact and was generating C M~ itary Assistance command,1V etnamtes'
strains throughout North Vietnam: The I).I.A.--Defense Intelligence Agency
(bombing is estimated to have caused DMZ-Demilitarized zone.
n'GUN-Government of South Vietnam
North Vietnam economic and milita
losses totaling Chiefs of Staff
g just under $500-million. N.V,A.-North Vietnamese Army
In addition, there were many additional N.L.F.=--National Liberation Front (Vietcong)
losses that could not, in the intelligence' NVN-North Vietnam
RVNAF-Republic of (South) Vietnam
community's opinion, be assigned any, armed forces
meaningful values. SVN-South Vietnam
Unfortunately, the available intelli- 'U.S./F.W.--United States/Free World forces
gence indicators were relatively silent;
about the significance of these strains,-'
he., about their cumulative ability to,
Withdrawal of U. S.' arc es
Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider
that the essential conditions for a ces-
sation of hostilities include an effective
cease-fire, verified withdrawal to North
Vietnam of all North Vietnamese per-
sonnel (including those in Laos and
Cambodia), verified cessation of infil-
tration, substantial reduction in terror-
ism, repatriation of U.S. prisoners,
agreement to re-establish the demili-
tarized zone with adequate safeguards,
no prohibition against U. S. assistance
to insure that the RVNAF is capable of
coping with the residual security threat
and preservation.of the sovereignty of
the GVN.
It may not be possible for negotia-
tions to achieve agreement in full on
,all of the essential conditions. However,
the degree to which the essential condi-
tions can be achieved as a result of
negotiations is crucial to the determina-
tion of whether "victory" has been
.achieved or a strong non-Communist.
political role assured.
Achievement of .the essential condi-
tions for cessation of hostilities is con-
tingent upon continuation of the U.S.
effort and improvement of the RVNAF.
It is inconceivable that the essential
conditions could be realized as a result
of an early unilateral reduction of U.S.
military effort.
Office of Secretary of Defense
There is a need within the U.S. Gov-
ernment for agreement on the' essential
conditions for a cessation of hostilities.
The following is a suggestive list of
criteria:
A. Restoration of the demilitarized
zone defined in terms of the 1954 Gen-
eva accords,
B. Mutual withdrawal of forces in ac-
cordance with the Manila communique
and as security conditions permit. The
required security conditions are: (I) re-
spect for the DMZ; (2) no attacks on
the major cities; (3) no infiltration to
replace troops withdrawn; (4) no at-
tacks on units which have been desig-
nated by either side to the other for
withdrawal and which are in the process
of withdrawal.
C. Withdrawals include: (1) all North
Vietnamese forces whether or not they
are fighting in North Vietnam's units to
include regroupees; and (2) the with-
drawal of North Vietnamese troops In
D. An agreement on Inspection and
verification machinery. We would be
prepared. to rely upon our unilateral
means of surveillance.
E. Release of all U.S./F.W. personnel
held by the MVN/M.F.
C.I.A.
The difference in estimates_tof total
enemy strength between the C.I.A. and
D.I.A. on the one hand and CINCPAC/
MACV on the other) may become of
major political importance if develop-
ments in Paris should lead to an agree-
ment on the phased withdrawal of NVA
troops which intelligence might be re-
ouired to confirm or monitor.
or more parts of the country, particu-
larly in III Corps. These offensives.
could include ground assaults or attacks.
'by fire against any number of second
ary provincial centers and allied instal-
lations, a general heightening of minor
actions and harassment throughout the
country, and/or a strong counter effort
against the pacification campaign,;.
'T'here may also be some "dramatic:"
incidents, involving perhaps the infil-
tration of sapper units and some com-
bat squads into Saigon or (> ner major
urban areas, the brief seizing of a sec-
tion of a provincial capital and a dev-
astating attack against a model pacifi-
ci'~ion area or refugee centers. Such
military successes as might he achieved
would be only temporary and would not
approach the scale of Tot 1968. By a
careful choice of targets. and tactics,
the enemy might be able to hold down
his casualties; any major commitment
of troops, however, would cost him
dearly.
Joint Chiefs of Staff
The enemy retains a significant ca
pability to launch offensive actions in
South Vietnam (SVN) at times of his
own choosing and on a broad scale
within .the next six months. However,
it: is doubtful that he can successfully
"carry off a large-scale offensive and
achieve "dramatic" results -on a par
with the Tot offensive of last year.
...Again from a purely quantitative
standpoint, the enemy. could launch an
attack through' the demilitarized zone
(DMZ) with an equivalent strength of
two divisions, an attack against Danang
by the equivalent of about one division,
and an attack against Saigon with a
strength of up to four or five divisions.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (J.C.S.) be-'
lieve that the allies in SVN have the
forces and means to defeat an enemy
,offensive and that this is quite apparent
to the Communists.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000300350073-4
 rove
PP T F"or eTea ?A0N~ Z9*'h l R%-016A
? State Department participation unless the N.L.F, could
be negotiated into the picture.
Hanoi decided to negotiate for a num- Combined with these realizations
ber of reasons related to its estimate was a desire to reduce the scale of the
of the course of the war and its chances conflict, or at least to end the bombing.
for success. Mainly, it came more and North Vietnam was beginning to feel
more to realize that it could:. not win greater pressure toward the middle and
the conflict by continued military and latter part of 1967, as the bombing be.
international political pressure, and that came heavier. The Communist leader-
it would have to negotiate in order to ship also became worried that it was
make the American. forces leave. It also losing members of the important south-
sensed that the constitutional structure ern cadre element in its southern struc-
in South Vietnam, supported by the ture at a rate which, if continued over
South Vietnamese Army,' was develop- a long time, would leave the. Vietcong
ing a manner which might preclude unable to compete effectively in the
South. It wanted to open possibilities required evolution in their position will
for greater emphasis on political war- come slowly.
fare, and also to reduce the chance that
the U.S. might escalate further.
But Hanoi's concern About its pros-
pects for winning was not accompanied
.by any feeling that it had lost the war
and that it needed to surrender. On the
contrary, in fact, the Communist leaders
felt distinct. cause for pride because
North Vietnam and the Vietcong, even
with large amounts of Soviet and Chi-
nese aid, had resisted U. S. military
pressure for several.years'and had not
been beaten. They also believed that
U.S. public opinion was bginning to tire
,of the war, and they believed that elec-
`'tion year politics in the United States
offered them an opportunity to profit
from this attitude. Although the elecion
is now over, the Hanoi leaders continue
to believe that public pressure will force
the U. S. Government to end the war.
One reason Hanoi is negotiating is
because it believes that we will have to
look for compromise formulas in the
talks, and that its own intransigence,
cotfpled with continued military initia-
tives, will add to public pressures on
the Administration to make such com-
promises.
However, the North Vietnamese lead-
ership recognizes that such a settlement
will not be. easy to obtain, and that it
may take some time before the U. S.
is prepared to grant terms which the
Communists now consider acceptable.
The leadership therefore hopes to con-
tinue to exert military and political
.pressure against us, and particularly
against the South Vietnamese Govern-
ment, in order to force or persuade us
to accept Communist terms. At the
`same time, the leadership recognizes
that its own southern structure may
suffer further under continued warfare.
Thus the Communists are negotiating
under pressure, just as they think we
are negotiating under pressure. Some
of the same pressures which drove them
to negotiate will also drive them to
modify their own terms and conditions
over time. The Communists will want
to pick the best possible moment for
compromise, when we have yielded on
the things which they consider vital but
before they themselves have had to
give up anything of critical importance.
This will require delicate and sensitive
timing. It is thus not correct to say that
the Communists are not negotiating
"seriously." They are negotiating seri-
ously, in the sense that negotiations
Although there is strong evidence of
constructive Soviet effort over this pe-
riod, one must balance this appraisal
with the observation that the North
Vietnamese may at times have employed
the Soviets as intermediaries to convey
positions upon which they had already
decided themselves, so that they would
not have to "lose face" by making the
concessions directly to us.
Even with this caveat, however, the
record would appear to support the con-
clusion that since May, 1968, the So-
viets have employed their influence
over Hanoi in a generally constructive
direction both as to' tithing and sub-
stance. From all Indications they will
continue to stake out tough Hanoi bar-
gaining positions, to explore U.S. think-
ing and, whenever they consider it war-
ranted, to utilize their leverage upgn
Hanoi in measured, highly selective and
carefully timed fashion. ??
Military Community
(Including the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the American command In Saigon.)
As far as our knowledge of how
Hanoi thinks and feels, we see through
the glass darkly if at all.
Nothwithstanding, all echelons gefi-
erally agree that the preponderance of
evidence indicates that North Vietnam
is in Paris because of a decision that
it would be less costly to get the bomb-
ing stopped and to negotiate the U.S.
out of South Vietnam (SVN) than to
continue fighting for another 5 to 10
years.
On the basis of intelligence derived
from analysis of Hanoi's known diplo-
matic relations with China and the So-
viet Union; reports from third-country
diplomats; and continuing study of pub-
lic and private statements by officials
of the three countries, there does not
appear to be significant pressure by
Moscow or Peking on North Vietnam.
tinue their efforts, public and private, withdraw. Significant improvement to
to influence North Vietnamese decisions RVNAF is limited because of constraints
in Paris and in the conduct of the war. . of the present military and political Sys.
At best, the Chinese probably hope to tems. RVNAF must take major political
impress on Hanoi that any Paris settle- and military action, some of which are
ment will not alter China's support for not now under way, to become an ef-
wars of national liberation throughout fective force in the near future. D.O.S.
Southeast Asia, while the Soviets pre- is inclined towards this view.
3jdramese
orces
State Department.
Assuming that all U.S. forces and all
NVA forces-fillers as well as organized
units but not regroupees-were with-
drawn from South Vietnam, the
RVNAF alone should be able to cope
with the remaining Vietcong. As the
RVNAF modernization and improvement
program advances, the ability of the
Government forces to make inroads into
the VC military-political apparatus and
to reduce the level of the insurgency
will be enhanced. Even spokesmen for
the other side (e.g.,- Tran Buu Klein
and Wilfred Burchett) have recently
made reference to their concern for the
fate of the Vietcong if the North Viet-
namese troops were pulled out.
If NVA regular units were withdrawn
but NVA personnel remained in Viet-
cong units as fillers, the relative balance,
would be more difficult to assess. Under
these circumstances it would probably
be necessary to provide the RVNAF
with sufficient U.S. combat support to
make up for its deficiencies until the
entire modernization and self-suffi-
ciency program were completed.
Under current and foreseeable cirpum-
stances, it will probably take a minimum
of two years before structural and tech-
nical reforms can make any substantial
contribution toward RVNAF fighting ef-
fectiveness. Themore critical deficiencies
-- motivation, discipline and leadership
-- are essentially deeper and longer-
term problems, some arising out of com-
plex socio-political traditions and others
greatly dependent on the prevailing poli-
tical and military environment. A clear-
ly accelerating favorable military trend
highlighted by ARVN battlefield suc-
cesses could have considerable effect on
RVNAF motivation and morale. A stable
political situation, and particularly one
in which the top military leadership is
united'and securie, would favorably af-
fect discipline and lower-level leader-
ship.
Military Community .
RVNAF is making fairly rapid strides
in improvement and effectiveness and
the prognosis for a self-sufficient force
designed to hold its own against an in-
ternal threat is good. RVNAF will con-
tinue to overcome its recognized en-
demic problems such as lack of leader-
ship, difficulties with the population,
etc. The J.C.S. CINCPAC and COMUZ-
MACV are inclined towards this view.
RVNAF is making only limited prog-
ress due primarily to recent inputs of
U.S. resources, to U.S. combat activity
iUi strategy, Approv Silni or F~i ielaset the hop
rn i 01601 R000300350073-4
see the war end by a negotiated settle- achieve a breakthrough in the pegotia- i
meat favorable. to themselves. But the tions.
 'Without major reforms within the
RVNAF command and selections stem,
'howeveA oyl Fi tRe 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000300350073-4
as presen l organized and led will ever
constitute an effective political or mili-
tary counter to the Vietcong. Moreover,
as the Government of Vietnam's (GVN)
major presence in the countryside, the
RVNAF as presently constituted will
only continue to widen the gap which
exists between the Government and the
rural population. Thus, any program of
priority changes must have as its pri-
mary purpose the provision of an inter-
val during which maximum pressure can
be exerted in the GVN to make the
necessary organizational and political
changes commensurate with the as-
sumption of a larger role in the political
struggle and the,war.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000300350073-4
 POST
? Siri.
Approved For Release 2001/03/0: Jp~-P80-01601
STATI NTL
arfare: DeeiqMi1ied Han
Aleino Found Foe Stronger in '69 Than '65
By Michael Getler to suggest that these hard- Pentagon cites military esti Bray was also asked if he
Washington Post staff writer ships reduced to a critical. mates of about 95 tons of thought another critical
The Military situation in level North Vietnam's will- supplies destroyed each day judgment made in the 1969
Vietnam outlined to Presi- ingn`ess or resolve to con on the trail between Novem- survey "holds true today":
- the assessment that "all
dent Nixon by his top mill- her 1968 and the conclusion
tary and civ' fan advisers tinue the conflict. On the of the study. agencies agree that South
? contrary, the bombing ac- ,~ Vietnam's armed forces
early in 199 included a Pen- tually may have hardened But, they add, while this could not, either now or
tagon assessment that Hanoi the attitude of the people is impressive, it is not really even when fully modern
could continue to sustain and rallied them behind the what counts. The critical ized, handle both the Viet-
very heavy troop losses for government's programs." factor is the amount that cong and a sizeable level of
"at least the next several Ironically, the report says reaches South Vietnam ... North Vietnamese Army
years" in its war against the ,there is some evidence ? , and since we have no con. forces without U.S. combat
South. trol over imports to North
indicating that morale and Vietnam or inputs to Laos, support in the form of air,
also
that included in assess-
massive U.S. support
has the
declined s onif? it appears that the enemy tics co atnds, someeryg ound
Vietnam for
" can continue to push suffi- f
?
e
orc
s
h d
N
ort
V AULLnammmuring 1965- halt" in November, 1Jtiii. to South Vietnam in spite of
68, while inflicting a consid- It is also noted, however, relatively heavy losses in-
erable toll on the North, that "whatever their feel- flicted by air attacks."
may have actually stiffened ings about the war, the peo- It is not known whether
the enemy's will and even ple of North Vietnam have those 1969 assessments are
its capacity to pursue the lacked either the will or the applicable to the Nixon ad-
fight. means to make any dissatis- ministration and the current
The Pentagon's civilian faction evident." bombing in response to I)a-
hierarchy was joined, in this Asked for their views on noi's invasion across the
% critical judgment by the the effects of the bombing DMZ. But they are becom-
Central Intelligence Agency. on North Vietnam's econ- ing an issue between the
The views of these agen- omy, the Pentagon replied President and his critics on
ties-as well as contrary as- that "while air strikes de- U.S. war policy. '
sessments offered by top stroyed about $770 million Yesterday, Sen. Mike-
U.S. military commanders in r, 1
D
Al
f
}
d
Washington, Honolulu . and
Saigon-rare contained in
the responses of -various
arms of government to a
government survey on Viet-
nam conducted by the Nixon
administration immediately
after taking office.
Yesterday, The Washing-
ton Post published a sum-
mary of the survey carried
out by the President's Na-'
tional Security Council. Ad-
ditional documents that pro-
vide more detail about the
specific views of the mili-
tary, CIA, State and De-
clearer idea when the of-
fensive ends . . . the South
Vietnamese are better
equipped and better able to.
acquit themselves well on
the battlefield now than at
that (earlier) time ... that
has been the whole purpose
of Vietnamization," includ-
ing the withdrawal of Amer-
'scan ground forces.
There is no plan, however;
to withdraw all American
air forces from Thailand
and- Guam or naval forces
from offshores.
Wide Differences Noted
As the summary to the
huge NSC survey pointed
out, the views among the
Vietnam specialists within,
the Federal bureaucracy
were "profoundly different"
on many key points.
The debate was particu-
were "fair or accurate criti- larly sharp between the
cism." Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
The earlier analysis of the U.S. Pacific fleet command
effects of the bombing, he and the military command
said, "covers a situation at a in Saigon, on the one hand,
different time and
d
d th
Offi
f
h
. un
er an
e
ce o
e Secre-
t
Tense Departments have also
road and rail repair and different circumstances. 'tary of Defense, CIA and
been made available. 110,000 soldiers for air de- What the North Vietnamese the State Department on the
"The bombing undoubt- fense, the report states that Army has now faced us with other, over the success of
edly had adverse effects on "the enemy has access to is something quite different the U.S. bombing campaign.
the people of North' Viet- sufficient manpower to meet from what was essentially In its entirety, the re-
nam," the Pentagon re- his replenishment needs for small scale or guerrilla war- ' sponsd of these groups to
sponse says. "Individual citi- at least the next several fare. In adopting tactics the .White House questions
zees suffered many hard- years, even at the high 1968 which are more conven early in 1969 provides proba-
ships ... food was rationed (annual) loss rate of about
consumer goods were 291,000" men.
scarce ... air raid warnings Hanoi's eligible manpower
disrupted lives and forced pool was put at 1.8 million
many to leave their homes, men, though combat losses
Moreover, the report states, in the South had caused ex-
it has. been estimated that pansion of the eligible draft
tional ... much larger ... bly the most thorough de-
units including tanks and bates over the effectiveness
heavy artillery, they offer of air power in specific mili-
individual targets which tart' situations since the con-
were rarely, if ever, availa- troversy over the World
ble in earlier years . , , War II strategic bombing.
They have made themselves survey.
approximately 52,000 civil-. age and sending men South more heavily dependent on On the use of the B-52s-
fans were killed in N ~i with less training than logistical and resupply fact - which have now for the first
rvsPiC'; -
Vietnam b~ P 9r bhr leas (20.01/03/) 4ita?IA RDR8O-Eph1~641RGOQ3Q0i OO3 4tar
1tiZ ~f ec iveness o ture, more accessible to re- gets deep inside North Viet-
"Still," the document con- U.S. bombing against the Ho taliation froip the air." nam-the Pentagon analysis
tinues, "there is no evidence Chi Minh Trail in Laos, the
-
as
a, attempte
worth o
capital stock, mill- rave (
tary facilities and current to enter the NSC document
production, 'North Vietnam into the public record on the
received about $3 billion Senate floor, charging that
worth of economic and mili- the bombing policy which he
tary aid from Communist-. said had been proven wrong
bloc countries. in 1969 was now being rein
"Thus, in terms of total stated.
to comment on
economic and military re-
sources available to suppor t Gravel's charges, State De-
the war," the document partinent spokesman
Charles W. Bray III said he
states, "North Vietnam is didn't think such charges
better off today (early 1969)
than it was in 1965."
Even though the bombing
of the North drained off
roughly one-half million
 Approved For Release 2001/03/64: UPAMIOND-01
By Jack Anderson
Government strategists in
1969 delivered a unanimous
warning to incoming Presi-
dent Nixon that South Viet-
nam's armed' forces would be
no match for North Vietnam-
ese-Viet Cong forces "in the
foreseeable future," that the
pacification program showed
no promise of "complete suc-
cess" for "several years," and
that the Saigon government
might not "survive a peaceful.
competition with the (Commu-
nists) for political power in
South Vietnam."
This gloomy outiook, con-
tained in a secret, two-inch-
thick review known as Na-
tional Security Study Memo-
randum 1, has changed only in
degree during the past three
years.
The President's response
has been to do his best to bol-
ster Saigon while extricating
the U.S. from the tragic Viet-
nam war. He has been deter-
mined, however, to end the
cgmpiled by foreign, policy
czar Henry Kissinger. He sent
eight pages of pointed, pene-
trating questions to all the
government agencies involved
in the war effort.
Their answers showed con-
siderable confusion over what
was happening in Vietnam.
The U.S. embassy and military
command in Saigon, joined by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, gen-
erally took a rosy view. The
Defense Secretariat, Central
Intelligence Agency and State
Department were more skepti-
cal.
Saigon Doomed
Here are highlights from
the exhaustive study:
reed that
t
i
s ag
All the exper
amese armed the U.S. high command found
t
h Vi
e
n
the Sout
forces, "in the foreseeable fu- that Saigon controlled "three-
ture," couldn't fight off the fourths of , the population."
Vietcong and North Vietnam- The Joint Chiefs expected thisI
ese "without U.S. combat sup- to rise to 90 per cent by the
port in the form of air, heli- end of 1969.
copters, artillery, logistics and Their figures were disputed,
some ground forces." however, by the Defense Sec-
The toughest estimate, sur- retary's office, which sug-
prisingly, came from the De- gested "at least 50 per cent of
lense Secretary's office, which the total rural population is
predicted bluntly: "It is un- subject to significant VC pres-
likely that the (South Viet- sure and influence."
namese, as presently organ-
ized Victory
and led, will ever consti- No tute an effective political or South Vietnamese politics,
military counter to the Viet- according to the study, were
cong." plagued with "pragmatism, ex-
The South Vietnamese pediency, war weariness, a de-
ore fes, with an annual deser- sire to remain unaligned and
tion rate of 34 per cent, were end up on the winning side,"
American involvement witbl dignity. In, his private convey-
sations, he has repeated that
he' won't let the U.S. he
"pushed around,'! "degraded"
or was the reason he
struck back with such fury
from the air after the North
Vietnamese assault, across the
Demilitarized Zone.
The secret 1969 study, known simply as NSSM-1 In-
side the White House, was -1vation, leadership and deser-
were "equivalent to losing one No U.S. agency would fore'
ARVN division per month." cast a "victory" over the Comm
Nevertheless, the majority munists, but the military stii1
view was that Saigon was stressed "the need for contin
making "reasonable progress" ued U.S. support."
toward building a force "able There was general agree
to hold Its own against an in- ment that "the. enemy has
ternal VC threat." been able during the last four
Disagreeing, the Defense years to double his combat
ecretary's office doubted forces, double the level of in-,
"that current expansion and filtration and increase they
re-equipment programs are scale and intensity of the main`
sufficient to make (the South force war even while bearing:
Vietnamese) into an effective heavy casualties."
fighting force." It was also agreed that the,
Although the pacification Communists were recruiting;
program couldn't "promise and infiltrating troops faster,
d off
kill
ld b
e
e
anything close to complete than they cou
success'within several years," The enemy expansion of'.
300,000 new men ? each year,
the study noted, "requires that?
the allies inflict losses of;
25,000' KIA (killed in action,
per month, or 7,000 more than:
the current rate."
The Saigon embassy's evalu
ators suggested that "the VC,
are husbanding their re-
sources to give themselves thj
option of a 'climaxing' offen
sive."
The State Department fore
saw in 1.969 what has now hap-
pened. "The Communists,'
sal State, :'may feel that a
demonstrably strong blow
against the pacification Pro-
gram would have wide reper
cussions particularly at a time.
of optimistic allied ? claims.
about pacification successes."
Q1 1972, United Feature syndlcetS
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000300350073-4
The Washington Merry-4o fouUa>t
STATINT
'69 Stud `Fold of Sai'on':Weakness e
I i tion problems." The total de- i bility and clandestine activi.
 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R
SI:~n7~7J.,'.7':. V
2 6 APR 1972STATINTL
oviet -tole
npioma -by: al S, r
ono Cites VC A Pins Aid, 1help on Talks
By Murrey Marder ade on Haiphong harbor, or not clear is whether It was voys,' Thus, the euphemistic
otherwise cutting the Soviet necessary for them to bring term "understandings"
was
Staff Writer
r'^ Naahington Post supply line to North Viet- pressure on the North Viet- used.
The Soviet Union gave nam. namese to bring about a Defense Secretary Melvin
help at "several critical : There is one outstanding compramise:' R. Laird testified last week
points" in launching tire difference in the interna The State Department that. the language of the
;Paris peace talks on Vict- tional alignment, however. said that North Vietnam, re "understandings" was ac
Dam in 1.968-69, but simulta- in 1969, American and taming "firm control over tually, "negotiated" with the
neously plagued the Nixon its own war. strategy," may Communists in ? the secret
administration by supplying Chinese relations were in a "at times have employed the
The bulk of North Vietnam's state of total hostility. China 1968 meetings In Paris.
Soviets as intermediaries to The .1969 NSC study re-
sophisticated weapons. was adamantly opposed to convey positions upon which veals, "With the beginning
That dual Soviet role in any negotiations to end the they had already decided of the Paris talks last May,
-the Vietnamese war is offi- war in Vietnam, and many themselves, so that they the Soviets began anew and
cially confirmed for the first U.S. strategists concluded would not have, to `lose face' decidedly more assertive
time in the National Secu- that even if the United by making the concessions phase of their diplomacy.
rity Council . study of the States did risk the interna-
war, directly to us." "Ambassador Zorin (Val-,-
in
completed in early tional consequences of inter- erian Zarin, then rin 1969: dieting all Soviet supplies Even so, the report dor in Paris) and Minister
This review reports more for the war, North Vietnam said from May 1968 to the (Valentin) Oberemko were
could fight on by relying date the study was corn- authorized by 14'loscow to act
represent-
disclosure than any other mainly on Chinese supplies pleted, State concluded that as primary Soviet represent-
Union pthat Soviet to continue "protracted war- the Sovites "employed their atives with respect to the
Union participated , in ]7ri ? influence over Hanoi is gen. talks. At several critical
late vate 1968 negotiations in Paris in faToday, it is the Nixon ad-' orally constructive direction points during' the ensuinb,
disputed "undderstandings" ministration's assessment both. as to timing and sub. months one or both of them
"understandings" the
that China's self-interest, ex- stance." The report said So intervened constructively,
for he alt Johnson ithe bombing of amplified by the President's oft trough Hanobar ai ng acting under both general
f breaking, talks in Pe- g guidelines and explicit in-
North Vietnam. ? ground positions, to explore U.S. structions from Moscow.
The Russian interinedi- king in February, and U.S. thinking" or when Moscow "Thus, it was Zorin who-
arics were Ambassador Val- troop withdrawals from wished, it utilized its "lever- elaborated on the two-phase,
erian Zorin, and the minis- South Vietnam, have helped age? with Hanoi in "highly concept for stopping the
ter of the Soviet Embassy in induce the Chinese to dilute selective" fashion. bombing without any osten
Paris, Valentin Oberemko, their on final commitment "In dealing with the sidle reciprocal action by
the study shows. North Viet- to prolonging the Vietnam -
nam repeatedly, Vietnamese," the Hanoi, and indicated Hanoi
.the
has denied ese conflict.
there were any understand- North Vietnam, however, State Department section of might receptive to such
an anpt?o ach.
ings" and has insisted the granted no "veto power" ei- the report said, "the Soviets "When on Oct. 11 A he
bombing halt was "unton- ther to the Russians or to have experienced the full. North Vietnese' for the first
ditional." the Chinese over Ilanoi's de degree of Hanoi's ideologi- time gave a clear indication
This dispute has , re- cisions in the war, all U.S. cal rigidity and distrust of they would accept the GVN'
bounded into the headlines intelligence experts agreed the West, and on occasion (government of South Viet-
with the 6U.S. charge, and in the NSC study. The Con- (they have privately deplored nam) as a participant in the.
the North Vietnamese dc- tral Intelligence a g e n e ylexcessive North Vietnamese talks, the Soviets thought
nial, that the current Com- noted that Hanoi has bal- stubbornness." this move so important they;
munist offensive, launched anted; adroitly between its Specific illustrations of confirmed this position to us.,
March 30 across the Demili- two chief allies, and "in Soviet action in helping to on the following day.
tarized Zone dividing North competing for influence (in launch the ?aris talks ill "At several points during
and South Vietnam, is a Hanoi) Peking and Moscow 1968-69 were unofficially re- the culminating phase of'
"blatant violation of the tend to cancel out each ported in 1969-1970, and un- these difficult negotiation'
1968 "understandings." other." A critical question is officially acknowledged by the Soviets accepted our
There is a striking paral- whether that balance is the Russians. But, publicly, strong representations about
lel between the situation changeable now, with the the Soviet Union denied North Vietnamese intran-,
,that existed then acid the shifts of American-Chinese- that it had any involvement signence and appeared to,
news of today, illustrated by Soviet relationships since in one of the most impor- pass them along to Hanoi to
1969.- tant of those actions-the good effect.
the secret trip of presider- in a State Department as- disputed "understandings" "When the two sides were'.:
tial advisor Henry. A. Kissin sessment in the NSC report, that accompanied the halt in deadlocked on the issue of:
ger to Moscow last, weekend, dated Feb. 21, 1969 and the American bombing of what terminology to use in a
which was disclosed yester- signed by Secretary of State' North Vietnam on Nov. 1, secret minute-a demand'
day. ' William P. Rogers, he stated: 1968? later dropped by the DRV
Then and now, the United! stated: North Vietnam Insisted (North Vietnam)-the Sovi-
States was seeking coopcra- "We attribute more signif- that the bombing halt was ets put forward a formula
tion from the Soviet Union icance than does the Em "unconditional." In fact, tion which resolved the im
for ending the Vietnamese ~assy passe.
war. Then and now, or at , Igo (the Soviet Embassy in American officials said, the "When the talks on prate--
least up to the time of Kis- Saigon) to Soviet efforts to United for States seirit out thits e ducal arrangements were.
singer's visit to Moscow last be helpful in moving the ne- bterms ombing halt, and these deadlocked in January, the.
week, U S. strategists were o ations ahead, and we rl understood by Soviets suggested the for
consider ~lroDvdd F v'- F eieasev2OOLt/0t8t y;sW8Ot? M18000300350073-4
posing an air and sea block- did so is quite clear: W i
 Approved For Release 2001/03/0411' tir3P=01601 R000
26 APR 1972-
Nixon's .War
By way of prelude to almost every speech he has
ever made about the Vietnam war, President Nixon
has been at pains to remind us, just for the record,
of the terrible legacy he inherited- from the Demo-
crats: over half a million Americans in a combat
role; casualties running at the rate of more than
300 a week killed in action; no plan to "Vietnamize"
the war or to bring our military forces home. There
is some truth in this, of course; Mr. Nixon did fall
their to a heavy burden not of his making. But the
roots of involvement reached back into a Republi-
can administration of which he was a part. There
was also a plan to end the war which General Wil-
liam Westmoreland could have furnished the new
- lixon administration because he had laid it all out
as early as November, 1967. For better or worse,
"Vietnamization" was already in the official lexicon.
And far more important, the really big, tough de-
cisions had already been made by President Lyndon
Johnson when he refused in March of 1968 to go
on down the road of "graduated response," and de-
cided instead to end the bombing of the North and
to deny ,for the first time the next big commitment
of American troops. In short, the Johnson strategy
had failed by January, 1969, and the country had
begun to accept the real limits of a limited war.
cvs
That lesson was also part of Richard Nixon's
legacy if he had chosen to accept it. He was a free
agent,.In a way that his predecessor had never been,
and not just because he was a new President with
a-mandate- to end the war. He was a free man in
the most significant sense because he had inherited
not a bureaucratic monolith hell-bent on pursuit
of a discredited and unworkable policy, but a bu-
reaucracy divided; there were other voices saying
sensible and realistic things, other forces at work
in the big departments of government which were
there for the President to hear and to use in the
difficult business of turning the governmental ap-
paratus around on a new course. But President
Nixon did not listen to these voices and never told
us about them because he did not wish, for his own
reasons and out of his own geo-political concepts,
to abandon the old goals of our Vietnam mission.
He did not want to accept the hard consequences
of the lesson other men had learned. Those on the
outside could only guess at the division within the
government, only hear snatches of the argument,
only speculate about the depth of the carefully sup-
vealed in some detail in this newspaper on Tuesday.
They tell us little that is directly relevant to the
current situation. Rather, they describe an oppor-
tunity tragically lost. They tell us that by early 1969
only the very same people who had made most of
the miscalculations which carried us up to March
of 1968 with a big war and no solution still believed
that the war in Vietnam was winnable in any prac-
tical sense. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the mili-
tary command in Vietnam, and the diehards in the
Saigon embassy still believed this. But there was a
considerable body of opinion that believed other-
wise, that was prepared to support-and reinforce
a new, more realistic and more promising approach
to Vietnam. By and large, the Secretary of Defense
and the State Department and the CIA. believed:
That the North Vietnamese had the will and the
resources to carry on the war indefinitely against
unlimited bombing;
That the South Vietnamese showed little prospect
of ever being able to conduct their end of the tiyar
without extensive American military support in-
cluding the use of air power and combat troops;
That pacification wasn't working and showed
little hope of working over the long haul;
That B-52s were a doubtful asset except for close,
in tactical support of combat' operations;
That there was something to be said for promot-
Ing accommodations on the local level, in the dis-
tricts and villages and provinces, between the gov-
ernment people and the Viet Cong;
That neither this country's standing in the world
nor the fate of Southeast Asia, hinged on the out-
come of the Vietnamese struggle.
cwm
But Mr. Nixon ignored the best part of this coun-
sel and so here we are, having dropped more b9mbs
in the last three years than in all of the five years
of the Johnson administration and having suffered
more than one-third of all the American casualties
that have been suffered in this war-and sf111 with
no solution. So it is no longer enough-now that
we have seen the Kissinger Papers-to he told that
this is not Mr. Nixon's fault because he didn't lead
us into it. That's true; he didn't. But he had iin-
ning room in early 1969 - much more than we
knew. And because he didn't use it, Mr. Nixon can-
not be pictured any longer as the hapless prisoner
of past policy. The message from the Kissinger
Papers is plain. Just as the responsibility for the
early Vietnam involvement and the later build-up
may have been, progressively, Dwight D. Eisen-
hower's and John F. Kennedy's and Lyndon B.
Johnson's, what we are now confronted, with, for
better or worse, is Richard M. Nixon's war.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP80-01601 R000300350073-4
pressed reservations which were held by important
people in key agencies-until this week when the
hard evidence finally became available. That is the
.real and immensely profound significance of the
"Kissinger Papers," the. contents of which were re-