AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR AND MISSING IN ACTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (AS OF MAR. 11,1972)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01601R000300350072-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 72
• Publication Date: April 26, 1972
• Content Type: OPEN

STATINTL
fI 3562 Approved For ReL OS 1 AL'I ~QPg -01601 R000
pr2 , 1972
1700, a U.S. Army OH-6 helicopter on a vis-
ual' reconnaissance mission received enemy
ground fire, crashed and was destroyed 21
miles northeast of Saigon In Bien Hoa Prov-
ince. One U.S. was wounded in the action.
4. Yesterday morning at approximately
1000, a U.S. Air Force RF-4 while on an un-
armed reconnaissance mission over North
Vietnam, was fired upon by an ememy anti-
aircraft artillery site located in an area five
miles northwest of Dong Hoi In North Viet-
nam. U.S. Air Force F-4 escort aircraft con-
ducted a protective reaction attacking the
site with bombs. Results of the strike are un-
known. There was no damage to the U.S.
aircraft. (This is the 90th protective reaction
announced this year. Note: Protective re-
action #90 called out yesterday evening was
in error. This was a repeat of protective re-
action #89 which was reported in yesterday's
communique. The reason for this error was
a misreading of the target location coor-
dinates which made it appear as a separate
protective reaction very close to protective
reaction 089 in time and location.)
5. Yesterday, ships of the U.S. Seventh
Fleet reported firing at enemy targets lo-
cated in the southern half of the DMZ.
LAOS 6, Yesterday, U.S. aircraft, including U.S.
Air Force B-52's, continued air operations
along the He Chi Minh Trail In Laos, In addi-
tion, U.S. aircraft flew combat missions in
support of Royal Laotian forces in Laos.
CAMBODIA
7. Yesterday, U.S. aircraft, including U.S.
Air Force B-52's, continued air operations
against enemy forces and their lines of sup-
ply and communications in Cambodia.
TROOP REDEPLOYMENT
8. Six U.S. Army detachments: the 236th
Medical Detachment, the 346th Aviation De-
tachment, the 261st Field Artillery Detach-
ment, the 83rd Medical Detachment, the 5th
Quartermaster Detachment, and the 53rd
Quartermaster Detachment have commenced
stand down as a part of troop redeployment.
Personnel within these detachments will be
reassigned within the Republic of Vietnam
or returned to the United States using
normal returnee procedures. The approxi-
mate total number of space reductions is 100.
Memorandum to correspondents.
Macol-Official U.S. aircraft losses in con-
nection with the war in Southeast Asia
through 7 March 1972.
Fixed wing aircraft:
Category I: 1,453 (one loss).
NVN: 937 (no change).
RNV. 434 (no change).
Laos: 82 (one loss).
Category II: 1,953 (2 losses).
Helfcopters :
Category I: 2,176 (no change).
NVN: 10 (no change).
RNV: 2,068 (no change).
Laos: 98 (no change).
Category II: 2,547 (no change).
Definitions:
Category I-Combat type aircraft lost to
hostile action while flying missions over
either North Vietnam, the Republic of Viet-
nam, or since 10 March 1970, over Laos.
Category II-Combat type aircraft lost to
non-hostile action, support aircraft losses,
and other losses in connection with the war.
Starting dates for'reporting aircraft losses:
North Vietnam-August 5, 1964.
Subject: Weekly status reports-Aircraft Republic of Vietnam-January 1, 1961.
losses. Laos-March 10, 1970.
AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR AND MISSING IN ACTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (AS OF MAR. 11, 1972)
Missing Captured Total
fly country:
North Vietnam-------- ---------------- 411 388 799
South Vietnam ---------------------------- 456 96 552
Laos---?-------------------------------- .262 5 67
By service: Missing Captured Total
Army----------------------------- ----- - 353 75 428
Navy----------------------------------- 109 145 254
Marine Corps____________________________ 90 25' 115
Air Force --------- . ---------------------- 577 244 821
Total ------------------------------
1969
Missing-.--- -------,
54
204
226
294
176
Captured___________________________
74
97
179
95
13
DECEMBER 8, 1971
No. 1026-71 C-232) .
OXford 7-5331 (Info.)
OXford 7-3189 (Copies)
U.S. MILITARY CASUALTIES-SOUTHEAST ASIA
The Department of Defense today an-
nounced the following casualties in connec-
tion with the conflict in Southeast Asia.
KILLED AS A RESULT OF HOSTILE ACTION
Army: California
SP4 Dennis R. STEWART, husband of Mrs.
Mary A. STEWART, 2909 Occidental Drive,
Sacramento, 95826.
Air Force: Maryland
Sgt. Thomas E. PIKE, son. of Mr, & Mrs.
Emerson T. PIKE, Friendsville, 21531,
DIED NOT AS A RESULT OF HOSTILE ACTION
Army: Arkansas
SP4 Marvin R. KEETER, son of Mrs. & Mrs.
Luther C. KEETER, Route 6, Fayetteville,
72701.
KENTUCKY
SP4 William T. WARREN, Jr., husband of
Mrs. Joyce A. WARREN, 6315 Mount Everest
Drive, Louisville, 40210.
MISSOURI
SP4 Ronald REMBOLDT, son of Mrs. Mabel
0. REMBOLDT, 1018 Jefferson Street, Union,
63084.
Air Force: Kentucky
CPT Charles P. RUSSELL, son of Mr. &
Mrs. Lee R. RUSSELL, 813 Stanley Street,
FIepkinsville, 42240.
FEBRUARY 29, 1972
No. 142-72 (C-287)
OXford 7-5331 (Info.)
OXford 7-3189 (Copies) -
U.S. MILITARY CASUALTIES-SOUTHEAST ASIA
The Department of Defense today an-
nounced the following casualties in connec-
tion with the conflict in Southeast Asia.
KILLED AS A RESULT OF HOSTILE ACTION
Air Force:-Ohio
1LT Richard N. Christy, II, son of Mr. and
Mrs. Richard Christy, Route 3, Marietta,
45750.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, NATIONAL MILITARY
COMMAND CENTER, MESSAGE CENTER
UNCLASSIFIED
VZCZCMLT399
MULT
Action ASD:Pa: (25) J3: (04)
Distr CJCS (01) DJS(03) NMCC SecDef
(07) ASD:ISA (10) ASD:COMP (01)
SecDef: DIA:
CSA
ONO
NIC(O1) DIA(20) CIA NSA
ANMCC
File (1)
(073)
Transit/ 100320Z/ 100503Z/001:43T018-
0700502
DE RHMSMVA #24,610700324
ZNR UUUU
P 100320Z Mar 72
FM COM USMACV
To AIG 7046
RUMUJEA/315th TAW Phan Rang AB
RUHHHBRA/ CincPac Flt
BT
Unclas (01)
Subject: MACV weekly summary release
number 69-72 of 9 Mar 1972
The following is a summary of significant
items released to news correspondents INS
Saigon at 1630H this date
1970 1971 1972 Total
85 79 7 1,129
12 11 5 489
Casualties-Military
Following are the casualty statistics re-
ported during the. period 27 February 1972
through 4 Max 1972 to the Department of De-
fense by the Military Services during the
week ending Saturday. Delayed reports and
status changes for earlier weeks are included
as they are received. Totals (shown in paren-
theses) are cumulative figures for Southeast
Asia from i January 1961 through 4 Mar 1972
U.S. -
5 (45,661) deaths resulting.
38 (302,745) total. wounded.
14 (152,913) wounded (hospital care re-
quired). -
24 (149,832) wounded (hospital care not
required.
1,408 current missing/captured/interned.
9 (10,095) deaths not as a result of hostile
action.
Missing not as a result of hostile action.
Following are U.S, losses in Laos as a re-
sult of action by hostile forces for the period
27 February 1972 through 4 Mar. 1972. All
figures below are included in the totals on
the preceding page. The "on ground" c ate-
,gory refers to casualties to U.S. military per-
sonnel stationed in Laos. "Air operations re-
fers to casualties to U.S. military personnel
incident to air operations over Laos. Figures
in parentheses are cumulative -totals since
10 March 1970."
AIR OEERATIONS
0 (100) deaths resulting from hostile ac-
tion.
4 (279) total wounded.
0 (113) wounded (hospital care required).
4 (166) wounded (hospital care not re-
ciuired).
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H 3572 -HOUSE pra .26, 1972
does not diminish U.S. involvement nor
make it of less vital concern to us in
Congress or to those whom we repre-
sent. The costs-the cost in people, the
cost in resources drained, the cost in
youth alienated, the cost in a country
divided-should all be well known to
each and every one of us.
The question is whether we are going
to permit the secrecy and the news man-
agement and the concealment of facts to
continue, or whether we, as Representa-
tives, are going to demand that the exec-
utive branch fully inform the Congress
and the American people.
In Southeast Asia itself, the examples
of secrecy and news management are
legion.
Sortie and tonnage figures per coun-
try remain classified, concealing the deep
involvement of the United States in the
massive air' campaigns over Laos and
Cambodia.
Statistics for the bombing of Hanoi
and North Vietnam have recently been
classified, allowing for further hidden
escalations.
Reporters are not permitted to accom-
pany spotter and attack planes on their
missions over Laos and Cambodia, as
they were in the past over South Viet-
nam, resulting 1 unreported civilian
-casualties and ecological destruction in
Vietnam. Pilots, air attaches, and other
personnel involved with the bombing of
Laos and Cambodia are functionally in-
accessible to newsmen, which again
serves to censor independent accounts of
the effects of the air war.
Aerial reconnaissance, folders, some of
them'quite old, of areas designated as
civilian sectors remain inaccessible to
Congressmen and to newsmen. These
photographs 'would reveal once-and for
all the extent of bombing of civilian areas
so that we would have an understanding
of what the massive application of air-
power in Vietnam really has meant in
the devastation of that country, which
we are destroying in order to save.
The story of the captain, commenting
upon a destroyed village in Vietnam
some years ago, gave a very apt descrip-
tion of what the mission was, "We had
to destroy the village in order to save it. "
Only the sketchiest information is
available on the costs of the air war and
the relative amounts of the different
types of ordnance used. The lack of such
information obscures the costs and con-
ceals. the antipersonnel character of the
bombing.
For almost a decade, a brutal war has
been waged by our Government in the
name of the American people. It is high
time the public was told the truth about
our disastrous involvement in this dev-
astating conflict.
The passage of the resolution before
us today would be a major stride in
tearing the veil of secrecy from the war
in Indochina and exposing it for what it
really is.
How unfortunate it is that it is only
now- that the so-called Kissinger pa-
pers are being revealed, These papers-
National Security No. 1-tell us, as the
Washington Post editorialized this morn-
ing: '
That by early 1969 only the very same
people who had made most of the miscalcula-
tions which carried us up to March of 1968
with a big war and no solution still believed
that the war in Vietnam was winnable in
any practicable sense.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military
command in Vietnam and the diehards in the
Saigon Embassy still believed this. But there
was a considerable body of opinion that be-
lieved otherwise, that was prepared to sup-
port and reinforce a new, more realistic and
more promising approach to Vietnam. By
and large, the Secretary of Defense, the State
Department and the CIA believed:
That the North Vietnamese had the will
and the resources to carry on the war in-
definitely against unlimited bombing;
That the' South Vietnamese showed little
prospect of ever being able to conduct their
end of the war without extensive American
military support including the use of air
power and combat troops;
That pacification wasn't working and
showed little hope of working over the long
haul;
That B52s were a doubtful asset except
for close in tactical support of combat op-
erations;
That there was something to be said for
promoting accommodations on the local level,
in the districts and villages and provinces,
between the government people and the Viet
Cong;
That neither this country's standing in
the world nor the fate of Southeast Asia
hinged on the outcome of the' Vietnamese
struggle.
Yet, while the President ignored the
counsel of the National Security Memo=
randum, the American people and its
representatives in Congress were not told
that it even existed. This callous dis-
regard of the people's right to know can-
not be countenanced.
The basic issue is the imperative need
for the' Congress to heed the desires of
the American people in bringing this war
to an immediate end. Another death is
one too many. Another day is one too
much. It is time to give peace a chance.
Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2
minutes to the gentleman from Cali-
fornia (Mr. DELLUMS).
(Mr. DELLUMS asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in
support of the resolution.
I would like to call' attention to the
basic nature of the information being
requested: How many men have we in
Vietnam? How many times a government
acting in our name has bombed another
country? How many countries are we
fighting in today?
It is a scandal that we, Congressmen-
so-called legislators-have to go to the
executive branch begging hat in hand for
this sort of information. Must we always
grope about in the dark, killing and
maiming and wounding like a blunder-
ing giant, without even knowing it? Will
this be our excuse when we are con-
fronted with the consequences of our
acts-"Well, we didn't really know what
we were doing?"
Mr. Speaker, I look at the adverse re-
port that the committee has kindly pro-
vided us with, and I see these phrases
"in view of the fact," "since," "because
of," and I think that these men we are
going to see some reasons for the bizarre
refusal-to provide - this basic data. But
no-all we see are mere repetitions of
the same refusal. Does 'the Department
of Defense think that all they need do is
smile at us blandly and mutter "public
interest," and we will go quietly away,
saying, "Our master has spoken. We need
not fear-surely he will take good care
of us."
When the Nixon administration took
office, we all hoped that they had learned
from. the mistakes of the- previous ad-
ministration. -
And they have.
The previous administration seemed to
think they had to convince us-and be-
cause they did not have a case, they lied.
They were found out in their lies, and
what happened?-protests, accusation, a
sense of betrayal.
Yes, the present administration has
learned from this mistake: If you can-
not say anything good, and you do not
want to be caught in a lie-why, do not
say anything at all. And then, when
someone asks an inconvenient question,
shake your head in a statesmanlike fash-
ion and say, "If you only knew what I
knew-how sorry you would be you were
so unkind."
Mr. Speaker, we have to admit that
sometimes democracy has a few incon-
veniences. One of these inconveniences
is that if you want to carry out insane, il-
legal and immoral adventures on the
other side of the globe, you will have to
rip your own country apart in order to
be able to do it. This inconvenience can
be removed if we starve democracy of
its life-blood, which is full and accurate
information. But there is no fifth amend-
ment for the Government--democracy
depends on the Government being forced
to give incriminating evidence against
itself.
Mr. Speaker, our responsibilities are
clear, it is time to live up to them. I am
convinced that once the American peo-
ple become aware of what is being done
in their name-once they realize the de-
mented and murderous way in which
Yankee ingenuity, which they are justly
proud of, is being used-they will want
nothing so much as to stop this war as
fast as possible. -
Therefore, I am putting into the REc-
oRD at this point information gathered
with painstaking care from nonclassified
sources by various groups on the out-
side. I think we Representatives should
be shamed by these private citizens who
must do our work for us.
And if those who identify the pride of
powerful men with the enduring inter-
ests of this country feel that the careful'
conclusions of these observers is biased
or misleading-why, let them reply, not
with vague innuendoes and melodramat-
ic accusations, but with precision, clar-
ity, and rationality. Mr. Speaker, the in-
formation contained in these insertions
is specific-let us have specific informa-
tion in return, so that we have a basis for
rational discussion, not blind and slavish
trust.
One year ago this week, I served as
chairman for a series of four ad hoc
hearings concerned with the command
responsibility for American war atroci-
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war direction, but these need not concern us remain friendly to the United States." Japan ton's intervention 'in Indochina was mots-
here. was cited as the "case In point," and Japa- vated solely by a desire to control the raw
For the next four years, as the Vietnamese nese trade expansion was cited as essential to materials of Southeast Asia, or to prevent
effectively resisted French efforts to recon- her remaining "friendly" tar the U.S, Japan from slipping out of her economic
quer them, the U.S. was preoccupied with The National Security Council policy de- and, political grip, though these aims were
Europe. But in 1949 Washington decided-, termination of March 6, defining the U.S. most influential in shaping Washington's
in the interests of the cold war-to support position toward Indochina, was thus a direct direction in 1954. The question is certainly
France, though the then-Secretary of State, outgrowth of this Presidential Commission more comple4. There is, for example, re-
Dean Acheson, has since admitted Wash- report. On April 7, [a month after the NSC peated emphasis on the "domino theory,"
ington knew that the Vietminh exercised decision and some ten weeks after the Com- as well as the statement attributed to John
authority over most of the country. In his mission report,] President Eisenhower sum- Foster Dulles soon after the date for Viet-
memoirs Acheson tells of French plans to med up "the strategic importance" of Indo- namese unification had passed, cited in the
"Vietnamize" the war-"to so weaken the china. "First of all," he said, "you have the reprint before you: "We have a clean base
enemy before reducing French forces in specific value of a locality in its production there [in Vietnam] now, without a taint of
Indochina that indigenous forces could of materials that the, world needs." Two ma- colonialism. Dienbienphu was a blessing in
handle the situation." The French policy terials supplied by Indochina that were "very disguise."
was thus one of mass extermination of important," he observed, were "tin and tung- I have in mind, too, ex-President Johnson's
Vietminh supporters-which meant. most sten." Others included "the rubber planta- description of all U.S. postwar foreign policy,
of the population-to permit imposition of tions and so on." made in his first post-presidency apologia
the puppet Bao Dai regime upon the rem- A week earlier, in a speech before the Over- for his' foreign policy, In which he described
nants without need for permanent large- seas National Press Club in New York which its aim as maintaining a system in which
scale French forces. Washington supported indicated Washington's determination to pre- the U.S. could "move and trade and live in
this, Acheson writes, though it realized that vent any meaningful negotiations at the freedom." The implications are not difficult
Bao Dai could never get enough popular forthcoming Geneva Conference, Secretary to grasp. American economic and political
backing to rule without French bayonets. Dulles said: power is so enormous today that it will in-
This realization did not deter the United Southeast Asia?is the so=called "rice bowl" evitably dominate wherever it penetrates, and
States from escalating material aid to which helps to feed the densely populated any nation seeking to protect itself against
France in her war ter Impose this regime region that extends from India to Japan. It this penetration become by definition a
-upon the Indochinese people-in obvious is rich in raw materials, such as tin, oil, threat to the free world. Material interests
contempt of the principles of independence rubber and Iron ore. It offers industrial Japan and considerations of alleged national secu-
and self-determination. potentially important markets and sources of rity have been inseparable throughout Amer-
By February of 1954, mass Indochinese raw materials, The area has great strategic lea's history and they have operated inex-
resistance and popular antiwar pressures in value. [Southeast Asia is astride the most tricably in relation to Indochina. Nor were
France forced the Berlin Foreign Ministers' direct and least-developed sea and air routes domestic political considerations entirely
Conference to agree to Soviet proposals for between the Pacific and South Asia.] It has absent in determining Washington's course
negotiations to take place at Geneva in May major naval and air bases . Under the in 1954. The essential point here is that it is
or June. We know now that Washington conditions of today, the imposition on South- a cynical falsehood to state, as President
Immediately proceeded to ,that all in its power east Asia of the political system of Commu- Nixon has done, that the U.S. is in Vietnam
to block the negotiations, and, after they nist Russia and Its Chinese Communist ally, solely to repel" aggression and permit self-
had gotten underway at Geneva, to break by whatever means, would be a grave threat determination in the south. No living indi-
them up. On March 6, less than three weeks to the whole free community. The United vidual knows better than he how false that
after Berlin, the U.S. National Security States feels that the possibility should not be is. For our purposes here, the historic facts
Council determined that Washington had passively accepted but should be met by concerning the actual motivation for U.S.
to take all possible measures to prevent united action. policy in 1954 underscore its Illegality within
Communist gains in any part of Indochina. Note the phrase "by whatever means." The the framework of the UN Charter. The rea-
Southeast Asia, the NSC said, supplied the Eisenhower Administration knew then that sons given for the U.S. course in 1954-
"Free World" with vital commodities and 80 percent of Vietnamese supported Ho Chi whether those advanced by the Eisenhower
was an essential trading partner for Japan. Minh, and Dulles was clearly stating that this Administration with respect to raw materials
Its "fall" could undermine Japan's alliance made no difference; the U.S. would permit control, etc., or those advanced by Johnson
with the U.S. And, according to the Council, no settlement at Geneva and no self-deter- with respect to U.S. business freedom in other
Indochina was the key to Southeast Asia. urination for the Vietnamese. lands-are plainly contemptuous of UN
The NSC's position defined the. policy On April 16, In an address which received Charter guarantees.
which, with refinements, has shaped Wash- world-wide attention, Vice-President Nixon During the Geneva Conference In Wash-
ington's course in Southeast Asia up to the declared that the situation in Southeast Asia ington dredged up Ngo Dinh Diem from his
present. It also indicated two major concerns was most critical to the U.S. and that he exile in the U.S. and persuaded the French
In shaping this course-U.S. control of the would favor sending in U.S. forces if the to make him premier of the puppet Eao Dai
raw materials of Southeast Asia, and preser- French pulled out of Indochina. Its chief regime. It sent General William Donovan,
vation of Washington's dominant political importance, he declared, lay in the fact that Chief of the Office of Strategic Services, and
and economic influence in Japan. Only six it was vital to Japanese commerce and its C.I.A. conmterinsurgency expert Edward
weeks before the NSC's policy statement, a "loss" would make Japan a satellite of the Lansdale to Saigon to impose Diem upon the
Presidential Commission on Foreign Eco- Soviet Union. In the light of Nixon's persist- South. With the British it presented a 7-
nomic Policy had delivered a report which ent efforts to prove support of his present point memorandum to French Premier Men-
emphasized that U.S. dependence on foreign policies by a "silent majority" in the U.S., des-France which Eisenhower later charact-
sources of raw materials was constantly grow- and his persistent pleas for adherence to the erized as Washington's "minimum terms"
ing, and that these sources-and private in- rule of the majority, it is ironic to note that for agreeing to a settlement, though he con-
vestments in developing them-had to be he declared for sending U.S. troops to Indo- fessed that the U.S. as a non-belligerent had
protected. The report noted that more than china with or without the support of public no right to meddle. The terms included: par-
half of the nation's consumption of zinc, opinion which, he Insisted, was "unin- tition of Vietnam; "securing" the southern
lead, antimony, manganese, bauxite and formed." Nixon confessed that if the French half for the west, with no political arrange-
chrome, and practically all its nickel, tin, stepped out, the Vietminh would control all ment permitted which would give the people
natural rubber and jute had to be obtained of Indochina within a month, there the right to choose Vietminh leader-
abroad. [Since the National Security Council, The Eisenhower, Nixon and Dulles state- ship; and no limitation on the import of
President Eisenhower, Vice-President Nixon ments marked the initiation of an intensive arms and military "advisers" to "protect" the
and Secretary of State Dulles based their effort to get Churchill and congressional South.
subsequent pleas for military intervention leaders to agree to U.S. military intervention We know, of course, that the Geneva Con-
in Indochina on this report, and since stu- on the side of the French. But the congres- ference explicitly rejected each of the above
dents of U.S. Involvement in Vietnam have sional mood, sensitive to public reaction terms in Its provisions for 1056 electlens for a
overlooked it, it is useful to quote from the after Korea, was against intervention and single all-Vietnam government, and for bar-
published staff papers out of which the re- the British commonwealth nations-reflect ring importation of arms and military advis-
port was composed.] The "transition of the ing Asian desires generally-wanted an end ers. But a month before settlement was even
United States from a position of relative self- to the war. When Washington realized in arrived at, Washington had already prepared
sufficiency to one of increasing dependence May that it could not block a settlement at the groundwork for putting its own partition
upon foreign sources of supply constitutes Geneva, the National Security Council called scheme into effect, regardless of Conference
one of the striking economic changes of our for modification of the U.S. position. Parti- -decisions or the desires of the southern Viet-
times," the report declared. It was thus "es- tion of Vietnam was demanded, with. the _ namese.
sential that foreign sources of scarce mate- south "to be retained at all costs." This To avoid isolation, however, the U.S. was
rials needed for defense remain in friendly became the active principle of U.S. policy at compelled to bow to allied pressures and .to
hands." A second imperative for U.S. security Geneva and after Geneva, and it remains so pledge at Geneva that it would not disturb
was that "countries which occupy a key geo- today, the accords, explicitly stating that it did so
graphical position in our system of defense I am not here suggesting that Washing- because of its obligations under Article 2,
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Lao zones encompass an area the size of New One of the most heavily bombed areas has action being taken against pilots for bomb-
York state, or about two-thirds of the coun- been the Plain of Jars, located in northeast- ing civilian targets in Pathet Lao zones, al-
try. They are composed of 3-4,000 tiny vil- ern Laos and controlled by the Pathet Lao though a few have been punished for strikes
lages, each consisting of a few dozen bamboo since 1964. If Khe Sanh and My Lai were the on friendly villages.
homes, a pagoda, rice storehouses, a few him- symbols of American ground intervention "Now the cabinet is in deep discussion of
dred head of water buffalo, cows, pigs, chick- during the 1960s, the Plain is the symbol of a series of proposals by General Henri Na-
ens, and ducks, and inhabited by some of the the automated war of the 1970s. varre, commander in chief in Indochina, that
poorest, most gentle, rice farmers in South- n the Plain, once Laos' most prosperous the war be increasingly turned over to the
east Asia. arse, there were no American ground com- Vietnamese themselves, permitting France
Each day for the last several years, hun- bat troops. As former Ambassador W. H. to reduce the burden on its manpower and
dreds of millions of dollars of the world's Sullivan told the U.S. Senate In April, 1971, economy."-Life, August 3, 1953.
ted aircraft have been hover- the area was not related to the security of The bombing of villages results most fun-
hi
ti
t
s
ca
sop
mos
ing over these villages: 01E, 02, and OV1O American ground forces in South Vietnam damentally from a 25-year-long American
spotter planes at 2,000 feet; AlE, A26, T26 American-supported Asian troops were like- refusal to allow guerrilla forces to come to
prop bombers, AC47, AC54,, AC119, AC130 wise doing little fighting there. . power in Indochina.
gunships, flare ships, rescue and gunship George Chapelier, a Belgian U.N. advisor, Richard Nixon's first public admission on
helicopters at 5,000 feet; F4, F100, F105, A7, has describua what occurred; ". . . in 1969 April 17, 1971, that withdrawal hinges on
B57 jet bombers, jet reconnaissance, EC47 and . jet planes came daily and destroyed all keeping a noncommunist government ex-
EC119 electronic aircraft at 10,000; KC135 stationary structures. Nothing was left plains the reliance on bombing.
supertankers at 20,000; B52s at 30,000, EC130 standing. The villagers lived in trenches and For Asian ground armies alone will hardly
command and control aircraft at 35,000; and holes or in caves. They only farmed at night. accomplish what 550,000 American troops
SR71 reconnaissance aircraft at 70,000 feet., in the last phase, bombings were aimed at could not. The ARVN, whatever its improve--
Giant computers, seismic and acoustic the systematic destruction of the material ment in the last five years, jemains riddled
sensors, infra-red devices, and ANAPQ108 basis of the civilian society." with corruption, elitism, and poorly moti-
radar (designed to see through trees) have In September, 1969, CIA-supported Meo vated conscripts. As their raping, looting and
been tracking squat Soviet-built trucks or troops went in and took out the remnants indiscriminate shelling of towns has shown
farmers trying to grow rice at night; laser- of what remained. Some 25,000 refugees were In Cambodia, they have yet to master the
guided bombs and TV-guided missiles have removed. - most elemental rules of ground warfare in
been loosed on buffalo, trucks, rice store- The Plain of Jars is today a deserted waste- Indochina. Their failures In Laos, and their
houses, homes, and peasants alike. More than land. loss of 54 posts in the "pacified" Mekong Del-
two million tons of ordnance have been "Sure, some of the villages get bombed, to during the first four months of 1971, have
dropped, $5-$10 billion spent. there's no other way to fight a war out surprised few old Indochina hands.
"By the admission of American officials here, for God's sake. It's a war, and the civil- The Lon Nol army, although its soldiers'
closely associated. with the war there, Laos lians have to suffer. We did it at Cherbourg, courage is often admirable, has made little
has been the most heavily bombed country didn't we?"-L. Hafner, Deputy Director, headway, even with ARVN help. The guer-
in the history of aerial warfare."-The Wash- USAID/Laos, January 4, 1971. rillas now control from 60 to 70 per cent of
ington Post, May 23, 1971. "All refugees talk about the bombing. They Cambodia.
Hundreds of case histories of bombing don't like, [it]. But even if you found an The Royal Lao Army and CIA-directed
casualties have been recorded on film and example in which it was proven conclusively Armee Clandestine in Laos are even weaker.
tape in the refugee camps. Several thousand that houses were bombed, so what?"-J. Wil- With the communist capture of the Bolovens
refugees, several hundred defectors, and liamson, USAID refugee relief chief, Vien- Plateau in May of this year, the Royal Lao
Western observers who have visited these tiane, February 2, 1971. government now controls little more than
zones all report constant bombing of towns While American officials concede that vil- the major towns.
and villages and widespread destruction. lages are frequently bombed, they tend to at- And the Royal That army is something
Each one of the refugees interviewed from tribute this to Air Force "stupidity," "con- of a standing joke in South Vietnam. As-
both northern and southern Laos said that fusion," or "ove,rkill." There is little doubt, signed to guard one corner of Long Binh base,
his village was either partially or totally de- however, that American policymakers also its major accomplishment to date has been
stroyed by American bombers while he still share the responsibility. Deputy Assistant mastering the complexities of the black
resided there, or that beginning in 1969 the Secretary of Defense Dennis J. Doolin.has' market.
planes came "like the birds," as one old man testified to Congress that in Laos "all United At this writing, Asian troops are essentially
put it, "and the bombs fell like the rain." States operations, including our air opera- playing a supplemental. role: serving as live
All refugees and defectors say the guerrilla tions; are controlled by the U.S. ambassador." bait to lure the enemy out into the open for
soldiers avoided the villages, neither biv All Indications are that the American am- the bombers, as in the February, 1971, Lao-
ouacking in them nor storing arms and am- bassador has approved strikes against civilian tian invasion; searching for enemy supplies,
munition in them. All say that the vast ma- targets in $athet Lao zones. As Robert Shap- as in the A Shau valley; taking out refugees,
jority of the casualties from the bombing len has written in Foreign Affairs, an Amer- as on the Plain of Jars; and guarding the
were civilian and not military, as the soldiers Scan goal has been to "destroy the social major bases and towns. In any case, we risk
were out in the forest and could not be and economic fabric in Pathet Lao areas," in Vietnamization because we do not have to
found. an attempt to weaken the communists' rely on it. We rely on the bombs.
A significantly high number of casualties stronger ground army by depriving it of indi- "Me Ou was 59 when she died on February
are children and old people. When asked genus food supplies, disrupting communisa- 20, 1969. It was a cold day and she decided to
why, refugees explain that the children like tions, killing off potential recruits or porters, leave the trench about 3 p.m. to get some
to "play around" too much and get caught demoralizing the civilian population, and clothing for herself and the children. The
in the open and, confused with terror, do not causing a refugee flow to friendly zones. jets bombed while she was in the house.
make it to the holes. Old people "Often could Informed sources indicate that this has She was burned alive."-Me On's son-in-law,
not hear well or could not run fast enough," largely been due to pressure from the CIA, Plain of Jars.
one chief of a Plain of Jars sub-district ex- which is heavily involved in targeting Amer- Domestic pressures generated by the
plained. He also said that most of the casual- ican bombing strikes in Laos. The CIA has its ground war have also played a part in the
ties were due to anti-personnel bombs own photo-reconnaissance team, reconnais- shift to air. The Vietnam ground war costs
dropped in or near the villages, but that sanbe aircraft, and ground observers in Pa- more in money and in lives. The American
napalm, fragmentation bombs, and 500- thet Lao zones. Together with Air Force per- people will not continue to pay the price that
pound bombs were also frequently dropped. sonnel, CIA representatives participate in has already come to $100 billion spent, 50,000
"During 1969 about 45 per cent of the people, weekly meetings at Udorn Air Force Base dead, 300,000 wounded-nor will the troops,
mostly old people and women, never left in Thailand to draw up target listings. who are now in grassy-headed revolt.
their trenches or caves at all. They were too Largely because of its direction of the The air war, however, provides few such
afraid. The others would go out and do their Armee Clandestine, an indigenous paramili- problems. Although its cost is considerable,
work if they didn't hear. the planes coming." tary force, the CIA, sources say, has consist- probably over $10 billion annually, much
Various press reports suggest that the same ently placed inhabited villages on the tar- of the money used for upkeep of air bases
kind of bombing is going on in guerrilla- get list in an attempt to weaken the Pathet and development of new aerial technology
controlled zones of Cambodia. Population Lao. would be spent even without the air war.
estimates for these zones begin at one mil- It Is certainly clear that the American em- Charles Schultze, former-director of the
lion. The air war is still relatively new there, bassy has taken few steps to enforce the Bureau of the Budget, estimates that costs
and as a result, refugees who have lived for Rules of Engagement (military rules of war- above normal upkeep of bases and produc-
long periods of time in guerrilla areas have fare that prohibit attacks on civilians). To tion of aircraft are $2-3 billion for 1972. And
not yet come into friendly regions. But pri- this day, only one junior Foreign Service of- more important, U.S. casualties are minimal
vate interviews with informed American ficer has been assigned to check proffered from the air. American pilots, freed from the
sources indicate that the bombing of civilian target listings. Virtually no mechanism has discomforts of the ground war, and rarr'lly
targets in Cambodia is as extensive as in been established to monitor strikes, and seeing the people they kill, tend to
Laos. there are no known instances of disciplinary fewer complaints., -
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 April / IBpd 7d For Releaskk11299`fMI04~'CtxC=RDP80-O'f6DTR000 0 350
?;Aan in
technological developments from the air with limited
500-pound bombs outside of popula ed areas berh1967.cit hasogrown and been r fin d.
increased ingenuity and resourcefulness. may It is Ho Chi remarked Minh himself who is said to of jet ad 2 llaaseruand TV-guidednmisile sdes notusing What
every mane in uniform ineeverye ation In
have a e graduating class of s
ap- ear to be the result of a series of carefully the world.
pera, the e elite elie units of f the.North Vietnamese planned decisions. It was just part of ongoing Warfare has gone electronic.
army, "You are our ans swers to the B52s."
technological development. The war kept up What it all means is just beginning to
The war in Indochina today has become with the advances; each new improvement filter through. The Senate Armed Services
man sly one of technology versus the hu- was put into action. Committee held hearings in November. In
man pirig. Dow, Honeywell, and Lockheed did their late January a censored transcript was re-
The
my men' enthusiasm. s biggest sm. I If I had asked f was foor restrain part; so did the Air Force, Marines, and Navy, leased, and for the first time the world got
first p
eers, all my men would argue to be the e first the State Department and the CIA, Standard a look at the most classified war of all time.
chosen. 'Let me do it, they killed my mother!' Oil and Gulf. The momentum was more The Laotian problem had ground rules im-
'No, let me go, they destroyed my village.' powerful than the people within it; a belief posed on it by almost everyone in govern-
they would say. Were we afraid of the planes? in technology covered the horrors, much as ment above the rank of general. For instance,
Oh, no. If they stayed up high, they couldn't a belief in religion protected the Inquisition. no American was to fight. on the ground in
hit us. If they came down low, we could shoot And without anybody really understanding Laos. But, of course, it was agreed that if
The lanes or caring, thousands of Indochinese villages the infiltration of men and munitions could
d 11 b--1,1 be Just how that was
them down. We were very angry. P were destroyed in the process. be slowe a
didn't come to bomb the soldiers, they tried The roar of the bombs and the noise of to be accomplished was left to the military.
to kill the villagers. The villagers are just the planes frightened me terribly. Our life The classic military answer was to close the
foarmerer became like one of animals who search to port at Haiphong. That solution never was
tar ms. They didn't do defector , thing against
chote pito ts."-Pathet Lao defrm escape the butchers. Each day, across the politically feasible. The decision was to light
captain. forests and ditches, we sought only to escape above Laos, harass the Ho Chi Minh trail, re-
The ews wispirit seems to be tours Idi- from the bombs. When looking at the face duce the input-and don't get "involved"
that with spirit Lao defectors will, , of my innocent child, I could not stop cry- blockading or endangering Soviet, Chinese,
Intervi
the that fag from breaking the enemy's w Ing for his future. Why do the men in this and other shipping off Haiphong.
the bombing strengthened young "Before, maybe world not love each other, not live together The following Journal exclusive gives, for it.
piness in development the first time, the story of how the Ho Chi
er cent of the ymen would
P y
t build ha
20 30
l
p
p
on
y
in peace no
, P
per and progress? Human beings, whose parents Minh trail was bugged and how the bugs
volunteer to join the Pathet Lao army,"
plains one defector. "But by cherished them, died from the explosions of help get the oidance to the targets.
cent and more wanted to join. Nobody really the bombs. Who then thinks about the affec- THE BINH TRAM EXPRESS
understood what the Pathet Lao meant by tion and love their parents felt for them? The distance from Mugia Pass to the DMZ
'American imperialism' before the planes As for the other men, do they know all the
came. But by 1969 the attitude was 'better is 75 miles as the crow flies. The trail which
to die fighting than hiding in the holes.' " unimaginable atrocities which can happen covers that 75 miles and on into Cambodia
In an arena where American-supported here in this war?"-from essay by 35-year- 3,600 tulles in length.
old woman refugee from Plain of Jars. now The Ho more Chi than Minh trail stared out as a
ground faree ing in ot The questions raised in this, the third
as they are, s are, succh h s senttuniments on t the he other year of the Era of the Blue Machine, really footpath. Today it is an insane maze of
side are a key factor, At this writing, commu- less to do with men than Man., twisting, tangled roads, a rabbit warren. It
nist guerrillas are the only force in Ind have are What does it mean, after all, when the wasn't r'anned that way. It developed.
china who believe they know what they are As the Air Force bombed and closed roads,
strongest of the species is systematically kill- new ones were hacked from the jungle. As
The fighting for, influx of more than 30,000 refugees and maiming some of tie weakest. .. the trail became longer and more compli-
heavily areas u 19 the most prosperous regularly destroying the Opted, the NVA began to develop a system
kno edge homes and belongings of some of the poor- which the U.S. military refers to as The Pony
from made th bombed common during
has made the bombing comknowledge eft? . .. the most industrialized constantly. Express. Cargo coming down the trail is
in American-supported zones. Laotians
all poltical stripes are opposed otians d to the of some of devastating the the most land rural? and ... food and the supplies of most passed from truck to truck. This occurs at
bombings because it caused hardship to technically advanced using their most sophis- truck parks and storage areas.
their fellow Laotians against whom they ticated weaponry against a people who pose Located along the way are Binh Trains
bear no enmity; and because they believe it the most marginal of challenge to their in- (military relay stations) staffed by engineers,
widened the war. They blame Souvanna terests?" transport workers, and anti-aircraft gunners.
Phouma's government in part for permitting In a nuclear age such questions are of Each station crew has the responsibility of
It. Conversely, they admire the Pathet Lao more than passing concern. covering a portion of the trail on each side
for standing up to it. - of- Its station, maintaining land telephone
The war in Laos has always been for essen- From the Armed Forces Journal, Feb. ? 15, lines used in rhoving traffic, and keeping its
tially political ends. The communists have 19711 portion of the road open.
made it clear they are not planning to take The infiltration begins at nightfall, and by
BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF HO CHI MINH TRAIL dawn the surviving vehicles must be off-
over Ing, has the unndordoubtedly towns aided militarily. them in The bomb- achiev- (By George Weiss and the Journal staff) loadbd and their cargos hidden. The trucks
ing a political victory. This may later be Allied Forces have for the past 21/2 years may attempt to make it back into the sanc-
true of the other countries as well, making been waging, with increasing success, a here- tuary or may be directed to a hidden park
one wonder whether technology can keep up tofore secret electronic war along the Ho where they will remain throughout the day-
with the growing opposition to the U.S. in Chi Minh trail. light hours.
Vietnam, if we will resort to even more Current operations in Laos are providing Trucks bringing equipment into Laos are
effective bombs to keel) down more strength- a climactic test for the Pentagon's new the largest. They carry eight tons of cargo.
ened wills. sensor technology and could, as intended, Trucks on the trail usually carry five tons.
"I can assure you that my words are those break the back of the enemy's resupply effort The Tallest trucks are used for areas where
of a devoted pacifist. My very hardest job is and thus lead to a final denouement of the speed is important and carry about three
to give out medals of honor. If I lived in war itself. tons.
another country that wanted to be sure and Even more significant, in the opinion of Speed on the Ho Chi Minh trail is a rela-
would Its right k sod-determination, -d several highly placed Journal sources, is the tive thing. Almost every truck moves in low
would say: "Thank God that the United fact that a successful outcome to the Laos/ gear. The explanation is quite simple: The
this moment of threatening ing Cambodia/I Corps campaign would be en- operation (or 98% of it) is carried out in
are not ben eet on conquest
we or on r umbrella couraging proof that, contrary to some darkness on bad roads and without lights
are n
thatrs. But we do have a nuclear moral opinion, the persistent and patient appli- Drivers cover only about a 20-mile portion of
be protect others. This is the moral cation of superior technology can be decisive the trail each night. They are expected to be a terrible our position. w could in guerrilla war situations. know every turn and obstacle along their
to force can
terrrible threat to the e world if we were to lose e
that restraint."-Richard Nixon, interview Here, as pieced together from congres- route-
with C. L. Sulzberger, The New York Times, sional, DOD, and other sources by Pentagon From the Air Force point of view, the ef-
March 10, 1970. Editor George Weiss and other Journal staf- ? ficiency of the trail has been degraded as
The issues raised by the air war go far fers, Is the real story behind the electronic planned. A ton of munitions may now spend
y interdiction program, weeks and sometimes months in transit.
o American l leaders. eaders. For if the or if ty last or few years yeamotives THE ELECTRONIC WAR Each stop means the trucks must be un-
have shown anything, it is that technologi- "We wired the Ho Chi Minh trail like a loaded and the cargos placed in caves or pits
cal growth has a dynamic of its own, inde- drugstore pinball machine and we plug it in dug in the ground for protection against
pendent of the will of individuals. Ameri- every night." The Air Force officer who said bombers.
can leaders are more products of this process that was not making an idle boast. Laos has IGLOO WHITE
than 'Its conscious manipulators, more, the been "bugged" with the most efficient elec- The code name for the electronic opera
Man In the Grey Flannel Suitt-or sometimes tronic system ever devised. The real secret tion is Igloo White. It was designed for fight-
-the Mad Hatter-than Big Brother. about the "secret war" Is that this is one we Ing a war in hostile territory, offering the
The change in the Laos air war, from a may be winning. enemy absolute control of their surface ter-
.
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'--H 3609
 AprAPpTcV:d For` Release0
Security Affairs, described such oharacter-
types on the basis of age, past negative ex-
periences with the Saigon authorities, eco-
nomic background, socio-economic frustra-
tions, education, and peer-group relation-
ships.] With the information provided by
such studies, the authorities have embarked
upon a program, to intern, draft, or kill the
vulnerable character types. The problem
presented by the insurgents' appropriation
of government equipment has been met
largely through the improvement of ARVN
combat units, and the suspension of socio-
political programs in Infected areas. To in-
hibit the insurgents' access to food, the au-
thorities have engaged in policy of crop-
destruction in NLF'-controlled areas, while
in contested areas, a policy of food confisca-
tion and limited distribution Is being em-
ployed. [By the policy of limited distribu-
tion, it is hoped that the peasant population
will receive enough to survive, but lack any
surplus that they might willingly make
available to the insurgents.]. The problem of
day-by-day support for the insurgent is most
easily handled. It involves the simple expedi-
ent of raising the costs of such support for
the population. Two of the best-known ex-
amples of this cost-raising are: the Army's
destruction of My Lai, and the CIA's Proj-
ect Phoenix. The former was a punitive op-
eration carried out against the villagers in
an area in which the NLF had recently been
active, while the latter, though much more
sophisticated in nature,. were merely a puni-
tive program designed for the assassination
of low-echelon NLF collaborators.
The final aspect of the U.S.'s current coun-
terinsurgency strategy involves the elimina-
tion of the NLF's exogeneous inputs. Since
the ouster of Sihanouk, the Cambodian port
of Kompong Som has been effectively closed
.to the NLF. As a result, all of its exogeneous
inputs now come from North Vietnam, chan-
neled through the Ho Chi Minh trail net-
work in eastern Laos and northern Cambo-
dia. Originally, V.S. strategy for reducing the
level of such inputs to the NLF consisted of
the interdiction of supply trails-that is, the
intensive aerial bombardment of the areas
through which, the supply trails run. How-
ever, the number of trails involved, their
natural camouflage, and a terrain that was
unfavorable to aerial warfare reduced the ef-
fecaiveness of aerial interdiction to nuisance
value. Faced with this fact, the Nixon gov-
ernment has embarked on a more direct ap-
proach-the U.S.-ARVN invasion of South-
ern Laos. This invasion has not only failed,
it has also sharply narrowed the U.S.'s avail-
able options in Southeast" Asia. The crushing
defeats handed elite ARVN units like the
39th Rangers, in addition to disasters like
the forced evacuation of Sepone, will certain-
ly have damaged the morale of the ARVN.
The invasion has only reiterated the reality
that the ARVN is not a match for main-force
NVA units. Given this reality, Nixon is faced
with only three alternatives: (1) he may in-
definitely maintain large numbers of U.S.
combat forces. in Vietnam as a counter-force
to the NVA, and not expand the war fur-
ther-an option not guaranteed to win votes
in the 1972. elections; (2) he may abandon
his Vietnamization policy and withdraw the
remaining U.S. forces, knowing as he does so
that he leaves the Thieu-Ky regime to a
certain defeat; or (3) he may elect for a U.S.
invasion of North Vietnam-the objective
being the final elimination of both the NVA
and the NLF's exogeneous inputs. In October
of 1970, Nixon made clear how far he was
prepared to go in the elimination of North
Vietnamese aggression. At that time he made
a statement "which puts the enemy on warn-
ing that if It escalates while we are trying to
de-escalate, we will move decisively and not,
step by step." is
The likelihood is that Nixon will order an
invasion of North Vietnam-perhaps before
D4N1QJAi ID-GtbO1rR000300350072-5 H 3623
this article is printed. To let the war drag on
would cost him his Presidency. To withdraw
immediately would be to make himself the
"first President to preside over an, American
defeat." It would also mean the probable
loss of Laos and Cambodia from the V.S.
camp; the loss of the Vietnamese off-shore
oil franchises; the loss of access to the Me-
kong River Delta development; and would
leave the U.S.'s staunchest Asian ally, Thai-
land, facing hostile governments along its
entire eastern, border-governments that
might be inclined to assist that country's
own domestic insurgents. The only serious
objections to such an invasion that are likely
to be raised within the President's circle of
advisers concern the possibility of conflict
with China. Against such arguments will be
ranged the positions of two groups: the Pres-
ident's counterinsurgency experts who will
maintain that the on-site destruction of
North Vietnam is the only way. to bring the
war to an end-before 1972; and the strategic
planners, who have for twenty years main-
tained the position that the time to deal
with China is now. [Whether or not China
would actually respond to a U.S. Invasion of
the North is a matter of speculation. It would
hardly seem to be in her best interest to
engage the U.S. in a war which would al-
most certainly be nuclear, but the Chinese
have long been sensitive to the presence of
hostile forces on its immediate borders. Ad-
ditionally, the recent visit of Chou-en Lai to
Hanoi may be an indication of significant
Chinese commitment to the cQntinued ex-
istence of North Vietnam.]
The final question that remains is this:
assuming that the Wolf-Kissinger-Nixon
counterinsurgency strategy is carried out to
its logical conclusion-the invasion of North
Vietnam-and assuming that it will not lead
to a war with China, is it a winning strategy?
Will it terminate the insurgency in South-
east Asia to such a degree that the South
Vietnamese government can be fairly said to
"control" its own territory? There is of
course, no way of proving the point, one way
or the other. But if one were to accept the
validity of the systems approach analysis of
insurgency movements, then one must agree
(however reluctantly), that if the organiza-
tion can be destroyed at its functional level,
then the movement will be destroyed. For so
long as an opposition movement Is-organized,
the organization is understood by the au-
thorities, and the authorities possess suffi-
cient force, then the opposition movement
continues to exist at the pleasure of the au-
thorities only. The only way in which au-
thorities who are using this approach can be
beaten, Is if they either lack sufficient power,
or are themselves organizationally destroyed.
The United States has the former, while the
National Liberation Front of Vietnam can-
not do the latter.
FOOTNOTES
1 See: Roger Hilsman;; To Move A Nation;
New York; Dell Publishing Co., Inc,; 1964.
8 Ibid.
' Ibid.
lGeneral David M, Sharp (ret.); The New
American Militarism"; The Atlantic; April
1969; p. 55.
s U.S. Congress, Senate Hearings, State-
ment of Robert McNamara, Secretary of De-
fense, before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee in.Support of FY 1967 Military
Assistance Programs, "What should be the
Foreign Policy of the United States"; April
20, 1966; p. 79.
s See: Sir Robert Thompson; Defeating
Communist Insurgency; New York; Frederick
A. Praeger; 1966; p. 122.
Ibid; pp. 56-7; 123-6.
Hilsman; To Move A Nation; op. cit.; P.
527.
' General William Westmoreland; "Coun-
terinsurgency"; Tricontinental-11; March-
April 1969; pp, 91-2.
"See: Richard M. Nixon; "Asia After Viet
Nam"; Foreign Affairs; October 1967.
"Found in: Henry Kissinger: "Reflections
on American Diplomacy"; Foreign Affairs;
October 1956; pp. 37-56.
12 Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, jr.;
Rebellion ? and Authority: An analytic essay
on insurgency conflicts; Chicago; Markham
Publishing Co.; 1970; p. 29.
Ibid.; p. 30.
Charles Wolf, jr.; United States Policy
and the Third World; Boston; Little, Brown
& Co.; 1967; p. 69.
n Also see: Edward J. Mitchell; "Inequality
and Insurgency: A Statistical Study of South
Vietnam"; The RAND Corporation; June
1967; pp. 1-23; (P-3610).
18 Wolf; United Stated Policy; op. cit.; p.
66; and Leites and Wolf; Rebellion and Au-
thority; op. cit.; pp. 96 & 156.
17 Leites and Wolf; Rebellion and Author-
ity; op. cit.; p. 35.
is As quoted by: Daniel Ellsberg; "The
Murder in Laos-The Reason Why"; New
York Review of Books; March 11, 1971.
Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2
minutes to the gentleman from Ohio
(Mr. SEIBERLING).
(Mr. SEIBERLING asked and was
given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. SEIBERLING. Mr. Speaker, I
yield to the gentleman from New York
(Mr. BADILLO).
(Mr. BADILLO asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. BADILLO. Mr. Speaker, I rise in
support of House Resolution 918 and. call
for its passage as. an essential step to-
ward full assertion of congressional re-
sponsibility in determining the course
and extent of our involvement in the
Indochina war.
The information sought in this resolu-
tion is information that Congress and
tho American people must have. It is
difficult to comprehend how an adminis-
tration which came to office with a
pledge to square with the American peo-
ple about the war in Vietnam could con-
tinue to shroud its conduct of that war
in secrecy and it is even more difficult
to comprehend why the Congress lets
the administration get away with it.
There is a crisis of confidence in Gov-
ernment today. It is present in every
corner of our Nation. I doubt that there
is one Melilber of this House who is not
aware of the skepticism and distrust
Americans have for their Government
these days. -
If we are going to rebuild that confi-
dence, if our constituents are ever to be-
lieve in the things we say and do, then
we must strip away the secrecy and dou-
bletalk which characterizes so much of
what goes on here in the Nation's Capi-
tal. And there is no better place to start
than with the truth about the air war
over Indochina, for this war is at the very
root of our crisis of confidence.
I commend my friend and colleague
from New York (Mrs. ABZUG) for her
energy and initiative in pressing this
resolution and I urge its passage.
Mr.'SEIBERLING, Mr. Speaker, I rise
in support of this resolution.
It is not that some of the information
is not available, but what is on trial here
is the credibility of the Congress of the
United States. The American people,
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war during the Quemoy-Matsu crisis, and the
Vietnam tragedy. However, the fact that
Vietnam occurred as a result of the same
essential political premises as occasioned Ko-
rea should not be allowed to obscure the fact
that the military strategies which have been
developed and implemented in Vietnam make
this conflict very much more important than
just another "cold war" gone hot.
There are any number of facts about the
military campaign In. Southeast Asia that
are well known, and often commented
upon-among -them that;: the U.S. has
dropped more bombs in Indochina than were
dropped in the entire Pacific Theatre of World
War TI; that the U.S. has had over forty
thousand of its young men killed in this war;
that this has been the longest war in Ameri-
can history; etc. The list of facts to attest
to the magnitude of the American effort in
Vietnam is endless. Yet, even as the U.S.
and its. allies march into another "neutral"
nation, we are left with the feeling that if
there was ever a bottomless pit, this is cer-
tainly it. But viewing the magnitude of the
efforts and the paucity of the visible victories
leaves a series of unanswered questions. With
all of this effort, why hasn't the war been
won? Have the strategic planners gone com-
pletely instane? Are the U.S.'s military com-
manders total incompetents? And in the final
analysis, is this kind of.anti-guerrilla war in
Asia feasible under any strategic conditions?
To deal with these questions it would be
necessary to consider the specific strategies
that have been ` employed in the Vietnam
war-and these usually haven't been ade-
quately considered, at least not by "critics"
of the war. This is largely attributable to the
fact that, most of the critics view the entire
war as Immoral and unconscienable-- that is,
it is a political conflict among the Viet-
namese people, and should be settled as such,
without the benefit of U.S. war technology.
To the extent that some of the war critics
are now beginning to deal with the strategies
and tactics of the war, the tendency has
been to examine those aspects of the strategy
that would make the U.S. commanders cul-
pable of "war crimes." They may very well be
culpable, but it is still important to exam-
ino the general nature of the strategies used
in Vietnam-important for three reasons.
(A) The strategies have changed twice, a fact
that Is not generally appreciated; (B) there
'are many in the U.S., particularly radicals,
who argue that the war has come home-that
tactics developed In Southeast Asia are cur-
rently being practiced In the United States;
and (C) a comprehension of the strategies
currently being employed in Indochina serves
as a very useful model for predicting the fu-
ture of America's foreign policy, not only
with the members of the client network, but
also with the enemies of the network.
THE NEW FRONTIER AND AMERICAN POLICY IN
THE THIRD WORLD
Among the changes that 'John Kennedy
brought to U.S. Politics in 1961, probably
none was so far reaching as the changes In
the relations of the U.S. and the "Third
World." This revision stemmed from neces-
sity rather than from style. The immediately
preceding years had seen in the Third World,
among other unfavorable developments: the
success of revolutionary movements in Indo-
china (1954), and Cuba (1959); and at the
time of Kennedy's accession, Algerian revolu-
tionaries were bringing their liberation
struggle to a successful conclusion. It would
be no exaggeration to suggest that in 1960
U.S. policymakers viewed the changing situ-
ations throughout the underdeveloped world
with a dismay that approached horror-not
only because these revolutionary victories
had added numbers to the "other side," but
also because the new regimes that emerged
were openly bent on promoting and aiding
similar revolutions throughout the Third
World.
. In 1961, the view from the White House
was that not only might such revolutions
prove contagious, but that the U.S. was
largely unprepared to prevent or terminate
them. In 1961, Eisenhower's approach to de-
fending the Empire was seen as both pro-
hibitively expensive and basically imprac-
tical-that is, neither nuclear threats nor
the use of World War II-type conventional
force seemed a viable counter-force to organ-
ized and sophisticated guerrilla revolution-
aries. In the aftermath of the CIA's Bay of
Pigs disaster in 1961, and the "almost"
Pathet Lao victory in Laos in the same year,
Kennedy was determined that the U.S.
should develop and embark upon a strategy
capable of inhibiting the spread and the
success of guerrilla movements.
The strategy which grew out of this deter-
mination was to be known as "counterinsur-
gency," and in its most elemental form, Ken-
nedy's counterinsurgency strategy amounted
to a combination of : military; para-military;
social; economic; psychological; and "civic
action" operations, to be carried out by the
U.S. and its clients against Insurgency move-
ments. ["Insurgency" is used here to refer
to "all types of non-conventional forces and
operations. It includes guerrilla, partisan,
subversive, resistance, terrorist, revolution-
ary and similar personnel, organizations and
methods . (It) Includes acts . con-
ducted for the purposes of eliminating or
weakening the authority of the local govern-
ment." U.S. Army Field Manual, FM-31-15,
Operations Against Irregular Forces, p. 3.J
As Kennedy envisaged counterinsurgency,
and as he Integrated the strategy Into his
foreign policy, the military was not intended
to be, or become, the primary factor. Rather,
the strategy which he envisioned was based
upon the belief that nationalist revolutions
In the Third World were the direct result of
the crushing socio-economic deprivations
that existed in those areas. Kennedy wished
for a strategy that would win for the United
States-and its client regimes-the "hearts
and minds" of the people. Thus the emphasis
was to be placed on "benevolent" programs
designed to ameliorate the worst of the de-
privations, or more accurately what Wash-
ington perceived as the most pressing prob-
lems and conflicts. The U.S. military's role
was to be restricted to the utilization of
highly trained military specialists who were
to serve As trainers and advisers to the na-
tional militaries in America's client network,
thus saving the U.S. the immense cost of
maintaining a large occupation force in
crisis areas?
COUNTERINSURGENCY IN INDOCHINA
Among Kennedy's advisors there was some
disagreement with this "hearts and minds"
approach to counterinsurgency, notably on
the part of economist Walt W. Rostow. From
Rostow's perspective, such socio-political
reform measures as Kennedy envisioned were
not feasible in any situation in which there
was an on-going insurgency movement. On
the one hand, argued Rostow, such a situa-
tion was far too unstable to permit capitalist
"growth" to proceed, and on the other, such
reforms as might be affected would likely be
subverted by an efficient guerrilla movement?
In 1959, the Vietnamese National Libera-
tion Front (NLF) had renewed the liberation
struggle in South Vietnam that had been
suspended in 1954. By the first year of Ken-
nedy's Presidency, the regime of Ngo Dinh
Diem faced a perilous future, and it was
clear that without sustained U.S. assistance
his government would fall. Viewing this
Vietnamese crisis, Rostow argued that only
a large-scale commitment of U.S. combat
forces could save the Saigon government,
but Kennedy sided with his "hearts and
minds" strategists and entrusted his Viet-
nam policy to Roger Hilsman's State Depart-
ment Bureau of Research and Intelligence.
In response to the immediate NLF-guerrilla
threat, the Kennedy government committed
U.S. military and CIA advisers to train and
assist the Army of the Republic of Vietnam
(ARVN). The rationale for this military com-
mitment, wrote Hilsman, was that Kennedy
appreciated that if the other efforts of the
U.S. were to succeed then the U.S. would
have to be able to guarantee the physical
security of rural and urban residents. If it
could be demonstrated to the indigeneous
population that they could be effectively
protected from the NLF, then the possibility
would be enhanced that they would make
the "choice of refusing to cooperate" with
the -enemy, In this manner, Hilsman rea
sonpd, the guerrillas would be denied-their
most valuable resource-the rural popula-
tions
The long-term, non-military aspect of the
Kennedy program in South Vietnam was to
institute a "system of government services
and assistance" that would end the tradi-
tional isolation of the rural areas from Sai-
gon-the intention being to transfer the de-
pendence of the rural population away from
the guerrillas to the central authorities. -
Thus, the de-emphasis of the role of the
military in Kennedy's counterinsurgency
strategy was clearly qualitative rather than
quantitative. That is, their physical presence
was considerable while their role was
auxiliary.
While the -practice of counterinsurgency
was continuing in Vietnam, the development
of the model was progressing- in the United
States. Tens of thousands of civilian and
military officials were being sent through
counterinsurgency centers at Fort Bragg
(N.C.), Fort Gurlick (Canal. Zone), Quantico
(Va.), and the Industrial War College in
Washington, prior to being posted abroad.
As a supplement to government research and
analysis centers, the Kennedy government
distributed large counterinsurgency research
grants, both to universities and private re-
search centers in the U.S. Much as the Eisen-
hower administration had made use of the
universities for nuclear research during the
1950's, Kennedy (vie the Department of De-
fense and the CIA), promoted counterinsur-
gency studies at universities such as Colum-
bia, Berkeley, American University, and
Michigan State, (to name only the foremost). -
Private research centers were also to be the
beneficiaries of this new military science.
Scholars at the RAND Corporation, the In-
stitute for Defense Analysis, and the Stan-
ford Research Institute, became the govern-
ment's primary civilian technicians in the
field of counterinsurgency strategy and
tactics. (The largest of these institutions, the
RAND Corporation, is a private research cen-
ter initially established to serve the Air Force.
In recent years it has been expanded from
weapons system-analysis to the world's
largest counterinsurgency center. Its trustees
are drawn from private industries, universi-,
ties, and the media. Located in Santa Monica,
California, RAND's staff Includes hundreds
of social, behavioral, and natural- scientists, .
engineers, etc. "Most of Its projects,", ac-
cording to Dartmouth's Lawrence Radway,
"are begun under contract with the armed
forces.. ." In all military projects, the RAND
staff has access to the most classified of in-
formation, and the confidence of highest of
the nation's leaders. For further information:
Lawrence Radway, Foreign Policy and -Na-
tional Defense, (Palo Alto: Scott, Foresman
and Co., 1969).)
By 1963, the Kennedy administration had
created a "round-robin" type structure, em-
ploying both behavioral asocial scientists and _
the technicians of the physical sciences. Com-
menting on this alliance In his American -
Power and the New Mandarin, Noam Chom-
sky described it as one In which "engineers"
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1972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE H 3621
construct "their bombs and missiles," while
the behavioral social, scientists design and
implement "experiments" to test Third World
peoples and their resources against newly-
devised control mechanisms. Then, (as to-
day), it was not uncommon to find a RAND
social scientist or a Berkeley political scien-
tist working alongside U.S. Army military ad-
visory teams in the hamlets and rural vil-
lages of Southeast Asia. Nor was It surprising
that secretly-funded CIA conduit founda-
tions should have set up experimental con-
trol laboratories" throughout South Amer-
ica, utilizing the most liberal of social scien-
tists to study security-related behavior pat-
terns of the in,digena, (i.e. American Univer-
sity's Project. Camelot).
In spite of the government's emphasis on
reform programs, and the encouragement of
civilian groups and agencies In the counter-
Insurgency field, a possibly Inevitable muta-
tiori of the strategy began to occur-partic-
ularly in the realm of practical application
of the strategy. As counterinsurgency pro-
grams became an Increasingly important part
of the operations of the Department of De-
fense, and as spending on these programs
continued to increase within the military
establishment, military leaders began to re-
ject the notion that theirs should be the
secondary role in the strategy. As General
David Shoup, a former Commandant of the
Marine Corps has noted: Vietnam had be-
come an area In which "top ranking Army of-
ficers wanted to project Army ground com-
bat units ... to test plans and new equip-
ment." 4 Thus, the military leaders at the
Pentagon wished to do the things that Ken-
nedy wished to avoid--turn the Vietnam
war Into an American war.
As Kennedy still saw the role of the U.S.
military In less-developed countries, it was
to be limited to an advisory and training
function. The various national armies would
then be at the disposal of the local U.S.
Chief-of-Mission and his military experts. Or,
as Robert McNamara expres.ed it:
"The United States cannot be everywhere
simultaneously. The balance of forces and
the variable alternatives which challenge us
In the changing contemporary world can only
be conquered with faithful friends, well-
equipped and ready to carry out the duties
assigned to them ... The Military Aid Pro-
grain . helps in maintaining military
forces which complement our own armed
forces .5
This U.S military role was advocated to
Kennedy by two counterinsurgency experts:
the State Department's Rober Hilsman, and
the British Institute of Strategic Studies' Sir
Robert Thompson.
These two strategists felt, as did Kennedy,
that insurgencies, were internal matters
which could never be completely defeated by
the mere use of force. In their view, If the
U.S. were to rely solely upon force in its
campaign against the NLF, not only would
the "infected population" be alienated from
the Saigon regime but it might very well be
made more sympathetic to the insurgents.
[This alienation would result from the nega-
tive aspects stemming from the pursuit of a
military solution-the destruction of rural
resources, crops, civilians, etc.] The perma-
nent defeat of the SILF, liiismanand Thomp-
son argued, could only be achieved by the ap-
plication of political and social programs "to
which military measures were subordinated."
The actual situation in Vietnam, they had
discovered, was one In which the U.S. advisers
were applying a shot-gun approach; that Is,
they were directing tho available military
force indiscriminately against all areas in
which the NLF was operative. Because of the
ever-extended and diffuse nature of this ap-
proach, the entire anti-NLF campaign was
becoming less and less effective, as "the insur-
gency movement had Infected all areas of the
countryside." 6
In light of the power of the NLF, Thomp-
son advised that if the U.S. were to avoid
an imminent failure, It should withdraw
the ARVN troops to whatever secure base
areas then remained, and begin the construc-
tion of what he termed "strategic hamlets".
A decade before, Thompson had advised the
British Imperial General Staff that if it was
to defeat the Malayan insurgents It would
first have to secure a minimal number of
base areas. In Vietnam, Thompson was even
more convinced of the need for strategic
hamlets. In his view, if the U.S. did not direct
the Vietnamese campaign in that direction,
all future efforts to defeat the NLF would
be both expensive and eneffective.
This strategic hamlet policy was based upon
what later became known as the "oil blot
principle". The principle, as Thompson pro-
sented it, was that the U.S. and the Govern-
ment of Vietnam (GVN), should select those
areas, both urban and rural, with the fewest
number of active Insurgents and begin for-
tifying the villages and hamlets In the
selected areas. [This would necessitate "start-
ing small", for as Thompson noted in his
Defeating Communist Insurgency, most of
South Vietnam's rural provinces were under
the effective control of the NLF.] Within
these hamlets, the U.S. and GVN agents
should concentrate their sociopolitical pro-
grams, and "priority In respect to security
measures should be given to the more highly
developed areas of the country." The con-
centration of U.S.-ARVN counterinsurgency
measures in these select areas was not seen
by Thompson as a loss factor. To the con-
trary, he maintained, there would be many
occasions when the U.S. would have to ac-
cept the fact that the guerillas would main-
tain "control over remote areas" as a result
of "infiltration across inaccessible borders".
If the U.S. were prepared to accept this and
initiate thh process of securing Its base areas,
Thompson believed that there would then be
an increased chance of implementing success-
ful socio-political programs.'Onoe these base
areas were effectively controlled, the U.S.
and GVN could begin the expansion of their
counterinsurgency operations outwards, into
the areas previously controlled by the NLF?
L. R. J. AND COUNTERINSURGENCY
In 1964, the obvious paralysis of the ARVN,
(and the fact that It was being used more to
further political ambitions of its Individual
generals than to fight the NLF), convinced
Lyndon Johnson that the Saigon government
would not survive without a massive increase
in U.S. support and combat functions there.
Such an extension of the direct military role
of the U.S. was enthusiastically supported
by such advisers as Rostow, national secu-
rity expert McGeorge Bundy, and the De-
fense Department's McNamara, [According
to Hilsman, it was essentially Rostow's argu-
ment that had persuaded the President on
this course.] 8 The rationale of this exten-
sion of the war was clearly stated by Gen-
eral William Westmoreland, when he said:
"Everything a nation does-any nation-
must be behind the protective shield pro-
vided by its military services." 8 Thus, the
U.S. combat role In South Viet am, and the.
bombing of North Vietnam, were both in-
tended as the "protective shield" behind
which the Saigon government could embark
on those stop-gap socio-political reforms in-
tended to win for it the "hearts and minds"
of its people.
In January of 1964,. Hilsman left the gov-
ernment in opposition to the new direction
being taken in counterinsurgency strategy,
and with his departure the management of
the policy was removed from the State De-
partment to the Pentagon and National Se-
curity Council. [This managerial change was
to affect not only the Indochina war, but
largely marked the eclipse of the State De-
partment as a significant participant in for-
eign policy development and execution.]
Military supervision of the U.S.'s Third
World policy was consistent with Rostow's
belief that in the final analysis, the U.S.
military would provide for those underdevel-
oped countries' which were "besieged by
communist insurgency," the "security re-
quired for law and order, nation-building,
and all those other requisite conditions of
the 'take-off' stage of (capitalist) develop-
ment and growth." Although the Johnson
Presidency saw the commitment of U.S.
forces in areas other than Southeast Asia, it
was in his continuous and increasing alloca-
tion of combat forces in Vietnam, between
1964 and 1967, that he demonstrated his
faith in the Rostow-Bundy-McNamara
counterinsurgency strategy.
Although the Johnson government greatly
Increased the use of U.S. military force
throughout the Third World, it nonetheless
continued to try to use this force as a "pro-
tective shield." Despite the bullets, bombs
and napalm-despite the bloody and expen-
sive "search and destroy" missions-the pri-
mary objective remained, as it had been,
under Kennedy, the stabilization of these
client areas by means of selective improve-
ments In sociopolitical conditions. [To be
sure, improvements that were to result from
such nations experiencing a capitalist "take-
off'-all fully consistent with the interests of
the Metropolitan powers.]
The increased U.S. role in the shooting war
increased the visible costs of Vietnam to the
American people. The subsequent erosion of
popular support for U.S. involvement, cou-
pled with the psychological defeat suffered
by the U.S. at the time of the 1968 Tot offen-
sive, combined to cost Johnson the Presi-
dency. His successor was to significantly alter
the nature and tactics of counterinsurgency.
Prior to his election, Richard Nixon had
written an article In Foreign Affairs in which
he described what he saw as being "Asia
After Viet Nam." 10 His vision revolved
around the future lessening of the highly
visible U.S, presence in the Far East-this
to be accomplished in the long-run by en-
couraging America's Asian allies, particularly
Japan, to take their places on the front lines
of the Pacific Rimlands as a bulwark against
future insurgent challenges to U.S. client
control. What Nixon saw as being the short-
range prerequisite to this goal was a success-
ful conclusion of the Vietnam w