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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000100670001-2
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• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
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• Publication Date: May 22, 1974
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

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NIARC,H-APRIL 1974 VOL. XXIII
Problems of Communism is a bimonthly publication.
Its purpose is to provide analyses and significant
background information on various aspects of world
communism today. Opinions expressed by contrib-
utors (as well as geographical boundaries and
names used in articles and illustrations) do not
necessarily reflect the views or policies of the
United States Government. Communications on all
matters except subscriptions should be addressed
to the Editors, Problems of Communism, US
Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue,
NW, Washington, DC, 20547.
The Chinese Political Spectrum
by Michel Oksenberg and Steven Goldstein
Sino-Indian Relations: Changing Perspectives
by S. P. Seth
Kim's Korean Communism
by Bruce G. Cumings
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INDEXING: Articles in Problems of Communism
are indexed, inter alia, in the Social Sciences and
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ABC POL SCI.
EDITOR: Paul A. Smith, Jr.
MANAGING EDITOR: Marie T. House
ASSOCIATE EDITORS: Clarke H. Kawakami,
Wayne Ha!I, David E. Albright
DE3iGNER: Joseph D. Hockersmith
The Italian CP at the Grass Roots
by Alan J. Stern
The Life Struggle of Indian Communism
by Bhabani Sen Gupta
The Maoist Educational Revolution
by Theodore H. C. Chen
Stalinism: A Marxist Analysis
by William Zimmerman
Marx and the Soviet Path
by Jiri Valenta
Of Encyclopedias and Economists
by Vladimii G. Treml
The Political Economy of Comecon
by Andrzej Korbonski
Cover: Chou En-lai, veteran party leader and
Premier of the People's Republic of China, pictured
at Peking Airport in 1970. Photo by Denes
Baracs for Interfoto MTI (Hungary) via EUPRA.
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By S. P. Seth
xcept for a brief interlude of Sino-Indian cor-
diality in the mid-1950's, relations between
the two largest and most populous Asian na-
tions over the past twenty-odd years have been
marred by mutual distrust, tension, and occasional
armed hostilities along disputed segments of their
common frontier. In the last two years, however,
there have been subtle indications of a char .e in
atmosphere as a combination of factors has _eem-
ingly impelled both powers toward a more relaxed
and constructive approach to the problems dividing
them.-The present article will endeavor to trace the
beginnings of this change against the background
of the earlier record of tension and conflict.
Observers have generally tended to view the bor-
der dispute as the basic cause of hostility and im-
passe in the relations between India and China. In
fact, however, the border conflict only triggered ten-
sions that developed from other causes. When one
looks back over the checkered course of Sino-Indian
relations, it becomes apparent that the primary
source of strain between the two countries has lain
in faulty assessments on both sides of each other's
political and strategic objectives, not only in the
context of bilateral relations but also in the broader
context of global politics.
In order to see how these misjudgments devel-
oped, it is necessary to go back to 1950, when ten-
Mr. Seth, formerly a Senior Research Officer in the
Indian Ministry of Defense, is currently in Australia
engaged in free-lance writing on China-related as-
pects of contemporary Asian politics. His articles
have appeared in such publications as Asian Survey,
The 'World Today, Pacific Community, and Australian
Outlook.
sion first began building up between India and the
newly-established Communist regime in China. The
starting point was the Chinese military occupation of
Tibet, which removed what had long served as an
effective buffer between China and India. Growing
acrimony in India over the Tibetan issue was tempo-
rarily arrested in April 1954 with the conclusion of
a Sino-Indian agreement whereby China, in return
for Indian acceptance of Tibet as "part of China,"
promised to respect Tibetan autonomy and agreed
to the continuance of certain Indian trading priv-
ileges in Tibet inherited from Britain and the pro-
vision of facilities for Indian religious pilgrims.' But
while this agreement smoothed over the immediate
differences between the two go.'ernments and
ushered in an interval of euphoria in Sino-Indian re-
lations, the atmosphere of cordiality proved short-
lived.
Tibet and the Border Conflict
The main reason for the renewal of tensions was
the fact that the Chinese occupation of Tibet acti-
vated the whole issue of the boundary between Chini
and India, setting in train the long series of claims
and counterclaims, and resultant armed border
I A reading of the text of this agreement shows that India
conceded more than it gained, but the Indian' vernment skilfully
"sold" the agreement to the public by playing up the relative:y
minor Chinese concessions regarding Indian trade and pilgrim traffic
to Tibet and explaining its acceptance of Tibet as "part of China"
as signifying recognition merely of China's "suzerainty" rather
Iron "sovereignty." See in this connection P. C. Cha~ra?:art;.
fnJ1a's China Policy, Bloomington, Ind., Indiana University Press,
1952, pp. 25-57. For the agreement text, see Lek Sabha Secretarial.,
Foreign Policy of India-Teats at Documents (1947-59), 2nd ed.,
N~-w Delhi, 1953, pp. 103-03.
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clashes, that developed during the late 1950's.2 The
boundary dispute mainly involved two widely sep-
arated sectors: the eastern sector, where Tibet ad-
joined India's Northeast Frontier Agency (now
Arunchal Pradesh) and where the line of physical
control generally followed the historic McMahon
Line; and the western sector, between Tibet and the
Ladakh region of Kashmir, where there were conflict-
ing claims on both sides and no clear line of actual
control. Chinese interest centered primarily in the
western sector, more particularly in the Aksai Chin
district of northeastern Ladakh, which lay athwart
the only feasible overland route between China's
Sinkiang Province and Tibet. When India discovered
in 1958 that the Chinese had built a motor road
through the Aksai Chin and established a line of ad-
vance positions guarding the road, the border dispute
suddenly assumed serious proportions. So far as the
eastern sector was concerned, the Chinese had indi-
cated in 1956 that they were prepared to accept the
McMahon Line as the boundary,' but after the dis-
pute in the western sector became acute, they sought
to use their acceptance of the McMahon Line as a
bargaining counter to pressure India into accepting
an overall settlement legitimizing their new "line of
actual control" in the west.
Even though the border problem was largely a
political issue that might have been resolved by
compromise in easier circumstances, it became en-
meshed in the overall climate of mutual distrust that
was again beginning to permeate Sino-Indian rela-
tions. This atmosphere of suspicion deepened still
further with the 1959 Tibetan revolt against Chinese
rule. On the one hand, China's forcible suppression
of the revolt evoked a sharp reaction in India, where
there were open expressions of sympathy for the
Tibetan cause; on the other, the action of the Indian
government in granting political asylum to the Dalai
2 On the positions of each side in the border dispute, see: For
India, Government of India, Notes, Memoranda and Letters
Exchanged and Agreements Signed Between the Governments of
India and China, White Papers Nos. 1-12 (1954-1966), New Delhi;
Government of India, Reports of the Officials of the Government of
India and the People's Republic of China, New Delhi, 1961; and
Surya P. Sharma, "The India-China Border Dispute-An Indian
Perspective," American Journal of International Law (Washington,
DC), January 1965 (reprinted by the Indian Ministry of External
Affairs). For China, The Sino-Indian Border Question, two separate
studies with the same title, Peking, Foreign Languages Press,
1352 and 1965.
3 According to then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, he
received such assurances personally from Chinese Premier Chou
En-tai when they met in 1956. See Government of India, India's
Foreign Policy (Selected Speeches of Jawaharal Nehru, September
J946-April 1961), New Delhi, 1961, p. 360.
Lama in the face of Chinese protests markedly in-
tensified Chinese suspicions of India's intentions with
respect to Tibet, particularly in view of New Delhi's
equivocal position on the issue of China's "sov-
ereignty" over that sensitive region.'
Parallel with these developments, the buildup of
distrust between Delhi and Peking was given added
momentum by the emergence of a Chinese s rategy
aimed at exploiting differences between India and
Pakistan. Evidence of this new strategy appe red as
early as the 1955 Bandung Conference of Afr -Asian
states, at which China's representatives we seen
befriending the Pakistanis despite the fact th t Paki-
stan, through its membership in SEATO (Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization), belonged-to the Western
alliance system. According to Pakistani ac ounts,
Chou En-lai, in private talks with Pakistan's Prime
Minister Mohammad All Bogra during the confer-
ence, unquestioningly accepted the latter's assur-
ance that Pakistan's adherence to SEATO as not
directed against Chinas as well as Bogra's xplana-
tion that Pakistan's "virtual defenselessness is-a-vis
India at that time" necessitated "strengthening its
relative military position even if this had to be done
through American assistance." ' Seen after the con-
ference, according to Rushbrook Williams, ho had
close contacts with the Pakistani official e tablish-
ment,
Karachi received . .. a private message from
Peking. The Chinese People's Government assured
the Government of Pakistan that there was no con-
ceivable clash of interests between the two countries
which could imperil their relations; but that this posi-
tion did not apply to Indo-Chinese relations, In which
a definite conflict of interest could be expected in
the near futrjre.'
In light of these exchanges, it is clear that Peking's
discernment of the potential value of Pakista i friend-
ship in the event of an anticipated conf ict with
4 See in. 1.
5 See Khalid B. Sayeed, "Pakistan and China: The Scope aid Limits
of Convergent Policies," in A. M. Halpern, Ed., Policies Towa. d China:
Views from Six Continents, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1965; utubuddin
Aziz, "Relations Between Pakistan and the People's Republic of
China," in Foreign Policy of Pakistan-A Symposium, Karachi, Th_
Allies Book Corporation, 1964, p. 79.
? Anwar Eyed, "Sino-Pakistan Relations," Pakistan Hori en
(Karachi), 2nd quarter, 1969, p. 108.
7 Rushbrook Williams, The State of Pakistan, London, F~ber,
1962, p. 12J.
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India inspired Chinese readiness to overlook Paki-
stan's alliance with the West. It also seems probable
that the same calculation motivated Peking's con-
sistent refusal-even while India and China still ap-
peared to be on the best of terms-to publicly en-
dorse India's position in the dispute with Pakistan
over ownership of Kashmir.
Peking's Misperceptions
In the latter half of the 1950's, the strains in Sino-
Indian relations were augmented by still another fac-
tor-namely, Chinese misperceptions of India's role
in the context of global politics. These mispercep-
tions stemmed primarily from Indian moves toward
closer relations with both the Soviet Union and the
United States. The Soviet Union, against the back-
drop of deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations, offered
India extensive economic assistance, later supple-
menting it with sales of military equipment, and
there also were indications of a trend toward more
cooperative relations between Washington and New
Delhi. These developments were viev ed in Peking as
signifying a shift in India's international political
"alignments" to the strategic disadvantage of China.e
Against this background of developing Indo-Soviet
and Endo-US ties, the Chinese construed India's con-
tinuing sympathy for the Tibetan cause, so dramat-
ically symbolized by the Dalai Lama's 1959 flight to
political haven on Indian soil, as evidence that India
was becoming a willing too[ in an aggressive inter-
national conspiracy directed against China. This
suspicion found expression in Chinese accusations
that India was being used as a base of American op-
erations to support rebellion in Tibet by training
and arming Tibetan "counterrevolutionary" forces.'
Toward the end of the 1950-62 period, initial
Soviet-American moves toward detente-though
briefly interrupted by the U-2 incident and later by
the Cuban missile crisis-tended to reinforce a
Chinese "siege mentality" that pictured India as a
"front man" for China's more powerful adversaries.
This integration of the supposed threat from India
into Peking's broader perception of a global anti-
Chinese conspiracy created an extremely complex
situation that defied solution through bilateral Sino-
Indian negotiations.
The Chinese, indeed, were right in estimating that
India counted upon developing closer links with the
United States and the Soviet Union as a principal
means of containing a possible Chinese threat to
A.ccc,cing to Edgar Snow, Peking felt that India was "maneuvering
to g.-s bon American and Russian aid in order to oppose the
unification of the People's Republic," See his The Other Side of the
P :er-Red China Today, London, Gollarc2, 1963, P. 591.
9 Sr._ trdian Government V/nits Paper No. 1, referred to in fn. 2
ao;ve, pp. 6C?59.
Indian security. However, their perception of the
developing international situation, and more particu-
larly of India's "involvement" in an aggressive con-
spiracy against China, was clearly overdrawn.
This becomes clearer if we look at the measures
that India was actually taking to bolster its security
vis-a-vis China. These measures combined diplomacy
with discreet precautionary steps more directly re-
lated to military security. On the diplomatic side,
India continued its vociferous professions of friend-
ship for China and sought to promote China's in-
volvement and acceptance in international forums in
the hope that this would subject Peking to a measure
of international discipline. At the same time, New
Delhi took steps to cultivate closer political ties with
the superpowers ? in order to achieve "security
through policy," 10 and it had also sought earlier to
strengthen India's security perimeter by entering
into treaty relationships with the Himalayan states of
Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim.
On the military side, India undertook the con-
struction of strategic roads linking the interior with
the hitherto inaccessible, mountainous border regions
and the establishment of an administrative network
in those areas. Indian units also carried out occa-
sional patrols in the border districts "to show the
flag," and eventually a more active security posture
was adopted with the establishment of so-called for-
ward posts in the vicinity of Chinese-occupied posi-
tions in the disputed areas. These limited military
measures, however, represented more a conscious
.demonstration of India's will to stand up to Chinese
threats than a full-fledged security effort.
In sum, neither India's diplomatic initiatives nor
its military precautions appeared to justify Peking's
perception of India as part of an aggressive interna-
tional conspiracy against China.
Indian Misperceptions
If the Chinese exaggerated, and overreacted to,
the perceived Indian threat, India at this stage also
misjudged the situation-but in an opposite sense.
Despite the apparent strains in Sino-Indian relations,
the Indian government persisted in its belief that a
direct, large-scale military confrontation with China
was politically unthinkable. Consequently, when the
conflicts over Tibet and the border issue became too
conspicuous and threatening to be glossed over any
longer, the government tended to take refuge in e:,-
pressions of righteous indignation at w;iat it saw as
C,' inese betrayal of India's good faith.
10 R. K. Nehru, "Relations with China and Pakistan," The Times of
India (New Delhi), Independence Day Supplement, Aug. 15, 1972.
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it was, indeed, genuinely felt that India had made
vital concessions to China by accepting the latter's
position on Tibet and by crusading on China's behalf
in various international forums; and as an implicit
quid pro quo, New Delhi expected Peking to respect
India's general position in the boundary dispute be-
tween the two countries, which China did not offi-
cially challenge until 1959. It was also felt that the
Chinese had not been forthright in putting forward
their formal territorial claims only after establishing
a forward "line of actual control" in the Aksai Chin
(western sector), for which they then demanded
Indian legitimation." As Prime Minister Nehru sub-
sequently remarked, Indian acceptance of this de-
mand would have been tantamount to condoning
aggression after it had been committed.12 Finally, the
inclusion in China's September 1959 territorial de-
mands of claims in the eastern sector-notwith-
standing Chou En-tai's 1956 assurances to Nehru
that China would accept the McMahon Line in that
area-added to the Indian sense of betrayal. The
Indian general public, having been subjected to
much trumpeting of the slogan Hindi-Chin) Bhai Bhai
(Indians and Chinese are brothers), fully shared this
sentiment, creating an internal political climate that
made it all but impossible for the government to
negotiate a political settlement of tha border issue
on any terms that would be acceptable to Peking.
Thus, the 1950-62 period saw the gradual devel-
opment of a hostile relationship between India and
China which first gathered momentum in the context
of bilateral relations and then acquired global con-
notations as Peking came to view India as part of a
hostile international environment. It was not surpris-
ing, therefore, that confrontation rather than con-
ciliation became the keynote of policy on both sides,
finally producing the border war of 1962.
Hostile Coexistence
Following the 1962 hostilities, which ended in-
conclusively without any agreement settling the bor-
der issue, armed conflict gave way to a state of hos-
i1 Prime Minister Nehru expressed his disillu opment when he
remarked that in the past, whenever India had called th Chinese
Governmen"s attention to errors in Chinese maps showing Indian
territory as part of China, the Chinese had evaded the issue by saying
that "these were old maps, and their revision would be taken
up later when they had the leisure to do so." See India's Foreign
Po:icy, op. cit., p. 350.
12 Government of India, Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, Vol. 4
(Seoternber 1957-Aprii 1963), hew Delhi, 1964, p. 217.
the coexistence between India and China. The hi-
nese remained nervous and suspicious with respe t to
Indian policy on Tibet, especially in view of er-
sisting political instability there and the presen e of
the Dalai Lama and his entourage in India, w ere
Peking feared that he might be encouraged to s t up
a Tibetan government-in-exile backed by India and
outside powers. At the same time, in the global con-
text, Peking became even more fixed in its perception
of India as a client state and cat's paw of China's
major enemies-the United States and the US R-
with whom Chinese relations were steadily worse ing.
Peking's suspicions deepened as India proceed d to
strengthen its defenses with American and especially
Soviet military assistance."
A key element in China's response was the rans-
lation of Peking's discreet approaches to Pakis~an of
the mid-1950's into an active policy of forging close
ties with that country as a regional counterwei ht to
India. The prospects for such a policy must ha''e ap-
peared. particularly bright to Peking in light If evi-
dences of Pakistan's growing disillusionment with its
Western allies for having failed to take advant ge of
India's dependence on their support during th Sino-
Indian border conflict to pressure Delhi into s tiling
the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan on terms fav rable
to Karachi." Accordingly, China in 1963 con luded
a provisional agreement with Pakistan defini g the
boundary between China's Sinkiang Provinc and
that part -of Kashmir claimed by Pakistan,15 a d the
next two years witnessed visits to Karachi y top
Chinese government leaders, who publicly s ressed
China's solidarity with Pakistan.16 Since the border
agreement in effect ignored India's claim o sov-
ereignty over all of Kashmir, it evoked a sha p pro-
13 On US military aid between late 1962 and September 196
when it was discontinued following the outbreak of the '9'15
indo-Pakistan conflict, see K. Subrahmanyam, The Asian alance of
Power in the Seventies-An Indian View, New Delhi, Institu a for
Defense Studies and Analyss, 1968, p. 21. On Soviet mitt ary
credits to India prior to 1965, see Selig Harrison, "Troub d India
and Her Neighbors," Foreign ANairs (New York), January 1965,
p. 326; after 1965, see an estimate of US Undersecretary f State
Kenneth Rush, reported in The Times of India, April 21, 197 .
74 Pakistan's President Ayub Khan made his disillusionme t plain
when he warned his Western allies in October 1963 that t ey should
"not rule out the possibility of Pakistan firmly allying with China
in order to safeguard her independence against Indian agg essicr,."
See B. L. Sharma, Pakistan-China Axis, Bombay, Allied PubI shing
Horse, 1968, p. 96.
15 Text in Government of India, Ministry of External Atfa rs,
Sino-Pak "Agreement" - Scne Facts, New Delhi, 1963, p. 4.
16 During a highly successful visit to Pakistan in 1964, hinese
Premier Chou En-lai voiced general support of Pakistan's tans on
Kashmir and criticized India, by implication, ter adopting a big-
nation chauvinistic attitude of imposing one's will on othirs" (see
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test from New Delhi and further aroused Indian
suspicions of an emerging Peking-Rawalpindi "axis."
There have also been strong indications that
China, prior to the 1965 Indo-Pakistani clash, entered
into an understanding with Karachi committing China
to aid in the defense of East Pakistan if India should
attack that region in a war with Pakistan."
In the event, East Pakistan did not become in-
volved in the 1965 hostilities, so that this under-
standing, if it existed, would not have applied.
Even so, China's failure to give more direct and posi-
tive support to Pakistan during the 1965 conflict
with India caused at least a temporary setback to
Peking's strategy of playing off Pakistan against
India. Instead of abandoning the policy, however,
China redoubled its efforts in order to recover lost
ground."
While trying to groom Pakistan as an external force
contributing to the political fragmentation, and hence
the weakening, of India, China also sought to pro-
mote the same objective by encouraging and sup-
porting subversive forces within the Indian polity.
Peking, in fact, had good reason to be optimistic that
India might soon fall asunder under the pressure of
its internal political contradictions. Maoist-inspired
"Naxalite" elements in India's West Bengal state and
rebellious tribal groups in remote areas of north-
eastern India seemed to provide potential nuclei for
a general Maoist revolutionary upsurge, and in
1966-67 internal political unrest gained momentum
as India faced near-famine conditions because of
widespread drought. The 1967 general elections,
moreover, tended to fragment the Indian polity by
bringing into power in a number of provinces a con-
glomeration of coalition governments composed of
Pakistan Times [Lahore], March 24, 1964). Visiting Pakistan the
following year, then Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi called "the
solidarity of the 750 million peoplrof China and Pakistan ... an
important force for the defense of world peace" (Dawn [Karachi],
March 28, 1965).
' Speaking in the Pakistan National Assembly on July 17, 1963,
thcn Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto strongly hinted at the
existence of a defense understanding with China when he declared
that "an attack by India on Pakistan would also involve the security
and territorial integrity of the largest state in Asia. This new factor
is a very important one. I would not, at this stage, wish to
elucid3,e it any further" (Foreign Policy of Pakistan [A Compendium
of Mr. Bhutto's Speeches as Foreign Minister in the Pakistan National
Assembly], Karachi, Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1965,
p. 75). See also Patriot (New Delhi), June 27, 1969, quoting an
East Pakistani author, Kammaluddin Ahmed, in a bock entitled
Our Freedom Struggle (then banned in Pakistan), to the effect that
there was a detailed understanding between China and Pakistan
regarding the defense of East Pakistan in the event of Indian attack.
1s See the author's "China as a Factor in Indo-Pakistani Politics,"
World Today (London), January 1969.
disparate elements which had nothing in common
except their antipathy to the ruling Congress party.
Although the Congress was returned to power at the
center, its parliamentary majority was significantly
reduced and dangerously faction-ridden.
Amidst these conditions of rampant political con-
fusion, the Peking-backed Communist Party of India
(Marxist-Leninist)-or CPI(M-L)-resorted to tactics
of mass terror, particularly in West Bengal, and China
also undertook to equip and train selected cadres for
an insurgent Naga regime that had set itself up in
the remote hill-country of northeast India. At one
time, it even appeared that the rebellious tribesmen
(Nagas and Mizos) and the Maoist revolutionaries in
West Bengal, with the prompting and encouragement
of Peking, might engage in concerted action to dis-
rupt India's polity.
Given these seemingly bright revolutionary pros-
pects in India, it was not surprising that China was
initially unresponsive when the New Delhi govern-
ment, prompted by a feeling of increased self-con-
fidence resulting from India's relative success in the
1965 clash with Pakistan, initiated a series of signals
in late 1967 indicating its desire to reopen a dialogue
with Peking ;coking toward a normalization of inter-
state re;ations.79 An additional reason for the lack of
response from Peking at this time may well have
been the virtual paralysis of Chinese diplomacy as a
consequence of the Cultural Revolution, which
reached its high point of intensity in mid-1967. In
any event, Sino-Indian relations remained in stale-
mate until after the Ninth Party Congress of the
Chinese Communist Party declared an end to the
Cultural Revolution in the spring of 1969.
Interval of Relaxation
The interval between the latter part of 1969 and
the events leading up to the Bangladesh crisis of late
1971 brought a brief whiff of fresh air into Sino-
Indian relations as Peking's tactics toward India
showed some hopeful signs of change. The probable
reasons for this shift in style (though not in sub-
stance) were several.
First, the change appeared to be in line with
China's new diplomatic approach that began to un-
fold in the wake of the Cultural Revolution. So far as
11 See statement ty the then Indian Foreign 1, inister, M. C. Chagla,
orted i
Th
S
rep
n
e
taPesman (New Delhi), Aug. s0, 1967. The series of
signals cu!minated in a statement by P,ime Minister Indira Gandhi
seeking a dialogue v.?'th Peking, reported in The Hindustan Times
(Ne.v Delhi), Jan. 2, 1959.
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India was concerned, the new Chinese tack mani-
fested itself in a resumption of diplomatic courtesies
and even of some formal contacts between Chinese
and Indian envoys stationed in third countries. The
most significant indication, however, came in Mao
I Tse-tung's reported remarks to the Indian Charge
d'Affaires at a May Day 1970 reception in Peking,
urging that China and India become friends once
again.22
Second, it was no doubt evident to Peking that the
prospects for an anticipated Maoist revolutionary up-
surge in India were already on the wane, with the
Indian left-Communist forces and the Naga rebels
both hopelessly divided -within their respective
ranks." Peking's disillusionment with the tactics and
strategy of the CPI (M-L) was, lit"fact, explicitly con-
veyed to the Indian party in a secret letter from the
Chinese Communist Party,22 which had the contrary
1 effect of further aggravating the fragmentation within
the already divided left-Communist ranks.
Third, contrasting political changes in India and
in Pakistan probably induced a Chinese reappraisal
of the subcontinental balance. On the one hand, the
general political situation in India, though still not
entirely stable following the split in the ruling Con-
gress, did indicate a pro-Indira Gandhi upsurge
which was confirmed in subsequent national elec-
tions. In Pakistan, on the other hand, severe political
disturbances led in March 1969 to the resignation
of President PTub Khan and the establishment of a
new military regime under General Yahya Khan,
which reimposed martial law and suspended the con-
stitution. These events exposed sharp divisions in the
body politic and were bound to create apprehensions
in Peking regarding Pakistan's political stability and
its effectiveness as a counterweight to India.
Finally, China's softened attitude toward India no
doubt resulted, in part, from a growing acrimony in
Indo-Soviet relations caused mainly by a shift in
Moscow's policy vis-a-vis Pakistan. This shift, evi-
denced by a Soviet decision in 1968 to supply so-
phisticated military equipment to Pakistan and by _a
20 The Statesman, June 8, 1970.
21 Chinese hopes of stirring up unrest in India's vulnerable
northeastern border regions were dealt a heavy blow by the Indian
authorities' arrest of Naga rebel "Commander-in-Chief" Mowu Ancami
v.hen he and a number of followers attempted to get back into
Nagaland after receiving weapons and training in China.
See ibid., March 17, 1969.
22 For text of the letter, see Mainstream (Delhi), Oct. 21, 1972,
p. 33. The letter had been originally sent in November 1970.
23 For a detailed discussion of these misunderstandings, see the
authcr's "Russia's Role in tndo-Pak Politics," Asian Survey
(Berkeley, Calif.), August 1969.
24 The Satesman, March 8, 1959.
series of subsequent visits to that country by high-
level Soviet military dignitaries, was interpretec in
India as signifying a Soviet move to follow the W st-
ern policy of creating a parity of power betty en
India and Pakistan. There also were misunderstand-
ings over a host of other matters, including the act
that Soviet official maps continued to reflect endo Be-
ment of Chinese claims in the boundary dispute rith
India." At a time when Sino-Soviet hostility was a out
to erupt in the armed clashes of March 1969 on the
Ussuri River boundary and later along the Ce tral
Asian border, China could hardly have failed to dis-
cern the potential advantage that might be der ved
from exploiting, the simmering differences between
Moscow and New Delhi. In this context, a Radio
Peking commentary at about the same time as the
outbreak of the Ussuri River clashes significantly
omitted India from a list of Asian countries acc sed
of ganging up with the Soviet Union and the U ited
States in an anti-Chinese "Holy Alliance." 21
The Bangladesh Crisis
The easier atmosphere that appeared to be emerg-
ing in Sino-Indian relations in 1969-70, how ver,
evaporated almost as quickly as it had surfaced, as a
combination of regional and global developments
during 1971-the burgeoning separatist move ent
in East Pakistan, the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty of
August 1971, and the December war between India
and Pakistan that clinched the independen e of
Bangladesh-again intensified tensions. between New
Delhi and Peking.
The independence movement in East Pakistan,
which threatened to bring about Pakistan's dismem-
berment, and India's moral commitment to su port
it created an extremely difficult dilemma for P Eking.
On the one hand, China's vital interest in preserving
a balance of forces on the subcontinent dictate that
it act in support of its Pakistani ally. On the other
hand, it wished to avoid provoking India into active
involvement in Pakistan's dismemberment an also
to keep alive New Delhi's interest in normalizing
relations with Peking. Therefore, the Chinese res onse
was muted and twofold.
First, Peking stepped up its verbal professi ns of
"undying friendship" for Pakistan and of support
against possible external "aggression" (obviously
from India). Such pronouncements, it was hoped,
would not only help to deter Indian involvement but
also would offset Soviet criticisms of the repressive
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policies being pursued by the Yahya Khan regime
toward the separatists in East Pakistan."
Second, Peking balanced its vociferous expres-
sions of support for Pakistan with a carefully re-
strained and low-key reaction to popular Indian fervor
for the Bangladesh movement in the hope that such
a response would be less likely to prod India into the
very course of action that Peking wished to prevent.
At the same time, China was reported to be discreetly
advising the Pakistani government "to act with re-
straint and seek a political settlement of the East
Bengal [i.e., East Pakistani problem." 'b Moreover,
when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (later to become President,
and currently Prime Minister, of Pakistan) visited
Peking in early November, 1971 at the head of a
high-level delegation including army, navy and air
force chiefs, Pakistani hopes of obtaining direct
Chinese military help in the event of a conflict with
India over East Pakistan apparently received no en-
couragemen t.='
Thus, China appeared to be trying to walk a politi-
cal tightrope in coping with the threatening situation
on the subcontinent-balancing between loud verbal
support of Pakistan (coupled with quiet diplomatic
pressure for a peaceful resolution of Pakistan's in-
ternal political contradictions) and careful restraint
toward India so as not to destroy New Delhi's hopes
for a nornalizat,?Gn of Sino-Indian relations.
The same note of restraint was evident in the ini-
tial absence of hostile official reaction from Peking
to the conclusion of the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty,
in spite of the fact that it obviously strengthened
India's hand vis-a-vis both China and Pakistan. This
restraint, of course, was cast aside with the outbreak
of the December Indo-Pakistan war, China thereafter
assailing the treaty as an "aggressive alliance" and
claiming that India would never have taken up arms
in support of Bangladesh had it not been for the
deterrent effect of the treaty (i.e., on China).3'
in fact, while the Indo-Soviet treaty did provide
India with a valuable political and security prop such
as the country had not enjoyed at the time of the
1962 border war with China because of Nehru's re-
luctance to seek such a link with any superpower,
25 On the Soviet and Chinese roles In the eang!adesh crisis, see
Zubeida Mustafa, The 1971 Crisis in Pakistan-India, the Scvi:-t Union,
and China," Pacific Community (Tokyo), April 1972.
6 PEI radio report quoting the Rawalpindi cerrespcndert of
The Times (London), also in The Hindustan Times, Nov. 1.. 1971.
77 A dispatch published in The Cbscrver (London), Nov. 13, 1971,
reported that Mr. Bhutto, in an interview following `;s return from
China, indicated the-t Pakistan could "probably hope for little real
help there."
2P `-e, e.g., statement by the Chinese delegate to the UN Sccu-ity
Ccur?.cil ouririg the debate on the atn,.iss;cn of Bangladesh, reported
in The Times of India, Aug. 27, 1972; alto in Peking Review
Dec. 8, 197 Pest 18 ye,.-r5 Pied a ,
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China's options in the Bangladesh crisis would have
been extremely limited even without it. Consequently,
when the crisis actually erupted into war between
India and Pakistan, the role that Peking chose to play
was precisely the limited one that many informed
Indians anticipated: China restricted its response to
efforts to mobilize international diplomatic pressure
as a means of thwarting the realization of India's
objectives.
There were a variety of considerations that con-
tributed to China's decision to eschew military inter-
vention-some military, others political. The military
considerations were essentially three: (1) The logis-
tical and combat limitations that would be imposed
on Chinese forces operating from the difficult Tibetan
terrain amidst a hostile native population' ruled out
anything beyond minor diversionary actions that
would probably be ineffectual. (2) As the Chinese
had learned from an armed border clash at Nathu La
in 1967, when the Chinese had reportedly suffered
high casualties and failed to dislodge the Indians
from their positions, the Indian. border forces were
much better prepared than at the time of the 1962
war. (3) Once hostilities began between India and
Pakistan in December, the speed with which the
Indian forces attained their objectives in East Paki-
stan (Bangladesh) deprived the Chinese of the oppor-
tunity to gain a possible strategic advantage by a
quick thrust from the Chumbi Valley through the
northwestern part of Sikkim, which could have cut
off India's northeastern provinces from the rest of
the country.
The political deterrents were equally cogent: (1)
The Indo-Soviet treaty heightened the probable risk
involved in Chinese military intervention against
India. (2) The activities and subsequent death of
Lin Piao (allegedly in a plane crash in the Mongolian
People's Republic in September 1971) had produced
unsettled political conditions inside China that mili-
tated against any military adventurism abroad. (3)
Peking probably recognized that the independence
movement in Bangladesh was a genuinely popular,
indigenous phenomenon that Pakistan would not be
able to crush, especially in view of the more than
1,000-mile distance between West and East Pakistan.
(4) China probably also realized that military inter-
vention would permanently alienate the population
of Bangladesh from China without creating favorable
objective conditions for the reunification of Pakistan.
All these considerations evidently convinced Peking
of the wisdom of heeding Mao's teaching never to
engage in an unwinnable war. Consequently, the only
2' Michael Peissel, in his book Cave/ers cf Kham-The Se_ret war
in Tioet, Lcnden, Heinemann, 1972, claimed that China for the
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option left open for China was to resort to diplomatic
efforts to -thwart India's intervention in support of
independence for Bangladesh and to prolong the
conflict there in the hope that eventual disenchant-
ment with India on the part of the local population
would promote leftist political tendencies and thus
create favorable conditions for Chinese manipulation
in furtherance of Peking's objectives.
India's speedy victory in`'the war defeated this
Chinese strategy, however, and the immediate effect
of the conflict was to return Sino-Indian relations-
at least on the Chinese side-to the state of hostile
vituperation that had characterized them throughout
most of the 1960's. In the wake of the hostilities,
Peking unleashed an unprecedentedly harsh propa-
ganda assault against India in which it questioned the
very basis of Indian nationhood, denigrating the state
as a British creation,30 and went so far as to voice im-
plied threats that others might do to India what that
country had done to Pakistan." The attacks also
castigated India as a "sub-superpower" that posed
an increasing threat to its smaller Asian neighbors,
and Chinese leaders conjured up a vision of India
as part of a Soviet-dominated encirclement ring
designed to strangle China.32
These emotional outbursts were understandable
in light of Peking's discomfiture at having been un-
able to prevent the dismemberment of Pakistan, and
New Delhi chose to play down the Chinese attacks
and keep open its earlier option for a dialogue be-
tween the two governments. This course proved wise,
for the Chinese, having let off steam, subsequently
returned to a correct, if not very friendly, posture
toward India.
Meanwhile, the drastically altered situation on the
subcontine.~ resulting from the defeat and breakup
of Pakistan confronted both China and India with a
whole new set of problems and concerns that con-
tinue to have an important bearing on their policies
toward each other. These problems and concerns
revolve around two major elements: first, the posi-
tion of Pakistan on the subcontinent; and second,
India's relationship with the Soviet Union.
The Status of Pakistan
dominance of India and the weakened condition of
Pakistan sharply reduced the effectiveness of the
latter, from China's standpoint, as a regional coun-
terweight to India. At the same time, Chliina could
not ignore the fact that Pakistan still faced potential
internal troubles arising from minority autonomy
movements in its Northwest Frontier and Baluchistan
provinces, which presented the danger of a urther
threat to the country's integrity if it were to be en-
couraged on a collision course with India. Both these
considerations tended to incline Peking to and a
new concern for stability, rather than confro tation,
on the subcontinent.
There were, in fact, numerous evidences during
1972-73 of such a concern on China's part. When
Professor John K. Galbraith, formerly US a bassa-
dor to India, visited Peking in September 1972, he
was assured by Chinese Vice-Minister of oreign
Affairs Chiao Kuan-hua that China desired peaceful
relations with and between India, Pakistan and
Bangladesh. Chiao, according to Galbraith 's pub-
lished account, also used the occasion to seek the
American's good offices in counseling his Indian
friends to show greater flexibility and moderation
toward Pakistan's postwar Bhutto government."
Other signs of Peking's new attitude were p ovided
by its favorable reception of both the Simla agree-
ment of July 1972 and the Delhi agreement of Au-
gust 1973," which marked important steps toward
the normalization of Indo-Pakistani relations and the
amicable settlement of various issues.left.by the war.
China's interest in promoting stability on t e sub-
continent, as well as in avoiding any further erosion
of Peking's credibility with Pakistan, likewise dic-
tated a policy of continued political support for the
Bhutto government in order to shore up i s posi-
tion in Pakistan's fragmented polity and provide it
with at least some bargaining power in its negoti-
ations with India. But if Peking was to avoid what
Delhi might see as an outright anti-Indian posture,
its support of Pakistan could not be open ended.
Thus, when the question of the admission of angla-
desh to the United Nations came before he UN
Security Council in August 1972, China acceded,
apparently not without some reluctance,'' to an
I 33 J. K. Galbraith, A China Passage, New York, Hcughtcn
1973; from extracts published in The Hindustan Times. Anri
In regard to the first, the greatly increased pre -I in is'emabad during an official visit to Pakistan, reportec i
30 Chou En-lai in:erview with Neville Maxwell, reported in
The S..ndey Times (London), Dec. 5 and 19, 1971.
3' New China News Agency (NCNA) report, Dec. 17, 1971.
35 In a book published after a trip to China in 1971, former
French Premier Pierre Mendes-France recounted an interview with
Chau En-tai in December 1971. in which Chou took this line. See
l The Times of India, Aug. 30, 1972. On Chinese reception
Delhi agreement, see The Hindustan Times, Oct. 4, 1973.
htifi;in,
11, 1973.
:t, made
35 Prime Minister Bhutto reveeled in press interviews tha it
had required considerable effort on his part to persuade t e
Chinese to exercise their veto in the UN. See report by P. J.
Lakshaman in The Times of India, Jan. 18, 1973; also Ehutto's
interview with Lewis Simons of The Washington Post, gsot d in
I "d 972
v
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appeal from the Bhutto government to exercise
its veto power, but the Chinese delegate to the
Council was careful to make it clear-to both India
and Bangladesh-that China was "not fundamentally
opposed" to the new state and was interested only
in "a reasonable settlement of the issues" between
Pakistan and Bangladesh."
There were subsequent indications as well that
China sought to encourage Pakistan's early recogni-
tion of Bangladesh. Thus, in July 1973, Chinese
official comment warmly welcomed a resolution of
the Pakistan National Assembly authorizing Prime
Minister Bhutto to recognize Bangladesh "at an ap-
propriate time," " and several months later the
Pakistani government-owned Morning News (Karachi)
warned domestic opponents of recognition that Pakis-
tan's friends, including China, could not wait in-
definitely to recognize the "near-reality" (of the new
state).'?
On the Indian side, too, the new situation on the
subcontinent in the wake of the December 1971 war
was one in which India clearly had nothing to gain
from any further dismemberment of Pakistan, en-
tailing as it would the risk of converting that country
into an area of global confrontation and. thereby
undermining India's own security. Furthermore. ris-
ing Soviet influence in Afghanistan, in conjunction
with the existence of minority separatist movements
in Pakistan's adjoining Northwest Frontier and
Baluchistan provinces, was a development which,
notwithstanding the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty,
would clearly be prejudicial to India's long-range
national interest and would likewise tend to con-
strict Delhi's options in international politics.
These concerns, as well as India's genuine desire
to place the new political structure of the subcon-
tinent on a more stable footing, undoubted y lay
behind the more flexible and conciliatory posture
adopted by the Indira Gandhi government toward
Pakistan after the 1971 conflict. The posture itself
was manifest in the series of bilateral negotiations
concerning reciprocal withdrawals of forces from
territories occupied during the hostilities, the re-
patriation of Pakistani prisoners-of-war, and other
matters involved in the process of normalizing
relations.
Pcking and Indo-Soviet Ties
Sino-Indian relations-i.e., India's tie with the Soviet
Union symbolized by the 1971 Indo-Soviet friend-
ship treaty-there is ample evidence that this rela-
tionship sharply intensified Chinese suspicions of a
joint conspiracy on the part of Moscow and New
Delhi against the PRC. Chinese Premier Chou En-lai
personally voiced such suspicions in talks with the
visiting French ex-Premier Pierre Mendes-France, in
Peking in December 1971. Chou denounced Soviet
policy in the Indo-Pakistan war, then going on, as
aimed at catching China between two military jaws-
Siberia and Mongolia in the north and "a Soviet-
dominated India and Bangladesh in the south." '?
Even stronger language was used in a Chinese propa-
ganda broadcast, which assailed India's "invasion" of
Pakistan as "out-and-out aggressive war" directed by
Soviet revisionist social-imperialism" to further its
aims of "setting Asians against Asians" and gaining
"control of the South Asian subcontinent and the
Indian Ocean."'?
China, like India, also feared a possible move by
the Soviet Union to use Afghanistan as a base for
supporting the separatist movements in Pakistan's
vulnerable border provinces. But in this the Chinese
tended to see India as a co-conspirator with the USSR
and Afghanistan in a joint plot to effect a further
dismemberment of Pakistan within the next few
years. These Chinese suspicions were openly ex-
pressed in connection with the July 1973 coup in
Afghanistan, which resulted in the establishment
of a new . government under Prince Mohammad
Daud, reputedly a close friend of the Russians and
a hard-line advocate of the unification of ethnic
groups divided between Afghanistan and Pakistan's
Northwest Frontier and Baluchistan provinces."
Peking's apprehensions regarding Soviet expansion-
ism in South Asia and possible Indian "involvement"
in it may likewise have inspired a Chinese diplomatic
move in June 1973 to encourage Iran to bolster its
military strength by seeking foreign arms and to enter
into closer political and military cooperation with
Pakistan. ,',.._
On the other hand, at a time when the Chinese
were drastically restructuring their foreign diplomacy
in order to counter the growing Soviet threat from
the north, they could not ignore the danger that
a policy of intransigent hostility toward India and
continued refusal to respond to Delhi's overtures
for a dialogue might only push India further into
79 See to. 32.
pivotal element affecting I 40 NCNA English-language broadcast from Peking, Cec. 2'-,
'1 For Huang Hua's statement in the UN Security Ccunal,
Peking Review, Dec. 8, 1972, p. 11.
7 lhid., July 20, 3973, p. 19.
1971.
41 See T.he Austra!;an (Sydney), Aug. 4, 1973, quoting a Clare
Hollingsworth cispatch `rom Peking to the London Daily Telegraph.
4 See reports on visit to TehEran by Chinese Fore'-n Ar!n ste-
39 Quoted in The Times et India Ncv. 12, 1972.
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the embrace of Moscow. One indication of Chinese
awareness of this danger was a considerable toning
down oanti-Indian propaganda emanating from
Peking. Thus, the Indian subcontinent was conspicu-
ously omitted from the customary analysis of the
international situation contained in the Jen-min
Jih-pao (People's Daily) New Year's (1973) editorial,"
thereby sparing India from the kind of violent anti-
Indian invective that had highlighted Chinese propa-
ganda immediately after the 1971 conflict. Even
more significant was the fact that Chou En-tai's report
to the Tenth Congress of the Chinese Communist
Party in August 1973 similarly avoided any direct
criticism of India, although it did make passing
reference to the dismemberment of Pakistan, which
Chou blamed exclusively on the Soviet Union."
There was further evidence that explicitly linked
this apparent softening of the Chinese attitude toward
India with Peking's desire to avoid strengthening-
and, if possible, to weaken-India's ties with the
Soviet Union. Following a visit to China in early 1973,
Sultan Ahmed, editor of the authoritative Pakistani
newspaper Morning News, reported that there was
a feeling in Peking official circles that if Sino-Indian
relations were to improve, India's "dependence on
the Soviet Union" would be reduced."s
As for India, the international situation in the
aftermath of the Indo-Pakistan war tended to bring
to the fore a different but converging set of concerns.
The Indo-Soviet treaty had not only had a harmful
impact on Sino-Indian relations but had also created
the impression in some foreign countries that India
was abandoning its long-standing policy of nonalign-
ment in favor of "alliance" with the USSR. Inasmuch
as India did not conceive of the friendship treaty as
anything like a formal alliance, this situation tended
to persuade New Delhi of the need to correct such
misinterpretations and to broaden its international
options by cultivating balancing relationships with
China and the United States.
India and the Soviet Connection
India's concern in this regard was evidenced by
a number of official statements explicitly aimed at
reassuring the Chinese and others regarding the
nature of the Indo-Soviet relationship. Foreign Minis-
ter Swaran Singh, addressing the Indian Parliament
in late 1972, characterized the view that this re-
lationship was an obstacle to the normalization of
U Reprinted in Peking Review, Jan. 5, 1973, pp. 9-11.
+a Ibid., Sept. 7, 1973, pp. 35-36.
4 Quoted in The Times of India, March 7, 1973.
Sino-Indian relations as "completely mistaken,"
adding:
The Indo-Soviet treaty is not aimed against an
country. We are prepared to consider similar of
ments with any other country that is willing
so. 46
' third
range-
to do
Foreign Minister Singh coupled these reassu ances
with a new bid for direct talks with China on the
issues "which have bedevilled our relations in the
past." {7
Shortly thereafter, the Indian Foreign Minister
used the occasion of a press conference in Tokyo to
clarify India's position on a much broader rage of
issues to which the Chinese were sensitive, including
the Indo-Soviet relationship. Attempting to dissociate
that relationship from Sino-Soviet hostility, Mr. Singh
emphasized that the two were unrelated, an that,
in fact, the strains in Sino-Indian relations ant dated
those between China and the Soviet Union. On
another related and highly sensitive issue, the Soviet-
sponsored Asian collective security scher e, he
avoided any explicit reference to the Soviet proposal
but expressed the view that Asian security co id be
achieved only by strengthening the individual Asian
nations, and that this in turn could be accomplished
only through economic development. Mr. Singh also
reiterated New Delhi's position that Taiwan had
always been part of China, adding that India would
never support self-determination for the island (This
was possibly meant to reassure the Chines that
India would not be a party to any Soviet machina-
tions for an independent Taiwan.) Finally, the Indian
Foreign Minister cited the absence of tensions
on the Sino-Indian border as a hopeful sign p inting
toward improved relations between China and India."
There alsp were more general statements by
Indian government leaders designed to correct mis-
understandings abroad of the Indo-Soviet relation-
ship. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, for example,
categorically denied in December 1972 that India
was anybody's satellite," and in June 1973, in
connection with reports that the Soviet Union was
seeking naval facilities on the Indian coas , she
declared that-india had not given and did not ntend
to give bases to any foreign power." A Nev York
"The Times of India, Dec. 1, 3972.
+s Ibid., Jr n. 10, 1973.
";G d., Dec. 23, 1972.
6? Ictervie.v with Australian Broadcasting Commission, re
in ibid., June 3, 1973. For a detailed discussion of India's
with the ma;cr powers in the aftermath cf sac,;;adesh, see t
author's "Ir.l:ia's New Role in the South Asian Context," Pa
Ccmr-ru,7Yy A--il 1(.73
nr?ed
cia; uns
ific
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Times report from New Delhi in March 1973 pic-
tured Mrs. Gandhi as "seeking to blunt the view that
India's nonalignment is slipping away" and even
pointed to signs of "a delicate turn" in Indo-Soviet
relations. In this context, the report also noted the
Indian government's firm determination not to dove-
tail its economic planning with that of the Soviet
Union."
These indications of a disposition on India's
part to move away from overly close ties with the
USSR in order to mend relations with China were
indirectly reinforced by signs of apprehension in
Moscow. An early evidence of Soviet nervousness
on this score was an article by G. V. Matveev in the
Moscow scholarly journal Problemy Dalnevo Vostoka
(Problems of the Far East), which for the first time
voiced unreserved support of India on the Sino-
Indian border issue and accused China of duplicity
in taking over the Aksai Chin.52 Soviet party chief
Brezhnev's spectacular visit to India in November
1973 could also be seen as attributable, in large
measure, to the same concern over the future orienta-
tion of Sino-Indian relations.
Thus, in two vital areas bearing on Sino-Indian
relations-i.e., the strategic position of Pakistan on
the subcontinent and India's association with the
Soviet Union-the period since the end of the Indb-
Pakistan war has seen forces at work that have
appeared to be nudging both India and China toward
a reorientation of their bilateral relations along lines
of conciliation rather than confrontation. It remains
to sum up the evidences to date of a disposi-
tion on both sides to enter into direct negotia-
tions with a view to composing their past differences.
Trends in Bilateral Relations
On the Indian side, we have already noted Foreign
Minister Singh's renewed appeal for direct talks
with China in his late 1972 statement in the Indian
Parliament, as well as his explicit reassurances to
the Chinese on the Indo-Sovie4t relationship and other
sensitive issues in his Tokyo press conference of
January 1973. It should also be noted that Chinese
accusations of Indian meddling in Tibet, made in the
UN administrative and budgetary committee in Oc-
tober 1972," drew the reassuring response that
=' Fxcrc'.s reported in The Times of India, Va?ch 28, 1973.
=G. V. "Political ;.Machinations of Peiing on the
Indian Sutc~-r;;rent,' Prcbtemy Gatrcvo Vcctoka !:'cscc:+), No. 4,
1972, pp. 22-45; gist reported in The Hind;rsian Times, Jan. 7, 1373.
53 See The Times of India, Cct. 22, 1972.
India unequivocally accepted China's sovereignty
over Tibet, did not harbor any emigre Tibetan gov-
ernment, and was not acting in any way in support
of Tibetan rebellion.54 Furthermore, while Indian
official staters ents, for obvious reasons, have re-
mained non commital on the boundary issue, New
Delhi's expressed desire for talks without precon-
ditions would seem to suggest that India is not
unwilling to discuss and settle the problem on a
compromise basis.
On the Chinese side, too, there have been slight
but-in the aggregate-significant indications of a
more positive attitude toward India. One was the
appointment in March 1973 of a new Chinese Charge
d'Affaires in New Delhi after an 18-month period with-
out diplomatic representation above secretary-level
(the new Charge, Ma Mu-ming, had been First Secre-
tary of Embassy in New Delhi in 1956, during the pe-
riod of Sino-Indian cordiality)." Another was the re-
publication in China in April of a note which Chou
En-lai had addressed to the heads of Asian and African
states in 1962 with regard to the Sino-Indian border
dispute.55 Although the republication was probably
meant to serve notice on India that China was not
likely to retreat from its old position that the
boundary should be fixed on the basis of "actual
control," it could also be seen as reflecting an inten-
tion on Peking's part to take up New Delhi's offer
of direct talks on outstanding issues at an appro-
priate time. Of possible significance, too, was China's
reported abandonment of a cotton-farming project
in a strategic area of Nepal close to the Indian
border, which had aroused Indian apprehensions.
While economic considerations could have influenced
the Chinese decision, the move was viewed, in part,
as a political gesture toward India.57
There have also been roundabout hints in the
diplomatic sphere of a Chinese change of heart.
Coincidentally with Foreign Minister Singh's con-
ciliatory press interview in Tokyo, the Chinese were
reportedly telling a visiting Italian delegation in
Peking (headed by Italy's Foreign Minister) that
China was not intransigent toward India and that,
on the contrary, several attempts had been made on
the Chinese side to promote a new phase of improved
relations between the two countries." Still more
significant, perhaps, was a report that Romanian
President Nicolae Ceausescu told visiting Indian
54 ibid., Nov. 17, 1972. See also Mrs. Gandhi's irtervlew v,,;,.,)
Murray Gart, Time ;New York), Dec. 11, 1372, p. 24.
55 Tr;_ Times of India, March 22, 1973.
51 Reported in The Statesman, April 18, 1973.
57 See The Times of Indiia, April 6 and 27, 1973.
'?a Soe ibid., Jan. 10, 1973.
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000100670001-2
President V. V. Girl in Bucharest last October that he
had the impression of a much more relaxed Chinese
attitude toward India, and that he expeci.eo this to
lead to a normalization of Sino-Indian relations.59
In view of Romania's close political contacts with
Peking and the part it reportedly played as an early
honest broker between China and the United States,
Ceausescu's remarks to the Indian President were
probably more than a diplomatic nicety.
Meanwhile, the new mood on both sides has been
reflected in the attendance of appropriate Chinese
diplomatic representatives at official Indian functions
both in and outside India and in exchanges of cordial
messages between the two governments on important
national occasions. (Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
took note of this in a press interview in Colombo last
year, when she remarked, "Earlier they [the Chinese]
were not on talking terms with us, but now they
are . . . and come for our receptions and the like.
This continues to progress." 60) Other straws in the
wind have been the cessation of the "loudspeaker
war" between the opposing Chinese and Indian lines
of control in the vicinity of Nathu La and the inaugu-
ration of Ethiopian Airways flights to China via India,
with Chinese through travellers permitted to move
about freely in Bombay without Indian visas."
All these scattered bits of evidence, when taken
together, suggest that while no new explicit and
clear-cut policy framework has emerged on either
side, at least there has been significant movement
toward preparing the climate for a dialogue between
New Delhi and Peking. It should be borne in mind
in this connection that substantive changes in
Chinese foreign policy particularly have tended-as
in the case of the Sino-US rapprochement-to follow
after a protracted preparatory course evidenced by
seemingly insignificant changes in emphasis and
subtle nuances. Whether in terms of such minor
clues or in terms of the strategic forces now at work
in subcontinental and global politics, it seems reason-
able to infer that China and India, after two decades
of almost continuous tension and hostility, are at last
moving toward a normalization of their relations.
59 See report in The Overseas Hindustan 7 f?11s (New Delhi),
Oct. 1E, 1973.
65 The Statesman, April 30, 1973.
61 The Times of India, April G and 7, 1973.
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