LETTER TO HON. ALLEN W. DULLES FROM THOMAS E. MURRAY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R000300010038-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 29, 2003
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: December 7, 1959
• Content Type: LETTER

Approved For Release 2003/05/23: CIA-RDP80R01731 8000300010038-1
December 7, 1959
It is my hope that you will be able to find time to
read the enclosed address to be delivered before
the Institute of World Affairs.
I would appreciate any comments that you would care
to give me on my specific disarmament proposal.
With kind personal regards,
Sincerely yours,
Hon. A11en W. Dulles
Central Intelligence Agency
2+30 E Street, North West
Washington, D. C.
_L
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
^ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTM: HR 70-2
DATE: ~ ~ REVIEWER:.)
STAT
STAT
Approved For Release 2003/05/23: CIA-RDP80R01731 8000300010038-1
 Approved For Release 2003/05/23 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8000300010038-1
FOR RELEASE
5:00 pom., December 9, 1959
SUMMARY OF
REMARKS PREPARED BY THOMAS Eo MURRAY
Consultant . to the Joint Committee on Atomic .Energy
for Delivery before the
INSTITUTE OF WORLD AFFAIRS
Huntington-Sheraton Hotel, Pasadena, California
December 9th, 1959
THE DISMANTLING OF THE ERA OF TERROR
During the past decode American armament policies have. been disorderly,
undirected by a clearly defined national purpose. We are now .in danger lest our
disarmament policies fall .victim to the same disorders.
The first task is to define our national purpose in. disarmament negotiations.
The basis of definition must be the distinction between discriminating force, which is
apt for political purposes, and indiscriminate violence, which is inept for political
purposes.
Our purpose must be to dismantle the Era of Terror by dissipating the threat of
unlimited violence that lurks in existent megaton stockpiles.
I therefore propose: (1) that an .international agency be set up to supervise
the destruction of American and Russian megaton weapons; (2) .that. the destruction be
done on a matching basis, weapon for equal weapon; (3) that the process be continued
until. its political purpose is achieved.
(more)
Approved For Release 2003/05/23 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8000300010038-1
 Approved For Release 2003/05/23 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8000300010038-1
Nine reasons stand .in favor of this proposal o (1) i t takes more realistic
account of national security than current American disarmament policy; (2) it goes
to the heart of the issue; (3) it is practical o because its appeal is .to the coincident
self-interest of both parties; (4) it will recommend itself to world opinion and gain
for the United States the initiative in negotiations; (5) it will put an end to the threat
of unlimited violence as an instrument of politics; (6) it will. remove from the cold war
the false issue of "survival", (7) it will release military strategy from the control. of
megaton technology and end the fataD divorce between military and political policy;
(8) it will embody in a limited agency the principl? of international control of weapons
and make possible further developments; (9) it will serve to stimulate the work of the
Intemational Atomic Energy Agency by putting highly enriched fissionable material at
its disposal for peaceful useso
It will. be .objected .that this proposal will .impair the military strength of the
United States and expose us to the risk of sudden massive attacko Neither objection is
valido The first rests on a false concept of strength? The second mistakes the real risk,
which is Soviet use of force, not violenceo
Approved For Release 2003/05/23 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8000300010038-1
 Approved For Release 2003/05/23 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8000300010038-1
FOR RELEASE
5x00 p. m. , December 9, 1959
REMARKS PREPARED BY THOMAS E. MURRAY
Consultant to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
for Delivery before the
INSTITUTE OF WORLD AFFAIRS
Huntington-Sheraton Hotel, Pasadena, California
December 9th, 1959
THE DISMANTLING OF THE ERA OF TERROR
On August 29, 1949, when the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic device, a
new era began in the long history of the relations between politics and force. During the
ensuing decade the pace of political and technological change has been so swift .that men are
now beginning to say that we have reached the end of the era that began in 1949,
One general judgment of the era is becoming increasingly common. We now realize
that the immense drive to arm the United States with nuclear weapons and delivery systems has
not been guided and controlled by a clear and practical national purpose. In particular, five
criticisms are gaining currency.
First, our armament effort has been wrongly subject to the domination of technology.
We have failed to submit technological possibilities to the criterion of military and political
usefulness. Second, the result has been an emphasis on the strategy of unlimited war, as
exhibited in the concept of massive retaliation. Third, the further result has been a complete
divorce between military strategy and political aims. Our dominant military strategy and .its
supporting arms look to the release of unlimited power, whereas our political aims, whatever
they may be, are certainly not unlimited. Fourth, and again in consequence, in the very midst
of the enormous power-struggle now going on in the world arena, our foreign policies lack the
(more)
Approved For Release 2003/05/23 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8000300010038-1
 Appr'ov~ed Fi~r'f~eidase 20b3105123" CfA-I~DI?`80R01731(7000300010038-1
necessary support of force Qur military '?strength"? has degenerated into a mere capacity to wreak
un{invited nuclear violence, which is politically useless? and this very capacity inhib9ts us from
the use of Limited force, which may be politically necessaryo Fifth, this whole disorderly structure
of policy stands under the final peril, which is a lack of more{ sanctiono {t is against the dictates
cal reason that military strategy should accept the control of technologyo P?litics, not techno{ogy,
as the rig~r~?ful masher of military doctrine {t is also against the dictates of reason that the use of
force whir.h mar be the necessary instrurraent of Bustice, should suffer moral degradation and
become a sheer e~.ercise in violence, which c'r~n serve no moral ar political purposeso
These five criticisms are entirely valide If {may say so, {had made them myself
before their valid?aty began to. be commonly recognizedo Taken together, they demonstrate the
instant reed for a new design of American policy, guided by a new vision of the public purpose
of American
The danger at the moment is that American disarmament policies during the decade
to come will be characterized by the same confusions that have marked our armament policies
in the decade that is pasto We swung into action on armament without stopping to put right order
irr our thoughto ~/Ve have already swung into action on disarmament without stopping to correct
the disorder:, of thought that hove already proved so pernicious and will prove pernicious againa
The first problem then is to define the public purpose of America in the field of
disarmamente The bas?ss of definition must be the essential distinction betw:~en violence and
force This is a pclituca{ distinction, based on a moral premiseo By violence {mean the use of
(more)
Approved For Release 2003/05/23 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8000300010038-1
 Approved For Release 2003/05/23 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8000300010038-1
military power in such an extensive, indiscriminating, or even unlimited, measure and manner
that its use becomes inept and useless for the rational purposes of politics, which are always
limited. By force.) mean the use ~f power in such a limited measure and in such a discriminating
manner that .its use becomes an apt instrument for the achievement of .legitimate political goals.
The release of violence is irrational and therefore immoral but the use of force, as thus defined
can be rightful, depending on the political rationality and .moral rightness of the particular pur-
poses for which it is used.
The past decade has been an Era of Terror because over it has hung the threat of
violence--uncontrolled, unlimited, both politically and morally absurd. Our immediate and
urgent purpose, therefore, must be to effect an orderly dismantling of the Era of Terror, by
dissipating this threat of violence. This negative purpose must be allied with the more positive
purpose of effecting the. orderly'construct.ion.of anew era. One cannot give it a name or fully
describe it. But its essential characteristic must be the reinstatement of force as an instrument
for the basic political purpose that is .indicated in the American Constitution, namely "to establish
justice o "
Given the nature of man, the art of .international politics. cannot dispense with the
use, or at least the threat, of force, any more than human society can dispense with law, which
requires force to back it up. On the other hand, international politics perishes as an art~if power
is allowed to suffer moral degradation and become mere violence, which is destruc#,ive of the
very idea of force and of law took.
(more)
Approved For Release 2003/05/23 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8000300010038-1
 Approved For Release 2003/05/23 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8000300010038-1
This statement of the two-fold national purpose of America immediately serves
to make it clear that nuclear tests are not the primary or most important issues The past
decade has not been the Era of Terror because it has been an era of testse The current morator-
ium on all tests has done nothing to banish the threat of violenceo This threat derives from
the escape of nuclear technology from the control of military doctrine and political purposeo
Here the primary issue appearso Technology does not know the difference between violence
and forceo Left to itself, without the control of higher policy, it has tended to enlarge our
capacity to wreak violence, not to use forceo Government, however, is supposed to know
this essential political and moral distinctiono And it is the duty of govemment, by political
decision, to make the implications of the distinction binding both on the deliberations of the
military strategist and on the experiments of the technological experto
The primary issue therefore is a reform of thought, .to be expressed in political
decisionso Moreover, it is not difficult to discern the direction that political decision must
take, if it is to rectify its own past errors and retrieve its own past failuresa The disorders of
policy in the past decade have left as their fateful legacy a great and ever growing stockpile
of weapons of violence--megaton weapons whose destructive capacity is unlimited, if used
in the numbers required by the current strategy of massive retaliations We must assume that
the Soviet stockpile matches our owno The sheer existence of these stockpiles is the proximate
reason why the past decade has been an Era of Terroro These stockpiles have created their own
strategy, which is that of war of annihilationo And the threat of annihilation has in turn
created the terroro
(more)
Approved For Release 2003/05/23 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8000300010038-1
 Approved For Release 2003/05/23 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8000300010038-1
It follows in all logic that the Era of Terror will not be dismantled until these
megaton stockpiles are themselves dismantled. This is the immediate issue presented for political
decision. The decision does not fall to trhe strategist or to the technologist. It falls squarely
within the province of politics; for it is an issue that concerns the public purpose of the United
Stateso The making of this decision by government is the very condition for the restoration of
politics to its rightful place of primacy in the structure of American policy. There is no other
way in which the present rupture between political purpose and military strategy can be healed
in its depths.
I should like, first, to present in general outline the form that this political decision
should take, and then construct the argument, pro and con.
My suggestion has two parts. First, that an international agency be constituted
and located on neutral territory and empowered to supervise the systematic destruction of the
megaton weapons in the American and Soviet stockpiles. Second, that the destruction be done
on a matching basis, weapon for equal weapon. The United States will hand over to the
international agency one megaton weapon, beginning in the highest range; the Soviet Union
will in turn hand over one weapon of the same sizeo Experts in the agency will be able to
estimate, within a small percentage of error, whether the weapons are equal in their yield.
The "hardware" of the weapons will then be destroyed in some public fashion. Their content
of highly enriched fissionable material will be put at the disposal of the appropriate international
authority for peaceful useso This matching of weapons, one for one, will continue. The process
has a pol itical purpose--to end the Era of Terror, to banish the threat of violence, to redeem
(more)
Approved For Release 2003/05/23 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8000300010038-1
 Approved For Release 2003/05/23 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8000300010038-1
force from its moral degradation and its political absurdity. The process will therefore continue
until this political purpose, under "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind," has been
achieved.
Considerable detail ought to be added to this proposal; but the presentation of its
substance is sufficient for the purposes of immediate public debate. I shall undertake to make
the case for it.
In the first place, this proposal takes far more realistic account of the needs of
national security than does current American disarmament policy. Our present policy was
announced at the London conference of 1956, and it has not been changed. It calls for nuclear
disarmament: first, by the cessation of all nuclear tests; second, by the stoppage of the flow
of fissionable. material. into weapons; third, by the total destruction of all existing nuclear stock-
piles. This proposal clearly illustrates our fatal habit of divorcing political and military policies.
For political reasons we declared a moratorium on all tests, despite the fact that military reasons
demanded certain kinds of tests. These tests would develop, what I have called, the third
generation ~ of weapons. They would be carried out underground and give us new types of much
needed limited weapons, defensive and offensive, which could be used indiscriminating fashion.
Moreover, the other parts of the proposal, if carried out, would be fatal to any rational concept
of American military strength. The program would strip us, not only of the capacity for unlimited
and useless nuclear violence, but also of the most useful and necessary capacity to use .limited
nuclear force.
It is true, that the carrying out of the present program was made contingent on the
establishment of international inspection and controls. However, in the matter of tests it
is clear to informed people that an adequate and effective inspection system, which would detect
(more)
Approved For Release 2003/05/23 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8000300010038-1
 Approved For Release 2003/05/23 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8000300010038-1
tests even down to five or ten kilotons is for the present not a definite scientific possibility, '
and fit is also;, for the foreseeabGe future, a political impossibilityo An adequate and effective
system would have to consist of thousands of stations equipped with devices not yet invented;
this is the scientific problems Many hundreds of these stations would have to be on Soviet and
Red Chinese territory; this is the political impossibilityo
Moreover, the stoppage of all nuclear production and the total destruction of
existing stockpiles--stand even farther beyond the possibility of control for scientific and political
reasons Theref'oreo the first argument for my new proposal lies in the need to find a safe alterna-
tive to the extremely risky and altogether unrealistic policy to which we are presently committed.
In the second place, the new proposal goes to the heart of the .issue. It is the
sinister stockpiles of megaton weapons, and the strategies of annihilation built on them, which
give off the fumes of terror that today are poisoning the international atmosphereo The terror has
to be attacked at its source, which is the bilateral and balancing power of the United States and
the Soviet Union to wreck the fabric of civilization in a matter of hoursa These pools of potentially
unlimited violence must be drained aid drieda All other issues are secondary to thiso
Ir1 the third place, this proposal is practical o It should be possible to negotiate an
agreement on.it between ourselves and the Soviet Union, the only two necessary partners to such
an agreemento The single indispensable condition of agreement exists, namely, self-interest,
hard and cold self-interest, the common and coincident self-interest of both parties. It is as
much in the interests of the Soviet Union as it is In our own to avoid the ultimate catastrophe in
which t?he Era of Terror may culminate, if it is not deliberately brought to an end. No national
interest, American or Russian? is served by maintaining and increasing a stockpile of weapons
(more)
Approved For Release 2003/05/23 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8000300010038-1
 Approved For Release 2003/05/23 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8000300010038-1
of violence that are utterly useless for any political purpose, Russian or American. The
political absurdity of unlimited nuclear violence--reciprocally acknowledged--this is the
basic fact on which, as on solid ground, an agreement can be based. In the course of their
rivalry for megaton armament the UaS. and the U.S.S.R. have both been driven into an
absurd situation. There is a common interest in putting an end to it.
Moreover, the proposal is practical for another reason. It avoids the political
stone wall into which other American proposals have always run. This. stone wall is set up
by the Soviet concept of absolute national sovereignty which forbids honest and effective
international inspection of Soviet territory. Anew formula has to be found to establish the
principle of international control. The proposal 1 am discussing contains this new formula.
It does not call for inspection of Soviet territory.
In the fourth place, this new proposal. will .inevitably find favor in the court of
world opinion. This is what the nations really want--that the United States should take the
lead in bringing them out from under the shadow of possible annihilation. The Soviet Union
could not refuse to follow this lead without incurring the political punishment of the disfavor
of the nations. Moreover, by making this proposal the United States would finally assume the
initiative in the problem of disarmament. In all negotiations the party that defines the issue
has already gained the initiative. We lost it by giving way under pressure and allowing the
Soviet Union to define, as the primary issue in disarmament, the cessation of all tests. This
was a grave mistake on many countso We shall rectify it, and gather the initiative into our
own hands, only if we ourselves define the real issue that rightfully claims primacy. This
primary issue is the stockpiled capacity for unlimited violence.
(more)
Approved For Release 2003/05/23 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8000300010038-1
 Approved For Release 2003/05/23 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8000300010038-1
In the fifth place, if megaton means of wreaking violence were thus gradually
to be destroyed by mutual agreement, the threat of violence would cease to be of use as an
instrument of international politicso It would be absurd foa~ a nation to begin surrendering its
weapons of terrorp and at the same time go on brandishing the threat of their used Nuclear
blackmail would be at an endo The international atmosphere would be considerably clearedo
In the sixth placed the essential distinction between the cold war and the Era of
Terror would begin to be realizedo The cold war had begun before the Era of Terror set in;
it will continue after the terror is endedo Basically, the cold war is a crisis in civilizations
The contest is between opposed conceptions of the nature of man, his role in history, and
his relation to the stated This ideological conflict has carried over into the field of politics;
and its economic dimension is continually growingo During the Era of Terror it has also acquired
a military dimension of altogether swollen proportioned Until this military dimension is cut
down to proper size, the real issues in the cold war will be obscuredo
In particular, it is absolutely necessary to remove from the cold war the issue of
sheer physical survival o This issue has done nothing but dQrken counsel, paralyze purpose, and
confuse policyo The issue is fundamentally false; survival should never be an issue in political
strugg)es or even in warn But a.nightmarish sort of reality attaches to the issue.of survival
because of the megaton stockpiles whose use would imperil the survival of everybodyo Until
these weapons are destroyed, the issue of survival will continue to distract the mind of America
from its real jobs The public purpose of America in opposing world Communism will remain
blurred, undefined to ourselves, to the Soviet Union, and to all the worldo
more)
Approved For Release 2003/05/23 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8000300010038-1
 Approved For Release 2003/05/23 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8000300010038-1
In the seventh place, a most salutary effect would be produced on American
strategic thought. At least since 1953 it has stood under the hypnotic influence of megaton
technology. Its focus has been fixed on the strategy of annihilation. The concept of massive
retaliation has held it in deadly thrall. The spell can only be broken by the political decision
to enforce the primacy of politics and to begin an orderly surrender of weapons that are
politically useless. This decision would compel the military strategist to take new thought.
There could at .last take place a movement towards increased flexibility in strategic thinking,
towards a revival of the traditional principle that the aim of a general is the will. of the opposing
commander, not the butchery of his forceso still less the .total destruction of his country and
the indiscriminate slaughter of .its civilian population. Thus military doctrine would find its
way to rightful relation with political aims. The fatal rupture would come to an end. And with
this change in strategy from emphasis on inept violence to emphasis on apt force the technology
of weapons would at last be brought under proper rule and restraint. The tail. of technology
would cease to fly the kite of strategy.
In the eighth place, a step would be taken toward the positive goal of American
disarmament policy.. The distant goal, still far over the horizon of the future, is the gradual
transfer of the right to use arms and to produce nuclear armso to some new kind of international
authority. A small step toward this goal would be taken by establishing an.international agency
empowered to supervise the destruction of weapons of violence. This assignment is very limited.
But the new agency would embody the essential principle of intemational control of nuclear
armament. The principle would have been publicly recognized in the face of the nations and
extensions of it would gradually become possible.
(more)
Approved For Release 2003/05/23 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8000300010038-1
 Approved For Release 2003/05/23 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8000300010038-1
In the ninth place, a considerable amount of highly enriched fissionable
material would become available, presumably to the International Atomic Energy Agency,
for peaceful purposes particularly for the development of industrial nuclear power. This
fact would give a tremendous and badly needed impulse to the whole program of Atoms for
Peace. This development would have important consequences both in the improvement of
international relations as well in the advance of economic progress.
Here then are the reasons in favor of the proposal . What are the reasons against
it? There are only two.
First, it will be said that an agr?ement to match the Soviet Union in the destruc-
tion of weapons of violence would impair the military strength of the U.S.
This objection rests on a false concept of strength. I do not consider it strength
on our part to consent to the current degradation of force into violence. On the contrary,
it is weakness. Surely, it is moral weakness. It is a failure of the moral intelligence to under-
stand what is going on, or a want of moral courage to stop this process of corruption. It is
also political. weakness. It is a failure of the political intelligence to see the absurdity of
violence, and to see also the rational necessity of force, for .the purposes of politics. Moreover,
unless this process of moral degradation is checked by the courage of political decision, the
result will. be to continue and increase our military weakness, the weakness of a nuclear estab-
lishment whose political uselessness grows more and more apparent, and the weakness of a
technology, whose resources of power are exploited without purpose, because they lack due
military and political direction.
(more)
Approved For Release 2003/05/23 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8000300010038-1
 Approved For Release 2003/05/23 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8000300010038-1
It is becoming apparent today that we have been pursuing an illusion of strength
along adead-end road, the same dead-end road into which technology turned military doctrine
in 1953, when the hydrogen bomb assumed control of strategy. Since that day our nuclear
superiority has been lost. A balance of nuclear power has been established. In this new situa-
tion the strategy of ultimate deterrence plus massive retaliation and the megaton stockpile
which supports this strategy have lost whatever value, both military and political, they may
once have had in the past day of our nuclear superiority.
The conclusion is that we ought now to make some political use of this stockpile
since it has been a military liability. Self-interest presently dictates that we trade in our
great weapons of violence, one for one, with the Soviet Union doing the same, as a political
deal with a political purpose. This act of self .interest would also be an act of the moral
conscience of America and a declaration of our civilized public purpose. We would give
witness in action that we shall not abdicate the right uses of force, but that we do abjure the
senseless uses of violence, because .we understand .that politics needs force, but morals condemn
violence.
The second objection raises the ultimate question: Would the proposed action
invite massive Soviet aggression and open the U.S. to defeat and .destruction? Would not the
Soviet Union "cheat on10 the agreement in order to gain nuclear superiority in megaton weapons,
and then would it not, at some given moment, launch a total attack.on the U.S.?
(more )
Approved For Release 2003/05/23 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8000300010038-1
 Approved For Release 2003/05/23 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8000300010038-1
This possibility cannot be absolutely excluded. Here is the irreducible risk.
No policy can take account of every single future possibility. Policy directs. itself to what
is likely to happen, not to what may ,possibly happen. Risks must always be calculated.
On any fair calculation the risk involved in my proposal is minimal. Certainly it is far
less serious than the risk involved in the present American disarmament proposal .
It has to be remembered that the distinction between force and violence, which
I am urging as the basic premise of American policy, does in fact constitute the basic premise
of Soviet policy. In contrast Communjsm is not committed to the political ineptitude of
unlimited violence. The communist purpo$e is always to use apt force, whenever it is useful
or necessary. Here.l.ies the real risk for the U.S. Force is forever the servant of Communist
policies. It will be used not only on the defensive occasion but also to further the success of
the offensive move.
Therefore the U. S. must always expect from the. Soviet Union the threat, and the
use of apt force in support of declared policies. This, I repeat, is the real risk, the ever
present likelihood--in fact, the certainty--to which American policy must address itself. This
risk .was disregarded by the sweeping three part disarmament policy set by the U.So in 1956.
My proposal takes it fully into account.
For the rest, there remains the outside possibility, the unlikely contingency, the
tenuous risk that no disarmament policy, however ingenious, can absolutely exclude. Might
it not happen that, at some future and undetermined date,. in a conjectural situation of
possible Communist nuclear superiority, the Soviet Union might conceivably threaten the use
(more)
Approved For Release 2003/05/23 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8000300010038-1
 Approved For Release 2003/05/23 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8000300010038-1
of total nuclear violence, for no very clear or predictable political. purpose? Who could
possibly answer this question? This is not the kind:of guesswork .on whstich present American
policy ought to be basedo For my part, I cherish the confident hope that, if such a threat
of violence were ever to be made, the United States would be secure enough in other forms
of valid nuclear strength, to have the courage simply to defy ito
Let us, however, come back from speculations about the unforeseeable future
to the certain and seen realities of the presente The existent fact is that the real. invitation
to military helplessness and political defeat before the advancing .farces of Communism is
being issued by the present rigidity of the American posture, both political and military,
that refuses to make the essential distinction between apt force and inept violencea The
enforcement of this distinction points the only way to security, both for ourselves and for
al I the wort d o
I do not, of course, maintain that it will be easy to negotiate in detail the
precise and concrete meaning of this distinction as applied to nuclear stockpileso But I do
maintain that this is the cardinal issue that needs to be negotiatedo I further maintain that the
necessary premise of negotiation existso It is a matter of self-interest to both parties to agree
to the distinction itself and to strike a further agreement to negotiate its practical meaning.
Success in the negotiations is not assuredo But at least success is amore genuine possibility
and a more instant necessity in this area than anywhere elseo
Nor need we fear that the guidance of Divine Providence will be lacking to us
as we thus set to work to dismantle the Era of Terror, which has grown increasingly offensive
to the moral conscienceo The redemption of mankind from the dominion of terror is not alien
to the intentions of Godo
Approved For Release 2003/05/23 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8000300010038-1
 STAT
Approved For Release 2003/05/23 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8000300010038-1
Approved For Release 2003/05/23 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8000300010038-1
 Approved For Release 2003/05/23 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8000300010038-1
Please file this with ER 12-104ao
Approved For Release 2003/05/23 :CIA-RDP80R01731 8000300010038-1