THE OPTICAL INSTRUMENTS INDUSTRY OF EAST GERMANY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01093A001000080001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 60
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 26, 1999
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 23, 1955
• Content Type: IR

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PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
THE OPTICAL INSTRUMENTS INDUSTRY
OF EAST GERMANY
CIA/RR PR-130
23 December 1955
ib-C6.7 f
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
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:W~~NIN,QThis material conta3xis i .formation affecting
the National ,Defense of the ,United States
Within the meaning of thy espionage laws,
Title ' 18, USC, Secs. 793, and -794, the trans
mission or revelation of. hich in aay manner
to an unauthorized?person is prohibited by law.
17
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S-E-C -
PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
THE OPTICAL INSTRUMENTS INDUSTRY OF EAST GERMANY
CIA/RR PR-130
(ORR Project 34.643)
NOTICE
The data and conclusions contained in this report
do not necessarily represent the final position of
ORR and should be regarded as provisional only and
subject to revision. Comments and data which may
be available to the user are solicited.
E
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S -E -C -R -E -T
CONTENTS
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
A. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1. Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. Importance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
B. History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
C. Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1. Comparisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Convertibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
II. Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
A. Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
B. Current Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1. Lagging Product Development . . . . . . . . . . 12
2. Expanding Production in Other Areas . . . . . . 12
3. Legal Attacks on the Use of Trade Names . . . . 13
III. Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
A. Distribution Pattern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14+
B. Exports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
C. Military Requirements 16
IV. Future Expansion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
V. Inputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
A. Manpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
B. Raw Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
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Page
1. Quartz and Fluorite Crystals of Optical
Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2. Black Instrument Lacquer . . . . . . . . . . . 22
C. Component Parts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1. Small, Precision Ball Bearings . . . . . . . . 22
2. High-Quality Camera Shutters . . . . . . . . . 23
D. Replacement of Capital Goods . . . . . . . . . . . 23
VI. Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Intentions . . . . . 24
A. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
B. Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
C. Intentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Appendixes
Appendix A. Optical Instrument Plants in East Germany,
1955 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Appendix B. Technology of the Production of Optical
Instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Appendix C. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Appendix D. Gaps in Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Appendix E. Source References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1+9
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S -E -C -R -E -T
Tables
Page
1. Estimated Output of the Optical Instruments Industry
of East Germany in Current and Constant Value,
1946-55 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2. Fulfillment of Production Plans in the Optical
Instruments Industry of East Germany, 1949-54 . . . . 11
3.
Estimated Distribution of Optical Instruments Produced
in East Germany, by Broad Categories, 191-4-9-53 . . . . 14
4. Estimated Exports of Optical Instruments from East
Germany, 1951-53 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5. Estimated Employment in the Optical Instruments
Industry of East Germany, 1947-55 . . . . . . . . . . 18
6. Distribution of the Labor Force in Ten Optical ,
Instrument Plants in East Germany, by Sex and by Duty,
1951 ......................... 19
Estimated Major Raw Material Requirements for the Pro-
duction of Optical Instruments in East Germany,
1950-55 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
8. Optical Instrument Plants in East Germany, 1955 . . . . 28
Estimated Output of Optical Instruments in East Germany,
by Plant, 1547-54 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
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Illustrations
Following Page
East Germany: Major Optical Instrument Plants,
1955 (Map) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
East Germany: Estimated Output of Optical Instru-
ments, 1946-55 (Chart) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
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CIA/RR PR-130 S-E-C-R-E-T
(ORR Project 34.643)
THE OPTICAL INSTRUMENTS INDUSTRY OF EAST GERMANY*
Summary
The optical instruments industry of East Germany, reduced almost
to inactivity following World War II, has made a spectacular recovery
to its wartime level of production. Between 1948 and 1952, both value
of output and employment quadrupled. The value of output in 1954,
DME (Deutsche Mark East) 189 million, was 24 percent over the value of
output in 1952. In 1954 the East German industry employed about one-
quarter as many productive workers as the US industry, being easily
the largest producer of optical instruments in the European Satellites.
Although 85 percent of the wartime production of the optical in-
struments industry of East Germany was consumed by the armed forces,
only about 10 percent is used currently for military purposes. The
export market is now absorbing 50 percent of the total production,
but this market is dwindling because of Western competition and legal
restrictions on the use of established trade names. If stocks of un-
sold goods accumulate, the industry may receive budgetary cutbacks.
Given increased demand, the further expansion of the production
of optical instruments in East Germany would easily be possible be-
cause equipment requirements are modest and East Germany has skilled
labor readily available and an adequate source of optical glass. No
expansion is likely, however, unless it is stimulated by unexpected
demands by the Soviet Bloc or by an increase in military requirements.
For the present, at least, the optical instruments industry of East
Germany appears to have reached its postwar production peak.
* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent
the best judgment of ORR as of 1 November 1955.
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I. Introduction.
A. General.
1. Definition.
The term optical instrument is used in this report to
denote a device which may operate to transmit, reflect, refract, and/or
diffract visible light or ultraviolet or infrared radiations by means
of precisely formed solid elements such as lenses, prisms, mirrors,
and gratings. It also includes the housing or mounting for these
elements, a means of adjustment, and such nonoptical accessory com-
ponents as are needed to make a complete instrument. Such devices
are products of what is loosely referred to as the optical instru-
ments industry, a group of plants associated by common principles
of design, materials, and manufacturing methods.
Not properly included are certain products which may have
a similar nomenclature or purpose but which are produced by other in-
dustries, such as the electron microscope, the cathode-ray tube, the
mass spectrometer, X-ray analytical instruments (diffraction and
absorption equipment), and searchlights and similar illuminating de-
vices which incorporate so-called "lenses" that are not ordinarily
formed to the exacting tolerances common to optical instruments.
In some instances, precision instruments not employing
optical systems are produced in optical instrument plants. A discus-
sion of these instruments is not included in this report except where
specifically noted.
The functions performed by optical instruments are so
many and so varied that a detailed enumeration of them would be
impractical.* Some idea of the scope of their functions, however,
may be drawn from the following major categories:
* Reference may be made to published texts for a comprehensive review
of optical instruments, their principles of operation, and their applica-
tions. / (For serially numbered source references, see Appendix E.)
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a. Military Optical Instruments.
Fire-control devices.
Observational instruments.
Aerial reconnaissance instruments.
Training equipment.
b. Civilian Optical Instruments.
Industrial, commercial, and engineering
instruments (such as those for surveying,
shop measuring and inspection, and pro-
fessional photography).
Medical instruments (such as microscopes,
diagnostic and surgical instruments, and
ophthalmological instruments).
Research and analytical instruments (such
as astronomical instruments and devices
for chemical analysis and physical testing).
Consumer instruments (such as eyeglasses,
magnifying glasses, photographic equipment,
telescopes, and binoculars).
3. Importance.
Optical instruments fill many needs -- for example, as
military end items and in industrial equipment and consumer goods.
During wartime, military requirements, both direct and indirect,
place demands on the producing industries substantially in excess
of those imposed by the economy in peacetime. The demand for mili-
tary end items such as fire-control devices, observational instru-
ments, aerial reconnaissance instruments, and training equipment
rises sharply, and this demand is superimposed on increasing re-
quirements for both medical and industrial instruments. Such'a
contingency becomes the more serious because there are, in general,
no suitable substitutes.
Although the production of optical instruments fills a
wide variety of needs which must be met in modern economies and which
may become critical during a war, its contribution to Western econo-
mies and to that of East Germany normally is small. Roughly 0.5 per-
cent* of the total labor force of East Germany found employment in
See V, A, p. 18, below.
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the optical instruments industry in 1953, and the contribution of the
industry to the gross national product probably did not exceed the same
proportion. Despite the lack of data, it is estimated that the combined
direct and derived employment attributable to the production of optical
instruments would not account for over 1.5 percent of the total labor
force.
The high rate of growth exhibited by the optical instru-
ments industry of East Germany in the period following World War II
decreased sharply in 1954 and will continue to level off in 1955 and
1956.* Consequently, it is probable that the industry will not con-
tribute a larger share to the gross national product in the near future
and may decline in relative importance.
B. History.
In Germany in the century preceding World War II the produc-
tion of optical instruments developed from an empirical craft pur-
sued by a few independent artisans into a highly technical industry
resting on a sound theoretical basis and employing thousands of workers.
Even before World War I, Germany's world dominance in this field was
unchallenged, and as recently as 1945 its optical instruments industry
was the largest in the world. 2/
After World War II and the partition of Germany, East Germany
retained about one-third of the prewar optical instruments industry,
including the important centers in Jena, Dresden, and Rathenow. It
also retained the principal central European producer of optical glass,
VEB (Volkseigene Betrieb -- People's-Owned Enterprise) Jenaer Glaswerk
Schott and Genossen, formerly Schott and Genossen, Jena. 3/ During
1945 and 1946 the industry was dismantled thoroughly, and 90 percent
or more of its production equipment was removed to the USSR. 4/
Even with its production facilities thus severely crippled --
and despite such other adverse factors as Soviet demands for large
reparations deliveries and the loss of key personnel through conscrip-
tion to the USSR and defection to the West -- the postwar East German
industry recovered notably to achieve by 1953 an output probably about
equal to that of the same area in 1944.
See II, B, p. 12, below.
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In addition to rebuilding the domestic optical instruments in-
dustry of East Germany, East German skilled labor, technical experts,
and production equipment have been forced since World War II into the
development of the optical instruments industries of both the USSR and
the European Satellites. Before World War II, Germany dominated most
of the European industries, either exporting finished products to
other nations or controlling their small industries as subsidiaries.
In the postwar period there seems to be a deliberate policy of build-
ing up the production of the other Satellites in spite of the fact
that East Germany rapidly regained a position where it could meet
the optical instruments requirements of the other Satellites. The
fact that deliberate encouragement was extended to the smaller indus-
tries of the other Satellites is attested by Soviet orders compelling
the leading East German firm, VEB Carl Zeiss Jena, to furnish,
against its will, considerable quantities of production equipment
and data to Polish and Czechoslovak optical instrument plants. J
C. Technology.'
1. Comparisons.
There are few noticeable differences in technological
development between the optical instruments industry of the US and
that of East Germany. Those differences which do exist in their
instruments are in the favor of the US and generally are related to
more "gadget" features than to fundamental principles of design.
Although such features may not be materially important to the func-
tioning of the instruments, they do affect vendibility, and this
factor has had an adverse effect on the competitive position of
East Germany in the export market. 6/
With respect to production equipment, the optical in-
struments industry of East Germany may be inferior, at least tem-
porarily, in the following:
a. In the Application of Digital Computers
to the Calculation of Optical Systems.
The calculation of optical systems is one of the
most laborious tasks known in practical mathematics, and the use
of the digital computer in the US in recent years has encouraged
* For additional discussion of the technology of the production of
optical instruments, see Appendix B.
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the development of more exacting and more complex optical system
designs than were practicable previously. Because neither the USSR
nor any of the European Satellites is known to have produced a prac-
tical digital computer as yet, jj the optical instruments designers
of East Germany may not currently have access to this advanced design
aid.
b. In the Ruling of Diffraction Gratings.*
Efforts of the research department of VEB Carl Zeiss
Jena to reproduce the diffraction-grating ruling machines previously
developed, and removed by the USSR after World War II, were not
effective at least up to mid-1953. Spectroanalytical instruments
employing diffraction gratings have not appeared among the postwar
products of the optical instruments industry of East Germany. 8/
The other European Satellites have no optical instru-
ments industries approaching that of East Germany in technological
development. Even Czechoslovakia, which has grown markedly since
World War II, lags behind East Germany in the diversity and complex-
ity of production, in facilities for research in the design of op-
tical instruments, and in the level of development of manufacturing
methods.
If desired, it seems probable that the USSR could re-
duce considerably the technological inequalities among the optical
instruments industries of the European Satellites by making East
German methods and equipment more generally available. By this type
of exploitation of East German knowledge, the USSR has already
greatly advanced its own optical instruments industry and has provided
some degree of aid to the smaller Polish and Czechoslovak plants.**
This demonstrated ability to disseminate the more advanced East
German technology among the other Satellites, when desired, reduces
somewhat the advantages presently accruing to the Western economies
from the lack of technological development in the optical instruments
industries of the smaller Satellites.
2. Convertibility.
Converting an optical instruments industry from a peace-
time to a wartime basis may involve a considerable revision of the
* A diffraction grating is a series of very fine, accurately spaced,
straight lines ruled on a suitable surface for the purpose of pro-
ducing spectra by interference.
** See B, p. 4, above.
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product mix but may not necessarily involve much change in the character
of the materials and equipment used or in the manufacturing methods.
The principal problem, therefore, becomes one of attaining the necessary
level of production, which involves the procurement of the necessary
production facilities and equipment and the training of an adequate
labor force.
Both the production equipment and the labor force of the
optical instruments industry may be divided into categories, in terms
of product, as follows: those involved in the production of the non-
optical components of the instruments and those engaged in producing
the optical elements themselves and in assembling the optical instru-
ments. The first group involves principally metal-foundry and machine-
shop equipment and personnel, which may be made available in wartime
at the expense of less critical industries. For the second group,
however, there is no reserve, because it is in a large measure peculiar
to the industry. The limiting factors in attaining wartime expansion,
therefore, would be the availability of production equipment and of
personnel equipped to produce and assemble the optical elements of
the instrument.
In this respect, East Germany is fortunately situated.
Currently capable of sustaining a production of optical instruments
approximately equal to its peak production during World War II and with
a considerable apprentice-training program in effect,* the problem
of East German industry conceivably could be reduced largely to the
procurement of the necessary jigs, fixtures, and tools (commonly pro-
duced within the industry) and to the organization of manufacturing
methods suited to large-batch production.
The absence of purposeful stockpiling of optical instru-
ments which might be needed by the East German armed forces in war-
time offers confirmation of the fact that the facilities of its
optical instruments industry are considered to be readily capable
of conversion to wartime production.
The 16 plant organizations of the optical instruments industry
of East Germany are under the immediate direction of the Main Adminis-
tration for Precision Mechanics and Optics, which is subordinate to
See V, A, p. 18, below.
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the Deputy Minister for General Machine Construction in the Ministry
for Machine Construction. 9/
Until late 1953 the optical instrument, plants were organized
in the VVB (Verwaltung Volkseigene Betrieb -- Administration of People's-
Owned Enterprise) Optik. When the former Ministries for Heavy Machine
Construction, for General Machine Construction, and for Transportation
and Agricultural Machine Construction were combined to form the present
Ministry for Machine Construction, 10/ the VVB Optik was dissolved,
and the optical instrument plants were assigned to two combines under
the Main Administration for Precision Mechanics and Optics, each com-
bine headed by a Leitbetrieb (Directing Enterprise). 11/ Thirteen
of the plants are organized in an optical combine having the VEB
Carl Zeiss Jena as its Leitbetrieb. Three optical instrument plants
and other producers of nonoptical instruments are contained in a pre-
cision mechanical combine under the Leitbetrieb VEB Feinmesszeugfabrik
Suhl, a producer of precision instruments.
The exact functioning of this reorganized structure is not entirely
clear. The most notable result of the changes appears to be a tighten-
ing of authority of the Ministry for Machine Construction over the
optical instrument plants. The control of the individual plants con-
tinues to originate practically in the ministry, which is empowered to
deal directly with the State Planning Commission, to allot stocks of
raw materials and funds within its sphere, and to police the per-
formance of its subordinate units. Considerably more authority is
entrusted to the Leitbetriebe, however, than was entrusted to the
former VVB Optik. The individual plants appear to have been reduced
almost to the level of branches of the Leitbetriebe, which conduct
administration, research and development, planning, personnel manage-
ment, and quality control; determine production norms; and direct
production and sales for the entire group of plants. 12/
Although the new structure reduces even further the self-
determination of the individual optical instrument plants, it may
have been instituted in an attempt to increase the efficiency of
the supervision of the plants by transferring a part of this function
from the ministerial bureaucracy to a position closer to the operating
level.
Although the Leitbetriebe concept has been attributed to a
tendency in East Germany to imitate the USSR, 13 there is no evidence
that the Soviet optical instruments industry is organized in any
similar manner. This type of administrative structure appears to be
an East German creation, at least in its application to this industry.
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II. Supply.
A., Production.
Available evidence indicates that, conforming to the long-
standing German reputation for self-sufficiency in the field of optical
instruments, the import of such instruments into East Germany is neg-
ligible and that the national production, therefore, is a reasonable
measure of the total supply.
The estimated output of the optical instruments industry of
East Germany in 1946-55 is shown in Table l.* In view of the wide
variety of instruments produced, the production of the industry is pre-
sented in total value terms. First it is presented in current East
German factory delivery prices (Effektivpresen) -- that is, the
price paid to the producing plants for instruments by the DIA
(Deutscher Innen- and Aussenhandel) and the DHZ (Deutsche Handels-
zentrale), the organizations through which all export and domestic
marketing is effected. For purposes of comparison, perhaps a more
accurate measure of real production based on the average 1949 output
per worker has been included in Table 1. Comparison of the 2 value
series indicates that about 21 percent of the reported increase in
the current value of output between 1949 and 1953 may be attributed
to price increases.
Clearly evident is the very rapid recovery of the optical
instruments industry of East Germany after its dismantling in 1946
to a current level of production estimated to be approximately
equal to its peak production during World War II. The recovery
was facilitated materially by the following factors:
(1) An adequate reserve of skilled labor was available,
particularly in the prewar producing centers in Jena, Dresden, and
Rathenow.
(2) Optical glass was obtainable from VEB Jenaer Glaswerk
Schott and Genossen, Jena. Although the types and quality were not
adequate for complete freedom in design, it was generally possible to
adapt the design to the glass available.
(3) Requirements for production equipment were modest and
traditionally have been fulfilled largely by the industry.
* Table 1 follows on p. 10.
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Regionally, the area of greatest output is in Jena, Bezirk
Gera, which in 1954 accounted for 56 percent of the national output
of optical instruments. Next in importance are the 11 plants in
Bezirk Dresden, which turned out about 27 percent of the 1954 output.
Rathenow, Bezirk Potsdam, accounted for approximately 10 percent of the
1954 output, and the balance (about 7 percent) was distributed among
3 plants elsewhere.*
Measured in terms of plan fulfillment, the optical instru-
ments industry of East Germany has established a good postwar record,
overfulfilling planned output during 3 of the 4 years for which in-
formation is available. The production of the industry during several
years (1949-54) of rapid growth is shown in Table 2.
Fulfillment of Production Plans in the Optical Instruments Industry
of East Germany a/
1949-54 -
Number of
Production b/
(Million Current DME)
Fulfillment
Year
Plants Included
Planned
Actual
(Percent)
1949
1
45.2
49.8
110
1950
4
70.8
74.3
105
1951
12
120.0
113.6
95
1952
13
145.0
163.1
112
1953
16
N.A.
185 c/
N.A.
1954
16
N.A.
189 c/
N.A.
a. 1
b. These figures include the production of nonoptical instruments
in 1 plant in 1949 and in 2 plants in 1950-52, inclusive.
c. Figure from Table 1, p. 10, above.
* For a list of the major optical instruments plants in East Germany
in 1955, see Appendix A, Table 8, p. 27, below, and for the estimated
output, by plant, in 1946-54, see Appendix C, Table 9, p. 40, below.
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The leveling off of the production of optical instruments in
East Germany which occurred in 1954* is expected to become more pro-
nounced in 1955 and 1956.
In its recovery since World War II the East German industry,
aided by the worldwide reputation of such names as Zeiss, Ihagee,
and others, was able to dispose of an increasing percentage of its
expanding production by export until, by 1953, one-half of the
national output was being shipped to foreign consumers.** The
current serious problems of the industry arise from its dependence
upon foreign buyers to support its present high level of production.
The following factors are especially pertinent:
1. Lagging Product Development.
In undertaking to reacquire a high level of pro-
duction in East Germany after World War II, the development of new
optical instruments with appeal for foreign consumers was neglected.
Partially, this neglect may have been because of the shortage of
key design personnel resulting from large-scale conscriptions for
service in the USSR and defections to the West. In any event, the
East German optical instruments industry entered 1954, for example,
with only 5 readily vendible camera models to offer foreign buyers
plus 5 others of limited exportability, as contrasted with the ready
availability in large quantity of 180 models from the enterprising
optical instruments industry of West Germany. 15/
2. Expanding Production in Other Areas.
East Germany is experiencing increasingly intense
competition in world markets, particularly from the US, West Germany,
Italy, and the USSR. 16/ Japan also is a serious competitor.
In addition, there is evidence that various countries
in the Soviet Bloc are becoming self-sufficient in at least a few
consumer optical instruments. Soviet-made cameras, for example, may
be purchased in such diverse markets as Bangkok, Thailand; Bombay
* See Table 1, p. 10, above.
See Table 4, p. 15, below.
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and Calcutta, India; and Rangoon, Burma; and they have appeared
recently in Greece. 17/ It appears that an optical instruments
industry is being started in Communist China, one of the principal
markets for Satellite products. 18/ The initiation of the produc-
tion of consumer cameras is expected in 1955 in Poland, Hungary,
and possibly in Rumania. 19
3. Legal Attacks on the Use of Trade Names.
Arguing that it had transferred its activities legally
to West Germany since World War II and that the expropriation of its
Dresden plant without indemnification did not encompass rights to trade
names belonging to the firm, Zeiss-Ikon AG, Stuttgart, West Germany,
obtained an order in a Swiss court in December 1953 banning the sale
of the long-established products of VEB Zeiss-Ikon, Dresden. In the
following months, similar actions by West German Zeiss firms suc-
ceeded in barring the sale of many East German optical instruments
bearing well-known Zeiss trade names in West Germany, Italy, Belgium,
and the Netherlands and caused the impounding of optical goods forwarded
from East Germany for exhibit at the Cairo Trade Fair in March 1954. 20/
A large part of the East German export trade in opti-
cal instruments since World War II has included instruments using trade
names which originally were the property of the Carl Zeiss Foundation,
now considered legally to be located in West Germany. The possible
extension of sales bans to additional areas of the non-Soviet Bloc world
could limit materially the ability of the optical instruments industry
of East Germany to continue to distribute about one-quarter of its
exports in those markets. Legal counteractions in West Germany having
failed, the East German industry has been forced to abandon the use
of valuable trade names in connection with much of its non-Bloc trade
and to undertake the difficult process of introducing new and unknown
trade names in an already highly competitive export market. East German
Zeiss products have appeared in the West in 1955 bearing the trade
name "Ernst Abbe Jena" instead of "Carl Zeiss Jena."* The West Ger-
man Zeiss organization, in a statement issued in November 1954, con-
tends it has sole rights to the name "Ernst Abbe." The legal contro-
versy presumably will continue.
* Ernst Abbe assumed management of the firm on the death of Carl
Zeiss, its founder, in 1888.
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A. Distribution Pattern.
The distribution pattern of the many types of optical instru-
ments is so complex that it is only treated in general terms. The
percentage distribution of the East German output of optical instru-
ments by broad categories, in 19+9-53 is shown in Table 3.
Table 3
Estimated Distribution of Optical Instruments Produced
in East Germany, by Broad Categories a/
194.9-53
Percent of Total Production
Category 12 119950 1951 1952 1953
Military optical instruments 6 18 7 10 9
Ophthalmic instruments 7 9 6 10 N.A.
Optical instruments and lenses 28 19 31 26 N.A.
Optical photographic equipment 59 54 56 54 N.A.
Total 100 100 100 100 100
a. For the derivation of these estimates, see Appendix C.
Table 3 clearly indicates the low level of production of
ophthalmic instruments, which are intended principally for consump-
tion by the Soviet Bloc, and the consistently high proportion of
readily vendible photographic equipment. The small percentage of
production for the military forces shows significant variation only
in 1950, when a first order for 200 Model A-1-p aerial gunnery
trainers* for the USSR accounted for about 25 percent of the value
of the 1950 production at VEB Carl Zeiss Jena. No trainers were pro-
duced in 1951, and the inclusion of 79 units in the 1952 production
at Carl Zeiss Jena accounts approximately for the difference shown
See III, C, p. 16, below.
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in Table 3 between the output of military optical instruments in 1951
and in 1952.
B. Exports.
Quantitative estimates of the exports of optical instruments
from East Germany in 1951-53 are shown in Table 4.
Estimated Exports of Optical Instruments
from East Germany a/
1951-53
Exports Percent of
Year (Million Current DME) Total Production
1951
36
32
1952
58
38
1953
101
55
a. For the derivation of these estimates,
see Appendix C.
Table 4 shows clearly the rapid rise in East German exports of
optical instruments in recent years. Well aware of the reputation of
its optical instruments, the East Germans have incorporated them regu-
larly in the negotiation of foreign trade contracts. 21/
The general trend of exports is perhaps typified for the opti-
cal instruments industry of East Germany by the export plan of VEB
Carl Zeiss Jena, producer of over 50 percent of the national output,
which in 1953 and again in 1954 contemplated the delivery of about
75 percent of its instruments for export goods to Soviet Bloc coun-
tries, including Communist China, with the balance to be distributed
in non-Bloc markets. 22
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C. Military Requirements.
Military optical instruments comprised about 20 percent of the
gross sales of Carl Zeiss Jena in 1933. By 1939 the proportion of
output for the armed forces had reached almost 75 percent and prob-
ably exceeded 85 percent during World War II. Data on the prewar
production of military optical instruments at other East German plants
are lacking but may be inferred from the Zeiss example.
By contrast, military optical instruments have been only a
small proportion of the production of the optical instruments indus-
try of East Germany during the postwar years.* The lack of emphasis on
this category of production may have stemmed from an increasing
self-sufficiency of the USSR and the other European' Satellites in the
production of such instruments and from a desire to exploit the foreign
trade possibilities of established East German optical instruments.
It also may have resulted from well-founded suspicions of political
disaffection among East German optical instrument workers. 23/ In
any case, work for military purposes before 1952 was confined largely
to the repair of military optical instruments 24/; the production for
the USSR of the type of instruments produced in Germany during World
War II; and the production of instruments not designed for employment
directly in warfare, such as aerial photographic equipment, aerial
gunnery trainers, and radar trainers.
Since early 1952, key technical personnel returning to East
Germany from extended periods of service in the USSR have been re-
employed in considerable numbers in important design and development
posts in the optical instruments industry, 25 and some evidence of
renewed development activity in the field of military optical instru-
ments has been observed, particularly in the fields of photogrammetry
and fire control.
VEB Carl Zeiss Jena is the only producer in the Soviet Bloc
of the Model A-l-p aerial gunnery trainer, a device resembling an
airplane cockpit in which an instructor, for purposes of training,
may simulate by optical means various conditions of flight and of
aerial combat. Zeiss first produced this complicated instrument in
1950. It shipped 200 units to the USSR in 1950, 79 in 1952, and
135 in 1953. An order for 135 units to be furnished in 1954 probably
was increased to about 150 units during that year. 26/
* See A, p. 14, above.
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Before 195+ the Model A-1-p aerial gunnery trainer was pro-
duced solely for the Soviet Air Force, but two trainers probably
were shipped to Communist China in late 1954. 27 Also, the 1955
export plan of VEB Carl Zeiss Jena contemplates the delivery of
50 of these Model A-1-p trainers to China in 1955. 28/
Influences currently operating to hinder a continued high
level of production of consumer optical instruments plus the near-
availability of newly designed military optical instruments suggest
the probability that the proportion of East German production devoted
to military end items will increase.
IV. Future Expansion.
It may reasonably be inferred from the very rapid recovery of the
optical instruments industry of East Germany since World War II that
production has kept pace with increased capacity. Capacity is defined
to allow for the imbalances in inputs which occurred during the period
of expansion. Shortages of production equipment in the early postwar
years and, at a later date, poor-quality optical components probably
retarded the full utilization of the existing supply of skilled labor.
Postwar expansion generally has taken place within the framework
of facilities existing at the close of World War II. Stripped plants
have been re-equipped, war-damaged buildings gradually have been re-
stored, and plants occasionally have been shifted from one optical
firm to another -- for example, the Dresden/Reick plant of VEB Zeiss-
Ikon was transferred to VEB Carl Zeiss Jena. 29/
No new optical instrument plants have been constructed, but at
least temporary use is being made of idle facilities at the Rheinmetall-
Borsig AG, Soemmerda Werke, of the business-machine industry, 30/ and
plans to utilize the additional capacity of the same industry at VEB
Mechanik Bueromaschinenwerke Optima have been reported. 31 The produc-
tion of projection equipment in excess of the current capacity of VEB
Filmosto Projektion in Dresden has been transferred to the Geraetewerk
Friedrichshagen in Berlin, not previously a producer of optical instru-
ments. 32/
These very modest steps toward an increase in productive capacity
tend to support a conservative view on the probable course of output
of optical instruments in East Germany in 1955 and 1956.
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V. Inputs.
A. Manpower.
One of the most important inputs to the optical instruments in-
dustry is labor, about 50 percent of which must be skilled or semi-
skilled. The estimated employment in the optical instruments indus-
try of East Germany in 1947-55 is shown in Table 5.
Estimated Employment
in the Optical Instruments Industry
of East Germany a/
1947-55
Year
Number of Workers
1947
4,700
1948
6,700
1949
14,100
1950
18,300
1951
22,700
1952
26,700
1953
30,600
1954
31,200
1955
31,200
a. For the derivation of these
estimates, see Appendix C.
The distribution of the total labor force in 1951 among various
categories has been determined for 10 East German optical instrument
plants, which accounted in that year for about 25 percent of the total
output of the industry, and is shown in Table 6.*
Table 6 follows on p. 19.
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Table 6
Distribution of the Labor Force in Ten Optical Instrument Plants
in East Germany, by Sex and by Duty a/
1951
Category of Workers
Number
of Workers
Percent of Total
Labor Force
By sex
Males
2,238
55.3
Females
1,809
1+4.7
Total
4,047
100.0
By duty
Administrative workers
338
8.4
Technical workers
307
7.6
Productive workers
2,594
64.1
Helpers
128
3.2
Apprentices, male
275
6.8
Apprentices, female
405
9.9
4,047
The high proportion of female workers, approximating that of
the early years of World War II, is significant, L4/ as is the trend
to increase the ratio of females to males in apprentice programs,
which tends to place the optical instruments industry in a favorable
position in case of a wartime demand for male personnel.
The ambitious training program of the optical instruments in-
dustry of East Germany, as shown in Table 6, is being continued with
about 4,500 workers enrolled in 1953-54 in apprentice programs dispersed
among 13 East German plants. Assuming a 3-year apprentice training
period, which appears to be standard in the industry, the expected
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annual increase in trained productive workers would appear to be about
1,500, more than the anticipated increase in total employment in 1954
over 1953. Taking into account deaths, transfers, defections, and the
possibility that the ratio of productive workers shown in Table 6 is
presently not fully representative, it still appears that the appren-
tice program probably supplied the industry's needs for new productive
workers in 1954 and will produce a surplus in 1955. Some of this sur-
plus may be used to replace older workers of questionable political
reliability. 35/
In view of the currently expanded condition of the optical
instruments industry, it does not seem likely that further require-
ments for labor in event of a major war would introduce extreme dif-
ficulties. Such increases in productive labor as might be necessary
could be expedited, as they were by both sides during World War II, 36/
by abandoning the 3-year apprentice program in favor of a 6-month
period or more of training designed to produce a single well-developed
manipulative skill. By such means, the total skilled labor force
could be increased rapidly.
It seems likely that the optical instruments industry of East
Germany is capable of supplying its normal requirements for trained
productive workers for possible peacetime expansion during the next
several years and, by modifying its training program, could meet the
demands of wartime expansion without undue delay.
The optical instruments industry requires small quantities of
a wide variety of raw materials. 37/ Its consumption of such basic
materials as ferrous metals, plastics, copper, and copper-base alloys
is relatively small. On the other hand, it is the only consumer of
optical glass and a consumer of an appreciable amount of fine-mesh,
closely graded abrasives. Estimates of the major raw material re-
quirements for the production of optical instruments in East Germany
in 1950-55 are shown in Table 7.*
The requirements listed in Table 7 are modest quantitatively,
but there have been reports at various times of shortages of all the
raw materials listed, 38/ as well as of complaints of poor quality.
In general, it appears that the optical instruments industry of East
Germany is receiving sufficient supplies of these materials on the
Table 7 follows on p. 21.
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Table 7
Estimated Major Raw Material Requirements for the Production
of Optical Instruments in East Germany a/
1950-55
Raw Material
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
Optical glass
727
846
1,135
1,372
1,402
1,402
Abrasives,
all types 727
846
1,135
1,372
1,402
1,402
Aluminum,
all forms 433
504
676
817
835
835
Magnesium,
all forms 28
32
43
52
53
53
Brass, all forms
727
846
1,135
1,372
1,402
1,402
Ferrous metals, all forms
930
1,153
1,361
1,565
1,596
1,596
a. For the derivation of these estimates, see Appendix C.
average, but erratic deliveries, 39/ substandard quality, and failure
of supplies to conform to specified dimensions and composition 40/ have
had deleterious effects on the quality of the instruments, the fulfill-
ment of specific production quotas, and the accomplishment of delivery
commitments. 41
Shortages of other important raw materials have been reported 42/
even when annual requirements are quite small. Of particular importance
are the following shortages:
1. Quartz and Fluorite Crystals of Optical Quality.*
The principal East German consumer, VEB Carl Zeiss
Jena, required 500 kilograms of quartz crystals and 100 to 150 kilo-
grams of fluorite crystals for the 1953 production program. 43/
Neither material occurs naturally in the European Satellites in the
required quality, and attempts to produce these materials synthetically
in the Zeiss crystal laboratory have not had significant success. 44/
Attempts at illegal procurement of quartz and fluorite crystals from
non-Soviet Bloc sources are continuing 45 with generally indifferent
success.
* For a discussion of the required qualities of these materials and
their applications, see Appendix B.
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2. Black Instrument Lacquer.
The quality of black instrument lacquer available in
East Germany L6 results in finishes of low durability, which soon
develop faults and expose the metallic parts to corrosion, thereby
affecting the quality of the optical instrument.
Economies of some raw materials are being achieved by the
institution of recovery processes, L7 but, in normal peacetime pro-
duction, there is little reason to believe that the deficiencies in
the quality and supply of raw materials will be remedied materially
within the next year.
In the event of war, the quality and the delivery schedules
of raw materials produced in East Germany probably could be improved,
as is evidenced by the ready availability of high-grade materials when
they are required for the production of military optical instruments
and of optical instruments to be shipped to the USSR. 48 Shortages
of materials not produced in East Germany or in the other European
Satellites might then be alleviated by deliveries from the USSR, which
appears to have adequate domettic sources for most of the raw material
requirements of its own optical instruments industry.
C. Component Parts.
The supply of nonoptical components in the optical instru-
ments industry of East Germany differs little from that for raw
materials. Small quantities of a wide variety of nonoptical com-
ponents are required, and the industry has been subjected to inter-
mittent deficiencies in quality and supply, particularly with respect
to the following:
1. Small, Precision Ball Bearings.
Small, precision ball bearings are required for use in
microscopes, particularly in the fine focusing mechanism, and were
formerly obtained from West German sources. Although the 1953 require-
ments of VEB Carl Zeiss Jena for 26,000 ball bearings apparently were
met by East German suppliers, the quality was such that further finish-
ing was required after receipt by Zeiss. 491 Zeiss has started pro-
duction of small, precision ball bearings, and improvement in the supply
may be expected.
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2. High-Quality Camera Shutters.
When Germany was partitioned after World War II, the opti-
cal instruments industry of East Germany was cut off from Munich and
Calmbach, formerly its sources of high-quality, between-the-lenses
camera shutters. The resulting deficiency caused distress among East
German producers of high-grade cameras, as is evidenced, for example,
by the poor performance of the earlier postwar "Contax" cameras made
by VEB Zeiss-Ikon in Dresden. 50 VEB Zeiss-Ikon undertook to develop
the production of camera shutters, but the shutters produced have not
been of a highly satisfactory quality. 51/ It is likely that a con-
siderable quantity of camera shutters reaches East Germany through
illegal channels, particularly because such items are small, light de-
vices of considerable unit value. 52
D. Replacement of Capital Goods.
The recovery of the optical instruments industry of East Germany
after World War II was facilitated by its modest requirements for pro-
duction equipment, both in quantity and complexity.
Glassworking machinery is about the only equipment peculiar to
the optical instruments industry. Although permitting a high order of
accuracy of work, the machinery is in itself simple and traditionally
has long been made within the industry.
Automatic screw machines and certain other simple machine tools
were available from postwar supplies in East Germany in sufficient quan-
tity to permit the fabrication of the available amounts of raw materials.
As a result of the recent reconstruction of the optical instru-
ments industry and assuming a reasonable balance between the acquisi-
tion of production equipment and the expansion of production, it is
probable that 50 percent of the industry's equipment is not over 5
years old and that 75 percent is not over 8 years old. As obsolescence
is not a major factor, it is not likely that requirements for the re-
placement of important production equipment will assume noticeable
proportions for a considerable period.
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VI. Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Intentions.
A. Capabilities.
About one-quarter of the size of the comparable US indus-
try in terms of productive employment 53/ and capable of sustained
production about equal to its peak production during World War II,
the optical instruments industry of East Germany is in a position to
contribute substantially to the over-all economy of the Soviet Bloc,
both in peace and in war. Highly competent technically and pro-
duciag a considerable part of the necessary production equipment
within the industry, it could assist materially in the development
of less advanced optical instruments industries in other European
Satellites.
The optical instruments industry of East Germany is readily
capable of at least a moderate further expansion. A material in-
crease in production, however, is not likely in the near future,
because current production is satisfying domestic and Soviet-Bloc
demands and is supplying an annual exportable surplus which is be-
coming increasingly difficult to market.
The optical instruments industry of East Germany is geo-
graphically concentrated largely in the areas of Dresden, Rathenow,
and Jena. Its principal source of optical glass also is located in
Jena. It is well integrated and capable of rapid recuperation as
its recovery since World War II testifies. The industry is vul-
nerable to the interruption of its supply of major raw materials,
to the loss of key technical personnel, and to the malfunctioning
of the planning system.
The denial. of certain imported materials such as optical
quartz and fluorite crystals and boron compounds 54/ (for use in
the production of many forms of optical glass), although not result-
ing in inactivity, has proved distressing in the past and hampers the
development of production of advanced types of optical instruments.
C. Intentions.
Recognition by responsible authorities 55/ of the forces
operating to limit the continued high level of production in the
optical instruments industry of East Germany plus recommendations
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for the development of types of instruments acceptable to foreign
buyers, the dispatch of trade delegations to various Asiatic and
South American countries to spur the sales of instruments, 561 and
the utilization of a system of subsidies to the producers of in-
struments for export L7/ suggest that a vigorous offensive to re-
capture dwindling foreign markets is contemplated.
Reductions in about mid-1954 of the advertised prices of
certain photographic equipment 58 and reports of plans to expand
production in 1955 of inexpensive box-type cameras 59 appear to
indicate an intention to improve the exploitation of the domestic
market.
The considerable proportion of the optical instrument plants
in East Germany which were devoted to the production of military
optical instruments before World War II has been discussed.* By
contrast, the current low level of such production in East Germany
does not suggest the imminence of expanded military activity.
See III, C, p. 16, above.
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APPENDIX A
OPTICAL INSTRUMENT PLANTS IN EAST GERMANY*
1955
* For the location of the major optical instruments plants in East
Germany, see the map, following p. 3)+.
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b-E-C -R-E-T
APPENDIX B
TECHNOLOGY OF THE PRODUCTION OF OPTICAL INSTRUMENTS
1. General.
The production of an optical instrument involves six major opera-
tions within the optical instruments industry, as follows:
Design
Production of raw materials for optical elements
Production of optical elements
Production of nonoptical components
Assembly
Testing
These operations are generally characterized by the high levels of
skill, versatility, and experience required of the workers; the close
tolerances to which specifications are held; the small size of produc-
tion lots and the consequent infrequency of continuous processes; the
small quantities of raw materials required and the small cost of raw
materials relative to that of labor; the diversification and considerable
degree of specialization of the production equipment; and the stability
of techniques and methods over long periods of time. The brief descrip-
tion which follows is intended only to outline the nature of each opera-
tion.
2. Design.
The detailed designing of an optical instrument is a process of
compromise -- that is, compromise among the desired instrumental speci-
fications, the characteristics of available optical glasses, the aber-
rations inherent in optical systems, and the specifications of avail-
able grinding and polishing tools and test plates, as well as among
such more common factors as costs, anticipated market, available produc-
tion equipment, and skilled labor. The final design is evolved partly
by empirical methods and partly by calculation, the latter being among
the most complicated and laborious operations in practical mathematics.
Both the quality of the design and the speed with which it is achieved
are in direct ratio to the experience of the designer and his familiarity
with the facilities of the plant.
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In recent years the introduction of the digital computer into
design work in the US has expedited enormously the calculations,
thereby encouraging the use of more exact (and more complex) mathe-
matical descriptions of optical systems and generally enhancing the
role of mathematical operations in developing and checking design
specifications.
3. Production of Raw Materials for Optical Elements.
Optical elements are generally made of glass, occasionally of
various crystalline minerals, and, in certain cases, of transparent
plastics. Regardless of the nature of the materials, its use in
optical elements demands a very high degree of optical homogeneity;
freedom from color, solid occlusions, and bubbles; transparency;
chemical and physical stability; resistance to deformation under
stress; the property of taking a high polish; and close adherence to
the accepted optical specifications -- that is, of index of refrac-
tion and dispersions -- for the specific type from batch to batch.
About 200 glass compositions, with optical specifications dis-
tributed over a considerable range, have been developed and are pro-
duced in relatively small quantities by a carefully controlled batch
process. Raw glass is delivered as chunks, resulting from cooling
the batch in its crucible, or as cast slabs. In the US, varieties of
glass for which there is large demand are produced by a continuous
process in the form of long slabs and, for use in certain applications,
by rolling into sheets much in the manner in which plate glass is made.
Glass which is intended for processing into spectacle lenses, ophthalmic
glass, is not held to such rigid tolerances as is optical glass.
Optical glass undoubtedly is the most critical single material
entering into optical instruments and, with very few exceptions, one
for which no satisfactory substitute is known.
Crystalline minerals are used for optical elements which must
demonstrate physical properties that glasses do not possess, as fol-
lows: quartz for the transmission of ultraviolet radiation; sodium
chloride, silver chloride, potassium bromide, caesium bromide, and
caesium iodide for studies in infrared; calcium carbonate (calcite,
Iceland spar) and sodium nitrate for polarization; calcium fluoride
(fluorite, fluorspar) and lithium fluoride for correcting for chro-
matic aberration; and so forth. Most of these materials now are pre-
pared in crystalline form of excellent optical properties by passing
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a melt of the material at a slow and closely controlled rate through
a sharp temperature gradient which includes the melting point. With
the notable exceptions of calcite and fluorite, which have not yet
been crystallized successfully, this process has freed the optical
instruments industry from dependence upon natural sources for optical
crystals.
During World War II, efforts were made to prepare optical ele-
ments of various plastics because of the advantages offered by these
materials in infrangibility, transparency (greater than that of optical
glass in some cases), low weight, and properties favorable to molding
directly to final form. Small optical elements of two materials, poly-
styrene and pblycyclohexyl methacrylate, were produced for use in
binoculars, tank periscopes, and other military optical instruments,
in which they performed quite satisfactorily. In general, however,
plastics are regarded as inferior to optical glass except, perhaps, in
the production of elements with aspheric surfaces, which are exceedingly
difficult to form in glass to the strict tolerances required.
4. Production of Optical Elements.
Optical elements are formed from raw glass blanks by lapping, using
successively finer abrasives until the desired configuration is achieved.
The process is characterized by the crudeness of the lapping machinery,
by its slowness, and by the exceptionally high accuracy of the finished
work, the dimensions of which may well have tolerances as rigorous as
one millionth of an inch. The abrasives in common use are the following:
for rough grinding, carborundum, alundum, corundum, boron carbide,
diamond dust, and emery grit; for truing and smoothing, emery powder;
for final polishing, rouge which is used almost universally; and for
a preliminary polish, burned aluminum oxide and more recently cerium
oxide, zirconium oxide, and titanium oxide.
The grading of abrasives is most important, particularly in the
finer grain sizes, because a few coarse particles in the smoothing
and polishing abrasives can produce deep scratches, which are expen-
sive and time consuming to remove.
A considerable saving in time has been accomplished in recent years
through the use of surface generating machines employing cylindrical
sintered diamond tools and vacuum chucks and operating upon glass
blanks pressed roughly to final form. With this equipment the pre-
liminary roughing to form requires only a minute or two.
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optical crystals are shaped by methods essentially the same as
those employed for glass. Plastics, however, have been molded to
final form with an accuracy sufficient for certain limited applica-
tions.
The ruling of diffraction gratings is performed automatically
by machines which require the utmost precision in their manufacture
and operation.
Formed optical elements are often "coated" to increase the
transmittance of light. This operation consists of the exposure
of the element to the vapor of a metallic salt in a vacuum chamber
and results in the application of a very thin, uniform layer of the
salt on the element surface.
Optical elements frequently are employed in the form of combina-
tions assembled with a cement, Canada balsam being by far the most
generally used.*
5. Production of Nonoptical Components.
Aside from the processing of optical elements, the production of
components for optical instruments presents no appreciable problems
which are unique to the optical instruments industry and which can-
not be solved by ordinary foundry and machine shop operations.
6. Assembly.
In the assembly of optical instruments, the only extraordinary
operations are those involved in the mounting of the optical elements,
some of which must be centered or mounted with a high degree of pre-
cision and stability.
7. Testing.
Optical instruments generally require final testing and fine
adjustment to precise performance specifications. Unusual skill and
long experience are required in this operation, the success of which
is predicated upon a thorough knowledge of the instruments, their
function, and their anticipated performance.
* German scientists returning from the USSR have told of a Soviet
synthetic balsam which is far superior to Canada balsam but which has
not been made available to the East Germans.
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S-E-C-R-E-T
APPENDIX C
METHODOLOGY
I. Supply.
All evidence indicates that imports of optical instruments into
East Germany have been almost nonexistent for many years. Conse-
quently, the domestic production was assumed to be a reasonable
measure of the total supply. Early observation of the wide variety
of instruments produced by the optical instruments industry of East
Germany indicated that production estimates based on the number of
units produced would be without meaning. All production estimates,
therefore, have been developed in terms of value, using current fac-
tory delivery prices.
The published statistics on the accomplishments of the optical
instruments industry of East Germany commonly include other products
of the Main Administration for Precision Mechanics and Optics, such
as measuring instruments, medical instruments, and office machines.
This practice precludes accurate separation. Consequently, the
industry's output in 1946-53 was developed by a combination of plant
studies and output estimates, checked with over-all reported statistics
where available. For this purpose, small local plants and ophthalmic
shops employing fewer than 25 workers were excluded. Sixteen plant
organizations comprise the East German industry, dominated by VEB Carl
Zeiss Jena, which, since 1949, has produced annually over one-half
of the national output.
All available reports of planned and actual plant production and
reports of plan fulfillment since World War II were tabulated, and
the sources were noted. Confirmations and inconsistencies were ob-
served, and the values which appeared to be the most trustworthy were
accepted as reasonable estimates of the year's production. These esti-
mates of the output of optical instruments in East Germany in 1947-54
are shown in Table 9.* Production estimates for the years for which
adequate reports were not available were derived by estimate, or by
interpolations or extrapolations from reported production.
Table 9 follows on p. 40.
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