PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT THE ABRASIVES INDUSTRY IN THE USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01093A000800100006-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 1999
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 25, 1955
• Content Type: IR

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Iease.t999,/P9JQ? ;_:. CIA - ~~79-01093AQQQ8Q010Q006-4
R SIONA INTELLIGENCE REPORT
THE ABRASIVES INDUSTRY IN THE USSR
CIA/RR PR-103
:25 March 1955
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
C I:~I E OF.. RESEARCH _AND_. REPORTS
NOT RELEASABLE TO
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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Approved For Release 19V6,141FIDENTIAL
NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS
PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
THE ABRASIVES INDUSTRY IN THE USSR
CIA/RR PR-103
(ORR Project 34.231
The data and conclusions contained in this report
do not necessarily represent the final position of
ORR and should be regarded as provisional only and
subject to revision. Comments and data which may
be available to the user are solicited.
NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS
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DENTl
CONFI
CONTENTS
Page
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
?-
A. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .
B. History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
C. Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Comparison of Soviet and US Technology . . . . . . 4
3. Convertibility to Wartime Economy .. . . . . . . . 4
D. Organizational and Administrative Structure
II, Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
A. Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1. Crude Abrasives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Abrasive Grain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. Use of Abrasive Grain Produced in the USSR by
Class of Product . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . 8
4. Estimated Value of Abrasive Grain Production . . 10
5. Geographic Distribution of Production . . . . . . . 12
B. Imports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
C. Inventories and Stockpiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
III. Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A. Use Pattern . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
B. Exports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
C. Substitutes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
IV. Future Expansion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A. Existing Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
B. Projected Expansion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
- iii -
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CONFI NTIAL
Page
V. Inputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
A. For Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
l.. Raw Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2. Fuel and Power . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . 20
3. Capital Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4. Manpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
B. For Expansion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
VI. Intentions and Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
A. Intentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
B. Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Appendixes
Appendix A. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Appendix B. Gaps in Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Appendix C. Source References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1. Estimated Total Production of Crude Abrasives in the
USSR, 1940 and 1946-56 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. Estimated Total Production of Abrasive Grain in the USSR,
1940 and 1946-56 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Estimated Value of Total Production of Abrasive Grain in
the USSR, 1949-56 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4. Geographic Production of Abrasive Grain in the USSR, 1953 . 13
CIAL
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5. Estimated Imports of Abrasive Grain into the USSR
by Country of Origin, 19+6-56 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6. Estimated Manpower Requirements for the Abrasives
Industry in the USSR, 19+6-56 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7. Estimated Requirements for Abrasive Grain in the
USSR, 19+6-56 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Illustrations
Following Page
Technology for the Production of Abrasives (Chart) . . 4
Estimated Production of Abrasives in the USSR by Inside
Economic Region, 195+ (Map) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Back Cover
C
F DE TIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
CIA/RR PR-10-
(ORR Project 34.231) - - - - - -
THE ABRASIVES INDUSTRY IN THE USSR*
Summary
The USSR will be self-sufficient in the production of abrasives by
the end of 1955. The present emphasis on the development of the Soviet
abrasives industry has enabled the Russians to overcome shortages prev-
alent in the economy before 1952 and to export small amounts of abra-
sives and abrasive products to Communist China.
Total production of crude artificial abrasives in the USSR is esti-
mated to be 133,500 tons* in 1954, or approximatgly 61 percent as much
as the average annual postwar production in the US and Canada.*** Cur-
rently the Soviet rate of production appears to be in line with its
growing economy. The abrasives industry is only a small part of the
gross national product but an industry upon which all other production is
dependent. Without abrasives, modern mass production of interchangeable
parts and moving mechanisms would be impossible. Metal-fabricating in-
dustries are therefore the major consumers of finished abrasive products.
The industry is patterned after that of the US and uses the same
or similar techniques of manufacture. The production of crude abra-
sives is confined mainly to two products, aluminum oxide and silicon
carbide. In the USSR the crude abrasives industry centers about four
plants. These plants supply the required abrasive grain to some 12 to
14 plants engaged in manufacturing finished products (such as bonded
and coated products, grinding powders, and refractories).
The inputs to the Soviet abrasives industry are relatively small.
The industry is not even a major consumer of most of the raw materials
needed, such as electrical energy, bauxite or alumina, petroleum coke,
and silica sand. These all are found in sufficient quantities in the
* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent
the best judgment of ORR as of 15 October 1954.
Tonnages throughout this report are given in metric tons.
*** The US and Canadian crude abrasives industries are so interwoven
that figures published are for the combined production of both countries.
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USSR to provide for the present and anticipated levels of production of
this industry. Electrical energy, the most critical requirement for
crude abrasives production, is available in the vicinity of the crude-
producing plants. The total electrical requirement of the crude abra-
sives industry is estimated to be less than 5 percent of the total elec-
tricity produced in the areas in which the crude-producing plants are
located.
The manpower requirements for the industry are small. On-the-job
training of new workers is considered adequate except for a small group
of skilled technicians and engineers. In 1954, fewer than 20,000
workers were estimated to be required for the entire industry, or less
than 0.2 percent of the industrial labor force in the USSR.
The basic conclusions of this report are (1) that the Russians have
achieved since 1930 an abrasives industry capable of producing more
than present domestic requirements and (2) that there are no shortages
of inputs which would prevent further expansion to meet civilian or war
needs.
I. Introduction.
A. General.
The abrasives industry is an important component of the war-
making capability of any nation because mass production of modern arms
and machines of defense is impossible without an adequate supply of
high-quality abrasive products.
The industry is characterized by a relatively small number of
producing units and a dependence upon a stable supply of electric power.
Its direct contribution to the gross national product is insignificant
in spite of its essentiality in modern industry.
The production process has three major steps: (1) the high-
temperature chemical process, which produces crude abrasives; (2) the
pulverization and grading process, which produces abrasive grain in
standard sizes; and (3) the manufacturing process, in which bonded,
coated, and other abrasive products are made from the grain.
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This report is limited to that part of the abrasives industry
of the USSR producing artificial abrasives -- aluminum oxide and sil-
icon carbide -- and natural abrasives -- emery and corundum. Indus-
trial diamonds or other natural abrasives such as garnet and flint are
not evaluated in this report.
B. History.
The first abrasives plant in the USSR was the Il'ich Abrasives
Plant, built in Leningrad in 1930. The Il'ich Abrasives Plant, which
has facilities for producing both aluminum oxide and silicon carbide,
was followed in 2 years by the construction of the Chelyabinsk Abra-
sives Plant, which has facilities for producing only aluminum oxide.
The Zaporozh'ye Carborundum Plant, dedicated exclusively to the manu-
facture of silicon carbide, began production in 1939, and the Tashkent
Carborundum Plant, with facilities for both silicon carbide and aluminum
oxide, began production in 1942. /*
In addition to these 4 main plants, which produce crude abra-
sives, crush and sort the grain, and manufacture some finished products,
some 12 to 14 other plants J produce finished abrasive products, such
as grinding wheels, stones, coated papers and cloths, grinding grain,
and refractory products.
Before World War II a central scientific laboratory for abra-
sives and polishing materials, known as the All-Union Scientific Re-
search Laboratory for Abrasives and Grinding, was established in
Leningrad near the Il'ich Abrasives Plant. /
C. Technology.
1. General.
The basic operation in the production of artificial abra-
sives is the high-temperature chemical process during which a batch of
raw materials is heated electrically until it fuses to form a crystalline
structure possessing excellent abrasive properties.**
* For serially numbered source references, see Appendix C.
For a diagram illustrating the processes of manufacturing abra-
sive products, see the chart following p. L.
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The two industrially important abrasives formed in this way
are aluminum oxide and silicon carbide. Regular aluminum oxide is
formed from bauxite, coke, and iron :filings in an arc-type furnace at
an average rate of 3,000 kilowatt-hours (kwh) of electricity per ton
of aluminum oxide formed. A somewhat better grade, white aluminum oxide,
using alumina instead of bauxite in its manufacture, requires approx-
imately 1,800 kwh of electricity per ton of white aluminum oxide formed.
Silicon carbide is formed from sand and coke in a resistance-
type furnace at an average rate of 8,500 kwh of electricity per ton of
silicon carbide formed.
In either operation, a block of crude abrasives weighing
several tons is formed. This is crushed and pulverized and the grain
accurately graded from coarse to fine.
Bonded abrasive products such as wheels and stones are
manufactured by mixing grain with suitable bonding materials and then
pressing the mix into shapes which are set by firing.
Coated products are made by distributing the grain over a
surface of cloth or paper to which an appropriate adhesive has been
applied.
2. Comparison of Soviet and US Technology.
The abrasives industry of the USSR is modeled after that
of the US, and though methods are comparable, it is believed that Soviet
finished products are somewhat inferior to US finished products. For
example, a few Soviet abrasive wheels analyzed by a US manufacturer in-
dicated some bonding deficiencies. J Some Soviet arc-type furnaces
used for aluminum oxide are, however, larger than those used in this
country. The average US furnace will produce approximately 5-ton
blocks of crude abrasives. J The Russians are reported to be using
furnaces with approximately 13,500-kilowatt capacity, J which produce
an aluminum oxide block weighing 25 to 30 tons. J
3. Convertibility to Wartime Economy.
The abrasives industry requires no changeover in equip-
ment and methods to convert from a peacetime to a wartime economy.
The same products are essential to both economies, although a wartime
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TECHNOLOGY FOR THE SYNTHETIC PRODUCTION OF ABRASIVES
REGULAR ALUMINUM OXIDE
CALCINED
BAUXITE
IRON
BORINGS
Electric Power
rllllllh
REGULAR ALUMINUM OXIDE
*Calcined bauxite ----- 1.225 tons
Iron borings --------- 0.062 ton
Metallurgical coke ---- 0.052ton per ton of finished
Carbon electrodes ---- 31 pounds i regular aluminum oxide
Electrical energy ----- 3000 kwh
*One ton of dry bouxite equals approximately 0.63 ton of calcined bauxite.
MAGNETIC
SEPARATOR
GRADING
SCREENS
STORAGE
TANKS
WHITE ALUMINUM OXIDE
Alumina -------------- 1.02 tons
finished
Graphite electrodes ____9 p white e aluminum Peuoxide
Electrical energy ------ 1800 kwh
SILICON CARBIDE
Sand --------------- 1.650 tons
Coke___ 1.300 tons per ton of finished
Sawdust Of used)____ 0.055 ton silicon carbide
Electrical energy ______8500 kwh
REFRACTORIES BONDED PRODUCTS COATED PRODUCTS
Furnace linings Grinding wheels Abrasive cloth
Laboratory ware Segments Abrasive paper
Resistors Stones Abrasive discs
OTHER PRODUCTS
Polishing powders
Lapping paste
Buffing compounds
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GRADING
SCREENS
STORAGE
TANKS
STORAGE
TANKS
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economy requires substantially increased rates of production. Since the
industry is operating at near-capacity levels, increased production would
have to be met by expansion of facilities. There is no technological
reason why expansion should be limited. In the short run, there may be
some internal dislocations caused by an expansion, but given time for
programming, a substantial expansion should be possible.
D. Organizational and Administrative Structure.
Before March 1953 the abrasives plants of the USSR were under
the Main Administration of Abrasives in the Ministry of the Machine-
Tool Industry, with A.I. Kostousov as the Minister. The Director of the
Main Administration of Abrasives was P.P. Tubanov, as of September 19+8,
and presumably Tubanov was still Director of the Main Administration of
Abrasives in 1952, when he coauthored an article on abrasives.
In March 1953 the Ministry of Machine-Tool Industry and several
other ministries were combined to form the Ministry of Machine Building.
Kostousov was a Deputy Minister in this Ministry. J
When the new government was announced on 27 April 1954, the
Ministry of Machine Building was split into several new ministries, one
of which was the Ministry of Machine-Tool Industry, with Kostousov as
the Minister. J
The USSR has gone back to the same ministerial setup which
existed before the merger of 1953, including the same minister. Al-
though the abrasives industry has not been located in the new setup,
the assumption is that the prior relationship, in substance, exists.
The organization and administrative structure of the industry follow
the normal Soviet pattern.
II. Supply.
A. Production.
1. Crude Abrasives.
Estimates of the production of the four plants in the USSR
producing crude artificial abrasives are shown in Table l.* Production
Table 1 follows on p. 6.
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of aluminum oxide was 37,000 tons in 1946 and 100,000 tons in 1954,
approximately 2.7 times as great. Production of silicon carbide was
7,000 tons in 1946 and 33,500 tons in 1954, approximately 4.8 times
as great. The production of both aluminum oxide and silicon carbide
is expected to increase approximately 20 percent by 1956. The pro-
duction of artificial abrasives in 1954 was a ratio of approximately
25 percent silicon carbide to 75 percent aluminum oxide. 10
In the US and Canada,* average production of aluminum
oxide was 153,800 tons for the period 1946-53,* and average annual
production of silicon carbide was 66,000 tons for the same period..
Thus the USSR in 1953 produced approximately 60 percent as much
aluminum oxide as was produced in the US and Canada in an average
postwar year and 46 percent as much silicon carbide, or for the arti-
ficial abrasives industry as a whole, approximately 56 percent.
The USSR recognizes the importance of artificial abra-
sives, and production of natural abrasives expressed as equivalents
of artificial crude abrasives is expected to decline from approxi-
mately 21 percent of total crude production in 1946 to approximately
4 percent of total crude production in 1956.
The estimates of annual production shown in Table 1
are based in part on plant studies. These data have been evaluated
in terms of over-all production increases reported from time to time
and the announced plan of industrial growth, modified by estimates
of fabricated metal production. 11
Figures for the production of natural abrasive ore
shown in Table 1 are approximations based on Shimkin studies 12
and the US Bureau of Mines estimates. Natural abrasives as defined
in this report are declining as an important material in the over-
all Soviet abrasives industry, since (a) corundum deposits are be-
coming exhausted 13 and (b) emery is less desirable in the manu-
facture of grinding wheels because of the variation in the ore and
inferior cutting qualities. The inconsistency makes it difficult
to control the quality of wheels on a production basis and to
* The US and Canadian crude abrasives industries are interwoven,
and combined production totals are reported.
-X The average of the postwar years was used, since it appears that
the level of production has not changed substantially, but the totals
for individual years show fluctuations that would not be representative.
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maintain the standardization required in the manufacture of modern
wheels to meet the increasing demand by the growing machine-building
industries for better grinding, polishing, and finishing of machine
parts. 14
Since there is considerably more loss in conversion of
natural abrasive ore to grain than in conversion. of artificial crude
abrasives, an equivalent to the artificial crude has been calculated.
This calculated equivalent is used in obtaining any figure for total
crude production.
2. Abrasive Grain.
The estimated annual production of abrasive grain in the
USSR is given in Table 2.* Before the crude abrasives can be used to
make abrasive products, the blocks must be crushed into grain. The
relationships pointed out in the last section, however, are maintained.
Grain production can be estimated by the use of US anal-
ogy because grain production is equal to crude production minus manu-
facturing losses. These losses in the US average 20 percent for
artificial grain and 50 percent for natural grain.
3. Use of Abrasive Grain Produced in the USSR by Class
of Product.
In the US, approximately 67 percent of all abrasive grain
produced** is used for the manufacture of bonded products -- largely
grinding wheels -- and 13 percent for the manufacture of coated prod-
ucts and grinding powders. The remaining 20 percent is used for non-
abrasive applications, such as refractories and resistors. The grain
for nonabrasive applications is primarily silicon carbide, and only
a small percentage of aluminum oxide grain is used for these purposes.
The USSR apparently places a somewhat greater emphasis on
bonded products than does the US. About 75 percent of all abrasive
grain is being used for the production of bonded products, 12 percent
for the production of coated products and grinding powders, and the
remaining 13 percent for nonabrasive uses.
* Table 2 follows on p. 9.
Produced in the US and Canada.
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In the US it takes approximately 1.1 tons of abrasive grain
to make 1 ton of finished bonded products. L6/ Since Soviet technology
is similar, it is reasonable to use the same conversion factor for the
USSR. Therefore, an estimated 63,000 tons of bonded products were
produced in the USSR in 1953.
4. Estimated Value of Abrasive Grain Production.
The estimated value of abrasive grain, produced in the USSR
during 1954 in constant 1949 ruble prices is 61.5 million rubles of
aluminum oxide grain, 36.5 million rubles of silicon carbide grain, and
3 million rubles of natural corundum and emery grain, or a total of
98 million rubles of abrasive grain. (See Table 3.*) The prices used
for 1949 appeared in a Russian Export-Import Dictionary 17 and are,
therefore, presumably wholesale prices.
Evidence indicates that the price of aluminum oxide grain
had not changed much on the average from 1942 to 1949, but that silicon
carbide grain had increased in price considerably in 1949 over the aver-
age 1942-46 prices.
Although there is no evidence of the direction prices moved
since 1949, it is felt that less error will be introduced by using
constant 1949 prices than might occur if Soviet prices were adjusted
on the basis of price movements in the US, Norway, or some other country
producing artificial abrasives. A document L8/ with 1952 information
indicates that for aluminum oxide the 1949 price is approximately cor-
rect in the latter period.
The price selected for natural corundum and emery is
subject to considerable error because the average price varies
greatly depending on the percentage of corundum to the percentage of
emery included, and no Soviet price for either of these products is
available. The value of natural abrasives produced, however, is only
a small percent of the value of artificial abrasives produced and is
declining in importance. Even a considerable error in the price of
natural abrasives would have little effect on the value of total abra-
sives produced.
* Table 3 follows on p. 11.
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5. Geographic Distribution of Production.
The production of crude, abrasives and. abrasive grain is
concentrated in four plants located near plentiful sources of electric
power. These plants are also on the periphery of the area containing
the largest part of Soviet economic activity. In general, the finished
products plants are located near the crude- and grain-producing plants.
Three or four exceptions point to the influence of consuming areas on
the location of finished products plants. The notable exceptions are
the Moscow and Shuya plants located in Region VII,* which is probably
the largest consuming region in the USSR, and the Khaikhta plant in
Region XI. Khaikhta is located on the Trans-Siberian Railroad, approx-
imately halfway between the supply of abrasive grain in Chelyabinsk
and Tashkent and the shipyards, aircraft plants, and developing indus-
tries of the eastern section of the USSR. See Table 4** and the mapXXX
-
for further details of geographic location of production.
B. Imports.
During World War II the USSR imported a considerable amount of
abrasives from the West, especially from the US. Imports from the US
during 1943-45 amounted to 5 or 6 million dollars of crude abrasives,
abrasive grain, and finished products annually. 21/ US exports to the
USSR declined rapidly after 1945 and ceased in 19 8. Norway also ex-
ported small quantities of silicon carbide to the USSR from 1947 to
1949.
After World War II the USSR turned to the European Satellites
for abrasives. Apparently the stocks of abrasives on hand in East
Germany were seized and sent to the USSR as reparations. In 1946,
East Germany shipped approximately 2,200 tons of silicon carbide and
660 tons of grinding wheels to the 'USSR as reparations payments. 22
Since the East German silicon carbide plants were dismantled and
shipped to the USSR after the war, 23 the assumption is that this was
shipped from stock and did not indicate current production. It is
assumed that available East German stocks of aluminum oxide were also
shipped to the USSR in 1946. This amount is estimated to be 3,000 tons
for 1946.
* The term region throughout this report refers to the economic
regions define- and numbered on CIA Map 12048.1, 9-51 (First
Revision, 7-52), USSR: Economic Regions.
Table 4 follows on p. 13.
# Inside back cover.
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Imports of abrasives by the USSR from East Germany were calculated
by estimating total production in East Germany and assuming that a certain
percentage was shipped to the USSR. Reports for the years immediately
after the war indicated that this percentage was very high, and most re-
ports indicated that about 70 percent was going to the USSR. 24 Later
reports indicate that the percentage going to the USSR declined some,-
what. L5/ It is estimated that by 1954 the Russians will become nearly
self-sufficient in the production of abrasives.* This, together with the
indication that East Germany is now attempting to export abrasives to
West Germany, 26 leads to the conclusion that the Soviet demand for
Satellite abrasives is declining. Soviet imports from East Germany,
which amounted to an estimated 7,300 tons of abrasive grain in 1950,
are expected to decline to 1,900 tons in 1956.
Czechoslovakia has recently been reported to be shipping abra-
sive products to countries other than the USSR. 27 However, about
25 percent of the abrasives production of Czechoslovakia went to the
USSR in 1948. 28 Czechoslovak statistics show exports of 687 tons of
grinding wheels to the USSR in 1948. 2 / In 1950, Czechoslovakia was
exporting about 25.percent of its total production of abrasives. 202
Thus 2,600 tons of grinding wheels are estimated to be imported by the
USSR from Czechoslovakia in 1953.
The other East European countries do not meet domestic require-
ments. Both Hungary 31/ and Rumania 32 are reported to be planning
new production capacity and are not now exporting significant quantities
of abrasives to the USSR.
Table 5** summarizes the estimated imports of abrasives into the
USSR during 1946-56.
C. Inventories and Stockpiles.
The estimated amount of abrasive grain available for stock-
piling or export in the USSR. in 1954 was 4,700 tons. For other years,
the estimated amounts are as follows: 1952, 900 tons; 1953, 3,700 tons;
1955, 5,700 tons; and 1956, 8,300 tons. The amount of abrasives used
by the USSR was determined by multiplying the estimated number of grind-
ing machines in the USSR by the estimated amount of abrasives used
* See Table 7, p. 31, below, for estimates of Soviet requirements.
** Table 5 follows on p. 15,
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annually per grinding machine. The use rate per machine was based on a
1937 article by a Soviet abrasives expert 39 and brought up to date by
analogy with US requirements. It was assumed that 20 percent of the ma-
chine tools in the USSR are grinding machines. 40 The number of machine
tools in the USSR was taken from a CIA estimate.
III. Demand.
A. Use Pattern.
Abrasive products are used in almost all industries, especially
the machine-building and metalworking industries. Therefore, the
geographic location of the manufacturing industry in the USSR is a
geographic breakdown of the use pattern for the abrasives industry.
This is in contrast to the relative concentration of production in a
few areas.
The principal abrasive-consuming industries are the transporta-
tion equipment, metalworking equipment, and metallurgical industries.
These three industries are estimated to consume approximately two-thirds
of the abrasives in the USSR. The remaining one-third is widely dis-
tributed among various industries, including the ballbearing, ordnance,
machine-building (excluding metalworking equipment), woodworking,
leather, and optical industries.
B. Exports.
Recent reports indicate that the USSR is exporting a very small
proportion of its annual abrasives production. 41 These reports are
of offers of abrasive grains, which are purported to have come from the
USSR, and of shipment of finished products to Satellite countries. The
offers of grain were made by East-West traders to non-Soviet Bloc
countries.
Although the USSR is reported to be exporting abrasives to
Communist China, Chinese imports are apparently coming mostly from the
East European countries -- East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and
Hungary. 42
C. Substitutes.
In general, there are no good substitutes for artificial abra-
sives. In some specialized applications, however, there are possibil-
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ities of substitution, which will reduce the need for abrasive mate-
rials. Recent developments of electrolytic methods of grinding and
metal removal by the USSR indicate that the Russians have developed
means of machining hard metals which were heretofore difficult to
machine and the machining of which previously required many types of
grinding wheels and other abrasives. L3/
Electrolytic methods of grinding, when applied to the cutting
tool industry, will eliminate at least 50 percent of the need now found
for special types of grinding wheels and diamond-impregnated wheels. 44
There are various combinations of electrolytic processes of machining
and grinding that permit the application of this new method of machining
to a variety of uses in metal removal operations which will eliminate
the need for an abrasive material.
The USSR is now apparently beyond the experimental stage in
the use of these methods. Commercial models of anode mechanical
grinders and electric spark apparatus for machining metals are re-
ported to be in series production. 45 Until detailed studies of the
extent of possible use and the number of machines of this nature pro-
duced can be made, no estimate of the amount of abrasive materials
saved is possible. Once a number of these machines are in operation,
requirements for abrasives will be reduced.
Silicon carbide can be substituted to a certain extent for
operations normally using diamond-impregnated wheels. This substitu-
tion, however, is somewhat limited.
IV. Future Expansion.
A. Existing Capacity.
The present production of abrasives in the USSR is believed
to be near capacity level. Some of the most important abrasives plants
in the USSR are reported to be competing to outproduce each other, ful-
filling or exceeding their norms to win high honors in the All-Union
Socialist competition. 46 These factors, together with a continuing
increase in the production of abrasives, indicate operations at near-
capacity level. Recent reports 47 indicate that improvement of
equipment is being made to increase capacity.
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B. Projected Expansion.
The Fifth Five Year Plan (1951-55), while saying nothing specif-
ically on abrasives, specifies "that the capacity of existing enter-
prises must be increased by reconstruction, installation of new equip-
ment,, mechanization of production, and improved technology to increase
production." L8/
There have been no reports indicating construction of new abra-
sives plants. Production increases of crude and grain products through
reconstruction of furnaces 49 and technological advancements in furnace
capacity are being accomplished. 50 Dissemination of knowledge among
workers in abrasives plants to increase their capabilities and output
is under way. 51
Mechanization and installation of new equipment has increased
the production of grinding wheels and coated products immensely, reduced
man-hour requirements, and produced a better quality product. 52
V. Inputs.
A. For Production.
1. Raw Materials.
The requirements of the abrasives industry are relatively
small. The industry is probably not even a major consumer of bauxite
or alumina, petroleum coke, and silica sand, the major raw materials
of the industry.
a. Crude Abrasives.
The crude abrasives industry requires, on the average,
the following inputs for each ton of crude produced:
Regular aluminum oxide 53
Electrical energy 3,000 kwh
Calcined bauxite* 1.225 tons
Iron borings 0.062: ton
Metallurgical coke 0.052 ton
Carbon electrodes 35 pounds
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White aluminum oxide
Electrical energy
Alumina
Graphite electrodes
Regular silicon carbide
Electrical energy
Petroleum coke or pitch coke
Silica sand
Sawdust
Electrodes
1,800 kwh
1.02 tons
10 pounds
8,500 kwh
1.3 tons
1.65 tons
0.055 ton
Negligible (electrodes
last 2 or 3 years)
The USSR will produce approximately 1 million tons of
bauxite in 1956, as compared with 800,000 tons in 1953 (dry basis but
not calcined). 5)+/ In addition, approximately 900,000 tons of baux-
ite and 120,000 tons of alumina are imported from Hungary annually. 55/
On this basis, there is sufficient bauxite and alumina available to the
USSR to produce the amounts of aluminum oxide estimated. 56
There are apparently large resources of silica sand in
the USSR and the European Satellites for manufacturing silicon carbide. 57
Petroleum coke, a byproduct of the petroleum industry, also appears to
be in sufficient supply. 58
b. Finished Products.
The finished products -- bonded and coated products --
require the addition of numerous raw materials in relatively small
amounts.
Approximately 15 to 20 percent of the weight of finished
bonded products consists of bonding agents and centers made from lead,
tin, natural rubber, cryolite, shellac, resins, kaolin, and felspar.
The coated products require hide glue, paper made of manila rope, cloth,
and the like. Although some of these items are necessary in the produc-
tion of the finished products, the total amounts are not very large.
Since each type of product does not require each of these inputs, the
amounts required will depend upon the product mix produced. Including
rejections and losses in manufacture, approximately 1.1 tons of grain
are required per ton of grinding wheels. 59
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When manufactured into coated products, a ton of abra-
sive grain will produce approximately 100 reams or rolls of aluminum
oxide and 110 reams or rolls of silicon carbide. Fifty-one yards of
cloth and 8.2 pounds of glue are required per ream or roll (9-inch by
11-inch sheet or 27-inch roll).
The crude abrasives industry requires extraordinary amounts
of electrical energy in relation to the amount of product. Soviet plants,
however, are located in areas where the power is available. Using esti-
mated production for 1954, the following energy requirements were
calculated:
Plant
Electrical
Energy Requirements
(Million Kilowatt-Hours)
Source and Capacity
of Power Stations LO/
Million Kilowatt-Hours)
Il'ich, Leningrad
170
Leningrad Network
4,200
Chelyabinsk
190
City of
Chelyabinsk
2,900
Zaporozh' ye
100
City of
Zaporozh'ye 2,500 to 3,000
Tashkent
100
Uzbek Power
System
2,700
The above estimates of power output are for 1952 or earliery
while the abrasive requirements are based on estimated 1954 production.
Therefore, because additional power capacity has been installed since
1952, the crude abrasives production requirements for electrical energy
are very probably a smaller percentage of the regional output than is
indicated.
Considerable electricity and fuel are also required for the
production of finished products. The fuel to heat the kilns may be gas,
oil, coal, or electricity. In a plant where the kilns are fired by
coal, oil, or gas, approximately 800 kwh per ton of bonded products is
required. Electrically heated kilns require almost 1,500 kwh per ton.
For coated products approximately 22 kwh per ream or roll is required.
Refractories require approximately the same electrical inputs as bonded
products. Conversion from one fuel to another co4}ld be made without too
much difficulty by alterations of the kilns.
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3. Capital Equipment.
Standard buildings and industrial machinery are adaptable.
in most instances to the production of abrasives. The crude furnaces,
the crushing machinery, the wheel-curing kilns, temperature and humidity
control devices, and other equipment are standard throughout the industry.
The equipment used in this industry has a long service life. The equip-
ment in a Czechoslovak plant was estimated to be possibly 50.years old. 61
The industry thus operates with few or no replacements for long periods
of time.
In grading the grain, the practice of the US industry is to
use silk screens manufactured in Switzerland, France, or West Germany.
In US practice these screens are estimated to last long enough to grade
20 to 100 tons. The coarser grains are now graded with metal screens,
which last longer. The very fine grains (240 grit and finer) require
water classification or mechanical methods. The USSR is presumably using
these same methods and is also reported to be experimenting with centrif-
ugal separators for grading. 62
The jaws and the rollers of the crushing equipment require
replacement from time to time. Although this equipment should not be
difficult to duplicate, it is vital in maintaining the efficiency of
production.
4. Manpower.
The manpower requirements, especially of the crude abrasives
industry, are small. Because of the low total requirements for skilled
personnel, manpower for the industry is not a problem. On-the-job train-
ing of new workers is considered adequate. 63 A group of skilled tech-
nicians and engineers, however, is required.
By US standards, it is estimated that the abrasives industry
employs 1 employee for every 11 tons of crude abrasives produced. This,
however, includes the manufacture of artificial crude abrasives, the
processing of abrasive grains, and the production of finished abrasive
products. About 10 percent of the total employees are engaged in the
manufacture of crude abrasives. 64
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Table 6 shows the estimated manpower requirements for the
industry. These estimates are calculated by US analogy with the assump-
tion that the Soviet workers are only two-thirds as efficient as US
workers.
Table 6
Estimated Manpower Requirements for the Abrasives Industry
in the USSR a
1946-56
Number of Employees
Required to Manufacture
Year
Crude Abrasives
Produced
(Tons)
US
Standards
Soviet
Standards
Crude
Abrasives
Finished
Products b
1946
56,300
5,100
7,600
800
6, 800
1947
66,500
6,00o
9,000
goo
8, loo
1948
77,600
7,100
lo,6oo
1,100
9,500
1949
88,200
8,000
12,000
1,200
10,800
1950
99,500
9,000
13,500
1,400
12,100
1951
108,500
9,900
14,8oo
1,500
13,300
1952
118,200
10,700
16,ooo
1,600
14,400
1953
128,goo
11,700
17,600
1,800
15,800
1954
140,500
12,800
19,200
1,900
17,300
1955
153,100
13,900
20,800
2,100
18., 700
1956
166,900
15,200
22,.800
2,300
20,500
a. Assuming that a Soviet worker is two-thirds as efficient as?a US
worker.
b. Figures may not total because of rounding.
There. is considerable heavy work in both the primary and
secondary industry for which male workers are desirable. Female
workers, however, are used extensively in the secondary industry. In
the US, approximately 75 percent male and 25 percent female workers are
employed. 65 Reports indicate that the USSR is using approximately
60 to 70 percent female workers. j6j
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B. For Expansion.
Although proportionately more inputs would be necessary for ex-
pansion than are needed for continued production on the same level, the
abrasives industry takes such a small percentage of the total supply of
these inputs that an expansion as projected by this report is apparently
feasible.
VI. Intentions and Vulnerabilities.
A. Intentions.
The abrasives industry is an indicator of changes in economic
and military activity. Changes in amount and type of production cause
a change in the demand for and consequently the production of abrasives.
A change to consumer goods will cause a small increase in demand for
abrasives for the tooling period and then a decline. A change to war
materiel will, on the other hand, be characterized by a substantial in-
crease in demand for and therefore production of abrasives.
At present the USSR is giving considerable attention to the
abrasives industry. The industry shows a continuous growth pattern
since it was started in the 1930's. Largely because of the rapid ex-
pansion of industry in general, the USSR has been deficient in abrasives
until the last 2 or 3 years. Thus, until quite recently, the buildup
in the production of abrasives was necessary to meet the demands of the ex-
panding Soviet economy. Present indications are that the growth of the
abrasives industry is to continue in the foreseeable future.
B. Vulnerabilities.
The abrasives industry is not vulnerable to economic pressures.
A very rapid expansion to meet military requirements might cause short-
term internal dislocations. Although the crude abrasives plants currently
consume less than 5 percent of the total electric power produced in the
regions in which the plants are located, electric power is an absolute
necessity for producing crude abrasives.
Aluminum oxide, the most important abrasive for grinding steel,
requires bauxite for continued production. Hungary is an important
source of bauxite. 67 Silicon carbide, the other artificial abrasive
produced in quantity, is dependent upon petroleum or pitch coke. The
bulk of this material at present is reported to be coming from Rumania. 68
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The production of crude abrasives is concentrated in four plants.
Since aluminum oxide and silicon carbide are not both produced in all
plants, the concentration is somewhat greater, only three plants produc-
ing each product.
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APPENDIX A
METHODOLOGY
1. Production.
Estimates of total production were derived from references to the
producing plants in the abrasives industry, to the percentage change
in the industry as a whole between specified periods, and to the develop-
ment of an artificial abrasives industry.
(1) Artificial Crude Abrasives.
The production of crude abrasives was arrived at by
establishing a prewar estimate from plant studies and an estimate of
the natural abrasives output for the year 1940. / In the Chelyabinsk
Abrasives Plant, production was 9,000 tons in 1939 and about 10,000 tons
at the beginning of the war (19+1). 70 Assuming a straight-line inter-
polation, Chelyabinsk in 1940 was producing approximately 9,500 tons.
A 1931 publication 71/ reports that the I1'ich Abrasives
Plant has an annual capacity of 9,600 tons of aluminum oxide and 1,700
tons of silicon carbide. It is assumed that in 19+0 this plant pro-
duced at this capacity.
The first section of the Zaporozh'ye Carborundum Plant
started production in 1939. L An early report 73/ indicated that
this plant would have at least a 3,000-ton silicon carbide capacity
for a 5-month operational period. A German report in June 19+1 74
estimated silicon carbide production at this plant.to be 3,600 tons
annually. Therefore it is estimated that in 19+0 the output of this
plant was 3,500 tons. One report 75 predicted that the 1939 silicon
carbide production would be 3.5 times the 1938 silicon carbide produc-
tion, which was estimated to be 1,500 tons. This would mean that in
1939 the Russians expected at least 5,200 tons of silicon carbide, the
major difference in production to be taken up by the.Zaporozh'ye plant.
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The total Soviet artificial crude abrasives production for
1940 is therefore estimated to have been 24,300 tons. This estimate
appears likely because the Soviet plan for production of artificial abra-
sives in 1939 was for 35,456 tons. 76 This same source stated that in
the first quarter of 1939, fulfillment was approximately 65 percent of
this plan. Assuming that this ratio continued through the four quarters
(usually the Russians accelerate their production in the fourth quarter).,
they would have produced a total of approximately 23,000 tons. One ref-
erence 77 stated that in 1937 in the USSR the capacity for manufacturing
grinding grains was 23,000 tons, or approximately 29,000 tons of crude.
(2) Natural Abrasives.
The estimate for natural abrasives for 1940 was calculated
as follows: one source 78 stated that the output of natural abrasives
for 1937 was reported to be 14,173 tons of corundum and 15,101 tons of
emery. Since this is a mined product, it indicates a recovery of refined
product (natural ore) of approximately 50 percent, or for the above pro-
duction approximately 14,600 tons. In order to convert the natural ore
to an equivalent value of that of artificial abrasives the following
equivalent values were applied: 1.25 tons of artificial crude is equiv-
alent to 1 ton of grain, and 2 tons of natural ore is equivalent to 1 ton
of grain, Thus 1.25 divided by 2 equals 0.625. A unit weight of natural
ore (refined) is equivalent to 0.625 unit weight of artificial crude in
the manufacture of abrasive grain.* Therefore 14,600 tons of natural ore
would be equivalent to 9,100 tons of crude for 1937.
The production of natural abrasives in 1940 is assumed to
have continued at an average annual increase of 13 percent, or 13,200
tons crude equivalent. It is felt that at this time the production of
natural abrasives continued to increase commensurate to the growth of
the national economy 79 (a) to supplement the greater demand made by
the steady growth of the metal fabricating industries and (b) to help
offset the deficits of artificial abrasives due to production diffi-
culties encountered by the rapidly expanding abrasives industry.
* :Due to the variable quality of the natural ore in hardness and
structure, it is generally accepted by the abrasives industry and the
US Bureau of Mines that natural abrasives have a work value of only
50 percent of the work value of artificial abrasives.
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Reports of construction and restoration of abrasives plants per-
mitted a 1946 estimate. A report LO/ told of a 50-percent production
increase over the prewar level, yielding an estimate of'56,000 tons for
1946.
(1) 1946.
(a) Artificial Abrasives.
Restored plants are assumed to have resumed production
at or near a rate equivalent to the time of dismantling. In support of
this reasoning, a report 81 stated that the Tashkent carborundum or
abrasive tool plant produced 4,700 tons in 1947, and a published report
that this plant in 1947 produced 134.6 percent more in 1947 than in 1946
places the 1946 figure at 3,500 tons. The Chelyabinsk plant, which had
acquired equipment from the dismantling of the Il'ich plant and two
small plants in Luga during the war, increased their production con-
siderably. A calculated estimate from reports stating the number of
furnaces, the size of "pig," and the time cycle of furnace runs in-
dicates that the Chelyabinsk plant in 1949 was producing about 43,000
tons of aluminum oxide. A report stated that at the beginning of the
war this plant was producing 10,000 tons. 12J Therefore it was esti-
mated that Chelyabinsk was producing approximately 27,500 tons of
aluminum oxide.
(b) Natural Abrasives.
The estimate for the output of natural abrasives is
a residual which is reasonable, considering the declining emphasis being
placed on natural abrasives. It is perfectly clear from all evidence
that the Soviet emphasis is on artificial abrasives and not on natural.
A diminishing supply of corundum and the unsuitability of natural abra-
sives for most modern metalworking requirements have produced this
trend. 83 There are some abrasive operations, however, such as polish-
ing precision lenses and foundry uses, where corundum is desirable.
Some emery is also used in the manufacture of coated abrasives. There-
fore the estimate of natural abrasives was calculated on an arithmetical
decline to an approximate 7,000 tons in 1950 and then held constant at
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this level because of the probable constant requirements to meet special
needs.* In evaluating this estimate, the annual requirements of the US
abrasives industry for natural abrasives were considered. The USSR
would probably require a proportionate amount of US requirements.
(2) 1950.
Nikitin stated that production of abrasives in 1950 was to
increase 2.6 times over prewar production, 84 and the estimate for 1950
was thus made by taking 2.6 times the 1940 estimate. The total planned
output for 1950 was therefore 97,500 tons. At least one plant fulfilled
the gross plan by 105 percent, 85 and reports stating that other crude
abrasives plants were being converted to high-speed smelting 86 lead to
the assumption that an average estimate of a 102-percent plan fulfill-
ment for the industry in 1950, or a production of 99,500 tons, was
likely.
The total of 99,500 tons was allocated to the individual
producing plants on the basis of information obtained from various
sources. These allocations indicate that approximatd1y 75 percent
of the artificial crude was aluminum oxide and 25 percent silicon
carbide. These figures agree with a goal announced earlier. 87
The estimates for the years 1947-49 were obtained by a
straight-line interpolation with the exception of the calculated esti-
mates for Chelyabinsk and Tashkent.
(3) 1951-56.
For the best estimate of production subsequent to 1950,
production was estimated to increase 9 percent per year. The 1955 index
of production for fabricated metal products (1950 = 100) is estimated
to be 154. The average increase therefore would be approximately
9 percent per year.
Another estimate is based on reports of percentage increases
of production of finished products which stated that 1951 production was
13 percent over 1950 and that 1952 production was 28 percent over 1950. 89
A report stated that 1953 production of finished products was 50 percent
* The range of error is plus 50 and minus 25 percent.
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over 1950.90 The above percentages were applied to the estimate of
1950 production of crude in the USSR plus the estimated imports of grain
(converted to crude equivalents). Then for each year the estimated
annual imports were subtracted from the results of the above calcula-
tions to give estimates of production in the USSR. The estimates for
195+ and beyond were calculated on an assumed 9-percent annual increase
over the 1953 estimate.
The totals calculated in the above manner were distributed
as follows: the best estimate of natural abrasives was subtracted from
the total, giving the estimate for artificial crude. The artificial
crude was distributed on the basis of 75 percent aluminum oxide and 25
percent silicon carbide.
2. Requirements.
The estimate of total abrasive grain required was made as follows:
an article in Stanki i instrument 91 said that in 1937 the Soviet abra-
sives requirements totaled 27,000 tons for 27,000 grinding machines.
Their stated goal was to reduce the requirements to 0.5 ton per grinding
machine by 1942) by improving quality and utilization.
It is assumed that the USSR has improved the quality of production
and the efficiency of use since the 1930's. This assumption is supported
by the following factors:
(a) Soviet periodicals and press frequently mention improved quality
of abrasives and new techniques of grinding. 92
(b) Analysis of Soviet wheels indicates that construction and grain
are comparable to US wheels but that they had an incomplete bond develop-
ment. 93
(c) Various reports have indicated that imports have been declin-
ing in recent years.
(d) Recent reports have indicated some small amounts of exports.
(e) The estimate of requirements based on the number of grinding
machines and the assumption of grain required per grinding machine,to-
gether with estimates of production, indicate that the USSR is now self-
sufficient in abrasives production.
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On this assumption, a requirement of 1,000 pounds of grain per grind-
ing machine was-assumed for 1946. Since about 75 percent of all abra-
sive grain goes into grinding wheels and 1.1 tons of grain are necessary
to make a ton of wheels, the assumption is that 680 pounds of grinding
wheels were used per grinding machine in the USSR in 1946. The total
1,000 pounds of grain per grinding machine is broken down as 750 pounds
into wheels (680 pounds of wheels) and 250 pounds into coated abrasives,
grinding grains, refractories, and the like.
In the US an average of approximately 500 pounds of grinding wheels
per grinding machine was required in 1952. An analysis of Soviet grind-
ing wheels showed, that although the wheels tested showed construction
and grain comparable to US wheels, they had an incomplete bond develop-
ment and thus would wear faster. On this basis the USSR is assumed to
require 20 percent more wheels, or 600 pounds of grinding wheels, per
machine. This is equivalent to 660 pounds of grain, for wheels, or
880 pounds of grain total. Periods between 1946 and 1952 were determined
by interpolation. For 1953-56 it is assumed that total grain require-
ments will decline another 20 pounds to 860 pounds per machine.
Twenty percent of the Soviet machine tool park 94 consists of grind-
ing machines. The 20-percent figure is the approximate breakdown in the
US and agrees with the Soviet goal. 95 Table 7* is a summary of the
estimates of grain requirements.
* Table 7 follows on p. 31.
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Table 7
Estimated Requirements for Abrasive Grain in the USSR
1946-56
Requirement s
Abrasive
Grain Per
Total
Year
Grinding
Wheels
(Pounds)
Grain
for Wheels
(Pounds)
Grinding
Machine
(Pounds)
Grinding
Machines
(Units)
Grain
(Metric
Tons)
1946
68o
750
1,000
131i-,000
60,900
1947
670
735
980
157,000
69,900
1948
655
720
960
182,000
79,400
1949
64o
705
940
209,000
89,300
1950
625
690
920
225,000
94,100
1951
615
675
goo
241,000
98,600
1952
600
66o
880
257,000
102,800
1953
585
645
860
274,000
107,100
1954
585
645
860
291,000
113,800
1955
585
645
860
309,000
120,800
1956
585
645
860
328,000
128,200
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APPENDIX B
GAPS IN INTELLIGENCE
Current information on the Soviet abrasives industry is limited to
fragmentary reports from Soviet newspapers, periodicals,. and radio
broadcasts, Detailed information on types of products and quantities
manufactured, sources of raw materials, distribution of finished prod-
ucts, number of furnaces, and number of employees, especially for .the
four plants which produce crude abrasives -- the Chelyabinsk Abrasives
Plant, the Iltich (Leningrad) Abrasives Plant, the Zaporozh'ye Carborundum
Plant, and the Tashkent Carborundum Plant -- is needed.
Further information on representative sizes and types of grinding
wheels is necessary. Estimates of Soviet requirements are affected by
the quality of wheels.
Detailed information on types of plants and amounts of production,
number of employees, size of plants, and sources of abrasive grain is
needed. Further information is needed for firm estimates of breakdowns
of total production into types of products and geographical distribution
patterns.
Information on exports is practically nonexistent, and information
on imports is very fragmentary. Further collection from the Satellites
may fill this gap.
There is no information available on the Soviet distribution of
finished products. Current information on abrasives prices in the USSR
is lacking.
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APPENDIX.C
SOURCE REFERENCES
This report is based largely on official Soviet information, such
as periodicals, newspapers, books, and radio broadcasts, supplemented
by information reports collected by the intelligence community. From
the information collected from the above sources, estimates of produc-
tion, distribution, and the like were made by use of conversion factors
determined from information collected from official US publications,
US abrasive industry representatives, and the US Bureau of Mines.
Thirty-five percent of the sources are official Soviet information
sources; 30 percent are intelligence reports with evaluations ranging
from A-1 to F-6; and the remaining 35 percent are references to US
practice. Most of these reports are believed to be fairly reliable,
and the over-all evaluation of the sources is estimated to be B-2.
Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated
"Eval.," have the following significance:
Doc. - Documentary
A - Completely reliable
B - Usually reliable
C - Fairly reliable
D - Not usually reliable
E - Not reliable
F - Cannot be judged
1 - Confirmed by other sources
2 - Probably true
3 - Possibly true
1. - Doubtful
5 -.Probably false
6 _ Cannot be judged
"Documentary" refers to original documents of foreign governments
and organizations; copies or translations of such documents by a staff
officer; or information extracted from such documents by a staff
officer, all of which may carry the field evaluation "Documentary."
Evaluations not otherwise designated are those appearing on the
cited document; those designated "RR" are by the author of this report.
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No "RR" evaluation is given when the author agrees with the evaluation
on the cited document.
1. Stanki i instrument, No. 11, 1947- U. Eval. RR A-2.
2.
25X11.
5.
6.
7.
8.
STATSPEC
9.
10. Stanki i instrument, Vol. 8, No. 22, 1937, pp. 1-4. U.
Eval. RR A-2.
11. CIA ORR Computed Indices of Gross National Product by Sector
for the USSR, 1938, 1948, mid-1956, Based on ORR contribu-
tions to Project 10.116, 1 Apr 1954. S.
12. D.B. Shimkin, Minerals -a Key to Soviet Power, Cambridge,
1953, p. 288. U. Eva1.?RR -2.
D.B. Shimkin, The Mineral Self-Sufficiency of the Soviet Union,
Cambridge, 1949, Vol. I, pp. 7d-d2. U. Eval. RR B-2.
13. Shimkin, 1949, op. cit.
Shimkin, 1953, op. cit.
14. Stanki i instrument, No. 11, 1947. U. Eval. RR A-2.
25X1A15.
16. is
17. B.T. Icolpakov, Export-Import Dictionary, Vol. I., Moscow
Vneshtor izdat 1952, . 29. U. Eval. RR A-2.
25X1 A 18.
19.
25X1 A 20.
21.
22. CIA FDD, Report U-4867, 20 Oct 1953?
25X1 A 23 .
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25X1A
25X1A
54+. CIA RR PR-91, Material Balance Analysis of Soviet Bloc
55.
25X1 C
Economic Capabilities to Support Specified War Activities
beginning in Mid-1955, Nov 1954. S.
56. Kirkpatrick and Montague, op. cit.
57?
25X1 A 58.
59.
25X1C60.
25XX A
25X1 C 62.
IA/RR , lilgt Tension Transmission Network of the Urals
Area, 19 Jan 1953. S.
63. Students Committee Report, SR 49-20, op. cit.
64. Ibid.
65. Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufactures:
1947. U. Eval. RR A-2.
25X1 A 66.
25X1 A 67.
68. Ibid.
25X1C 69.
70. Die Chemische Industrie, Vol. 67, 25 Jan 191+4, p. 10. U.
Eval. RR 2.
71. V avangarde tekhniki, 1931. U. Eval. RR 2.
72. American Russian Chamber of Commerce Bulletin, Jul 1939, G.
Ippolitov, Chief Engineer of the Main Administration of the
Abrasives Industry, "Development of the Abrasives Industry in
the USSR," translated from Mashinostroyeniye, 17 Apr 1939-
U. Eval. RR B-2.
Stanki i instrument, Vol. 8, No. 22, 1937, pp. 1-4. U.
Eval. RR A-2.
25X1 A 74.
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75. American Russian Chamber of Commerce Bulletin, Jul 1939, op. cit.
76. Ibid.
77. Stanki i instrument, Vol. 8, No. 22, 1937, pp. 1-4. U.
Eval. RR A-2.
78. Shimkin, 1953, op. cit.
79. N. Voznesensky's report delivered at the 18th All-Union
Conference of the CPSU, 18 Feb 1941. U. Eval. RR 2.
80. Stanki i instrument, No. 11, 1947. U. Eval. RR A-2.
25X1A81.
82. Die emisc e inaustrie, o .
Eval. RR 2.
83. Stanki i instrument, No. 11, 1947- U. Eval. RR A-2.
84. P.V. Nikitin, Mashinostroyen:iye SSSR v poslevoyennoy stalinskoy
25X1A 85.
86
.
STATSPEC
pyatiletke (Machine-Building Industry of the USSR in the Postwar
Stalin Five Year Plan). Moscow. 1949. D. 11. U. Eval. RR 2.
CIA FDD Summar No. 11, 8 Sep 1953. C. Eval. RR B-2.
25X1A
Pravda vostoka, 16 Jan 1948. U. Eval. RR 2.
87.
Stanki i instrument, Vol. 8, No. 22, 1937, pp.
1-4. U.
Eval. RR A-2.
88.
CIA ORR contribution to NIE-11-4-54, "Computed Indexes of Gross
National Product by Sector for the USSR, 1938, 1948, mid-1956,"
Soviet Capabilities and Probable Soviet Courses of Action
through Mid-1956, 30 Apr. 1954. S.
89. CIA FDD, Report U-4995, 9 Nov 1953, translation of "Soviet Abra-
sives Industry in 1951-52," Stanki i instrument, Dec 1952. C.
Eval. RR 2.
90.
CIA FDD, Summary. No. 179, 11 Aug 1954. C.
Eval. RR 2.
91.
Stanki i instrument, Vol. 8, No. 22, 1937.
U. Eval. RR A-2.
92.
CIA FDD, Report U-4995, 9 Nov 1953, G.M. Ippolitov and
P.P. Tubanov "Soviet Abrasives Industry in 1951-1952,"
translated from Stanki i instrument, Moscow, Dec 1952, pp. 6-8.
C. Eval. RR 2.
25X1A
93.
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94. CIA/RR 47, The Machine Tool Industry of the USSR, 22 Nov 1954.
Sj, US OFFICIALS ONLY.
95. Stanki i instrument, Vol. 8, No. 22, 1937. U. Eval. RR A-2.
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