ESTIMATIVE SUPPORT FOR NEW OR REVISED NSC PAPERS

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79B00970A000100010116-4
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RIPPUB
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T
Document Page Count: 
4
Document Creation Date: 
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 31, 1998
Sequence Number: 
116
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Publication Date: 
January 28, 1953
Content Type: 
MF
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79B00970A000100010116-4.pdf374.18 KB
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Approved For Release 2001/08/08: SNA000100010116-4 gArew 4mi 0 R DEPUTY Dj1TflaIcEL 28 January 1953 SUBJECT! Estimative Support for New or Revised MSC Papers At the Senior Staff meeting on 27 January, five major subjects were proposed for early Council consideration, as follow: a0 Overall Asia policy (acrid by all beads 40 desirable, with not!! by JCS that a nuper?priority Aper on Indochina might be noceseary)? Policy toward the luropean Satellitse (proposed by c. Policy toward the Middlo iast generally (St sod by d. Policy toward Yegoslavia(proposed by Defuse). to. European policy in the event of continued non-ratificstioo of JC, with particular reference to addseion of West rmany and Spain to NATt (proposed by Defense). This memo gives the existing state of estimative suort for such papers, the relevant estimates already programmed, and the apparent rated for now estimates, with diecuseion of oossiblo timing. State). State), 74-r7o I. 1 4aia Po]4.oy subject order of the Current Policies books a. We have an overall estimate of Gamsunist intentions in Asia, RIMA47 (31 October 1952), still gencrally valid but not covering any reaction to armed Western courses of action. It is now planned to bring this up to date, as park of the new -edition of lills64 (Part II), for Juno publication, covering the period up to mid.1955. Possibly mood: a tore uroot and selective estimate assuming certain lesion courses of action. b. We have a currently valid estimato of Sin relations* mrss58 (10 September 1952). We do not hays any extensive *Waste of internal conditions in Communist China more recent than Julio 1951, though the subject has been touched en in suocessive Approved For Release 2001/08/08 660970A000100010116-4 25X6A Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CI i(k AB0 ft "rf P d9 W00100010116-4 Korean **time es and in the estimates of the effect of b other measures (see c. infra). Bemuse of the viaknes intelligence= this'ara","7n exteneive research effort had been laid eat leading to an estimate in early 1,5k. Pending completion of this it was planned to treat Communist China in the new NIO-64 (Part II), due in June. Possible augs an urgent estimate on internal condi- tions in Common/lit-dine. This in no closely related to the need in above that the two might profitably be merged. a. We have an set/mate of Communist in . in Korea, NIN45/1 (30 July 1952), which was reviewed in Ncvmab.r and judged not to need revision at that time. A new estimate, 55/2, is now being prepared for March publication. We have also e$iaat,d the consequences of certain assumed courses of action that sight be used against the Comemnists to break the Kerwin deadlock (mebargo? blockade, air war in Manchuria) in St-27 (5 *Nan 1,52), and the $IC has OM' tOroughly into the status of existing trade and shipping controls on trade with Communiet China (the most recent edition being 3 October 1952)0 Psep#le neecles acceleration of NIE-55/2. Any further review of the Consequences of assumed courses of action should probably be handled in a single paper, merging with the needs stated in a. and b. above. The availability of n-27 should make possible fairly rapid Sandi/as of these points. 0. With respect to Jvraces likelihood of Comm= et attack, NI14 /1 (1 A appears valid, and we have an extensive estimate that capabilities for offensive action on aey front general statements on world reaction thereto, 58-29 which was prepared in support of NIC 128 and was judg valid in November. Poss01- nestles review of SE-29 an the light of oontemplated coUreos of action. the still Nation- h same 2), S. With respect to Southeast Asia, we have a generally d estimat, of the Indochina situation. NIN-35/2 (29 August 1952), Unite of the Burma situatioe, WI1-74, in final stages and f publication by 3 February. As updating of SI1?35/2 is pro- or May publication. We have no estimates on the Malayan or 2 Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79600970A000100010116-4 25X6A Approved For Release 2001/08/08 Thailand el nation's, nor any recent Poes#41e nledes acceleration of NIA- lessiggenem of manned courses of action. The assumed courses of action in Indochina on the re night be considered in the sem or 4 neparate paper, br beekground in Thailand and *days, and for Berm whatever NIS*74 is indicated. I?! OAGl00100010116-4 g, We are covering Xndoneds in a hoduled for February peblication. Philippines, and Hong on and Macao *pert frus tbsir tra Communist China) are not novered in existing or planned (Dirtiest... Asia acne on of 2 tion o mope and aaatalagated co estimate should this are* could depend heavily Apert from the possible need for tecelora coal estimates on Aorea and Indoshina, the of any now estimate should probably be geared to es of aotion. if them courser are Asia-wide, the be. If Immediate action in Indochina As contemplated, be dealt with separately. The timieg of either would an how narrowly the essential questions 044 be framed. 7, ing estimate on tIox latellites, NIE-33 (7 Novsi*ber but somewhat out of date, thongh the situation is briefly in the later Awaim44 (Part 1) (8 Narfaibar 1552). A ceeplet. successor had been programmed for the third qsarter of a separate estimate on Feat Germany at the ems time. since the contemplated sonnies of &diem will probably ? poUtical situation and will not depend on the enact alit* monomial and military potential made in d be possible to accelerate a polities]. estimate (with economic and military treatment) for publication 3.6 weeks ation, leaving the monvaio and military detail to be covered either in a 'operate astimate or in hIE...64 (Part II). 25X6A 1,wwww6maminnoLin countries, NIE43 igypt, MIN-76, in about Feb III. Middle Seat that this paper will omit Iran and deil with p we have a current general estimate on the (15 January 1933), and a *peeing estimate on an advanced sta03e mut cspsble of publication by . 3 . Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79600970A000100010116-4 25X6A 25X6A Approved ForpRelease 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79600970A000100010116-4 ur 5. The existinr estimate on Yugo/sledsJanuary 1952)? is useful for general background, bet out-of da4s in SONO respects. A successor is planned for publication in 53. It Should be noted that the main point rained by Mr. Nash dealt with Yugealavorientatitm and attitude toward 9B aid. This im not covered in NIB-29/2 adequately. (A corner of llogoelav foreign po167? toward Albania, is Covered in the resent NIF442/1.) Feasible need: acceler- ation of the new estimate on Yugoslavia, with heavy eephaira on Yugoslavian attitudes in the Bast-Weat conflict (which will be covered in general terms in NIE-45, scheduled for February P01 tication). If possible, this should include the Tux:Delay reaction to oontemplated courses of action. V1 Lamson Deftes 6. We have current estimate+, an France and Its4rip 112-63 (23 January 1953) and NZI-71 (in final stages, oapebli,:ef publica- tion by 15 February). Both of these touch briefly on EtiO ratifica- tion. We have no estimates of the likelihood of ratifitation by other ICC signatories, nor of the rosettes to rejection or indefinite delay of EDC by any country, nor of relations to proposeis for the admits:Lon of West 9ermany or Spain to NATO. A general bailie estimate 25X6A on the future is tentatively progressed for 1.he third (Porter, but 0/NE is ourrent1,7 considering earlier initiation. Foe' needs: the first need should be a full appraisal of the laC r*ttfiestion situation, including the probable timetables of coneid- oration by each signatory, and the chariest of ?atria** a!mlieetton or indefinite delay by each. In our judgment this is so such a current diplomatic natter that it should be handled by State sin, rather than by a national estimate. National estimates could 'Oe used to v 25X6A tiaates on (3) any ev.iit the setts" would be a diffi- .d should be Oxen net less than two months for preparation .? Presumably admission of Spain would not be a matter of comparable urgency. lettmates of 'the Spanish reaction and of the reaction of present NATO ooentries would be in order at the right time. If this is urgent anCearly general Spanish paper would be desirable. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDF'79600970A000100010116-4 , a 25X6A 25X6A 25X6A