ESTIMATIVE SUPPORT FOR NEW OR REVISED NSC PAPERS
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79B00970A000100010116-4
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RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 31, 1998
Sequence Number:
116
Case Number:
Publication Date:
January 28, 1953
Content Type:
MF
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R DEPUTY Dj1TflaIcEL
28 January 1953
SUBJECT! Estimative Support for New or Revised MSC Papers
At the Senior Staff meeting on 27 January, five major subjects
were proposed for early Council consideration, as follow:
a0 Overall Asia policy (acrid by all beads 40 desirable,
with not!! by JCS that a nuper?priority Aper on Indochina might be
noceseary)?
Policy toward the luropean Satellitse (proposed by
c. Policy toward the Middlo iast generally (St sod by
d. Policy toward Yegoslavia(proposed by Defuse).
to. European policy in the event of continued non-ratificstioo
of JC, with particular reference to addseion of West rmany and
Spain to NATt (proposed by Defense).
This memo gives the existing state of estimative suort for
such papers, the relevant estimates already programmed, and the apparent
rated for now estimates, with diecuseion of oossiblo timing.
State).
State),
74-r7o
I. 1 4aia Po]4.oy
subject order of the Current Policies books
a. We have an overall estimate of Gamsunist intentions
in Asia, RIMA47 (31 October 1952), still gencrally valid but not
covering any reaction to armed Western courses of action. It is
now planned to bring this up to date, as park of the new -edition of
lills64 (Part II), for Juno publication, covering the period up to
mid.1955. Possibly mood: a tore uroot and selective estimate
assuming certain lesion courses of action.
b. We have a currently valid estimato of Sin
relations* mrss58 (10 September 1952). We do not hays any extensive
*Waste of internal conditions in Communist China more recent than
Julio 1951, though the subject has been touched en in suocessive
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Korean **time es and in the estimates of the effect of b
other measures (see c. infra). Bemuse of the viaknes
intelligence= this'ara","7n exteneive research effort had been laid
eat leading to an estimate in early 1,5k. Pending completion of this
it was planned to treat Communist China in the new NIO-64 (Part II),
due in June. Possible augs an urgent estimate on internal condi-
tions in Common/lit-dine. This in no closely related to the need in
above that the two might profitably be merged.
a. We have an set/mate of Communist in . in Korea,
NIN45/1 (30 July 1952), which was reviewed in Ncvmab.r and judged
not to need revision at that time. A new estimate, 55/2, is now
being prepared for March publication. We have also e$iaat,d the
consequences of certain assumed courses of action that sight be used
against the Comemnists to break the Kerwin deadlock (mebargo? blockade,
air war in Manchuria) in St-27 (5 *Nan 1,52), and the $IC has OM'
tOroughly into the status of existing trade and shipping controls on
trade with Communiet China (the most recent edition being 3 October
1952)0 Psep#le neecles acceleration of NIE-55/2. Any further
review of the Consequences of assumed courses of action should probably
be handled in a single paper, merging with the needs stated in a. and
b. above. The availability of n-27 should make possible fairly rapid
Sandi/as of these points.
0. With respect to Jvraces
likelihood of Comm= et attack, NI14 /1 (1 A
appears valid, and we have an extensive estimate
that capabilities for offensive action on aey front
general statements on world reaction thereto, 58-29
which was prepared in support of NIC 128 and was judg
valid in November. Poss01- nestles review of SE-29 an
the light of oontemplated coUreos of action.
the
still
Nation-
h same
2),
S. With respect to Southeast Asia, we have a generally
d estimat, of the Indochina situation. NIN-35/2 (29 August 1952),
Unite of the Burma situatioe, WI1-74, in final stages and
f publication by 3 February. As updating of SI1?35/2 is pro-
or May publication. We have no estimates on the Malayan or
2
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Thailand el nation's, nor any recent
Poes#41e nledes acceleration of NIA-
lessiggenem of manned courses of action. The
assumed courses of action in Indochina on the re
night be considered in the sem or 4 neparate paper, br
beekground in Thailand and *days, and for Berm whatever
NIS*74 is indicated.
I?!
OAGl00100010116-4
g, We are covering Xndoneds in a
hoduled for February peblication.
Philippines, and Hong on and Macao *pert frus tbsir tra
Communist China) are not novered in existing or planned (Dirtiest...
Asia
acne
on of
2
tion o
mope and
aaatalagated co
estimate should
this are* could
depend heavily
Apert from the possible need for tecelora
coal estimates on Aorea and Indoshina, the
of any now estimate should probably be geared to
es of aotion. if them courser are Asia-wide, the
be. If Immediate action in Indochina As contemplated,
be dealt with separately. The timieg of either would
an how narrowly the essential questions 044 be framed.
7,
ing estimate on tIox latellites, NIE-33 (7 Novsi*ber
but somewhat out of date, thongh the situation is
briefly in the later Awaim44 (Part 1) (8 Narfaibar 1552).
A ceeplet. successor had been programmed for the third qsarter of
a separate estimate on Feat Germany at the ems time.
since the contemplated sonnies of &diem will probably
? poUtical situation and will not depend on the enact
alit* monomial and military potential made in
d be possible to accelerate a polities]. estimate (with
economic and military treatment) for publication 3.6 weeks
ation, leaving the monvaio and military detail to be
covered either in a 'operate astimate or in hIE...64 (Part II).
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countries, NIE43
igypt, MIN-76, in
about Feb
III. Middle Seat
that this paper will omit Iran and deil with
p we have a current general estimate on the
(15 January 1933), and a *peeing estimate on
an advanced sta03e mut cspsble of publication by
. 3 .
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5. The existinr estimate on Yugo/sledsJanuary
1952)? is useful for general background, bet out-of da4s in SONO
respects. A successor is planned for publication in 53. It
Should be noted that the main point rained by Mr. Nash dealt with
Yugealavorientatitm and attitude toward 9B aid. This im not covered
in NIB-29/2 adequately. (A corner of llogoelav foreign po167? toward
Albania, is Covered in the resent NIF442/1.) Feasible need: acceler-
ation of the new estimate on Yugoslavia, with heavy eephaira on
Yugoslavian attitudes in the Bast-Weat conflict (which will be covered
in general terms in NIE-45, scheduled for February P01
tication). If
possible, this should include the Tux:Delay reaction to oontemplated
courses of action.
V1 Lamson Deftes
6. We have current estimate+, an France and Its4rip 112-63
(23 January 1953) and NZI-71 (in final stages, oapebli,:ef publica-
tion by 15 February). Both of these touch briefly on EtiO ratifica-
tion. We have no estimates of the likelihood of ratifitation by
other ICC signatories, nor of the rosettes to rejection or indefinite
delay of EDC by any country, nor of relations to proposeis for the
admits:Lon of West 9ermany or Spain to NATO. A general bailie estimate
25X6A on the future is tentatively progressed for 1.he third
(Porter, but 0/NE is ourrent1,7 considering earlier initiation.
Foe' needs: the first need should be a full appraisal of the laC
r*ttfiestion situation, including the probable timetables of coneid-
oration by each signatory, and the chariest of ?atria** a!mlieetton or
indefinite delay by each. In our judgment this is so such a current
diplomatic natter that it should be handled by State sin, rather
than by a national estimate. National estimates could 'Oe used to v
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tiaates on (3) any ev.iit the setts" would be a diffi-
.d should be Oxen net less than two months for preparation
.? Presumably admission of Spain would not be a matter
of comparable urgency. lettmates of 'the Spanish reaction and of the
reaction of present NATO ooentries would be in order at the right time.
If this is urgent anCearly general Spanish paper would be desirable.
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