ARMS SALES TO THE THIRD WORLD, 1976

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00457A000700110001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 1, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
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Arms Sales to the
Third World, 1976
State Dept. review completed
Secret
ER 77-10500
September 1977
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?
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Arms Sales to the Third World, 1976
Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence
September 1977
Arms sales to the Third World fell to US $14.4 billion in 1976,
registering the second annual decline from the record $20.7 billion sales of
1974 and the $16.7 billion total of 1975. The reduction is attributable to (a)
a huge backlog of outstanding arms orders and (b) the continuing heavy flow
under old contracts of deliveries-$8.7 billion in 1976-which was being
absorbed into inventories of the less developed countries (LDCs). Over the
next several years, we expect the market to stabilize around an annual
average of approximately $15 billion in sales and $10 billion in deliveries.
Middle Eastern and North African buyers continued to dominate the
market. Iran and Saudi Arabia remained the largest single customers.
The US share of the market, though reduced from the 1972-75 average,
was 54 percent of the total in 1976. At the same time the Communist share
Note: This paper has been coordinated with the Department of State and
Defense Intelligence Agency. US data are for fiscal years, from Defense
Security Assistance Agency sources. Fiscal Year 1975 and 1976 data are
preliminary. Because of differences in the categories included in arms sales
data and, in certain cases, different methods of pricing arms sales, the data in
this report have major problems of comparability. Data on US arms sales and
deliveries are the most comprehensive-they include military hardware, sup-
port items (some of which are not recorded in data on other suppliers), and
services (which are usually excluded from estimates of other suppliers' sales).
This means that the US figures greatly overstate the role of the United States
as a supplier of military hardware in the narrow sense. The problems and
implications inherent in the use of customary data on arms sales will be
discussed in a forthcoming report.
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rose to 20 percent. Non-Communist (except US) countries also expanded
their share to 26 percent, despite a reduction in the absolute level of French,
Italian, and West German sales in 1976. The United Kingdom, which main-
tained its record 1975 level of sales, was able to gain a sizable edge over West
European competitors.
ii
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Arms Sales to the Third World, 1976
Sales Drop Again
Arms sales to Third World customers con-
tinued to fall off in 1976, as major LDC buyers
absorbed large deliveries of new equipment
under old orders and concentrated on technical
training and infrastructure development. While
Saudi purchases rebounded from the temporary
slump of 1975, other large customers-especially
Iran, Syria, and Libya-reduced their orders.
The reductions pushed sales down to $14.4 bil-
lion, compared with $16.7 billion in 1975 and
$20.7 billion in 1974. France, Italy, West Ger-
many, and the United States bore the brunt of
the reductions, their combined sales falling by
almost 30 percent from 1975 (figure 1 and
appendix tables 1 through 8).
This second consecutive annual decline fol-
lowed a precipitous rise that had culminated in
record 1974 sales of $20.7 billion. About a third
of the increase was attributable to inflation.
Substantial price rises were part of the global
pattern of inflation; they were accentuated by
the upsurge of Middle East orders after the 1973
war and supported by the new wealth of oil
producers. The rising proportion of more expen-
sive modern weaponry also helps account for
the sharp rise in orders through 1974.
The decline in sales in 1975-76 is even more
pronounced if viewed in real terms. The world-
wide inflation has persisted. The inflation rate
for arms probably is in the neighborhood of 6
percent per annum.
Altogether Third World nations purchased
$75 billion of arms in the past five years. Coun-
tries in the Middle East and North Africa ac-
counted for 70 percent of the total.
The Customers
Middle Eastern and North African countries
retained their position in 1976 as the most
lucrative arms market in the developing world.
. ec_ -- -
Non-Camn unist
1971
a a are or isca ears.
ata are or a ern- ur n
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SECRET
Figure:2
Global Arms Sales to the Third World,
1976
Middre East
and
North Rfeiea
7E
Even though orders from the area fell well be-
low recent records, continuing massive arms pur-
chases by OPEC countries kept Western order
books full and provided the USSR with a large
new source of hard currency. Iran and Saudi
Arabia still were the biggest customers, account-
ing for 40 percent of all LDC orders (figure 2).
From only about $1 billion in 1972, their com-
bined purchases shot past $8 billion in 1974.
Subsequently, their orders have hovered around
$6 billion a year.
Iran's $3.2 billion of orders last year con-
tinued to outrun Saudi Arabia's. In the past five
years, Tehran has bought a total of $15.8 billion
Third World Arms Purchases,
1972-76
Total
Middle East and
North Africa
53,063
Asia and the Pacific
15,460
Latin America
3,938
Sub-Saharan Africa
2,184
of arms to upgrade and to expand its armed
forces and to project a big power image at home
and abroad. Its purchases have included armored
personnel carriers and artillery from the USSR,
ships and advanced aircraft from the United
States, and Chieftain tanks from the UK. The
United States remains by far the largest supplier,
although recent large purchases in the UK have
reduced the US share to less than 50 percent,
down from 80 percent during 1972-75.
Saudi arms purchases increased to $2.7 billion
in 1976, moving closer to Iran's. These expendi-
tures again focused on infrastructure and sup-
port. More than any other LDC, Saudi Arabia
has allocated massive amounts of money to mili-
tary support facilities, such as base construction,
vehicle maintenance facilities, and warehouses.
In 1976, about two-thirds of the total value of
its US contracts were for operation of Saudi
facilities and for maintenance of F-5Es over a
three-year period. Almost all of Riyadh's $10.7
billion of foreign arms expenditures since 1971
have been in the United States, a pattern that
continued last year.
Though dwarfed by Iranian and Saudi arms
purchases, orders placed by other Middle East-
ern and North African countries in 1976 were
large by LDC standards.
? Iraq rose to third place on the buyers' list,
largely because of acontract with
the Soviets for jet lighters, missiles, and
tanks.
? Israel's orders, while well below 1974 crisis
levels, topped a billion dollars and featured
fighter aircraft and missiles purchased from
the United States.
? Egyptian orders rallied moderately after a
two-year lull, with more than $450 million of
orders, placed largely in the West.
? New purchases by Libya and Syria fell off
sharply in 1976 as these countries continued
to take delivery under major contracts signed
in earlier years.
Sales to East Asia as a whole were cut again
from the already reduced levels that followed
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the end of the war in Vietnam. The drop was
accounted for by the termination of US arms
sales to Vietnam and Cambodia. South Korea,
Taiwan, and Thailand-the largest East Asian
arms customers-all expanded their purchases.
Led by Brazil, Chile, and Peru, Latin Ameri-
can countries pursued arms modernization pro-
grams begun a decade ago. Chile and Peru spent
lavishly on modernizing their forces, each to
enhance its security against the other. Peru's
I lorders from the USSR in 1976
move oscow into the forefront as Peru's
major supplier; for the first time, the Soviets
received orders from the Peruvian Air Force.
Peru's navy, heretofore dependent on Western
suppliers, also initiated negotiations for naval
craft from the Soviet Union. The perceived
threat from Peru gave the Chilean Government
domestic support to increase arms purchases and
to divert attention from persistent economic
problems. Orders totaling $40 million included
submarine spare parts, helicopters, and missiles
from the UK, West Germany, and Israel. Brazil's
$55 million of orders were mostly from the
United States.
Arms for sub-Saharan Africa, while only a
small fraction of the LDC total, continued to
make headlines in 1976, partly because of the
expanding Soviet commitment to the continent
but also because of the high potential for con-
flict throughout the area. Growing national ri-
valries, national security problems, and an un-
stable political climate were all exacerbated by
new promises of weapons for established govern-
ments and insurgent groups.
Sub-Saharan LDCs placed orders totaling
about $800 million last year, 43 percent with
Communist countries. These orders maintained
the new higher levels reached the year before
and also included modern weaponry that had
begun to flow into Africa in 1975. In East
Africa a major arms race developed between
Ethiopia and Somalia as political tensions
mounted. It was fueled by a major new Soviet
arms accord with Ethiopia; at the same time,
Moscow remained Somalia's chief source of
arms. Further south, Tanzania, Mozambique,
and Angola were major recipients of Communist
arms.
High Deliveries Continue
Despite the reduction in new orders in 1976,
arms deliveries rose slightly as suppliers filled
orders from previous heavy commitments. The
$8.7 billion of arms received by LDCs last year
was surpassed only in 1973 during the massive
resupply of the Middle East belligerents follow-
ing the October War. The oil-rich clients again
were the major recipients, with Iran's $1.5 bil-
lion of receipts by far the largest. Next in order
were Israel, Libya, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Syria,
which together with Iran accounted for over
half of all 1976 deliveries. In 1975 they had
accounted for less than 45 percent (appendix
tables 9 and 10).
The United States was the only major arms
exporter-except for Italy-to experience a de-
cline in the value of deliveries in 1976. Although
US deliveries to large Middle Eastern clients
were at near record levels, the virtual elimina-
tion of the Military Assistance Program (MAP)
after fiscal year 1975 dragged the overall total
down by more than 15 percent. This decline
reduced the US share of arms deliveries to the
Third World from 57 percent in 1975 to 44
percent in 1976.
The slack in US deliveries was more than
offset by large increases from other Western and
Communist countries. British and West German
arms exports reached their highest levels, while
French deliveries also rose sharply, although still
below the 1973 peak. Communist shipments
were at a near record pace, surpassed only by
deliveries in the crisis year 1973.
Third World orders of expensive high-technol-
ogy ordnance that showed up in 1976 deliveries
included:
? Osa-II missile attack boats to Algeria,
Libya, and India.
? The SA-3 surface-to-air missile system to
Tanzania.
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? MIG-21 fighter aircraft to Angola.
? MIG-bis aircraft and the SA-6 surface-to-air
missile system to India.
? An F-class submarine to Libya.
? Advanced L version export model of the
MIG-21 jet fighter to Algeria-Algeria's first
aircraft from Moscow since 1974.
First West European deliveries of:
? One type-209 West German submarine to
Venezuela.
? French Exocet antiship missiles and a West
German guided-missile boat to Ecuador.
? One British Mark 10 guided-missile de-
stroyer to Brazil.
? Two British Oberon submarines, six West
German BO-105 helicopters, and 100 Israeli
Shafir air-to-air missiles, all going to Chile.
? British Swingfire antitank missiles to Egypt.
French Mirage. III jet fighters to the United
Arab Emirates.
In 1976 the United States for the first time
exported advanced attack aircraft and missile
systems to a number of LDCs. Iran received
advanced variable-geometry F-14 fighters and
F-5 F fighters; Jordan, Redeye missiles; and
Greece, A-7 attack aircraft.
Suppliers
Competition to maintain foreign earnings and
to keep order books full intensified as LDC
orders fell off last year. Historically, the United
States has claimed the largest share of the mar-
ket, followed by the USSR, France, and the
United Kingdom. The data tend to overstate the
US share of actual weapons sales, however, since
only about 40 percent of the US total has con-
sisted of actual military hardware. Another 40
percent has been for support, including com-
munications and radar; the remainder has gone
for training, construction of ancillary facilities,
and other services. In contrast, the estimated
figures for Communist and other Western sup-
pliers include very little infrastructural develop-
ment and services.
France and Italy were most affected by re-
duced LDC demand in 1976 as their combined
sales fell by almost 80 percent from 1975 levels.
The United States also lost part of its market
while UK orders maintained record 1975 levels,
giving the British a sizable edge over other West
European arms merchants. Meanwhile, the
smaller Western exporters as a group more than
tripled their sales, making some inroads into the
shrunken 1976 market.
The United States
US weapons are among the most sought after
because of their advanced technology and repu-
tation for performance. Also important are De-
partment of Defense and manufacturer support
for incorporating the weapons into recipient
military systems and reliable follow-on spare
parts programs. These support and maintenance
operations, especially for advanced equipment,
create considerable follow-on sales, which may
exceed initial outlays. Over the life of a US
aircraft, the cost of support equipment (includ-
ing initial and follow-on spares) and training
may be two to four times the cosT of the origi-
nal plane; the cost of the initial support pack-
ages may be as much as 30 percent of the
flyaway cost.
Virtual elimination of the MAP has put al-
most all US arms sales on a cash or credit basis
under Foreign Military Sales (FMS) or commer-
cial orders. US sales, which had skyrocketed in
the mid-1970s, totaled $42 billion for
1972-76. Sales peaked in 1974 at $11.5 billion,
fell to $8.3 billion in 1975, and dropped further
to $7.7 billion in 1976. The recent declines
reflect especially the reduction of Iranian pur-
chases and the cutoff of aid to Vietnam. Mean-
while, record sales to Saudi Arabia established
Riyadh as the largest US customer. Sales to
Israel, the third largest buyer, did not change
markedly from 1975; they remained down al-
most 60 percent from the 1974 peak.
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Western Europe
Italian, French, and West German arms sales
declined far more sharply than US sales last
year. Still, all major West European accounts,
except Italy's, were well above pre-1974 levels.
The UK's 1976 sales maintained their fast
1975 pace and were highlighted by Iran's order
of $840 million worth of Chieftain tanks. The
$1.5 billion total was double the annual average
of 1973-74 and moved the UK up to third place
among LDC arms suppliers. The $5 billion in
British arms sales in the past five years have
helped to bolster the United Kingdom's balance
of payments and to maintain a healthy defense
industry. Arms exports to LDCs have contrib-
uted to the employment of 300,000 in British
arms factories-1 percent of the labor force-and
account for about 3.4 percent of total exports.
London also sees arms sales as yielding political
advantages in certain areas of the world.
Until the mid-1960s, British weapons exports
were almost entirely to former dependencies
that London regarded as strategically impor-
tant-Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, India, Pakistan, and
South Africa. More recently most of the de-
mand for British weapons has come from Iran
and the oil-rich countries of the Arabian Penin-
sula. London's Middle Eastern and North Afri-
can clients accounted for more than two-thirds
of total British orders in 1972-76. Latin Ameri-
can countries, particularly Argentina and Brazil,
also have purchased major amounts.
The United Kingdom has imposed few re-
straints on foreign arms sales, although as a
general rule it forbids sales to countries engaged
in military hostilities. All contracts are subject
to Ministry of Defense approval. From time to
time, political considerations have controlled
sales, as illustrated by London's current refusal
to sell arms directly to South Africa or to cer-
tain rightwing dictatorships. Credits are auto-
matically extended for all sales, terms varying
with the nature of the goods.
France, which had ranked as the largest arms
supplier to the LDCs after the United States and
the USSR, lost its place to the UK in 1976.
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Sales tumbled to about a half billion dollars
from more than $2 billion the year before. Mid-
dle Eastern and North African clients have ac-
counted for the bulk of France's total $5.8
billion of military sales in 1972-76. Although
the manufacture of weapons systems contrib-
utes only about 2 percent to France's GNP and
directly employs less than 2 percent of the labor
force, arms exports are considered vital for elim-
inating the trade deficit. Exports also are seen as
an important way of reducing the unit cost of
arms for the French military and as a means of
expanding French influence abroad. Military
equipment has ranked as the third largest
French export in recent years, accounting for
about 5 percent of total French exports and
nearly 10 percent of the value of exports of
finished industrial goods.
West German arms exports are small by global
standards and in comparison with the size of the
FRG economy. Bonn has sold a total of $2.6
billion worth of arms to LDCs in the past five
years. The 55-percent drop in 1976 sales, to less
than a half billion dollars, increased pressures on
the government to liberalize controls over arms
exports. Bonn's policy is the most restrictive
among major suppliers, authorizing the export
of only a limited range of modern conventional
weapons, primarily ground forces equipment.
The weapons industry now employs about
200,000 workers directly and another 40,000
indirectly. Advocates for relaxation of controls
argue that expanded arms sales would increase
the number of jobs and help to reduce the slack
in the steel and shipbuilding industries. They
also argue that increased arms sales would help
to stimulate orders for civilian goods.
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The USSR
Moscow's willingness to provide modern
weapons to almost any LDC-often at prices
below those for comparable Western equipment
and on attractive financial terms-has given the
Soviets a big slice of the LDC arms market. Sales
in 1976 accounted for almost 20 percent of the
world total; deliveries, for more than 25 per-
cent. Many less developed countries obtained
their first supersonic jet fighters, missile sys-
tems, or missile patrol boats from the USSR.
Moscow, not bound by various restrictions that
inhibit Western suppliers, has established itself
as a credible supplier, particularly to countries
with few other potential sources.
Moscow parlayed its arms deals into a $2.6
billion business in 1976. If US costs of produc-
tion were substituted for Soviet trade prices, the
value of last year's sales would increase to al-
most $3.5 billion. An estimated 70 percent of
the 1976 orders will be paid in hard currency or
its equivalent. A massive arms agreement with
Iraq, huge new sales to Iran and Peru, and major
contracts with India and Angola pushed the
1976 sales to heights previously reached only in
1973-74. Soviet sales in the past five years
totaled $12.4 billion, only 25 percent below
sales of all Western Europe.
Prospects
Given no major economic or military develop-
ment that upset current international balances,
we expect annual arms sales to the Third World
to level off at about $15 billion through 1980.
This estimate does not take into account a possi-
ble multilateral agreement to restrict exports. It
assumes that any further decline in the US mar-
ket share will be taken up largely by other
Western suppliers, especially France, the UK,
2~X1A The author of this paper isInter-
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national Trade and Services Division, Office
of Economic Research. Comments and que-
are welcome and should be directed to
ries
I I
and possibly West Germany. We expect Moscow
to continue its aggressive sales campaign, particu-
larly in view of Soviet need for additional large
inflows of hard currency; sales possibly could
move up in the $3 billion to $4 billion range in
the next few years. We assume a moderate slow-
ing of the rate of inflation of arms prices be-
cause of reduced demand (in real terms) and
some easing of cost pressures on munitions in-
dustries. In any event, a fairly stable dollar
figure for arms sales in the Third World would
entail a distinct downward trend in real volume,
given likely inflation rates.
In making projections of demand, we have
reviewed recent patterns and also have taken
into account the $45 billion in orders still out-
standing at yearend 1976, which will require
considerable time for absorption into LDC in-
ventories. These orders could barely be worked
off by 1980 even if present delivery levels rise
by as much as 25 percent, to $11 billion a year.
We expect demand to follow recent patterns,
with the Middle Eastern and North African cus-
tomers dominating the market. Perceived re-
gional threats will continue to generate competi-
tion and to provide the rationale for large pur-
chases in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America.
The countries in these areas will replenish and
update their stocks to prepare for possible con-
frontation and, in the case of Africa, for large-
scale insurgent activity.
LDCs will continue to seek modern weapons
systems and large support packages.. The existing
absorption problem created by the more sophis-
ticated weaponry will be accentuated and fur-
ther increase the need for logistical support de-
velopment and a larger deployment of trained
personnel to use the equipment.
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APPENDIX
Arms Sales to the Third World, by Supplier'
Total ' ...........................................
74,645
8,283
14,611
20,706
16,682
14,363
Non-Communist Countries .......
60,521
6,549
11,599
16,654
14,232
11,487
United States' .........................
42,364
5,458
9,365
11,532
8,326
7,683
Western Europe ......................
16,862
974
2,141
4,698
5,616
3,433
Other .........................................
1,295
117
93
424
290
371
Communist Countries' .............
14,124
1,734
3,012
4,052
2,450
2,876
USSR " .......................................
12,372
1,504
2,808
3,506
2,003
2,551
Eastern Europe ........................
833
151
131
325
136
90
China .........................................
340
78
24
81
36
121
Other' .......................................
579
1
49
140
275
114
' These data are sales and aid commitments and are to be differentiated from arms exports (deliveries).
Recipient total includes Greece and Turkey and excludes Spain and Portugal.
' Data are for fiscal years, and data for 1975 and 1976 are preliminary.
' All values of Communist country agreements are at Soviet trade prices, which are generally lower than
prices of comparable equipment sold to- the West. Soviet dollar values do not indicate cost of producing
comparable items in the US.
If Soviet arms sold to the Third World were priced at US costs of production instead of trade prices, the
total value would be increased by about one-third.
' Includes Cuban, North Korean, Vietnamese, and Yugoslav sales.
Arms Sales to the Third World, by Major Recipient
Total ....................................
74,645
8,283
14,611
20,706
16,682
14,363
Of which:
Iran ....................................
15,850
762
2,283
5,383
4,182
3,240
Saudi Arabia ...................
10,653
482
2,652
2,962
1,835
2,722
Israel .................................
5,230
530
205
2,521
914
1,060
Iraq ...................................
4,035
423
364
1,290
531
1,427
Syria ..................................
3,302
446
1,181
857
704
114
Libya ................................
3,101
156
49
1,973
588
335
Egypt ................................
2,193
431
1,095
22
179
466
South Korea ....................
1,944
370
309
222
347
696
Greece ..............................
1,679
203
81
851
414
130
India .................................
1,141
153
209
71
563
145
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Table 3
United States: Arms Sales to the Third World
Total .........................
42,364.4
5,458.2
9,365.1
11,532.4
8,326.2
7,682.5
Middle East and
North Africa ....
28,952.8
1,870.7
4,828.9
9,571.5
6,544.6
6,137.1
Egypt .....................
67.4
0
0
0
Negl.
67.4
Greece ...................
1,039.2
203.3
66.2
461.8
218.6
89.3
Iran .........................
11,683.7
556.1
2,177.1
4,408.5
3,070.4
1,471.6
Israel ......................
5,151.0
472.3
203.3
2,5053
910.8
1,059.3
Jordan ....................
869.6
60.6
48.0
103.2
146.8
511.0
Kuwait ...................
554.4
0
Negl.
.32.1
388.1
134.2
Lebanon ................
21,2
0.2
8.8
10.3
0.8
1,1
Morocco .................
448.2
7.5
2.7
8.3
300.8
128.9
North Yemen .......
136.6
0
0
2.6
.4
133.6
Saudi Arabia ........
8,325.3
465.8
1,999.3
1,924.7
1,408.4
2,527.1
Tunisia ...................
12.0
1.5
3.9
2.3
2.1
2.2
Turkey ...................
6310
100.0
319.5
111.3
93.7
7.5
Other ....................
12.2
3.4
0.1
1.1
3.7
3.9
East Asia .................
12,128.6
3,432.0
4,366.0
1,677.9
1,490.1
1,162.6
Cambodia ..............
981.6
176.8
154.8
406.0
244.0
0
Indonesia ...............
135.6
18.4
17.5
14.2
62.1
23.4
Laos .......................
632.8
277.3
277.1
66.7
11.7
0
Malaysia ................
77.8
42.9
3.9
12.0
7.7
11.3
Philippines ............
176.0
14.8
23.0
22.5
54.2
61.5
Singapore ..............
58.4
9.9
11.7
13.4
6.8
16.6
South Korea .........
1,872.3
370.2
309.0
198.4
300.3
694.4
South Vietnam.....
6,863.8
2,284.7
3,254.6
759.8
564.7
0
Taiwan ..................
927.3
117.0
263.2
128.3
191.7
227.1
Thailand ................
402.1
119.6
50.8
56.5
46.9
128.3
Other .....................
0.9
0.4
0.4
0.1
Negl.
Negl.
Sub-Saharan Africa .
274.4
15.4
13.5
30.3
40.8
174.4
Ethiopia .................
214.6
10.0
9.7
18.7
34.3
141.9
Nigeria ..................
36.6
2.7
1.4
6.6
3.3
22.6
Zaire ......................
16.1
2.4
.7
1.6
1.7
9.7
Other .....................
7.1
0.3
1.7
3.4
1.5
0.2
South Asia ...............
154.9
3.4
19.5
16.1
47.4
68.5
India ......................
22.3
2.0
Negl.
3.3
8.4
8.6
Pakistan .................
132.4
1.4
19.3
12.8
39.0
59.9
Other .....................
0.2
Negl.
0.2
Negl.
0
0
Latin America .....,..
853.7
136.7
137.2
236.6
203.3
139.9
Argentina ..............
98.1
28.4
28.0
9.3
18.0
14.4
Bolivia ...................
16.6
3.5
3.4
3.2
3.4
3.1
Brazil .....................
208.6
33.1
15.7
75.5
31.6
52.7
Chile .......................
150.1
6.6
15.5
77.8
41.5
8.7
Colombia ...............
13.7
5.6
1.8
1.8
2.0
2.5
Ecuador .................
19.7
Negl.
Negl.
Negl.
16.4
3.3
Guatemala .............
15.2
4.0
3.9
1.8
2.1
3.4
Panama .................
11.0
0.6
3.6
4.0
0.8
2.0
Peru .......................
124.5
1.5
25.0
43.7
26.4
27.9
Uruguay ................
20.6
3.4
2.6
2.9
8.7
3.0
Venezuela ..............
140.5
47.2
28.5
9.4
44.8
10.6
Other .....................
35.1
2.8
9.2
7.2
7.6
8.3
' Data are for fiscal years, and data for 1975 and 1976 are preliminary.
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Western Europe: Arms Sales to the Third World
Total ....................................
16,862
974
2,141
4,698
5,616
3,433
France ..............................
5,756
291
484
2,391
2,064
526
United Kingdom ............
4,991
266
881
765
1,542
1,537
West Germany ...............
2,564
247
241
705
940
431
Italy ..................................
2,052
121
432
539
839
121
Netherlands ......................
417
14
40
93
34
236
Belgium ............................
394
17
49
90
82
156
Other ................................
688
18
14
115
115
426
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Arms Deliveries to the Third World, by Supplier
Total' .............................
41,407
6,466
10,090
7,946
8,196
8,709
Non-Communist ............
29,557
5,093
6,863
5,541
6,110
5,950
United States S ...........
22,161
3,896
5,650
4,119
4,649
3,847
Western Europe ........
6,317
1,009
1,103
1,246
1,224
1,735
France .....................
2,115
375
519
416
349
456
United Kingdom ...
1,638
239
297
394
310
398
West Germany ......
1,382
222
119
185
260
596
Italy .........................
632
83
94
177
167
111
Belgium ...................
190
7
18
44
49
72
Netherlands .............
162
35
35
5
56
31
Switzerland .............
76
39
13
14
9
1
Spain ........................
122
9
8
11
24
70
Other ...........................
1,079
188
110
176
237
368
Communist Countries.
11,850
1,373
3,227
2,405
2,086
2,759
USSR ............................
10,332
1,207
3,008
2,246
1,685
2,186
Eastern Europe ..........
727
72
117
129
213
196
China ...........................
344
90
77
19
72
86
Other 8 .........................
447
4
25
11
116
291
' Total includes Greece and Turkey and excludes Spain and Portugal.
E Data are for fiscal years, and data for 1975 and 1976 are preliminary.
Includes Cuban, North Korean, Vietnamese, and Yugoslav deliveries.
Arms Deliveries to the Third World, by Major Recipient
1972-76
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
Total .....................
41,407
6,466
10,090
7,948
8,196
8,709
Of which:
Iran .....................
4,654
556
566
885
1,180
1,467
Syria ...................
3,241
282
1,273
1,017
282
387
Israel ..................
3,006
282
242
1,052
725
705
Iraq ....................
2,578
141
646
638
465
688
Saudi Arabia ....
1,877
159
124
480
480
634
Egypt .................
1,850
548
724
155
345
78
Libya .................
1,728
129
182
221
501
695
South Korea .....
1,235
367
283
118
217
250
Turkey ...............
932
185
118
209
267
153
India ..................
900
204
180
131
161
224
12 SECRET
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Secret
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 ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
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29 August 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Distribution Section, P&PD/OL
FROM: Chief, Registry and Dissemination Branch, PPG
SUBJECT: Dissemination of QER Report, ER 77-10500
(Job 425-1122-77). Arms Sales to the Third
World, 1976,
Attached is the dissemination list for subject report. Copies # 1
through '#., 50 will be picked up or forwarded to PPG/R&D, Room 7G07,
STATINTLHq, please notify
when you receive
the remaining copies for distribution. When a report has an ELITE,
the elite copies must be disseminated before standard distribution is
made.
Attachment: a/ s
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(COPY)
MEMORANDUM FOR-
Mr. Haro H. launders
Director
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
Attached is your personal copy of
our memorandum, "Arms Sales to the Third
World, 1976." FR 77-1fcnn
MAURICE C. E NS
Director of Economic Research
Central Intelligence Agency
1$ SEA 1977
(DATE)
STAT
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