SOVIET RYAD COMPUTER: A PROGRAM IN TROUBLE

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• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
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• Publication Date: September 1, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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Soviet RYAD Computer:
A Program in Trouble
Confidential
NOFORN
Confidential
ER 77-10491
September 1977
Copy 1_35
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Controlled by Originator
REL This Information has been Authorized for
Release to.
Classified by 015319
Exempt from General Declassification Schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption categoryi
Sec. 58(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified oni
date impossible to determine
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Soviet RYAD Computers:
A Program in Trouble
Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence
September 1977
Key Judgments
The USSR continues to experience serious delays in the development,
production, installation, and effective use of its RYAD computers, which
form the cutting edge of the Kremlin's computer modernization program.
In the Ninth Five-Year Plan, 1971-75, the USSR and its East European
allies produced only 10-15 percent of the anticipated number of RYAD
computers, a series of third generation computers modeled on the IBM-360
series. Furthermore, output has included only the smaller, less powerful
RYAD models, with the final product decidedly inferior to the IBM originals
in reliability and compatibility and in the quality of associated input-output
and auxiliary storage devices. Despite this poor track record, the Kremlin is
pressing ahead in the Tenth Five-Year Plan period, 1976-80, with the
development of a RYAD II series?similar to the IBM-370 series.
In addition to the general-purpose RYAD computers?which represent
about 20 percent of the current value of output of the Soviet computer
industry?the USSR is turning out several types of specialized military and
civilian computers. Through the brute force application of large technical
resources the USSR is gradually incorporating modern computer technology
into its military and industrial operations, but at an efficiency level far below
Western standards and at a technological level roughly 10 years behind. Use
of RYAD computers to handle complex Soviet military problems, such as
command and control, will be delayed until larger RYAD systems, equipped
with high-performance, off-the-shelf peripherals, appear in the 1980s.
While the use of computers in specific civilian sectors moves forward in
numerous small ways, the difficulties encountered in these relatively simple
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tasks demonstrate the unreality of grandiose schemes for computerizing the
planning, management, and operation of the entire economy.
Soviet and East European achievements in the computer field would be
even less impressive were it not for substantial acquisition?legally and
illegally' ?of Western equipment and technology.
1
The term illegal in this report refers to acquisition in contravention to established COCOM barriers.
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Soviet RYAD Computers:
A Program in Trouble
Origin of the RYAD Series
The Soviet decision in the mid-1960s to build
a family of compatible2 RYAD computers was a
belated response to the need for complete mod-
ernization of Soviet computer technology. The
USSR was lagging far behind the West in the
development, production, and application of
data processing systems for economic and in-
dustrial uses. Soviet computers had been de-
signed mainly for scientific applications and had
insufficient internal memories. Auxiliary mem-
ory and input-output equipment were techni-
cally poor and in short supply, electronic com-
ponents were unreliable, spare parts were diffi-
cult to obtain, and a multiplicity of models
prevented users from sharing programs and ex-
periences. Moreover, because individual users
typically made nonstandard modifications, even
compatibility between computers of the same
model was lost.
To cut development time and save resources,
top-level planners chose to adopt the IBM series
360 logic design and software, using the engi-
neering talents and production capacity of So-
viet and East European countries. The planners
may also have gambled that the improvement in
relations among several East and West European
countries would speed acquisition of needed
Western know-how. Also, the Soviets wanted to
decrease East European reliance on the West as a
supplier of computing equipment.
The RYAD program was designed as a family
of seven computer models3 which were to be
2Two computer models are compatible when the same programs
can be used on each.
3RYAD models are referred to by the designation ES (Edinnaya
Sistema?Unified System) followed by four digits or by R
(RYAD) followed by the final two digits (e.g., ES-I010 is
equated to R-10). The seven models were the ES-1010, 1020,
1021, 1030, 1040, 1050, and 1060.
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compatible with each other and with IBM-360
computers as well. Production, originally
planned to begin in 1970, was delayed until late
1972 when serial production started on the two
smallest models in the series, the ES-1020 and
ES-1030. In May 1973, several different RYAD
central processing units and a number of
RYAD-compatible peripheral equipments were
exhibited in Moscow. Production of third gener-
ation RYADs thus began in the USSR and East-
ern Europe about three years later than antici-
pated and nearly 10 years later than production
of comparable equipment in the West.'
Levels of Output
The RYAD production program has contrib-
uted to the advancement of the Soviet position
in computers, although at a pace far below ex-
pectations. The USSR and Eastern Europe to-
gether produced an estimated 1,700 RYADs
during the Ninth Five-Year Plan period
1971-75.5 The USSR produced about 80 per-
cent of this total?mostly the smaller ES-1020
and ES-1030 models (see table 1). The largest
RYAD models, the ES-1050 and ES-1060,
which the Soviets had hoped to put into quan-
tity production, were still under development in
1975.
Output of RYADs in the USSR rose sharply
over the plan period, from only 10 units in 1971
to 700 units in 1975. This growth was achieved
mainly by shifting resources from the produc-
tion of MINSK-32s to RYADs (ES-1020) at the
Minsk Computer Plant, and from M-222s to
4 For additional information on the early phases of the RYAD
program see: ER RP '73-15, Soviet RYAD Computer Program,
August 1973 (SECRET NOFORN). This report furnishes details
on the performance characteristics of the various RYAD models.
sFor the methodology used in production estimates, see the
Appendix.
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Table 1
USSR and Eastern Europe: Estimated Production of RYAD Computers
Model
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1971-75
Total
10
40
206
559
886
1,701
Total production
10
39
205
555
880
1,689
USSR
10
35
175
450
700
1,370
1020
5
20
100
300
400
825
1030
5
15
75
150
300
545
Eastern Europe
0
4
30
105
180
319
Bulgaria
1020
0
0
5
10
10
25
Czechoslovakia
1021
0
2
5
15
20
42
East Germany
1040
0
2
10
30
50
92
Hungary
1010
0
0
10
50
100
160
Total prototype
0
1
1
4
6
12
USSR
0
0
1
4
6
11
1050
0
0
1
4
5
10
1060
0
0
0
0
1
1
Eastern Europe
0
1
0
0
0
1
Poland
1030
0
1
0
0
0
1
RYADs (ES-1030) at Kazan. By the end of
1975, production of MINSK-32s had been
phased out entirely. This left RYAD as the only
major computer system in production that was
intended mainly for use in economic data pro-
cessing.6
As for East European producers, East Ger-
many provided the only success story. East Ger-
many developed and produced the ES-1040, a
well-made and apparently reliable machine. Al-
though output remained small, by the end of
1975 East Germany was producing at the rate of
about 100 units per year and had the manu-
facturing facilities to produce roughly twice that
figure. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, progress in
the production of RYADs was slow. Hungary
took on the smallest and simplest machine in
6In addition to RYAD, the USSR is producing a series of
computers for industrial control applications. Some models in
this series, such as the M-4030, also are based on IBM-360
designs and are competitive with RYADs for general data
processing applications. The status of production of a third
series, the URAL computers, which had resulted from earlier
Soviet attempts to provide a compatible family of computers for
general uses, is not known.
2
the RYAD family, the ES-1010, but had gotten
production up to only 100 units by 1975.
Czechoslovakia was producing the ES-1021 at
the rate of less than two per month in 1975, and
Poland, which was intended to be a major pro-
ducer of the ES-1030, had built only a single
prototype.
Furthermore, in Hungary and Czechoslovakia,
the machines produced were not fully com-
patible with the other RYAD models. They are
still included in the RYAD family because they
can use the same input-output and related pe-
ripheral equipment. The ES-1010 is used as (a) a
"front end processor," initially massaging the
data for further processing by the larger
RYADs, (b) a control unit in a process control
environment, or (c) a minicomputer for stand-
alone problem solving. The Czechoslovak ma-
chine has found little acceptance either inside or
outside Czechoslovakia.
Failure to Meet Plan
Output of RYADs in the USSR and Eastern
Europe has fallen far short of the planners'
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expectations. Specific numerical goals for the
production of RYADs have never been pub-
lished. The Soviets, at least early in the program,
apparently anticipated output of 3,000 to 5,000
RYADs a year by 1973. For instance, M.Ye.
Rakovskiy, the Deputy Minister of GOSPLAN,
hinted in 1971 that 12,000 to 15,000 RYADs
would be available for use during the Ninth
Five-Year Plan.
In the USSR, production of RYADs has been
delayed by shortages of adequate components
(mainly integrated circuits) and by backward
production technology and quality assurance.
Through 1973, few integrated circuits (ICs)
were available for RYADs. The USSR produced
ICs of the type used by smaller RYADs7 only in
very small quantities; yields of acceptable de-
vices were low, with military authorities having
first selection of the better quality devices. Out-
put of ICs increased rapidly after 1973, enabling
the USSR to move into commercial-scale pro-
duction of the smaller RYAD machines.
Poor fabrication techniques have also held
down production. Lacking the advanced ma-
chinery of Western producers, the Soviets have
substituted manual techniques for automatic
wiring of back panels and for automatic inser-
tion of components into printed-circuit boards.'
In addition, the Soviets have relied on simple
electrical and electronic instrumentation (such
as voltmeters and oscilloscopes) for online test-
ing of subassemblies, while most Western pro-
ducers use computerized test equipment.
Mass production of RYADs has also been
delayed by tight competition for resources
within the computer industry. RYAD, while the
most publicized program, is only one of several
large computer production programs in the
USSR. The share of RYAD output in the total
value of Soviet computer production probably
amounted to less than 20 percent in 1975. This
calculation is based on the unit price of RYAD
TTL (Transistor-Transistor Logic) of relatively low density (up
to ten gates) and low power.
8 Despite Soviet claims to have introduced automatic production
and test equipment, Western observers have reported that
computer production remains highly manual.
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1020s and 1030s in standard configuration, i.e.,
including associated peripherals.
By 1980, RYAD production will remain less
than half of the computer industry's output
even in the unlikely event that RYAD produc-
tion can be boosted to 3,000 units per year.
That level of output would require commission-
ing new plant capacity or converting existing
facilities to the RYAD program. In mid-1977
there was no evidence of either development.
Problems with Peripherals
Conventional types of peripheral equip-
ment?punch-card and paper tape devices, line
printers, and magnetic tape units?appear to be
produced in adequate quantities to meet RYAD
production needs, but are obsolescent by West-
ern standards. For example, Soviet-produced
line printers in use with RYADs are slower and
of generally lower performance than printers in
use with IBM Series 360 machines. Soviet mag-
netic tape units are approximately 10 years be-
hind Western state of the art and have not been
supplied with sufficient quantities of domesti-
cally produced high-quality magnetic tapes. The
USSR has tried to remedy this shortage by im-
porting tape from the US and Western Europe,
and magnetic tape units from Eastern Europe.
Failure of the USSR to produce high-capacity
magnetic disc drives and disc packs has been a
major deficiency in peripherals technology.
Most of the RYADs produced to date use low-
capacity (7.25 megabyte)9 disc drives produced
by Bulgaria or 30-megabyte disc drives imported
from the West. Soviet and Bulgarian claims that
production of 100-megabyte drives is imminent
are exaggerated, to judge from the continued
vigorous pursuit of Western manufacturing tech-
nology for high-capacity drives.
Relation of RYAD to Overall
Computer Effort
Despite the unspectacular performance during
1971-75, the Soviets appear committed to
RYAD as the major computer system for meet-
ing Soviet general-purpose data processing
9 Millions of bytes, each of which has eight binary digits.
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Table 2
USSR: Estimated Value of RYAD Production as a Percent
of Total Computer Production
1971
1972
1973 1974
Million 1967 Rubles
1975
Total
Total computers
905
1,213
1,699
2,221
2,927
8,965
Of which:
RYAD
8
25
122
296
486
937
ES-1020
3
11
53
158
210
435
ES-1030
5
14
69
138
276
502
Percent
RYAD as a share of total
1
2
7
13
17
10
needs. Conversion to large-scale production of
upgraded models is now being accomplished and
planning is under way for a follow-on program
of more advanced RYAD-II systems.
At the same time, other special-purpose com-
puter programs for both military and industrial
applications are proceeding apace. Military pro-
grams include: development of a new military
computer system at the Vilnyus Computing Ma-
chines Plant; expansion of military computer
production at the Minsk Computer Plant; and
continuing strong efforts on military-related
computers by major development centers in
Moscow, supported by production facilities in
Moscow and Zagorsk. Among special-purpose
computers for industrial applications, produc-
tion of the M-6000 process-control minicom-
puter, believed to be a copy of a Hewlett-
Packard model, is being emphasized.
Role of Western Technology
Western technology has made important con-
tributions to the RYAD program, both directly
and indirectly. The West has (a) been the source
of designs for most models of the RYAD family,
(b) provided manufacturing technology for disc
drives and packs, and (c) furnished components,
especially some types of integrated circuits in
4
critically short supply in the USSR and Eastern
Europe. Moreover, the USSR has acquired,
through both legal and illegal channels, specific
items of machinery crucial to the development
of supporting technologies, such as machines
used in the production of. multilayer printed-
circuit boards, integrated circuits, and memory
cores. The Communist countries are acquiring
valuable expertise in systems analysis, pro-
graming, and other computer specialties at a
training center in Czechoslovakia established
under United Nations auspices. Center special-
ists also conduct courses in the USSR and else-
where in Eastern Europe. Much of this training?
and experience is applicable to the exploitation
of RYADs. Finally, the Soviets have gained ex-
perience and training in systems analysis, soft-
ware, and applications, through work in Western
computer installations, and through purchases
of RYAD-like computer systems.
The USSR began to copy IBM designs after it
clandestinely acquired an unknown number of
IBM-360 computers in the mid-to-late 1960s.
About the same time, East Germany also clan-
destinely acquired an IBM computer and/or
major subsystems and components which served
as the basis for development of the ES-1040.
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None of the other countries in Eastern Europe,
so far as is known, has been directly involved in
copying IBM computers or components.
The USSR copied mainly the architecture (or-
ganization)1? of the IBM-360, while East Ger-
many also appears to have attempted to copy
the physical layout, subassemblies, and com-
ponents. Copying by East Germany, which in-
volved dismantling, measuring, and analysis of
parts and circuitry, required at least 7,000 scien-
tific-engineering man-years to bring the ES-1040
program to the stage of production prototypes.
East Germany may have chosen to go the
route of complete duplication because of its
willingness to use, or its broad access to, critical
components from the West. The USSR, on the
other hand, may have felt that it could leap-frog
valuable development time by designing around
its own components. In any event, East German
copying efforts appear to have been the most
successful, since its RYAD model ES-1040 more
closely approximates the operational character-
istics of the IBM machines than any other
RYAD model.
The design of the Hungarian version of
RYAD (ES-1010) is based on the design of a
French computer which the French firm CII11
in 1970 licensed Hungary to produce. Hungary
modified the design of that computer to work
with RYAD peripherals.
Since the USSR has been unable or unwilling
to provide Eastern Europe with needed quan-
tities or semiconductors, several countries have
been forced to use Western-made semicon-
ductors. For example, Hungary's model has
been built with substantial reliance on Western
components; Poland has acquired small quan-
tities of Western semiconductors for RYAD de-
velopment work; and East Germany has com-
bined both Communist and Western (US, West
10A general application computer system consists of one or
more pr ocessors, memories, input/output devices, and
communications links. The number, interconnection scheme,
and operating modes of these subsystems determine the
architecture of the computer system.
11 Compagnie Internationale pour L'Informatique.
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German, and Japanese) components in its pro-
duction models.
Soviet capability to provide components for
RY AD s? though severely limited?has been
aided greatly by acquisition of Western-made
machinery. The acquisitions have included
whole plants for production of printed-circuit
boards, machinery for most of the processes in
IC manufacturing, specialized equipment for
making memory cores, and technology for as-
sembling and testing memories. The illegal ac-
quisition of core presses and test machinery has
made it possible for the USSR to provide in-
creased memory capability in its new model
RYADs developed after 1974.
Bulgaria may have received assistance in
setting up production of disc drives and disc
packs from West Germany in early 1972. Appar-
ently, Bulgaria did not acquire technology for
producing the critical magnetic recording heads,
because Bulgaria purchased a large number of
Western-made heads legally and illegally during
1972-74. Bulgaria also purchased a wide variety
of machined metal parts for disc drives. East
Germany is believed to have acquired significant
assistance from West German firms for its
RYAD development and production program,
including production machinery and know-how.
Backwardness of Eastern Technology
The RYADs produced to date have failed to
achieve the levels of technical performance spe-
cified by original design goals; speeds have been
slower and memory capacities far smaller than
desired. The USSR came closest to reaching
original speed goals with the ES-1020, but still
fell short by 15-25 percent. The Hungarian
ES-1010s exhibited the poorest performance,
with operating speeds falling short of goals by
30-50 percent. In all cases, RYADs were able to
reach only about 25 percent of the original goals
for memory capacity. Poor quality ICs and
other design deficiencies were primarily respon-
sible for failure to meet speed and memory
goals. Table 3 compares the original design goals
for speed and memory for four RYAD models
with those actually achieved.
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Table 3
USSR and Eastern Europe:
Performance of RYAD Computers,
Planned and Actual
Thousand
Speed
(Operations/
Second)
Memory*
(Characters)
Model
Planned
Actual
Planned
Actual
1010
10
5-7
64
16
1020
20
15-17
256
64
1030
100
60-70
512
128
1040
380
250-300
1,024
256
* These are typical installed memory sizes; a few larger
installations have been noted.
That the USSR is not reported to have deliv-
ered any RYADs with the maximum internal
storage capacity cited in early design goals may
be due in part to manufacturing problems that
forced use of cores with 0.8-mm outside diameter
rather than the 0.6-mm cores originally specified
for the computers. The larger power require-
ments and increased heat dissipation problems
with the larger cores impose constraints on the
capacity and performance of the internal mem-
ories that are physically and economically prac-
tical for most RYAD installations.
Medium-sized RYAD systems (ES-1020s and
ES-1030s) have a poor record for reliability.
Central processors currently appear to operate
satisfactorily, but users continue to complain of
lengthy downtime from overheating of com-
ponents and frequent breakdowns of periph-
erals. Poorly constructed magnetic disc drives
suffer from dust contamination and metal ex-
pansion from temperature changes; these drives
require excessive downtime for scheduled main-
tenance alone. In contrast, the East German
model ES-1040, which has been examined by a
US computer manufacturer, is said to be highly
reliable in operation.
6
The Soviets continue to grapple with the
technological design of the most powerful
RYADs, the ES-1050 and ES-1060. To achieve
the high speeds called for in these models, the
designers are using special ECL (emitter coupled
logic) integrated circuits. These circuits tend to
break down under conditions of high heat gen-
erated by their large power requirements and
sustained by the poor heat dissipation character-
istics of the computer's design. Recently, some
ES-1050s have been delivered to Soviet users
although series production is not yet apparent.
The ES-1060 continues to be under develop-
ment.
Troubles with Software
Users of RYADs are faced with exceptional
difficulties in meeting data processing needs
with existing software.1 2 Few standard applica-
tions programs have been developed from
scratch for use with RYAD. For the most part,
programs currently in use were originally devel-
oped with the MINSK-32 and have been re-
written to operate with RYAD. Even so, delays
have been extensive; the complexities of soft-
ware alteration have left many of the MINSK-32
programs, as well as programs developed for
other Soviet computer models, still not con-
verted for use with RYAD. In addition, users
have been unable to use, without modification,
the inventory of software programs devised by
IBM for use with its Series-360 machines be-
cause: (a) many IBM programs were designed
for use in a different institutional environment
and simply are not applicable; (b) the memory
capacity (especially external random access disc
storage) requirements of many IBM programs
exceed the capabilities of RYAD computers;
and (c) since the operating system for the Soviet
RYAD is not a precise duplicate of the
IBM-360, most IBM programs require modifica-
tion to run on RYAD machines.
12 Software is of two types: (1) Systems software, which refers
to the sets of instructions needed to operate a computer; and (2)
Applications software which refers to the programs written for
use with the computer facilities of a given industrial plant,
laboratory, or military installation. Programs are written for use
with a particular computer installation and can be run on a
different installation only if they, or the installation, are
modified.
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As an exception to these limitations, users of
the East German ES- 1040s may be able to
employ directly IBM-360 applications programs.
East Germany seems to have duplicated the IBM
operating system successfully. East Germany's
assimilation of IBM design?a sharp contrast
with the experience of other RYAD pro-
ducers?probably reflects the closeness of its co-
operation in computer technology with West
German manufacturers.
The Soviets have intensified efforts to rewrite
existing RYAD programs and to develop new
standardized data processing programs specifi-
cally for RYAD computers. At the same time,
the Soviets are developing new operating sys-
tems to reduce the need for program modifica-
tions. For example, the development of DOS-2
(Disc Operating System), which is capable of
utilizing "most" of the programs for the
MINSK-32, was recently announced. This sys-
tem may be intended for use only with the
RYADs produced at Minsk, since it was devel-
oped at the Minsk Scientific Research Institute
of Electronic Computers, the institute that de-
signed the ES-1020 and ES-1022. A larger and
much more versatile system, called ES-OS, also is
under development. It is being designed to exe-
cute several different programs simultaneously
(multiprogram ing).
The status of DOS-2 and ES-OS in mid-1977
is not known. The OS, in particular, has not
been fully tested; implementation of this operat-
ing system will require internal and external
memory capacity greater than what is being
delivered with most RYADs. Checkout and
debugging of ES-OS almost certainly will con-
tinue for several years.
Acceptance of RYADs
The USSR is the largest user of RYADs.
During the Ninth Five-Year Plan, East Germany
shipped about one-third of its output to the
USSR, and Hungary about 80 percent of its
output. Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria produced
RYADs mainly for their domestic markets. Of
the more than 200 RYADS exported since 1972
by the USSR, the bulk of these were supplied to
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Eastern Europe. The USSR has shipped RYADs
to the Netherlands, Belgium, and Finland for
use in Soviet-controlled firms in those countries,
to India, and probably to a few other non-Com-
munist countries. According to a high-ranking
official of the Soviet computer industry, Soviet-
controlled firms will attempt to market more
than 500 RYADs, apparently in Western Eu-
rope, during 1976-80. RYADs may eventually
find a small market in developing countries if
reliability, servicing, and the availability of spare
parts can be improved.
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland have
participated in the RYAD program reluctantly.
Understandably they prefer native or Western
computers for their own use. Poland, in partic-
ular, favors its own successful line of ODRA
computers, which have been built under British
license. However, Soviet pressure is mounting
for greater participation by Poland in the RYAD
program, lessening Poland's chances to market
ODRAs in Eastern Europe as an alternative to
RYAD.
RYAD in Transition
Even as RYADs began to go into large-scale
production in 1974, the Soviets were busy de-
signing more powerful versions of the basic
models. These new computers, the ES-1022 and
ES-1033, are to replace the ES-1020 and
ES-1030. They have been designed to operate
much faster than the original models?five times
as fast in the case of the ES-1022?and to have
double the memory capacity (see table 3).
Higher speeds and larger memories are achieved
through the application of more powerful cir-
cuits and smaller memory cores; otherwise, the
original models are largely unchanged.
The new models went into production in the
USSR in 1976 and production of the original
models has been substantially reduced. Produc-
tion rates of the new machines can be expected
to rise rapidly since no major changes in manu-
facturing technology need to be assimilated. In-
deed, in the case of the ES-1022, recently intro-
duced simplified production methods may en-
hance learning effects. Even so, in 1976 and
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CONFIDENTIAL
Table 4
Estimated Characteristics of the Modified
RYAD Computers
Thousand
Model
ES-1012
ES-1022
ES-1032
ES-1033
ES-1050
Speed
(Operations/
Second)
10
100
200
150-200
500
Memory
(Characters)
64
512
1,024
1,024
1,024
1977 at least, total production may not reach
the maximum level achieved for the original
RYADs in 1975 for a variety of reasons. The
changeover involves disruption to the rhythm of
production; dissatisfied users of ES-1020s are
shipping their machines back to the factory for
conversion into 1022s; and shortages have al-
ready surfaced in the supply of higher powered
integrated circuits.
In Eastern Europe, only Hungary and Poland
have introduced upgraded models in the first
series of RYAD machines. In 1973, Hungary
introduced an upgraded ES-1010, called the
ES-1010BM. Further modifications such as the
ES-1012 will not be able to run RYAD applica-
tions programs, as was the case with the
ES-1010.
Poland has developed the ES-1032, a model
that has operating speeds comparable with those
of the Soviet ES-1033. It appears to have been
developed independently of the USSR. Accept-
ance testing was under way in mid-1976 and
the model may now be in production. Poland
claims to have the capacity to produce "many
more" than 25 units annually and will produce
the ES-1032 on a special order basis.
In addition to the computer proper, the
USSR is attempting to improve the capabilities
and diversity of peripheral devices for use with
RYADs. In 1974, the Soviets claimed to have
developed 33 new peripherals, including rela-
8
tively advanced types with advertised specifica-
tions close to those in use in the West a few
years ago. A few of these?for example, graphic
terminals, data transmission equipment, plot
ters?have been shown at trade fairs, usually in a
nonoperating mode; none of the advanced de-
vices have been observed in use with RYAD in a
user environment. Indeed, RYAD computers are
still being delivered with the standard con-
figurations of the peripherals offered five years
ago; in many cases, these peripherals are simply
repackaged versions of devices developed for
even earlier computers. Thus, significant new
peripherals apparently are not yet being pro-
duced, at least in quantity.
Some progress has been made by Bulgaria in
mastering the technology for manufacturing
high-capacity magnetic disc devices, which are
needed to exploit fully the inherent processing
capabilities of the new models. In late 1976, US
visitors to the East German plant that produces
ES-1040 observed a large number of Bulgarian.
made. 30-megabyte drives. The East Germans
allege that the drives operate reliably. The US
visitors were not allowed to inspect the drives to
determine if the components (especially the
magnetic recording heads) were of Communist
or Western origin.
For its part, the USSR also claims to be
producing 30-megabyte drives?some have been
displayed at trade fairs?but these claims are
doubtful. The Soviets are still attempting to
acquire US technology to make such drives, and
the Ministry of the Radio Industry reportedly
has been experiencing technical difficulties with
production.
Prospects for a RYAD II Generation
In October 1974, the RYAD partners an-
nounced that a new generation of RYAD com-
puters, called RYAD II, was under development,
but a target date for production has not been
announced. RYAD Hs, patterned after the cur-
rent IBM Series 370 computers, are to be much
more powerful than current models and to
represent a major advance in Communist com-
puter technology. They are to be compatible
with existing RYADs and with both IBM-360
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and IBM-370 machines. According to Commu-
nist sources, RYAD IIs will have:
? A much larger capacity for internal storage
of data. This will be accomplished, in part,
through the use of semiconductor memories
and, in part, through the use of "virtual"
memory.' 3
? A larger number of data channels and high-
speed multiplexers." 4 These features will per-
mit the use of higher speed peripherals and
greatly increase data processing capabilities.
? A capability for "network" operations, that
is, for computer-to-computer communica-
tions.
? Improved reliability through computer
self-diagnosis of faults.
The technology of RYAD II is far beyond
current state of the art in the USSR and Eastern
Europe. In particular, RYAD II will need very
high density integrated circuits (large-scale inte-
gration?LSI) for internal memory and some
logic processes. Circuits currently in use are rela-
tively simple, low-density (small-scale integra-
tion?SSI) types. The capacity of the disc drives
needed (100 megabytes and larger) exceeds the
capacity of drives available from Bulgaria by
more than three times and of drives most com-
monly in use by almost 15 times. The com-
plexity of the software needed to operate
RYAD IIs is considerably greater than that now
in use.
The Soviets claim to have developed working
prototypes of two models of RYAD II, the
ES-1035 and the ES-1060,15 and to be nearing
production of these two models. The USSR
conceivably could produce a small number of
these models during the 10th Five-Year Plan;
because of the enormous leap in technology
required, however, any units produced would
"A technique for increasing the apparent internal storage of a
computer by special programs that allow disc storage to act as
internal memory.
14Channels are provisions for external access to the computer;
multiplexers are devices that permit more than one external
device to be connected to the computer via a single channel.
15This model is assumed to be a redesign of the ES-1060 of the
original RYAD series that was never produced.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
have few of the advanced features indicated
above. In particular, "network" operations are
doubtful for many years because of the lack of
data transmission equipment.
If RYAD Hs are to be produced according to
design specifications before 1980, a great deal of
Western machinery and production know-how
will be required. Indeed, the vigor with which
the Soviets seek this technology, by both legal
and illegal means, will provide an indication of
the priority attached to this program.
Economic Implications
In the near future the number of RYADs in
operation will be too small to give a noticeable
boost to the Soviet economy. By 1980, 5,000
RYADs may be installed and at work in the
USSR. No more than half are likely to be in
production facilities?as opposed to institutes
and universities?and many of the larger plants
will have more than one. Of the roughly 50,000
industrial enterprises, fewer than 5 percent will
be equipped with RYADs by 1980?that is, with
a modern data processing capability.
RYADs in place will continue to be used
unproductively by US standards. Soviet com-
puters are operated 11 to 12 hours a day,
whereas 16 to 18 hours or more are considered
necessary for economic use in Western eco-
nomies. The almost desperate shortage of quali-
fied personnel is another factor impeding effec-
tive utilization. The planned replacement of
existing MINSK-32s with RYADs adds another
costly and disruptive element; as noted pre-
viously, complex modifications of MINSK-32
programs are needed before this software can be
used on RYADs.
Higher echelon organizations, at the ministry
or national level, will be especially hard put to
carry out complex planning and management
activities with RYADs, since only the smaller
machines will be generally available; develop-
ment of required software will require huge in-
vestments of technical resources. Moreover, the
collection and processing of data from subordi-
nate echelons will be difficult and inefficient
since data transmission facilities for computer-
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to-computer communications will not be avail-
able.
The increasing availability ?of RYAD com-
puters in plants, institutes, and other organiza-
tions should result in some reduction of the
share of manpower assigned to clerical work. It
is not clear, however, that they will provide a
net labor savings for industry or the economy as
a whole. Users need to acquire personnel and
staff to service and maintain the computers; the
Soviets have found that it takes 150 to 200
percent more people, on the average, to operate
a computer than it does in the West. In addition,
computer people command higher wages than
the people they are replacing.
Military Implications
The Soviets have traditionally used special
purpose computers for military systems with
specific functions, such as missile guidance or
airborne navigation. These special purpose com-
puters probably will continue to enjoy a high
priority in the Soviet computer industry. In
addition, the USSR needs general purpose com-
puters with good data handling capabilities for a
large variety of military activities, such as R&D,
control and monitoring of space activities, com-
mand and control, and logistics. Nonmilitary
computers, such as BESM-'6s and M-222s, have
always been used for these purposes. RYADs,
especially the newer models now in production,
will provide improved data-handling capabilities
over these models.
Currently, there is limited use of RYADs in
Soviet military plants and institutes. Their em-
ployment for the broader military problems
listed above will have to await full development
of larger RYAD systems, including especially
10
major improvements in disc storage capacity and
software, maintenance, and user experience. Use
of RYADs for these complex military purposes
cannot be expected before the 1980s.
Perspective
Since World War II, the Soviet economy has
expanded more through extensive growth (the
channeling of larger and larger amounts of labor
and capital into production) than through inten-
sive growth (the achievement of higher and
higher yields from each unit of labor and
capital). Experiences in the computer field illus-
trate this general economic pattern. The
modernization of the Soviet computer industry
has been given high priority by the central lead-
ership, and planners have provided increasing
inputs of factory floorspace, technical labor,
and funds to purchase foreign technology. At
the same time, difficulties and delays common
to the whole economy have appeared, such as
(a) setbacks in production schedules, (b) short-
ages of peripheral equipment and support
services (support services tend to be neglected
under central planning), and (c) reluctance of
potential users to accept the disruptions that
accompany a transition to new equipment or to
new models of old equipment. Use of the com-
puter tends to underscore the worst features of
the Soviet economy. Thus, while the USSR is
gradually incorporating the fruits of the com-
puter revolution into its economy, its mastery
of the computer is approximately 10 years be-
hind the West.
The author of this paper is
USSR/Eastern Europe Division, Office of
Economic Research. Comments and queries
are welcome and should be directed to Mr.
telephone [phone]X1 A
1A
CONFIDENTIAL
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25X1B
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25X1B
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CONFIDENTIAL
APPENDIX
Methodology For Production Estimates
Unit Production
Little hard information is available on which to base estimates of
RYAD production in 1971-75. The numbers in table 1 in the text have been
put together from a variety of sources, including: (a) open source
information; (c) reports of emigres; (d)
observations by Western visitors to Eastern computer plants; and (e) other,
he numbers are estimated through 1974 with
high confidence. The 1975 estimates, especially for the USSR, are more
tenuous.
visits by US personnel to the Minsk
Plant allowed an estimate to be made through 1973 for the ES-1020 and
through 1974 for the ES-1030.
In 1974, several US visitors to the Minsk Computer Plant observed
production of the ES-1020 and made some estimates of the capacity of the
plant. They observed that the plant was producing at a capacity of 400-500
computers annually, and that twice as many ES-1020s as MINSK-32s were
being produced (300 ES-1020s and 150 MINSK-32s). For 1975 the capacity
remains the same, but it is known that MINSK-32 production was being
phased out. Production of the ES-1030 for 1974 represents a reasonable
production of the series from the previous years.
Total production of the East German ES-1040 for 1971-75 was given to
various US personnel on several occasions and was confirmed by random
The annual series represents a logical
allocation of this total. Total RYAD production for the period in Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland is provided 25X1C
and, in the case of Hungary, by open sources. The annual figures are
distributed on the basis of fragmentary information.
Ruble Production: USSR
Table 2 provides an estimate of the production value of Soviet RYAD
computers as a percentage of the total value of Soviet computer production.
The latter series is from official Soviet statistics, whereas the RYAD value
series is based on the unit estimates in table 1 and published prices of
525,000 rubles for the ES-1020 and 920,000 rubles for the ES-1030.
CONFIDENTIAL 11
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