ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00457A000300020001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 53
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 8, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 3, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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F oreign
Assessment
('enter
Economic Intelligence
Weekly, Review
ER E!W 77-044
Copy N!
565
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/ Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
NFIBONLY- NFIB Departments Only
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL ... - This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
Classified by 015319
Exempt from General Declassification Schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
? 5B(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
date impossible to determine
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NOFORN
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW
Common Fund Negotiations Heat Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The developed and developing countries are coming into the second round
of common fund negotiations with widely differing proposals.
US Price Competitiveness Strengthens Against Japan
and Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
US price competitiveness in manufactures has improved, mainly as a result
of the appreciation of foreign currencies against the dollar.
Lower Import Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Output and stocks will reach record levels in 1977/78, but import demand
will be down because of increased feeding of wheat.
India: Foodgrain Overhang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Government grain stocks have outrun storage facilities.
25X6
Review of Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
World Shipbuilding: Prolonged Depression.
25X6
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NOFORN
The developed and developing countries are coming into the second round of
the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) common fund
negotiations in Geneva, 7 November - 2 December, with very different proposals.
The position of the Group of 77 (the LDC caucus known as the G-77)
continues to be a mosaic designed to meet diverse national needs. It reflects the
extensive logrolling required to achieve consensus among some 115 LDCs. In
contrast, the developed countries' common fund proposal is more sharply defined
and technically specific. This proposal tackles commodity price instability but does
not address other major issues in the LDC proposals.
Agreement on any specific package at the upcoming meetings is highly
unlikely; the two sides may simply talk past each other. We cannot rule out the
possibility of confrontation and breakdown of negotiations even though the current
LDC leadership is under considerable pressure to show progress.
LDC Perspective
LDC proposals on international support for commodity prices date back at
least to the 1955 Bandung Conference. This meeting, which spawned the
Non-Aligned movement, drew together Asian and African leaders in a call for
international action to stabilize both prices and demand for primary commodities
through bilateral and multilateral arrangements. This issue has been pursued over the
years with varying interest and embellished from time to time with specious
arguments about secularly declining terms of trade for LDCs and the need for
commodity price indexation.
For the last several years, the common fund has been the keystone of LDC
demands for change in the "rules" of international commodity trade. The G-77
believes such a fund could bolster LDC commodity export prices and enhance
prospects for additional international commodity agreements. Moreover, it would
meet their demands for greater political control of the international economy.
Widespread support for the common fund among the LDCs makes this issue a
Note: Comments and queries regarding the Economic Intelligence Weekl Review
are welcome. For the text, the may be directed to of the
Office of Economic Research, for the Economic n ica ors, to
- of OER,
25X1A
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touchstone of industrial country response to Third World concerns. Accordingly, the
London summit statement in May 1977 that there should be a common fund and
subsequent agreement on this proposition with the developing countries at the
Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC) ministerial meeting in
June were viewed by the LDCs as steps in the right direction. They were not, how-
ever, considered very big steps.
LDC Proposals
A G-77 draft position paper for a common fund was assembled by a working
group and sent to the 115 individual countries for review over the summer. This
cumbersome process resulted in a piece that, for all its vagueness on key technical
aspects, is quite clear on certain long-held G-77 views. The paper calls for the
creation of a common fund that:
? Stands as an independent financial institution.
? Finances buffer stocks under existing international commodity agree-
ments and encourages new agreements (the so-called first window).
? Finances resource-development projects and other measures for the
LDCs that are related to commodities (the second window).
? Is controlled through some voting formula that guarantees an LDC share
of at least 51 percent.
The LDC draft has been the subject of controversy within the G-77 and will
continue to be debated until the meetings open. Major changes are unlikely at this
late date, the more so because they must be filtered through an elaborate caucus
system.
Despite attempts to create an image of LDC unity behind the G-77 proposals,
the 115 LDCs have differing views about which facets of the draft proposals are
important. In any event, five elements seem to be central to LDC behavior in the
impending negotiations-political power, LDC unity, independent financing of the
fund, price stabilization, and the second window. LDC reaction to the developed
country proposals will largely depend on how individual countries line up on these
elements and how they chose to act within G-77 caucuses in responding to the
developed country proposals.
Political Power. From its inception, the common fund has been viewed by
many LDCs as a political issue-a part of the struggle for control of international
institutions. For those LDCs that exercise leadership in the Third World-Venezuela,
Indonesia, Algeria, Yugoslavia, and Nigeria, for example-establishment of the
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common fund is an important symbol of an increased global role for the Third
World, irrespective of whether the fund makes economic sense or specifically aids
them.
LDC Unity. A strong predisposition exists within the G-77 not to buck group
unity, which is viewed as having political value transcending the negotiating issues.
Indeed, some LDCs-Brazil is a good example-have been known to tacitly support
G-77 arguments inimical to their own interests so long as they feel they can rely on
the United States and other developed countries to reject the group position. Key
G-77 members such as India, Brazil, Venezuela, Mexico, and Yugoslavia are adept at
pushing their own interests in meetings; once a compromise is reached, however,
even they consider it prudent to support agreed positions or be quiet. The wide
adherance to group unity poses a major problem for developed country negotiators
in Geneva. It compounds the difficulty of dealing with the single representative who
speaks for the LDCs at plenary sessions and means that getting G-77 agreement to
changes is difficult and time consuming. The requirement for group unity also
inhibits LDCs sympathetic to industrial countries' proposals from speaking out in
their various closed caucuses.
Independent Financing. The LDC position paper calls for prior, independent
financing of the common fund through government contributions as opposed to
funding from the resources of individual international commodity agreements. The
LDCs take this position because:
? Resources in an independent common fund could be used to spur the
establishment of new international commodity agreements. Producers and
consumers of a commodity would not have to agree on respective shares
of buffer stock financing.
? Independent funding could allow the common fund to finance projects
such as commodity export diversification in individual countries through a
second window.
? An independently financed common fund could be controlled by LDCs
(assuming developed country acquiescense on voting rights), thereby
fulfilling the LDC desire for at least one internationals institution of their
own.
? Many Third World countries probably hope that an independent
common fund run by the LDCs will somehow be able to jack up their
export prices.
Because the independent financing concept is a means to several objectives,
most LDCs support it. Notable exceptions are certain Latin American and Middle
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Eastern countries-Brazil, Argentina, Saudi Arabia, and Iran-that feel they stand to
lose more than they would gain from a common fund.
Price Stabilization. Commodity price stabilization-at the heart of any common
fund design-draws support from the great majority of LDCs. Some advocates in
developing and developed countries have argued that price stabilization yields net
benefits to both producers and consumers. This argument is particularly attractive to
the many LDCs that rely heavily on commodity exports to support national
development projects and maintain domestic incomes; this is especially so with
countries that have experienced roller-coaster changes in their commodity export
prices in the recent past. These LDCs view price stabilization as an effort to reduce
the uncertainty of future earnings, even when they realize that it might reduce total
earnings over the long term. Thus, such comparative moderates in the North-South
dialogue as Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Zaire support the
stabilization feature of the common fund argument. Most other activists on this
point are only interested in "'stabilization" in so far as it opens the door to steadily
higher prices.
Second Window. From the beginning, LDC proposals for a common fund have
included provisos that the fund should be able to take measures in addition to price
stabilization to help alleviate commodity problems. This objective is embodied in
the second window proposals. Several African and South Asian countries believe it
unlikely that the commodities they export will be involved in agreements with
international buffer stocks. Accordingly, these countries want to insure that, if a
common fund is created with independent financing, they will get their share of the
pie. They want the second window to be able to finance-among other things-
export diversification, infrastructure improvements, market promotion, research and
development, and compensatory finance. In short, they want a second window that
one UNCTAD official privately labeled "a bottomless pit".
Developed Country Views
The developed countries will contend that a common fund should be built
around the pooling of financial resources of individual international commodity
agreements. This pooling proposal meets some LDC desires for commodity price
stabilization by:
? Encouraging the establishment under existing commodity agreements of
buffer stocks.
? Drawing on the expertise in the commodity groups to estimate financial
requirements from the fund.
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? Taking advantage of savings that would occur when the peak needs of
each commodity do not coincide.
At the same time, the pooling proposal meets developed country concerns by:
? Strictly limiting the amount of financial support that an individual
commodity agreement could receive.
? Allowing each commodity agreement to operate independently.
? Avoiding the creation of a new international development institution
through the second window proposal.
On the eve of the meetings, the developed countries are edgy about prospects
for progress but are considerably more unified than in the past. For the moment, the
Germans seem to have conquered their qualms about going too far. The North-South
liberals-the Dutch, the Scandinavians, and some policymakers in the United
Kingdom-feel that the developed countries could have been bolder and will need to
offer more to sustain negotiations. The United States, stuck with the chore of
negotiating a group position, is reasonably confident that it can keep developed
country unity long enough to initiate constructive discussion with the LDCs.
Mixed LDC Reaction Likely
There is no developed country proposal that would be acceptable to all
members of the G-77. Indeed, even complete acceptance of the G-77 position would
not be viewed by many LDCs as a wholly favorable turn of events because of
individual differences on what is important in their collective position.
In any event, the proposals of the developed countries at the November ne-
gotiations will elicit a varied LDC response:
? Serious inquiry and perhaps even encouragement by LDCs such as
Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Zaire that place a high priority
on price stabilization.
? Expressions of disapproval from African and South Asian LDCs,
particularly India and Pakistan, that want the second window.
? Relief from those Latin American and Middle Eastern countries that are
wary about the effect of LDC proposals on the international economy and
their own financial positions.
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? An ambivalent reaction from countries that seek an increased global role
for the Third World; moderates may play up the responsiveness of the
developed countries' proposal; radicals probably will lambast the devel-
oped countries for a lack of political will and insensitivity to LDC needs
and their refusal to live up to earlier pledges on the common fund.
Future Developments
The G-77 is unlikely to be enthusiastic about developed countries' proposals on
the common fund because they fall so far short of LDC demands for independent
financing, the second window, and assured LDC control of the new institution. The
real question is whether the moderates in the G-77, particularly those who favor
price stabilization measures, can wield enough influence to gain acceptance of the
developed country proposals as the basis for future negotiations. They will be
hobbled in this by the complications of dealing in three regional LDC caucuses and
through the single designated LDC spokesman. In any event, common fund
discussions are likely to be a continuing source of tension both within the G-77 and
between North and South. (Secret Noforn-Nocontract)
US PRICE COMPETITIVENESS STRENGTHENS AGAINST
JAPAN AND WESTERN EUROPE
US price competitiveness in manufactures has strengthened vis-a-vis Japan and
most major West European countries in the last 12 months mainly as a result of the
appreciation of foreign currencies against the dollar. The impact of the changed
price relationships has begun to be reflected in the relative volume of the exports of
the United States and its major competitors. The slippage in the US shares of major
foreign markets (in constant dollars), evident through most of 1976, was being
gradually reversed by first half 1977. The appreciation of major foreign currencies
against the dollar in the past 90 days will place US exports, at least temporarily, in
an even more favorable competitive position.
Despite these US competitive gains, pressure against the dollar continues. Much
of this pressure reflects concern over the record 1977 US trade deficit, which results
from factors other than US competitiveness in manufactures, such as (a) higher
imports of oil, (b) the slow growth of many foreign economies in which the United
States has a major market share, and (c) the steeper price trend for US imports
compared with US exports.
Establishment of New Currency Regime in 1970-73
The massive realignment of currencies between first quarter 1970 and March
1973 strengthened the US price competitiveness in international markets by nearly
6 SECRET 3 November 1977
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20 percent as measured by the price-adjusted exchange rate (PAER).* This change
indicates both the impact of exchange rate changes and the difference in wholesale
price trends (manufactures) among major developed countries. By comparison,
Japan's price competitiveness declined 20 percent, while the losses of France, West
Germany, and Canada ranged from 7 percent to 10 percent. Only the UK and Italy
among the major countries joined the United States in improving their price
competitiveness in international markets.
The currency realignment was undertaken in an effort to overcome the distor-
tionsthathad accumulated during the long period of the fixed exchange rate system and
was intended to prevent the necessity for such major one-time changes. Within a few
weeks, maintenance of the
new official rates was aban-
doned by most major coup- Big Seven: Change in Price-Adjusted Exchange Rate
"managed" (1st Quarter 1970 to March 1973)
tries and a new
floating exchange rate system Percent
was established. The new
system was soon tested by the Japan States ...................................................................: 19
apaan - 20
severe shock caused by the west Germany ... ......... ......... ......... ......... - 7
massive 1973/74 OPEC price France .............................................................................. -10
hikes; it met the test success- United Kingdom .............................................................. 16
fully. Exchange rates changes Italy ..................................................................................
compensated for large differ- Canada .............................................................................. -10
ences in inflation rates. As a
result, the 1976 PAER indexes
for most major developed countries were near the March 1973 level (plus or minus 5
percent). The major exception was Japan, whose price competitiveness measured by
the PAER improved by 8 percent, the combined result of depreciation of the yen
against major currencies and a relatively low domestic inflation rate.
Recent Trends
The appreciation of the yen in the last 12 months has brought the Japanese
PAER back to the March 1973 level. The Japanese PAER reached 99 percent of that
benchmark level by August 1977 and 102 percent as of 17 October** as the yen
*This analysis is based on trends in the PAER index, which measures trends in domestic wholesale prices in 17
major countries (including South Africa) and adjusts these domestic price movements for exchange rate changes.
If, for example, prices in one country rise 10 percent more than in competitor countries while its exchange rate
declines by 15 percent, the country's competitive position would be improved, that is, its PAER index would
move down by approximately 5 percent. Although we consider the PAER to be the best overall indicator of
trends in competitiveness, it may not take account of factors such as relative profit trends.
**Wholesale price trends for October and in many cases September are projected based on the most recent two
months data available. PAER values based on estimated price indexes usually diverge little from later revisions.
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Major Developed Countries: Price-Adjusted Exchange Rate'
1st Half
3d Qtr
17 October
1974
1975
1976
1977
1977
1977E
Big Seven
United States ......................................
98.6
102.6
104.4
104.0
104.6
104.4
Japan ..................................................
99.2
90.9
92.2
95.8
97.5
102.4
West Germany ..................................
100.8
97.3
97.9
99.2
99.8
100.5
France ................................................
91.5
101.0
96.9
91.2
92.3
92.1
United Kingdom ................................
97.6
103.1
95.7
97.5
100.4
103.2
Italy ....................................................
111.2
105.8
101.6
103.6
102.7
102.5
Canada ................................................
103.9
98.3
103.2
100.1
96.7
93.0
Netherlands ............................................
99.2
101.3
102.7
105.7
106.3
106.5
Belgium ................................................
99.4
93.9
95.5
98.1
97.5
97.3
Switzerland ............................................
102.1
104.5
107.8
99.1
98.9
103.6
Sweden ....................................................
104.3
105.8
107.2
107.7
104.9
97.2
Norway ..................................................
104.0
107.0
109.3
110.7
110.8
108.9
Denmark ................................................
97.7
99.2
101.4
100.2
98.2
96.5
Austria ......................................................
100.9
103.4
104.7
108.9
106.8
106.0
Australia ..................................................
101.9
98.5
98.0
88.3
84.3
85.9
Spain ......................................................
101.1
102.2
99.6
104.5
97.5
89.8
An increase in the PAER index indicates a decline in price competitiveness.
E Price indexes for October are estimated.
appreciated 15 percent since second quarter 1976. As a result, the dollar wholesale
prices of goods manufactured in Japan rose 16 percent in the past 12 months
compared with 7 percent for US manufactures.
The UK has lost the price competitiveness gained in 1976 when sterling fell
sharply. The British PAER rose by 15 percent between the last quarter 1976 to 17
October 1977 because of (a) the continuation of a relatively high domestic inflation,
and (b) the strengthening of the pound as North Sea oil has mounted in volume.
Canada and France have been the largest gainers among major countries in price
competitiveness in the last 16 months. The Canadian dollar's 9-percent depreciation
helped to bring down the PAER from 104 percent of the March 1973 level in second
quarter 1976 to 93 percent as of 17 October. The Canadian dollar has been pushed
down by a combination of (a) political uncertainties, notably the Quebec separatist
movement and interprovincial squabbling over energy; (b) narrowing interest rate
differentials, which discouraged capital flows into Canada; and (c) the generally
bleak prospects for the domestic economy. The downward movement of the
Canadian dollar has exceeded what would be expected by looking at relative
inflation differentials. The depreciation of the franc has kept French price competi-
tiveness from mid-1976 through the present period at below the March 1973 level.
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Big Seven Countries:
Change in Overall Price Competitiveness (197611-17Oct 1977)
As a result of low internal inflation rates, the West German and Swiss PAER
remained near the 1973 level through 1977 despite the considerable appreciation of
their currencies.
The stability of the aggregate US PAER in the last year masked significant
changes in US price competitiveness among its largest trading partners. Against
Canada, the US bilateral price competitiveness fell 10 percent from second quarter
1976 to October 1977, while compared with Japan, the US gained 11 percent. The
fall with respect to Canada did little to hurt the US trade position in manufactures
because (a) Canadian manufactures are only a small factor in international markets,
and (b) much of US-Canadian trade is intrafirm. Substantial gains also occurred in
the US price competitiveness vis-a-vis West German, British, and Italian manu-
factures as shown in the tabulation.
West United
Japan Germany Kingdom Italy
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US Bilateral Dollar-Based Price Competitiveness from Second Quarter
1976 to 17 October 1977
Canada .................................... -10 West Germany ...................... 7
Japan ...................................... 11 Italy ........................................ 8
France .................................... -3 United Kingdom .................... 11
After the currency adjustments through mid-October are taken into account,
the price index of US wholesale prices for manufactures based on March 1973 just
about equaled the dollar-based index for Japan, West Germany, the UK, and Italy.
French and Canadian prices were about 10 percent below the comparable US price
index.
Among other developed countries, Australia, Denmark, and Sweden have
maintained their price competitiveness in manufactures through large and sometimes
repetitive currency devaluations. Despite the concern that these are competitive
devaluations, the evidence indicates that they occurred only after relatively high
rates of domestic inflation had begun to price goods out of international markets.
The Netherlands, Norway, and Austria appear to be losing ground in the battle
to remain price competitive. Their currencies are tied to the value of the West
Major Developed Countries: Wholesale Price Indexes for Manufactures Measured in US
Dollars
1st Half
3d Qtr
17 October
1974
1975
1976
1.977
1977
1977
Big Seven
United States ......................................
124.9
139.3
147.9
155.7
159.8
160.5
Japan ..................................................
124.2
125.8
132.0
143.9
150.8
158.9
West Germany ..................................
125.1
136.5
138.1
150.0
156.2
158.0
France ................................................
115.3
140.2
135.4
138.1
144.3
145.6
United Kingdom ................................
122.2
143.7
136.0
148.0
158.3
161.6
Italy ....................................................
136.6
146.8
142.1
154.1
157.5
159.7
Canada ................................................
129.5
136.4
150.1
153.9
152.3
148.6
Netherlands ............................................
123.1
139.7
142.9
157.9
164.4
166.2
Belgium ..................................................
122.2
131.1
133.5
146.6
151.4
152.6
Switzerland ............................................
126.8
146.1
149.1
148.3
155.4
162.2
Sweden ....................................................
130.0
148.7
151.7
163.7
162.1
154.5
Norway ..................................................
130.4
150.7
155.9
168.6
172.2
170.7
Denmark ................................................
122.8
140.7
144.7
163.3
155.7
153.2
Austria ......................................................
127.0
144.5
147.2
163.8
169.9
167.8
Australia ..................................................
125.8
133.7
136.5
130.2
127.8
133.6
Spain ......................................................
125.4
142.7
140.4
156.7
166.4
141.4
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German mark and, because their inflation has outpaced inflation in the FRG, they
have lost their price edge as the mark climbed in value. In the Netherlands and
Norway, an energy bonanza has kept foreign payments reasonably sound despite a
loss of price competitiveness in manufactures.
Price Movements and Trade
The US competitiveness in international markets vis-a-vis the Japanese began to
improve even before the sharp depreciation of the US dollar in the past 90 days.
Last year Japan, partly because it benefited from relatively low dollar prices on its
exports in 1975 and early 1976, was able to increase sharply its share (in constant
dollar terms) in nearly all markets. By contrast, since the beginning of this year,
partly as a result of yen appreciation in 1976, the Japanese share of the industrial
country and LDC markets has declined slightly, although remaining high compared
with the early 1970s. The United States meanwhile has increased or maintained its
market position in most major countries after losing badly to the Japanese in 1976.
Foreign currencies, notably the yen, nonetheless have continued to appreciate
substantially against the dollar in a few months. This development in part reflects a
highly visible, large jump in the US trade deficit that resulted mainly from factors
other than reduced US competitiveness in manufactures: (a) the large increase in US
oil imports, from $34 billion in 1976 to an annual rate of $45 billion in the first
eight months of 1977; (b) the slow growth in foreign markets of importance to the
United States, both in key industrial countries where the recovery has been slow and
in LDCs that are major US customers; and (c) the faster rise of import prices
compared with export prices due to constrained supply conditions in some import
commodities, such as coffee.
In the same vein, the large appreciation of the yen reflects the acute awareness
in exchange markets of the burgeoning Japanese trade surplus (in dollar terms),
which in turn was caused by factors other than a major expansion of Japanese
export volume. These other influences include higher dollar prices for Japanese
exports as a result of the yen appreciation and informal Japanese trade barriers
which have effectively held down imports of foreign manufactures.
The most recent currency adjustments can be expected to further strengthen
the competitiveness of US exports. It could take at least several months before the
benefits of this improved position will have a significant impact on exports. Mean-
while, increased import prices will reduce the likelihood of any sharp decline in the
sizable US trade deficit and may push up the domestic inflation rate slightly.
(Unclassified)
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WORLD COARSE GRAINS: RECORD OUTPUT,
LOWER IMPORT DEMAND
We estimate that world coarse grain* production and stocks will reach record
levels in 1977/78. World import demand for coarse grains will be lowered by
increased feeding of wheat.
US production is forecast by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) to set
a new high; exports during 1977/78 are expected to drop. Although domestic
consumption will increase sharply over last year, US stocks in 1977/78, therefore,
will reach their highest level in five years. The final outcome of Southern Hemisphere
crops and the size of Soviet grain purchases are the principal uncertainties.
Record World Production
We agree with the USDA estimate that world production of coarse grains in the
1977/78 crop year will approach a record 700 million tons, about 10 million tons
larger than in 1976/77. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) forecast of
1977 production-on a calendar rather than crop year basis-is 726 million tons.
Excessive summer rains, which decreased both production and quality of wheat over
widespread areas, benefited most coarse grain crops, especially corn. We estimate
that 1977/78 world corn production will set a new record.
The largest increase in coarse grains is estimated for Western Europe--27
percent over the drought-reduced 1976/77 crop. The EC expects a record barley
harvest, and corn production will be up more than 4 million tons. In Eastern Europe
1975/76
1976/77'
1977/78
Total ................................................
321.8
344.8
345.7
Argentina ......................................
5.9
8.8
7.8
South Africa ................................
7.3
9.5
9.0
Brazil ............................................
17.9
18.7
17.8
Thailand ......................................
3.0
2.7
1.8
European Community ................
14.1
11.0
15.2
Eastern Europe ............................
29.9
28.4
30.2
United States ................................
146.5
157.9
160.1
Other ............................................
97.2
107.8
103.8
Preliminary.
2 Projected.
*Includes corn, sorghum, barley, oats, millet, rye, and miscellaneous grains.
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corn production should rise 6 percent. Thailand's 1977/78 corn harvest is down
almost 1 million tons because of drought.
Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa all will have smaller 1977/78 corn harvests
than last year's excellent crops. Less favorable growing weather is largely
responsible. A cut in hectarage also will affect output in Brazil.
Production of coarse grains in the Soviet Union is estimated to be about 95
million tons in 1977/78 compared with 116.2 million tons a year ago.
Argentine sorghum production is forecast to reach 6.5 million tons, about 5
percent above 1976/77. Due to an extended drought, Australia's barley harvest is
forecast at 2.4 million tons, down 14 percent. On the strength of expanded area and
above-average yields, Canadian barley production in 1977/78 is projected at 10.8
million tons, 3 percent above last year.
Use Up Due to Greater Feeding
World consumption of coarse grains in 1977/78 is forecast at a record 677
million tons, up 9 million tons because of higher livestock feeding.
EC feeding of coarse grains is expected to drop slightly in 1977/78 due to a 7-
percent greater feed use of wheat. Other West European countries will boost feeding
of coarse grains by 1.3 million tons, to 27.2 million tons. East European feeding of
coarse grains is expected to show a slight gain in 1977/78; Soviet feeding will be
down, as imports will not offset the production shortfall. Increased feeding of wheat
in the USSR, however, is expected to more than offset the cut in coarse grains. The
three major Asian import markets-Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea-will increase
their usage of coarse grains by an estimated 6 percent over last year. The USDA
projects US feed use of coarse grains at 119.7 million tons, 7 percent above
1976/77.
Import Demand Down
We forecast world import demand for coarse grains in the marketing year
ending 30 June 1978 (MY 1978) at 80 million tons, down 2.5 million tons but still
the second-highest on record. The latest USDA and FAO estimates put world import
demand at 77.8 million and 67.0 million tons, respectively. For corn, the most
important coarse grain, we forecast world import demand at 54.3 million tons, only
slightly below MY 1977.
EC corn imports in MY 1978 are expected to drop 28 percent, to 13.6 million
tons. This reduction reflects the higher output of coarse grains and forage and the
large amount of feed-quality wheat available from this summer's harvest. Elsewhere
3 November 1977 SECRET
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in Western Europe, higher feeding requirements in Spain and Portugal and lower
barley production in Greece are expected to push up MY 1.978 demand for imported
corn by an aggregate 1 million tons.
East European imports of corn in MY 1978 are expected to reach 5.1 million
tons, somewhat larger than last year. A sharp increase in Polish imports, due to
weather-related losses, will more than offset lower Czechoslovakian imports. East
German corn imports should remain the same at about 2.3 million tons.
we estimate that the USSR will
import 8.9 million tons of corn (largely US origin) in MY 1978, a 78-percent hike
over MY 1977. We attribute the increase to continued Soviet efforts to improve
livestock, reduced coarse gratin production, and attractive world corn prices.
We expect Asian coarse grain import demand, including corn, to continue to
grow. The US share of this market in MY 1978 will increase because of a shortfall in
Thailand's exportable supplies. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, with their
expanding livestock industries, will increase their MY 1978 corn imports by 500,000
tons to 12.5 million tons.
Imports
Total ........................................................
53.1
54.4
54.3
European Community ' ........................
14.5
18.9
13.6
Other Western Europe ........................
5.6
6.7
7.4
Eastern Europe .......................................
4.7
4.8
5.1
USSR .......................................................
11.7
5.0
8.9
Western Hemisphere ..............................
3.3
3.4
3.2
Asia ........................................................
12.2
14.3
14.7
Africa ......................................................
1.1
1.:3
1.4
Exports
Total ........................................................
53.1
54.4
54.3
Argentina ................................................
2.6
4.4
4.4
Brazil ......................................................
1.4
1.2
1.3
South Africa ..........................................
3.2
1.5
3.1
Thailand ................................................
2.3
2.0
0.9
Eastern Europe ......................................
2.0
1.3
1.3
United States ..........................................
39.5
42.6
41.9
Other ......................................................
2.1
1.4
1.4
Data are for marketing year ending 30 June of stated year.
Preliminary.
' Projected.
' Excluding intra-EC trade.
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World Exportable Supplies and Stocks Up
World export supplies are more than adequate to meet import needs in MY
1978. Increased supplies in North America, the EC, and South Africa will more than
offset a drop of 1.1 million tons in Thailand's exportable supplies of corn. Due to
limited storage facilities, each of the leading Southern Hemisphere corn exporters
will continue to maximize exports.
Argentine corn exports in MY 1978 are estimated to be about equal to MY
1977 exports; Brazil's are to be up slightly. In South Africa MY 1978 corn exports
should more than double due to larger supplies and an increased Asian market
demand attributable to Thailand's shortfall. These estimates of corn exports by the
three major Southern Hemisphere shippers represent maximum availabilities and
minimum stock levels. Planting is still in progress, and production estimates are
preliminary. Since stock levels are at a minimum, any decreases in production would
result in corresponding revisions in export estimates.
Thailand's corn exports in MY 1978 are estimated at only 900,000 tons; in
view of already low stocks, this too is a maximum availability. The Thais, have
recently been forced to halve contracted exports to Japan and Taiwan for MY 1978.
The EC's improved harvest will allow an increase in intra-EC coarse grain trade
as well as in exports to third countries. Most of the corn shipments will remain
within the EC with shipments to third countries reaching only about 500,000 tons.
East European corn exports in MY 1978 will differ little from a year ago.
Exports of Australian barley and sorghum as well as Argentine sorghum are
estimated to be near maximum levels; stocks will remain low. In the case of
Canadian barley, even with an estimated MY 1978 export of 3.9 million tons, ending
stocks are forecast at a high 3.8 million tons. Although a large share of these stocks
would be available for export, port capacity is insufficient to move much more
barley.
We estimate that 1977/78 world coarse grain stocks will reach a record 83.3
million tons, up 11.6 million tons or 16 percent from the previous year. By far the
bulk of the increase will consist of US corn and, to a lesser extent, EC barley. The
1977/78 ending stocks of all coarse grains outside the United States will be only 2
percent larger than last year, or a total of about 42.5 million tons.
Demand for US Corn Down, Stocks Up
We estimate foreign demand for US corn in MY 1978 at 41.9 million tons,
700,000 tons below MY 1977 and 2.5 million tons above the midpoint of the USDA
forecast. Our higher estimate of Soviet imports of US corn accounts for most of the
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difference. Since the United States is the only exporter with large supplies and ship-
ping capability, foreign demand for US corn would become even greater if Moscow
stepped up orders.
The USDA estimates US corn exports for the US crop year ending 30
September 1978 will be from 35.6 million to 43.2 million tons. The midpoint of
39.4 million tons compares with our estimate-adjusted to the same October-
September year-of 41.6 million tons. The USDA forecasts stocks on 30 September
1978 will be 25.5 million to 40.7 million tons, with a midpoint of 33.1 million tons.
Our corresponding US stock estimate is 30.9 million tons. Using this latter figure,
stocks on 30 September 1978 will be 8.6 million tons larger than a year earlier and
more than three times the size of carryover stocks two years earlier.
Uncertainties that could tighten the market:
? Our forecasts of Southern Hemisphere production and exports could
prove optimistic due to continued unfavorable growing conditions.
? Current speculation of a 10-percent acreage set-aside of US feed grains
and the use of the Long Term Reserve program in the US could prove to
be low.
? Soviet MY 1978 grain imports could be larger than now forecast.
? A downturn could occur in the currently favorable prospects for
Northern Hemisphere winter grains. (Confidential Noforn)
INDIA: FOODGRAIN OVERHANG
India faces a short-term grain glut even though the critical long-term problem
remains the feeding of a rapidly growing population.
Two above-average crop years (1975/76 and 1976/77), together with high
imports, pushed government grain stocks to a record 20 million tons as of Septem-
ber 1977. Because government storage facilities cannot properly handle this volume,
large amounts are subject to spoilage. The problem will intensify through the current
crop year, with record harvests again in prospect. The bulging stocks give New Delhi
a cushion against at least one bad crop.
Fluctuations in Production and Stockpiles
During the 1960s India found itself chronically short of foodgrains, with
annual imports amounting to roughly 6 million tons and government-owned carry-
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2 75
Stock Levels (Yearend)
Million Tons
25 ,.
0
1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 77
India: Foodgrain Production,
Imports, and Stock Levels'
0
1970 71 72 73 74
Imports
Production
1. Production data are for crop years generally ending in June of year stated, imports are on a calendar year basis,
and stock data are for December of given year.
574410 11-77
over stocks to only 1 million to 3 million tons. Grain output climbed rapidly in the
late 1960s and early 1970s because of good weather, increased use of fertilizer, and
the introduction of high-yielding wheat seeds (HYV). As a result, imports dropped
to a mere 445,000 tons by 1972. Government buffer stocks reached 8 million tons
at yearend 1971 and production hit a new high of 108 million tons in the 1970/71
crop year. The stockpile dwindled tj2ereafter as insufficient rainfall from 1973
through 1975 caused production to plummet. In addition, New Delhi was forced to
boost imports during a period of unusually high world prices.
By yearend 1974 government carryover stocks had dropped to 2.5 million tons.
At that time, the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi sought to build a buffer against
at least one poor crop. A bumper 121-million-ton crop in 1975/76-up from 100
million in 1974/75-facilitated government efforts to buy grain on the domestic
market. Imports also were stepped up, further adding to the stockpile. Although
new import orders were stopped in July 1976, deliveries on previous contracts
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continued into early 1977. Imports in 1975-76 totaled 14 million tons, the highest
two-year level since the famine years of 1966-67. These imports roughly coincided
with the two exceptionally good harvests of 1975/76 and 1976/77, with the result
that government grain inventories mounted rapidly to 20 million tons by September
1977.
Current Storage Problems
The government has already accumulated larger grain stocks than can be
properly stored. Since 1975, programs to add 7 million tons of new storage capacity
have moved slowly; only about 2 million tons of new storage capacity has been
added to the 11 million tons available at yearend 1975. As a result, about two-fifths
of current stocks are stored in the open or on wooden pallets covered with
polyethylene sheets. Use of inadequate facilities is likely to result in losses from
spoilage and rodents of as much as 2 million to 3 million tons, depending on how
long it stays in inventory. Aside from spoilage, the costs of maintaining the stockpile
this year will amount to $500 million, or 3 percent of total budget expenditures.
Government Response
The Janata government has adopted several measures designed to draw down
stocks by increasing sales through the government distribution system. To date New
Delhi has:
? Increased the quota of wheat sold through the ration shops from 8 to
12 kilograms per month per person.
? Slightly increased the number of ration shops in the system.
? Advanced loans to state employers for bulk foodgrain purchases.
? Reduced the prices of wheat to millers by 7 percent.
? Removed all restrictions on interstate movement of foodgrains.
So far these measures have had little effect on stimulating sales through
government shops. One problem is New Delhi's reluctance to reduce prices charged
at these outlets from the current level of $142 per ton. Private grain distributors, for
their part, use the government selling price as a minimum floor price for their own
sales. As a result the level of consumer purchases made through the open market
system as well as the ration shops remains restricted by price and by the low
purchasing power of the bulk of the population.
Another factor slowing the drawdown of stocks is the narrow popularity of
wheat. The bulk of the population outside the northwest wheat areas prefers rice,
and a bumper rice harvest is currently under way.
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o 100-
a
I
i11
& 1 Production
50 'Nil
00.
?`I
25 a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 t i l l 1( I I i l l
1957/58 60/61 65/66 70/71 75/76 77/78
1. Wholesale price index from the International Financial Statistics is used as a deflator.
574411 11-77
India Wheat: Area, Production, and
Producer Guaranteed Prices
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Exports as a Possible Solution
New Delhi is looking to exports as a means of slimming stockpiles. The Soviet
Union has agreed to accept :payment in kind for a wheat loan granted in 1973; India
will ship 1.5 million tons for Soviet use over the next year or two. India also plans to
loan 100,000 tons of wheat to Vietnam. Indian embassies reportedly have been
instructed to search for additional buyers. We doubt this latter effort will be
successful. Constraints on India's transport and port facilities pose a serious problem
as does the generally low quality of Indian wheat, which makes up the bulk of the
stockpile.
Prospects
Indian grain stocks will increase further over the next two months as the major
fall harvest comes in. The 1977 summer rains were excellent. Some observers even
forecast a record grain crop of 125 million tons for 1977/78. To help minimize the
stock additions, New Delhi is now considering both a further cut in government sales
prices and inauguration of "work for food" programs. Since construction in new
storage facilities is still lagging, any additional stock accumulation above present
levels would be subject to very high spoilage rates.
As practical matter, India should maintain grain reserves of about 20 million
tons if proper storage facilities are available. Given present levels of consumption
and production, this would provide enough grain to offset a 15-percent crop
shortfall. Although production continues high in the current crop year, the probabil-
ity of a sharp drop in output in the fall of next year is high. Weather remains the
dominant variable in Indian foodgrain production and the latest three crop years
(July 1975 through June 1978) have included two excellent and one average rainy
season. Historic patterns argue against an extended run of good fortune.
The Janata government, while not adequately pushing construction of storage
facilities, has avoided measures that would reduce grain production incentives. The
government, for example, has increased both wheat and rice purchase prices in 1977
despite the stock overhang. Because of the general domestic inflation, including
substantial rises in the prices of inputs to the agricultural sector, further increases in
government purchase prices will be needed to stimulate farm output over the coming
years. (Confidential)
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Next 7 Page(s) In Document Exempt
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 Approved For Release 2002/02/01 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300020001-8
25X6
Review of Report
WORLD SHIPBUILDING: PROLONGED DEPRESSION*
Output in the depressed world shipbuilding industry will continue to fall until
the early 1980s, when production will be about one-third the peak 1975 level of 34
million gross register tons (GRT). The decline stems from speculative overbuilding in
the early 1970s and the worldwide economic recession-set off by the massive
1973/74 oil price hikes-which deflated demand for both tankers and bulk carriers.
European shipbuilders have been hit not only by the global recession but also
by the aggressive Japanese shipbuilders, who enjoy a 30-percent cost advantage;
Japanese yards continue to win about half the world's dwindling orders. Negotia-
tions on market sharing between the European. Community and the Japanese are
stymied by disagreement on how to measure production and by an inability to
coordinate third-country production. The West European shipbuilders face a gloomy
long-term outlook not only. because of formidable Japanese competition but also
because of growing competition from the rapidly developing shipbuilding industries
of Brazil, South Korea, and Taiwan.
Various international plans to reduce the oversupply of tankers-currently
about 37 percent of the world tanker fleet-have foundered on the rock of national
interests. With international cooperation out at least for the present, national
subsidies to the shipbuilding industry are propping up production and thereby
postponing recovery of the industry beyond the mid-1980s. (Unclassified)
*This review presents the highlights, in modified form, of a forthcoming report by the Office of Economic
Research.
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China: Economic Indicators
(ER 77-10508, October 1977, Unclassified)
This handbook brings together economic estimates for the People's Republic of
China, a country that has not released-economic statistics systematically since 1960.
It is a sequel to People's Republic of China: Handbook of Economic Indicators, ER
76-10540, August 1976, Unclassified).
25X
25X1A
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 Approved For Release 2002/02/01 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300020001-8
Western Arms Sales to Third World Countries, First Half 1977
(ER 77-10636, October 1977, Secret Noforn)
This publication summarizes US and other Free World military sales and
deliveries to LDCs during the first six months of 1977. A statistical appendix
provides country-to-country arms transactions for the period.
The Impact of Fertilizer on Soviet Grain Output, 1960-80
(ER 77-10557, October 1977, Unclassified)
This publication reviews the impact of increased applications of fertilizer on
Soviet grain output between 1960 and 1975, assesses planned applications during
the 1976-80 plan period, and reviews the probable effect of fertilizer on future grain
yields. An appendix also describes the sources and methodology used in deriving
estimates presented in the publication.
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 Approved For Release 2002/02/01 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300020001-8
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 National
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Assessment
Center
Economic Indicators
Weekly Review
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 Approved For Release 2002/02/01 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300020001-8
This publication is prepared for the use of U.S. Government
officials. The fonnat, coverage and contents of the publication are
designed to meet the specific requirements of those users. U.S.
Government officials may obtain additional copies of this document
directly or through liaison channels from the Central Intelligence
Agency.
Non-U.S. Government users may obtain this along with similar
CIA publications on a subscription basis by addressing inquiries to:
Document Expediting (DOCEX) Project
Exchange and Gift Division
Library of Congress
Washington, D.C. 20540
Non-U.S. Government users not interested in the DOCEX
Project subscription service may purchase reproductions of specific
publications on an individual basis from:
Photoduplication Service
Library of Congress
Washington, D.C. 20540
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 Approved For Release 2002/02/01 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300020001-8
1. The Economic Indicators Weekly Review provides up-to-date information
on changes in the domestic and external economic activities of the major non-
Communist developed countries. To the extent possible, the Economic Indicators
Weekly Review is updated from press ticker and Embassy reporting, so that the
results are made available to the reader weeks-or sometimes months-before receipt
of official statistical publications. US data are provided by US government agencies.
2. Source notes for the Economic Indicators Weekly Review are revised every
few months. The most recent date of publication of source notes is 20 October 1977.
Comments and queries regarding the Economic Indicators Weekly Review are
welcomed.
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 IN DUSTRI ,-d'BQ sTLGQ*2/MOgXAdDB go9apAW
United States
Japan
1973 AVERAGE 120
West Germany
130
120
France
110
JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT
1972 1973 1974
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 Approved For Release 2002/02/01 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300020001-8
111
JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT
United States
Japan
West Germany
France
1974 1975 1976 1977
Percent AVERAGE ANNUAL
Change GROWTH RATE SINCE
from
LATEST Previous 1 Year 3 Months
MONTH Month 1970 Earlier Earlierl
103
Percent AVERAGE ANNUAL
Change GROWTH RATE SINCE
from
LATEST Previous 1 Year 3 Months
MONTH Month 1970 Earlier Earlierl
, .P 77 0.4 3.6 6.1 49 t United Kingdom IUL 77 2.8 0.4 -1.0 -8.5
AUG 77 1.2 3.8 2.9 -2.6 Italy AUG 77 -3.4 1.5 -1.8 -33.4
aUG 77 a 2.1 2.1 u Canada AJN 77 03 4.1 4.5 1.4
:A000 77 0 3.1 0 -3.1 1
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UNEMPLOYMENT PERCENT OF LABOR FORCE
United States
West Germany
JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT JAN APR JUL OCT
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
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 Approved For Release 2002/02/01 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300020001-8
United Kingdom
Italy (quarterly)
A labor force survey based on new definitions of economic activity sharply raised the official estimate of Italian unemployment In first quarter 1977. Data for earlier periods thus are not comparable.
Italian data are not seasonally adjusted.
Canada
THOUSANDS OF PERSONS UNEMPLOYED
1 Year
Earlier
3 Months
Earlier
1 Year
Earlier
3 Months
Earlier
United States
- FP 77
6,773
/,448
6,962
9
United Kingdom
-rp 77
1,446
1,319
1,353
Japan
JUN 77
1,190
1,120
1,050
i
Italy
/7 III
1,692
776
1,432
West Germany
CEP 77
1,046
1,034
1,045
Canada
IUL 77
659
751
870
France
"EP 77
1,159
941
1,150
NOTE: Data are seasonally adjusted. Unemployment rates for France are estimated. The rates shown for Japan, Italy and Canada are
roughly comparable to US rates. For 1975.77, the rates for France and the United Kingdom should be increased by 5 percent and
15 percent respectively, and those for West Germany decreased by 20 percent to be roughly comparable with US rates.
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DOMESTIC PRICES1 INDEX: 1970=100
United States
West Germany
150
125
France
225
200
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United Kingdom
Italy
300
275
250
225
OCT JAN APR JUL OCT
1973
3 United States
Japan
West Germany
France
-0.3
-1.4
8.2 7.6
9.9 9.1
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14.8 20.0 13.4
13.9 1S.5 '.. 6.8
14.7 5.0
20.1 9.9
9.6 2.2
8.4 10.3
 ' Approved For Release 002/02
GNP
RETAIL SALES
Constant Market Prices
Constant Prices
Average
Average
Annual Growth Rate
Since
Annual
Growth Rate Since
Percent Change
Percent Change
Latest
from Previous 1 Year
Previous
Latest
from Previous
1 Year
3 Months
Quarter
Quarter 1970 Earlier
Quarter
Month
Month
1970
Earlier
Earlier e
United States 77 111
0.9 3.2 4.6
3.8
United States
Aug 77
1.6
3.3
4.7
-3.7
Japan 77 II
1.9 5.6 5.6
7.6
Japan
Jun 77
-0.1
9.8
2.6
1.4
West Germany 77 11
-0.2 6.3 2.4
-1.0
West Germany
Aug 77
3.4
2.9
7.9
14.5
France 76 IV
0 3.9 4.9
0
France
Jun 77
7.7
-0.3
1.0
-8.1
United Kingdom 77 I
-1.9 1.6 -1.3
-7.5
United Kingdom
Sep 77
-0.7
1.0
-2.2
12.2
Italy 76 IV
1.1 3.0 5.5
4.6
Italy
Apr 77
-0.4
2.8
1.0
-3.1
Canada 76 IV
-0.6 4.8 3.4
-2.5
Canada
Jun 77
-0.7
4.1
-3.7
-8.7
Seasonally adjusted.
Seasonaty adjusted.
Average for latest 3 months compared with average for prev
ious 3 months.
FIXED INVESTMENT'
WAGES IN MANUFACTURING'
Non-residential; constant
prices
Average
Annual
Growth Rate Since
Average
Percent Change
Annual Growth Rate
Since
Latest
from Previous
1 Year
3 Months
Percent Change
Latest
from Previous 1 Yea,
Previous
Period
Period
1970
Earlier
Earlier'
Quarter
Quarter 1970 Earlier
Quarter
United States
Jul 77
0.6
7.5
7.6
8.1
United States 77 III
1.0 2.1 7.8
4
2
.
Japan
Jun 77
1.7
17.3
12:5
8.7
Japan 77 11
0.5 1.1 4.5
2
0
.
West Germany
77 II
1.7
9.5
7.5
7.2
West Germany 77 II
- 1.6 0.4 3.4
-6
4
.
France
77 I
2.3
14.1
13.9
9.5
France 75 IV
8.8 4.2 2.9
40
1
.
United Kingdom
tun 77
0.3
15.7
3.4
3.6
United Kingdom 77 I
-0.6 0 3.4
-2
5
.
Italy
May 77
5.3
21.1
29.4
33.2
Italy 76 IV
5.2 3.0 15.4
22
4
.
Canada
Jun 77
1.3
11.5
10.7
11.7
Canada 76 IV
8.5 6.8 5.1
38
7
'
.
Hourly earnings (seasonally adjusted) for the United States, Japan, and Canada; h
ourly wage
Seasonally adjusted.
rates for others. West German and French data refer
to the beg
inning of the quarter.
Average for latest 3
months compared with that for previous
3 months.
MONEY MARKET RATES
Percent Rate of Interest
1 Year
3 Months
I Month
Representative rotes
Latest Date
Earlier
Earlier
Earlier
United States
Commerical paper
Oct 12 6.43
5.19
5.38
6.01
Japan
Call money
Oct 14 5.00
6.75
5.63
4.88
West Germany
Interbank loans (3 months)
Oct 12 4.06
4.80
4.19
4.07
France
Call money
Oct 14 8.38
9.75
8.63
8.50
United Kingdom
Sterling interbank loans (3
months)
Oct 12 5.18
14.24
7.89
6.09
Canada
Finance paper
Oct 12 7.09
9.44
7.25
7.50
Eurodollars
Three-month deposits
Oct 12 7.19
5.46
5.75
6.49
Approved For Release 2002/02/01 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300020001-8
 EXPORT PRIQAAproved For Release 2002/02/01
1 ?9 7A000300020001-8
US $
National Currency
Average.
Average
Annual Growth Rate Since
Annual Growth Rat
e Since
Percent Change
Percent Change
Latest
from Previous 1 Year 3
Months
Latest from Previous 1 Year
3 Months
Month
Month 1970 Earlier
Earlier
Month Month 1970 Earlier
Earlier
United States Jul 77
-0.6 9.6 4.7
-1.7
United States
Jul 77 -0.6 9.6 4.7
-1.7
Japan Jun 77
2.0 10.8 14.9
10.1
Japan
Jun 77 0.4 6.5 4.7
-1.0
West Germany Aug 77
- 1.1 11.4 9.1
7.9
West Germany
Aug 77 -0.2 4.5 -0.1
0.6
France Jul 77
1.5 11.3 8.2
10.2
France
Jul 77 -0.1 9.2 8.7
1.7
United Kingdom Aug 77
2.9 11.0 13.9
15.7
United Kingdom
Aug 77 1.9 16.1 16.7
10.1
Italy Apr 77
-0.3 11.1 17.4
12.6
Italy
Apr 77 1.9 16.9 18.5
16.6
Canada May 77
0.3 9.7 -0.8
-0.8
Canada
May 77 0.1 9.7 6.1
7.4
IMPORT PRICES
OFFICIAL RESERVES
National Currency
Average
Annual Growth Rate
Since
Billion US $
Percent Change
Latest Month
Latest
from Previous 1 Year
3 Months
1 Year
3 Months
Month
Month 1970 Earlier
Earlier
End of Billion US $ Jun 1970 Earlier
Earlier
United States Jul 77
0.6 13.4 7.9
7.6
United States
Aug 77 19.1 14.5 18.6
19.2
Japan Jun 77
-0.8 10.9 0.3
-14.8
Japan
Sep 77 17.9 4.1 16.5
17.4
West Germany Aug 77
0.6 4.4 -0.7
3.3
West Germany
Aug 77 34.9 8.8 34.3
34.8
France Jul 77
0.1 10.3 14.3
-0.3
France
Jul 77 9.9 4.4 9.4
10.0
United Kingdom Aug 77
-1.0 19.3 13.9
1.7
United Kingdom
Sep 77 17.2 2.8 5.2
11.6
Italy Apr 77
1.0 21.1 13.7
15.1
Italy
Jul 77 10.5 4.7 6.2
6.8
Canada May 77
0.5 8.6 11.9
18.2
Canada
Jun 77 5.1 4.3 6.0
5.1
CURRENT ACCOUNT
BALANCE'
BASIC BALAN
CE
Current and Long-Term-Capital Transactions
Cumulative (Million us $)
Cumulative (Million
US.$)
Latest
Latest
Period
Million US $ 1977 1976
Change
Period Million US $ 1977 1976
Change
United States 2 77 11
-4,605 -8,763 1,070 -9,833
United States
No longer published 2
Japan Aug 77
660 5,321 1,255
4,066
Japan
Aug 77 260 3,781 1,472
2,309
West Germany Aug 77
-726 684 177
506
West Germany
Aug 77 -1,048 -3,403 883
-4,287
France 77 II
-438 -2,101 -2,052
-50
France
77 I -1,354 -1,354 -2,015
660
United Kingdom 77 I
-773 -773 -502
-271
United Kingdom
76 IV -277 N.A. -4,171
N.A.
Italy 77 1
-929 -929 -1,413
484
Italy
76 III 779 N.A. 1,096
N.A.
Canada 77 1
-1,530 -1,530 -1,911
381
Canada
77 1 -550 -550 882
-1,432
'Converted to US dollars at the current market rates of exchange.
'Converted to US dollars at the
currant market rates of exchange.
2 As recommended by
the Advisory Committee on the Presentation of Balance of Payments
' Seasonally adjusted.
Statistics, the Department of Commerce no longer publishes a basic balance.
TRADE-WEIGHTED EXCHANGE RATES
EXCHANGE RATES
As of 28 Oct 77
Spot Rate
Percent Change from
Percent Change from
As of 28 Oct 77
US $ - 1 Year 3 Months
-
1 Year 3 Months
Per
Unit 19 Mar 73 Earlier Earlier
21 Oct 77
19 Mar 73 Earlier Earlier 21 Oct 77
Japan (yen) 0.0040 5.02 17.33 6.36
1.84
United States
5.29 0.62 -0.33 -
0.21
West Germany 0.4
421 24.85 6.97 1.28
0.31
Japan -
10.95 19.44 6.46
1.82
(Deutsche mark)
West Germany
27.67 4.39 0.78
0.02
France (franc) 0.2
066 -6.26 2.79 0.67
0.34
France
-7.83 -0.73 -0.20
0.05
United Kingdom 1.7770 -27.79 7.73 2.33
0.42
United Kingdom
-28.60 7.03 2.51
0.22
(pound sterling)
Italy
-39.36 -4.60 -0.60 -
0.20
Italy (lira) 0.0011 -35.76 - 1.22 0.26
0.09
Canada
-7.88 - 13.24 -3.74 -
0.92
Canada (dollar) 0.9043 -9.36 - 12.09 -3.29
-0.77
'Weighting is based
on each listed country's trade with 16 other industrialized countries to
i
reflect the competitive
es.
impact of exchange rate variations among the major currenc
Approved For Release 2002/02/01 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300020001-8
 Approved For Release 2002/02/01 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300020001-8
World
Big
Seven
Other
OECD
OPEC 2
Com-
munist
Other
World
Big
Seven
Other
OECD OPEC'
Com-
munist
Other
UNITED STATES'
1974 .............
98,507
45,866
15,630
6,723
3,406
26,882
100,218
49,490
9,415
15,636
1,282
24,395
1975 .............
107,592
46,926
16,191
10,765
3,699
30,011
96,140
46,715
8,170
17,083
1,156
23,016
1976 .............
114,997
51,298
17,612
12,567
3,936
29,584
120,677
56,626
9,058
25,017
1,445
28
531
1st Qtr ........
27,360
12,184
4,088
2,751
1,144
7,193
27,319
12,884
2,226
5,570
327
,
6,312
2d Qtr ........
29,695
13,383
4,496
3,113
1,088
7,615
28,367
14,332
2,242
5,582
372
5,839
3d Qtr ........
27,437
11,944
4,073
3,106
850
7,464
32,452
14,285
2,228
6,952
389
8,598
4th Qtr ........
30,505
13,787
4,955
3,597
854
7,312
32,539
15,125
2,362
6,913
357
7,782
1977
1st Qtr ........
29,454
13,752
4,716
3,136
951
6,899
34,990
15,124
2,566
8,324
366
8,610
2d Qtr ........
31,673
14,282
4,707
3,389
816
8,479
37,907
17,059
2,578
8,673
411
9,186
JAPAN
1974 .............
55,610
18,591
6,862
5,450
4,367
20,340
62,074
18,755
6,219
19,970
3,684
13,446
1975 .............
55,812
16,468
6,091
8,423
5,283
19,547
57,853
16,917
6,083
19,404
3,382
12,067
1976 .............
67,364
22,406
8,588
9,278
5,049
22,043
64,895
17,534
7,777
21,877
2,926
14,781
1st Qtr ........
14,429
4,848
1,827
1,872
1,289
4,593
14,832
4,083
1,696
5,213
671
3,169
2d Qtr ........
16,431
5,402
2,092
2,271
1,348
5,318
15,903
4,347
1,948
5,400
667
3,541
3d Qtr ........
17,542
5,897
2,272
2,476
1,135
5,762
16,818
4,497
2,137
5,406
747
4,031
4th Qtr ........
1977
18,962
6,259
2,397
2,659
1,277
6,370
17,342
4,607
1,996
5,858
841
4,040
1st Qtr ........
17,911
5,848
2,449
2,459
1,409
5,746
17,452
4,717
1,845
6,246
801
3,843
Apr & May .....
13,017
4,404
1,611
1,823
875
4,304
11,988
3,195
1,380
3,925
575
2,913
WEST GERMANY
1974 .............
89,365
30,820
36,431
4,066
9,473
8,575
69,659
23,878
25,504
9,211
5,153
5,913
1975 .............
90,181
28,331
36,406
6,776
10,629
8,039
74,986
27,085
27,761
8,239
5,526
6,375
1976 .............
101,980
33,443
41,811
8,245
10,310
8,171
88,211
31,281
32,632
9,720
6,718
7
860
1st Qtr ........
23,467
7,918
9,519
1,710
2,430
1,890
20,147
7,130
7,577
2,189
1,502
,
1,749
2d Qtr ........
24,570
8,215
10,110
1,838
2,421
1,986
21,571
7,704
8,133
2,223
1,625
1,886
3d Qtr ........
25,147
8,003
10,272
2,235
2,510
2,127
21,791
7,565
7,894
2,575
1,699
2,058
4th Qtr ........
28,796
9,307
11,910
2,462
2,949
2,168
24,701
8,883
9,028
2,732
1,891
2,167
1977
1st Qtr ........
27,804
9,281
11,609
2,307
2,156
2,451
24,084
8,465
8,828
2,578
1,270
2,943
Apr ...........
9,230
3,058
3,849
799
694
830
7,991
2,892
2,949
756
428
966
FRANCE
1974 .............
45,914
19,361
14,854
3,017
2,265
6,417
52,874
22,062
13,620
10,117
1,714
5,361
1975 .............
52,189
19,960
15,454
4,909
3,477
8,389
54,238
23,039
14,350
9,665
2,065
5,119
1976 .............
55,680
22,438
16,081
5,067
3,558
8,536
64,256
27,750
16,894
11,336
2,384
892
5
1st Qtr ........
13,639
5,524
3,921
1,240
917
2,037
15,529
6,567
4,157
2,818
595
,
1,392
2d Qtr ........
14,769
5,911
4,395
1,221
1,059
2,183
16,187
7,149
4,324
2,610
593
1,511
3d Qtr ........
12,409
4,922
3,446
1,280
729
2,032
14,841
6,431
3,733
2,723
577
1,377
4th Qtr ........
14,863
6,081
4,319
1,326
853
2,284
17,699
7,603
4,680
3,185
619
1,612
1977
1st Qtr ........
15,323
6,250
4,540
1,392
847
2,294
17,885
7,494
4,840
3,056
600
1,895
Apr ...........
5,232
2,193
1,569
460
288
722
5,788
2,499
1,543
879
194
673
UNITED KINGDOM
1974 .............
38,615
11,704
15,544
2,554
1,458
7,355
54,107
18,158
17,968
8,695
1,870
7,416
1975 .............
43,751
12,399
16,310
4,535
1,768
8,739
53,260
18,387
18,370
6,912
1,726
7,865
1976 .............
46,312
14,016
17,492
5,133
1,619
8,052
56,029
19,653
18,732
7,292
2,143
8
209
1st Qtr ........
11,637
3,415
4,362
1,238
433
2,189
13,641
4,704
4,597
1,824
510
,
2,006
2d Qtr ........
11,553
3,532
4,307
1,259
420
2,035
14,052
5,041
4,547
1,738
579
2,147
3d Qtr ........
11,058
3,430
4,100
1,262
386
1,880
13,787
4,744
4,547
1,893
528
2,075
4th Qtr ........
12,064
3,639
4,723
1,374
380
1,948
14,549
5,164
5,041
1,837
526
1,981
1977
1st Qtr ........
13,150
4,008
5,145
1,521
413
2,063
15,575
5,786
5,068
1,783
514
2,424
2d Qtr ........
14,375
4,195
5,700
1,687
530
2,263
16,623
6,009
5,718
1,702
602
2,592
Approved For Release 2002/02/01 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300020001-8
 Approved For Release 2002/02/01 : CIA-RDP79BOO457AO00300020001-8
Developed Countries: Direction of Trade
(Continued)
Exports to (f.o.b.)
Imports from (c.i.f.)
World
Big
Seven
Other
OECD
OPEC 2
Com-
munist
Other
World
Big
Seven
Other
OECD
OPEC 2
Com-
munist
Other
ITALY
1974 .............
30,252
13,894
7,135
2,238
2,701
4,284
40,682
17,949
6,394
9,384
2,513
4,442
1975 .............
34,825
15,626
7,519
3,718
3,228
4,734
37,928
17,284
6,189
7,854
2,431
4,170
1976 .............
35,364
16,698
8,276
4,027
2,592
3,771
41,789
18,585
7,755
7,831
3,000
4,618
1st Qtr ........
7,398
3,513
1,713
756
597
819
9,092
4,063
1,708
1,689
608
1,024
2d Qtr ........
8,705
4,157
2,040
951
623
934
10,716
4,786
1,918
2,092
744
1,176
3d Qtr ........
9,398
4,505
2,191
1,057
657
988
10,335
4,497
1,860
2,035
792
1,151
4th Qtr ........
9,863
4,523
2,332
1,263
715
1,030
11,646
5,239
2,269
2,015
856
1,267
1977
1st Qtr ........
9,668
4,520
2,264
1,236
655
993
11,299
4,964
2,130
2,166
720
1,319
Apr & May .....
7,480
3,435
1,719
981
540
805
8,523
3,829
1,561
1,605
523
1,005
CANADA4
1974
.............
32,390
26,827
1,970
626
851
2,116
32,408
25,965
1,508
2,613
343
1,979
1975
.............
31,778
25,885
1,753
827
1,255
2,058
34,050
27,181
1,579
3,126
311
1,853
1976
.............
37,746
31,415
2,048
930
1,270
2,083
37,922
30,383
1,661
3,171
363
2,344
1st
Qtr ........
8,539
7,197
424
167
334
417
9,159
7,331
367
843
85
533
2d
Qtr ........
10,015
8,441
496
183
345
550
10,290
8,175
421
954
95
645
3d
Qtr ........
9,216
7,486
568
271
354
537
8,834
6,965
433
716
91
629
4th
Qtr ........
9,976
8,291
560
309
237
579
9,639
7,912
440
658
92
537
1977
1st
Qtr ........
9,672
8,201
524
248
231
468
9,640
7,850
391
742
87
570
2d
Qtr ........
10,740
9,055
540
278
292
575
10,841
9,007
430.
677
96
631
Data are unadjusted. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
2Including Gabon.
Import data are f.a.s.
Import data are f.o.b.
Approved For Release 2002/02/01 : CIA-RDP79BOO457AO00300020001-8
 Approved For Release 2002/02/01 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300020001-8
FOREIGN TRADE BILLION US $, f.o,b., seasonally adjusted
United States
14.0
12.0
10.0
Japan
West Germany
10.0
8.0
4.0
3.5
Approved For Release 2002/02/01 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300020001-8
 Approved For Release 2002/02/01 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300020001-8
United Kingdom
Semilogarithmic Scale
.J
4.9
APR JUL OCT JAN
1974
CUMULATIVE (MILLION US $)
LATEST
MONTH
MILLION
US $ 1977
1976
CHANGE
LATEST
MONTH
MILLION
US $ 1977
1976
CHANGE
8
095 41
159
32,650
26.1%
United States
SEP 77
1,0,916
90,584
85,171
6.440
United Kingdom
SEP 77
.
,
936 44,196
4
37,511
17.8%
12,631
109,882
88,297
24.4%
,
Balance
-1,715
-19,298
-3,126
-16,172
Balance
159 -3;037
-4,861
1,824
022 29
216
4
23,305
25.4"0
Japan
AUG 77
6,521
51,989
42.541
22.2"o
Italy
AUG 77
,
,
071
489 29
3
25,696
13.1%
5,466
40,645
35,772
13.6%
,
,
Balance
1,055
11,344
6,769
4,575
Balance
533 146
-2,391
2,537
3
325 20
711
18,774
10.311.
West Germany
SEP 77
90,061
8,023
86,227
70,820
73,878
60,750
16.7"0
16.6%
Canada
JUN 77
,
,
3,311 20,020
18,940
5.7%
Balance
2,038
15,407
13,129
2,279
5
510
41
964
37,453
12.0?'o
France
AUG 77
,
5,888
,
44,174
39,000
13.3%
Balance
-378
-2,210
-1,548
-662
Approved For Release 2002/02/01 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300020001-8
 Approved For Release 2002/02/01 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300020001-8
FOREIGN TRADE PRICES IN US $1
United States INDEX: JAN 1975 =100
Japan
West Germany
1Export and import plots are based on five month weighted moving averages.
A-14
Approved For Release 2002/02/01 : CIA-RDP79B00457A0003006200C
 Approved For Release 2002/02/01 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300020001-8
France
United Kingdom
._....'?~,104
1977
W4353 10-77
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 Approve ELECTED DEVELOPINGPCOUNTRIES 0020001-8
MONEY SUPPLY'
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION'
Average
Average
Annual Growth
Rate Since
Annual
Growth Rate
Since
Percent Change
Percent Change
Latest
from Previous
.
1 Year
Latest
from Previous
1 Year
3 Months
Month
Month
1970
Earlier
Period
Period
1970
Earlier
Earlier'
Brazil
May 77
1.5
36.3
41.7
Brazil
76 11
0.1
11.0
10.7
0.4
Egypt
Apr 77
1.2
18.6
23.0
India
Feb 77
3.5
5.5
6.8
18.8
India
Apr 77
0.9
12.2
19.7
South Korea
Jun 77
8.3
22.8
14.7
22.8
Iron
Jun 77
-4.5
28.8
26.5
Mexico
May 77
1:9
5.9
2.4
27.1
South Korea
Jul 77
1.9
31.6
39.6
Nigeria
76 IV
0.2
11.3
9.0
0.7
Mexico
Jun 76
-0.3
17.0
16.6
Taiwan
Jul 77
-2.0
14.2
8.9
12.7
Nigeria
Feb 77
5.9
35.9
54.8
Taiwan
May 77
0.6
24.1
21.0
Seasonally adjusted.
' Average for latest 3 months compared with average for previous 3 months.
Thailand
May 77
1.5
13.5
13.0
' Seasonally adjusted.
'Average for latest
3 months compared with average for previous 3 months.
CONSUME
R PRICES
WHOLESALE PRICES
Average
Annual Growth Rate Since
Average
Percent Change
Annual Growth Rate Since
Latest
from Previous
1 Year
Percent Change
Month
Month
1970
Earlier
Latest
from Previous
1 Year
Month
Month
1970
Earlier
Brazil
May 77
3.5
26.9
44.4
Brazil
Aug 77
0.9
27.2
37.0
India
Apr 77
0.3
8.1
8.3
India
May 77
2.0
9.5
10.2
Iran
Jun 77
1.6
12.5
29.9
Iran
Jun 77
0.1
10.9
21.6
South Korea
Aug 77
1.3
14.6
9.7
South Korea
Aug 77
0.7
16.3
9.2
Mexico
Jul 77
1.1
14.7
32.9
Mexico
Jul 77
0.7
16.4
48.2
Nigera
Mar 77
3.4
14.9
13.6
Taiwan
Jul 77
0
9.1
4.1
Taiwan
Jul 77
0.4
10.6
7.2
Thailand
Jul 77
1.0
10.1
7.1
Thailand
Jul 77
0.4
8.6
9.4
EXPORT PRICES
OFFICIAL RES
ERVES
US $
Million US $
Latest Month
Average
1 Year
3 Months
Annual Growth Rate Since
End of
Million US $ Jun 1970
Earlier
Earlier
Percent Change
_
Latest
from Previous
1 Year
3 Months
Brazil
Feb 77
5,873 1,013
3,667
5,139
Period
Period
1970
Earlier
Earlier
Egypt
Apr 77
405 155
375
389
Brazil
Mar 77
4.5
16.5
35.4
-34.4
India
Jun 77
4,559 1,006
2,449
3,747
India
Nov 76
-2.1
9.4
10.5
-4.0
Iran
Jul 77
11,592 208
8,426
10,548
Iran
Jun 77
0
36.0
18.9
0
South Korea
Jul 77
3,656 602
2,128
3,247
South Korea
77 I
1.7
8.8
11.9
6.9
Mexico
Mar 76
1,501 695
1,479
1,533
Nigeria
May 76
-0.1
33.2
8.2
6.6
Nigeria
Jun 77
4,663 148
5,885
4,931
Taiwan
May 77
0.4
12.3
9.4
14.7
Taiwan
Jun 77
1,411 531
1,394
1,349
Thailand
Dec 76
2.0
13.3
13.1
77.7
Thailand
Jul 77
2,017 978
1,929
2,006
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 Approved For Release 2002/02/01 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300020001-8
Latest 3 Months
Percent Change from
Jun 77 Exports
190.5
37.3
6,199
4,410
40.6%
Jun 77 Imports
47.0
-0.4
5,963
5,938
0.4%
Jun 77 Balance
236
- 1,528
1,764
76 IV Exports
-9.0
-33.3
NA
NA
NA
76 IV Imports
76 IV Balance
177.6
15.7
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Apr 77 Exports
109.3
13.0
1,890
1,670
13.2%
Apr 77 Imports
-56.3
5.6
1,456
1,434
1.5%
Apr 77 Balance
434
236
198
Iran
Jun 77 Exports
-4.4
4.2
11,984
10,968
9.3%
May 77 Imports
143.6
6.8
5,268
5,050
4.3%
May 77 Balance
4,845
3,926
919
South Korea
Jun 77 Exports
107.4
23.8
4,518
3,414
32.3%
Jun 77 Imports
158.0
31.7
4,692
3,625
29.4%
Jun 77 Balance
-174
-211
37
Mexico
Jun 77 Exports
17.1
25.3
2,162
1,661
30.2%
Jun 77 Imports
73.5
-21.5
2,340
2,971
-21.2%
Jun 77 Balance
-178
-1,310
1,132
Nigeria
May 77 Exports
17.1
24.5
1,965
1,570
25.2%
Dec 76 Imports
Dec 76 Balance
73.5
8.4
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Taiwan
Jul 77 Exports
207.0
22.1
5,078
4,458
13.9%
Jul 77 Imports
92.6
16.8
4,441
3,924
13.2%
Jul 77 Balance
637
534
103
Thailand
Apr 77 Exports
34.3
22.9
1,221
963
26.8%
Mar 77 Imports
30.1
22.7
940
766
22.7%
Mar 77 Balance
- 22
- 39
17
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AGRICULTURAL PRICES MONTHLY AVERAGE CASH PRICE
WHEAT CORN
SUGAR
$ PER METRIC TON 75 C PER POUND
1-26 OCT II
SOYBEANS
15 $ PER BUSHEL
1-26 OCT
$ PER METRIC TON
1-26 OCT I I ^
COFFEE/TEA
400 C PER POUND
2,000
TEA
London Auction
17 OCT
100.0
10 OCT
96.9
300
SEP 77
89.6
1,500
OCT 76
76.0
26 OCT 0.4901
19 OCT 0.5027 150
SEP 77 0.4963 500
OCT 76 0.7827 100
1-26 OCT I
26 OCT 1.96
19 OCT 1.88
SEP 77 1.84
OCT 76 2.51
1-26 OCT ii
COFFEE
Milds Washed, New York
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 Approved For Release 2002/02/01 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300020001-8
37.5 $. PER HUNDRED WEIGHT
No. 2 Medium Grain, 4% Brokens,
f.o.b. mills, Houston, Tex.
17 OCT 16.50
$ PER METRIC TON 400
26 OCT
142.00
350
19 OCT
135.00
SEP 77
143.50
300
OCT 76
171.48
CPYRGHT
325 C PER POUND
Bahia, New York price
225 '
1.17 OCT I I
T Percent UUIK, r.o.D. uecatur
80 1973
1.26 OCT 11 100
1976 1977
SOYBEAN OIL/PALM OIL
$ PER METRIC TON $ PER POUND
7,000 0.5
19 AUG 213.50
12 AUG 225.00
AUG 77 222.22
OCT 76 132.54
FOOD INDEX
500
1-19 AUG 1,000
11
1977
SOYBEAN OIL
Crude, Tank Cars, f.o.b. Decatur
26 OCT 0.1887
19 OCT 0.1823
SEP 77 0.1917
OCT 76 0.2068
26 OCT 0.200
19 OCT 0.200
SEP 77 0.216
OCT 76 0.194
1-26 OCT I
NOTE: The food index is compiled by the Economist for 16 food commodities
which enter international trade. Commodities are weighted by
3-year moving averages of imports into industrialized countries.
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_6,000 0.4 -
 Approved For Release 2002/02/01 : CIA-RDP79B00457A000300020001-8
INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS PRICES MONTHLY AVERAGE CASH PRICE
80
$ PER METRIC TON LEAD
C PER POUND
26 OCT
54.2
60
6
.
26 OCT
28.3
31.C
19 OCT
55.2
60.6
19 OCT
27.9
31.1
SEP 77
54.3
60.6
3
OCT 76
73
.2,500
SEP 77
26.3
31.0
'
800
58.5
.0
35
OCT 76
21.0
25.I
55.0
1-26 OCT i I 1,000
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 10
1-26 OCTI
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
LME US 14,000
1-26 OCT I I '
0 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 0 150
125
100
24 OCT 50.0
19 OCT 50.3
SEP 77 59.6
OCT 76 64.8
$ PER METRIC TON150
1-26 OCTj
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
1-24 OCT I
0
1973 1974 1975 1976 1!977 100
1-26 OCT I.I
1973 1974 1975 1976 - 1977
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CPYRGHT
ALUMINUM
Major US Producer
d per pound
53.00
51.00
48.00
41.00
US STEEL
Composite
$ per long ton
359.36
339.27
327.00
303.85
IRON ORE
Non-Bessemer Old Range
$ per long ton
21.43
21.43
20.51
18.75
CHROME ORE
Russian, Metallurgical Grade
$ per metric ton
150.00
150.00
150.00
150.00
CHROME ORE
S. Africa, Chemical Grade
$ per long ton
58.50
58.50
42.00
44.50
FERROCHROME
US Producer, 66 -70 Percent
E per pound
41.00
43.00
44.00
53.50
NICKEL
Composite US Producer
$ per pound
2.16
2.35
2.41
2.20
MANGANESE ORE
48 Percent Mn
$ per long ton
72.24
72.00
72.00
67.20
TUNGSTEN ORE
65 Percent W03
$ per short ton
10,112.96
10,628.47
7,640.84
5,101.29
MERCURY
NY
$ per 76 pound flask
140.00
166.15
132,45
132.00
SILVER
LME Cash
E per troy ounce
481.92
479.23
421.55
433.80
GOLD
London Afternoon Fixing Price $ per troy ounce
160.68
149.17
116.12
142.76
RUBBER
60 C PER POUND
LUMBER INDEX6
160
1Approximates world market price frequently used by major
world producers and traders, although only small quantities of
these metals are actually traded on the LME.
2Producers' price, covers most primary metals sold In the US.
3As of 1 Dec 75, US tin price quoted is "Tin NY lb composite."
4Quoted on New York market.
5S-type styrene, US export price.
6This index is compiled by using the average of 13 types of lumber whose
prices are regarded as "bell wethers" of US lumber construction costs.
7Composite price for Chicago, Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh.
NOTE: The industrial materials index is compiled by the Economist for 19 raw
materials which enter International trade. Commodities are weighted by
3-year moving averages of imports into industrialized countries.
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