SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R002200020011-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 100
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2003
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: January 1, 1960
• Content Type: DISP

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THE TRIAL OF THE
IF. EXCLUSIVE AUTHORIZED ACCOUNT
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THE TRIAL OF THE
EXCLUSIVE AUTHORIZED ACCOUNT
OF THE COURT PROCEEDINGS
OF THE CASE OF
FRANCIS GARY POWERS
HEARD BEFORE THE
MILITARY DIVISION OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S.S.R.
MOSCOW
AUGUST 17, 18, 19, 1960
introductory comment by
HAROLD J. BERMAN
TRANSLATION WORLD PUBLISHERS
CHICAGO 1960
i'A
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Copyright, ? 1960 by TRANSLATION WORLD PUBLISHERS
Introduction, Copyright, ?, 1960 by Harold J.
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED,
including the right to reproduce this book or portions thereof in any
Photos: TASS, Moscow, U.S.S.R.
Printed in the United States of America
First Edition: September, 1960
Published by
TRANSLATION WORLD PUBLISHERS
Suite 900, 22 West Madison Street. Chicago 2, Illinois, U.S.A.
INTRODUCTION
By Harold J. Berman*
1.
This book contains the official record of the trial of an American
airplane pilot, Francis Gary Powers, for espionage, in the Military
Division of the Supreme Court of the USSR on August 17-19, 1960.
The record was released, in English translation, by the Soviet Gov-
ernment. This is, then, the official story of the trial, containing,
in full, the indictment, the testimony presented in court, the closing
speeches of the prosecutor and the defense counsel, the "last word"
of the accused, and the verdict of the court. The book also contains
some pictures taken during the course of the proceedings by the
Soviet news agency TASS.
Writing only two weeks after the close of the trial, one can hardly
hope to put it in proper historical perspective. That it has generated
an intense interest is apparent from the enormous publicity given
to it in the press and radio of virtually all countries. Yet its signifi-
cance is by no means clear. Perhaps, like the Czech trial of the
American journalist William Oatis in 1951, it soon will be recorded
as an almost forgotten episode in the "cold war." Yet there are ele-
ments in this case which seem to give it a more lasting importance.
It dramatizes some of the most acute problems of international
relations in our time.
Powers presented himself as a very unconventional spy. Accord-
ing to his testimony at the trial, he had volunteered for the United
States Air Force shortly after graduating from a small mid-western
college, and he had contemplated becoming a commercial air pilot
after his term of enlistment was over, but found he would be "too
old and not acceptable" for that. Approached by the Central In-
telligence Agency in 1956, at the age of 27, he took a "civilian" job
requiring him to make high altitude flights along the Soviet border
for the purpose of collecting radar or radio information, at a salary
of $2500 a month. This, he said, was approximately the same salary
as a first pilot or captain of an airliner, and he "felt very lucky to
get such a job." He was trained to fly a Lockheed U-2-a small,
light, unarmed plane designed for altitudes of 60,000 to 68,000 feet
-and to "turn levers on and off over specified places." He knew
that equipment was installed on the plane for purposes of photo-
graphing objects on the ground and recording radar signals, he
testified, but he had never seen the equipment. "We were allowed to
know only what was necessary for our work." He was just a pilot.
When he was assigned the job of flying across the Soviet Union
from Pakistan to Norway, he was "scared," but he could not refuse
to do it because, as he put it, "By refusing I would have been con-
sidered a coward by my associates and it would have been a non-
fulfillment of my contract [with the C.I.A.]." His fears were some-
*Professor of Law? Harvard University; author of Justice in Russia: An
Interpretation of Soviet Law (1950), The Russians in Focus (1953), Soviet
Military Law and Administration (with Miroslav Kerner, 1955), and other
books, as well as numerous articles including "Soviet Law Reform-Dateline
Moscow 1957," Yale Law Journal, 1957, vol. 66, p. 1161, and "The Comparison
of Soviet and American Law," Indiana Law Journal, 1959, vol. 34, p. 563.
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Introduction Introduction
what calmed by the assurance of his Colonel that Soviet rockets has certainly abided by this accepted international standard! It has
could not reach him at 60,000 feet. When in fact he was forced down never given the slightest official indication that it even knows of
over Sverdlovsk, he apparently was willing to tell his Soviet cap- the existence of Rudolph Abel. When asked by American corre-
tors all he knew-which apparently was not much-about the in- spondents, in connection with the U-2 incident, whether it is not
telligence activities in which he was engaged. true that Soviet spies are active in various countries, Soviet Foreign
This, then, was no Rudolph Ivanovich Abel, Colonel of the Soviet Minister Andrei Gromyko replied that the Soviet Government does
K.G.B. (Committee on State Security), who was convicted of not engage in such activities. According to international practice
espionage by a federal district court in New York in 1957 and he "cannot" say otherwise.
sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment. Abel was charged with having Nevertheless on May 9, 1960, with specific references to the U-2
for eight years headed a spy ring in the United States for the pur- flight by Francis Powers over Soviet territory, Secretary of State
pose of collecting and transmitting to the Soviet Government infor- Christian Herter stated :
mation relating to arms, equipment and disposition of United States "In accordance with the National Security Act of 1947, the
Armed Forces and to the atomic energy program of the United President has put into effect since the beginning of his Ad-
States. Though grilled ceaselessly by the F.B.I. for five days with- ministration directives to gather by every possible means
out sleep, and then daily for three weeks, Abel gave no information the information required to protect the United States and
concerning his activities as a Soviet agent. He pleaded not guilty, the Free World against surprise attack and to enable them
did not take the stand to testify, and has never admitted that he i to make effective preparations for their defense. Under
was a spy. these directives programs have been developed and put into
Powers, on the other hand, pleaded guilty, took the stand, de- operation which have included extensive aerial surveillance
scribed his activities in detail, and admitted that he was a spy. He by unarmed civilian aircraft, normally of a peripheral char-
gives the impression simply of one of thousands of ordinary citizens acter but on occasion by penetration."
who happen to work for C.I.A.-a technician, a pilot, but hardly a Thus the United States officially admitted that it had commissioned
spy! It is perhaps the fact that the image of Francis Gary Powers Pilot Powers to fly a civilian unarmed aircraft over Soviet territory
seems no different from any other airplane pilot who might have for the purpose of obtaining clandestinely information in regard to
been born in Burdine, Kentucky, 31 years ago (his 31st birthday Soviet military secrets.
fell on the opening day of the trial), which gives the case a certain This admission did not come easily. It was wrung from the State
initial significance. What is espionage? Is it evil? Is this the kind of Department by a Soviet maneuver. On May 5, 1960, Nikita Khrush-
person against whose activities espionage laws are passed? Are our chev, Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Soviet
concepts of espionage suited to a "space age"? Union and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, made
If Powers behaved unconventionally for a spy, the United States a long speech to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, toward the end
Government behaved even more unconventionally for a government of which he announced that on May 1st an American plane flew
charged with having commissioned a spy. It admitted that it had! into Soviet territory and was shot down. He stated that he would
"Spies," states a leading treatise on international law bring the matter before the Security Council of the United Nations,
(Oppenheim's International Law, 8th ed., 1955, vol. 1, p. "in order to put an end to aggressive acts by the United States." He
862), " are secret agents of a State sent abroad for the pur- denounced the flight at length but gave no further details of it and
pose of obtaining clandestinely information in regard to did not mention that the pilot of the plane had been taken alive.
military or political secrets. Although all States constantly On the same day, May 5th, a State Department spokesman,
or occasionally send spies abroad, and although it is not referring to Mr. Khrushchev's announcement, told the press that
considered wrong morally, politically, or legally to do so, the Department had been informed by the National Aeronautics and
such agents have, of course, no recognised position what- Space Administration that
ever according to International Law, since they are not "an unarmed plane, a U-2 weather research plane based at
official agents of States for the purpose of international re- Adana, Turkey, piloted by a civilian had been missing since
lations. Every State punishes them severely if they are May 1.... It is entirely possible that having a failure in
caught committing an act which is a crime by the law of oxygen equipment, which could result in the pilot losing
the land, or expels them if they cannot be punished. A spy consciousness, the plane continued on automatic pilot for
cannot legally excuse himself by pleading that he only a considerable distance and accidentally violated Soviet air-
executed the orders of his Government, and the latter will space. The United States is taking this matter up with the
never interfere, since it cannot officially confess to having Soviet Government, with particular reference to the fate
commissioned a spy." of the pilot."
Such is the black-letter rule : a government "cannot" officially At the same time the NASA released a statement describing in
confess to having commissioned a spy. The Soviet Govarn t ee~~ 11 e nl ,~r~f 1, o difficulties with his
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sued such a policy for purely defensive purposes. What it
emphatically does deny is that this policy has any agres-
sive intent, or that the unarmed U-2 flight of May 1 was
undertaken in an effort to prejudice the success of the
forthcoming meeting of the Heads of Government in
Paris ..."
The summit conference nevertheless broke up because of the
hostility created by the U-2 incident and the treatment of it by both
sides. Speculation that the Soviet Government would have found
other causes to break it up is beside the point; there was no need to
find other causes. At the first meeting of the four leaders, Mr.
Khrushchev read a statement about the U-2 flight, terming it
"provocative" and "aggressive," and stating that agreement could
not be sought among the four states
"when the Government of one of the great powers declares
bluntly that its policy is intrusion into the territory of
another great power with espionage and sabotage purposes.
. It is clear that the declaration of such a policy, which can
be pursued only when states are in a state of war, dooms
the summit conference to complete failure in advance."
The only thing that could save the summit conference, Mr. Khrush-
chev stated, would be a condemnation by the United States Govern-
ment of the provocative actions of the United States Air Force, a
pledge to refrain from such actions in the future, and a calling to
strict account of those directly responsible for the violation of the
borders of the USSR by American aircraft.
"It stands to reason," he said, "that if the United States
Government were to declare in the future the United States
will not violate the state borders of the USSR with its air-
craft, that it deplores the provocative actions undertaken
in the past and will punish those directly guilty of such
actions, which would assure the Soviet Union equal con-
ditions with other powers, I, as head of the Soviet Govern-
ment, would be ready to participate in the conference and
exert all efforts to contribute to its success."
Mr. Eisenhower, in reply, said that in previous statements
"... the position of the United States was made clear with
respect to the distasteful necessity of espionage activities
in a world where nations distrust each other's intentions."
He reaffirmed that "these activities had no aggressive in-
tent but rather were to assure the safety of the United
States and the free world against surprise attack by a
power which boasts of its ability to devastate the United
States and other countries by missiles armed with atomic
warheads."
He added that the Soviet statement contains
"an evident misapprehension on one key point. It alleges
that the United States has, through official statements,
threatened continued overflights.... The United States has
made no such threat. Neither I nor my Government has in-
tended any. The actual statements go no further than to
say that the United States will not shirk its responsibility
to safeguard against surprise attack. In point of fact, these
flights were suspended after the recent incident and are
not to be resumed."'
Mr. Khrushchev was not satisfied with a "suspension" of the
flights. When he asked Mr. Eisenhower whether he meant a "tempo-
rary suspension," the President replied to the effect that the flights
were suspended "indefinitely" but that he could not bind his suc-
cessor in the White House. Mr. Khrushchev took this to mean a sus-
pension until January, 1961.
We cannot understand the significance of the Powers trial unless
we realize what lay behind Mr. Khrushchev's demand for a pledge
that the United States would not undertake such flights in the fu-
ture, a statement "deploring" the violation of Soviet territory in
the past, and a declaration that the person directly responsible
would be punished.
It is perfectly clear that the source of Mr. Khrushchev's unwill-
ingness to participate in the summit conference was not the fact
that a U-2 plane had flown over Soviet territory taking pictures of
military objects. He had undoubtedly been angry when such flights
were initiated in 1956, but he then kept his anger to himself and
did not announce that he knew of the flights. Only when he could
simultaneously annouce that Soviet rocketry had developed to the
point that the U-2 could be brought down at 68,000 feet was he
willing to divulge that for four years he had been smarting under
these flights ; for in revealing his past weakness, he could at the
same time condemn American violations of international law and
secure a certain humiliation of the United States Government
(somewhat compensated, however, by a certain pride in American
technological superiority which had permitted the flights to go on
without interference for four years). What Mr. Khrushchev
wanted, then, was an apology-a statement of regret, a pledge of
discontinuance, and a promise to call to account those responsible.
The almost universal American reaction to this demand was that
it was absurd. The President of the United States, it was said,
could obviously never submit to such a self-abasement. Mr. Khrush-
chev must know that. Therefore the demand could not be serious.
Mr. Khrushchev, as a "realist," could not let the summit meeting
stand or fall on a mere ceremony.
The American reaction was based in part on ignorance of inter-
national law and international custom, and in part on ignorance
of, or indifference to, Soviet internal politics. In the first place, it
was said by many that espionage is not considered to be a violation
of international law, since it is practiced by virtually all states ;
but it was not added that this is so only because the state which
commissions the spy "cannot officially confess" to having done so.
The admission of espionage removes the veil of international
A record of most of the statements concerning the U-2 incident referred to here
may be found in Events Incident to the Summit Conference, Hearings Before
the [Fulbright] Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, 86th Congress,
2nd Session, May 27, June 1, 2, 1960.
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Introduction
viii
legality. (There is no question that espionage is illegal under the
domestic laws of all countries ; the only question is as to the re-
sponsibility of one state, under international law, for violating the
espionage laws of another.)
In the second place, many failed to recognize that an intrusion
into Soviet airspace at a flight of 12 miles is clearly a violation of
international law, regardless of what may ultimately be decided con-
cerning outer space. Several international conventions (for example,
the 1944 Chicago convention on International Civil Aviation, to
which the United States is a signatory) have stated that each state
exercises sovereignty over the airspace above its territory. Prob-
ably most jurists would agree that such sovereignty does not extend
upward indefinitely, but none would exclude the airspace within
which airplanes carrying bombs can fly ! Indeed aerial incursion is a
far more serious threat to international stability than espionage on
the ground for it may be mistaken for an air-raid and could con-
ceivably lead to violent retaliation.
But the chief error in the general American reaction was the
failure to recognize that it is entirely customary in international
relations, and is indeed a principle of international law, that a
state which commits a violation of international law is required
formally to apologize and to declare that it will take appropriate
measures to call to account the persons responsible. In numerous
instances such apologies have been demanded and granted. The
United States insisted upon such a declaration from Japan in 1937,
when Japanese aircraft bombed for three hours and finally sank the
United States gunboat Panay and three American vessels in the
course of the hostilities in China; Japan expressed her profound
regret at the incident, presented sincere apologies, promised in-
demnification for all losses, and undertook to "deal appropriately"
with those responsible for the incident. The International Court of
Justice has on occasion required one government to apologize to
another for a violation of international law. The international law
books say that whenever there is an international delinquency, "at
least a formal apology on the part of the delinquent will in every
case be necessary" (Oppenheim, id., p. 354).
The very reason which made it seem impossible for the State
Department to issue a formal statement of apology to the Soviet
Government-namely, loss of "face"-made it seem necessary to
Mr. Khrushchev to obtain such an apology, for without an apology
the flight must be justified, and any justification is a public humilia-
tion of the Soviet Government. We could justify the flight on the
ion is a "closed society" planning a "sur-
i
t U
h
S
n
ov
e
e
ground that t
prise attack"-or we could issue a formal apology : "The United
States Department of State regrets ...
At first blush all this seems extremely childish. Why should in-
ternational law require an apology when everyone understands that
the government required to make the apology is not sorry? Or why
should a government feel insulted when another government merely
states what it honestly thinks? Or, to put the question in still more
crucial terms, why should a government resent a charge made by
another government when everyone knows that the charge is true?
The answer is: the charge itself, the insult, the refusal to apologize,
is a denial of the equal rights of the other government; it establishes
a double standard ; it denies the universal application of the prin-
ciple. A tongue-in-cheek apology pays lip-service to the principle-
in this case the principle of territorial sovereignty ; a refusal to
apologize adds insult to injury, and declares that we recognize the
principle of territorial sovereignty in the case of some countries
but not in the case of the Soviet Union.
The requirement of an apology in international law has no analogy
in our domestic law. But in domestic law it is easy enough for the
aggrieved party to get satisfaction through a lawsuit. If my enemy
trespasses on my property I can go to court and get damages-
possibly even punitive damages-and an injunction. If a hostile
plane intrudes over a country's territory and is shot down, however,
there is no easily available judicial remedy against the offending
government. Suit can be brought in the International Court of
Justice, but many countries (including both the United States and
the Soviet Union) do not accept the compulsory jurisdiction of that
court in all cases. Moreover, diplomacy requires a more speedy re-
sponse.
An apology was especially necessary for Mr. Khrushchev in view
of what he stands for in Soviet politics. He had staked a great deal
on personal diplomacy, on his position as personal representative of
the Soviet Union in world councils, on his friendship with President
Eisenhower; also he had staked a great deal on his version of the
Leninist doctrine of "peaceful co-existence"-namely, that the Soviet
Union can participate on a normal basis in international relations
generally, and that the strengthening of the legal framework of
international relations, the development of increased stability in the
world, will enable the USSR to devote more of its resources to econ-
omic development and thus to forge ahead of the United States. In
his defense of the U-2 flight, the President had betrayed his "friend"
by espousing different standards of international law for "open"
and "closed" societies. The distinction would permit us to send over
Soviet territory not only reconnaissance planes but planes "armed
with lethal weapons" (as Gromyko put it).
Moreover, Mr. Khrushchev has stood for increased rationality
and legality in the Soviet internal social, economic and political
order, always subject to the control, of course, of his own efferves-
cent, impatient, ingenious and sometimes ruthless personality. The
substantial increase in legal security of Soviet citizens since Stalin's
death in 1953, especially in the very broad realm of political speech,
has always been understood to depend in part upon the security of
Soviet international relations. When the United States asserted its
right of espionage and aerial intrusion, there was bound to be a
certain tightening of controls at home. Stalin's myth that the Soviet
Union is infested with capitalist spies seemed to take on an aura of
reality. Thus our government's statements challenged not only Mr.
Khrushchev's foreign policy, but also his domestic policy.
It also challenged his personal position of leadership in the Soviet
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Intro uctzon
Union and in the Communist world. Undoubtedly there are many
Russians, as well as many Chinese, Czechs and others, who consider
Mr. Khrushchev's foreign policy to be based on wishful thinking.
In the Communist world, as in the West, negotiation seems to many
to smack of softness. The very fact that an American U-2 plane was
flying over Soviet territory discredited Mr. Khrushchev in the eyes
of such people. An apology from the United States Government was
needed to restore his prestige, to provide a symbol of the success of
his diplomacy. The refusal to apologize, coupled with the public
characterization of the Soviet Union as in effect an outlaw, bound m
the ordinary rules of international law do not apply, was
undermine his position at home-unless he was able to return blow
for blow.
Thus it was not the U-2 flight itself but rather the failure of the
United States Government to make the proper accepted ceremonial
expressions of regret which caused Mr. Khrushchev to refuse to
participate in the summit conference, to withdraw his invitation to
Mr. Eisenhower to visit the USSR, and thereafter to denounce the
President in a series of press conferences and speeches. Eventually,
the expression of regret and repentance which Mr. Khrushchev
could not wring out of the United States Government were wrung by
the Military Division of the Supreme Court of the USSR out of
Francis Gary Powers.
Finally, the Soviet Government wanted to have the United States
policy of aerial reconnaissance over Soviet territory denounced as an
act of aggression. Here its motive was not only to discredit the
United States but also to bring pressure to bear upon various coun-
tries surrounding the Soviet Union to withdraw their permission for
United States air bases to be located on their territory. On May 13th
the Soviet Government issued notes of protest to Turkey, Pakistan
and Norway for placing their territory at the disposal of foreign
military aircraft to prepare for and carry out penetration of Soviet
territory. (Powers had informed his captors that his plane had been
based in Adana, Turkey, had taken off from Peshawar, Pakistan,
and was preparing to land ultimately in Bodoe, Norway.) In each
protest it was stated that should such acts of provocation be re-
peated, the Soviet Government warns that it will be forced to take
appropriate retaliatory measures. Ultimately it was announced that
the Soviet Government would send missiles against the bases in
order to stop such incursions should they recur.
After the collapse of the summit conference, the Soviet Govern-
ment called for a special session of the Security Council of the
United Nations to consider the Soviet charge that the Powers flight
was an "aggressive act" on the part of the United States. After a
lengthy debate in the Security Council from May 23 to May 27, the
Soviet charge was rejected by a vote of 7 to 2. The incursion of a
single unarmed plane for espionage purposes hardly seemed to the
majority to warrant denunciation as "aggression" under the U.N.
Charter. However, the governments of Turkey, Pakistan and Norway
all submitted notes to the Soviet Government, stating that they
had no knowledge that such flights were being made from the United
States bases on their territory and that they would take all possible
steps to prevent their territory from being used for such purposes.
H.
It was on the background of these events, and of a general deteri-
oration of the international situation which followed them - in
Japan, in Cuba, in the Congo, and in American-Russian relations
generally - that the Powers trial took place. In one sense it was an
anti-climax, for it could only add details and sidelights to what had
already been revealed concerning the facts of the U-2 flight. In an-
other sense, however, it offered a dramatic review of the events
which preceded it, chiefly through the mouth of the man who was
immediately responsible. Moreover, it gave the Soviet Government
the opportunity to present those events in the most favorable pos-
sible light from its point of view.
It was clear from the start that not only Francis Gary Powers but
also the United States Government was on trial. The indictment
charged that Powers' flight was "an expression of the aggressive
policy pursued by the Government of the United States." Indeed,
one of the principal themes not only of the indictment but also of
the trial and the verdict, as well as of the extraordinary publicity
given to the case by the Soviet Government, was the condemnation
of aerial reconnaissance by the United States as a violation of inter-
national law and an act of aggression. Thus the United States Gov-
ernment was, in a sense, a co-defendant, although it was not named
as such in the indictment, did not testify, and was not represented
by counsel.
In addition, the Soviet legal system was itself on trial in the
Powers case. The notorious abuses of legal procedures by the Soviet
leadership in the past, and especially the extortion of false confes-
sions and of abject self-denunciations from prominent political
figures tried for "counter-revolutionary crimes" in the late 1930's,
had led to a widespread belief that any Soviet court proceeding is
bound to be a sham and a mere propaganda stunt. It was predicted
by many American commentators that Powers would be "brain-
washed" and that he would not receive a fair trial. Essays were
published in leading newspapers and magazines in the West which
stated that under Soviet law the accused in a criminal case is at the
mercy of the prosecution, that there is no presumption of innocence,
that the indictment is tantamount to a conviction, that the accused
has no right to counsel, that if defense counsel is permitted he is
merely an agent of the state and in effect an assistant to the prose-
cutor, and that the judges receive their instructions from the Com-
munist Party. In support of these propositions, reference was made
to Lenin's statement that "law is politics," and to the accepted
Soviet definition of law as an expression of the will of the dominant
class. Thus it was widely concluded that Powers would simply be
used as a whipping-boy in order to publicize Soviet attacks upon
United States policies.
These views reflect a basic misconception of the nature of the
Soviet legal system. The record of the Powers trial shows that it
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xii Introduction Introduction xiii
was indeed used in order to publicize Soviet attacks upon United
States policies. Not only the Soviet Government and the Soviet press,
but the judges, the prosecutor and even the defense counsel made
little effort to conceal the fact that they were using the trial as a
means of promoting Soviet political objectives. At the same time
it was a fair trial, in the sense that Powers did not appear to be
"brainwashed" (whatever that means), his lawyer defended him as
rigorously as was possible under the circumstances, the trial pro-
cedure (though different from our own) preserved most (though not
all) of the basic principles of procedural justice, the prosecution was
required to prove its case, and the sentence appears to have been a
proper one. This combination of the legal and political elements in
the case is one of its most striking features, and a source of great
confusion to Western observers.
A more detailed analysis of some of the strengths and weaknesses
of Soviet criminal procedure, as reflected in the Powers trial, is
presented below. The point stressed here is that the Soviet legal
system, at its best, seeks to preserve the rights of the accused in crim-
inal cases and to mete out impartial justice, while at the same time it
consciously and explicitly uses the trial, and indeed the very safe-
guards of justice themselves, as instruments of the social and polit-
ical objectives of the state. For example, the requirement of Soviet
law (as of other Continental European legal systems) that even
when the accused admits his guilt there must be a trial in which the
prosecution proves its case-a requirement which is humane in
that it helps to guard the accused against the consequences of a
false confession-may serve (and did in the Powers case) as a
means of extracting the maximum political value from the trial.
Similarly, the fact that the indictment (in contrast with Anglo-
American practice) is a long report by the investigator describing
all the evidence which supports the charges, affords protection to
the accused since it acquaints him in advance with the prosecution's
case, but at the same time it can be, and is supposed to be, used con-
sciously as an educational instrument and a means of influencing
political thought.
Thus Soviet law and Soviet politics are directly related to each
other not only in the political sense but also in the legal sense; that
is, the law itself recognizes the relevance of the political, or educa-
tional, factor in judicial proceedings. A Soviet trial is supposed to
be correct, impartial, just, reasonable, and at the same time it is
supposed to serve as an object-lesson to society, a means of teaching
the participants, the spectators and the public generally to be loyal,
obedient, disciplined fighters for Communist ideals. Law is law, and
yet it is intended to serve political ends ; it is permeated with con-
scious political purposes, and yet it is not supposed to be abused.
The result is not the crude melodrama of the Soviet purge trials
of the 1930's. The result, at least the intended result, is correct pro-
cedure, a proper sentence-and a political victory. Nevertheless, the
tension between the demands of justice and the demands of politics
can never be entirely eliminated. The fate of the accused is bound to be
individual facts and deliberately made an object-lesson to the public.
The conscious and explicit use of the drama of criminal procedure
to educate, train, discipline and mold the minds of the participants,
the spectators, and the public generally, while at the same time and
for the same purpose preserving the traditional legal safeguards of
justice, is a principal key not only to an understanding of the Powers
case but also to an understanding of Soviet law in general.
Can such a combination of political and legal elements satisfy the
requirements of justice? It is the Soviet thesis that there is no
fundamental conflict between the individual and the collective. Social
policy, properly understood, can never conflict with justice in the
individual case. The Powers case tests that thesis. Was it unfair
to Powers to make his trial a "demonstration trial," as Soviet writers
term those occasional trials to which various segments of the pop-
ulation are especially invited to be taught an important lesson of a
social or political nature? More particularly, was it unfair to Powers
to use the trial as a forum for proving the Soviet charges against
the United States Government?
Before an answer to that question is attempted, it should be noted
that, whether or not it was unfair to Powers, it was unfair to the
United States Government. The United States was charged with a
variety of offenses : aggression in conducting aerial reconnaissance
over Soviet territory, deceit in failing to acknowledge Soviet charges
until the evidence of them was overwhelming, violation of interna-
tional law in conducting aerial incursions into Soviet airspace, viola-
tion of international law in conducting espionage activities against
the Soviet Union, violation of international law in failing to apologize
for these violations of international law. In addition, it was implied
that the United States violated international law in sending the U-2
plane over Afghanistan without permission, and possibly in using
Turkish, Pakistani and Norwegian bases for purposes to which
those countries had not consented. All these charges were made
either expressly or by implication in the indictment. Evidence sup-
porting them was introduced at the trial, chiefly by questions put to
Powers by the prosecutor. The charges were reiterated and sup-
ported at length and in Vyshinskian style in the closing speech of
the prosecution. They were not denied by Powers and were in fact
supported by his defense counsel. The court, in its final opinion, ac-
cepted them as proved. However, the "conviction" of the United
States Government by the Military Division of the Supreme Court
of the USSR involved a serious procedural flaw: the "co-defendant"
was tried in absentia and without representation or defense.
Was it prejudicial to the defendant that these charges were
made against his government? Was it prejudicial to him that the
trial took place in a special hall with over 2,000 spectators, that it
was televised, that prominent representatives of many organiza-
tions in various countries were invited to attend, that simultaneous
oral translations of the proceedings into English, French, German
and Spanish were provided, and that detailed and often one-sided
reports of the case in various languages were distributed to the
influenced in one way or another when the trial is lifted above its press before, during and after the trial? The excessive denuncia-
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xv
tion of the United States Government and the excessive publicity
given to the proceedings in the courtroom would probably have been
grounds for reversing a conviction under American law; it would
not be necessary to show that they in fact prejudiced the defendant's
case in any particular way-they would have been considered im-
proper as such, and a denial of his Constitutional right not to be
deprived of his liberty without due process of law. (Indeed, in
England one-sided press comment in advance of or during a trial
is not permitted, on the ground that public opinion should not be
allowed to sway the course of the trial even indirectly.) But this
only begs the question, for it is the Soviet view that it is not neces-
sarily a denial of the rights of the accused to introduce these po-
litical elements into a criminal case.
In some respects the charges made against the United States
Government were relevant and material to the Powers case. It was
entirely relevant that the State Department and the President had
confirmed the fact that Powers had been sent over Soviet territory
in a Lockheed U-2 plane in order to procure information concerning
Soviet military installations. This was important corroborating
evidence that Powers was guilty of the crime of espionage. In addi-
tion, the responsibility of the United States Government for the
flight, and also its "criminal aggressive actions" and "monstrous
crimes directed against the peace and security of the peoples" bore on
the question of the sentence which Powers deserved, although their
significance in that respect is ambiguous. On the one hand, the fact
that Powers was carrying out instructions of his Government
could be treated as a mitigating circumstance which entitled him
to a lesser punishment than might have been meted out, for example,
to a political conspirator who was seeking to overthrow the Soviet
Government for "ideological" reasons; and indeed Powers' defense
counsel so argued, stressing that Powers was a person without
political motivation of any kind who was simply obeying the in-
structions of his superiors. On the other hand, the fact that the
policy of the United States which Powers was carrying out was,
in Soviet eyes, a vicious policy with extremely dangerous conse-
quences for the Soviet Union and for world peace, could be treated
as a circumstance which aggravated Powers' guilt and which, as the
prosecutor stressed, called for a more severe punishment. A great
deal of the testimony concerning United States policy was in fact
relevant to the question of mitigating or aggravating circumstances
-which in turn bore on the question of the sentence to be imposed.
Nevertheless the denunciation of American political leaders and
of American foreign policy went far beyond the limits of legal
relevance and legal propriety-judged, at least, by traditional West-
ern standards. The State Department's initial subterfuge in assert-
ing that the U-2 plane was engaged in weather research and only
accidentally crossed the Soviet boundary, had no bearing upon any
legal issue in the case; yet it is stressed in the indictment and in
the trial. The allegation that the United States had violated inter-
national law in conducting aerial reconnaissance over Soviet terri-
tory-though fully supported by legal authority, in this writer's
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1
opinion-is entirely out of place; yet it seems to have played an
extremely important part in the case. Indeed, Powers was asked by
the prosecutor whether he was aware that his acts were in violation
of international law, when in fact the only charge against him was
that he violated Soviet law; and great stress was placed on the evi-
dence that there were no markings on the outside of the plane which
would identify it as a United States plane, apparently in an effort
to show that international legal definitions of espionage, in which
the clandestine aspect of the activity is stressed, were satisfied-
although the openness or secrecy of the defendant's act had no bear-
ing upon his guilt under the Soviet domestic law of espionage. These
and other matters brought in to the case were only remotely re-
lated to the guilt or the sentence of Francis Gary Powers. It is pos-
sible, and perhaps even likely, that Powers did not suffer any detri-
ment because of the prosecution's excessive emphasis upon the
"malevolence" of United States "ruling circles;" indeed he may
have benefitted by the fact that the Soviet Government was
thus able to let off steam about America's responsibility for the
deterioration of the international situation. The more beastly the
United States Government appeared, the more insignificant the
individual defendant. seemed to become. The fact remains, however,
that the use of his trial as a forum for the elaborate reiteration of
charges against a foreign government was not only an abuse of the
judicial process by Western, though not by Soviet, standards, but
also might have been prejudicial-by any standards-to the accused.
M.
From a legal point of view, the case itself is an extremely simple
one. Powers was indicted under Article 2 of the Soviet Law on Crim-
inal Responsibility for Crimes Against the State, which makes it a
punishable offense for a non-citizen to gather information consti-
tuting military or state secrets for the purpose of transmitting such
information to a foreign state. This is called espionage in Soviet
law, as it would be under American law.2 Specifically, Powers was
charged with photographing Soviet secret military and industrial
installations and tape-recording Soviet radar signals while piloting
a Lockheed U-2 airplane 1200 miles across Soviet territory from
Peshawar, Pakistan, to Sverdlovsk, at an altitude of over 12 miles.
He was caught in the act; he admitted the charge; and the United
States Government released statements confirming that it had sent
Powers on the flight over Soviet territory for the purpose of aerial
reconnaissance. Thus the only legal question in dispute was the
measure of punishment, since under Soviet law espionage is punish-
able by deprivation of freedom from seven to fifteen years or by
death by shooting, and the choice of penalties within these limits is
at the discretion of the court.
Despite the simplicity of the specific legal question to be decided,
the procedure of investigation, indictment and trial presents a com-
plex picture to a person trained in, or used to, the American (or
'The Soviet and the American statutory definitions of espionage are set forth,
and citations are given, in Procurator-General Rudenko's closing speech.
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English) system of criminal procedure. To a much greater extent it
resembles the system which prevails in most Continental European
countries, although there are some important differences as well.
If United States law had been applicable, and not Soviet law, and
if an appeal could have been taken to an American court, the convic-
tion would have been reversed on the ground that the accused was
denied certain basic protections secured by the United States Con-
stitution. (Perhaps the same would be true, mutatis mutandis, in
many countries of Western Europe.) Yet it is unfair to judge Soviet
procedure by American legal standards; it can only be judged by
universal standards of justice. Only a few suggestions of such uni-
versal standards can be made in the short compass of this Introduc-
tion, and that is probably best done by a brief expression and critique
of the various principal phases of the case.
Preliminary Investigation and Indictment
In any legal system a person should not be indicted for a crime
unless the official, or the official body, charged with the responsibility
of issuing the indictment has evidence that points clearly to his
guilt. However, the procedure for gathering such evidence should
safeguard the suspect against wrongful detention and coercion of
various kinds. The Anglo-American system of preliminary investi-
gation and indictment has stressed the second of these principles.
Our historic writ of habeas corpus entitles any person who is de-
tained for any reason to appear before a court to have the legality
of his dentention determined. Similarly, a person arrested for having
committed a crime is entitled under American law to be "arraigned,"
that is, brought before a magistrate to have the charges against him
formally presented, and under federal law he is entitled to be ar-
raigned "forthwith." Upon arraignment he is entitled to have coun-
sel and at no time is he required to answer any questions that may
tend to incriminate him. Connected with the protection of the sus-
pect against detention and questioning is our system of indictment.
Whether the indictment is issued by a grand jury or whether, as in
many states, it is issued by the prosecuting attorney, it does not
purport to be the result of an impartial investigation in which the
accused has had the opportunity to furnish evidence in his own be-
half. Once the indictment is issued, the prosecution and the defense
prepare their cases independently. The indictment only states in
summary form when, where and how the accused alleged committed
the various violations of law with which he has been charged.3
,it may well be asked how, since American law guards so jealously the right
to be arraigned and to have counsel, the Soviet spy Rudolph Abel could have
been held incommunicado by the F.B.I. for four weeks prior to his arraignment
and subjected to severe pressures to divulge information and to defect. That
question troubled the United States Supreme Court, which by a 5 to 4 vote
sustained his conviction on the ground that he was an alien arrested by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service in a deportation proceeding. Deporta-
tion proceedings are not subject to the Constitutional safeguards of a criminal
prosecution. The majority of the Court held that since he was properly subject
to deportation as an alien who had illegally entered the country, the fact that
the F.B.I. took advantage of the opportunity to seize evidence without a warrant
and to question him for a long period prior to arraignment was not a sufficient
ground to reverse his conviction, as it would have been had he not been properly
subject to administrative arrest. Abel v. U.S., 80 S. Ct. 683 (1960).
In Continental European legal systems, and in Soviet law, stress
has been laid on the protection of the accused against an ill-founded
indictment, rather than the protection of persons against wrongful
detention or coercion or self-incrimination. There the indictment is
prepared by an impartial official (called a juge d'instruction in
French law, an "investigator" in Soviet law) after an investigation
in which the accused and others have been required to participate.
It is forbidden to use coercion or torture in the investigation, and
in that sense the persons questioned are free to refuse to answer;
but contrary to our "privilege against self-incrimination," unfavor-
able inferences may be drawn from such a refusal. After a thorough
investigation, an indictment is drawn which must list all the evi-
dence upon which the charges are based. The accused must be shown
the materials of the investigation and the indictment in time for
him to request that additional evidence be obtained prior to its final
presentation.
There is a substantial difference, however, between the Soviet
system of preliminary investigation and the system prevailing in
Western Europe. The Soviet investigator is not subordinate to the
court, as in Western Europe, but to the Procuracy. The Procuracy is
a body which supervises the administration of justice generally, in
the Soviet Union, and which also conducts the prosecution of crim-
inal cases. The investigator is a subordinate official of the Procur-
acy ; appeals from any abuses in the course of investigation cannot
be taken, as in Western Europe, to a court but only to the Procuracy.
It does not offend American concepts of justice that the indictment
is issued by an official subordinate to the prosecutor, but that is
because our indictment is a different type of document, and our
system of investigation is different; it does offend Western European
concepts that the Soviet indictment, though supposed to be an im-
partial statement of the evidence against the accused, is actually
subject to the approval of the office which conducts the prosecution.
Thus in the Powers case the indictment was approved by Procurator-
General of the USSR Roman A. Rudenko-who conducted the prose-
cution.
More important, perhaps, is the fact that the accused is not
entitled to counsel, under Soviet law, until the very last stage of the
preliminary investigation. This is contrary to the general Contin-
ental European practice and would be a violation of basic Constitu-
tional rights under American law. The question of right to counsel
during the preliminary investigation was vigorously debated by
Soviet jurists prior to the reform of 1958. Some urged that a person
ought to be entitled to have counsel with him at any time ; others
argued that the presence of counsel would impede the preliminary
investigation. A compromise was effected in the 1958 Fundamental
Principles of Criminal Procedure: the accused is entitled to counsel
to challenge what might be termed the first draft of the indictment
when it is first presented to him, as it must be, prior to its issuance
by the court in a preliminary administrative session. Thus Powers
was assigned counsel on July 9, 1.960, when the preliminary investi-
gation was completed; his counsel could have at that time requested
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xviii Introduction Introduction
the investigator to make further investigations or he could have
challenged the indictment before it was finally issued by the court
on August 10th. This is the significance of Powers' testimony: ". . . I
am satisified with my counsel. I wanted him to be my lawer and
at my request he was permitted access to materials in the case since
the moment when the materials in the investigation were presented
to me for my information." Powers' statement is in the language of
Article 22 of the Fundamental Principles.
The importance of the fact that the accused may be detained for
investigation without the right to see counsel-or anyone else, for
that matter-for a period from one month (in ordinary cases) to
nine months (with the permission of thQ Procurator-General of the
USSR)-is well illustrated in the Powers case. Powers was held
incommunicado from May 1, 1960, to July 9, 1960, before he was
permitted to have counsel. A man kept in solitary confinement for a
long time tends to lose his perspective ; he tends to depend on the
investigator to tell him what to say. Even assuming that the investi-
gator is entirely humane, wise and fair, the prisoner tends to lose
lose his capacity to act objectively in his own interests. He becomes,
perhaps, excessively worried, excessively eager to bring the investi-
gation to a close, excessively anxious to do what the investigator
suggests may be best for him to do. A lawyer representing Powers The Tribunal
from the time he was arrested might have been able, for example, There are three facts about the tribunal which tried Powers that
to give him valuable advice concerning the consequences of his are striking to an American. First, the trial was held in the Supreme
disclosing classified information upon his return to the United Court of the USSR. The Supreme Court of the USSR sits generally
States after the expiration of his sentence. as a court of review of decisions of lower courts; it may, however,
A second feature of the investigation in the Powers case which at its own discretion, try very important cases in first instance. A
must be explained is the fact that it was conducted by the Committee consequence of trial in the Supreme Court of the USSR is that the
on State Security of the Council of Ministers of the USSR-the right of appeal, which ordinarily is available to the losing party in a
K.G.B. We know very little about the actual operations of the K.G.B. Soviet trial (whether criminal or civil), is lost.
It seems to fulfill the functions of both the C.I.A. and the F.B.I. It is Second, the case was tried in the Military Division of the Court.
empowered also to conduct the preliminary investigation in all The Supreme Court of the USSR consists of 11 members. It is di-
cases of crimes against the state (formerly called "counterrevolu- vided into three divisions-a Civil Division, a Criminal Division,
tionary crimes"). The predecessor of the K.G.B.-known as the and a Military Division. The Military Division sits generally as a
N.K.V.D. (and previously as the G.P.U.)-conducted the prelimi- court of review of cases tried in the military tribunals; these are
nary investigation of Zinoviev, Bukharin, and other political figures permanent courts, staffed by professional military judges, which
condemned in the purge trials of the 1930's. Theoretically, the have jurisdiction over military crimes. Formerly, the military
Procuracy controls all preliminary investigations in criminal cases, tribunals had an extensive jurisdiction over counterrevolutionary
but in the purge trials control was in fact taken out of the hands of crimes, whether committed by military personnel or civilians. The
the Procuracy. It is interesting to speculate whether Procurator- 1958 Statute on Military Tribunals restricts their jurisdiction over
General Rudenko, who "approved" the indictment, in fact supervised civilians to cases of espionage.
the investigation of Powers by the K.G.B. Military tribunals in the Soviet Union in general follow the same
The indictment itself is some 7000 words in length. (A typical procedure as the civilian courts. They are bound by the Funda-
indictment in the United States would seldom run beyond a few mental Principles of Criminal Procedure. Military judges, though
pages.) It describes at length the evidence upon which it is based, sometimes of high military rank, are essentially professional judges
referring to Powers' own testimony in the preliminary investiga- and not "soldiers." Lieutenant-General of Justice Borisoglebsky,
tion, that of various witnesses, that of experts, various documents, Chairman of the Military Division, has had a long career on the
the film removed from the plane, etc., etc. In addition to describing Soviet bench. Thus it can be asserted with some confidence that the
the evidence, it refers to volumes of materials prepared during the Powers trial would not have been substantially different in charac-
preliminary investigation, which volumes become part of the record ter if it had taken place in the Criminal Division, rather than the
of the case. Thus there is no question of "surprise." The accused Military Division, of the Supreme Court.
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knows in advance of the trial what evidence is to be used against
him, what witnesses are to be called, and what the theory of the
prosecution's case will be; and except in unusual circumstances, no
evidence can be produced by the prosecution on trial which was not
referred to in the indictment. Thus some of the perils which a crimi-
nal defendant must run in an American court are eliminated in the
Continental European and Soviet type of trial.
At the same time the Powers indictment-for reasons already
indicated-is heavily loaded with political charges against the
United States. By Western standards, such matter should have been
stricken as "surplusage." Reference is made to "this gangster
flight," to "the aforesaid brazen act of aggression," to Soviet pro-
tests against "repeated intrusions" by American aircraft, to phrases
used by John Foster Dulles, to the "reckless actions of the United
States Government" which "have brought about the breakdown of
the summit meeting in Paris," etc., etc. If Powers had been innocent
-and Soviet law states that he could not be assumed to be guilty-
such irrelevant denunciations would clearly have helped to create
an atmosphere which would have very much hurt his chances of
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Introduction Intro uctzon
Third, the case was tried by a professional judge and two "peo-
ple's assessors"-D. Z. Vorobyev and A. I. Zakharov. These are lay-
men, not jurists. One is a Major General of Artillery, the other is a
Major General of the Air Force. All Soviet trials are tried by a
single professional judge and two people's assessors. (Appeals are
heard by a bench of three professional judges.) The people's asses-
sors are elected for a period of three years, and sit for ten days each
year. They are not a jury, for they are as much judges of law as of
fact and each has an equal vote with the professional judge. The
system of people's assessors was introduced originally in order to
bring a popular element into judicial administration. In the course
of time, however, they have tended to pay a rather unimportant
role in Soviet trials. The Supreme Court has a panel of people's
assessors-consisting generally of prominent laymen-attached to
it for use on the rare occasions when it sits as a trial court.
Powers could have been tried by the military tribunal of the
military district in which he was captured. If so he would have had
a right of appeal to the next higher military tribunal, and if his
conviction had been sustained on appeal he could have petitioned
either the Procurator-General of the USSR or the President of the
Military Division of the Supreme Court "to protest" the case to
that court. Such review on protest is discretionary. As it is, Powers
could (and did) petition for clemency to the President of the Pre-
sidium of the Supreme Soviet. He also could have petitioned for
review by the full bench of the Supreme Court of the USSR, but
such review is entirely discretionary.
More important than the structure of the court which tried
Powers is the question of its independence. Are those observers
correct who suspected that Presiding Judge Borisoglebsky and his
two associates were told in advance what sentence to impose? Was
the entire trial masterminded from the Kremlin? The Soviet answer
is an indignant, No. The Soviet Constitution states that "judges are
independent and subject only to law." Communist Party interference
in the trial and decision of cases is denounced. Yet Mr. Khrushchev
has told us that Stalin personally manipulated the trial of political
cases in the past. As long as there are no independent agencies of
public opinion free to denounce abuses by the country's top leader-
ship, there will be suspicion of secret manipulation.
Having said this, I shall venture the following guess : that Mr.
Khrushchev issued orders to his subordinates that if the judges,
the investigator, the prosecutor, the defense counsel, or anyone else
connected with the conduct of the Powers case asked for instructions
from the Communist Party leadership, they should be told that this
case was to be handled absolutely correctly, with strict legality, and
that any person who abused the independence of the court would
be severely punished. He might have added one qualification : "as
long as you are sure Powers will testify that he was shot down at
68,000 feet"-for one of the most important military aspects of this
case, from the Kremlin's standpoint, was the announcement to the
- orld that Soviet rockets could reach the U-2.
The Trial Procedure
(a) Presumption of evidence and burden of proof:---Soviet law
has rejected the phrase "presumption of innocence" but has re-
tained the substance of the doctrine. In effect, the burden of proof
is on the prosecution, and no inference of guilt may be drawn from
the indictment. This is basically what "presumption of innocence"
means. The reason given for the rejection of the phrase-some
Soviet jurists argued for its inclusion in the 1958 Fundamental
Principles of Criminal Procedure-is that it is not understood
properly and is translated into Russian as "The accused is con-
sidered innocent until proved guilty." This is incorrect, it is argued,
since the only significance of the "presumption" is to cast the burden
of proof on the prosecution ; if the accused, were "considered" in-
nocent, he could not even be kept under arrest.
The rule that no inference of guilt may be drawn from the indict-
ment is of special importance in a system of preliminary investiga-
tion such as the Soviet. It is sometimes charged against that type
of system that the trial is in effect an appeal from the indictment.
The tendency to attach excessive importance to the findings con-
tained in the indictment is to some extent counteracted, however,
by the requirement that the prosecution must prove the charges
contained therein.
The 1958 Fundamental Principles do not expressly state that the
burden of proof is on the prosecution, but instead state that the
burden of proof may not be placed upon the accused, and also that
a conviction may not be based on "assumptions," but can be handed
down "only if in the course of the court trial the person has been
proved guilty of having committed a crime." These formulations
presuppose a trial procedure quite different from the Anglo-Amer-
ican. In the first place, although the burden of proof is on the prose-
cution in the sense that if the accused is not proved guilty the
prosecution loses and he is acquitted, the system of trial procedure
permits the proof of guilt to be adduced in a variety of ways and
not necessarily by the prosecution. As an American lawyer would
put it, the prosecution has the burden of persuasion but not the
burden of going forward with evidence. In fact, in the usual Soviet
criminal trial-as in the usual Continental European criminal trial
-the interrogation of witnesses and of the accused is conducted
chiefly by the judges. Thus the court takes initiative in eliciting
evidence.
In addition, Soviet law-and Continental European systems gen-
erally-do not use the phrase "proof beyond. a reasonable doubt."
In all cases, criminal or civil, the court, it is said, must be "con-
vinced" of the guilt of the accused or else it must acquit him.
These questions are academic in the Powers case. The proof
introduced by the prosecution was overwhelming. Not only was
there a full admission of guilt by the defendant and corroboration
by his principal, the United States Government, but there were eye-
witnesses, expert witnesses, and so-called "real evidence" (equip-
ment of the plane, the film, etc.)
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(b) The effect of the plea of guilty.-In American law, generally
speaking, a plea of guilty dispenses with the necessity of a trial,
leaving room only for a hearing on the question of the sentence. In
a few states, a plea of guilty is not permitted where the defendant
is charged witha capital offense. In the federal courts, the court
may refuse to accept a plea of guilty if it wishes. In our system of
courts martial, a plea of guilty is not accepted in a capital case. The
effect of not permitting a plea of guilty is to require the prosecution
to prove its case.
In Soviet law, as in Continental European law generally, a plea
of guilty does not relieve the prosecution of the burden of proving
guilt. As indicated earlier, this is a humane rule, for it tends to
overcome the consequences of a false confession. It is particularly
necessary in a system which relies so heavily upon a supposedly
impartial preliminary investigation, for the evidence procured
during the preliminary investigation may have been extorted by
improper means and may be false.
Yet it is a mistake to assume that the accused is always better
off because the case against him must be proved. In the course of
presenting evidence, the prosecution may succeed in persuading the
court to impose a much heavier sentence than it could obtain if the
proceedings were limited to a hearing on the question of the penalty
to be imposed.
In the Powers case, the rule requiring proof or guilt, despite a
plea of guilty by the accused, was indispensable to the political
purpose of the trial. One may speculate as to what sentence Powers
would have received if he had had a hearing on that question alone.
(c) Examination and cross-examination.-The usual pattern of
a Soviet criminal trial (as of a Continental European trial) consists
of examination of the accused and of witnesses by the court, to-
gether with supplementary questions put by the prosecution and
defense counsel. A striking feature of the Powers case was the use
of the Anglo-American cross-examination technique whereby wit-
nesses are asked a series of specific questions requiring relatively
short answers, the questioning being conducted by the opposing
lawyers. The reasons for the adoption of this method of adducing
testimony in the Powers case are probably threefold : in the first
place, both Procurator-General Rudenko and Defense Counsel Grinev
participated in the Nuremberg trials, where the Anglo-American
methods of examination and cross-examination made a very favor-
able impression on Soviet jurists; in the second place, it may be
surmised that it was thought that this method would make the trial
seem more fair to American audiences who are used to it; in the
third place, this method gives a strong impression of spontaneity
and yet is able to be very largely rehearsed in advance. To an Amer-
ican lawyer Powers' testimony gives every appearance of having
been thoroughly prepared. Rarely will a witness answer questions
so briefly and so precisely without extensive coaching in advance;
also on several occasions Powers repeated his testimony in almost
identical words. This is not to suggest that the testimony was false.
It is impossible to tell from the trial record whether or not it was,
and reports of eye witnesses are almost uniformly to the effect that
it sounded genuine. But unquestionably Powers was well coached by
his lawyer.
Yet despite the use of a technique of examination and cros;;-
examination similar in some ways to that used by American lawyers,
the trial procedure was entirely contrary to American practice. With
use, the prosecution first calls its witnesses (each of whom is first
examined by the prosecutor and then may be cross-examined by
the defense counsel), and then after the prosecution rests, the de-
fense calls its witnesses (who may be cross-examined, in turn by
I the prosecutor) ; and the defendant is not a witness for the prose-
cution. The cross-examination is limited generally to matters raised
on direct examination. In the Powers case, the first witness was the
defendant, who was examined by the prosecutor! Thus Powers was
convicted in the first instance on the basis of his own testimony.
(Under Soviet law he could have refused to testify, but such refusal
would have entitled the court to draw the inference that his refusal
to testify was an admission of guilt; in any event, Powers wanted
to testify, since that was his best chance of obtaining a lighter
sentence.)
It should be noted that the witnesses are called, in Soviet- (and
Continental European) practice, by the court, not by the lawyers,
and in the Powers case it was the court which determined that
Powers should be called first and that he should be examined first
by the prosecutor.
(d) Right to counsel; mitigating and aggravating circumstances.
-The accused is entitled to counsel, under Soviet law, but it is said
by some that the Soviet defense attorney is not a champion of his
client's rights but rather a servant of the State. Soviet jurists, on
the other hand, claim that the way in which the defense counsel
serves the cause of socialism is by protecting the rights of his client.
There is abundant evidence that in many cases Soviet lawyers have
vigorously championed their client's rights, and abundant evidence
that in many cases, notably the purge trials and other political cases,
they have not. What kind of a job did Mikhail I. Grinev do for his
client Francis Powers?
In his closing speech, Grinev stated that the defense counsel's
task is "to submit for the consideration of the court everything that
can favorably affect the destiny of the defendant." He showed a
certain diffidence in this respect, however, for he prefaced the state-
ment with the words, "regardless of what crime the defendant has
committed and irrespective of the indignation it has caused among
the Soviet public." Yet he warmed to his task as he proceeded.
Some American lawyers have suggested that Grinev should have
advised Powers to plead not guilty, should not have put him on the
witness stand, and should have confined his own efforts to breaking
down the prosecution's case. This indeed is what Rudolph Abel's
lawyers did in a parallel situation in the United States. But Abel
was convicted and sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment! Moreover,
under Soviet procedure, as has already been indicated, Powers
was called to the stand by the court. Finally, he had already ad-
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Introduction Introduction
xxiv
mitted his guilt during the preliminary investigation (before he had
counsel) and that was a matter of record at the trial. urnMate h cons Grinev played his part, in this writer's pinione tw its a particular
skill. His tactic was to draw a picture
type of person-a type of person entitled to a light sentence. Both
h
as through elicited Pofrom wers' Powers ii
closingstat men
hi t
through tgeech,o as well which
his closing sppe that Grinev succeeded in conveying the spdesired ectator s at the tria land by
it has been widely accepted by
the reading public. If the picture he conveyed was indeed a true one,
that may have made his task easier, although experienced trial
lawyers will testify that it is often more difficult to convey a true
picture of a criminal defendant than to convey a false picture. to conve What is the image of Powers which of inev Sought class background, working It was the image of a young man rather simple, completely a-political, influenced by a materials s is
d
env oneta
a lacking in r place a high of theiTiw der rimpl cat ons of his
missio in
mission a victim
truth forces when he is confronted with it; naive, rather
admit the e of
frank to
than mercenary; a person with limited horizons ; a cowardly person -posing no real threat to the Soviet Union-yet cooperative and State
F sincere. Although he was an officer in ut United
if knowssl cru don t
he testified : Unfortunately nobody mys
kill a person even to save my own life. I could not do it." He had
ordered lthough he had been told he
not realized when 'e the SovietiUnion,
oto fly
would fly along the Soviet border and would be given other assign-
ments Brought by circumstances orealize he that w his flight was
a seriou profoundly
a serious c crime and a grave threat to peace,
sorry that he had undertaken it. Powers.
This may or may not be the true image of Francis Gary n an If it th gcertainly who should not be punishedltoo severely.
f-confi
it is the image and
oviet Why, Grvengeance nev aed, shoulea crea urel? The truesvilla ns, he
argued, re Central so pitiable
a uery; if the d been sitting iin the dock, Powers "could un-
dou ftheyh
doubtedly expect a considerable mitigation of punishment."
This was the image. fitted the the 1958 Fundamental
cumstances. of Under
Principles cir-
Criminal Law), the court, in passing sentence, is di-
rected to consider the following as mitigating circumstances which
entitle the accused to a more lenient punishment :
ces
" (1) prevention by the guilty person of the harmful cons done,
of the crime, or voluntary compensation for the injury
elimination of the harm caused ; [Powers, Grinev argued, had co-
operated fully with the Soviet authorities after his capture and
cooperating fully at the trial.]
personal
l
I
d
was
the 01
with
" (2) commission of a crime asT he taken his
first
job
United States Air Force because he was unemployed and could not
find other suitable work ; he had taken his job with the C.I.A. to
pay off his debts and become independent of his parents.]
"(3) commission of a crime under the influence of threat or
coercion or because of material or other dependence. [Powers,
Grinev argued, did not undertake the flight of his own volition but
acted under orders of his superiors.]
"(8) sincere repentence or voluntary surrender and admission
of guilt." [Powers stated several times in the course of the trial
that he was repentant and sorry for what he had done; he testified
that he offered no resistance to his capture; he admitted his guilt.]
Prosecutor Rudenko's picture of the defendant ~wa quite different.
He portrayed Powers as a trained, ruthless spy.
show that he is by no means a weak-willed and blind tool, a robot
in the hands of the American Intelligence Agency and the Pentagon,
whom they used for espionage, subversive activities and aggres-
sion. He is a dangerous criminal. He cannot plead compulsory ful-
fillment of an order for, having voluntarily sold his honor and his
conscience, the whole of himself, for dollars, he undertook to carry
out any criminal acts, that is, he acted from mercenary and base
motives. He did not commit his crimes merely by a method, which,
as the law says when defining circumstances aggravating responsi-
bility, was to the general danger, but by a method fraught with
danger for millions and millions of people. He consciously com-
mitted a crime with consequences of a gravity which cannot
in o deter-
measured by the scale which we are accustomed to apply
the gravity of a crime. Such is the true face of the De-
mining be
fendant Powers."
Yet because, said the Procurator-General, Powers had sincerely
repented, the court should not impose the death sentence but
rather the maximum period of deprivation of 'freedom, 15 years.
(This is now the maximum Soviet sentence, except for death, for
any crime.) Under the Soviet law on circumstances which aggravate
responsibility (Article 34 of.the 1958 Fundamental Principles of
Criminal Law), the following types of circumstances are listed:
"(1) commission of a crime by a person who has previously
committed a crime ; [Rudenko brought out that Powers had flown
along Soviet borders in the past, and over the territory of various
]
en obtained
t b
.
e
countries whose permission had no
" (2) commission of a crime by an organized group ;
"(3) commission of a crime with mercenary or other
tives ;
" (4) serious consequences arising from the crime ;
"(9) commission of a crime by a method that constitutes a
general danger." the list of
Neither the list of mitigating circumstances nor
aggravating circumstances purports tohbehet of avvravatingoc r
family circumstances; [Powers Approved For Release 2003/10/07 CIA-RDP80B01676R002200020011-6
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Introduction Introduction
xxvi
cumstances ; the list of mitigating circumstances may be added to
he republican codes and also by the court in passing sentence.
(e) "The last word". - In Soviet criminal procedure the accused
is entitled to make a statement to the court after the argument is
closed and the court is about to retire to consider its verdict. A
few states of the United States have a similar rule. The accused's
"last word" is customarily very short, in Soviet practice, and more
or less in the style which Powers used.
It may be noted in passing that under Soviet procedure the
closing argument of the defense counsel is made after the closing
argument of the prosecution. This seems sensible. It is contrary
to American practice, however.
(f) The sentence. - Four and one-half hours after the close of
fol-
of the opinion,
the argument the line the the closing read its
lowed d
though in milder language. The sentence, however, was more
lenient derivation oflfreedom, dofewhich the first three years were
years' deprivation
to be served in prison. This means that after three years, the re-
mainder of the term is to be served in a corrective labor colony.
Under Article 44 of the 1958 Fundamental Principles of Criminal
Law, after a person has served one-half his hsentence he may be
paroled sentence may be
by the court, or the unserved part of
commuted, if he "has shown by his exemplary conduct and honest
attitude toward work that he has reformed."
Since the period of detention prior to trial May 1, t d5 in Hthe
sentence, Powers will be eligible for parole ever, his sentence could be commuted at any time by the Presidium
of the Supreme Soviet.
IV
We may view the Powers case in many different perspectives : as
;
o Soviet in, action
human
g m international politics; as anle xample ofc
of grim
of espionage, aerial
a complex problem
intrusion, y; as a tragic episode in cold war" diplomacy.
and apology
in
Many of the human elements are omitted from the picture as pre-
of Powers' him aid and
sented wife to make contact with him and to bring s
co
comfort, the frustrations which they endured -n the hands ap both of
ear-
the State Department and of the Soviet Govrnmet of the Soviet
ance finally as spectators at the trial by permission
overnment,
aspects of their the story must be gleaned chiefly hfrom the news-
asp One sidelight appears in the trial record : Defense Counsel
papers. _
(,rinev, in proving that his client was of a hpoor s show ng howa Powers
ground, introduced in evidence photogrp beer grew up and the house in which he lived. The enuogr efforts do see
given to Grinev by Powers' family. Thus him, their trip to Moscow with Am1ica ers'ywifet tand heir sde m(and
other
t
were ill), and the conversations of their lawyers with Grinev prior
to the trial, were not entirely fruitless. Perhaps the pictures offered
in evidence were important not so much for what they told of the
defendant's "class origin" but chiefly as a reminder to everyone that
Powers' wife and parents were present in the courtroom and were as a deeply concerned about his fate. It would not be eato sy,isk the matter
collapse
compassion or as a matter of policy,
audience with a serious heart ail-
th
i
e
n
of Powers' mother, sitting
ment. Moreover, the Powers family gave the appearance of poor,
simple folk, deeply emotional, entirely unable to cope with the fate
that had suddenly overtaken them ; they were perhaps the best cor-
roborative evidence of the image of the defendant which the defense
sought to convey.
The efforts to secure representation by American counsel for
Powers make another story-one which has a diplomatic as well as
a human interest. Undoubtedly the defense could only be conducted
properly by a Soviet lawyer ; but the presence of an American
lawyer, at an early stage, to consult with both the defendant and
his Soviet counsel would have been extremely helpful. Under the
Roosevelt-Litvinov exchange of letters in 1933 it had been agreed
in principle that Americans charged with crimes in the Soviet Union
and Soviet citizens charged with crimes in the United States should
be entitled to representation by lawyers from their own respective
countries. The exchange of letters did not reach the stage of formal
agreement, however, and thus Powers had no right to American
counsel under Soviet law (although there is nothing in Soviet law
which would have prevented his being granted the privilege
American counsel). Belated efforts by two lawyers of the Virginia
Bar Association, representing Powers' wife, to procure permission
from the Soviet Government to consult with Powers and his counsel
prior to the preparation of the indictment met with refusal. Ulti-
mately no American was permitted to talk with Powers until after
his conviction.
Nor has the United States Embassy in Moscow been permitted to
see Powers at any time up to this writing (which is two weeks after
his conviction). The United States Government has called this a
breach of Soviet international obligations, since normally a person
charged with a crime in a foreign country is permitted to rely upon
the assistance of his government's accredited representatives. Yet
the United States complaint in this instance seems weak; for the
United States Government admittedly had sent Powers, an Amer-
ican intelligence agent, on a mission of aerial surveillance over
Soviet territory. It might give advice to Powers which would be
hostile to Soviet interests ; it might gain intelligence from Powers
concerning Soviet military secrets gathered on his flight or during
his detention.
These are only a few of the grimmer aspects of the case which
do not appear in the record of the trial. indeed the record of any
trial rarely gives more than glimpses into the real story of the
events which give rise to it. A judicial proceeding is primarily a
.American doctors as well, for be
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 Intro' RP fed
method of deciding what ought to be done in a given situation and
only secondarily a scientific investigation of the truth. It is con-
cerned with what happened only insofar as what happened is
thought to be relevant to a possible decision, a possible outcome of
the case. We cannot know from the record of the case, for example,
whether Powers stated the truth when he said that he was "pro-
foundly sorry" that he had committed a "grave crime" ; we can only
infer that he made these statements in the belief that they were
relevant to the sentence which the court would hand down, and that
both the prosecutor and the court accepted them. Similarly, although
great pains were taken to prove that Powers was shot down at
68,000 feet, we cannot know that this is so; we can only know that
there was uncontradicted testimony to that effect-which testimony
served the interests of both sides. Indeed, the trial record can only
tell us what went on in the courtroom. Its lasting value is in what
it reveals about the trial itself, about the legal system of which the
trial is a part, and about the way in which that legal system deals
with the issues which the trial presented.
About the Soviet legal system, the record of the Powers trial
tells us a great deal. It illustrates many features of the law-reform
movement which followed Stalin's death, and particularly the 1958
legislation on criminal law, criminal procedure, and crimes against
the state. As compared with what his situation would have been
under the pre-1958 Soviet law, Powers' rights were considerably
enhanced. Previously espionage was defined more loosely than it is
in the new legislation. Also it was termed a "counter-revolutionary
crime" and not simply, as now, a "crime against the state." These
changes in language reflect a somewhat higher degree of objectivity.
Previously Powers would not have been entitled to defense counsel
at as early a stage in the proceedings. Previously-and this is, from
Powers' standpoint, one of the most crucial reforms-he would have
been liable to a maximum period of confinement of 25 years, instead
of 15. And equally important, he will now benefit, presumably, from
the very considerable liberalization of the system of detention which
took place in 1954-1956 and from the more lenient rules with re-
spect to parole which were enacted in 1954. Under the 1956 law on
corrective labor colonies he will be entitled to have periodic visits
from his wife as well as many other privileges which previously did
not exist.
These reforms, part of a much larger law-reform movement, are
important not only in themselves but also as symbols of Khrush-
chev's pledge to develop a more rational, a more lawful, and a more
humane social and political order than existed under Stalin. It is
likely that if a "Pilot Powers" had been captured in Stalin's lifetime
he would have received a much harsher sentence, and also that he
would have been induced to denounce his government as "imperial-
ist" and "aggressive"-instead of being permitted to respond, in
effect. "thou sagest," to the question whether the flight was a viola-
tion of international law.
The fact that Stalin's successors have attached increased impor-
l a nce to the positive role which law can play in maintaining a stable
For Ref% M, 110/07 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002200020011-6
order at home is an encouraging sign that they also attach increased
importance to the positive role which law can play in maintaining a
stable international order as well. In this respect, too, there is some
comfort to be derived from the Powers case, and especially from the
impressive appeal to international law which Procurator-General
Rudenko made in condemning the U-2 flight. The more the Soviet
leaders become attached to international law, whether out of self-
interest or otherwise, the more hopeful are the chances of building
world peace.
By the same token, however, the fact that certain features of
Soviet criminal procedure, as reflected in the Powers trial, infringe
basic rights of the accused is a source of discouragement to those
who hope to find in law a common ground upon which peace can be
built. The possibility of detaining a person incommunicado for
months prior to his indictment casts a shadow over all subsequent
proceedings. Above all, the deliberate use of a trial as a means of
political education threatens the integrity of the judicial process.
In the Powers case, the introduction of a host of political irrele-
vancies and the reiteration of exaggerated charges of American
"aggression" debased the trial even though it may have had no
adverse effect upon the defendant. As James Morris wrote in the
Manchester Guardian Weekly after witnessing the case, "Through
the whole proceedings there stalked the beastly images of war,
power, fear, and propaganda, acting impartially for the accusers
and the accused." The failure to draw the proper lines between law
and politics has especially serious implications for the development
of international law, where those lines are in any case more indefi-
nite than in most areas of domestic law. Yet unless they are drawn
somewhere, international law degenerates into mere propaganda.
The record of the Powers trial is therefore an important document
not only in the annals of Soviet law, and of the comparison of Soviet
legal concepts and procedures with those of other countries, but also
in the annals of international law. In addition it contains important
implications for diplomacy. Of course one cannot begin to untangle
the web of diplomatic disasters which followed the U-2 incident by
a reading of the record of the Powers case, for that record presents
only the Soviet view and not that of the United States or other
countries. Nevertheless the Powers trial provides a starting-point
for thinking about how similar tragedies are to be avoided in the
future.
It is certainly to the best interests of the United States, and not
only of the Soviet Union, to strengthen the principle which excludes
the military aircraft of one country from the skies of another.
Scholarship in the field of comparative law might be enriched but no
reasonable person would be happy if we were to witness the trial of
a Soviet espionage pilot shot down over American territory. More-
over, it is certainly to our best interests that a single standard of
international law be maintained ; to argue that the U-2 flight was
not illegal because it was an act of self-defense against a totalitarian
power bent on conquering the world is extremely dangerous for us,
since if we declare that the Soviet Union is not entitled to the pro-
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1960
22
................
......................
23
24
......................
24
26
......................
27
!nko .................
28
.7, 1960 ..............
46
iko ..................
47
Grinev ..............
50
8, 1960 ..............
58
Grinev ..............
59
;udenko ..............
60
Borisoglebsky ........
67
curt Zakharov ........
68
ourt Vorobyev ........
71
......................
72
......................
74
......................
75
 i
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Examination of Witness Surin .................................... 76
Examination of Expert Alekseyev ................................ 77
Examination of Expert Tyufilin .................................. 82
Examination of Expert Istomin ................................... 84
Examination of Expert Andreyev ................................. 87
SECOND DAY, AFTERNOON SESSION, AUGUST 18, 1960 ...........
94
Examination of Expert Voroshilov ................................
95
Examination of Expert Burmistrov-Zuyev ..........................
98
Examination of Expert Prozorovsky ..............................
101
Examination of Expert Zhdanov .................................. 103
THIRD DAY, MORNING SESSION, AUGUST 19, 1960 ................
106
Speech for the Prosecution by Roman A. Rudenko,
Procurator-General of the USSR ...............................
107
Speech for the Defense by Defense Counsel Mikhail L. Grinev ........
136
Last Plea of Defendant Powers ..................................
148
THIRD DAY, AFTERNOON SESSION, AUGUST 19, 1960 .............. 184
The Verdict ...................................................... 185
Monday, July 11, 1960
IN THE STATE SECURITY COMMITTEE
UNDER THE USSR COUNCIL OF
MINISTERS AND THE PROCURATOR'S
OFFICE OF THE USSR
The State Security Committee under the Coun-
cil of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. has completed
investigations of the case of the American spy
Francis Gary Powers, who intruded into the
bounds of the Soviet Union in a Lockheed U-2
plane on May 1, 1960, with the purpose of collect-
ing espionage data, and who took air photographs
of industrial and defense objectives, and also col-
lected other information of a reconnaissance na-
ture, and was shot down by a rocket at an altitude
of over 20,000 meters.
Criminal proceedings are being instigated
against Powers according to Article 2 of the Law
on Criminal Responsibility for Crimes Against the
State (espionage).
The Indictment against Powers has been ap-
proved by the Procurator-General of the U.S.S.R.,
and the charge against Powers, in conformity with
Articles 9 and 16 of the Regulations on Military
Tribunals, has been submitted to the Military
Division of the Supreme Court of the USSR for
hearing.
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 Approved For Release 2003/10/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002200020011-6
INDICTMENT
Approved For Release 2003/10/07
At 5:36 A.M. Moscow time on May 1st, 1960, an unknown plane
violated the state frontier of the USSR at a point 20 kilometers
(131/2 miles) southeast of the town of Kirovabad, the Tajik Soviet
Socialist Republic, intruded into the airspace of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and proceeded into Soviet territory at an altitude
of 20,000 meters (65,600 feet).
The plane which violated the Soviet frontier was tracked con-
tinuously by units of the Soviet anti-aircraft defense. This surveil-
lance showed that the plane's route lay over large industrial centers
and important defensive objectives of the Soviet Union. Throughout
the entire flight, the plane remained at an altitude of 20,000 meters
(65,600 feet) at which no flights were made by any civilian planes.
The obtained data left no doubt that this was a deliberate incursion
with hostile aims into the airspace of the USSR.
In view of this, the Soviet Government ordered the plane to be
shot down. In fulfillment of this order, a unit of the Soviet anti-air-
craft defense brought the aforesaid plane down by a rocket, with the
very first shot, at 8:53 A.M. Moscow time, when it was at an altitude
of 20,000 meters (65,600 feet) in the area of Sverdlovsk, that is over
2,000 kilometers (1343 miles) from the point where it crossed the
frontier of the Soviet Union. The pilot of the plane bailed out and
was detained. The very first interrogation established that he was
Francis Gary Powers, a citizen of the United States of America
(Volume 1, pages 20-23; volume 2, page 2; volume 7, page 6).1
The examination of the plane's wreckage and of the special equip-
ment it carried established that it was an American plane of the
"Lockheed U-2" type, designed for flights at great altitudes, adapted
for intelligence purposes and, to this end, equipped for aerial photog-
raphy and radio reconnaissance from great heights. Found among
the wreckage were films of Soviet airfields and other important mili-
tary and industrial)t objectives in the Soviet Union. Moreover, a ferro-
Cli~e 69m hVe22are to lel 00020011 6uments gathered in the case.
 Approved For Release 2003/1p/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002200020011-6
The Trial of the U-2 The Indictment
4 I
magnetic tape was found with a recording of the signals of certain
Soviet radar stations (Volume 1, pages 49-52, 128-146, 227, 228,
248-253). State Security
The preliminary investigation, conducted by the S
Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, established
that the espionage flight of this plane had been organized with the
knowledge of the Government of the United States by a special
17 the
2, 3 under
American intelligence unit based in Turkey and known
code name of "Detachment 10-10" (Volume 2, pages
217).
When Comrade N. S. Khrushchev, the Chairman of the USSR
Council of Ministers, disclosed this gangster flight in his report
the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on May 5th, 1960, a
spokesman of the U.S. Department of State admitted on the same
day that the fact of the violation of the frontier of the USSR by an
American plane was "entirely possible" but would be of an acci-
dental, unpremeditated nature.
According to the statement of the Department of State, a "Lock-
heed U-2" plane had on May 1st engaged in weather research, "took
air samples" in the upper layers of the atmosphere in the area of
the Soviet-Turkish frontier, and strayed off course because of a
failure in oxygen equipment. This statement by the Department of
State said further that the pilot had probably lost consciousness,
and the plane continued on the automatic pilot and accidentally
intruded into the airspace of the Soviet Union.
This version was confirmed on the same day in a statement by the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration of the United
States, which allegedly had the control of the aforesaid plan which,
according to the statement, had been used to study g
ational
gical conditions found at Accong to a h for ttheNmissing
Aeronautics and Space Administration, a se
"Lockheed U-2" plane had been started in the area of Lake Van
in Turkey.
The same version was given in the note of the U.S. Embassy in
Moscow delivered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
on May 6th of this year.
On May 7th, addressting the
Soviet sGo e ment, Np S. KhSoviet
the USSR, the head of
exposed the falseness of this versA RWgideEQIC> 1 W@'2w3rltg0
facts which proved beyond doubt the premeditated, perfidious and
gangsterlike nature of the violation of the Soviet airspace by the
American "Lockheed U-2" plane, and also the intelligence purposes
of its flight which were incompatible with the elementary require-
ments of the maintenance of normal relations between states in
peacetime.
After that, the Department of State, cornered by the facts cited
by Comrade N. S. Khrushchev, had to admit in its new statement
of May 7th of this year the intelligence nature of the flight made
by the "Lockheed U-2" plane, noting, however, that "insofar as
the Washington authorities are concerned, there was no authoriza-
tion for any such flights as described by Mr. Khrushchev."
If this statement by the Department of State still left open the
question of the U.S. Government's direct implication in the afore-
said brazen act of aggression against the Soviet Union, all doubts
on this score were dispelled by the statement made by U.S. Secretary
of State (Christian A.) Herter on May 9th in the name of the United
States Government.
Secretary of State Herter announced in his statement, unprece-
dented in the history of international relations, that in accordance
with the National Security Act of 1947, President Eisenhower had
put into effect since the beginning of his administration directives
to carry out intelligence operations against the Soviet Union. Under
these directives, as noted by Herter, programs had been developed
and put into operation providing for the incursion of American.
reconnaissance aircraft into the airspace of the USSR.
Herter's statement was confirmed on May 11 by U.S. President
Eisenhower himself, who also admitted that flights by American
planes over the territory of the Soviet Union had been and remained
the "calculated policy of the United States." The same was said by
the Government of the U.S. in a note to the Soviet Government of
May 12th, 1960.
Especially brazen and shameless was the television speech by
U.S. Vice President Nixon on May 15th in which he not only con-
firmed the cynical statements that American overflights of the
territory of the Soviet Union were a calculated policy of the United
States, statements made earlier by Herter and Eisenhower and
violating the standards of international law, but went even further.
States needed a "continuous pro-
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gram" of espionage, and sought to justify the obvious lie in the May
5th statement by the U.S. Department of State about the "meteor-
ological research" allegedly conducted by the "Lockheed U-2" plane.
In other words, he was upholding for the United States of America
the "right to espionage."
These statements by the Secretary of State, the President and
the Vice President of the United States were an official confirmation
of the hostile activities which were conducted by the United States
of America with regard to the Soviet Union over a number of years
and expressed in repeated incursions by American planes into the
airspace of the USSR for intelligence purposes.
Thus, the Government of the U.S. officially proclaimed in peace-
time a policy which can only be followed in conditions where
countries are in a state of war.
During Eisenhower's tenure as President of the United States,
that is, beginning with January 1953, the Soviet Union made several
protests to the Government of the U.S. against the incursion of
American planes within the boundaries of the USSR.
In assessing these violations, the Soviet Government pointed out
that "these violations of the frontiers of the Soviet Union by
American military planes are connected with the fulfillment of
definite assignments of the American military command." (The note
of September 8th, 1954.)
Protesting resolutely against such acts, the Government of the
USSR stressed repeatedly in its notes to the Government of the
U.S. that these intrusions "are a gross violation of the elementary
standards of international law" (The note of September 8th, 1954),
and constitute "premeditated actions by certain U.S. circles aimed
at aggravating the relations between the Soviet Union and the
United States of America" (The note of July 10th, 1956).
In reply to all these notes, the Government of the U.S. limited
itself to formal answers.
The repeated intrusions by American planes within the confines of
the Soviet Union are a flagrant violation of the universally recog-
nized principle of international law establishing the full and
exclusive sovereignty of every state over the airspace above its
territory.
The principle whereby "each state has full and exclusive sov-
ereignty over the airspace above its territory" was anchored in the
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multipartite Paris Convention on the Regulation of Air Navigation
of October 13th, 1919, taken up in the Havana Convention of 1928,
concluded by a number of American States, and reproduced in
Article I of the Convention on International Civil Aviation con-
cluded in Chicago on December 7th, 1944.
The same principle of complete and exclusive sovereignty of a
state over its airspace found expression also in the national legisla-
tion of various countries, including the Soviet Union and the United
States of America (The Air Commerce Act of the U.S. Congress
of 1926 and the Civil Aeronautics Act of the U.S. Congress of 1938).
Article I of the Air Code of the USSR of 1935 also lays down that
"the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics exercises the full and
exclusive sovereignty over the airspace of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics."
This principle of sovereignty is sacred and immutable in inter-
national relations.
In these conditions the above statements of President Eisenhower
of the United States, Vice President Nixon and the United States
Secretary of State Herter by which they attempted to justify viola-
tions of the USSR sovereignty by American aircraft and elevated
such violations into a principle of the state policy of the United
States can not be regarded otherwise than as an open declaration
of the refusal of the United States Government to comply .with the
fundamental universally recognized standards of international law,
without the observation of which normal relations between states
are impossible.
The repeated intrusions of American aircraft into the airspace of
the USSR, specifically the flight of the "Lockheed U-2" plane on
May 1st of the current year, constitute a gross violation of the
sovereignty of the USSR and an act of aggression which tramples
upon standards of international law and the high principles of the
United Nations Charter which also bears the signature of the
United States of America.
With the present level of military techniques, in the conditions
when, as responsible American military leaders have repeatedly
declared, the United States of America is constantly keeping aloft
patrol bombers carrying atomic and hydrogen bombs, reconnais-
sance flights involving the photographing of possible bombing
targets and the spotting of radar installations represent composite
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8
elements of a military attack from the air.
Under such conditions, the intrusion of a foreign aircraft into the
limits of the USSR can at any time be an indication of the beginning
aof an armed attack. Moreover, there is nothing to not carry a
any such plane appearing over Soviet territory does
deadly load.
The aggressive act of the United States of America inheAm form of
arrogant invasion of the airspace of the USSR by an
jeopardizes
military aircraft represents an action which directly world peace. In the conditions when certain states possess nuclear
weapons and means to deliver them to targets almost instantane 1st,
1st
dertaken by the United States on May
t
un
-
nse
ly, the aggressive ac
1960 against the Soviet Union might have had most grave
quences for humanity.
nts of the United States Government
The abovementioned stateme
y 12th
leaders, and the note of the United States
on the alleged ci liananature
of the current year lay heavy stress o
of the "Lockheed U-2" plane shot down near Sverdlovsk.
The materials of the investigation prove the falsity of these
claims.
An identity certificate number AF 1,288,068 carries the insignia
of the United States Defense Department
States of America.' (Volume
"Department of Defense,.
1, page 99; volume 6, page 11.)
Asked whether the possession of such a certificate indicated that
he was employed as a United d States
n the United rStatestAPoForce eapslied
,,It means that I sere
a civilian." (Volume 3, page 180.)
Asked further how the institution in which he worked should be
regarded-as military or civil-Powers said :
"This is a kind of combination of civilian and military
service, all this is covered and ciphered by the name of
`Detachment 10-10.' " (Volume 2, page 2.)
Powers testified that approximately in April 1960 the Chief of
Staff of the United States Air Force, General Thomas D. White
visited the Incirlik airbase (Turkey) with
inspecting the "10-10" detachment. (Volume 3, pages 92, 93.)
Asked who else of the military, besides General White, had visited k
A MieMsF Ae5ahease 2003% 0/0
the Incirlik base, Powers said that
base it was visited on two occasions by (Lieut.) General Frank F.
Everest, the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Air Force in
Europe, and by other American generals. (Volume 4, pages 28, 211.)
It has thus been established that the "Lockheed U-2" plane shot
down on May 1st, 1960 belonged to the United States Airforce.
The criminal breach by the United States Government of the
universally recognized standards of international law represents
one of the elements of the aggressive foreign policy pursued by the
United States Government. This aggressive policy was repeatedly
formulated by United States leaders, in particular by former Secre-
tary of State of the United States John Foster Dulles as "from
positions of strength policy," "deterrent policy," and "the policy of
balancing on the brink of war."
As late as July 1959, the United States Vice President Nixon in
an article published by Life magazine again highly praised the so-
called "policy of balancing on the brink of war" and declared that
this policy remained one of the supreme principles of the United
States of America.
As is known, this policy was manifested in the conclusion under
the United States aegis of aggressive pacts and alliances in nearly
all parts of the world, in the arms race, in the establishment of a net
of military bases around the borders of the Soviet Union and other
socialist countries as well as in other aggressive actions endanger-
ing universal peace and security.
Expressions of the same policy were the systematic intrusions of
aircraft of the United States Air Force into the limits of the Soviet
Union, including the aggressive intrusion by an American "Lock-
heed U-2" military aircraft on May 1st, 1960.
The reckless actions of the United States Government have
brought about the breakdown of the Summit Meeting in Paris and
complicated the international situation.
The United States Government has drawn into the realization of
its aggressive policy a number of states bordering on the Soviet
Union, which have lent their territories for American military
bases and consequently are accomplices in the aggressive actions
against the USSR.
It has been established by the investigation that the intrusion of
the American "Lockheed U-2" aircraft on May 1st could not have
taken pplace without the use of military air bases on territories of
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states lying close to the Soviet Union, specifically of Turkey, Pakis-
tan and Norway in view of the fact that the maximum range of the
"Lockheed" U-2" aircraft being what it is, it could not operate from
the United States territory.
It has been established that the reconnaissance "10-10" detach-
ment in which Powers served was based on the American-Turkish
Incirlik airbase.
The unit was under the command of Colonel Shelton of the United
States Air Force.
The "Lockheed U-2" plane in which the aggressive intrusion into
the boundaries of the Soviet Union was carried out on May 1st of
the current year, was flown from the Incirlik base to the Peshawar
military airbase in Pakistan, from which it flew to the Soviet Union.
This involved a breach of the sovereignty of Afghanistan over the
territory of which the afore-mentioned plane flew unlawfully, with-
out the knowledge of Afghan authorities.
Asked what reserve airfields were indicated to him for his May
1st flight, Powers said:
"As reserve airfields I could use any airfield in Norway,
Pakistan and Iran." (Volume 3, page 88.)
It has also been established that according to his assignment
after ending his flight, Powers was to land on the Bodoe military
airbase in Norway which had been already used by the "10-10"
intelligence detachment on previous occasions.
These circumstances have been established by the testimony
given by Powers, his flight map and other evidence (Volume 2,
pages 9, 28, 180, 196-198, 304; volume 6, page 25).
Instructions given to Powers envisaged the possibility of a breach
of sovereignty of other states as well. On this question Defendant
Powers testified :
"In case of a shortage of fuel to fly to Murmansk along the
planned route, I could turn to the left before reaching
Kandalaksha and fly via Finland to Bodoe, Norway."
(Volume 2, page 241.)
The instruction given to Powers envisaged the possibility of land-
ing, if need be, on airfields in Finland or Sweden.
This is what Powers testified on this matter:
"This word `Sodankyla' written along the green line (the
line on the flight map) means that I could land at Sodan-
kyla airfield (Finland). However, Colonel Shelton has
warned me that this airfield is bad and that I may use it
only in case of emergency since in any way it is better than
to land somewhere on Soviet territory. He also said that it
is best of all to land in Sweden or Norway, the latter being
more desirable." (Volume 2, page 271.)
This testimony given by Powers is confirmed by the marks found
on his flight map. (Volume 6, page 25.)
Thus the investigation of the present case once more confirmed
the fact that American military bases established on the territories
of certain foreign states constitute a danger to peace and to the
security of nations.
For the realization of their aggressive policy of espionage against
the Soviet Union, the government and the military command of the
United States for a number of years have been selecting and train-
ing the necessary' personnel. It was for this purpose that the de-
fendant in this case, Francis Gary Powers was recruited.
During the investigation Powers testified that in 1950 he volun-
teered for the United States Air Force, underwent training at an
Air Force school in Greenville, Mississippi, and later on at an airbase
outside Phoenix, Arizona. After graduation he had served as a pilot
at various United States military airbases with the rank of first
lieutenant. (Volume 3, pages 109-113; volume 4, pages 43-45.)
In April 1956, Powers was recruited by the United States Central
Intelligence Agency to fly special reconnaissance missions on spe-
cially equipped high-altitude aircraft. (Volume 2, pages 88-92, 103,
178; volume 4, pages 45-49.)
When Powers was recruited, the tasks he was to perform were
explained to him. In this connection Powers testified :
"They said that my main job would be flying the aircraft
along the USSR borders to pick up any information I could
about radar and radiostations and any other information
that could be picked up. They also said that there might
be other duties in the future if everything went well."
(Volume 4, page 47.)
After that he signed a secret contract with the Central Intelli-
gence Agency of the United States headed by Allen Dulles and
pledged in writing to keep this cooperation secret. Powers was
warned that for violating his pledge and divulging information about
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the activities of the American Intelligence Service he is liable to
be punished by criminal law by ten years in jail or fined $10,000,
or both. (Volume 2, pages 92, 103-104.)
Indeed Chapter 37 on "Espionage and Censorship" of the United
States Legal Code contains Clause 793 which stipulates such pun-
ishment for offenses specified above.
Powers testified that for the fulfillment of espionage assignments
of the American Intelligence Service he was given a monthly pay
of $2,500, although when he served in the United States Air Force
he was paid $700 a month. (Volume 2, pages 2, 91.)
After being enlisted by the American Intelligence Service he was
sent for special training to a desert airfield in Nevada.
At this airfield which at the same time is a part of an atomic
testing ground, for two and a half months he studied the high-
altitude "Lockheed U-2" plane and received instruction in the
operation of equipment designed to intercept radio and radar
signals. Piloting aircraft of this type, Powers made high altitude
long-range training flights over California, Texas and the northern
United States.
For secrecy's sake, the spy pilots who underwent training at this
airfield were registered under fictitious names. In particular, Powers
was registered there under the name of Palmer. (Volume 2, pages
192-194; volume 3, pages 45-51; volume 4, pages 47-52.)
After special training Powers was sent to the American-Turkish
Incirlik military airbase near Adana where the reconnaissance unit,
known under the code name of "10-10" detachment was stationed.
This detachment assigned to conduct intelligence work against
the USSR by sending spy planes into the airspace of the USSR to
gather information on military, industrial and other important
objectives for the sake of camouflage was officially subordinated to
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). (Vol-
ume 2, pages 195, 217; volume 4, pages 52-56, 62, 313.)
Concerning the certificate found on Powers which was issued on
January 1st, 1959, he stated that this certificate "says that I have
the right to pilot a U.S. Air Force plane. It was issued to me in the
detachment "10-10" on airbase in Incirlik. The certificate was issued
to us in the name of NASA." (Volume 3, page 183.)
On orders of the "10-10" detachment command, Powers made
systematic intelligence flights since 1956 in a special high-altitude
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The Indictment
13
"Lockheed Ui-2" plane along the Soviet borders with Turkey, Iran
and Afghanistan. (Volume 2
,pages 8, 177, 178, 237-239.)
Powers said of these flights :
"We would take off from Incirlik airfield and would fly
eastward as far as the town of Van, situated on the lake
of the same name. After that we would proceed to Teheran,
the capital of Iran, and having passed it would fly east-
ward, to the south of the Caspian Sea. After that I usually
flew to the south of Meshed, crossed the Iranian-Afghani
frontier and further along the Afghani-Soviet frontier ...
not far from the eastern frontier of Pakistan a turn was
made and we returned to the Incirlik airfield taking the
same route. Later on we began making a turn earlier,
after penetrating into the Afghan territory for about 200
miles." (Volume 3, page 9.)
Powers further pointed out that during his intelligence flights in
this area he was told to use as emergency airfields, in case of a
possible landing, the airfields of Meshed and Teheran in the territory
of Iran. (Volume 3, page 87.)
The course of Powers' flight over the territory of the Soviet
Union on May 1st, 1960 was carefully prepared in advance. This
is indicated by the fact that this flight was entrusted precisely to
Powers, who familiarized himself with Bodoe airport in Norway
as early as 1958.
As established by the investigation, on April 27th, 1960 Powers
was brought in a transport plane of the United States Air Force
from the Incirlik Air Force base to Pakistan-the Peshawar airport.
Colonel Shelton and a party of 20 people from among the mainten-
ance personnel of the "10-10" detachment arrived simultaneously
at Peshawar base to prepare this flight. The specially fitted-out
"Lockheed U-2" plane was flown there from Turkey by another pilot
of the "10-10" detachment. (Volume 2, pages 179, 197-198, 240-244;
volume 3, pages 6-7; volume 4, pages 59-60.)
On the night of May 1st, 1960, two and a half hours before take-
off, Powers was ordered by Shelton to fly over the territory of the
USSR from south to north at an altitude of 20,000 meters (65,600
feet) along the following route : Peshawar, the Aral Sea, Sverdlovsk,
Kirov, Archangel, Murmansk and to land at Bodoe airport in
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The Trial of the U-2
In accordance with the orders he received, Powers when flying
over certain points of the Soviet territory was to switch on the
special equipment with which the plane was fitted out for aerial
photography and registration of the operation of radar stations of
the Soviet Union's anti-aircraft defense system. On Shelton's orders
Powers was to give special attention to several places on his course
and to two points-at one of which a missile-launching site was sup-
posed to be located and at the other, an especially important defense
objective.
Powers carefully complied with all these instructions. Powers
took off in his "Lockheed U-2" plane from Peshawar airport, climbed
to an altitude of 20,000 meters (65,600 feet), flew over the territory
of Afghanistan, intruded in the airspace of the Soviet Union for
more than 2,000 kilometers (1343 miles) from the frontier. The
navigation instruments and the special equipment functioned fault-
lessly during the flight.
Throughout the flight Powers felt normal and plotted intelligence
data on his flight map. In the area of Sverdlovsk Powers' plane was
shot down by the Soviet rocket troops. (Volume 2, pages 4, 9, 28, 37-
39, 179-181, 198, 199, 239-244, 254-260, 268-271, 273, 274; volume 3,
pages 20-23, 60, 61, 132-134, 142-145; volume 6, page 25.)
Asked about the circumstances under which the plane he piloted
was shot down, Powers testified :
"... quite unexpectedly I heard a kind of hollow explosion
and saw an orange flash. The plane suddenly pitched down
and, I think, its wings and tail started falling off. Perhaps
the plane was not hit directly and the explosion took place
near the plane and it was hit by the burst and fragments ...
I think it happened at the altitude of some 68,000 feet ...
I was shot down some 25-30 miles south or southeast of
Sverdlovsk. At the moment I was keeping to the route
indicated on my chart rather accurately ... when the plane
began to fall down I was.pressed to the central panel and
could not use the catapult. I opened the canopy, unfastened
the straps and got out from the plane through the top.
The parachute opened automatically." (Volume 2, page
182; volume 4, pages 256-257.)
The testimony of the accused, material evidence and expert con-
clusions have shown that the plane piloted by Powers was equipped
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The Indictment
15
with a special blasting device permitting the pilot to blow it up in
case of a forced landing in Soviet territory. Moreover, there was a
blasting machine in the tape recorder designed for registering the
signals of Soviet radar stations. (Volume 1, page 228; volume 2,
pages 209-210; volume 5, pages 30, 84-91.)
Powers was provided with a special pin with leth
l
a
poison from
the curare group. This pin was given to him, as Powers declared, to
commit suicide in case he was tortured. (Volume 1, page 37; volume
2, pages 10, 93; volume 5, pages 261-262.)
All these plans and the carefully thought-out measures of precau-
tion were intended to avoid the exposure of the United States ruling
quarters' aggressive policy and to deceive world public opinion.
Besides the poisoned pin, Powers was provided with : a noiseless
pistol and cartridges, a dagger, a pneumatic rubber boat, a set of
topographical maps of the European part of the USSR and the
adjoining countries, means for kindling a fire, signal cartridges, an
electric torchlight, compasses, a saw, fishing tackle and other imple-
ments and things, as well as 7,500 Soviet rubles and valuables (gold
coins, rings, wrist watches) which, as Powers testified, were given
to him by Colonel Shelton when he boarded the plane and were
designed to bribe Soviet people in case of a forced landing in Soviet
territory.
All this equipment was taken from Powers after he was detained.
(Volume 1, pages 21-22, 34-41, 67-72, 81-83, 161-188; volume 2,
pages 46-48, 219-220; volume 3, pages 244-250, 257-264; volume 4,
pages 1-7, 16-21.)
Witnesses V. P. Surin, a driver; A. F. Cheremisin, a worker; L. A.
Chuzhakin, a driver; P. E. Asabin, an invalid; and many others who
witnessed how the "Lockheed U-2" plane was hit by a rocket in the
area of Sverdlovsk and who detained pilot Powers when he para-
chuted down, have testified to the following:
V. P. Surin: "On May 1st, 1960, approximately at 11 A.M.
local time, when I was at home in my apartment, I heard a
sharp noise resembling that of a jet plane, but much
shriller. This got me interested and I ran into the street to
find out what was up. Then I heard an explosion and also
saw ... a column of dust ... At the same time I sighted a
cloud of smoke ' t},p~ hite object
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coming down. I followed it with my eyes and when it came
lower I saw it to be a descending parachutist. When all this
was happening, driver Leonid Chuzhakin, whom I know
from my work, pulled up next to me in his car. When he
got out of the car I pointed to the descending parachutist
and we started watching where he would land. Some time
later, we saw that he was landing on the shore of a rivulet
near the high voltage line. Chuzhakin invited me into his
car and we drove to the place where the parachutist landed.
Some 50 meters (164 feet) from there, Chuzhakin stopped
the car and we ran to the spot where the parachutist came
down." (Volume 4, pages 328, 329.)
L. A. Chuzhakin: "When the helmet with the earphones
was removed the parachutist said something in a language
we did not understand. We asked him who he was, but he
gave no reply. Then we saw that he was a foreigner. This
put us on the alert and then Cheremisin took away the long-
barreled pistol in a leather case that was hanging from his
belt. We asked him by gestures whether he was alone. He
replied also by gestures that he was. Seeing that the para-
chutist was a foreigner, we decided to detain him." (Vol-
ume 4, pages 399 and 400.)
P. E. Asabin: "The parachutist fell while landing. To pre-
vent him from being dragged by the parachute on the
ground I held him and helped him to spill the air from the
parachute, since I am acquainted with this having served
in the airforce in the past. Meanwhile my acquaintances
Anatoli Cheremisin, Leonid Chuzhakin and Vladimir Surin
came running up and helped the parachutist to get on his
feet. I helped him to remove the parachute, while Chere-
misin, Chuzhakin and Surin removed the helmet with the
earphones and the gloves. When the helmet with the ear-
phones was removed, the parachutist said something in a
language we could not understand. We asked him who he
was and what happened but he gave no reply and only
shook his head. We understood that he was a foreigner
and decided to detain him." VAW'PAO 4 '1e? ligPd aisle ~003/10
The Indictment
A. F. Cheremisin: "Supporting the detained parachutist
by the arms, Asabin and I led him to the
passenger
car
standing close by in which Chuzhakin adsSurin had
arrived. While putting him into the car, Asabin saw that
the parachutist had a hunting knife and took it away."
(Volume 4, page 387.)
The inspection of the remnants of the downed plane showed that
the parts and the instrumentation of the plane were seriously dam-
aged when the plane was hit in the air and when it collided with
the earth. Parts of the plane were scattered over an area of about 20
square kilometers (about 9 sq. miles). (Volume 1, pages 47-59, 227.)
Defendant Powers, when shown the parts of the downed plane
and asked what plane it was, replied :
"It is a `Lockheed U-2' plane in a very damaged condition."
When asked if it was the plane in which he flew over the territory
of the Soviet Union on May 1st, 1960, Powers replied :
"To my mind this is the same plane which I piloted on May
1st, 1960. In order to tell more exactly I must see the pilot's
cockpit if it still exists . . ."
After that defendant Powers was shown the preserved part of the
pilot's cabin. When asked "Are you familiar with this part of
the plane ?" he replied: "Yes, it is familiar to me. It is a canopy
of the pilot's cockpit. I am sure this is the canopy of the cockpit of
my plane . . ." (Volume 3, page 158-160.)
The experts who inspected the remnants of the downed plane
concluded that it was a subsonic one-seater reconnaissance plane of
the "U-2" type of the American firm "Lockheed" with a single
turbojet engine. The plane has no national identification marks. It
carried apparatuses for photographic and radio technical recon-
naissance including a two-lens aerophoto camera with a focal length
of 36 inches and also the apparatuses for detecting radio emissions
in the three centimeter, decimeter and meter ranges of wavelength.
Installed in the plane also was a remote controlled blasting block
containing 1.4 kilograms (over 3 lbs.) of explosives.
The instrumentation and parts of the plane carry trade marks
of different American firms; in particular, the turbojet engine was
made by the "Pratt-Whitney" firm, the starters and electric bat-
teries were made by the firms "Hamilton Standard," "General Elec-
tric"et.RR
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The Trial of the U-2 1 The Indictment
that it is the property of the United States Defense Department.
For instance the apparatuses for radio technical reconnaissance
made by the "Hewlett-Packard Company" and Huggins Laboratory
bear a special index showing that it belonged to the United States
Defense Department.
The absence on the plane of national identification marks and the
presence of a set of special apparatuses for photo and radio techni-
cal reconnaissance, as well as the blasting device for destroying the
plane clearly reveal its intelligence mission. (Volume 1, pages 227-
228, 248-253; volume 5, pages 84-91, 111-112, 115-158, 174-185.)
The expert technical examination has established that the plane
carried a special aerial sound recorder connected with the radio-
wave detector, with a roll of ferromagnetic tape for 8 hours of con-
tinuous operation. The sound recorder has the index MP 12,570
and serial number 769. It has a DC tape-feed actuating mechanism
made by the American Globe Industries, Inc. in Dayton, Ohio.
The decoding of the impulse signals recorded on the ferromagnetic
tape has shown these signals to belong to the ground radar stations
of the radar network of the air defenses of the Soviet Union.
These recordings can serve to determine the range of wavelengths
on which the reconnoitered radar stations operate, the frequency of
impulse repetition, the time of coverage of the plane by a radar
station and the area of its dislocation, the number and operating
duty of radar stations in service. (Volume 5, pages 29-36.)
The intelligence gathering activity of the "Lockheed U-2" plane
on its flight over the territory of the USSR has also been confirmed
by the findings of the technical experts who examined the plane's
photographic equipment.
The experts established the 73-B aerial camera number 732400,
which was found on the "Lockheed U-2", to be a special reconnais-
sance camera designed for high-altitude photography of 160-200
kilometer-wide (100-125 mile-wide) strips of land.
The investigation has established that during his flight over the
territory of the Soviet Union Powers photographed the territory
and industrial, military and other important establishments. Much
of the film, removed from the plane, has been found unexposed and
was developed.
The examination of the aerial film has established that the locality-
photographed with long-focus cameras from the plane is Soviet ter-
Approved For Release 2003/10/07
ritory stretching from a point west of Tashkent to Sverdlovsk.
Photographed on the film are a number of military airfields and civil
airports as well as important industrial establishments of the South
Urals.
The experts' findings and the rest of the evidence collected show
that the air photographs obtained during the flight of the "Lock-
heed U-2" plane, piloted by Powers, represent a wide range of intelli-
gence on industrial and military establishments within the photo-
graphed area applicable both for reconnaissance purposes and for
compiling topographic maps and also for determining the coordi-
nates of strategic military establishments. (Volume 5, pages 177-
185.)
The intelligence-gathering activity of the "Lockheed U-2" plane
has been confirmed also by Powers' testimony during the prelimi-
nary investigation and by his own written statement.
Questioned on the substance of the charge preferred against him,
Powers pleaded guilty and testified as follows :
"I plead guilty to the fact that I.have flown over the Soviet
territory and over the points indicated on the chart, turned
on and off the necessary controls of the special equipment
mounted aboard my plane. This, I believe, was done with
the aim of collecting intelligence information about the
Soviet Union."
And further on :
"In accordance with the contract which was signed by me
with the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States,
I was a pilot of this special air detachment of the USA deal-
ing with the collection of information about operational
radio stations and radars on the territory of the Soviet
Union and, as I suppose, about locations of rockets." (Vol-
ume 2, pages 176, 177.)
Powers' liability to the charge preferred against him is confirmed
by factual and written evidence, experts' findings and the testimony
of the witnesses.
On the basis of the foregoing:
Francis Gary Powers, born in 1929, citizen of the United States.
born in Burdine, Kentucky, college graduate, pilot of the special
"10-10" intelligence detachment of the Central Intelligence Agency
of the United States, is hereby accused of having, after being
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20 The Trial of the U-2
recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States
in 1956, conducted intense espionage activity against the Soviet
Union which is an expression of the aggressive policy pursued by
the Government of the United States.
On May 1st, 1960, he, Powers, invaded the airspace of the USSR
in a specially equipped intelligence plane, "Lockheed U-2", with the
knowledge of the United States Government and under instructions
from the American intelligence service which is implementing the
afore-mentioned aggressive policy, with a view to gathering strate-
gic intelligence on the location of missile bases, airfields, radar
facilities and other important defense and industrial establishments
of the USSR, that is, information which represents the state and
military secret of the Soviet Union, and, having flown over 2,000
kilometers deep into the Soviet Union, photographedt with special
equipment a number of the above-mentioned installations and tape
recorded the signals of radar stations, and collected other informa-
tion of espionage character.
The crime, committed by the accused Francis Gary Powers, falls
within the scope of Article 2 of the Law of the Soviet Union "On
Criminal Responsibility For State Crimes."
The indictment was drawn up in the city of Moscow on July 7th,
1960.
Composition of The Court
COMPOSITION OF THE COURT:
PRESIDENT:
Lieutenant-General of Justice
VIKTOR V. BORISOGLEBSKY
Chairman of the Military Division
of the Supreme Court of the USSR
MEMBERS OF THE COURT:
Major-General of the Artillery
DMITRY Z. VOROBYEV
People's Assessor of the Military
Division of the Supreme Court of the USSR
Major-General of the Air Force
ALEXANDER I. ZAKHAROV
People's Assessor of the Military Division
of the Supreme Court of the USSR
(signed) A. SHELEPIN,
Chairman of the State Security Committee
Under the Council of Ministers of the USSR.
Approved :
Procurator-General of
the USSR
State Counsellor of Justice
R. RUDENKO
July 9, 1960
Published: August 10, 1960
SECRETARY OF THE COURT:
Major of Administrative Service
MIKHAIL V. AFANASYEV
STATE PROSECUTOR
State Counsellor of Justice
ROMAN A. RUDENKO
Procurator-General of the USSR
COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENSE
MIKHAIL I. GRINEV
Member of the Moscow City Collegium of Lawyers
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FIRST DAY
AUGUST 17, 1960
FIRST SESSION, 10 A.M.
Approved For Release 2003/10/0
COMMANDANT OF THE COURT: The Court is coming. Please
rise.
PRESIDING JUDGE VIKTOR V. BORISOGLEBSKY: Be seated.
I declare the session of the Military Division of the Supreme
Soviet of the USSR open. The case considering criminal charges
against Francis Gary Powers, a citizen of the United States of
America, committed for trial in accordance with Article '2 of the Law
of the USSR "On Criminal Responsibility of State Crimes" is hereby
declared open. I order the commandant to bring the Defendant
Francis Gary Powers into the courtroom.
(Defendant Powers enters the courtroom).
PRESIDING JUDGE: In accordance with the Criminal Procedure
Code of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, this trial
will be conducted in Russian. Because the Defendant does not know
the Russian language, the court appoints as interpreters B. E.
Belitsky and I. A. Adamov.
Do the participants of the proceedings have any challenges to
the interpreters, Comrade Procurator-General?
PROCURATOR RUDENKO: No.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Comrade Defense Counsel?
DEFENSE COUNSEL GRINEV: No.
PRESIDING JUDGE : Defendant?
DEFENDANT POWERS: No. (Answers, sitting down)
PRESIDING JUDGE: Defendant, you are obliged to stand, when
the Court addresses you. You have no objections against the
interpreters Belitsky and Adamov?
DEFENDANT POWERS: No objections.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Interpreters Belitsky and Adamov, I must
explain to you that you must interpret everything that is said
exactly during the proceedings of this case. I must remind you of
Article 95 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR for the consequences
I14@dI~476f6f~Q. ~'o show that you understand
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The Trial of the U-2
and bear responsibility for the consequences of intentionally-incor-
rect translation, I must ask you to sign this statement. Comrade
Secretary, obtain their signatures.
(Secretary takes signatures from the interpreters)
SECRETARY OF THE COURT: We have their signatures.
PRELIMINARY QUESTIONING OF DEFENDANT POWERS
BY PRESIDING JUDGE BORISOGLEBSKY
PRESIDING JUDGE: What is your name? A. My name is Powers,
Francis Gary.
Q. Of what country are you a citizen? A. The United States.
Q. When were you born? A. 1929.
Q. Where were you born? A. Burdine in the state of Kentucky.
Q. What nationality? A. United States.
Q. Are your parents alive, where do they reside and what is their
occupation? A. Both my parents are alive. They reside in
Pound, Va. My father is a shoe repairman. My mother is a
housewife.
Q. From what institution have you graduated? A. I graduated
from Milligan College near Johnson City.
Q. What is your family status? Are you married? A. Yes, I am
married. No children.
Q. What is your profession? A. Pilot.
Q. What place of work? A. Detachment 10-10 at Adana, Turkey.
Q. Did you receive the text of the indictment in English? A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall the date? A. Last Wednesday. I don't know the
date.'
Q. Have you been told of the decision to bring you before this court?
A. Yes.
PRESIDING JUDGE : Comrade Secretary, who was called in the
capacity of witnesses for the Court and who has appeared?
SECRETARY OF THE COURT : For these court proceedings in the
capacity of witnesses to the trial the following witnesses were
summonded : Surin, Vladimir Pavlovich ; Chuzhakin, Leonid Alek-
seyevich; Asabin, Pyotr Yefremovich and Cheremisin, Anatoli
Fyodorovich.
PRESIDING JUDGE: I ask that the witnesses come forward to
'The date was the 10th of August, 1960 the date of issue, one week before the trial date.
(Publisher's note) Approved For Release 2003/10/
Preliminary Proceedings
the Court. (Witnesses come forward). Witnesses Surin, Chuzhakin,
Asabin and Cheremisin, I must explain to you that you are obliged
to give to the Court truthful answers in this case. I give you notice
in advance that for untruthful testimony, you will be responsible
before the law for violating Article 95 of the Criminal Code of the
RSFSR. I ask you to sign statements to the effect that you will bear
responsibility for submitting false testimony.
(Witnesses sign statement)
PRESIDING JUDGE : Witnesses, according to the law, you do not
have the right to be in the Courtroom until the moment when you
are to testify. Comrade Commandant, please conduct the witnesses
to the witness-room.
(The witnesses leave the Courtroom)
Comrade Secretary, who was summoned to this case in the capacity
of experts ?
SECRETARY OF THE COURT: As experts for this case, the fol-
lowing were summoned : Colonel Alekseyev, Nikolai Alekseyevich ;
Colonel of the Engineers Tyufilin, Yuri Vsevelodovich ; Doctor of
Technical Sciences Professor Istomin, Gleb Alekseyevich; Colonel
the Engineers Andreyev, Rostislav Aleksandrovich; Colonel of the
Engineers Voroshilov, Konstantin Vasilyevich, Colonel of the En-
gineers Burmistrov-Zuyev, Nikolai Mikhailovich; Honored Scien-
tist of the RSFSR, Doctor of Medical Sciences Professor Prozorov-
sky, Viktor Ilyich.
PRESIDING JUDGE: I ask that the experts come forward to the
Court (Experts come forward). Comrade experts, The Court will
explain to you your rights in this case. You are entitled to be present
in the Courtroom during the proceedings, ask questions of the De-
fendant and of the witnesses within those matters necessary for
you to deliver your conclusions, and to acquaint yourselves with the
materials in this case. Comrade experts, do you understand your
rights ?
(The experts signify that they understood)
PRESIDING JUDGE: According to Article 170 of the Criminal
Procedure Code of the RSFSR, I give you notice that you are
obliged to submit conclusions which are strictly in accordance with
the given facts and to give the Court your special knowledge which
you possess. For submitting false conclusions, you will bear re-
sponsibility under Article 95 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR.
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I ask you, Comrade Experts, to sign the statement to that effect.
(Secretary collects their signatures to the statement)
PRESIDING JUDGE: Comrade Experts, I ask you to take your
places.
PRESIDING JUDGE : Defendant Powers, I wish to explain to you
your rights in these proceedings under Article 277 of the Criminal
Procedure Code of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.
You are entitled to testify in your own language, take part in the
court proceedings, to put questions to the witnesses, to make state-
ments concerning the testimony of witnesses, to put questions to
experts for solution, to submit new evidence, to request new evidence
and documents to be included in the case, to have a lawyer in court
and to speak the last word at the end of the court proceedings. Have
you understood the rights granted to you in court by law?
DEFENDANT POWERS: Yes.
PRESIDING JUDGE : I announce the composition of the Court in
this case. This case is being considered by the Military Division
of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, as elected by the Supreme
Soviet of the USSR on February 12, 1957. Presiding Judge is Viktor
V. Borisoglebsky, Lieutenant-General of Justice and Chairman of
the Military Division. People's Assessors are Dmitry Z. Vorobyev,
Major-General of the Artillery and Alexander I. Zakharov, Major-
General of the Air Froce. The Secretary of the Court is Mikhail V.
Afanasyev, Major of Administrative Service. The State Prosecutor
is Roman A. Rudenko, State Counselor of Justice and Procurator-
General of the USSR. Counsel for the defense is Mikhail I. Grinev, i
member of the Moscow City Collegium of Lawyers.
PRESIDING JUDGE : Do the participants in these proceedings
challenge the composition of the court as a whole or any members
of the court individually? Comrade Procurator-General?
PROCURATOR RUDENKO: No.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Does the Defense Counsel challenge the
composition of the court as a whole or any members of the court
individually ?
DEFENSE COUNSEL GRINEV : No.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Defendant Powers, in accordance with Article
43 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the RSFSR you have the right
to challenge the composition of the Court as a whole or any member
of the Court because of their relations* 44a ~Qts~eol~/10/d
Reading of the Indictment
proceedings or any of the witnesses or experts in these proceedings.
Do you have any challenges of the composition of this Court?
DEFENDANT POWERS: No, I have no challenges.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Of the Secretary?
DEFENDANT POWERS: No.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Defendant Powers, on the same basis, you
have the right to challenge the selection of the Procurator.
DEFENDANT POWERS: I have no objections.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Defendant Powers, you also have the right
to challenge the selection of experts.
DEFENDANT POWERS: I have no objections.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Defendant Powers, in accordance with the
law, according to your request, your Defense Counsel Grinev was
permitted access to the materials in this case the moments when
they were presented to you for your information during the investi-
gation. Do you reject your Defense Counsel Grinev?
DEFENDANT POWERS: No.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Does the Procurator-General have any state-
ment or request to make in connection with the preliminary pro-
ceedings ?
PROCURATOR RUDENKO: I will not have any statements to
make.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Does the Defense Counsel have any state-
ment?
COUNSEL GRINEV: I have no statement to make.
PRESIDING JUDGE : Do the experts have any statements to make?
(Experts indicate they have not)
PRESIDING JUDGE: Does the Defendant have anything to say?
DEFENDANT POWERS : I have nothing to say at this time.
PRESIDING JUDGE: The preliminary proceedings are finished.
The judicial inquiry will begin. In accordance with Article 279 of
the Criminal Procedure Code of RSFSR, the Secretary of the Court
will proceed to read the indictment in full.
SECRETARY OF THE COURT AFANASYEV: (Full indictment
appears beginning on page 3)
PRESIDING JUDGE: Defendant Powers, you have heard the read-
ing of the indictment against you. Do you understand the charge
brought against you? Have you understood?
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PRESIDING JUDGE: Accused Powers, do you plead guilty of the
charge?
DEFENDANT POWERS: Yes, I plead guilty.
PRESIDING JUDGE: What proposals do the participants in these
proceedings have with regards to the order of business? Comrade
Procurator-General ?
PROCURATOR RUDENKO: I propose that the order of business
be the following: to begin with the examination of the Defendant
and then call in the witnesses as they were listed in the list, then
to the finishing speeches.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Comrade Defense Counsel?
DEFENSE COUNSEL GRINEV: I have no objections to the pro-
posals of the Comrade Procurator-General. I am in agreement with
him.
PRESIDING JUDGE: The Court sitting here, decides: the exami-
nation of the materials in this case will begin with the examination
of the Defendant, then the questioning of the witnesses, then the
hearing of the conclusions of the experts.
(Recess for twenty minutes)
COMMANDANT OF THE COURT: The Court is coming. Please
rise.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Be seated. The session is resumed. Comrade
Procurator, have you any questions to put to the Defendant Powers?
PROCURATOR RUDENKO: Yes, I have.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Defendant Powers, I ask you to answer the
questions of the Procurator-General of the Soviet Union.
QUESTIONING OF THE DEFENDANT
BY PROCURATOR-GENERAL RUDENKO
Q. Defendant Powers, when did you get the assignment to fly over
the territory of the Soviet Union? A. On the morning of May 1.
Q. From whom did you get that assignment? A. From the com-
manding officer of my detachment.
Q. Who is the commanding officer of this detachment? A. Colonel
Shelton.
Q. Where is this detachment located? A. It is located in Adana,
Turkey.
Q. Where did you get the assignment to fly to the Soviet Union?
A. In the town of Peshawar, Pakistan.
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Examination of Defendant by Procurator
Q. When did you arrive in the town of Peshawar?
A. I don't re-
member the exact date. But it was a few days before the flight,
I should say some four or five days.
Q. That means in the latter part of April? A. Yes, in the latter
Part of April.
Q. With whom did you arrive in Peshawar? A. It was a cargo air-
craft with roughly 20 people and the commanding officer Shelton.
Q. Was this a special trip in connection with preparation of the
flight to the Soviet Union? A. Yes, the plane was assigned only
to deliver our people to the airfield.
Turkey. From what airfield did it take off ? A. It took off from Adana,
.
Q. Did it fly non stop from Adana to Peshawar? A. No, there was
one landing for refueling.
Q. Where was that landing? A. I don't remember the exact name.
It was somewhere along en route.
by British personnel. I think it was Bahreinirfield was serviced
Q. Is that a British base? A. I can only say that British personnel
serviced the airplane.
Q. I- see. How did the U-2 plane get to the Peshawar airfield? A. It
was brought to the airfield the night before, April 30.
Q. By another Pilot? A. Yes.
Q. But it was brought for you to fly in it into the Soviet Union?
A. At the time I didn't know I had to make the flight, but,
apparently, the plane was brought there for that purpose.
Q. Was this the plane that You, Defendant Powers, flew into the
Soviet Union? A. Yes.
Q. Were you the only one prepared for the flight or were there other
pilots prepared too? A. There were two of us being prepared
at the same time.
Q. Why? A. I had no idea why. I have only my own opinions but
cannot answer for them.
Q. Were you specially trained for this fli ht ?
detachment were trained for the same flights aA. A
s I was Lots in my
Q. And you are included in this
Defendant Powers? A. Yes.
Q. When did you leave the base at Peshawar?
about 6:30 local time in the morning. A. I think it was
Q. What too
CI~ tt OV OF (4b200gh#&' A. For about two hours I
roug preparations for breathing oxygen for high-
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The Trial of the U-2
altitude flights and at that time I received a briefing.
Q. You left the base at Peshawar in the U-2 airplane? A. Yes.
Q. What kind of a plane is the U-2? A. It is a special high-altitude
aircraft prepared and designed to fly at very high altitudes.
Q. Is it a reconnaissance military plane? A. Well I wouldn't call it
exactly a military plane but it is an airplane of that type which
is for reconnaissance as well as research work at high altitudes.
Q. And for intelligence purposes? A. Well as I said I don't know
whether it was military or not.
Q. But it did belong to your detachment? A. Yes.
Q. That is, the 10-10 detachment? A. Yes.
Q. Is this a military detachment ? A. Yes, it is commanded by mil-
itary personnel, but the main part of the personnel were civilians.
Q. Did you see any identification marks on the U-2 before the flight?
A. Well, I could not inspect the plane because I was wearing a
special flying suit and hence I do not know if it had any mark-
ings. It was hard for me to look at all the sides of the plane.
Q. But did you see any identification marks? A. No, I did not ob-
serve the plane at close range.
Q. But at any time, Defendant Powers, did you see any identifica-
tion marks on the U-2? A. All the airplanes, based in Turkey,
had identification marks.
Q. But I ask you about this U-2? A. I personally did not see any
identification marks on this plane but all the other planes which
I have seen did have identification marks.
Q. It is important for me to establish that on the plane on which
the Defendant Powers flew did not have identification marks.
Why were there not any identification marks? A. I cannot be
positive that there were none.
Q. But you just informed this court that you did not see any
identification marks. A. I did not look for any.
Q. You further stated that the absence of the identification marks
was for the purpose of hiding the national identity of these
planes. A. Would you repeat the question?
Q. In the preliminary investigation you stated that the absence
of identification marks was for the purpose of hiding the national
identity of these planes. A. I do not remember.
Q. You do not remember? We will leave it to the experts to prove
that there were not any identifica%prgvA$V(Mcgeie %1401@W10
Examination of Defendant by Procurator 31
to ask you what route did you follow flying to the Soviet border?
A. I don't remember now the exact data of the flight, but I
flew directly from the Peshawar airfield to the Soviet border.
Q. Where and at what time did you cross the border of the USSR?
A. I don't remember now the exact time but I would say ap-
proximately 30 minutes after take-off.
At what altitude were you supposed to fly? A. At the maximum
altitude. Altitude varies with fuel load. As the fuel burns out
the plane climbs higher.
Q. To what altitude? A. The maximum altitude is 68,000 feet.
Q. What did Colonel Shelton tell you regarding safe flying at such
an altitude? A. I was told it was absolutely safe to fly over
the Soviet Union at such an altitude and that anti-aircraft
defense could not hit me.
What was your task in connection with the flight deep into the
Soviet Union on May 1 of this year? A. The objective was to
follow the route indicated on the chart and switch on and off
designated equipment. over the places indicated.
Q. Were these places marked on your chart? A. They were marked
just A or B or C or numbers 1-2-3.
Q. When were these signs made? A. They were made on the chart
before I received it.
PROCURATOR RUDENKO: I ask the Court to allow me to show
Defendant Powers his flight chart, which was found among the
wreckage of his plane. It is located in Volume 6, page 25.
(At the direction of the Presiding Judge, the Secretary shows
Defendant Powers the flight chart.)
Q. Defendant Powers, first of all, I have a question: does this flight
chart belong to you? A. Yes, this was the flight chart which
I had on the 1st of May.
Q. Were the main points of the route marked on this chart? A. All
the points were marked on this chart.
Are you able to name the main points as marked on the chart?
A. Yes, I am able to because the red penciled route indicated
the exact route 1 was to follow.
Q. Would you name these points? A. One of these is east of the
Aral Sea. One is North-west of Chelyabinsk. One is before and
07 : c~P&@Cpc4a7sQQgzdgg?
PUI g1 gear Arkhangelsk, near the
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34 The Trial of the U-2
Q. Is it the same one in the indictment? A. Yes, I am referring
to the one mentioned in the indictment.
Was an airfield indicated on Finnish territory as a reserve air-
field? A. I do not remember the name of it in Finland. Let me
see. It is in the indictment.
How was your landing in Bodoe to be guaranteed on May 1? A. I
don't exactly remember. I was to ask for instructions and land.
But representatives from the 10-10 detachment would have been
there to meet you? A. I believe they would have been there.
In other words, they knew well in advance at Bodoe about the
coming flight and landing? A. I was told I would be met by
detachment personnel.
Q. By what means were you to contact the Bodoe base in Norway
before landing? A. I would have called on the radio and given
my call signal, which was "Puppy 6-8" and asked for landing in-
structions.
Q. I understand. Now we come to the question in connection with
the flight over the territory of the Soviet Union. How long did
you fly over the territory of the Soviet Union? A. I can only
state approximately, because I do not know exactly, but it would
seem, about 3 to 31/2 hours.
Q. How many kilometers did you penetrate into the territory of
the Soviet Union? A. In kilometers I do not know. For 31/2
hours at the approximate speed of 380 miles an hour, this would
have been 1200 to 1300 miles. I have in mind the route on the
map with all the turns.
Q. At what height did the flight occur? A. The flight began ap-
proximately at 67,000 feet and as the fuel burnt out I rose to
68,000 feet.
Q. You followed the assigned flight route? A. I followed the as-
signed route as close as I could.
Q. How did you feel during the flight? A. Physically I was alright.
But I was very nervous and scared.
Q. What were you scared over? A. Just the idea of being over the
Soviet Union. It is not something I'd like to do every day.
Q. How was your oxygen supply? A. As far as I could tell, my
oxygen supply was in order.
Q. Everything was normal on the planeAp .o?~ 6r ~lia4e 3/1
Examination of Defendant by Procurator 35
hit I had some trouble with the automatic pilot. But everything
else was in order.
Q. Did you carry out all your assignments exactly along the route
of flight up till the moment your plane was hit? A. As nearly
as I could do so. There was bad weather and I deviated from the
course. Most of the route was covered by clouds and I could not
find my orientation on the ground.
Q. On your plane there was aerial reconnaissance photo-equipment.
What instructions were you given? A. I was not given any
specific instructions to operate the equipment. I was to turn
switches on and off as indicated on the chart.
Q. With what purpose did you switch on the equipment? A. I was
instructed how to do this. It was indicated on the map that the
equipment was to be turned on.
Q. Defendant Powers, you probably knew the purpose for which
you had to turn on and off the equipment? A. I could very well
guess the purpose for which I turned on and off the equipment.
If I would be very exact I would say no.
Q. Surely Defendant Powers knew of this equipment. A. Not at
first. But now that I have seen its results, I now know better
what this equipment is for.
Q. I think that Defendant Powers did not doubt that this was a
reconnaissance plane from the moment he started his flight?
A. No, I didn't doubt it.
Q. On your plane there was found radio intelligence equipment,
tape-recordings of various Soviet radar stations. Is that so?
A. I have been told that there were tape recorders, but I don't
know. However, much of the general equipment I do not know
what it looked like except what I've seen here.
Q. But you, Defendant Powers, were trained enough to know that
such equipment is designated for special spying flights. A. I
didn't know anything about the equipment before.
Q. But you were sufficiently informed that this flight had espionage
aims? A. I saw no other reason for such a flight. I ask that the
lights of the projectors be taken away. They are blinding my
eyes.
PRESIDING JUDGE: I ask that the lights be taken away. Please
continue.
~/07P.ffgAlfttoNB04&AM64ind6kljlLit6plane have a special radio
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36 The Trial of the U-2
equipment to create interference from radar stations? A. In the
tail sections of the plane were located equipment to distort radar
signals aimed at the plane from radar stations on the ground
and fighter aircraft.
Q. By what means were you to operate this equipment during your
flight? A. At certain places I was to turn it on.
Q. Specifically on the points that were indicated on the map?
A. Yes, on the points that were indicated on the map.
Q. Did you also make visual observations from the plane? A. Yes.
Q. Did you make corresponding marks on the map? A. If I under-
stand you correctly, yes, I remember making three marks on the
map.
What marks were they? A. First of all there was an airfield
not indicated on the chart. I defined as exactly as possible the
bearings of this airfield. The second I remember were huge
cisterns - for oil storage. This was done through a thin layer
of clouds. I was off the course and did not know the exact
position. The third was a big outfit indicating a lot of buildings
With what purpose did you make these marks? A. I was in-
structed to record everything that was not shown on my map.
This is a "pilot's habit."
The habit which has espionage purposes? A. I would have done
it over the territory of the United States, too.
But I asked you about the flight over the territory of the Soviet
Union. Consequently it was an intrusion for espionage purposes?
A. I suppose it was.
You do not deny that you invaded Soviet airspace in violation
of the law? A. No I do not deny it.
Therefore this intrusion pursued intelligence espionage aims?
A. I suppose so.
You stated here and during the preliminary investigation as well
that you switched the equipment on and off at definite points?
A. I did what the chart indicated.
Not knowing what the special apparatus was? A. I never saw
the apparatus.
With the same ease you could have pulled a switch and released
an atom bomb? A. It could have been done. But this is not the
type of plane for carrying and dropping such bombs
But this airplane flew at the height MPA3RQPd1PdFRMd46 Died/10/
Examination of Defendant by Procurator 37
not be seen from the ground what apparatus was on board. And
so, Defendant Powers, everything on this plane, its altitude,
equipment, everything points to espionage aims.
A. Yes.
At what altitude was your plane when it was struck by the
rocket? A. It was at the maximum altitude, at about 68,000 feet.
Under what circumstances did this take place? A. I just finished
making a turn. I was flying one minute straight after the turn
when I saw, that is felt, a sort of hollow-sounding explosion.
It seemed to be behind me. I could see an orange flash or an
orange-coloured light behind me.
In what district did this take place? A. It was a few miles south
of Sverdlovsk.
How did you leave the plane? A. I was unable to use the ejec-
tion seat because of forces originating in the falling plane. I re-
member that I was at a height of 30,000 feet and I realized I could
not use the ejection seat. So I opened the canopy and loosened
the straps. The centrifugal force pressed half of me against the
instrument panel while the other half hung outside. I had for-
gotten to disconnect the oxygen hoses and they held me in.
I had to struggle to get out. The parachute opened automatically
immediately after I left the airplane. By that time I was at an
altitude of 14,000 feet.
Q. What were your instructions with respect to forced landing on
the territory of the Soviet Union? What were you to do with
the plane? A. I was instructed previously that if it was abso-
lutely necessary to land on the territory of the Soviet Union,
that I was to destroy the airplane with the help of buttons and
levers which were located for that purpose and to escape capture.
And with the help of the survival kit I was to head for the
nearest border.
Q. The plane was equipped with special means for its destruction?
A. Yes, that's what I was told.
Q. How was this done? With total destruction, leaving no traces?
A. I don't know what would have happened had I pushed the
buttons. I was simply instructed just to push them.
Q. Defendant Powers, in your possession was discovered Italian,
French, German and gold money. Who gave them to you and
7 : CIAQRL 8OBo161R002.2V9bk28,4 11p6rt of my survival kit. I had
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The Trial of the U-2
gold money and Soviet rubles. The gold money was from different
countries, from which ones, I don't know. It was to help me flee.
Q. Why were you given Soviet currency to the amount of 7,500
rubles? A. For the same purpose as the gold coins, to bribe
people if I could do it. But I don't know how I could do that
without speaking the language of the country on whose territory
a forced landing could take place.
Q. But as soon as you, Defendant Powers, landed on Soviet terri-
tory, ordinary Soviet people, sensing that you were an enemy,
detained and searched and disarmed you and delivered you to the
authorities. A. That is so.
Q. For what purpose were you given a noiseless 10-shot pistol?
A. For hunting.
Q. And for that they also gave you 205 cartridges? A. Yes.
Q. As far as we know it is the custom to hunt with hunting rifles.
A. It is difficult to carry hunting rifles on this plane.
Q. Yes, especially on this plane, which has espionage purposes.
A. I think that the pistol that was given to me had nothing to
do with the purposes of the flight.
Q. Who gave you the poison needle? A. It was given to me by Colonel
Shelton during the briefing at Peshawar.
Q. For what purpose? A. In case I was captured, tortured and
couldn't stand the torture and would rather be dead.
Q. This means your superiors directed you in this flight not to
spare your life? A. It was more or less up to me to use that pin.
Q. But they gave you that needle with poison? A. Yes.
Q. They wanted you to blow up the plane, kill yourself and wipe
out all trace? A. No, they did not tell me to kill myself.
Q. But they gave you the needle to kill yourself ? A. If I was tortured.
Q. You were told torture would be used in the Soviet Union? A. I
don't remember being told but I expected it.
Q. Were you tortured? A. No.
Q. How did the interrogation authorities treat you? A. I have been
treated very nice.
Q. I want to ask you about the following. On the 17th of May in the
Gorki Central Park of Culture and Rest, were you shown the
remains and wreckage of your plane and its equipment? A. Yes.
Q. You were shown the remains of your plane? A. Yes, I was.
Q. This is the same plane, "Lockheed U-2" which ou flew? A. I
Approved For Release 2003/10/071,
Examination of Defendant by Procurator 39
believe this is the same plane.
But not in the same condition as it was when it was flown out
of Peshawar? A. Yes there was a big difference.
I should think there was. You were able to see the salvaged
remains of the cockpit of the pilot? A. I think they showed me
everything that was salvaged from the plane.
I want to establish and confirm this fact. The parts of the plane
are here and can be shown. But Defendant Powers here has con-
firmed they are his. Now I wish to put to the Defendant questions
about the beginning of his espionage activities.
Q. Tell us the circumstances under which you signed the con-
Defendant Powers, your flight on May 1st on the U-2 airplane
was undertaken in accordance with provisions under a secret
contract which you signed with the Central Intelligence Agency?
A. Yes.
tract with the Central Intelligence Agency. A. I was in the
service at that time in the Air Force. My name appeared on the
bulletin board to see someone after that. I met with these people
and talked. They told me they had a very good job, and I had
the qualifications for this. I was required to have some training
and to be away from the family overseas for some-18 months.
At that time I did not know what the pay would be. But they
said there would be an increase over what I received as first
lieutenant. I was told to go home and talk it over with my wife.
The next interview was in a day or two. I liked the idea of flying
service with a big salary. And I told them I would be willing
to be away from home and then they told me more about what
would be required. It was a fairly long time ago.
When was it? A. In 1956. Anyway, I was to meet certain physical
requirements and pass a medical examination. I met these tests.
I was given a special flying suit for high altitude flights. This was
tested in an altitude chamber. And I was told that I would be
paid $2,500 a month. Part of it would be held back and paid on
successful completion of the contract. One thousand was held
back each month. I was told that my main duties would be
to fly along the Soviet border and collect any radar or radio in-
formation. I was also told there would possibly be other duties.
Q. Did you sign the contract? A. Yes.
: CIA=RMbB F*0 bf2661 Jb@ Central Intelligence Agency?
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40 The Trial of the U-2
A. I don't exactly remember but it was a Mr. Collins. I think he
signed in my presence but there were others who signed it too.
Q. What were your liability for disclosing any details of this
contract as well as the character of your work? A. According to
the law, this was classified information.
Q. What was the penalty? Can you remember just now? A. I
don't exactly remember how the wording went, but it was said
that it was 10 years imprisonment and $10,000 fine or both.
Q. You signed this contract after you left the Air Force? A. I
don't remember the exact date when I left the Air Force and I
don't remember the date when I signed the contract. They were
close together.
Q. You named a sum that was to be given you - $2500 a month.
Is that right? A. Yes.
Q. Was the pay that you were to receive a large sum? A. It was
more than what I had been making. It was approximately the
equivalent of a pay of the captain of a commercial airliner.
Q. Was there anything in the contract about flying along Soviet
borders? A. No. That was explained to me before I signed the
contract.
Q. After you signed the contract, you must have realized that you
were to soon fly over the territory of the Soviet Union. A. At
that time I didn't know that.
Q. How is it that you didn't know that? A. Nothing was said con-
cretely about that in the contract. I was to carry out orders and
they told me nothing about that.
In the contract nothing was said, but they told you verbally that
you were to fly along the borders of the Soviet Union? A. Yes.
Q. From what time and where did you go into training after you
signed the contract with the Central Intelligence Agency?
A. Training began within a few days, although I can't remember
how many days, after the signing of the contract. Training
began after the end of May and went to the first part of August.
Q. Why did you undergo training under an assumed name? A. We
were told that in case of an accident that under no circumstances
the people not part of the unit were to associate the accident,
with let's say, Powers.
Q. Under what name were you training? A. The first name was the
same, the last name was Palmer.
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Examination of Defendant by Procurator 41
Q. After your training into what work were you sent? A. Into the
Detachment 10-10 in Adana.
Q. When was this? A. I think it was about August 20, 1956.
Q. What was the purpose and aims of the detachment in which
the Defendant was assigned? A. In general to gather infor;na-
tion along the borders of the Soviet Union. We likewise con-
ducted weather research reconnaissance to determine radio-
activity.
Q. Who commanded this detachment at the time that the Defendant
Powers arrived in 1956? A. Colonel Perry.
Q.. Who was immediately in charge of the 10-10 detachment? A. The
immediate supervision over the 10-10 detachment was under a
military commander but to whom he was responsible, I do not
know.
Q. But it was a military commander? A. The head of the detach-
ment was a military man.
Q. I understand. A. But the bulk of the detachment were civilians.
Q. But they obeyed the military supervisors? A. Yes, Colonel Shelton
was the commander of this detachment.
Q. How long were you in the 10-10 detachment? A. From the time
of my arrival until May 1.
Q. To whom did the military base at Adana belong where the de-
tachment 10-10 was located? A. I believe that it was located
on Turkish territory and belonged to Turkey. And the base
was peopled by Turkish as well as American personnel.
Q. The base belonged to Turkey but was commanded by Americans?
A. Well, there was also a Turkish as well as an American com-
mander. Who was senior, I don't know.
Q. Did everybody have access to the detachment 10-10? A. The base
was a classified area and only the personnel who worked on it
had access to it.
Q. American personnel? A. Yes, American personnel worked there.
Q. All those Americans were allowed access there? A. All those who
had business in the other detachments, but to the 10-10 detach-
ment not all were allowed.
Q. And so this Turkish base was under the full American command,
and so not only Turkish but many Americans were denied access.
A. Access to the 10-10 detachment was denied, but to the other
detachments it was allowed.
CIA-RDP80BOl676R002200020011-6
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42 The Trial of the U-2
I'm asking about the other detachments. A. I do not know about
the other detachments but I do know about the 10-10 detach-
ment.
So the detachment 10-10 was a special detachment? A. Yes, you
can call it a special detachment.
Namely an intelligence detachment? A. I think so, yes.
I want to ask you, who from the high command visited the 10-10
detachment? A. There were a number of people carrying out in-
spection tours. During that time, they visited the 10-10 detach-
ment.
Which of those can the Defendant Powers name? A. I had heard
that in the first part of April, General White visited the base,
because I saw his plane. I heard from friends that he visited the
base but I can't say for sure.
Who else from the high command visited the base? A. There were
others but I can't remember. There was General Everest.
Who is General Everest? A. At that timethe was the commander-
in-chief of the US Air Force in Europe.
For what purposes did he visit this detachment? A. I don't know
exactly but I was told it was an inspection tour.
Q. So that means that this military base was the center of attention
of the high command? A. It meant that the detachment, located
on the base was visited by the command.
Q. The detachment 10-10, as you said, was a special detachment? A.
It was a very special one, in view of the kind of work it was doing.
Q. Yes, in view of the work it was doing. A. But this does not mean
that it was shown to. visitors. The visitors, on the contrary, were
not shown this detachment.
But such visitors as White and Everest are not ordinary visitors.
A. Yes, you're right, they're big wheels.
Did any other kind of people visit the detachment 10-10? A.
There were many visitors, I don't remember who they were.
There were generals and congressmen. I think that the congress-
men didn't visit the detachment, but they saw the base.
Q. And who else visited the base? A. Also, it seems, Cardinal Spell-
man visited us.
So Cardinal Spellman interested himself in military bases? A. I
would say that he was interested in military personnel, not bases.
Examination of Defendant by Procurator 43
in spy operations? A. He was a well known church figure. I
think he wouldn't think too much of what a person does as what
he is.
Q. And did he bless these flights? A. I do not know and never saw
him do that. Mostly we conducted prayers with him.
PROCURATOR RUDENKO: Now I request the Court to allow me
to present Powers' identification card. It is in volume 6, page 11.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Comrade Secretary, show the defendant the
identification card.
(The Secretary shows Defendant Powers the card.)
Q. Does this card belong to you? A. Yes, it was issued to me.
Q. Please explain the emblem on the document and to what depart-
ment the stamp .on the card belongs. A. On the stamp it says,
"Department of Defense. United States of America."
Are both stamp and emblem of the U.S. Defense Department?
A. I would say the emblem and the stamp are the same.
Q. That is, of the Defense Department? A. Yes, it is written there:
"Department of Defense. United States of America."
Why should the Defense Department issue you an identification
card when you have nothing to do with the military department?
A. The Defense Department consists of the Department of the
Army, the Department of the Air ForW, the Department of the
Navy and I do not know what other departments.
But they are all military departments? A. Yes, I would say
Defense is military.
Now I would ask the Court to allow me to present Defendant
Powers a document issued in the name of NASA (volume 6,
page 14).
PRESIDING JUDGE: Comrade Secretary, present the document
to the defendant.
DEFENDANT POWERS: Here it is before me.
Q. This certificate belongs to you? A. Yes.
Q. And you had a relationship with this organization? A. I don't
know.
Q. You do not know whether you had any relationship? A. We had
a connection with NASA on our weather research work which
we did.
Q. But didn't you have with this organization a sort of employee-
2003/1 0J 't'A 9 ?dk6ff2doh0ti r met the personnel
Q. Would Cardinal Spellman give his blessings toodr#fg leas0
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48 The Trial of the U-2
those borders, I flew a normally established route.
Q. You made flights over the Black Sea. Where specifically? A. Yes,
on the southern shore of the Black Sea.
Q. Did you make any flights over the Caspian Sea? A. No, over the
Caspian Sea I did not fly. I flew south of it but not over it.
But you flew south of the Caspian Sea? A. Yes.
Were planes for special flights along the Soviet border equipped
with special reconnaissance equipment? A. Yes, there was
special equipment, but I did not know its character.
What particular objectives was your detachment interested in
and what tasks did the command set before you? A. In 1956
we were more interested in the Black Sea area and later our
interest centered more to the east. I was told on one flight that
I might see a rocket launching. I assume they were interested in
the launching of rockets.
Q. What did you photograph on these flights? A. I don't know, I
just turned on the switches.
You turned switches on and off just like you did on May 1?
A. Just in the same way.
Q. But you are sure that the switching of levers on and off provided
the necessary results? A. Yes.
Q. Did you record any radio ceiling or radar locations? A. I per-
sonally did not but I assume that the equipment did it.
Q. Did this not make clear that these were intelligence flights?
A. I would think they were intelligence flights.
Q. From what airfield did the U-2 planes fly along the borders of the
Soviet Union? A. The airfield from which I flew on these flights
was the airfield of Incirlik, near Adana.
Q. Did other pilots of the 10-10 detachment take part in similar
flights? A. I should say that the distribution of work between
pilots was fairly even.
Q. And could you say how many pilots there were in the 10-10 de-
tachment? A. There were seven civilian pilots.
Q. Civilians like you? A. Yes.
Q. On these border flights, which airfields could you use, in case
of accident? A. I could use any airfield in Turkey, Iran and
Pakistan.
Q. Which airfields in particular? A. I was told about various airfields
and given data on their airstrips and runwa s. I was told ab
Examination of Defendant by Procurator 49
airfields in Teheran, Meshed in Iran, Peshawar in Pakistan.
Q. Peshawar in Pakistan, Peshed and Teheran in Iran? A. But those
airfields I could use only in case of accident.
Q. But you used Peshawar not only in case of accident? A. That was
under entirely different circumstances.
Q. It's all the same. That airfield was used for flights over the ter-
ritory of the Soviet Union? A. Yes.
Q. With what bases did you keep radio contact during these flights?
A. We never had radio contact with our bases during the flights
with the exception of short times after going up and shortly
before landing.
Q. With what bases did you have radio contact? A. Incirlik but on
the 1st of May with Peshawar.
Q. You knew you were, prior to making the May 1st flight, to have
completed it at Bodoe? A. Yes.
Q.. Were you ever at Bodoe any other time? A. Yes, I was there once
before.
Q. When was that? A. In August of 1958.
Q. With what purpose? A. I ferried a plane from Adana to Bodoe.
Q. What kind of a plane? A. A U-2.
Q. The same plane with which you made the May 1st flight? A. I do
not know whether it was the same plane.
Q. But the same type? A. The same type.
Q. So thus you were familiar with the airfield? A. Yes, I made a
landing there once.
Q. That was the only occasion? A. Yes.
Q. Were you met by members of your detachment when you com-
pleted your mission? A. Yes, I was met by members of the 10-10
detachment.
Q. In Bodoe? A. In Bodoe.
Q. You then flew out of the airfield of Bodoe? A. I flew out of that
airfield in an ordinary transport plane.
Q. And other pilots flew out of that airfield? A. Yes, while I was
there, two flights were made from that airfield.
Q. On U-2 planes? A. Yes.
Q. Did you have occasion to visit the base at Peshawar prior to the
flight on May 1 ? A. I have been there one time before.
Q. When was that? A. I think it was in June 1959. What 07 : CIA-RDP8OB01676R002200~s6n? A. I flew a plane there.
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Q?
Q?
Q?
A U-2? A. Yes.
From what base? A. From Incirlik.
In other words, May 1 was not the first time you were in Pesha-
war? A. It was the second time.
Have you ever visited an air base near Wiesbaden, Western
Germany? A. Yes, I was there.
Q. How is this base named? A. That's the way it was named-Wies-
baden base.
Why did you visit this base? A. I ferried a training plane, a T33.
How long did you spend at this base? A. I was there many times.
Q.
Q.
Right now, I don't remember how much time I took to test this
plane. I also was in Wiesbaden on vacation.
I'm asking you specifically in connection with your work on the
U-2 plane. Did you ferry a U-2 plane from the base in Western
Germany to an Air Force base in the USA, near New York?
No.
A
.
Q. Then where did you ferry that plane? A. I ferried the airplane
from another Western German base, Hibbelstadt to New York.
Q. Hibbelstadt-that is in Western Germany? What kind of a
plane? A. A U-2.
Q. To what base? A. New York.
PROCURATOR RUDENKO: I have no further questions at this
time.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Defendant Powers, sit down. Comrade De-
fense Counsel, do you have any questions to your client?
DEFENSE COUNSEL GRINEV: Yes:
PRESIDING JUDGE: Defendant Powers, I ask you to answer to
your Defense Counsel's questions.
Examination of Defendant by Defense Counsel 51
accident crippled his health and nearly killed him.
Q. What about the composition of your father's family? A. I had
5 sisters and no brothers. My grandfather lives with his family.
Q. Could it be said that you come from a working family? A. Yes.
Q. Are your sisters married? A. Yes. All my sisters are married.
Q. Who are the husbands of your sisters? A. The oldest sister
married a shoemaker and he also drives a school bus, the second
one married an electrical fitter. The third married an ex-teacher
and who is now a postman. The fourth sister married a news-
paper agent in Washington. I do not know too much about the
character of his work. The youngest sister just married two
months ago and I do not know what her husband does.
Q. Did your father possess any real estate? A. Yes, my father owns
a f arm.
Q. Under what circumstances did he receive this farm? A. He in-
herited his part from his father and bought the other part from
the other members of his family.
Q. Does this farm produce anything or does it produce just for the
household of your family? A. It just produces enough for the
family, milk and vegetables and so forth. My father does not sell
anything.
DEFENSE COUNSEL GRINEV: Comrade Judges, the defendant's
parents have made available to me various photos showing how the
defendant grew up, and also the house in which he lived. I ask the
court to study these documents and attach them to the dossier.
QUESTIONING OF DEFENDANT POWERS BY DEFENSE
COUNSEL GRINEV
Q. Who are your parents and what are their occupations? A. I have
a father and mother. My father is a shoemaker. My mother
helped him earlier but now her health does not permit her to
work and she is a housewife.
Q. Did your father have any hired help in his shop? A. No.
0. And where did your father work before entering the shoemaking
(Secretary hands the photos to the court.)
PRESIDING JUDGE: Are there any objections on
Procurator-General?
PROCURATOR RUDENKO: I have none.
part of the
PRESIDING JUDGE: These photos will be attached to the dossier.
Proceed, Defense Counsel.
DEFENSE COUNSEL GRINEV : Tell the court about your health.
A. Well, as a child I suffered from the usual diseases affecting
children, I think I had diphtheria, but I am now physically fit
even though I am under an emotional strain.
Q. Will you explain then the mark on your cheek 9
birth mark.
Q. What education did you receive? A. I graduated from Milligan
business? A. He worked for many years in M &j.l L49se 1,200311V610,7e: r- 89B &76R002200020011-6
1
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The Trial of the U-2
Q. A U-2? A. Yes.
Q. From what base? A. From Incirlik.
Q. In other words, May 1 was not the first time you were in Pesha-
war? A. It was the second time.
Have you ever visited an air base near Wiesbaden, Western
Germany? A. Yes, I was there.
Q. How is this base named? A. That's the way it was named-Wies-
Q.
Q.
baden base.
Why did you visit this base? A. I ferried a training plane, a T33.
How long did you spend at this base? A. I was there many times.
Right now, I don't remember how much time I took to test this
plane. I also was in Wiesbaden on vacation.
Examination of Defendant by Defense Counsel 51
accident crippled his health and nearly killed him.
Q. What about the composition of your father's family? A. I had
5 sisters and no brothers. My grandfather lives with his family.
Q. Could it be said that you come from a working family? A. Yes.
Q. Are your sisters married? A. Yes. All my sisters are married.
Q. Who are the husbands of your sisters ? A. The oldest sister
married a shoemaker and he also drives a school bus, the second
one married an electrical fitter. The third married an ex-teacher
and who is now a postman. The fourth sister married a news-
paper agent in Washington. I do not know too much about the
character of his work. The youngest sister just married two
months ago and I do not know what her husband does.
Q. Did your father possess any real estate? A. Yes, my father owns
a farm.
Q. Under what circumstances did he receive this farm? A. He in-
herited his part from his father and bought the other part from
the other members of his family.
Q. Does this farm produce anything or does it produce just for the
household of your family? A. It just produces enough for the
family, milk and vegetables and so forth. My father does not sell
anything.
DEFENSE COUNSEL GRINEV: Comrade Judges, the defendant's
parents have made available to me various photos showing how the
defendant grew up, and also the house in which he lived. I ask the
court to study these documents and attach them to the dossier.
(Secretary hands the photos to the court.)
PRESIDING JUDGE: Are there any objections on part of the
Procurator-General?
PROCURATOR RUDENKO: I have none.
PRESIDING JUDGE: These photos will be attached to the dossier.
Proceed, Defense Counsel.
DEFENSE COUNSEL GRINEV: Tell the court about your health.
A. Well, as a child I suffered from the usual diseases affecting
children, I think I had diphtheria, but I am now physically fit
even though I am under an emotional strain.
Q. Will you explain then the mark on your cheek? A. This is a
birth mark.
Q. What education did you receive? A. I graduated from Milligan
CIAO 8M8J d?bRM9dN20011-6
Q. I'm asking you specifically in connection with your work on the
U-2 plane. Did you ferry a U-2 plane from the base in Western
Germany to an Air Force base in the USA, near New York?
A. No.
Q. Then where did you ferry that plane? A. I ferried the airplane
from another Western German base, Hibbelstadt to New York.
Q. Hibbelstadt-that is in Western Germany? What kind of a
plane? A. A U-2.
Q. To what base? A. New York.
PROCURATOR RUDENKO: I have no further questions at this
time.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Defendant Powers, sit down. Comrade De-
fense Counsel, do you have any questions to your client?
DEFENSE COUNSEL GRINEV: Yes:
PRESIDING JUDGE: Defendant Powers, I ask you to answer to
your Defense Counsel's questions.
QUESTIONING OF DEFENDANT POWERS BY DEFENSE
COUNSEL GRINEV
Q. Who are your parents and what are their occupations? A. I have
a father and mother. My father is a shoemaker. My mother
helped him earlier but now her health does not permit her to
work and she is a housewife.
Q. Did your father have any hired help in his shop? A. No.
Q. And where did your father work before entering the shoemaking
business? A. He worked for many years in the coal mines, but an
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The Trial of the U-2
In what specialty? A. My main subjects were biology and chem-
istry.
Q. Did you work while you studied? A. Yes, during the time I
studied I washed dishes and thus earned some money for studies.
During the summer vacations I did odd jobs, wherever I found
work.
Q. What wages did you earn for this? A. My studies were expensive
and I wanted to reduce the family's expenditures for my educa-
tion.
Did you engage in politics or belong to any political party?
A. No, I did not engage in politics and was not a member of any
political party. I had never voted in the elections.
Q. Were you ever in the Soviet Union before the 1st of May, 1960 or
were you interested at all in the Soviet Union? A. No, before the
1st of May, I never was in the Soviet Union, and political ques-
tions did not interest me. I was mainly interested in scientific
achievements of the Soviet Union. I think that all I knew about
the Soviet Union I got out of newspapers and magazines.
Q. From your explanations, it was evident that your father wanted
you to become a doctor. Why didn't you heed his wishes? Why
did you go into the Air Force? A. My father wanted me to be a
doctor but I felt that I wasn't suited for it. Besides that, this
demanded, that I study much harder and it would have cost much
more. Having graduated Milligan College, I was of age rather
close to the draft. I didn't know when I would be called but it was
evident that it would be a few months after my graduation.
It's hard to get a good job when you're draft-bait because nobody
wants you and nobody wants to hire you. I had some temporary
work during the summer as a life guard. When that job was
finished, I decided not to wait to be called up and so decided to
vounteer in the Air Force, inasmuch as aviation aways interested
me.
Q. Tell us about the circumstances of your going to work for the
Central Intelligence Agency. Did this take place on your initia-
tive? A. No, I was approached. After my term of enlistment
was up in the Air Force, I had wanted to get a job on a com-
mercial airline or some job like that, but I was too old when
my term was up and not acceptable. So when I was approached
Examination of Defendant by Defense Counsel 53
Q.
and offered a job in the CIA p*prcnWa2W8P10/07
salary as a first pilot or captain of an airliner, I felt very lucky
to get such a job.
After you signed the contract with the Central Intelligence
Agency, did you take on yourself any further obligations? A. No,
my only obligation was under the contract as a pilot. To fill in
my time between flights, I took a job as a flying safety officer
to promote safety in flying.
What did your work at the Central Intelligence Agency bring
you materially? A. It enabled me to pay my debts, live in com-
parative prosperity and save money for the future in the hope
of buying a house and setting up my own business to be inde-
pendent of my parents.
Under what conditions could you get extra pay under your con-
tract? A. It was established how much I would be getting a
month. The contract was such that I would not get all the money
every month. There was a sum being put aside each month to be
received after successful completion of the contract.
What pay did you receive in the detachment 10-10? A. A Pilot's
pay.
Did you fulfill any kind of supervisory or administrative func-
tion ? A. No, I was only a pilot.
Was the flight of the May 1 your only flight over Soviet terri-
tory ? A. Yes it was the only flight.
Were you consulted about the program of spy flights over the
Soviet Union? A. No, I knew of no such program.
Were you acquainted with the special apparatus on the plane?
A. No, I have never seen any of the special equipment loaded
or unloaded. It was never done in my presence. My knowledge
of the special equipment was to follow instructions on my map.
Did you know any of the results of your reconnaissance flights?
A. I was never informed of the results of my missions and did
not know whether the equipment worked properly except as
indicated by signal lights in the cockpit.
I seem to recall that you stated in one of the depositions in the
preliminary investigation that you hesitated over prolonging
your contract with the Central Intelligence Agency when the
contract lapsed. What were the reasons and why did you hesi-
tate? A. Well, the last time I was called on to renew the Con-
tGrAt K171~8~1JO~ b 1 Tlt bis difficult to explain the
 Approved For Release 2003/10/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002200020011-6
The Trial of the U-2
reasons for my hesitating, but one of the reasons was that the
job was nerve-wracking and high-altitude flights in a special
uniform were physically exhausting. In addition to that I had
a feeling-I don't know what it was-I just didn't like what I
was doing. If I had had time to look for another job, I would have
done so, but I had no time.
Were you sorry you renewed your contract?
sons are hard to explain.
A. Well, the rea-
Why are you sorry now? A. Well, the situation I am in now is
not too good. I haven't heard much about the news of the world
since I have been here, and I understand that as a direct result
of my flight, the summit conference did not take place and Presi-
dent Eisenhower's visit was called off. There was, I suppose, a
great increase in tension in the world, and I am sincerely sorry
I had anything to do with this.
Can you tell us where the difficulty of your job lay? A. The length
of the flights and the weight of the uniform that I had to carry.
For example I will tell you about an average flight. For two hours
before the flight, one had to put on a helmet which sat rather
tightly on your neck; the pilot had to breathe oxygen for a period
of two hours so as to maintain the oxygen ratio in his blood.
After that they gave you the special uniform-you had to have
help of one or two men-then they took the pilot to the plane.
Personnel had to help him strap up in his seat. All this took
place two hours before flight time and the flight itself was about
eight to nine hours long. The uniform all this time was rather
tight fitting around my body and around the neck was a hermeti-
cally sealed cork ring which leaves a mark on your neck. And
so when inside the cabin you had to move around, the tight-
fitting uniform would leave you cut and bruised. The uniform
had rubberized strips and under pressure, you would sweat and
these would stick to your body. For two hours before flight and
eight to nine hours during the flight a pilot cannot eat or drink.
and after a pilot has landed, his body is dehydrated. Usually
towards the end of a flight, the pilot was so worn out that he had
to be helped in his landing by special radio signals. Indeed a
pilot in such worn-out condition might in landing make a mis-
take. There are certain rules set up by the medical personnel.
Examination of Defendant by Defense Counsel 55
days. This pertains to any kind of a plane, even for training
planes. The doctors consider that a pilot is too mentally and
physically incapable of doing a second flight unless there is a
two-day lapse from the previous flight. Besides the flight would
bring with it many side effects. When you breathe 100 % oxy-
gen, and then go up and down in altitude, the inner ear fills
up with oxygen. During a pilot's sleep, the tissue absorbs oxygen
and there is a low pressure zone in your head which is very
uncomfortable. The result is you have a lot of headaches and
ear aches. This is about it.
Did Colonel Shelton ask your consent to the May 1st flight or
was it a categoric order? A. It was an assignment. I was not
asked whether I wanted to fulfill it or not. There were two of us
preparing for the flight and I did not know which one of us
would go.
Could you refuse to go? A. No, I could not refuse. It was an
order. I would have been considered a coward by all of my
associates and it would also have meant an unsuccessful comple-
tion of my contract.
What would you have to do in case of forced landing? A. I was
told that such a case was not very likely. I believed in the air-
plane. I was also told that the flight would not be interrupted. I
repeat, I was told this and I believed that except for technical
failure, there would be no accident, whereby the flight would be
cut short. I was told that in case of fuel or oxygen failure, I was to
destroy the plane, and if possible with the aid of my survival
equipment which was given to me, abandon the airplane.
How did you feel during this flight? A. Physically I felt -good,
my health was good, but the very idea of this flight did not
appeal to me. I was very nervous. It's very hard to explain, why
I was nervous, why under tension and why I was afraid. I had a
feeling of fear.
Did you resist any detention and did you contemplate resisting?
A. No I did not.
How were you treated during your detention? and thereafter?
A. Much better than I expected. First of all I did not resist
arrest and had no intention of resisting. At first I don't suppose
they recognized me as a foreigner. When I landed, they helped
According to these rules a pilot ha ri ?8y R 4@r21f 3/10/07' C DP8 6WOO2 f1 00fld-Gielped me take off my
 Approved For Release 5V03/10/07 : CIA The Trial of the U-2
-RDP801301676R002200020011-6
helmet. When it became clear to them that they were dealing
with a foreigner, naturally they decided to detain me. I asked,
on the way to the authorities, for a drink of water. They stopped
the car specially, offered me cigarettes and brought me a glass
of water. I think that I understood one word, "America" or
"American". And I think they knew I understood. When I got to,
I don't know what you call it, the office where the authorities
were, I complained of a headache. I hurt lm lhead somewhere in
the accident. I also had a scratch on my left leg. The was
called for
ame and he treated me. From there I was nd there I had an interpreter and from therea
Sverdlovsk I came
here. All the time I was treated very nice.
Q. Have your statements till now been truthful? A. Yes, it is im-
possible to deny what I have done. Once in a while I will change
my mind in some small details on this or that question.
Q. What is your present attitude towards work in the CIA and do
you now understand the danger the flight entailed? A. I under-. At
firs stand slot more now th the don tactr I e did nottwantI If I
whether I should renew
had a job, I would have refused to sign, now that I know some of
the consequences of my flight, though I don't know all of them by
any means. But as I indicated a few moments ago, I am pro-
foundly sorry I had any part in it.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I have no more questions for today.
PRESIDING JUDGE : The court will adiourn until 10 a.m. to-
morrow, the 18th of August.
(The session adjourned at 5:10 p.m.)
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 Approved For Release 2003/10/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002200020011-6
SECOND DAY
AUGUST 18, 1960
FIRST SESSION, 10 A.M.
COMMANDANT OF THE COURT: Please rise, the Court is coming.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Please sit down. The Court session of the
Military Division of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR has resumed.
Comrade Defense Counsel, have you any further questions to your
Defendant?
DEFENSE COUNSEL GRINEV : Yes.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Defendant Powers, reply to the questions of
your Counsel.
CONTINUATION OF QUESTIONING OF
DEFENDANT POWERS BY DEFENSE
COUNSEL GRINEV
Q. Why didn't you keep to your job of a life guard and not try to
find other work? A. I took the job of a life guard after I grad-
uated college. It was only a temporary job just for the summer
time until it -gets cold. It was practically impossible to find a
permanent job where I was living. No one would hire one who
was shortly to be drafted into the service.
Q. When signing your contract with the Central Intelligence
Agency, were you aware that you would have to make flights
over the territory of the Soviet Union? A. Not at the time I
signed the contract.
Q. When did you first hear of this? A. I would say six to seven
months after the contract was signed. Then it was said that this
was to be part of my duties. But in the meantime the Soviet
radar system proved to be much better than was considered
before and I was told that we would probably limit ourselves
to flights only along the Soviet borders.
Q. In the event of your refusal to make the flight on May 1, would
you have received that part of the money due to you under the
bbcontract? A. The way the contract was worded, it would have
Approved For Release 2003P13 rls ~A-1b $6 Vg? db b 311?-6They could have
 Approved For Release 2003/10/07 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002 1-6
'62 The Trial of the U-2
rocket? A. It was at that altitude that I was struck down by
something.
Q. You say you were struck down by something? A. Why, I had
no idea what it was. I didn't see it.
Q. But it was at that altitude? A. Yes.
PROCURATOR RUDENKO: I ask the court to make public at this
time the report of the commanding officer of the Soviet Army unit
which shot down the American Lockheed U-2 plane on which the
Defendant Powers was flying on May 1, 1960. This report is located
in volume 7, page 5-in the English Text on page 7.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Does the Comrade Defense Counsel have any
objection to the report of the Procurator-General?
DEFENSE COUNSEL GRINEV: I have none.
PRESIDING JUDGE: The Court, having consulted on the report,
has decided to grant the request of the Procurator-General of the
Soviet Union.
(Secretary of the Court reads the report in Court)
"To the Commander of the military unit:
"REPORT
"I hereby report that your order to destroy the plane that violated
the state border of the U.S.S.R. and intruded into our country on
May 1, 1960, was carried out at 8:53 Moscow time.
"As the plane entered the firing range at an altitude of over 20,-
000 metres one rocket was fired and its explosion destroyed the
target. ' The hitting of the target was observed by instruments, and
after a short interval posts of visual observation recorded falling
plane fragments and parachuting down of the pilot who bailed out
of the crashed plane. The results of the shot have been reported by
me to the superior command and measures have been taken to ap-
prehend the flyer who came down on a parachute.
"May 1, 1960. "Major Voronov."
Q. When flying over Soviet territory were you in radio communica-
tion with the air bases in Incirlik and Peshawar? A. No.
Q. Why did you not have radio communications with these bases?
A. The radio I had for communications was an ultra-high fre-
quency one. It is only for line-of-sight transmission and flying
at such a high altitude as I was, A Cli J0-K&f&yRL 1 3/
 Approved For Release 2003/10/07 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002200020011-6
2. AFTER THE VERDICT, Powers meets his family
for the first time. (Left to right), Wife Barbara, Powers,
Father Oliver, Mother Ida, Sister Jessica.
3. TENSE MOMENTS for the Powers family listening to
1. UNDER THE GLARE OF TV LIGHTS, Defendant Powers mops testimony translated simultaneously in five languages.
his brow while ponderiA ed'FbrReler'asgrda 3/10/07 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002200020011-6
attended the three-day tria.
 Approved For Release 2003/10/07 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002200020011-6
hose who
spy - plane
the co,-
tough they
thcught of
J." Khrush-
.he Pane
hibit.
9. PRESIDING JUSTICE
Lieutenant-General of Jus-
tice Viktor V. Borisog'eb-
sky
10. PEOPLE'S ASSESSOR
Major-General of the Ar-
tillery Dmitry Z. Vorobyev
11. PEOPLE'S ASSESSOR
Major-General of the Air
Force Alexander I. Zak-
harov
13. INTERNATIONALLY KNOWN JURISTS
and scholars attend the trial as guests.
12. PROCURATOR-GEN- A roved For Release 2003/10/07 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002200020011-6
ERAL State Counsellor of pp
Justice Roman A Rudenko
 Approved For Release 2003/10/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002200020011-6
XEM MAPWPYTA
IfflIETA PMEPHKAHCNOrf, CfMOfETA-PA38EQVMHa
'HAlj TEPPNTOD.~IE~ C TCKOro C0109A In MAU 1960
a,~ ~oRA pa:OiC-4']074.
~srr~. ra
Approved For Release 2003/10/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002200020011-6
 Approved For Release 2003/10/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002200020011-6
20. POWERS ID CARD
shows status as uniformed
services member.
I . uCOICAL CARE FACiL'+T,E' A .THOR1ZEO I'.:y. DATE OF: ~SUe
UYIFORMEO SE? zvl J' T
l~~ ..~- i 1958
I CIVILIAN , j +t 7 CSI , y
G+ SIGNATURL Id
I 4
~
U
/r Q
0 11 TYPED r3RAOE AND IvAMEI t U
IF FOUNU4
D WARNINI;7 VSE OF IHiS AUTHORIZATION SY OTHER ORCtE 1N Atyt? MA,,,~Qpy ? G
THAN PFRSO'+ VAMED THEREON. OR ANYU:E IN
Pt Y;OLATICPJ OF I?POVISIONS OF DEPENDENTS'Y.ED4 POSTMASTEFt
TO
r_ -~
D CAL CARI:ACT OF 1556 RENDERS USER !.TABLE FOR DEPARTMENT CRE I'I Ti' it
m PF'+OS#CUrION IJNDEO APPLICABLE FEDERAL LAWS tF DEF? 6
W4SHINGTO ~,'
0 PER??19UiG 7{I FAL'if STAIEMEN fS. (!R IS/: 10011 L- ~N 2:f. C ? O
CS f4? UNFORMED SERVICES IDENTIFI' :ATION AN(~,_KIri.. LF.PE C`RD IL
Approved For Release 2003/10/U77`- 01301676R002200020011-6
 e 2003/10/07 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002200020011-6
23. MORE OF POWERS "SURVIVAL" KIT including controversial hunting gun,
cartridges, compass, signal flares, kindling, morphine, knife.
 Approved For Release 2003/10/0
24. GLASS CARTRIDGE with poison needle.
Powers was to commit suicide on capture.
fiilllll~i;i
i
25. 11/4-IN. LONG POISON NEEDLE with curare, most deadly
known poison to man-known to kill within 30 seconds.
26. "I AM AN AMERICAN ... I need food, shelter . . . I will not harm
you . . . you will be rewarded." Silk cloth poster in 14 languages.
Approved For Release 2003/10/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002200020011-6
fill
 r9ed For Release 2003/10/07 : CIA-RDP80B01676R0022q
27. FLIGHT MAP FOUND IN POWERS' POSSESSION
traces routes ac,oss USSR to Bodoe, No-way.
28. CAPTURED FILMS from the U-2 cameras show
tear pctures cf a;?'elds, ins`-ta!!ai!ons `see ^+'c. 29, 30).
29. KHRUSHCHEV REVEALS
POWERS PHOTOS of soviet and they shc+,
ndustia e^trprses too'
30. "See those two white
lines? They are lines of our
fighter p anes.' N. S. Khrush-
chev.
 AApprove4 For, Rel
(EP11EiNUECXMA uwnt~~~
p IIItCI p'O yT.f~
w auvam' ~ '?+
n.:fV ,icy' 7+~
31. POWERS FLIGHT EQUIPMENT including air-tight helmet,
pressure suit, parachute, bailout oxygen regulator.
Of THE CONTROL PABEI I I
AILITARY FO',TohiIENT
33. U-2 CAMERA used to photograph Soviet airfields and installa-
tions. Powers' route. Large supply of film was recovered.
Approved For Release 2003/10/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002200020011-6
POWER
bb-
EVIDENCE THAT U-2 WAS MILITARY PLANE as used
32-
by Soviet Union on Trial of U-2 pilot.
 proved For Release 2003/10/07 : Cl
38. RADIO CHART. Powers could use radio stations of Turkey, Italy and Western Germany
ChANNEL
1.
317.5
Combined Fixer
2.
257.8
Corm-fined Tower
3.
385.4
Combined GCA SeconJa:-? Final
4.
344.0
Combined GCA Cecordar-: Search
5.
362.3
Combined APC
6.
353.8
Combined ARTC
7.
261.6
Aviano APC
8.
270.4
Brindisi APC
9.
321.8
Jerry Control
10.
307.9
Moselle Control
11.
339.0
Local Control
12.
342.8
Rhein Control
13.
263.6
Rhein Control
14.
305.4
Tncirlik Tower
(Sec &
DF)
15.
335.8
Incirlik GCA Primary
Final
16.
378.8
Ineirlik GCA PrLcary
Search
17.
7eU.ow
18.
Gold
19.
344.6
Pilot tf Forecaster
0167,000 1Q 6
 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002200020011-6
63
Re-examination of Defendant by Procurator
with a base at a distance of some 300-400 miles. But the moun-
tains between Peshawar and myself decreased the possible dis-
tance of radio communications to about 200 miles. I was much
too far from Incirlik to communicate.
Q. But was not the absence of radio communications with these
t
-
bases due to the secrecy of your flight? And was it not an a
tempt to avoid detection? A. Even if I had been able to com-
municate I would not have done it because of the possibility of
being detected.
Q. This is precisely what I am asking. I ask the Court's permission
to present to Defendant Powers the flight chart which is in
Vol. 6, page 25 of the record.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Comrade Secretary, please show it to the
Defendant.
(Defendant Powers is presented with the flight chart)
Q. Defendant Powers, is this your chart? A. Yes.
Q. Why is the main route of your flight indicated on this map in
red and blue pencil? A. I think I explained this yesterday. The
red pencil indicates points on part of the route to which I should
have kept as close as possible. The blue were less important
sections and just show the direction. It stands to reason that
during the entire flight I was not to deviate from any of the
points. But where the red marks were I was to keep as close as
possible.
Q. Thus the sections marked in red pencil are of particular interest
to the Central Intelligence Agency? A. In any case they were
of particular interest to the people who gave me this map.
Q. Whom? A. Inasmuch as I worked for the Central Intelligence
Agency I assume that these sections were of interest to them.
Q. I will ask you now to look at the map. The section of the route
from Kandalaksha to Bodoe is marked in brown pencil. What
does this mean? A. In case of a lack of fuel or oxygen I was to
cut my route short and follow this shortest route, but only in case
of emergency.
Q. What countries would you have crossed in flying on the route
marked in brown pencil? A. I would have crossed the territory
of the Soviet Union, Finland, Sweden, Norway.
Q. Before your flight on May 1, 1960 Colonel Shelton handed you
CIA-rcu1'oOB0 676R002200020011-purpose was this cloth? A. I
1
 Approved For Release 2003/10/07 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002200020011-6
64 The Trial of the U-2
don't know. I was already in the airplane when I got it from
Colonel Shelton. He ordered me to give this piece of black cloth
to the representatives of the 10-10 detachment who were to meet
me in Bodoe.
Q. In the event of your successful flight over the Soviet Union?
A. At that time he thought it would be successful.
Q. This was your point of destination, and you were to have been
met by representatives of the 10-10 detachment? A. Yes.
Q. And you were to have handed them this piece of black cloth
which was given to you by Shelton before your flight to the
USSR? A. Yes.
Q. In other words this cloth was something in the nature of a
password? A. I have no idea.
Q. But what do you think? A. I did not think that I would need a
pass, the plane itself was proof who I was.
Q. The plane itself and Powers himself. But why this piece of cloth?
A. I don't know, this was the only instruction I received on this.
Q. Let us leave this subject. In 1958 as you testified yesterday, re-
plying to my question, you ferried a U-2 aircraft from Incirlik
to the air base in Bodoe. What countries did you pass through
on that occasion? A. I took off in Turkey and flew over a part
Re-examination of Defendant by Procurator 65
What were these maps? A. They were part of my emergency
kit and in case of a forced landing were to help me make my
way out to the border.
Q. In other words they were to assist you to get out of the territory
of the Soviet Union? A. Yes.
I would like you to clarify why sections have been cut out of the
two maps and what sections they are? A. I have no idea who cut
out these sections and why this was done. But I was shown the
cut out sections.
Q. And what should be on these sections judging from the remain-
ing maps? A. As the two of the maps had nothing cut out and
the other two had sections cut out, in comparing them I could
see what was missing. I do not remember exactly, but I think,
there were identification marks, who manufactured them and
to whom they belonged.
Q. That's clear. And who were the makers of the maps and to whom
did they belong? A. May I see the maps?
Q. Please, try to remember. A. If I correctly remember the word
"restricted" or "confidential" was cut out. And the words "USA
Air Force" were also cut out. The maps were on cloth.
Q. Why was this cut out? A. I have no idea. The first time I knew
about it was when I saw them here.
Q. Evidently this was done to camouflage whose maps they were
and where they were made? A. That might be so, but why would
they have sections cut out on two maps and leave them on the
other two?
Th t with these
a
s
of Turkey, then Greece and Italy. I do not remember the exact
route, it might have been Switzerland, France, or Austria,
Western Germany, and I think Denmark, and Norway.
PROCURATOR RUDENKO: I ask the court to allow the Defendant
Powers to see the four topographic maps taken from his plane.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Comrade secretary, present these maps to
the defendant.
(The secretary presents Defendant Powers the four topographical
maps)
Q. Defendant Powers, are these your topographical maps? A. Yes,
I had maps like these.
Q. How many maps did you have? A. It was proven to me that I
had four. I thought I had only two.
Q. Did you have them personally? A. They were put in my pocket
by other people.
Q. And in the plane there were two also? A. I don't know, but dur-
ing the investigation I was shown four.
Q. And are these your maps? A. Yes, theyAwpepre g ve For Release
p
Q. This is quite clear, Defendant Powers. a wo m
identifications cut out were in your possession and were to assist
you, as you said, in getting out of the Soviet Union, but the other
two maps were in the plane which you were to have destroyed
on the orders of your masters? A. I was given only two maps
and was told they would help me in getting out of the country.
What maps were given me I find it difficult to establish at
present.
Q. These maps were found on you when you were searched and
the other two in the remains of the plane. A. Which were found
where, I do not know.
Q. Among the articles in your kit we found an appeal in 14 lan-
003/10/07 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002200020011-6
your
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 Approved For Release 2003/10/07 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002200020011-6 9
6
The Trial of the U-2
Examination of Defendant by Member of the Court Zakharov
I also worked as co-pilot on a cargo-type airplane but for very
little time.
You testified yesterday that you spent three or four days in
Peshawar before your May 1 flight. What personal preparations
world as well. And I assume a flight like this would be to look for
them I suppose. But I repeat, I do not know and I'm only ex-
pressing my own opinion.
Q. Defendant, did you realize whether by intruding into the air-
space of the Soviet Union you were violating the sovereignty
of the USSR? A. Yes I did.
Q. Why did you agree? A. I was ordered to do so.
Q. Do you think now you did your country a good or bad service?
A. I would say a very bad service.
Q. Did it not occur to you that by violating the Soviet frontiers you
might torpedo the summit conference? A. When I got my in-
structions, the summit was farthest from my mind. I did not
think of it.
Q. Did it occur to you that a flight might provoke military conflict?
A. The people who sent me should have thought of these things.
My job was to carry out orders. I do not think it was my re-
sponsibility to make such decisions.
Q. Do you regret making this flight? A. Yes, very much.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Defendant Powers, I will ask you now to
answer the questions of People's Assessor Major General of the
Air Force Zakharov.
EXAMINATION OF DEFENDANT POWERS
BY MEMBER OF THE COURT ZAKHAROV
Defendant Powers, would you tell us what types of planes you
have flown, what distances you have flown. It would be desirable
to know the number of flight hours for each type of planes
separately. A. You mean since I started flying?
Yes. A. During my training I was flying two different airplanes:
T-6 and T-33, as well as F-80 which was practically the same
as T-33 but with only one seat. It seems likely that during train-
ing I had something like 300 hours. After that I started flying
F-84G which is an American Air Force fighter aircraft. I do not
remember the hours, roughly, 400-500. Then I started flying an
F-84F. This is a later model of the same plane. I had some 100-
200 hours on that plane. Then I started flying a U-2 and had
approximately 500 hours on the U-2. During the time of flying
did you conduct for flying in general and especially what pre-
flight preparations did you conduct? A. The only preparations
were made the morning before the flight, the rest of the time
I spent reading.
What did these preparations consist of specifically? A. On the
morning of May 1st, I think it was 3 or 4 hours before the flight,
I was awakened, given breakfast and told that I was to fly to-
day. Another pilot was awakened at the same time and two and
a half hours before the take-off we started to breathe oxygen.
Soon after that the maps were given to me and explanations were
made. There were a few points pointed out on the map that might
help me to navigate. One of them consisted of a possible rocket-
launching site I might see. Another was pointed out as some-
thing there but I do not know, and there were some airfields,
I don't know how many. I cannot remember the entire briefing,
for much time has passed since then. -
Q. On this map were marked the routes and the assignments of
your flight with figures and symbols. Who prepared these maps?
A. I didn't see who prepared them and can only assume that it
was done by the navigator of the detachment.
Q. How much time did you spend in studying the route and the
map? A. I had very little time to 'study the route and the map.
Q?
the U-2 I also flew a T-33 plane and probably had 200 hours in it.
Approved For Release 2003/10/07
I was briefed at the same time. All this took place between the
time I put on the helmet until I started getting dressed which
was probably 45 minutes before the scheduled take-off. It should
be roughly 1 hour 15 minutes.
How much time did you spend preparing for the flight the first
time you flew along the Soviet border in 1956? A. I knew about
this flight several hours before, if I remember correctly it was
the day before.
What were your plans of action during the flight in the air space
of the Soviet Union in the event of encountering Soviet fighter
planes? A. I was told there was no danger of this. I was also
told that I might see Soviet fighter aircraft, and I did see the
trail of a plane, but at a lower altitude. I could not tell what
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74 The Trial of the U-2 Examination of the Witness Chuzhakin 75
PRESIDING JUDGE: Defendant Powers, do
tions of the witness?
DEFENDANT POWERS: No, I do not.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Do you have any
testimony of the witness?
remarks concerning the
DEFENDANT POWERS: The testimony is
to take this opportunity to thank the witness
for me.
correct. I would like
for what he has done
PRESIDING JUDGE: Witness Asabin, be seated in the courtroom.
Comrade Commandant, call the witness Cheremisin.
(Cheremisin enters the courtroom)
PRESIDING JUDGE: Your name?
WITNESS CHEREMISIN: Cheremisin, Anatoly Fyodorovich.
PRESIDING JUDGE : Tell the Court what you know about this case.
WITNESS CHEREMISIN: While visiting my relatives on May 1,
1960, I heard a strong explosion at about 11 in the morning which
made me wonder what it was all about. I went out into the street
and noticed a parachutist in the sky. I ran to the place where he
probably would land. The parachutist when landing fell. At that
moment, Asabin immediately ran up to him and helped him spill
the air from the parachute. I, as well as Surin and Chuzhakin, at
the same time ran up to him and helped the parachutist to get on
his feet. We all started to help him remove his equipment. When
the helmet and the earphones were removed from him we asked
him: "Who are you? Where are you from? What happened to you ?"
But there was no reply. This cautioned us. I noticed that the
stranger wore a long-barreled pistol on the belt of his flying suit
and took it away from him.
After this I and Asabin took the parachutist under his arms
and led him to a car which was standing close by. Chuzhakin started
up. Surin gathered up all his equipment. While we were getting
the stranger into the car, Asabin found and removed a dagger
from him. We took the parachutist to the neighbouring village,
to the village Soviet. On the way the stranger asked for something
to drink. We stopped the car and gave him something to drink.
On the way to the village, I wrote on the dusty interior of the car
the letters "USA" and asked him if he was an American. It was
evident that he understood me and nodded his head. While we were
thus engaged two comrades from the State Security organs arrived
and we turned over the parachutist together with his belongings
to them. This is my story.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Does the Procurator-General have any ques-
tions ?
PROCURATOR RUDENKO: No, we have none.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Does the Comrade Defense
questions?
DEFENSE COUNSEL GRINEV : None.
tions of this witness?
DEFENDANT POWERS: I have no questions.
PRESIDING JUDGE: (To the Witness Cheremisin)
seated in the courtroom.
(A 20-minute adjournment is announced.)
(After the adjournment the court hearing is resumed at 12 noon.)
COMMANDANT OF THE COURT: Please rise. The court is coming.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Please call in witness Chuzhakin.
(Witness Chuzhakin enters)
PRESIDING JUDGE: What is
nymic?
name and patro-
WITNESS CHUZHAKIN: Chuzhakin, Leonid Alexeyevich.
PRESIDING JUDGE : Tell the court what you know about this case.
WITNESS CHUZHAKIN: On the morning of May 1st, I drove in
a car to a neighbouring village. On my way back, at about 11:00
a.m., I suddenly heard an explosion. Seeing Surin standing by the
road, I stopped the car and asked what had happened. In reply,
Surin pointed up and I saw a parachutist descending. We then
decided together to help the parachutist, not knowing whether he
was a Soviet person or a foreigner.
Surin, Cheremisin and I rushed up simultaneously to the para-
chutist. Asabin was already there. The four of us helped the para-
chutist to his feet, freed him from the parachute, the helmet and
the earphones attached to it and the gloves and asked what had
happened, but he answered in a strange language. This made us
immediately suspicious. On seeing that he had a long-barreled
pistol, we immediately took it away and decided to turn him over
to the State Security organs. I ran to the car and started it up and
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The Trial of the U-2 Examination of the Witness Surin
Asabin, Surin and Cheremisin took the parachutist and his goods
to the car. We seated the parachutist in the car and put the para-
chute and all his equipment in the luggage compartment. When we
were helping the parachutist into the car we noticed that he had a
dagger and took it away. When we seated the parachutist we asked
him, pointing with fingers, how many flyers there were-one or two.
The pilot showed that he was alone. On the way he showed us with
gestures that he was thirsty. I stopped the car and we gave him
some water. The pilot also asked for a cigarette. My comrades gave
him their own cigarettes.
We returned to the neighbouring village where State Security
men were already waiting for us. We handed the parachutist over
to them. Later, at the pilot's request, I fetched a doctor. This is
my story.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Comrade Procurator-General,. do you have
any questions of the witness Chuzhakin?
PROCURATOR RUDENKO: No.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Comrade Defense Counsel, do you
questions of the witness Chuzhakin?
DEFENSE COUNSEL GRINEV: No.
have any
PRESIDING JUDGE: Defendant Powers, do you have any questions
of the witness Chuzhakin ?
DEFENDANT POWERS: No, I have no questions.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Do you believe his statements correspond to
the facts in this matter?
DEFENDANT POWERS: Yes.
PRESIDING JUDGE : Witness Chuzhakin, you may be seated in the
Courtroom. Comrade Commandant, I ask that the Witness Surin
be brought in.
(Witness Surin enters the Courtroom)
PRESIDING JUDGE : Your name?
WITNESS SURIN: Surin, Vladimir Pavlovich.
PRESIDING JUDGE Please tell the Court what
this case.
WITNESS SURIN: I was at home on May 1st, 1960, when at
approximately 11:00 a.m. I heard a loud noise like that of a jet
aircraft, only more piercing. I went out into the street when I heard
a loud explosion and saw a column of smoke rise in the distance
outside the village. Not understanding what had happened, I looked
Approved For
up and saw in the air a descending parachutist. At that moment
Chuzhakin drove up to me in a car. I pointed to the parachutist
and we followed him with our eyes to see where he would land. Then
we drove to the spot where we figured he would land. Some 50 meters
from the spot where he landed we stoppd the car and found Asabin
there who was helping to flatten the parachute. We all helped the
parachutist rise to his feet and began unfastening the parachute and
taking off his earphones, a helmet and gloves. Then I asked him
what had happened. He answered in a language we did not under-
stand and shook his head. We realized that he was a foreigner
and decided to detain him. Cheremisin immediately took away from
him a long-barreled pistol. Asabin and Cheremisin then took him
under his arms and led him to the car. At that moment Asabin
took away a dagger which the parachutist had. We delivered the
parachutist to the Rural Soviet where we handed him over to State
Security men. That's all I have to say.
PRESIDING JUDGE : Do the participants in the proceedings have
any questions of the witness?
PROCURATOR RUDENKO: No.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Comrade Defense Counsel?
DEFENSE COUNSEL GRINEV : No.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Defendant Powers, do you have any questions
of this witness?
DEFENDANT POWERS: No I have no questions.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Do you have any remarks?
DEFENDANT POWERS: I want to express my thanks for the help
which was shown to me by all these people on that day. This is the
first opportunity I have to thank them. I am happy to thank them.
PRESIDING JUDGE: The court will now hear the experts. Expert
Alekseyev, please take the stand.
(Expert Alekseyev comes forward)
PRESIDING JUDGE: What is your
nymic?
surname, name and patro-
EXPERT ALEKSEYEV: Alekseyev, Nikolai Alexeyevich.
PRESIDING JUDGE: What is your rank?
 Approved For Release 2003/10/07 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002200020011-6
80 The Trial of the U-2
determined route at an average speed of 750 kilometres an hour.
The amount of preparatory work on the chart, its size (the total
length of the chart is over 3 metres), the thoroughness with which
the preparations were made and the multitude of different data
entered on it by hand and by special stamps show that the flight had
been prepared beforehand ; that all the graphic data and calculations
on the flight chart were made on the ground before the take-off.
The notes made on the chart during flight show that throughout
the flight (as far as the Sverdlovsk area) pilot Powers knew his
whereabouts and kept a systematic check on the landmarks over
which he flew, i.e., he carried out a flight along a prearranged route.
2. Part of a logbook in which were entered : the name of the pilot
Powers, the number of the aircraft, 360... (the last figures were
undecipherable), the date and time of the take-off (0126 hrs GMT,
May 1, 1960), the call signal of the aircraft "Puppy 68," the presence
of special apparatus on board, known by the code letters B-T and
the sortie number-4154. Entries in the journal refer to a number of
actions by the pilot, the radio apparatus used, the navigational
elements of the flight, the expenditure and remaining stock of fuel
depending on the distance covered.
This document and, in particular, the entries giving the date and
time of takg-off, the number of the flight and the estimate of fuel
expenditure for the various stages of the route also prove that- the
flight of the American aircraft over Soviet territory on May 1, 1960
was deliberate and planned beforehand.
3. A cutting from a synoptic chart with the route marked on it
and with weather forecasts for each stage of the flight entered on it
and instructions concerning landing conditions at the end of the
flight. This document is also evidence that Powers' flight was
planned beforehand and that very thorough preparations were
made.
4. Four sheets of two-sided aerial navigation charts of the U.S.
Air Force marked "Confidential"-scale 1:2,000,000-issued by the
Aerial Navigation Department of the U.S. Air Force, Washington;
the chart was for the territory of Europe and the USSR.
These charts were apparently Powers' reserve to be used in the
event of serious deviation from the given route or in case of a forced
landing on the territory of the USSR which may also serve to con-
Examination of the Expert Alekseyev 81
The third group consists of flight documents of the universally
accepted type that are required by flight personnel on any flight.
These include: record of aerial navigation charts, check list of
apparatus on board, list of the aircraft's equipment, directory of
European airfields.
After a thorough study and analysis of the materials submitted
and the inscriptions made by the pilot in this flight, the expert com-
mission came to the following conclusions: The Pilot Francis Gary
Powers belongs to the United States Air Force.
The flight of the American aircraft over the territory of the Soviet
Union on May 1, 1960 was deliberate and planned in advance. The
charts with the route plotted and the navigational data were pre-
pared on the ground before the flight.
During the flight, Pilot Powers knew his location, regularly con-
trolled the flight by means of given landmarks and in fact had
carried out his flight along a previously charted route.
During the flight over the territory of the USSR, Pilot Powers en-
tered on his map, information of an intelligence character and also
entered weather conditions.
PRESIDING JUDGE : Do the participants in this proceeding have
any questions of the expert Alekseyev?
PROCURATOR RUDENKO: I have no questions.
DEFENSE COUNSEL GRINEV: I have no questions.
PRESIDING JUDGE : Defendant Powers, do you have any questions
of the expert Alekseyev?
DEFENDANT POWERS: No questions.
PRESIDING JUDGE : Do you have any remarks to make on the con-
clusions of the experts?
DEFENDANT POWERS: No remarks.
PRESIDING JUDGE : On the preliminary
given the materials of the experts?
investigation were you
DEFENDANT POWERS: Yes, I was acquainted with those ma-
terials.
PRESIDING JUDGE: You were explained your procedural rights-
to submit new questions, be acquainted with these materials and so
forth ?
DEFENDANT POWERS: Yes.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Expert Alekseyev, I ask you to be seated.
firm that the flight was thoroughly repared i ad a ce. Expert Alekseyev, I ask you to submit to the
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Court your conclusions
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82 The Trial of the U-2
in writing. Expert Tyufilin, come forward. Your name?
EXPERT TYUFILIN: Tyufilin.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Your given name and patronymic?
EXPERT TYUFILIN: Yuri Vsevolodovich.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Your title?
EXPERT TYUFILIN: Lieutenant Colonel of the Engineers.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Do you have a scientific degree?
EXPERT TYUFILIN: No I do not.
PRESIDING JUDGE: I ask you to submit the findings of the ex-
perts.
EXPERT TYUFILIN: A commission of experts consisting of offi-
cers of the Soviet Armed Forces: Major of the Engineers M. P. ish-
cheyev, Major of the Engineers A. P. Koptev, and myself,
Lieutenant Colonel of the Engineers Y. V. Tyufilin., was appointed in
accordance with the decision of the investigator of May 20, 1960.
The commission of experts was to establish : were there identifica-
tion marks on the Lockheed U-2 plane which was shot down on
May 1, 1960, showing to what state it belonged.
For its investigation, the experts were given remnants of the U-2
plane.
The plane wreckage, particularly the wings and fin, had a well-
preserved coated paint and varnish surface, which permitted the
experts to establish whether or not the aircraft had any identifica-
tion marks.
The result of our investigation revealed that there were no identi-
fication marks of any kind. The Court might confirm this by looking
at the photographs, located in this case, in volume 8, page 79. The
investigation also established that the outer varnish and paint lay-
ers was of the same color all throughout every part of the U-2 plane,
and the paint was of such consistency and thickness and uniformity
of color that no other tracings of any other paint were found.
In general, there were no distinguishing marks in this plane of
any kind and the commission dissolved the layers of paint where the
markings were usually found but found no tracings of identity
marks. On American military planes, as revealed by official Soviet
and foreign published materials, as a rule, the markings are found
on the upper panel of the left cantilever and the middle of the lower
panel of the right cantilever.
On the U-2 plane, according to the photographs appearing in the
Approved
Examination of the Expert Tyufilin 83
journal "Aviation Week", number 21 on May 23, 1960, on its fin
there is a sign "NASA" and underneath that sign, the number of
the plane, and because of this we paid special attention to those
places to discover erasures.
Based on that, we established that in the usual places where there
would be identity markings covered by layers of paint, its color and
other factors, there were no tracings of any marks. The upper parts
of the wings has a six-layer covering of paint and the layers of paint
were in the following order: yellow, dark gray, white, dark gray,
yellow and dark gray. Underneath none of these layers was any
tracing of any identity markings.
In the opinion of the expert commission, the downed U-2 plane of
May 1, 1960 did not have any identification marks signifying what
state it belonged to.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Do the participants in this proceeding have
any questions of the expert Tyufilin?
ANSWERS: No.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Defendant Powers, do you have any questions
of the expert?
DEFENDANT POWERS: Yes, I have a question. Would it be pos-
sible for identification marks to be put on top of the coating and
then removed?
EXPERT TYUFILIN: Theoretically, of course, it is possible.
DEFENDANT POWERS: I ask this because this plane has been in
Incirlik for several months and I saw identification marks on all the
planes there. I cannot agree that there have never been any identifi-
cation marks on this plane.
PRESIDING JUDGE: It is your right, defendant, to agree or not,
but the experts, on the basis of investigating the paint covering
arrived at the conclusion that there were no identification marks and
there are none as you saw for yourself when you inspected the
plane at the exhibition.
DEFENDANT POWERS: What I was trying to say, previous to
this flight there might have been identification marks on the plane.
I am no expert in this.
EXPERT TYUFILIN: In principle, there is this possibility.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Defendant Powers, do you have any more
questions of the expert Tyufilin?
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34 The Trial of the U-2
PRESIDING JUDGE: Please be seated, Defendant. Expert Tyufilin,
submit your conclusions to the Court in writing. I ask that the ex-
pert Istomin come forward. Your name?
EXPERT ISTOMIN: Istomin, Gleb Alekseyevich.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Your title?
EXPERT ISTOMIN: Doctor of Technical Sciences. Professor.
PRI~SIDING JUDGE: Will you present the conclusions of the
perts on the photographic equipment of the Lockheed U-2 plane.
EXPERT ISTOMIN : In the course of the investigation of the Pow-
ers' case, by decision of the investigating bodies, a commission of
experts has made a technical examination of the photographic equip-
ment which was on board the Lockheed U-2 aircraft shot down in
the Sverdlovsk area on May 1, 1960.
The commission was given the following parts of the photographic
equipment for study: a destroyed air camera magazine with four
rolls of aerial film 24 cm. wide, separate destroyed elements of the
aerial camera, and two rolls of film 7 cm. wide.
The experts were given the assignment to establish :
1. The tactical and technical data of the air camera installed on
board the Lockheed U-2 aircraft.
2. The technical characteristics of the aerial films used.
3. From what altitudes and in what areas of the Soviet
photographs were taken from the Lockheed U-2 aircraft.
Examination of the Expert Istomin 85
camera model "73-B" was installed on this aircraft for aerial recon-
naissance photography. The name of the model of the camera is
given on several company name-plates fastened to the camera body.
The locks of the removable spindles of the film spools carry an in-
scription showing that they were made in the United States.
For its tactical and technical characteristics the "73-B" model is a
reconnaissance air camera and its salient feature is that it is de-
signed to photograph large areas from the air in the course of one
flight.
The air camera has a rotating lens for ensuring multi strip photog-
raphy.
In the course of the flight on May 1, 1960, the air camera was used
for seven-strip photography consecutively through seven glass-
encased aircraft windows in the skin of the plane. The lens cover
was from 160 to 200 km. in width.
The camera was loaded with two films, each of which was 24 cm.
wide and about 2,000 m. long. The films were placed parallel to the
focal plane of the camera so that during each action of the shutter
two films were exposed with a total size of 45x45 cm. The supply of
film in the camera made it possible to receive about 4,000 paired
aerial pictures, i.e., to photograph in the course of the flight on May
1, 1960, a route of about 3,500 km.
The air camera had a lens with a rated focal length of 915 mm ; the
rated focal length of the lens and the actual focal length of the aerial
camera, equal to 944.7 mm, are indicated on the body of the lens.
The camera lens.with a sufficiently long focus made it possible to
obtain from the high altitudes at which the plane was flying rela-
tively large-scale photographs suitable for the purposes of aerial
reconnaissance. The image scale of the pictures obtained over the
territory of the USSR on May 1, 1960, was 220-230 metres in one
centimetre. On photographs of such a scale it was possible to deter-
mine the designation of most industrial and military installations.
The film used in the "73-B" model camera was studied with regard
to its photographic characteristics, resolving power, spectral prop-
erties, structure, composition of the emulsion layer and the proper-
ties of the base.
The film which was on the Lockheed U-2 aircraft possessed high
sensitivity and could ensure aerial photography throughout the day.
4. The possibilities of using the obtained aerial photographs.
The commission of experts, consisting of G. A. Istomin, Dr. Sc.
(Tech.) ; V. A. Bekunov, M.Sc. (Chem.) ; V. Y. Mikhailov and V. A.
Uvarov, both M.Sc. (Tech.) ; B. S. Samokhvalov and L. V. Zakur-
dayev, senior scientific workers ; and Col. of the Engineers V. I.
Krovyakov, Col. of the Engineers A. Y. Pogozhev, and Lt. Col. of
the Engineers B. G. Kurnakov, officers of the Soviet Army, has
examined in detail the submitted parts of the plane's photographic
equipment, processed the film, studied and map controlled the ob-
tained aerial photographs and studied the films with the object of
determining their technical characteristics.
The commission of experts has drawn up a detailed technical
finding. Allow me to dwell on the main materials of the experts'
finding.
A study of the remnants of the U-2 photographic equipment en-
It is a film of a special grade designed for aerial surveys
abled the commission to establish thp$ V* 8 P6WFi~I afWe b6Y/10/07: CIA-RDP80B01676R002200020011-6
from high
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86 The Trial of the U-2 Examination of the Expert Andreyev 87
altitudes. Compared with the film used in American spy balloons of
the 1956 model, the given grade has been improved for a number of
specifications essential for high-altitude aerial photographic recon-
naissance of military, industrial and topographic objects.
The film from the U-2 aircraft was processed. The negatives ob-
tained after laboratory treatment were identified and map-con-
trolled.
The results of the map control of the negatives showed that aerial
photographs were taken from the U-2 aircraft on May 1, 1960, over
the territory of the USSR along a route passing from an area West
of Tashkent to Sverdlovsk.
The route along which photographs were made conforms to the
route of flight plotted on the flight map which Powers had.
The altitude at which aerial photographs were taken was deter-
mined by the pictures with account of the actual focal length of the
camera ; according to this determination, the altitude was 20,000-
21,000 metres.
Identification of the aerial pictures shows that the latter contain
diverse espionage information about objects located along the route
of the plane's flight. The aerial photos show large inhabited places,
industrial and military installations-factories, plants, electric sta-
tions, warehouses, mines, various means of communication, air
fields, and anti-aircraft defense means. The aerial photos can be
used both for espionage purposes and for specifying topographical
maps.
The commission of experts established the following:
1. The 73-B model camera, installed on board the Lockheed U-2
aircraft is a special reconnaissance air camera designed for aerial
photography of a large area during high-altitude flights.
2. The film used in the camera installed on board the Lockheed
U-2 aircraft is of a special grade designated for aerial photographic
reconnaissance of military and topographical objects from high
altitudes.
3. The photographing of the territory of the Soviet Union was
made from an altitude of about 21,000 metres on a sector running
from an area North of the Soviet-Afghan state border, up to the
Sverdlovsk area. The route of the flight (judging by the results of
map control of the aerial photographs) conforms to the route plotted
on the flight map Powers had.
The total supply of film in the camera made it possible to photo-
graph a route of about 3,500 km long, i.e. to photograph a con-
siderable part of the territory of the Soviet Union along the route
of the plane's flight.
4. The aerial photographs made contain sufficiently complete and
diverse espionage information regarding industrial and military in-
stallations located on the photographed territory and can be used
both for espionage purposes and for compiling and correcting topo-
graphical maps and determining the coordinates of military and
topographical objects.
Thus, a study of the remnants of the photographic equipment of
the Lockheed U-2 aircraft which violated the state frontier of the
USSR on May 1, 1960, and the materials of the aerial photography
taken from it, lead to the conclusion about the reconnaissance nature
of this equipment and the espionage purposes of the flight by this
aircraft.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Do the participants in this court proceeding
have any questions to the expert Istomin?
PROCURATOR RUDENKO: No.
DEFENSE COUNSEL GRINEV: The Defense-none.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Defendant Powers, do you have any questions
to the expert Istomin?
DEFENDANT POWERS: No.
PRESIDING JUDGE: (Speaking to the Expert Istomin) I ask you
to submit your findings to the Court in writing. Expert Andreyev,
will you come forward. Your name?
EXPERT ANDREYEV: Andreyev, Rostislav Aleksandrovich.
PRESIDING JUDGE : Your title?
EXPERT ANDREYEV: Colonel of the Engineers.
PRESIDING JUDGE : Do you have a scientific degree?
EXPERT ANDREYEV: No, I do not.
PRESIDING JUDGE : Please relate the findings of the commission
of experts.
EXPERT ANDREYEV: In accordance with a decision of the in-
vestigator, a group of experts consisting of officers of the Air Force
Colonel of Engineers R. A. Andreyev, Lieutenant-Colonel of En-
gineers M. V. Krotov, Lieutenant-Colonel of Engineers V. N. Faikin,
Lieutenant-Colonel of Engineers I. B. Korochansky, and Lieutenant-
Colonel of Engineers A. F. Lebedev, M.Sc. (Technology) made an
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The Trial of the U-2
examination of the radiotechnical apparatus and the magnetic tape
recordings found on May 1, 1960, on the spot where the Lockheed
U-2 aircraft fell in the vicinity of the city of Sverdlovsk.
The experts were assigned to answer the following questions :
1. the purpose of the above-mentioned instruments ;
2. whether there was a recording on the magnetic tape, and if so,
the nature of the recorded signals or reports ;
3. what was registered with the help of those recordings and
whether the recordings contain intelligence data about the territory
of the USSR.
The commission of experts had at their disposal the following:
a) apparatus for detecting radio signals, including:
-antennas for various wave bands;
-a high-frequency reconnaissance receiver MP-11504 in the 3-centi-
metre wave band;
-a reconnaissance receiver MP-11048 in the one-metre wave band ;
-an amplifier ;
-a high-frequency filter;
-high-frequency switches ;
Examination of the Expert Andreyev
The design and type of the apparatus are such that they point to
its having been specially prepared for the flight on May 1, 1960.
The Antenna Gear
The antennas of the apparatus in question are wide range receiv-
ing antennas working in different bands of an extremely broad range
9f radio wavelengths. There were two antennas of the same type of
each band. All the antennas were fixed and installed in the lower
.part of the fuselage of the Lockheed U-2 aircraft behind radio-
transparent fairings. Some of the radiotransparent windows in the
fairings were on detachable frames. The antennas of the 3-centi-
netre band were of the parabolic type. Together with the waveguide
assemblies they ensured the reception of signals of reconnoitered
radiotechnical stations in the 2.3 to 4.0 centimetre band.
The antennas MP-11719 for the centimetre and decimetre wave
)ands had wideband balanced triangular dipoles over a metal mirror.
the wavelengths which such an antenna could pick up could extend
rom approximately 6 to 20 centimetres; in the lower frequencies
his range was limited by the above-mentioned high-fre
n the 15
u
q
ency filter
centimetre band (2,000 Mc/s).
-a -units MP-11471 distribution of unit video amplifiers ideo a MP-1230 with MP- inter-unit 10002; connective cables;
The antennas of the decimetre wavelength band are of a flat helical
b) aviation tape recorders (one partially and the other heavily Ype and can ensure reception over a very wide range of wave-
destroyed) ; gths, which, however, was limited, by a high-frequency filter, to
c) six tape recorder reels with ferromagnetic tape. A part of the he 30 cm. to 100 cm. band. It is well-known that in the U.S.A. flat
magnetic tape had burned up, apparently as a result of a deliberate
elical antennas are recommended for use as broad-band antennas
explosion. About 250 metres of tape (approximately 1.5 hours of ft h reduced aerodynamic resistance for use in aircraft aids for
work) was in good condition, completely intactand suitable for re- adio reconnaissance and radio suppression (see "Aviation Week?
.
production. Two of the (feed) reels contained magnetic tape with my 14 , 1958).
no recordings. The presence of two identical antennas for each band shows that All the units of radio apparatus bore the legend "MP" (Military fley nder could reconnaissance,
the bearings gs of the radio and radar stations
Procurements) with corresponding numerical indices. These indices ons
show the apparatus to be the property of the U.S. Defense Depart- Thus, the above antennas are typical antennas for radio reconnais-
ment and that it is top secret in the U.S.A. There are no markings~r ince this apparatus which cover a sufficiently wide range of wavelengths
of the company or other establishment which manufactured the purpose and ensure the possibility of determining the loca-
apparatus as a whole. However, parts, assemblies and separate units n of radio and radar installations.
bear many trade marks of such American companies as Huggins
Radio Receiving Instruments
Labs, of Menlo Park, California, Hewlett-Packard, General Electric,
The
Raytheon, Sylvania, Transco Products, California, Micro Lab and commission of experts examined a number of receiver units.
many others. e Presence of the u
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92
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Soviet Union and different towns, Dig in us ria an a ministrative
centers of our country, and also data on separate radar stations
belonging to this system.
2. These data were recorded on the ferro-magnetic tape of tape
recorders on which signals of ground radar stations of the anti-
aircraft defense system of the Soviet Union had been recorded.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Do the participants have questions to the
expert? No questions? Defendant Powers, do you have questions
to the expert or remarks in connection with the findings of the
commission?
DEFENDANT POWERS: No.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Expert Andreyev, please submit the written
findings of the commission of experts. The hearing is adjourned
till 4:30 p.m.
(The hearing adjourned at 2:00 p.m.)
f
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Examination of the Expert Voroshilov
range and accuracy are the same as those of conventional pistols. distance at day; at the other end, with a substance for coloured,
The cartridges are fed into the pistol from a detachable single-row most probably red, lighting clearly observable at a great distance
magazine housing 10 cartridges. With loading magazine the pistol at night.
weighs 1.3 kg. Smoke signals and coloured light signals are used both for military
This pistol is of the newest type of noiseless personal firearm. A and civilian purposes in the air, over sea and land for transmission
characteristic feature of the present model is that the report is re- of signals and commands and for communication. On the exterior
duced not only by a silencer but also by special design of the barrel. of the container there are inscriptions containing instructions for
The report of a shot from this pistol is much weaker than the report use and indicating that the signal is of type 13, model and that
of a conventional pistol. The trade mark and inscriptions in English it was manufactured in the U.S.A. by Aerial Products, Inc.,. in
indicate that the pistol was manufactured in the United States by Electon, Maryland.
High Standard Mfg. Corp., located in New Haven, Connecticut, PRESIDING JUDGE: Do the participants in the trial have any
and that the company manufacturing these pistols has applied for questions to expert Voroshilov?
a patent. PROCURATOR RUDENKO: I do not.
By its ballistic and technical characteristics and design this pistol DEFENSE COUNSEL GRINEV: I do not.
is neither a sporting firearm nor a hunting weapon nor a conven- PRESIDING JUDGE: Defendant Powers, have you any questions
tonal army weapon nor a personal weapon for officers of the armed o expert Voroshilov?
forces. The pistol is designed for noiseless firing at people in attack DEFENDANT POWERS: I have no questions, but I would like to
and defense. The pistol is completely in order and fit for use. This is Hake an explanation.
the description of the pistol. ?RESIDING JUDGE: Please.
The cartridges submitted for investigation are widely used in the DEFENDANT POWERS: Would it be possible for me to see one of
U.S.A. and are designed for shooting from rifles, revolvers and semi- hose things referred to, a phial?
automatic pistols and can be shot from a 0.22 calibre noiseless 'RESIDING JUDGE: Comrade Secretary, them.
pistol. )EFEND ' Which one?
ANT POWERS: The small one. (The court secretary
The three cartridge cartons bear trade marks in English which shows the phial to the defendant).
indicate that the cartridges were manufactured in the U.S.A. by NTERPRETER BELITSKY: The Defendant asks permission that
Remington Arms Co., Inc. of the Du Pont concern, he interpreter read out the instructions on the cover.
The cartridges are in good condition and are fit for firing. RESIDING JUDGE: Please read them.
The above-mentioned phials represent an incendiary means con- t bRP To BELITSKY (reading) : "Ignition phial M-2, com-
sisting of a packing, combustible substance and a friction-t ignite, break open red lid with the pin,
ignition device. On the exterior surface of the packing there is aside. Do not handle red section. Use thin piece pull wire from
od as
brief instruction for use of the phials written in English. Suchhown in drawing." And there is the illustration of a campfire.
De-
phials are manufactured for special use when it is necessary forsidant Powers claims that this substance is used to light amp-
flame to act for a comparatively long time on the object to be setres, and in particular, with damp wood.
on fire. 'EFENDANT POWERS: As regards the pistol it was given
only
The cylindrical container made of tin has lids at both ends and rep-ir hunting and I took it for this purpose. Unfortunately, n o
resents a combined signal flare for daylight and night time use withlt myself knows that I cannot kill a person even to save Amy own
a friction ignition device. The container is filled with a pyrotechnicalie,
substance: at one end with a coloured substance for forming smoke,RESIDING JUDGE: Defendant Power
probably of orange colour, and cleaAWp&W& Fi& A ff"I fide E# g@~i i ~O b~ _6are aware that at
bun game.
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DEFENDANT POWERS: Yes, I know. This was to be used only in
case I had a forced landing.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Expert Voroshilov, please submit the find-
ings of the experts to the court in written form. Expert Burmistrov-
Zuyev, please take the stand. What is your surname?
EXPERT BURMISTROV-ZUYEV: Burmistrov-Zuyev, Nikolai Mik-
hailovich.
PRESIDING JUDGE: What rank do you hold?
EXPERT BURMISTROV-ZUYEV : Lieutenant-Colonel of the Engi-
neers.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Do you have a scientific degree?
EXPERT BURMISTROV-ZUYEV: I do not.
PRESIDING JUDGE: I ask you to tell the court about the findings
of the experts.
EXPERT BURMISTROV-ZUYEV: Lieutenant-Colonel of the Engi-
neers N. M. Burmistrov-Zuyev, Lieutenant-Colonel V. P. Yefanov,
Lieutenant-Colonel of the Engineers K. A. Lepshchikov, and Captain
of the Engineers L. A. Shushko, officers of the Soviet Army, were
instructed by the investigation authorities to carry out a technical
examination of the special mechanism - the destructor unit -
found on May 1, 1960, in the wreckage of the Lockheed U-2 aircraft
shot down in the vicinity of the city of Sverdlovsk.
The experts were asked to answer the following questions :
What is the construction of the destructor unit? By what means
is the unit operated? With what explosives is the unit charged
and what destruction is it capable of effecting? What is the purpose
of the destructor unit?
As a result of a techincal examination, we have established :
1. Design of the Destructor Unit
The destructor unit (Model 175-10A) was manufactured
Beckman and Whitley and was located near the
housing
containing an
The Trial of the U-2
Examination of the Expert Burmistrev-Zuyev
The lower part contains the explosive and the upper part, the ex-
ploder.
The exploder also contains a safety device consisting of a rotating
electromagnet with a shaft and a safety catch. There is an aperture
in the shaft to take the safety catch which also has two detonator
caps pressed into it. Another two detonator caps are pressed into the
partition of the unit's housing.
When the unit functions, the electric detonators and the detonator
caps of the shaft and the partition form a single detonating circuit
for the transmission of the detonation from the electric detonators
to the basic explosive charge. This is effected by turning the magnet
shaft into the working position and thus closing the microswitches
in the feeder circuit of the electric detonators.
When the unit is at `safety,' i.e., when the safety catch is inserted,
no explosion occurs because the safety catch prevents the shaft of
the electromagnet from turning to the working position and, con-
sequently, prevents the feeding of the electric detonator circuit.
2. Methods of Operating the Destructor Unit
The unit is operated from the pilot's cockpit.
On the panel in the pilot's cockpit supplying alternating current to
the automatic pilot, bank indicator and other apparatus using elec-
tric power, there is the word `explosion' under which it is assumed,
there was a special switch for remote control.
The elements of the remote control circuit were not found.
For this reason it is impossible to reconstruct the remote control
system of the unit exactly. On the basis of the general design of the
unit, however, the following variants of a remote control system
are possible:
1. Electric control with a timing mechanism :
2. Electric control without a timing mechani
sm.
by the Both designs involve placing the mechanical safety device in the
cockpit. The unit Working position, i.e., the withdrawal of the safety catch from the
explosive, and a cover; there mechanism effecting the explosion.
exploder with
a safety catch, electric detonators, micro- The safety catch may be connected mechanically with any part of
h
switches and wires connecting the unit to the control system of the t
e aircraft that separates when the plane is abandoned by the
aircraft. Pilot (for example, with the cockpit ejector system).
The housing of the unit is a metal cylinder divided into two parts Should it be necessary to blow up the aircraft when
safety catch ma be withh~ b grounded, the
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The Trial of the U-2
your findings in strict accordance with the materials of the case
and the special knowledge which you have. You are responsible in
accordance with Article 95 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR for
giving deliberately false findings. I ask you to give the Court the
necessary signed statement. Go up to the Secretary.
(Zhdanov goes up to the Secretary and signs.)
Expert Zhdanov, you participated in the commission of experts
during the preliminary investigation. Please inform the Court on
the findings of the commission of experts.
EXPERT ZHDANOV: In accordance with the decision of the in-
vestigator of May 4, 1960, a commission of experts including Air
Force Major-General N V. Voronov, chairman, and members: Air
Force Major-General V. M. Lavsky, Colonel B. G. Kryukov, Colonel
Y. V. Sergovsky, Lieutenant-Colonel S. M. Andianov and myself,
Colonel I. I. Zhdanov, studied the maps, films and other materials
discovered among the remains of the plane shot down in the
vicinity of the city of Sverdlovsk.
The all-round and detailed study of the above materials provided
the experts with the opportunity of drawing conclusions that the
flights of the American pilot on the Lockheed U-2 plane on May 1,
1960 was premeditated, prepared in advance and was conducted
with reconnaissance aims.
This is shown by the specially prepared map found in the wreck-
age with the planned and marked route of flight from the Pakistan
area (Peshawar airfield) in the northwestern direction through the
Tajik, Uzbek, Kazakh republics, the Southern Urals up to Sverd-
lovsk with a turn towards Kirov, then to the White Sea, crossing
the eastern part of the Kola Peninsula and leaving along its northern
coast to the territory of Norway.
The total length of the route amounts to some 6,500 kilometers.
An analysis of the flight chart showed that the plane flew from
the Peshawar airfield to the Sverdlovsk area along the route set with
an average speed of some 750 kilometers an hour. This is confirmed
by the film taken of sections of the locality and notes on the course
and the actual location of the plane with the notes made on the flight
chart of the time by hand with red and black pencils.
The chart had notes made beforehand on switching definite
instruments and equipment on the plane on and off during the flight
Examination of the Expert Zhdanov
route were
attention.
marked to which the pilot
should have paid special
The investigation and study of documentary data conducted by
the commission of experts give ground to draw the conclusion that
the American plane which was shot down on May 1, 1960, in the
vicinity of the city of Sverdlovsk was a specially prepared air recon-
naissance plane which had the task of crossing through the entire
territory of the Soviet Union from the Pamir area to the Kola
Peninsula with the aim of reconnoitering military and industrial
objectives, important districts of the Soviet Union, by photograph-
ing them. The developed aerial films and the map control of the
films provided the opportunity of establishing that the locality
photographed from the plane with a long-focus camera is the ter-
ritory of the Soviet Union. A greater part of the route from the
west of Tashkent and up to Sverdlovsk was photographed, in par-
ticular, airfields and certain other objectives, the information on
which constitutes a state and military secret of the Soviet Union.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Are there questions to expert Zhdanov?
PROCURATOR RUDENKO: No.
DEFENSE COUNSEL GRINEV: No.
PRESIDING JUDGE : Defendant Powers, have you any questions
to ask Expert Zhdanov or remarks on the findings of the commission
f
o
experts.,
DEFENDANT POWERS: No.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Expert Zhdanov, present
written findings of the commission of experts.
(The Court adjourned at 5:40 p.m.)
to the Court the
over the territory of the Soviet Union; incidentally, sections of the
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THIRD DAY
AUGUST 19, 1960
FIRST SESSION, 10 A.M.
COMMANDANT OF THE COURT: The Court is coming. Please
rise.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Please be seated. The session is resumed.
Do the participants of the court proceedings have any addenda or
pleas pertaining to the legal proceedings?
PROCURATOR RUDENKO: I have no addenda or pleas to the
legal proceedings.
DEFENSE COUNSEL GRINEV: I likewise have no addenda or
pleas.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Does the Defendent Powers have anything
to add to these legal proceedings?
DEFENDANT POWERS: No, I have nothing.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Do you have any additional pleas concern-
ing the legal proceedings?
DEFENDANT POWERS: No.
PRESIDING JUDGE: At this point the hearings of the case will
close. The Court will hear the speeches of the participants in the
court proceedings. We will hear now the Procurator-General of the
Soviet Union, State Counsellor of Justice Rudenko deliver the speech
for the prosecution.
SPEECH FOR THE PROSECUTION
By R. A. Rudenko, Procurator-General of the USSR.
Comrade Judges !
I begin my speech for the prosecution in the present case fully
conscious of its tremendous importance.
The present trial of the American spy-pilot Powers exposes the
crimes committed not only by the Defendant Powers himself, but
it completely unmasks the criminal aggressive actions of United
States ruling circles, the actual inspirers and organizers of mon-
strous crimes directed against the e
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s own that at in n the the struggle
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The Trial of the U-2
Speech for the Prosecution
the four powers in Paris on May 16, 1960, declared, in an effort
to prevent the wrecking of the Summit conference, that the Soviet
Union, notwithstanding the provocative actions of the United States
Government, considered it possible to take part in the conference
provided the United States Government condemned the unparalleled
provocation against the Soviet Union, apologized for it and punished
those responsible.
President Eisenhower rejected the Soviet Union's just and legi-
timate demands. The United States Government thereby demon-
strated to the whole world its real intention of using the provocative
incursion of the U-2 aircraft into the Soviet air space as a pretext
to wreck the Summit meeting, plunge the world again into the state
of cold war, exacerbate tension in international relations and put
a brake on the Great Powers disarmament talks.
In this way the Summit conference was torpedoed by the United
States Government.
This was so evident that even prominent U.S. statesmen had to
admit that the Summit meeting had been wrecked by the United
States Government. I will quote the already known statement by
Fulbright, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, on the results of an investigation into the events which
led to the wrecking of the Summit meeting.
Fulbright said :
"It is perfectly clear that the U-2 incident and our
handling of it were the immediate cause of the col-
lapse of the conference. It is irrelevant in this con-
nection to argue that Khrushchev came to Paris with
a predetermined position to prevent the conference
from taking place. The determining factor in reach-
ing this position was the U-2 incident which had
occurred two weeks before the conference."
111
bomber on a criminal provocative flight into the Soviet Union on
July 1, 1960.
And this happened after President Eisenhower's assurance given
in May, 1960, that spy flights by American planes into the Soviet
air space would be stopped.
Comrade Judges, this trial has attracted the attention of mil-
lions of people throughout the world.
The case of the exposed American SPY-Pilot Francis Gary
Powers aroused such a sharp and angry reaction on the part of the
Soviet people and all peaceloving people because the exposure of
an American intelligence agent, caught red-handed and shot down
during an aggressive spy flight in the Sverdlovsk area on May 1
of this year, was simultaneously an exposure of the reactionary
ruling circles of the United States of America which have made the
national policy of their country a calculated policy of perfidy,
provocations and espionage, a "policy of balancing on the brink of
war" in the interest of capitalist monopolies.
These reactionary imperialist circles, which have proclaimed the
"deterrent policy" and the "positions of strength" policy to be
the supreme political principles of the United States, the circles
which organised the criminal aggressive intrusion of a military
plane into the Soviet Union, have patently shown to what criminal
methods, constituting a direct threat to peace and the whole of
mankind, they resort.
In their significance and the grave consequences which they
have already entailed, let alone those they could have entailed,
the criminal actions of the accused Powers go far beyond an
ordinary criminal act.
The correct assessment of these acts and the adoption of meas-
ures to prevent similar acts in the future is in the interest, not
only of the Soviet Union, against whom the criminal
rnent
encroach_
Subsequent events showed what a dangerous, aggressive line
was directly perpetrated, but of the whole of mankind.
was followed by the Government of the United States, which did The specific circumstances of this case, which were thorou hl
not stop its provocative actions against the USSR and which re- examined during the preliminary investigation and in court, the y
mained true to its "policy of balancing on the brink of war." entire course followed by Powers in his bandit flight over the
territory of the USSR, cannot but lead any rightminded person
A great wave of indignation swept the world when it became who is striving to maintain
known that new perfidious acts had been committed by the rulers concernin
g the peace on earth, to draw conclusions
of the United States who sent an RB- ag~ i e
` p l c3'p 1 l ' Q2 lO11l LO :c ll~t .I J?
he
a IStates policy, yrecognized n 0 standards of international
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The Trial of the U-2
Speech for the Prosecution
law by the American militarists and the criminal violation of the
national sovereignty of other states.
That is why the task of this court, as I see it, cannot be limited
to the establishment of facts concerning the acts with which the
Defendant Powers is being directly charged, and which he per-
sonally committed. Naturally, as in any criminal case, you, Com-
rade Judges, in strict accordance with the law must weigh all
the available evidence thoroughly, exhaustively and objectively
in order to establish the truth and find an answer to the question
-what crime do the actions of the Defendant Powers constitute?
But the verdict in this case will have a bearing on more than
just the personal fate of the Defendant Powers.
The verdict of the court, based on the evidence of the prelimi-
nary investigation and the trial, will again convincingly expose
before the whole world the criminal aggressive policy of the
United States ruling circles.
There is no doubt that your verdict will play its role in the
struggle of the forces of peace against the forces of aggression, a
struggle which is spreading increasingly throughout our planet
and on whose outcome the future of mankind depends.
I. The Circumstances of the Case
Permit me now to go over to a statement of the factual circum-
stances of the case, to an analysis of the abundant evidence which,
taken together, is not only proof of the crimes committed by the
defendant Powers, but at the same time exposes the organizers
and inspirers of these crimes.
The criminal acts committed by the Defendant Powers have been
fully established by evidence that cannot be refuted or shaken.
The very fact that an American reconnaissance plane was shot
down by Soviet rocket forces in the Sverdlovsk area on May 1, 1960,
and the very presence of the American spy-pilot Powers here in the
dock in Moscow, is convincing and irrefutable evidence.
The charges against the defendant in this case are fully sub-
stantiated by
himself
explaining the notes on his route charts he described in detail
the tasks assigned to him by the commander of espionage detach-
ment 10-10, Colonel Shelton, of the United States Air Force, who
indicated the points to which he was to pay special attention in
order to obtain information about rocket bases and other Soviet
defence installations of special importance.
It has been established that this detachment was based at the
Incirlik air base in Turkey, and it was there that the Defendant
Powers served as a spy.
The aggressive bandit flight on May 1, 1960 was the last in
Powers' spy career which began way back in 1956 when he signed
a secret contract with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in
Washington, the capital of the United States of America, and sold
himself to the American intelligence service for $2,500 a month.
It was explained to Powers that it would be his duty to make
reconnaissance flights along the frontiers of the Soviet Union,
and also to carry out other special assignments. It was precisely
from that time that Powers became a staff spy pilot, ready to
commit any crime to further the interests of the American military
who are in the service of the monopoly capital.
You will remember, Comrade Judges
the statement
d
b
,
s ma
e
y
the Defendant Powers during the preliminary investigation and
during this trial concerning his training for flights in U-2 aircraft
at the secret Las Vegas atomic range in a Nevada desert, and his
training in the use of special reconnaissance equipment. This train-
ing was directed by Colonel Perry, who later became the chief of
detachment 10-10, Colonel Perkins and Major Cords, while the
training of the recruited spy pilots in the piloting of U-2 recon-
naissance aircraft was done by representatives and flyers of the
Lockheed Corporation, which built the planes, and also by army
pilots.
Here is a graphic example of criminal collusion between a big
American capitalist company, an espionage center and the United
States military.
abundant objective evidence. The Defendant Powers For purposes of secrecy, all the recruited pilots were
i
g
ven as-
realises this and does not therefore attempt to deny his sumed names during training. Powers was known a
1
J.
s a men.
guilt in respect of the crimes committed. In the fall of 1956, the personnel of espionage detachment 10-10
Comrade Judges, you are familiar with the depositions made were transffeerrrred to the Incirlik American-Turkish air base near
by Powers during the preliminary investigaApprove For Aele se 2003/10/07 : ClA- DPMffib1 6ka22109@2@1f0J4i6 detachment was
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The Trial of the U-2
spy from retribution, even one from the country over which the
dollar holds undivided sway.
Comrade Judges, you will remember that the official statements
made by the U.S. Department of State and U.S. officials have in-
sisted firmly that the U-2 plane which was shot down was a civilian
plane and that pilot Powers was an employee of the Lockheed Air-
craft Corporation.
These statements were untrue.
The testimony of defendant Powers on the circumstances under
which he was recruited for intelligence service prove that aggressive
espionage flights over Soviet territory were organized and carried
out under the immediate direction of the U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency with the knowledge and sanction of the United States
Government and President Eisenhower.
It is known that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, headed
by superspy Allen Dulles, is directly subordinated to the President
of the United States of America and is an agency for political and
military espionage which heads the so-called "intelligence pool",
a kind of spy combine which unites all branch intelligence agencies
of the United States, including the Air Force Intelligence Service.
Individual parts and assemblies of the U-2 carried marks indicat-
ing that they were the property of the United States Defense
Department.
All flights on U-2 aircraft were carried out from Air Force bases
and under the direction of officers of the United States Air Force.
Defendant Powers testified that the 10-10 detachment was set
up jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. Air Force
and represented a combination of these two bodies.
In the 10-10 detachment Powers himself was issued an identity
card number AF 1,288,068 with an emblem of the United States
Defense Department and the inscription "Department of Defense.
United States of America."
Among the documents belonging to Powers there was also a
certificate issued by the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
ministration (NASA). This document certified that Powers was fit
for service as a pilot of NASA planes. The certificate also entitled
Powers to pilot military aircraft in conformity with special in-
structions of the United States Air Force and to land and take off
on the territory of air force bases.
Approved
Speech for the Prosecution
Concerning this document Powers testified:
"As I personally had nothing to do with NASA, I think
this document was issued to me as a cover to conceal
the true nature of the intelligence detachment 10-10."
Comrade Judges, you have seen these documents and they were
presented here to the defendant Powers.
In carrying out espionage flights, Powers and his masters un-
scrupulously violated the sovereignty of other countries. U-2 planes
flew over various countries whom the U.S.A. has involved in its
aggressive expansionist policy and who make their air bases avail-
able for the landing and take-off of American military aircraft.
With even greater arrogance Powers and other American air spies
violated the sovereignty of neutral countries, in particular of Af-
ghanistan, taking advantage of their technical superiority for this
purpose.
Thus Powers' career as a spy continued until April 27, 1960, when
the commander of the intelligence detachment, Colonel Shelton,
called a conference of the personnel and ordered Powers, as well as
another pilot and a large group of maintenance personnel to fly on
the same day to the Peshawar air base in Pakistan. They flew there
in a military transport plane, while the U-2 plane was flown there
somewhat later.
Detailed testimony on this wad given by the defendant Powers
during the preliminary investigation and at the trial.
Early in the morning of May 1, 1960, Powers was awakened, as
many times before, while training on the "alert flight" schedule.
This time, however, Powers was given a special mission for which
he had been trained for several years. He was to make a reconnais-
sance flight over the territory of the Soviet Union to collect im-
portant information on military and industrial installations. The
route of the flight lay from the Peshawar base in Pakistan, across
the territory of Afghanistan and a considerable
of USSR
territory and was to end at the Bodoe base in Norway.
Allow me to turn directly to Powers' testimony. This is what he
himself testified on this assignment, received from Colonel Shelton :
"In a few minutes the Colonel brought the maps and
showed them to me. He told me that this was the route
I was to fly. It was the route tho
th
n
e maps found in my
I n xe
For Release 2003/10/$: eCfA-Fi$~~17b~@~6&~21Q$ation about
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The Trial of the U-2 Speech for the Prosecution
some airfields and if I wanted to I could put the places 119
so
my map. I wanted to do so and did mark some of with such a pin that the American intelligence service intended to
them. There was also a place where he said I might see wipe out the traces of the crime.
a missile launching site. I also put it down. There was It has been proved by the testimony of Powers, the material evi-
dence and experts finding that the Lockheed U-2 aircraft in which
one place that he said he thought there was something Powers took off on his espionage flight was a special military ut he dnot know what. I also put this down." a
" I he did i fn kn nce plane and was equipped device by means
was to ," which the pilot could blow it upin the event of special
of
Powers testified, the territor
a forced landing on
"the course of the route which was plotted on the map 3 of the USSR. A blasting device was also fitted to
with red and blue pencils and to turn on and off the the tape recorder designed to record the signals of Soviet radar sta-
tions.
controls of the equipment over the points indicated on When Powers received his final orders and instructio
the map." ns he took
Off and, from
This is how Powers himself described the espionage assignments
having e flown war airfield, rose to the altitude of 20,000 metres
for collecting information on especially important defense and in- across Afghanistan, intruded into the air space
dustrial installations of the Soviet Union which he received before of the USSR.
the May 1 flight. But the instructions received by Powers and the Powers pleaded guilty to having flown over Soviet territory
means supplied to him to carry p gand off the corresponding controls of the special equipment installed
not confined to that. in his plane. Altogether there were five such con
Further Powers testified: reconnaissance equipment on board the plane functioned " ..the Colonel also said that just in case anything trots. The entire
and faultlessly. Moreover, during the flight Powers conducted visual should happen, he was giving me some packages with observations and plotted the results on the route
Soviet money and gold coins. They were put into my chart.
flying suit pockets. He also had a silver dollar coin It is known that the plane piloted by Powers crossed the state
which he showed me whad a pin installed in it. frontier of the USSR at 05:36 a.m. Moscow time, south-east of
we said that there was which s danger pin installed
Kirovabad, Tajik SSR, and from that moment until it was shot
no USSR
aircraft or rocket could get to my altitude but in case tracked b
down by Soviet rocket forces in the Sverdlovsk area, was continually
something should happen and I was captured, the pin y Soviet antiaircraft units. The whole nature of Powers'
contained poison and if I were tortured and could not aircraft flflight shows its provocative and aggressive aims. The pilot kept his
standit n I co iso ue h pinto kill tortured and
_at an altitude of 20,000 metres, that is at an altitude at
Thus
Thus having bought Francis Powers with dollars, having made which no civilian aircraft ever fly; the route
an accomplice in its foul crimes, the American intelligence
.r big in-
g dustrial centres and important Soviet defense installations
service considered in advance the possibility of the failure of its
In view of the fact that this was a case of the deliberate invasion
agent and, striving to avoid exposure, tried to convince him of the of Soviet air space with hostile aggressive intent the Soviet Govern_
inevitability of suicide should he find himself alive on Soviet terri-
ment gave orders to shoot down the plane and at 08:53 a.m. Powers'
tory. plane was shot down with a rocket at an altitude of 20,000 metres
in the Sverdlovsk area, that is at a distance of more than 2,000
Here we have the bestial, misanthropic morality of Mr. Dulles kilometres from the place it crossed and company which for the sake of that yellow devil, the dollar, --'is- Powers testified that while flying in the Sve frontier.
regards human life. altitude of 68,000 feet, that is, more tha rdlovsk area at an
It should be mentioned that it was not only by supplying Powers an orange flash and aft tt~~,, n 20,000 metres, he saw
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 Approved For Release 2003/10/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002200020011-6
The Trial of the U-2
Speech for the Prosecution
I)uring the flight he was pressed to the controls and could not use
the catapulting device but raised the canopy, unfastened the straps
and got out of the plane through the top. The parachute opened
automatically.
Many people were direct eyewitnesses of the explosion at a great
altitude after which the wreckage of the plane fell to earth and a
parachute appeared in the sky.
Comrade Judges, those who took part in detaining the American
spy have been interrogated in court and the testimony of these
witnesses is still fresh in your memory.
These Soviet people, boundlessly devoted to their country, this
time as always, displayed their vigilance and detained the spy-pilot
Powers as he parachuted down, took away from him a noiseless
pistol specially designed for foul murder and rendered the spy
harmless.
It is also known from Powers' testimony that detachment 10-10
was inspected in April, 1960 by none other than the Chief of Staff
of the United States Air Force, General Thomas D. White, in whose
honour a special reception was given. Detachment 10-10 was twice
inspected by the Commander of the United States Air Force in
Europe, General Everett.
Incidentally not only high ranking officers of the United States
Air Force but even certain Congressmen who, apparently, have
special access to such espionage agencies, visited the 10-10 detach-
ment at the Incirlik base.
Even Cardinal Spellman did not ignore the Incirlik air base and
he also visited the 10-10 detachment.
What conclusion do I draw from an analysis of the above-men-
tioned data?
The material of this trial conclusively proves that notwithstand-
ing all attempts by the American military to stage a kind of quick-
change vaudeville with Allen Dulles as producer, the real nature of
the 10-10 detachment in which Defendant Powers served, and of
other similar detachments, is sufficiently clear. The purposes and
aims of this detachment's activity made it nothing but a military
intelligence body.
There is no shadow of doubt that Powers'
aircraft specially fitted out and sent into
ing to the nature of his activity, continued to remain an army pilot
discharging the duties of a military intelligence agent and spy.
Powers himself admits that he was a civil pilot serving in the
Air Force.
In fact this is nothing but an espionage hybrid-the offspring of
the Central Intelligence Agency and the military intelligence of the
U.S. Air Force covered by the NASA fig leaf.
The espionage purposes of Powers' flight over Soviet territory
have been confirmed by all circumstances of the case, including
the testimony of the defendant and considerable material evidence.
I must especially stress that the above-mentioned statements of
leading U.S. government officials, statements in which they ad-
mitted to all the world that espionage and violation of the sover-
eignty of other states is the official policy of the United States,
in the light of the criminal case of Powers now under considera-
tion, assume procedural signficance and play the role of judicial
evidence. This evidence, that is the personal statements of the
above-mentioned government leaders, establishes fully that the
U.S. Government was the inspirer and organizer of the crimes
committed by Defendant Powers and others of his ilk.
There is every reason to consider the aforesaid statements as
indisputable evidence in the present case.
II. Material Evidence
Comrade Judges,
Fulfilling my duties of state prosecutor, I deem it necessary
to speak about the numerous items of material evidence in this
case.
As a result of the examination of this material evidence, its
careful study by experts in most diverse fields, the state prosecu-
tion is in possession of objective, irrefutable data, proving with
new force the indictment preferred against Defendant Powers,
and the deliberate, aggressive nature and espionage purpose of
his criminal mission.
The material evidence was exhibited in public; 320,000 Soviet
people and over 20
000 forei
ner
bl
,
g
s were a
e to see for themselves
plane was a military these clear proofs that expose the aggressive policy of the U.S.
the air space of the ruling circles which organized P
'
owers
bandit fli ht.
U.S.S.R. for aggressive espionage purposes and that Powers, accord- p s g
12690401Yilegfound scattered over
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The Trial of the U-2
an area of some 20 square kilometers where the Lockheed U-2 the 123
aircraft fell; they included: the forepart of the fuselage with the plane with an indication of the time made by hand in red and
central wing and the flier's cockpit with its equipment; a turbojet blue pencil on the flight chart. There are also marks made before-
engine; the tail of the fuselage with the keel, etc. These fragments hand on the chart with regard to switching the main assemblies
and assemblies were parts of a one-seater high-altitude subsonic and apparatus of the aircraft on and off during the flight over
intelligence plane of the U-2 type built by the American Lockheed Soviet territory.
Company. The material evidence establishes irrefutably that the flight of
Investigation of individual parts and units has shown that nu- the American plane over Soviet territory was deliberate and planned
merous U.S. companies took part in the building of the U-2 spy- in advance. The conclusions of the experts show that the chart with
plane and that certain parts and equipment are the property of the route of the flight and navigation calculations was prepared on
the U.S. Government. the ground before the take-off. While airborne, the pilot knew his
The plane's turbojet engine was manufactured by Pratt-Whitney, Position, systematically checked the flight over the landmarks indi-
as is shown by the firm's trade mark. The radio-reconnaissance cated on the chart and kept strictly to the
predetermined was manufactured by Hewlett-Packard and the Huggins During his flight over the territory of the Soviet Union the pilot
Labs (Menlo Park, California). This equipment and certain other plotted on the map information of a reconnaissance nature.
units have markings showing that they belong to the U.S. Defense Of special interest as evidence proving the espionage purpose of
Department. the U-2 flight is the aircraft's photo-equipment and the results of
This is especially important as refutation of the false claim the photoreconnaissance carried out b
that the U-2 plane was a civilian and not a military aircraft. during his flight over Soviety territory, Y the Defendant Powers
The instrumentation, communications, electrical and radar equip- Technical experts established that the aerial camera model 73-B
ment, are also manufactured by different American companies, installed on the U-2 aircraft is a special reconnaissance camera
which is confirmed by the respective trade-marks and labels. a designed
tittuudesded for photographing strips of terrain from the air at high
The plane has a special remote-controlled destructor unit manu- a.
factured by Beckman and Whitley Inc. (Model 175-10A) . The aerial film used in the aerial camera is a special type Investigation of the special charts, films and other materials, as photographic material, designed for the aerial reconnaissance of
experts, fact the U-2 well vs the conclusions of special charts, testify to the other
that as military and topographical objects while flying aircraft made a deliberate espionage reconnaissance flight that had The pilot photographed the territory of the Soviet Un on lforudthe
been prepared beforehand. Purpose of espionage.
This is confirmed by the discovery of a specially coded chart Examination of the developed aerial film and orientation of the
with the route of the plane's flight from the Pakistan area (Pesha- prints made it possible to establish that the territory war Airport) in a north-westerly direction, over the Tajik, Uzbek, was that of the Soviet Union. Photographed
and Kazakh Union Republics, the South Urals to Sverdlovsk with The aerial photographs contain intelligence information on
a turn towards Kirov, and then a turn in the White Sea area, USSR industrial and military installations.
crossing the eastern part of the Kola Peninsula and along its The experts examined the tape recorder with a ferromaetic
northern coast-line into Norwegian territory. tape and the optical instrument found in the area of the fa l of
Analysis of the flight chart shows that from Peshawar Airport the plane which were in their turn important mat
to the Sverdlovsk area the plane flew according to the plotted of the espionage purposes of the U-2 flight. erial evidence
course. This is confirmed by the photographs of stretches of the An examination of the tape recorder established that it had a
territory flown over, the course plotted, and the actual position of special demolition device designed for it Approved For Release 20 9 Y' ? t 1 B?t8( 1637 ?e?0 2D ~I tion. Expert ex-
e magnetic tape was in
Speech for the Prosecution
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The Trial of the U-2
Speech for the Prosecution
perfectly good condition. On decoding the tape it was established
that the signals recorded belonged to ground radar stations of
the radar anti-aircraft defence system of the Soviet Union.
The tape recorder was part of the radio-technical intelligence
equipment mounted on the U-2 aircraft.
The experts established that the U-2 aircraft was fitted with
special counter radar equipment designed to jam radar stations
for interception and guidance of fighter planes.
Beyond doubt equipment of such kind is installed on enemy
planes that intrude into the territory of another country for aggres-
sive purposes.
Experts examined the combined receiver and transmitter found
on the plane which represents an American serial built command
station designed for short range air-to-ground and air-to-air com-
munications.
The absence of equipment for long-range radio communication
on the U-2 aircraft is further evidence that the organizers of the
aggressive incursion took measures to conceal the piratical flight
of the U-2 aircraft and prevent its possible detection over the
territory of the USSR.
Comrade Judges, I have already mentioned that the U-2 aircraft
was equipped with a special demolition device ensuring the destruc-
tion of the plane in the event of a forced landing on U.S.S.R.
territory.
It has been established by examination that the remote control
of the destructor unit was installed in the cockpit. The electrical
control panel, among other inscriptions, has one reading "explo-
sion." The pilot was therefore fully aware of the existence of a
special demolition device on his aircraft and of the methods of
operating it.
The destruction unit found among the wreckage of the U-2
aircraft represents important material evidence of the aggressive
espionage purposes of the flight.
I have already mentioned in my speech the poison pin which was
found on the Defendant Powers.
If the assignments received by Powers had not been of a criminal
nature, his masters would not have supplied him with a lethal pin.
Inspection and forensic-toxicological examination of the pin
125-
smeared with a substance which, judging by its action upon ani
mals, toxic doses, and physical properties belongs to the curare
group-the most potent and fast acting of all known poisons.
Considering its extremely high toxicity, the experts' conclusion
was that a prick of this pin would kill a person instantaneously.
It has been established by the examination of the noiseless pistol
taken from Powers that it is a semi-automatic tenshot pistol of
the latest model designed to shoot at moving targets. Along with
the pistol there were found 205 cartridges for it.
Comrade Judges, analyzing all these data I have arrived at the
conclusion that this case offers a combination of material evidence
-these mute witnesses-which irrefutably and objectively estab-
lishes to the full the crimes committed by the Defendant Powers,
completely exposes the inspirers and organizers of these crimes
and provides justice with incriminating evidence of great convicting
force.
III. An Act of Aggression Against the Soviet Union
Comrade Judges, in assessing the gravity of the crimes com-
mitted by Powers we cannot forget even for a minute that he per-
sonally carried out such especially dangerous criminal assignments
which directly endangered universal peace and might have brought
a terrible disaster upon humanity.
The aggressive premeditated nature of the flight of the plane
piloted by Powers was perfectly obvious from the very moment he
crossed the border of the Soviet Union and intruded into the depth
of Soviet territory, flying at a tremendous altitude over important
defence and industrial installations. Naturally, from the earth no
one could tell whether or not this hostile plane, which unceremo-
niously and arrogantly intruded into Soviet air space, was carrying
a deadly load. It is, therefore, absolutely obvious that under present
circumstances, when certain states posses means of delivering them to targets at almost elightning s and
the aggressive act undertaken by the United States of America
on May 1, 1960, against the Soviet Union may be classed as a crime
that endangers the security of all mankind and could have had
the gravest of conse
ue
.
ll -
q
c
5 to
taken from the Defendant Powers establi hed tha ?? r',sent case ex oses tthh RPRP As pprove I3 ~ Fee`s 2004hkd Ct~i~R 0ud~~b$ng of universally
rna tonal law by American ruling cir-
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The Trial of the U-2
Speech for the Prosecution
Iles. In this connection it seems to me that it is necessary to
consider in the speech for the prosecution some points of inter-
national law which directly bear on the crimes committed by the
Defendant Powers and his masters.
An indisputable principle of international law, never challenged
by anyone, is the principle of full and exclusive sovereignty of a
state over its territory, including the entire air space above it.
This principle is embodied in a number of international conven-
tions and in the national legislation of nearly all states, including
the United States of America and the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Government has repeatedly protested against un-
lawful violations of Soviet air space by American aircraft and
warned the United States Government of its responsibility for
the very grave consequences that might arise out of such violations.
The United States Government, however, did not react to these
protests and, true to itself, continued its policy of cold war and of
the gross violation of the sovereignty of other states.
It is known that the Soviet Government protested against the
violation of the air space of the USSR by American military
aircraft in its note of July 10, 1956, addressed to the U.S. Gov-
ernment. In a letter of July 12, of the same year, the permanent
Soviet representative at the United Nations informed the Security
Council of these facts.
In its reply note of July 19, 1956, the United States Government
hypocritically denied the facts of violation of the air space of the
USSR by American military aircraft and claimed that the state-
ment of the Soviet Government was erroneous.
The United States leaders adopted a similar double-faced atti-
tude in all such cases until, on May 1, 1960, they were caught in
the act and had to admit to criminal intrusions into Soviet air
space which up to then they had brazenly denied.
In his appraisal of the criminal aggressive incursion by the
American U-2 aircraft into the USSR, N. S. Khrushchev stated
with full justification:
"Unheard-of and unprecedented are the actions di-
rected against the sovereignty of the Soviet state,
while the principle of sovereignty is a sacred and
immutable principle of international relations."
This principle was embodied in
tion of aerial navigation signed in Paris on October 13, 1919.
Article 1 of that convention reads :
"Every power has complete and exclusive sover-
eignty over the air space above its territory."
This principle is reaffirmed in the International (Pan-American)
Convention on Air Commerce signed in Havana on February 20,
1928, in the Convention on International Civil Aviation signed at
Chicago on December 7, 1944, and in a number of bilateral agree-
ments between states.
The above formula has been fully incorporated in the national
legislation of practically all states.
In particular, clause 176 of the Air Commerce Act of the United
States Congress of 1926, establishes that the United States of
America possesses and exercises full and exclusive sovereignty
over the air space above the United States.
The same principle is established by the United States Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938.
Article 1 of the Air Code of the USSR of 1935 establishes that
"the USSR exercises complete and exclusive sover-
eignty over the air space of the USSR."
It is common knowledge, however, that this is not the first time
that international law has been dealt with unceremoniously in
the United States of America. American theoreticians have even
established a special concept of "American international law."
C. Hyde, an American authority on international law chose this
title for his capital work, "International Law, chiefly as interpreted
and applied by the United States." (Publishers of Foreign Litera-
ture, Moscow, 1951).
However, the principle of complete and exclusive severeignty
of a state over the air space above its territory is so unquestionable
that it was unconditionally recognised even by "American inter-
national law."
This is what the aforementioned Hyde wrote, summing up the
results of examination of all conventions and laws pertaining to
this question : "The evidence is abundant that states have reached
a degree of unanimity in their assertion of the right of control
over the air space above their territories which suffices to warrant
the conclusion that that right is to be regarded as exe
lif
i
mp
y
ng
the App FBW8 18f I sera eu~003/1~/0 C1 ~A` d~ ~~1 ~0'2 o6B~ 1 191 C, page 366.)
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The Trial of the U-2
Speech for the Prosecution
129
American Senator Fulbright declared in this connection : "The The unlawful incursions of American militar
Head of State embodies in his person the sovereignty and dignity air space of the USSR planned b y planes into the
of his country. It is totally unacceptable for one Head of States to ice by order of the United States G ve nment,and specifically the
impinge upon the sovereignty of another, and much less so for incursion of the Lockheed U-2 aircraft piloted by Powers on May 1
him to assert the right to do so." of this year not only constituted criminal violation of the sover-
Any other solution to this problem is unthinkable. To any rea- eignty of the USSR but were also acts of aggression. sonable person, and not only to specialists in international law, it acts reflect the established United States policy olicy of "balancing on
it clear that the principle of the national sovereignty and supremacy the brink of war" pursued for many years by former gate
e-
of a state over the air space above its territory, in the same way tary John Foster Dulles and kept tirelessl at boilinnt by
as the principle of national sovereignty in general, is the founda- Pentagon warmongers. Y g point by
tion of normal relations between states in time of peace. This In his book "War or Peace?" Dulles
evokes no doubt. wrote:
"If at any time in the near future it seems that the
It is interesting to note also how the science of international law danger of war has
passed, the questions of the conduct of guilty states in cases similar greatest peril." (American , that will be a ger26 )
to the aggressive invasion by the U-2 aircraft. Edition, 1950, page 267.)
s s conception i
British Professor L. 0
ppenheim, in his treatise on international States les De foreign policy. S apparently still the foundation of United
law (Publishers of Foreign Literature, Moscow, 1948), points out
in this connection that in the event of administrative officials, on It seems to me that it is essential to consider whether the incur-
the military or naval forces of a state permit internationally in- air
sion by even a single plane into the space of another country
constitutes an act of a
jurious acts, "a state has, first of all, to disown and disapprove conclusion that an of ggre bon There is every for Y
incursion
of such acts by expressing its regret or even apologising to the
y a forei such as the
the U-2 spy plane, unquestionabl tu Plane, act of as that of
government of the injured state; secondly, damages must be paid y constitutes an act of aggression.
where required ; and, lastly, the offenders must be punished accord- Beyond doubt in modern conditions the invasion of the airspace
p (pages 332-333). coof any state, n sequences. even by a single plane, is fraught with disastrous
ing to the merits of the s ecial case" It goes without saying, however, that anyone who elevates crime
to the level of calculated state policy, deliberately takes the risk The experience of World War II shows that fli
of being caught in the act, recognises the "positions of strength" naissance planes usually preceded air attacks. But if tth sywas oso
olic as the supreme during World War II, in present-da
p y principle of state policy that person will such scouts is frau
ght y conditions the appearance of
without compunction disregard the universally accepted interna-
tionalpractices as embodied in the high principles of international well known-responsible military leaders of the United
law, and substitute lawlessness and arbitrariness for law and right. States have on more than one occasion announced this for all to
In its note to the United States Government of May 16, 1960, hear-that the United States of America is constantly the Soviet Government stated with the utmost clarity that the the air Patrol bomber squadrons carrying a load of atomic and keeping in
unscrupulous violation of the frontiers of another state, he it on drogen bombs.
land, water, or in the air, can be regarded as nothing other than an Thus the appearance even of a sin
act of aggression, and that an attempt to vindicate and "legalize" Soviet territory r over
Y can always be the foreru nner nner of of an attack plane from
such acts constitute nothing but the preaching of aggression, a the air. But even if squadrons of bombers do not follow right after
rom
policy that disregards the elementary standards of international the reconnaissance plane, th t
law and order and the principles of Apt vii#ddFBTia t@~I~a9bsFfl~3ft ;T tCt ~i~tQP9J 4 6~Z666260,f Eene, the aerial photo-
econnoitering of the anti-aircraft radar
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installations
air attack.
The Trial of the U-2
of the USSR constitute the component elements of
The American Des Moines Register wrote with perfect justice:
"Let us assume that the man in charge of the Russian
air detection system had interpreted pilot Powers'
flight as an attack and had pushed the button for a re-
taliatory blow ... in a few hours time those who sur-
vived would have found themselves in hell. When will
we at last realize that espionage, counterespionage
and all such idiotism belong to the dead past."
Leading U.S. statesmen are prone to use their allegedly peaceable
intentions as a cover for their criminal aggressive acts.
But everybody knows what the sincerity of such statements
amounts to. The road to hell, we know, is paved with such "good
intentions."
The words pronounced by President Eisenhower at the final meet-
ing of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Four Powers
in Geneva five years ago, on July 23, 1955, now sound like blas-
phemy.
He said then:
"I came to Geneva because I believe mankind longs
for freedom from war and rumours of war. I came here
because of my lasting faith in the decent instincts and
good sense of the people who populate this world of
ours. I shall return home with these convictions un-
shaken, and with the prayer that the hope of mankind
will one day be realized."
These solemn words were pronounced at a time when President
Eisenhower's administration, from the very beginning of its ac-
tivities, was implementing the program of military espionage
and criminal violation of the sovereignty of other states approved
by him.
Comrade Judges,
The statements of the President, Vice-President and Secretary of
State of the United States of America which I have mentioned,
stressed that the U-2 flight on May 1 of this year and other cases
of the incursion of American planes into the air space of the USSR
which took place earlier, had no aggressive aims but represented
defensive measures.
Approved For Release
Speech for the Prosecution
131
American aggressors, these newly-baked imitators of Hitler,
have attempted to vindicate their provocative policy by alleging
that they were conducting it for the purpose of averting the so-
called "danger of the Communist menace." But this argument, if
such it may be called, is not new; it bears a striking resemblance to
that used by the Hitlerites and Japanese militarists.
It is well known that at the Tokyo trial, Japanese war criminals
attempted to justify their aggressive actions as defensive measures.
The International Military Tribunal in Tokyo which tried the chief
Japanese war criminals said in its sentence that ". . . the leaders of
Japan have always tried to justify their aggressive military ven-
tures by calling them defensive." (International Trial of Chief
Japanese War Criminals, Publishing House of the USSR Academy
of Sciences, 1950, p.236.)
It is well known that the attempts of Hitlerites to justify their
aggressive policy against the U.S.S.R. by the "danger of a com-
munist menace" were fully exposed by the International Military
Tribunal in Nuremberg
.
U.S. prosecutor Jackson stated in his final speech at the
of the chief German war criminals :
"Some of the defendants say that the wars were not
aggressive and their purpose was to protect Germany
against a new possible danger-`the communist men-
ace' which with many Nazis was a kind of We fixe.
"This argument of self defense collapses right from the
start ..." (Materials of the Nuremberg Trial, vol. 2,
p.112, Russ. ed.)
U.S. statesmen now seek to revive the ide
fi
"
e
xe of a
communist
menace" which has been refuted by many years of history and
proved an utter failure.
Comrade Judges, I deem it necessary to dwell on another important
question which is of interest from the viewpoint of international
criminal law.
The Powers case which you are examining contains a peculiar
case of international complicity. As has been established at the pre-
liminary and court investigation, the aggressive spy flights by
American. planes over Soviet territory, especially Powers' flight in
the U-2 aircraft could not have tak
l
ace if states contiguous to
the Soviet Union en p
2003/10/07: CIA-RDP> (bgb''f%0W2 021itt8n and Norway, had
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The Trial of the U-2 Speech for the Prosecution
not made their territory available to the American military.
The flying range of the U-2 would not have allowed it to operate
directly from United States territory. This plane, like the entire
10-10 espionage detachment, was stationed at the Incirlik airbase
in Turkey. Powers' plane took off on its piratical flight from the
Peshawar base in Pakistan. He was to have completed his flight
and landed at the Norwegian Bodoe base.
The defendant Powers testified that when U-2 planes made in-
telligence flights along the Soviet frontiers, Meshed and Teheran
(Iran) were indicated as reserve airfields. On his May 1 flight
Powers could use as reserve any airfield in Norway, Pakistan and
Iran. He could also land at the Sodankyla airfield (Finland). How-
ever, Colonel Shelton warned him that this was a poor airfield and
should be used only in case of utmost necessity but it would at any
rate be better than landing somewhere in Soviet territory. Shelton
added that it would be better to land in Sweden or in Norway, but
prferably in Norway.
If all these circumstances are assessed in conformity with the
theory of complicity, those who organized and inspired this crime
and also those who are accomplices obviously facilitated the com-
mission of the crime by making available means and removing ob-
stacles should be regarded as accomplices in Powers' crime.
The Soviet Government has more than once warned the govern-
ments of countries linked with the United States by military bases
of the danger the installation of U.S. military bases on their ter-
ritory creates for those countries.
This trial graphically shows how well founded were the Soviet
Government's warnings.
This trial reveals completely the aggressive, misanthropic policy
of U.S. ruling circles and military who, in pursuance of their foul
aims, do not hesitate to flout the sacred principles of international
law in order to to continue their dangerous "balancing on the brink
of war."
But the peace-loving people throughout the world now know no
more acute and pressing problem then that of maintaining peace
on earth and averting the threat of another disastrous war.
The balance of forces in the world today is such that the cham-
pions of peace, all people of good will, all peace-loving mankind, can
curb the aggressors and in a united effort give a powerful rebuff to
the sinister forces of aggression.
IV. Juridical Qualifications of the Crime
Comrade Judges, I am now passing over to a juridical
of the acts incriminated to the Defendant P
owers.
According to the indictment the Defendant P
owers, having been
recruited by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in 1956, is accused
of intensiveexpressionespionagethe
of activity against the Soviet Union, which is
aggressive policy pursued by the U.S. Govern-
anment.
On May 1, 1960, he, Powers, invaded the air space of the USSR
in a specially equipped Lockheed U-2 reconnaissance aircraft with
the knowledge of the United States Government and under instruc-
tions from the American intelligence service which is implementing
the aforementioned aggressive policy, with a view to gaherin
strategic information on the location of missile bases, airfiel st radarr
facilities, and other important Soviet defense and industrial installa-
tions, that is, information which represents the state and military
secret of the Soviet Union.
Having flown over 2000 kilometers deep into the Soviet Union, he
photographed with special equipment a number of the above-men-
tioned installations, tape recorded the signals of radar stations and
collected other information of espionage character.
The crime acts of the Defendant Powers come under Article
2 of the Law of the Soviet Union "On Criminal Responsibility for
State Crimes."
Each point in the formulation of the indictment has been fully
established by all the evidence available in the case.
According to Article 2 of the aforesaid law, espionage is qualified
as "the appropriation or collection of information which represents
a state or military secret with the object of handing over to a foreign
state, a foreign intelligence service, or their agents, and also the
transmission or collection of other information on the assignment
of a foreign intelligence service to be used to the detriment of the
interests of the USSR."
As State Prosecutor I have no doubt whatever that all attributes
of this crime are present in the actions of the Defendant Powers.
The fact of the appropriation or collection of information which
represents state or military secret by Powers has been irrefutably
established. There is no need to dwell specifically on whether the
information on Soviet military and industrial establishments, air-
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The Trial of the U-2 Speech for the Prosecution
fields, radar facilities, etc., which Powers collected during his ag-
gressive flight over the territory of the USSR on May 1 of this
year represents a state or military secret. Such information in every
country is regarded as a specially guarded state and military secret.
Nor is there any doubt that Powers collected this information
with the object of handing it over to a foreign state, for all these
circumstances have been established with exhaustive fullness and
clarity at the preliminary and the court investigation and the De-
fendant Powers himself does not deny that he collected this informa-
tion in accordance with a direct assignment of the American in-
telligence service which was acting in conformity with the pro-
gramme sanctioned by the United States Government.
Another element of the crime envisaged by Article 2 of the afore-
mentioned law is also present, that is, the commission of the crime
by a foreign subject.
It has been fully proved that from the viewpoint of the criminal
legislation of the Soviet Union Powers is guilty of espionage. But I
should like to emphasize that under United States legislation the
actions of the Defendant Powers, had they been committed in the
United States of America and directed against the United States,
would also have been regarded as espionage and entailed severe
punishment.
I am referring to the United States Code issued in 1958 (published
in Washington in 1959; Vol. 4, Sect. 18, Chap. 37, headed "Espionage
and Censorship").
United States legislation envisages that criminal responsibility
for espionage is borne by any person who enters, penetrates, flies
over or by any other means obtains defense information which
might be used to the prejudice of the United States or to the benefit
of any other power.
This legislation established a long list of espionage objectives.
Among them there are, for instance, docks, canals, railway lines,
factories, mines, buildings, institutions, scientific research labora-
tories, and so on and so forth. As espionage objective are listed any
sketches, photos, photo negatives, drawing, plans, maps, models,
records or notices about anything connected with national defense.
That is how scrupulously United States legislation envisages
criminal responsibility for the slightest encroachment on the se-
curity of its country. Establishing such strict procedure in their
Approved
135
own country, why do United States ruling circles not want to con-
sider the procedure established by other states, why do they de-
liberately and unceremoniously undertake the crude violation of
laws issued by other states with the object of ensuring their se-
curity ?
The Defendant Powers perpetrated a grave crime against our
country and he must be condemned with the full rigour of the law
of the Soviet state, as he would be in any other country.
Comrade Judges, to conclude my speech for the prosecution, I
must return once more to the question of those most grave conse-
quences for peace and mankind, which Powers' criminal actions
might have resulted in. At the time when Powers' plane crossed the
state frontier of the USSR and intruded into the air space over
our territory, nobody could have known what.further aggressive
actions it was the harbinger of, and what lethal load it carried.
The Defendant Powers, whose crimes the American intelligence
service paid for so generously, is not an ordinary spy, but a specially
and carefully trained criminal. All Powers' actions show that he is
by no means a weak-willed and blind tool, a robot in the hands of
the American Intelligence Agency and the Pentagon, whom they
used for espionage, subversive activities and aggression. He is a
dangerous criminal. He cannot plead compulsory fulfillment of an
order for, having voluntarily sold his honour and his conscience, the
whole of himself, for dollars, he undertook to carry out any criminal
acts, that is, he acted from mercenary and base motives. He did not
commit his crimes merely by a method which, as the law says when
defining circumstances aggravating responsibility, was to the com-
mon danger, but by a method fraught with danger for millions and
millions of people. He consciously committed a crime with conse-
quences of a gravity which cannot be measured by the scale which
we are accustomed to apply in determining the gravity of a crime.
Such is the true face of the Defendant Powers. And had his mas-
ters tried to unleash a new world war, it is precisely these Powers,
reared and bred by them in the conditions of the so-called free
world, who would have been ready to be the first to drop atom and
hydrogen bombs on the peaceful earth, as similar Powers did when
they threw the first atom bombs on the peaceful citizens of the de-
fenseless cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
.
Comrad ~~pp~~
For Release 208 3/ W, t Aa ( @ ~?Y~Qf~l8 1n~-~y orders
137
itelligence
the State
ves of the
ive of the
o defense,
exercising
nselves of
rants the
opportuni-
.is defense
ibmit and
difference
e counsel
rht to de-
the Procu-
the Court
lefendant,
f Criminal
arges. No
3 categori-
se defense
has com-
ed among
ise to dis-
,it for the
Lbly affect
nt in this
nt Powers
thout bias
3 of which
nd submit
, and you,
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The Trial of the U-2 Speech for the Defense
Comrade Jud es 139
g , perhaps to satisfy my request and deviate from
the demand voiced here by the State Prosecutor with regard to distinguish You are has more than enough experience and wisdom to
my Defendant Powers. between truth and falsehood.
Therefore, I begin with the hope that you will consider my ar That is why I can expect with full confidence that you will accept
- the testimony of Powers you have heard here as truthful, p
ments and take them into account in passing the sentence. Comrade Judges,
Comrade Judges, The public significance of this case is quite obvious. Hence At the preliminary investigation and later at the judicial in- not accidental that it has drawn attention both inside our co it is
vestigation the Accused Powers fully pleaded guilty to the charges and far beyond its bounds.
preferred against him. country
That is why I deem it necessary first of all to declare that the I shall be right if I say that the Powers case is of international
importance, inasmuch as besides Powers, one of the perpetrators
defense challenges neither facts of the charges preferred against of a perfidious and a
Powers nor the assessment of the crime given by the State Prose- ggressive act against the Soviet Un on, there
should sit and invisibly be present here, in the
tutor, his masters, namel prisoner s dock,
Thanks to Powers' confession, a confession, moreover, corm- y, the Central Intelligence Agency headed by
borated by objective evidence in this case, it is beyond doubt that Allen Dulles and the American military and with them all those
sinister aggressive forces which strive to unleash another world
the man in the dock is indeed guilty of the crime and that the war.
crime itself has been committed as set forth in the indictment.
And if you only had to establish the link between the crime and rade Judges,
to the defense counsel for Powers, I urge you, Com-
the criminal, your task would have been accomplished and you pa Y attention to this circumstance which I feel
confident, will be of substantial importance in deterrninin
might have already regarded your work as completed. Punishment of Powers. g the
However, it is your duty not only to establish the fact of the The clums
crime and the substantiation of the char es y attempts of the United States leaders to vindicate
g es against the the unprecedented
defendant, but also to ascertain all the circumstances attending Union are still fresh in provocation
our mind, they staged against the Soviet
this crime.
That is why, investigating the case Everyone remembers how different versions one after another
you did not confine your- were launched by U.S. ruling circles and were immediately blasted
selves to ascertaining the facts only, but most thoroughly and ob- by the facts.
jectively established the circumstances attending Powers' crime, As you know, the U.S.
studied the motives which guided him, and in doing so took a alleging that the U-2 e Grst was Studt at fihe published a version
profound interest in his past and did everything to understand plane was studying the u
of the
Powers' attitude to the crime he committed and his role in this atmosphere and later on, caught red-handed upper layers of the
espionage against the Soviet Union was , declared that air
crime. its calculated policy.
You did so in full conformity with our, Soviet, law which obli- Speaking in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secrerter tary of State gates you, in determining the measure of punishment, to take into went as a cover story prbed the ate gedly my b the his d mane
consideration all the circumstances of the case, the r3' prompted allegedly onl
personality desire, a desire above all to protect Y by the humane
of the defendant and, of course, his testimony at the trial. this case too the U.S. Secretary of of the pilot, that is Powers. I truth,
From this it follows, above all, that in deciding the fate of since neither he nor his colleagues State did not speak the tAd-
Powers it will be important to what extent you will be convinced ministration thought of in the Eisenhower-Nixon
of the truthfulness of his testimony, protecting Powers, but, on the contrary,
on the contrary,
There is not the slightest doubt that such a competent judicial t
were very displeased that he had no rried out the suicide
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The Trial of the U-2
Speech for the Defense
Yet, the materials of the preliminary investigation and the
judicial investigation have irrefutably established that the plane
piloted by Powers intruded into the air space of the Soviet Union
on orders from the American authorities who had instructions from
the U.S. Government to effect the intrusion or, as the statement by
Secretary of State Herter says, to penetrate into the boundaries
of other countries.
In the given case the point is that the U.S. Government has pro-
claimed systematic espionage intrusions into the bounds of the
Soviet Union an integral part of its national policy, in fact laying
claims to some exceptional rights both with regard to the Soviet
Union and other states.
And, as has been learned from the explanations made by the
U.S. Secretary of States, the Eisenhower-Nixon Administration has
been pursuing such a policy from the very beginning of its term of
office.
In carrying out this policy, the ruling monopoly circles of America
do not even stop at committing such actions which directly en-
danger universal peace, which are taken ony when nations are
at war.
What I have said gives the defense the right to assert with
complete confidence that the appearance of Powers over Soviet
territory was not a manifestation of his own will but was predeter-
mined by the will of the aggressive circes behind him, specifically
the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States headed by
Allen Dulles, in the system of which Powers was a small pawn.
In other words, though Powers was the direct perpetrator, he is
not the main culprit, notwithstanding the fact that the case heard
today is associated with his name.
In this connection it is unfortunate that Powers alone is in the
(lock. If those who sent him to commit this crime were alongside
him, there is no doubt that the position of my client Powers would
be different and he would then hold a secondary place and conse-
(luently could undoubtedly expect a considerable mitigation of
Punishment.
It goes without saying that I do not absolve Powers from re-
sponsibility in arguing this way, but I want to emphasize and draw
your attention to the fact that he committed this crime not of his
own volition and reasoning, but on
from his masters; moreover, he was not connected with any of
them, except his direct superior, Colonel Shelton, and was not even
informed by them about the plans they harboured sending him to
commit this crime. More than that they deliberatey misled him,
assuring him that the flight over Soviet territory was absolutely
safe and did not involve any risk. Thus, Defendant Powers testi-
fied : "I was warned that the Soviet Union does not possess the
means to hit my plane."
However, life corrected these assurances given by Colonel Shel-
ton and others and Powers, having run a deady risk, thanks to the
vigilance of a unit of the Soviet rocket forces, is now faced with a
need to answer for his actions to a Soviet court of justice.
This to a certain extent lays emphasis on the place Powers held
among those who are realy guilty of the crime and who, in all
fairness, should bear their punishment in full measure.
On this score Powers himself testified :
"My task was to carry out orders given to me ... I
felt well though I was a bit nervous because I did not
enjoy the flight, but I was carrying out the assign-
ment of my bosses."
Comrade Judges,
Powers has testified that before taking off, the orders he received
from the commander of the 10-10 detachment Colonel Shelton were
that in the event of a forced landing, or if he had to bail out he
was to destroy the plane with all the equipment by pressing two
levers and that in the case of captivity and ill treatment Powers
was to commit suicide.
This order shows how carefully the Central Intelligence Agency
of the United States guarded the secret of the Lockheed U-2 air-
craft and its equipment. Moreover, this shows the extent to which
Powers' bosses feared his testimony to which you listened so
attentively at this trial.
Yet, when the plane was shot down, instead of destroying.it,
Powers bailed out and upon reaching the ground, instead of killing
himself with the poison pin solicitously given to him by the self
same Colonel Shelton, remained alive and gave testimony.
There can be different explanations of Powers' beh
i
av
our in this
orders from above, on orders case, but one thing is indisputable, name~lY , that all this to a certain
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 Approved
The Trial of the U-2
and at the same time once again most strikingly exposed the ag-
gressive and perfidious foreign policy of the United States care-
fully disguised by hypocritical phrases about peace and defense of
the so-called "free world."
The defense is convinced that in determining the punishment
for Powers you will have to take into account this breach of
Colonel Shelton's order on his part.
Comrade Judges,
Deciding on the punishment for Powers, you cannot but take into
account the testimony given by Powers both at the preliminary
investigation stage, and at the trial.
Concerning his testimony Powers says :
"I do all my best to be honest ..."
"I wish to be frank."
And this cannot be denied him because his behaviour during the
interrogations shows that the explanations he has given are not
just phrases, not an attempt to mislead the investigating bodies and
the court, but are truthful and sincere.
I do not know whether Powers has told the whole truth, but what
he has told is the truth.
Is it not a fact that everything that constitutes the substance and
subject of his guilt, of the guilt of his masters, was reflected by
Powers himself in his testimony given with all details which, I
repeat, leave no room for doubt concerning the truthfulness and
sincerity of this testimony.
It is a fact that the divulgence of state secrets in the United
States is punishable by ten years imprisonment, or a fine of $10,000
or both.
This notwithstanding, Powers gave truthful testimony and thus
entered into a sharp conflict with his employer.
It is not accidental that in testimony given at the preliminary
investigation defendant Powers said:
"I know that I shall be tried in your court, but if I
happen to return home I shall be tried there as well.
But this worries me little because I am not likely to
return home."
Who can tell, perhaps all this, the testimony written in his own
hand and the testimony he had repeatedly given voluntarily to the
investigator, are the result of the internal change which starts when
Approved
Speech for the Defense
143
he, although not of his own free will came in contact with Soviet
people and realized that much of what he had been told in America
about the Soviet Union and the Soviet people was in sharp contra-
diction with reality.
Testifying on this score, Defendant Powers said:
"I was deceived by my bosses. I never expected to find
such a good treatment here."
If in some cases the testimony of Powers is reserved and if some-
times he is not too talkative, this is explained, Comrade Judges,
by the fact that to this day he is still held captive by those forces
who sent him to commit this crime. Moreover, he realizes perfectly
well what are the ethical standards, if any, of the Central In-
telligence Agency of the United States. I believe I need not continue
to expound my considerations concerning the motives underlying
the behaviour of Powers after his detention.
Under all circumstances, proceeding from Article 33 of the Funda-
mental Principles of the Criminal Law of the USSR, such testimony
and such behaviour of the defendant constitute circumstances
mitigating his responsibility and, as a rule, they serve as grounds
for a more lenient attitude towards him, grave as his crime may
appear.
Comrade Judges,
To get a right idea of the ways which have led Powers to the
Central Intelligence Agency of the United States and made him a
tool of the aggressive policy of the Eisenhower-Nixon-Herter Ad-
ministration, it is necessary to cast at least a cursory glance at the
life path of Powers.
As you know, Powers was born in 1929 in Burdine, Kentucky,
and comes from a family of working people.
His father worked a considerable part of his life in the pits as
a miner. Then, after having been injured on the job, he had to give
up work in. the mines and became a shoemaker, opening up for this
purpose a small shop, in which he employed no hired labour. In fact,
the shop was the sole means of livelihood for the large Powers
family. The small farm which the defendant's father had inherited
did not produce for the market and merely satisfied the needs of the
family. Though he lacked sufficient means, Powers' father sought to
give his son a higher education and wanted him to be a doctor.
But Franca p e i
For Release 2003/0/8! : rCl-87161F?OQff?~1i8 because,
preliminary
:h a humane
d humiliated.
lead political
ituation and
none of his
specialists.
iys that had
Republicans
them.
ly he is pas-
inks of how
ensible how
aspirations
d dangerous
,nditions in
ment, with
pressed in-
Miss except
asses. With
movement
es says on
and truth
)ermissible
f profit, in
" is upper-
to enrich
and this
morality,
my client
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The Trial of the U-2
Speech for the Defense
His main aim in life is to have a good job for which he would be
paid many dollars. In his testimony of May 31, 1960, Powers said
on this point: "I wanted money to have good life. I wanted to buy
a good home and if possible to start a business of some kind ... I
would like to own a servicing and filling station."
As a result, in 1956 when it was proposed that he quit the Air
Force and take a job as a pilot in the Central Intelligence Agency of
the United States and promised a much bigger salary than in the Air
Force, that is, $2,500 monthly instead of the $700 he was getting, he
willingly, without hesitation, accepted the offer and signed a contract.
Here is what Powers himself said on this point: "This was a good
job with good pay and I did not consider this job dangerous, that is
at least until May 1. As a result, from the material viewpoint I lived
well, my wife and I had anything we wanted and at the same time
were able to make savings.
And so, all this enabled Powers to save about $15,000 for the pur-
chase of a house and, moreover, to accumulate about $30,000 under
the contract terms.
Here is the reason which brought Powers into the dock. Con-
sequenty, it was not ideological motives or ill will that have led
Powers to this perfidious, aggressive act, but the "business" ethics
in which he was brought up.
Influenced by these ethics, Powers lived under the delusion that
money does not stink and did not realize that the $2,500 he re-
ceived from the Central Intelligence Agency did have a most foul
stench, though he had some doubts the last time he was prolonging
his contract with the Central Intelligence Agency.
On this point Defendant Powers testified: "When I last extended
it I had some hesitations, and at present I regret that I extended
it. Other pilots had probably more sense and they left after their
contract term had expired."
The defense hopes that everything that happened to Powers
made him understand correctly the nature of the money he was
getting under the contract, and this lesson no doubt, will be a guar-
antee of his upright behaviour in the future.
Comrade Judges,
In his testimony of May 3, 1960, Defendant Powers said: "I do
not know Soviet laws. Perhaps despite my evidence and my be-
haviour I a
t
m
o be sentenced to death under your laws."
Approved
147
In this connection it must be stressed that Soviet criminal law
does not recognize such a formal approach in passing a sentence
upon a person who has committed even a grave crime.
The Soviet court is a humane court in which the motives of
formal demands of the law are not the sole and primary motive.
In passing a sentence our court has never been guided by con-
siderations of cruelty and revenge.
One could cite a whole number of court sentences vividly reflect-
ing the humaneness of the Soviet court, but this is hardly neces-
sary because they are widely known not only in our count
also far beyond its borders. In deciding. the fate of a defendant, , but
the Soviet court invariably proceeds not only stances of the case, but takes into account the defe
rom the circum-
ndant's person-
ality and circumstances mitigating his guilt.
In this case the circumstances mitigating Powers' guilt are,
as I said before, his truthful and sincere testimony. But I would
not discharge to the end my duty as a Soviet lawyer if I did not
set forth to the court my considerations concerning other circum-
stances which, it is my deep conviction, can be considered as miti-
gating circumstances.
First of all I would like to draw the court's attention to the
age of the defendant.
Powers is still young, he just turned 31.
I feel in duty bound to remind the court that Powers, while
signing the contract with the Central Intelligence Agency of the
United States did not know the real purpose of the task set before
him.
Nor should one disregard the doubts that have arisen in Powers'
mind as to whether his previous actions in the Central Intelligence
Agency of the United States were correct.
It seems to me, therefore, that there is every ground to recog-
nize the existence of mitigating circumstances and to adopt a less
severe measure of punishment.
Comrade Judges,
Our country is strong and powerful as never before and no
warmongers, American or some others, or all of them together,
can intimidate us and make us bow to them.
The brazen provocatio
f
n o
the American militar,
has not changed the fo y, as You know,
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148 The Trial of the U-2
the Soviet Union, as hitherto, is urging all upright people to pool
their efforts in the struggle for peace and against the intrigues
of the aggressors.
The American aggressors did not succeed in deceiving the peo-
ples and their actions in sending the U-2 spy plane into the air
space of the Soviet Union are regarded as a provocation by repre-
sentatives of most diverse views and convictions abroad.
Even in the United States the provocation of the militarists does
not reflect the genuine mood of the American people.
Divergences are also growing in the top leadership of the bour-
geoisie of the United States, as shown by statements of influential
American newspapers and prominent businessmen and politicians.
Comrade Judges,
If in this trial, I as the defense counsel for Powers ask you to
mitigate his punishment, I proceed not only from the reasons
underlying the motives of the crime and the circumstances in
which it was committed and also Powers' conduct after his deten-
tion, I also proceed from the strength, might and power of the
Soviet Union and from the fact that the initiative and strength
are at present in the hands of the peaceloving forces, the camp
of peace and socialism.
That is why I ask you once again, Comrade Judges, while pass-
ing the sentence to take into account all the considerations I have
set forth and to apply to Powers a more lenient measure of punish-
ment than that demanded by the State Prosecutor.
Your verdict will add one more example to the numerous in-
stances of the humaneness of the Soviet court, and will offer a
sharp contrast to the attitude to man on the part of the masters
of Powers-the Central Intelligence Agency, the ruling reactionary
forces of the United States who sent him to certain death and
wanted his death.
PRESIDING JUDGE: Defendant Powers, you have the word for
the last plea.
Last Plea of the Defendant
149
I ask the court to weigh all the evidence and take into considera-
tion not only the fact that I committed the crime but also the
circumstances which led me to do so.
I also ask the court to take into consideration the fact that no
secret information reached its destination.
It all fell into the hands of the Soviet authorities.
I realize the Russian people think of me as an enemy. I can
understand that, but I would like to stress the fact that I do not
feel nor have I ever felt any enmity whatsoever for the Russian
people.
I plead to the court to judge me not as an enemy but as a human
being who is not a personal enemy of the Russian people, who has
never had any charges brought against him in any court, and who
is deeply repentant and profoundly sorry for what he has done.
Thanks.
PRESIDING JUDGE: The Court retires to determine the verdict.
(At 12:50 p.m. the Court retired.)
DEFENDANT POWERS' FINAL PLEA
You have heard all the evidence of the case and you must decide
.what my punishment is to be.
I realize that I have committed a grave crime and I realize that
I must be punished for it.
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 Approved For Release 2003/10/07 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R002200020011-6
THIRD DAY
AUGUST 19, 1960
SECOND SESSION, 5:30 P.M.
COMMANDANT OF THE COURT: The Court is coming. Please
rise.
PRESIDING JUDGE : Please be seated. The session is resumed.
I will announce the verdict of the Military Division of the Supreme
Court of the USSR.
VERDICT
In the name of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Mili-
tary Division of the Supreme Court of the USSR consisting of:
Presiding Judge - Chairman of the Military Division Lieutenant-
General of Justice V. V. Borisoglebsky, and People's Assessors-
Major-General of Artillery, D. Z. Vorobyev, Major-General of the
Air-Force A. I. Zakharov, with the secretary - Major of the Ad-
ministrative Service M. V. Afanasyev, and with the participation
of States Prosecutor - Procurator-General of the USSR, State
Counsellor of Justice R. A. Rudenko, and defense counsel - M. I.
Grinev, lawyer, Member of the Moscow City Collegium of Advocates,
has in an open court session in the city of Moscow, on August 17-19,
1960 heard the case against :
Francis Gary Powers, a citizen of the United States of America,
born in 1929 in Burdine, Kentucky, a college graduate, pilot of
the special 10-10 intelligence detachment of the United States
Central Intelligence Agency, charged with having committed a
crime covered by Article 2 of the Law of the U.S.S.R. "On Crimi-
nal Responsibility for State Crimes."
Court examination of the materials of the case has established
that
on May 1, 1960, at 5 hours 36 minutes, Moscow time, a military
unit of the Soviet anti-aircraft defense in the area of the city of
Kirovabad, the Tajik S.S.R., at an altitude of 20,000 metres, un-
attainable for planes of the civil air fleet spotted an unknown air-
craft violati tt~~,,
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152 The Trial of the U-2
The military units of the Soviet anti-aircraft defense vigilantly
followed the behaviour of the plane, as it flew over major industrial
centres and important defense objectives, and only when the in-
truder plane had penetrated 2,000 kilometres into Soviet territory
and the evil purpose of the flight, fraught with disastrous conse-
quences for world peace in the age of thermonuclear weapons,
became absolutely obvious, a battery of ground to air missiles
brought the aggressor plane down in the area of Sverdlovsk at 8
hours 53 minutes as ordered by the Soviet Government.
The pilot of the plane bailed out and was apprehended upon land-
ing. On interrogation, he gave his name as Francis Gary Powers,
citizen of the United States of America. Examination of the wreck-
age of the downed plane showed that it was of American make,
specially designed for high altitude flights and fitted with various
equipment for espionage reconnaissance tasks.
In view of this, pilot Powers was arrested and committed for
trial on charges of espionage against the Soviet Union.
During the court hearings, defendant Powers testified in detail
about his espionage activity and the circumstances connected with
the violation of Soviet airspace on May 1, 1960.
In 1950 Powers volunteered for the American army, finished an
Air Force school, and served as pilot at different U.S. Air Force
bases in the rank of Senior Lieutenant.
In April 1956, Powers was recruited by the Central Intelligence
Agency of the United States for special intelligence missions in
high-altitude aircraft.
After he had concluded a secret contract with the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency for a term of two years, Powers was appointed
a high salary of $2,500 a month for espionage activity. He under-
went special training and was assigned to the intelligence air
detachment under the code name of 10-10, stationed at the Ameri-
can-Turkish war base of Incirlik, near the town of Adana, in Turkey.
The court has established that detachment 10-10 is a special
combination of the United States military and civilian intelligence
designed for espionage against the Soviet Union with the help of
reconnaissance planes sent into Soviet airspace.
Starting with 1956 Powers systematically flew on espionage
missions along the Soviet Union's frontiers with Turkey, Iran and
Afghanistan, on orders from the 10-10 detachment's commander.
Approved For Release
In May 1958, Powers renewed his secret contract with the Central
Intelligence Agency of the United States for a term of two years
and in January 1960, for yet another year.
The materials of the case and the testimony of Defendant Powers
have established that the criminal intrusion into the airspace of
the Soviet Union, committed by him on May 1, 1960, was carefully
prepared long before it took place.
On April 27, 1960 Powers, together with the commander of de-
tachment 10-10 American Colonel Shelton and a group of technical
personnel intended for preparing the U-2 plane for its flight, were
brought in a United States airforce transport aircraft from the
Incirlik base to the Peshawar airport in Pakistan.
Another pilot ferried the U-2 plane in which Powers was to vio-
late the air space of the Soviet Union to this same airfield from
Turkey on April 30 of this year.
On the night of April 30, 1960 Colonel Shelton gave Powers the
assignment to fly over the territory of the Soviet Union at an alti-
tude of 20,000 metres along the following course : Peshawar, the
Aral Sea, Sverdlovsk, Kirov, Archangel, Murmansk, and to land in
Norway, at Bodoe airport, with which Powers familiarized himself
back in 1958.
Flying over Soviet territory, Powers, on Shelton's orders, was
to switch on at definite points his special equipment for aerial
photography and the registration of the operation of Soviet anti-
aircraft defense radar stations. Powers was to give special atten-
tion to two spots - in one of them American intelligence suspected
the presence of missile launching ramps and in the other a particu-
larly important defense objective.
The material evidence of the case has established that Powers
fulfilled the criminal mission given him.
Having taken off from Peshawar airport in Pakistan, Powers
flew over the territory of Afghanistan and for more than 2,000
kilometres over the Soviet Union according to the fixed course.
Besides Power's testimony, this is confirmed by the American flight
map discovered in the debris of the U-2 plane and submitted to the
court, bearing the route plotted out by Major Dulak, navigator of
detachment 10-10 and also notes and signs made by Powers, who
marked down on this map several important defense objectives of
the Soviet Uni V~Rfr
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The Trial of the U-2
with the knowledge of the Government of the United States of
America, in a specially equipped U-2 intelligence plane intruded
into Soviet air space and with the help of special radiotechnical
and photographic equipment collected information of strategical
importance, which constitutes a state and military secret of the
Soviet state, thereby committing a grave crime covered by Article
2 of the Soviet Union's Law "On Criminal Responsibility for State
Crimes."
At the same time, weighing all the circumstances of the given
case in the deep conviction that they are interrelated, taking into
account Powers' sincere confession of his guilt and his sincere
repentance, proceeding from the principles of socialist humaneness,
and guided by Articles 319 and 320 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure of the Russian Soviet Federated Soviet Republic, the Mili-
tary Division of the USSR Supreme Court
sentences:
Francis Gary Powers, on the strength of Article 2 of the USSR
Law "On Criminal Responsibility for State Crimes," to ten years
of confinement with the first three years to be served in prison.
The term of punishment, including the preliminary detention,
shall be counted from May 1, 1960.
The material evidence are to be kept with the file of the case.
The money and valuables taken from Powers shall be forfeited to
the state treasury.
In conformity with Article 44 of the "Fundamental Principles
of the Criminal Procedure of the Soviet Union and the Union Re-
publics" the sentence is final and not subject to appeal or cassation.
Presiding Judge V. Borisoglebsky
People's Assessors :
D. Vorobyev,
A. Zakharov.
PRESIDING JUDGE: I declare the Court Session of the Military
Division of the Supreme Court of the USSR closed.
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