THE OVERSEAS CHINESE IN SOURTHEAST ASIA Section OC-3: THE OVERSEAS CHINESE IN BURMA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01383A000200020002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 114
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 5, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE OVERSEAS CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Section OC-3:
THE OVERSEAS CHINESE IN BURMA
A handbook:
domposition and structure
of the Burma Chinese community
25X1A8a
25X1A9a
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THE OVERSEAS CHINESE IN BURMA
PROBLEM
To provide a series of handbooks for guidance of field and
headquarters personnel on social, political and economic aspects
of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. Two previous papers
covered Thailand and Indonesia. The present paper discusses the
Chinese community in Burma and will be followed by reports on other
countries in Southeast Asia.
SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
This paper deals with the resident Chinese community of Burma
and does not include the remnants of the KMT Army operating in the
northern part of the country. Material for the study has been
drawn from overt publications and classified intelligence reports
available to this office before 5 January 1954.
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THE OVERSEAS CHINESE IN BURMA
SUMMARY
The position of the anti-Communists in the Burma Chinese com-
munity is improving for the first time since the Burmese Govern-
ment recognized Communist China in 1950. The trend now favors the
anti-Communists, although the group is split between pro-CHIANG
Nationalists and anti-Communist middle-of-the-roaders and despite
united Communist oppositions led by the Peiping Embassy. However,
the anti-Communists still are not in control of politics and economy
in the Chinese community.
The struggle between these factions is bitter in Burma, as
it is in China and Chinese communities everywhere. The Communists
have been extremely active, with control of the schools and youth
groups as their chief goals. Three years ago about 90 per cent of
Burma's approximately 270 Chinese schools were Communist controlled.
An increase in availability of non-Communist textbooks, through
American aid, and the general change in the political inclinations
of many community leaders, now have brought some two thirds of the
schools into the anti-Communist camp. To maintain the control they
still hold, the Communists have supported schools--as well as other
organizations--through the Bank of China's low-interest loan and
subsidy programs.
Most members of the Chinese community are not politically active
and are primarily concerned with earning a living. Consequently,
Communist and anti-Communist leaders work through so-called political
parties which act as clubs or propaganda centers. They are the under-
ground Kuomintang "Party" (KMT) and the Peiping Embassy-supported
China Democratic League (CDL). Supplementing them are many com-
munity organizations: student groups, clan associations, regional
associations, mutual benefit societies, labor and trade organiza-
tions and secret societies. Dynamic leadership often has led an
organization into the Communist or anti-Communist fold despite apa-
thetic membership. Both sides have aimed particular efforts at the
secret societies because nearly every adult male belongs to one of
them. The leading secret societies now are controlled by anti.-
Communists.
The 300,000 Burma Chinese form one of the smallest blocs of
overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. Only in Burma do the Chinese
take second place as a minority group, the Indians forming the
largest. The Chinese are not as influential in the economic life
of Burma as either the Anglo-Burmans or the Indians, but they do
play an important part.
Relations between the Burmese and the Chinese have been gen-
erally cordial, largely because the Chinese do not have the eco-
nomic hold on Burma that they have, for example, on Thailand, and
also because of racial kinship. Restrictions on the Chinese have
been at a minimum and might not exist at all but for the presence
of Nationalist General LI Mi and his Chinese troops in north Burma.
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THE OVERSEAS CHINESE IN BURMA
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Structure of the Chinese Community
Page 1
A.
Demography
1
B.
Religion
2
C.
Education
3
1. Literacy
3
2. The Chinese Schools
4
a. Communist Influence
6
b. Anti-Communist Influence
8
D.
Organizations Within the Chinese Community
9
1. Anti-Communist Organizations
10
a. Secret Societies
10
(1) Chien Te Tsung She
10
(2) Hung Men Ch'ing Lien'T'ang Ho
Sheng Kung Szu
11
b. The Union Chinese League (UCL)
12
c. The Anti-Communist Salvation Party (ACSP)
13
d. Chinese Merited Association
14
2. Pro-Communist Organizations
14
II. The
Economic Status of the Chinese in Burma
16
A.
The Chinese Labor Force
16
B.
Labor Unions and Trade Guilds
18
1. Pro-Communist Labor Organizations 19
a.
The Burma-Chinese Shop Employees
Association (BCSEA)
19
b.
The Burma-Chinese Laborers Federation
19
c.
The Eurma-Chinese Teachers Union
20
d.
Other Communist Unions
20
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2. Anti-Communist Labor Organizations Page 20
a. The Chinese Overseas Carpenters
Association
b. The Flying Wheel Lorry Association 21
c. Other Anti-Communist Labor Unions 21
C.
D.
Chambers of Commerce and Similar Organizations 21
Financial Institutions and Trade 23
1. Banks 23
2. Oriental Trading Company 24
III.
Information Media 25
A.
Press 25
1.
New China News (Hsin Chung Kuo Jih Pao)
25
2.
China Commercial Times (Chung Hua Shang Pao)
26
3.
New Rangoon Evening Post (Hsin Yang Kuang Pao)
26
4.
People's Daily (Jen Min Pao)
26
5.
National Daily (Kuo Min Jih Pao)
27
6.
Freedom News (Tzu Yu Pao)
27
7.
Progressive News (Chin Pu Pao)
27
8.
Overseas Chinese Youth Daily News
28
B.
Periodicals 28
1.
Voice of the Masses (Min Chung Hu Sheng)
28
2.
China Tribune Weekly (Chung Kuo Lun T'an Pao)
28
3.
Kiang Phone Weekly (Ching Feng Pao)
28
4.
Life Weekly (Sheng Huo Chou Pao)
29
5.
Asia Weekly (Ya Chou Chou Pao)
29
The China Review
2
IV.
Political Activities of the Burma Chinese
30
1.
China Democratic League (CDL)
2.
Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee (KMT RC)
33
3.
Kuomintang (KMT)
33
Other Political Groups
34
wommeMor
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V. Relations With Others
VI. Appendices
A. Reported Chinese Schools in Rangoon
B. Reported Chinese Schools Outside Rangoon
C. Reported Social and Fraternal Organizations
in Rangoon
D. Reported Social and Fraternal Organizations
Outside Rangoon
E. Officials of the Hung Men Ho Sheng Society
Elected 30 August 1953
F. Member Organizations of the Union Chinese
League (UCL)
G. Member Organizations of the Anti-Communist
Salvation Party (ACSP)
H. Reported Labor and Trade Guild Organizations
in Burma
VII. Source References
Page 35
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THE OVERSEAS CHINESE IN BURMA
STRUCTURE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNITY
A. Demography
Chinese--numbering some 300,000--live in almost every section
of Burma, except the Indian and Pakistani border areas. They are
concentrated in the larger cities and towns and wherever else eco-
nomic prospects are favorable, such as along the rivers and rail-
roads.
The first Chinese to emigrate to Burma probably came from
the province of Yunnan in southwestern China before the nineteenth
century. The migration of the Yunnanese Chinese was the only over-
land movement of Chinese to Southeast Asia from China proper. In
the nineteenth century this group was followed by emigrants trav-
eling by sea from Kwangtung and Fukien Provinces of southeastern
China, in the course of the widespread migration of Chinese from
this area to southeast Asia. The later groups settled mainly in
the Tennassarim area of Burma, principally around Moulmein and
Tavoy, and in the Irrawaddy delta area around Rangoon. Some also
went to the west coast Arakan region. The Yunnanese, coming across
the border from Yunnan, settled principally in the north and in the
Shan States with Lashio and Myitkyina as their principal centers.
Because the last complete and official census of Burma was
taken in 1931, current demographic information can only be esti-
mated. A 1950 pilot census of Rangoon and other areas, however,
gives some basis for estimates and serves to label certain figures
as either biased or erroneous. 2/ Most estimates of the Chinese
population in Burma range from 200,000 to 350,000, with a figure
of 300,000 being more generally accepted. A recent work by a Burma
Chinese says that the Chinese population of Burma is "over a mil-
lion, excluding the 15% of the Chinese population who adopted Bur-
mese nationality." I/ Even including children who, born of mar-
riages between Chinese men and Burmese women, may now consider
themselves Burmese, such a high figure is improbable.
Geographic distribution analysis indicates the principal cen-
ter of the Chinese population to be Rangoon and environs, with
about 50,000, and the second largest urban concentration to be
Moulmein, with 15,000. The author who claims a Chinese population
of over a million gives the following breakdown which, although
the figures may not be accurate, do serve to give a general pic-
ture of distribution among the regions of Burma. He states,
"the figures at the Immigration office of Burma and other government
organs concerned showed the distribution of the Chinese population
as 400,000 at Rangoon and the Delta areas, 100,000 at Aracan and
Tennassarim divisions, 200,000 along the railway lines and the
Irrawaddy up to Mandalay and about 300,000 in the areas between
Mandalay and Myitkyina, including the Northern and Southern Shan
States." The 1950 pilot census for Rangoon gives a Chinese popu-
lation of 54,000.
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Although this author's high figures apparently must be dis-
missed, the Chinese population in Burma has been noticeably in-
creasing in the twentieth century. The official census for 1911
reported the Chinese population to be slightly over 100,000, while
the last complete census of 1931 placed it at 193,594. These
figures indicate a doubling and perhaps a tripling of the popula-
tion in the last 40 years. V
An estimated breakdown of the Chinese population by dialect
group, including those born in China and their descendents, is
as follows: Hokkiens, 40 per cent; Cantonese, 25 per cent; Yunna-
nese, 20 per cent; Hakka, 8 per cent; Hainanese, 3 per cent; other
minor groups, 4 per cent. In general, only Yunnanese are found
north of Mandalay and in the Shan States area.
The sex ratio among the Chinese has been shifting greatly in
recent years. Before the 1912 Chinese revolution few Chinese wo-
men emigrated; in 1931 there were about two Chinese males per fe-
male in the country. By 1954 the proportion of women had increased,
but the exact ratio is unknown except for Rangoon, where the ratio
accordin to the 1950 census was 57 per cent male to 43 per cent
female. 1
Reporting on the ratio of China-born to Burma-born Chinese,
the 1931 census stated that about 54 per cent were born in Burma.
1/
Except for the northern areas where there has been much illegal
immigration across the largely unguarded and ill-defined border,
the percentage of Burma-born is now probably far larger. In Ran-
goon in 1950 only 3.6 per cent of the 54,000 Chinese were born in
China. Because of the large percentages of Burma-born Chinese,
the ratio of Chinese who have claimed citizenship of the host coun-
try is greater than in most other southeast Asian countries, though
still far less than the local governments would like. In Rangoon,
although 96.4 per cent of the Chinese were born in Burma, only 46
per cent have claimed Burmese citizenship.
.The fluidity of the Chinese population in Burma during World
War II and in the immediate post-war period seems to have been stabi-
lized a'`- 1 f i-n the extent that migration is now almost entirely
one-way: into Burma. The large numbers that fled Burma under the
Japanese occupation seem to have returned, many without re-entry
permits, and have been followed by many others, settling in al-
most all the sections of the country.
B. Religion
The Chinese brought their culture with them--language, cus-
toms, dress, food and religion. As in China, religious practices
were passed on to the children by the parents. The groups that
came to Burma were a cross-section of the Chinese people. They
brought with them a cross-section of Chinese religious thinking.
Burmese census figures do not list separately the Chinese
adherents to various religious sects, but the national totals
do include the resident Chinese. However, other evidence indi-
cates that the greatest percentage of Chinese are Buddhists and
Animists, the latter term including Taoists, Confucianists and
ancestor and spirit worshippers as well as the many Burmese ani-
mistic sects.
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There are many Buddhists among the Burma Chinese. Although
the families in China may have followed the Mahayana path to sal-
vation, most of their descendents who follow Buddhism with any.
marked degree of devoutness have since joined the Burmese on the
Hinayana path. This change is probably made more for convenience
than because of any change in doctrinal belief, which few held
strongly in the first place. Furthermore it indicates to some
extent the assimilation of the Chinese that has been taking place.
A group of Chinese Buddhists has been allowed to build a?large
shrine at the base of the Shwedagon Pagoda, a Burmese national
shrine.
Among the other groups in the Burma Chinese community are an
estimated 1,500 Moslems, called Panthays, who originally came from
Yunnan. There are also many Chinese who have become Christians
through the influence of the many Christian missions in Burma.
One such group is the Chinese Methodist Mission. .
In reality, however, the Burma Chinese, like his counterpart
elsewhere in southeast Asia, practices a complex cult that is a
combination of various religions and practices. He worships the
shen, fu and yao, spirits of Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism re-
spectively, To-me also revere and make offerings to members of the
Buddhist pantheon, notably Kwan Yin, the goddess of mercy, and
Kwan Ti, the god of war. Onelarge society, the Kean Taik, com-
posed mostly of merchants and businessmen, worships Twa-Peh-Kung,
the god of wealth. Many however profess no religious--FeIIefs and
perform no adorations other than the burning of Joss paper in
honor of their ancestors on a few special holidays. 2/
Religion does not play a very important part in the life of
the average overseas Chinese. He does not allow it to interfere
very much with his way of life nor guide it in any particular
channel. One writer has even termed the religious attitude of
the overseas Chinese as humanistic, with actions more reminiscent
of a rotary club than of a religion. 10
C. Education
1. Literacy
Literacy figures for a minority group are always difficult
to obtain, because of confusion as to which language is meant,
the language of the minority group or the language of the host
country. The 1931 Burmese census gave the following definition
of literacy: "Literacy implies being able to write a letter to
a friend and to read the answer to it." By this standard 52,000
Chinese males were literate and 75,000 were illiterate; 10,000
females were literate and 57,000 were illiterate. Although not
indicated, it must be assumed from the rather large percentage-of
literacy, as compared to nationwide figures, that the language in-
volved was Chinese. 11 By 1951, a State Department report stated
that 200,000 Chinese were literate in at least one of the Chinese
dialects. 12 This is about two thirds of the Chinese population
of Burma. The same report listed 60,000 Chinese as being literate
in English and 30,000 in Burmese. Only 5,000 males and 936 fe-
males were classified as literate in English in 1931. No 1931
figures were given for literacy in Burmese.
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To find reasons for such wide variations in the 20-year period
is difficult. The following factors may offer some degree of ex-
planation: (1) possible differences in the definitions of literacy
used; -(2) the improvement in the Chinese school system in Burma,
with increased opportunities for youths to obtain a Chinese edu-
cation; (3) better-educated immigrants, and (4) increased literacy
campaigns being conducted by local community nr.gantzations. The
increases in English and Burmese literacy are also the results of
better schooling and of the commercial value of these languages,
particularly of English for'international trade.
As for "oral literacy," most Chinese can speak one of the
Chinese dialects, although many cannot read or write it. More
than half the Chinese can speak Burmese and a substantial number
are.able to converse in English.
Analysis of the dialects spoken by the Chinese in Burma shows
that they closely follow the breakdown of place of origin in China.
The following dialect figures were reported in 1951: L3/
Amoy
120,000
Cantonese:
Toisan Cantonese 50,000
Pure Cantonese 10,000
Other Cantonese 10,000
70,000
Swatow
8,000
Foochow
20,000
Chaochow
2,000
Hakka :
Kwangtung Hakka 14,500
Fukien Hakka 14,500
29,000
Shanghai (including Wu)
1,000
Mandarin (including Yunnanese)
50,000
300,000
In addition, about 148,000 speak Mandarin as a second lan-
guage, largely because Mandarin has been the medium of instruction
used for more than 20 years.
With the gradually improving school system it appears that be-
fore long almost every Chinese will have the opportunity to learn
the language of his ancestors although the degree of assimilation
to the Burmese culture may spread to the point that few will seize
the chance.
2. The Chinese Schools
The Chinese schools in Burma form one of the chief targets,
if not the chief target, of Communist infiltration and attempts
at domination. Through the schools, the youth and youth groups
can be controlled, and it is through the youth that the Communists
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hope to gain complete control of the Burma Chinese and perhaps con-
trol of Burma as well. Although Communist influence is widespread
among the students, some two thirds of the Chinese schools are now
under anti-Communist management. (Because of the special problem
of the presence of Kuomintang (KMT) troops in Burma, and the Union
of Burma's opposition to them, it is necessary to be extremely care-
ful in the use of the term "pro-KMT" to describe anti-Communist ele-
ments. Many anti-Communists have been reluctant to openly associ-
ate themselves with the KMT, because of the feeling over the troops.)
The Chinese school system in Burma (using the word system in
its broadest and loosest definition) is independent of the Burmese
national school system. Unlike other governments in Southeast Asia,
the Burmese government places few restrictive regulations on the
Chinese schools. As Skinner stated it, "The Chinese schools in
Burma are virtually unregulated by the government. Only those
schools which desire to have matriculation certificates for their
graduates conform to the regulations of the Burmese Ministry of
Education, and very few Chinese schools do so desire. It is not
even required that Burmese be taught, much less that it be a medium
of instruction, as is Thai in Thailand." lw
Most of the Chinese schools are primary schools. There are a
few middle schools, mostly lower middle schools, and no colleges
or universities. There are also a few commercial schools, generally
on the middle school level. Most of the schools are supported by
the community through individual contributions, although some are
sponsored, or completely run, by organizations. Very few of the
schools are self-sustaining and the source of supporting funds is
generally linked to the political leaning of the school, because,
as elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the Chinese schools are an impor-
tant battleground in the Communist-KMT struggle. A recent example
of the extent of this olitically-slanted aid is a series of sub-
sidies amounting to 32,OOO kyats (about $68,000) to 16 pro-
Communist schools in the Rangoon area, made by the Communist-
dominated Bank of China. 15 Some pro-Communist schools have re-
ceived direct aid from the China Democratic League (CDL) or from
other pro-Communist organizations. Anti-Communist schools have,
on occasion, received aid from anti-Communist organizations, but
for the most part they must depend on aid from individuals; it is
this fact which accounts for the serious financial difficulties
of many of the anti-Communist schools.
A bitter fight has long been in progress over textbooks, the
Peiping-approved vying with the Taipei-approved volumes. When
Burma recognized Peiping the supply of textbooks to anti-Communists
became an acute problem. Few anti-Communist texts entered the
country, and those that did were sold through Chinese bookstores
almost entirely run by pro-Communists. When these dealers raised
the prices of anti-Communist texts and practically gave away Com-
munist texts, it was economically difficult for anti-Communist
schools to use texts of their choice. By early 1951 the situa-
tion had become so acute that only 12 schools were known to have
resisted the Peiping curriculum. American Embassy officials ur-
gently requested US subsidization of the anti-Communist Modern
Readers series, published by the Shanghai Book Company in nga-
pore, as the most effective weapon to counteract the Peiping-
published Hsin Hua Readers. In June of 1951 the first shipment
arrived and wasf'orma y presented by the American Embassy to a
group of anti-Communist elders of the community. Additional books
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were sold through the USIS-sponsored So Win Bookstore, which has
become the leading outlet for anti-Communist literature. The store
is self-sustaining and the working capital is now sufficient to
insure a steady supply of the books. In January 1953, 123 schools,
about half the Chinese schools in Burma, were purchasing texts at
the So Win Bookstore. 16 By autumn the figure had risen to more
than 150. 17
Communist influence in the Chinese schools of Burma has been
widespread, both in. Rangoon and in the outer districts. Even in
many schools where control of the school is in anti-Communist hands,
the Communists have heavily infiltrated the student body and many
pro-Communist alumni associations and student groups exist. Some
schools, though not many, are completely free of Communist infil-
tration. Some of these are in Rangoon and some in the outer dis-
tricts. In the outer districts, such a situation usually caused
establishment of a rival pro-Communist school in the same area,
as it did in Tavoy or Bassein. 18
The Communists, however, now appear to have lost much of the
ground they gained in the period immediately following the success
of the Communists in mainland China. Of the approximately 270
schools they controlled during that period, the number has now
fallen to slightly more than 100.
Control of student groups often has been a stepping-stone to
complete control of a school. Through these groups, pressure often
has been brought upon the directors of the school; for example,
threats to transfer to another school have been used to force the
adoption of the Communist-sponsored curriculum and textbooks. Many
of the schools were in financial straits, and so the fear of los-
ing tuition fees was often enough to turn the tide. Along the
same lines of economic pressure, the Communist-dominated Burma
branches of both the Bank of China and the Bank of Communications,
the largest Chinese banking chains in the world, will lend money
only to schools already under Communist control or those that
agree to change over to such control. Some schools receive a
direct Communist subsidy. 19 The cited battle of textbooks also
served as a catalyst of Communist control.
The center of pro-Communist Chinese school activity is in
Rangoon. Leading pro-Communist schools there are the Nan Yang
Middle School (Nan Yang Chung Hsueh, 0589-3152-0022-1331), the
Kemmendine Burma-Chinese High School (Hua Ch'iao Chung Hsueh,
5478-0294-0022-1331), the Fukien Girls' Normal School (Fu Chien
Nu Tzu Shih Fan Hsueh Hsiao, 4395-1696-1166-1311-1597_4636-1331-
2699), the Chi Bee Primary School (Chi Mei Hsiao Hsueh, 7162-
5019-1420-1331~, and many other primary schools. 20 Also,
several Communist high schools are run by individual organizations
and labor groups in an adult education pro:ram for the masses.
Another pro-Communist institution, the Rangoon Chinese Indus-
trial School (Yang Hua Yeh Kung Hsuen, 0111-5478-2814-0361-1331)
.,is a quasi-polytechnical, quasi-commercial school sponsored by
trade and labor groups.
Outside of Rangoon, pro-Communist schools exist in every
district and in almost every town or village with a Chinese
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population large enough to support one. Many villages have schools
with divided loyalties, some are completely in either the Commu-
nist or anti-Communist fold and in some villages rival schools
exist. There are a few middle schools in the areas outside of Ran-
goon, but most of th