CA PROPAGANDA PERSPECTIVES JULY 1970

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000400070001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 73
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400070001-5
Y July 1970
THE SOVIET NAVAL FORCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
Since 1968, when the Soviets began maintaining a continuous presence,
they have made over fifty goodwill or flag-showing visits to over twenty-
five ports in some twenty countries. They also engage in training exer-
cises and space support activities. In the current year there is likely
to be a sharp increase -- estimated by some to be as much as seventy-five
percent -- in the number of visits, many made in connection with the mark-
ing of the Lenin centenary. Among the Indian Ocean ports they have visited
are those in India, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Mauritius, the Somali Republic,
South Yemen and Tanzania.
When these visits first started in 1968, the squadron included ships
from the Atlantic and Pacific fleets and was made up of F-class submarines,
a guided missile light cruiser (KYNDA-class), a guided missile destroyer
(KRUPNYY-class) and a conventional destroyer (KOTLIN-class). Now the
Indian Ocean Fleet has an estimated total of fifteen to twenty ships con-
sisting of: four to six cruisers and destroyers, both missile-equipped;
one to three regular destroyers; some half-dozen support ships; four to
eight space-related or scientific research ships; and two to four submarines,
including an occasional missile-equipped nuclear-class submarine. A recent
addition to the fleet is a new type tank-landing ship capable of carrying a
battalion-size amphibious force. The growth of the naval force has been
accompanied by a comparable increase in the number of Soviet merchant vessels
and electronically-equipped fishing boats in the same area. None of the
naval ships has appeared to stay on station for more than a few months, bur
rotation on a regular basis ensures their continuous presence in the area E.
Concurrent with the increase in the size of the fleet has been the
acquisition of rights to use or construct naval facilities in the area.
There have been recurrent reports that the Soviets are building a submarine
repair base on the South. Yemen island of Socotra, which is located in the
entrance to the Gulf of Aden from the Indian Ocean. It has also been re-
peatedly rumored that the Soviet Indian Ocean Fleet has been granted base
rights on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, as well as on India's east coast,
including the submarine base at Visakhapatnam where the Soviets are helping
the Indians to expand the naval facilities and where Russian technicians
are reportedly stationed to service Soviet-made submarines. By an agreement
drawn up with the government of Mauritius in August 1969, the Soviets will
have a strategically located permanent supply base at Port Louis off the
east coast of Africa. It is very probable they will now actively seek to
acquire, through negotiations with the newly-elected leftist Ceylon govern-
ment, base rights at the northern port of Trincomalee which was used by the
allied forces in World War II.
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400070001-5CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
SUNDAY STAR
5 April 1970
CPYRGHT JAPAN TIMES
CPYRGHT
S E3, C. S 0 S
e
0 ce, a n
In fence i
;;y E :NEST W"SA Tl1ERALY,
Sr,CClal to The star
.OMBAY - The Soviets are
1 li:)clun , an econumfu Off-7
ve in South Asia in an effort
secure naval bases in the
if,'d an Ocean. Their biggest
^rget so far is Mauritius, an
land off the African Coast,
hich received its independ-
a.ce from Britain three years
3M, auritius is a small, over-
rowded island which was dis-
overed by the Portuguese
ore than 400 years ago, occu-
ied d by the Dutch, settled by
he French, and captured by
he British, who imported la
)orers from India.
Its ;Hain crop is sugar, but
l ince the British are with-
rawing their inflated subsidy,
he island faces economic col-
apse.
The Soviets already are buy-
ng oil and supplies in Port
ouis, the capital of Mauritius,
or'their growing Indian Ocean
cet, and are anxious to se-
ure e a land base on the island.t
In retuv'li, Moscow has
romised to set up some indus-
rics to help the island's econo-
my.
With this tempting offer,
Mauritius can hardly turn
down Moscow's overtures, but
t_)e: possibility of a Russian na-
val'base in the Indian Ocean
as caused great concern in
London and Washington.
There is a fear the Soviets
ill turn the ocean into a "Red
ca" when the British pull
heir forces out of the Far
Cast in 1971.
At present, the Soviet fleet
s supplied by a "sea train," a
actic developed by the U.S.
avy in the eastern Mediter-
ranean, Warships are supplied
at sea by auxilliary ships and
oilers, thus making a ,land
base unnecessary.
The big problem is that the
Soviet ships in the Indian
Ocean must return to the
Black Sea ports via the Afri-
can cape thousands of miles
away or to the Siberian naval
base at Vladivostok, for re-
pairs and :maintenance.
The Soviets are looking for a
base on the Indian subconti-
nent. Moscow is going all out
to woo Pakistan away from
the Red Chinese, but the Sovi-
et influence is not strop
enough as yet to bring up the
question of a naval base.
Russian influence in Indi
appears to he even greate
than that of the United States
Moscow has not only supplic
India with millions of dollar
for economic aid,. but. ha
equipped the Indian navy wit
submarines, destroyer escorts
missile-equipped patrol boats
and its air force with MI
fighters.
15 March 1970 a a can be round in its mili-
7 toy aid programs. The $10 It
K oviets OOSt mllion agreement with Iran]
.
Indian Ocean Elliott arms are 17fing Sur-
1) led to Yemen" and Souttt 11 _
o ce nit.eriy at onus w1 . i
M scow, calls for supply of
au tinlrcra.ft equipment and
ored personnel cnrrerE
By WILLIAM J. COi7GHLIN
80 million worth o? Sovie
'
x ilitaiy weapo nc, includin
t.iaireraft guns and radar,
tliser, seven destroyers
wen fi igates, from 6 to 1
bmarL es and 6 m inesweep
S,
Mosccw's military aid t
NEW. DELHI-The Soviet r~ of Aden. Nearly all ?he
nion is ceve o - . any equipment in Iraq i~
al, economic and xilitary ssian. Iraq operates
enetration of the Indian S viet-built submarine-
ubmarine chas-
cean area from the Persian e torpedo boas, TU16
ulf to Southeast Asia. n .dium bombers, IL28 light:
The y.Torld has carefully, b tubers and about 8a-, MIG
oted the Soviet buildup in i erceptotis, together with
he Mediterranean, and the S viet-b)iflt transport aircraft
remlin's influence. in North d helicopters.
frica and the Mideast. Mos- ' India's huge. military estab
.ow's less dramatic but Sig- 1' hment, 'secona biggest i
ificant moves into the Indian t e Free World, is largely
cean have drawn less atten- ,, viet-equipped-from Army
ion. t -ks, and Navy submarine.
But the Soviet effort there a d destroyers to Air Force
heady is well advanced. G21s and s u p e r s o n i
Snowledgebie observers be, khoi7 fighter bombers.
ieve Moscow is trying to fill Pakistan, under, its new
try vacuum that may.develop ilitary agreement with Mos
n the Indian Ocean in the c w, is believed to be receiv
vake of the 1971 withdrawal `1 g more than 250 tanks i
f British forces east of Suez dition to 130 mm. guns
nd the American slowdowa .r Jar equipment and helicop
t
Trs.
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1
J:"etnaln, Indonesia is equipped wit
The Soviet ? diplomatic
hrust was backed up in the
last year by increased fleet
ommitnient.s to the Indian
cean. Further, , it appears
hat Moscow soon will obtain
he vital naval. hascs in the
litical
egion to support its po
ge
s
h
ear .
-
ese bet
ust-concluded. Los Angeles . , pply of spare parts on
'imes survey of political and sh ba..is after the 1?35 ant `
ntelligence sources. through- nlmunist :illheavIs, Ms
ut the region. oreign Minister A" am Mali'
The Soviet success in na- aped to win Uett.er terms dut
ions bordering an ocean that g a v~';it to the Soviet ca)p
aps the east coast of Africa 1 last month"
aid the west coast of Austra- Reaction to the Sovie
I'll, as well as Asia and the )rust ,among As an nolitic<
radian subcontinent, presents. m'f'rs aas ranged from Iiec
foremost challenge to Presi- ost.ility in. Thailand to
dent Nixon's Guam Doctrine aria vrt.: corne from Sing;
aimed at casing U.S. commit- r.re'u pragmatic Prime Minis
meats in the region. r Lee Kuan Yew. Apath
i'lie Soviet Navy, while it est describes the attitude
rs. Indira Gaiiclhi'w ;oven
an Indian Ocean ly l fleet, has designated has be- ent in India. L,(,,onesi~.
an orei , Minister Ivlalik hopc
come the major naval powe power tm
in the ocean. No sooner had e rival forces cf all th
the British disclosed their in- ;'49 powers will stay cut bi
tentions in early 1968 of pull-' e is willing to accept. Amer
inn out of the Graters east of an anti Soviet economic ai
uuez than three Soviet war- The new Sf:yiet presence
ships embarked from the= at entirely 'u!Twelcom
North Pacific on a 23,000-mJ le ~~nae Asia- leaders set: it'
cruise to the Indian Ocean. videncer of a. deliberate S
One of ..the best. itautzes ? of > let policy to block Chine
xparision. (TPS)
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BALTIMORE SUN
19 April 1970 CPYRGHT
hda's NaWith .. Rance
Th Est Froth New. Base
3nviet Interest Heavy
In Base Going Up At
Visakhapatnam
By ADAM CLYME8
[New Delp! Bureau of The Sun]
Visakhapatnam, India-The
days, across the bay of.Bengal'
from this dusty boom town
where bars stock the best of
Russian vodka.
About halfway between India's
major, and overcrowded, East
Coast ports of Calcutta and
Madrsa, Visakhapatnam is
being turned into a major naval,
base at a cost estimated at;
about $130 million. While
American and Japanese private
capital is heavily involved inin-
dustry and civilian port expan-
sion, Russian assistance is a ma-
jor element in cinstruction the
base, the home port thus far for
three submarines and five de-
stroyer exports sold by the
U.S.S.R. to India.
Terms Secret
Terms are never puvlicly dis-
cussed, and no mention of Soviet
help appeared in the annual
defense report Tuesday, but the
Russian interest here is heavy.
About 40 engineers are showing)
CPYRGHT
the Indians how to install main-
tenance equipment. Naval offi-
cers are on hand to observe Indi-
an ship-handling under the one-
year guarantees that accompa-
But as the Soviet Navy in-
creases its own presence in Indi-
an Ocean waters, it is handy to
have repair equipment ready
tfor. Soviet-built. ships. Although
In ian officials insist no deals
h ve been made for a Russian
se," most observers consider
th only a semantic distinction,
an feel the Russians will be
ab e to use the facilities when
th y want them.
Eastward Focus
But the base is here., not to
su' Soviet convenience, but to
fo us on East Pakistan, on In-
di 's Andaman Islands, and on
po sible long-range instability,
in which China could have an
int rest, in Burma and Indone-
sia
nother base is being con-
str cted in the Andamans, in a,
su rb natural harbor concealed)
to iew except from the air. But
tha forward base 700 miles
fro here has no hinterland to
say ort it, and the East Naval
Cor mand-the older Western ,
o mand is at Bombay-is here
at izag, as the place is called.
A thoritative Indian sources
nsi t that the Russians have
J "All TD ES
Mriy 1970
dial Raussia Ink
protocol
nothing. to do with the Anda
mans, and that the ban on for-
eigners there applies to the lems with the Soviet ships;-in-'
Russians as much as to anyone eluding delayed deliveries. At
else. least one; and possibly three, of
Growing Dependence qie Petya class destroyer es-
; corts was laid' up in Bombay
Despite the growing depend- (.rather than at the incomplete
ence on Russian help, there i'
s facilities at Vizag) most of the
,clear evidence that the Indian winter with some undisclosed
Navy is not happy in a Russian
bear ht, M t operational problem. There are'
s
t
t
g. o
mpor
o n
, the
Indians recently scrapped a
two-year program of sending
crews to the Soviet Union to
learn how to operate the F-class
attack submarines being pur-
chased. ?
The Indians felt they were'
being "taken" by the charge of
$350' per man per month. So
when the third Soviet submarine
arrived here in early February,
its crew was trained in India.
' Ship Problems
Nor have the Russian naval
officers sent to India made a
favorable impression. According
to Indian officers they are clan-
nish and given to complaining
about their quarters. The Indi-
ans note that complaint sardoni-
cally and recall that they have
had to modify the Soviet sub-
marines to, provide more living
space for the crew.
There have
quill shortly visit the Soviet
Ltnion to study facilities avail.
able at the Black, Sea ports
and 'discuss technical details..
The protocol was signed by
S. A. Loujachenko, Soviet de-
puty minister of shipping,
and Igbal Singh, Indian :c(c
putt' Minister of shipping.
A seven-member' Soviet de??
legation led by Loujacheriko
has been visiting Indian ports.
Arid holding discussions' with
shippers and offiieiais since
May13.
ficulties,with the submarine en-
gines, attributed to their being`
used. in warmer waters than
those they were designed for.
But even with some difficul-
ties, the Indian Navy is commit-
ted to Soviet equipment, though
some officers talk longingly of
their old association with the
British, which they say ceded
because the B Britsh, which they
say ended because the British
.were unwilling to go along with
satisfactory credit terms on ship
purchases.
Vizag is the key to the utiliza-
tion of those Russian ships. The
submarine area in secluded,
with
neither the subs nor a Russian
tender on view. The port is now
the main training base for.sail_
ors, but expansion of other activ-
ities may shift that activity
away, to some place in neighbor.
'^$llr~ssa stato
CPYRGHT
pprov
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EVENING NEWS, Manila
9 May 1970
wo ovic u
reportedly been deployed by the Soviet Union in the Indian.
Ocean to buttress its fleet in that strategic area.
This is interpreted by military analysts as a confirmation
of earlier reports that the Soviet Union is in the process`of
organizing aapernianent task force in the Indian Ocean. ,
The Indiaii Ocean Fleet of the USSR, now estimated to
number between 14 and 19 seacraft, consists of missile-
equipped nuclear submarines. missile-equipped cruisers,
destroyers, support ships, and scientific or space-related
ships.
The latest additions to the Soviet naval contingent in the
Indian Ocean are reported to have been deployed from the
Soviet Pacific Fleet leaving the Japan Sca-about 5 April. On
that day, a newscast on Radio Moscow was monitored,
extolling the Soviet Pacific Ocean Fleet,. and stating that
"today the redoubtable surface and submarine vessels leave
the shores of the Soviet Far East for great journeys abroad.,"
CPYRGHT
There have also been recurrent reports alleging that. the
government of India has granted the Soviet Indian Ocean
Fleet base rights on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands at, the
other entrance to the Indian Ocean.
IJ ;An, has in succeeded in scu.inriii',
t of
The VYle
permanent supply base on the Island of Mautitius. It is nb}v
wooing., Pakistan and Malaysia for the obvious purpose'of
securing other support facilities.
The Soviet Union has made no secret of its intention'to
move into the vacuum created by the withdrawal of the
British from thc:,Indian Ocean in 1968. Publicly, Soviet fleet
of
vities have centered on goodwill trips and displays
st ngth.
ince 1968, the Soviets have literally advertised their
In ian Ocean Fleet by making 50 visits to 24 ports in 16
co ntries s bordering..on the Indian Ocean. Deploying first-line
ca ital ships and submarines, the Soviets have projected n
aw some presence with their panoply of formidable guided
mi siles and sophisticated electronic equipment.
The Soviet Union has simultaneously been engaged in, a
bu Id-up of ships that ultimately will have strategic as well'as
to tical objectives in the Indian Ocean area.
The diplomatic leverage its fleets in and around Asian
w ters give the Soviet Union should be carefully assessed.
T at Soviet diplomacy is trying its wings in a new climate is
evidenced by on-and-off suggestions from Moscow for a
"yew and more realistic" collective security agreement on
S utheast Asia. Through its deployment of naval forces in
t} Middle East, coupled with skillfully managed military
a_ istance to Egypt, the Soviet Union has become a Middle
E st power.
In the politics of the whole Middle East, the Soviet
U ion's military presence is a factor to reckon with. If its
s? cess in the Middle East is a reliable indication of the
diplomatic leverage that a show of strength gives the Soviet
U ion, there is no telling how soon the USSR will - be
e joying enormous influence in Southeast Asia and on.-the
P cific littoral.
From the Middle East to the Indian Ocean, the Soviet
1 pion has forged a chain of naval power, which does, not
a gur well for the balance of power in such a vast expanse.of
s rategic and diplomatic contention.
For the Philippines, Soviet military presence may, ri-
c asingly draw near. Through military and technical as-
s stance to other countries in this part of the world, the
SSR patently seeks to extend its military-diplomatic
i fluence. The thrust of Soviet power and influence in. this
1C I rection presents problems and challenges to Philippije-
American military collaboration.
Military experts have noted that Soviet Pacific Fleet
activity had increased almost 75 per cent in the last year;
This was directly due to an increase in Soviet naval activity in
the Indian Ocean and a widening of the range of the Soviet
Indian Ocean Fleet.
There has also been a significant rise in the number arid in
s
theroperations of Soviet merchant and fishing vessels in 1,11"
area.
The USSR is rapidly developing one of the largest
submarine fleets in the world. At the present rate :t-.is building submarines capable of firing nuclear missiles frcm a
submerged position, the-USSR may soon be the word's
foremost submarine power.
Much of the iformation the USSR has been collectin in
the Indian Ocean via its intelligence-equipped trawlers nd
scientific "research" vessels is believed to be vital to :he
strategic deployment of its submarines.
The Soviets are reportedly building a submarine rei, iir
base on the Island of Socotra belonging toSouthernYen,n.
Socotra, which lies in one of the entrances to the Ihu. an
Ocean, le 150 mils *le So uth ern coast of the Sultanate of
300 miles iron
Muscat and Om.,
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 CPYRGHT
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CHRI IAN SCIENCE MONITOR
22 May 1970
n~ a caLnerali ? ,.
Special to The Christian Science Monitor' "
Coclun, India.;
imany western ? dip omn s? see the ? oviej
Union as having staked out a claim to tho ; .,'
Indian Ocean: They feel Moscow intends
turning this':third biggest of. the world's:
.oceans into .a "Red sea."
Soviet interest'in'the' Indian Ocean'fol=j
lowed Britain's decision to withdraw its mili.
tary.presence cast of the' Suez 1y1971 .'Al-
ready the Royal Navy based in Singapore's
has shrunk to 11 destroyers and frigates;j
three submarines; and a few, mine sweepers. !
Meanwhile the British have becn~watch
;ing an increasing number of warships from,
the Vladivostok based Soviet Red Banner;'
Pacific fleet passing by Singapore as they
steam ilhrough the Strait of Malacca into the,
Indian Ocean. Other Soviet naval vessels
make even longer journeys to the. Indian.
Ocean; from the Buck Sea via the Mediter:
.ranean and the South Atlantic-around:the .
'tip of. South Africa. =
An American Admiral, John* S. McCain` ,
?Jr'.; commander'of the =Pacific; observe
'The Soviet buildup': in the Indian Ocean 'is...
Part of their worldwide emphasis "on ex-'
panding their sca power; And I don't mean]
naval units, but also oceanography, -fishing,-!.
and-their merchant marine."
s It.-has -been. estimated that the `So'ieti
',Navy's Indian Ocean squadron consists f
'14 warshlp5 guild aroun 7ui ?111lss1 e?car-
rydn~ vas e1s. Their area of operation is off
the West Coast of India in the Arabian Sea.
Most of the warships and supply vessels are
based in Vladivostok, but 'when the. Suez
Canal is open they will be ' supplied; from.
the Black Sea naval bases.
.The composition of the Russian squadron t
changes from -time to time as ships are
rotated. Recently, the Soviet newspaper Iz-.
vestia quoted Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, the.
Soviet naval commander, as saying that a,
nuclear submarine had made a four month'
cruise of the Indian Ocean.
Admiral McCain has no doubt that the.
Soviets intend adding an Indian Ocean fleet
to their expanding navy. "They have-every,
intention of filling the gap?left by the British:
withdrawal from the Indian Ocean," he
maintains. ? : ,
During Admiral Gorshkov's visit to India.
last year, there was speculation that the'
Soviets would be given bases on the Indian
subcontinent or on the strategic Andaman
Islands for their projected Indian Ocean.
fleet.
This has been denied many times by the
Indian Government. 'Defense Minister
Swaran Singh has repeated: "We have only..,
offered the Russians the port facilities that
771
:J1 UU/4
,we have given the warships of r1 a1n,
United States, and other countries." These
facilities include fresh water, supplies, and
emergency repairs. `
' According to Admiral McCain, the key to
the Soviet aspirations in the Indian Ocean
lies in their increased ;ability to. "operate
:111ar from -their own bases by relying on re-
'plenishment'at sea. The United States Navy
has long relied on this technique but the
Soviets have only recently adopted it."
Air cover not available
This "sea train" supply system in which
auxiliary vessels give logistical support to
the ships at sea, does .enable the Soviet fleet
tp avoid the international complications of.
;operating with bases. But it has one serious;
shortcoming. It leaves the Soviet warships:
`without vital air cover..' Without this, their fleet In the Indian Ocean
would, be in the same position as were'
Britain's battleships Repulse. and Prince of
Wales when Japanese torpedo planes sank'
them off the Malaya coast shortly after,
'Pearl Harbor. .
One way the Russians could provide
themselves with' air cover would be to
build large aircraft carriers. However, this
would ,prove costly. Instead observers be-
lieve the Soviets are likely to continue
building helicopter-carrying warships, such
as the Moscow, which is already in ?opera-
island .bases in and around the Indian
Ocean, 'and'to develop a fighter bomber the
equivalent of the American F-111. If the
Soviets can get these- bases and use them
as freely as the American use their bases
around the.,world, it will solve their prob-
lem of air cover for the Indian Ocean
fleet.
For this reason, Moscow has been shop-
ping around for land bases in the area.
They are developing their 'relations with
Malaysia and establishing diplomatic rela
tions with Singapore. They are also looking
for opportunities to establish Indian Ocean
bases in East Africa or at Red Sea ports.
Although the Soviet Indian Ocean fleet
.could operate by being supplied at sea, the,
warships periodically would have to return.
to Vladivostok or Black Sea ports for re
fitting and repairing. This problem would:
.be solved, though, if the Soviets could agu'ire:
the huge naval base in Singapore when the
British leave in 1971. . .
The -King George VI graving.dock, five
floating docks, berths,. cranes, work shops,.
`machine tools, and other equipment will re
,main idle when there is no British fleet to
serve. This in turn could, cause an economic
hardship for Singapore.
 CPYRGHT
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. om New Delhi to Singapore. Moscow has
already made advances on the economic`
front by giving large orders for Singapore!
products, and has begun operating a regular'
Black Sea-Singapore service to compete with;
the Far East Freight Conference.
The Soviets have made arrangements for{
the Jurong Shipyard to service their trawlers
operating in the Indian Ocean. They have-,, i
also expressed their desire, according to re.
ports, to rent facilities in the Singapore naval
bas c v.-hcn the British leave.
7ioscow also has its gaze on some of the:*
independent Indian Ocean islands.' In Mau.
ritius, Soviet ships, particularly tanlcwrs are'
making increasing use of Port Louis. With
the island facing possible severe economic
problems in 1970 when the Commonwealth
sugar guarantee price -system comes to an
end, the Soviets now are waiting to see how.:
Britain intends to support the island's
economy.
The Soviets chose the Mauritius area for
the splashdown of its "Zond 5" space cap-
sule following its moon orbit. Moscow has
hii ted that other. soft landings will be made
in the Indian Ocean, including manned space
capsules returning from moon orbit flights.?
All the evidence suggests, then, that the
'Soviets are rushing into the power vacuum=
being created by the 'British withdrawal. It'd
is thus ironic that almost a century agog
:Lord. Curzon, the Viceroy of India warned:
"The Russians are prodigiously strong and J
,would have to?.. be answered by a British i
countermove, otherwise Russia would plant "
her flag on the shores of the Persian gulf.
But her, first, move, Curzon warned, would
be..to attack, India and cripple the, British
'there. 4
 cF:RISTZP 'PM Fl ease 1$8/09/020 CIA-RDP 9-001194A0p0400070001-5 CPYRGHT
29 May 1970'
JJy Ernest Weatherall
Special correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
laysian Navy, three Soviet warships have
area 'where a five-nation military exercise
British, Malaysian, New Zealand, and
British pull their forces out of the Far East
!17117.11 i-Miense miser ar ar Swaran
Singh feels that the U.S. will remain in the
Indian Ocean despite indications of pulling
out. The 1970's would witness a triangular
power contest between the United States, the
Soviet Union, and China, Mr. Singh told the
parliamentary consultant committee for
India's Defense Ministry.
"These three contestants will largely can-
cel one another, leaving no single power un-
challenged in the. Indian Ocean." Mr. Singh
left no illusions about the limited role of the
Indian Navy. Its mission would be to defend
its coastal waters and ocean territories .like
the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Bay
of ? Bengal, and the Laccadive and Minicoy
Islands on its west coast.
Most naval authorities would not agree
with Mr. Singh that Communist China would
be in any position to move its naval forces
into the Indian Ocean power vacuum when
the British leave.
tical maneuvers of rival naval units, and
radio communications between the ships
the exercise, since the Russians have no air
Unless the Soviets bring in one of their
Freighters watched
bases in the area.
Soviet ships are no longer expected to be
the Tanzania-Zambia railway.
of the Indian Ocean. Singapore is prepared
ships cannot be serviced there as well, so
.
ready been repaired 'in the Singapore dock-
yards. Mr. Lee sees no reason why the Soviet
Some American combat vessels have al-
However, the stated American policy at the
Peking resources limited
There have been reports of submarines
and small Chinese naval craft being sighted,
along with trawlers that had more wireless
antennas than necessary for a fishing vessel.
But Peking's resources to build a navy to
rival that of the Soviet Union are very
limited.
Then there is the problem of securing a
naval base on the Indian Ocean. One possi-
bility would be at Dar es Salaam where the
Chinese are helping to build a naval base
at Kigamboni, which Peking might be per-
mitted to use.
The U.S. has only a converted seaplane
tender, and some other vessels in the Per-
sian Gulf as a permanent "Indian Ocean
squadron" to "show the flag."
But America has a sophisticated tracking
station, called "le golf ball" by residents
in the Seychelles, an island in the British
Indian Ocean territory. This listening post\
snoops on the growing number of Soviet
warships near St. Brandon Island off Mau-
ritius.
St. Brandon is a coral island on which the
Soviets are reported to be putting up a lis-
tening post themselves to keep an eye on the
Anglo-American military radar stations in
the British Indian Ocean territories.
from Southeast Asia. This could well leave At present, Soviet supply ships call regu-
 CPYRGHT
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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
11 June 1970
By lurncst ?Wcatherall
Special correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
New Delhi
By the time Britain removes the last rem-
nants of its once proud and powerful naval
force from east of Suez in 1971, the' Soviets
will have' established a strong naval pres.
ence in the Indian Ocean.
This is the view of Western political and'
military leaders who ? point to the. steady
buildup of Soviet ships in the area. Already
a Soviet naval force operates in strength
'in the Arabian Sea area of the Indian Ocean.
At the same time, Washington has re-
acted coolly to suggestions that it' act to fill
the vacuum left by the departing British
ships. Since the United States Navy is
stretched thin with commitments, it the
Mediterranean, Vietnam, and now the Sea
of Japan, the sentiment in Congress is
against further duties as world policeman.'!,'
9 are indications, however, that as
United States commitments in Vietnam de-
cline, it might act in concert with Aus-
tralian and New Zealand naval forces in pa-
trolling the ocean.
Itcgiona1 hurdle
Meanwhile.. several countries bordering on'
'the:.Indian Ocean are concerned with the
Soviet naval penetration of the area. Indo-
nesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik called
for "defense cooperation" between Ceylon,
India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Singapore, and.
Indonesia "to defend the Indian Ocean."
Indonesia has ?a powerful fleet,' mostly,
Russian-equipped during the Sukarno re-
girne. Its naval forces would have to be
taken into account in any future defense
setup. However, India has not reacted to.
the suggestion. One hurdle in convincing
India is that such cooperation would,include.
Pakistan.
South _Afric recently expressed its con
cern about the power .vacuum developing.
in the Indian Ocean. Prime Minister B. J.
Vorster said he was holding discussions at
the highest level" about the situation but.
did not reveal with whom the discussions'
were taking place.
Singapore's biggest concern is "an eco-
nomic one. When there are no more Ilritish
0.
' s ' ' seen I . U
ships using the huge naval base, the cit,,
without a hinterland will have to find other
ways of earning revenue. There have bee
indications that Singapore might rent th
naval base facilities to the Soviets afte
1971.
Meanwhile, both Singapore and Malaysi
have persuaded the Australians to keep
limited number of forces in their countrie
after the British leave.
There have always been Australian an
New Zealand warships with the British Fa
East fleet. Whether they pull out of thes
waters depends mainly on what the Unite
Statcs'does after the Vietnam war.,
Australia would like ?to1iave the U.S. talc
an interest in the Indian: Ocean and set u
a- chain of island bases. Britain still control
a number of these widely scattered an
thinly populated islands which are known a
the British Ifidian Ocean Territories-BIO
for short.
The westernmost base in the propose
Indian Ocean security chain would be in th ?
Seychelles Island off the' African coast.
the center would be the Chagos Archipelago
the largest island being the horseshoe
shaped coral atol called Diego Garcia. It i
13 miles. lpng and has an. excellent harbor
which could be used as a navy base as we
as a staging area for troops.
To the east are the Cocos Islands, another
strategic link in the chain. There is already
an excellent air base on Keeling, one of th
islands in the area.
'Showing the flag'
The Indian Ocean security chain would be
supplied from a "super base" in northern
Australia. It has been suggested that if and
when the United States troops pull out of
Vietnam and other areas on the Asian main-
land, they ae stationed in Australia as, a
mobile stra'.egic'force.
At prese-:t the U.S, has a tiny Middle
East squai. -on with two destroyers as its
only warships, though other vessels often
join the gr: up on a tour of duty. The flag-
ship of the fleet is the converted seaplane
tender V"'cour which has been. painted
white an. air-conditioned for its lonely
?vigil in ti?r: hot Middle East.
The sqi ;dron's home port is in Bahrain
off the e;.;tern coast of Saudi Arabia. In
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:normal times it is used to "show the flag"
off the East African coast, the Arabian Sea,
And the Persian Gulf. Recently, the U.S.
uided-missile frigate Dahlgren called at
Bombay to let the Indians know the So-
vlets had not yet turned. the Indlati Ocean
~nnto their own private lake.
However, there are indications that the
U.S. is being forced by the Soviet penetra=
'lion into the oil-rich Persian. Gulf area to
increase American presence in the. Indian
Ocean. It is known that American military
plInes have been making a survey of ;the
:rian:Ocean islands. -
Super-secret base
The leftist Patriot. a New Delhi news-
paper which echoes the Soviet line in India,
said that as a result of Prime Minister John
0. Gorton's visit to Washington, Australia
and the United States would establish mili-
tary bases on the Indian Ocean islands. The,
islands would also have 'a' system of early
warning communications- facilities which
would be linked with the proposed anti-
ballistic missile system to guard the U.S.
against nuclear attack. - ` ? .
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi told Parlia;
:.:Went that India had been informed by. the
United States that the proposed communi'
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
24 November 1969
CPYRGHT
over
By Ernest \Vcatherall
Special correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
In its first phase of filling the vacuum
following the. 1971 British withdrawal
from cast of Suez, the Soviet Union is
deploying warships in the Arabian Sea.
So far this fleet, supplied at sea by
auxiliary vessels, does not have to de-
pend on land bases.
however, there are indications that
the Soviet Navy is planning to use the
island of Mauritius as a_QexmarrLent
supply base for its. Indian Ocean fleet.
~Vestcrn-intelligenee has watched the
Soviet naval buildup in the area during
cation facilities on the Indian Ocean islands
cannot be considered tp be bases as 'there
is no intention of stationin' any troops on,
them.
It Is balioved thaao comtnunlustions buses
will be linked up to the now supor-riocrot
base in central Australia, which Mr. Gorton
admitted was being constructed. by the
'Americans. There are several other Ameri-
can "spy" bases in Australia. They have'
become the target of Soviet propaganda,
attacks, and many Australians tear the,
,bases someday may become targets of
'Soviet missiles.
While Indian politicians insist, there will
16, no power vacuum 'in tne, Indian Ocean
when the British leave, Vice-Admiral A. K.
Chatterji, chief of India's naval staff, takes
'a more realistic view. ? "India Is passing
through perilous times," hesaid. "Through-
out the vast area surrounding the Indian
Ocean there is a tremendous struggle for
survival on one hand and for power on the
other.
"With the withdrawal of the British naval
and military influence, a vacuum , will be
created in this area," Admiral Chatterji said.
'?'It.will be important thtt; whichever r-power
stops into this vacuum, the final result should
bb. ,consistent with: Indian-iAterests.'.:':,~:. .
CPYRGHT
the past ;two years. A few months ago
as many' as 16 Soviet vessels' were
sighted in the vicinity.
A Mauritian newspaper also reported
Soviet warships cruising or anchored
.oi the St. Brandon group of islands,
2 0 miles north of Mauritius. It was in
th region that the Soviet moon-orbiting
and 5" made its splashdown in Sep.
te fiber of last year.
ow that the monsoon in the Indian
0 an has ended, it is expected that the
So let Union will attempt another soft
la ding of its space vehicles.
St iking force described
lie combin-'ationoft6 navastriirig
fo ces changes, but _a t ical one._is
out
build around a Kynda._class guiae -
missile light cruiser escorted by.guided-
missile destroyers and F class attack
submaxines. _.:
Last year a 10,Fri?ton Soviet- cruiser
Dimitri Pozharsky and two other
warships visited Indian ports. However,
Soviet nuclear submarines pperating in,
the Indiari=Occan have--not-made--any
port calls during the past year for politi-
cal reasons.-
Soviet sailors have no longer become
a novelty in:the Mauritius capital, Port
Louis. The - sailors are mostly from,
tankers who put into Mauritius for fuel
oil for the `fleet. Soviet auxiliary ships
have been buying other supplies' and
rnuieinnc lately, which has 'caused a
8
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.~^^minor. bobni in economically depressed,
al auritius, ???? ,
iie'720?square mile island, a British'
possession for 154 years, received its in.
?cil:pendence last year. But its ind..epon`
dence: celebration was . muffled,by ,Cotn??
munal clashes.
SEtlillic (,roofs clash
The Creoles, who are of mixed Euro-,
pear and African ancestry and wlhd
trace their families back to the time
when the island was owned 'by -the
V rcnch clashed with the Muslin's: The
TIindus, who are disliked by both groups
and who were brought over to,vlork in.
the sugar fields by the British, account
for more than half of the 800,000 people
on Mauritius.
Addnd to this racial tension are both
a frighteningly high birth rate, and the.
island's one crop economy-sugar. The
gloomy economic picture is darkened by
t7n6' fadt'?that' B'ritains $804-ton' sugar
subsidy, .which brought n $8 million to
the budget . each year, is duo to expire,
soon.
O1P o. tunit~ noted
iilnless "1VIal ritiiX can diversify its;
ecoramy, the'' island wi11 be in trouble:?
The'rlew, government is trying to attract;
new foreign* investment to bring indus?;
try to 14fauritius.
CHRISTIAN SCIINCt MoN:TOR
9 January 1970
CPYRGHT
This chance to invest has not been.i
wasted on the Russians. As it is.-doing
in_lna_laysia, Singapore. nnd_othcr-.-stra
tegic areas, Moscow begins wit_h_ ar?
economic offensive-- to -secure "a foot=
hold.
Although the Russians can keep their
Indian Ocean warships supplied by a
"fleet train" at,sea, they prefer to have,
at least one land base. Vessels could be,
overhauled and 'repaired there instead
of being sent, back to the Black Sea
around' thq Cape of Good Hope or even
farther to the Siberian port of Viadi:
vostok? And Mauritius could be the place
to prgvido the naval base.
CPYRGHT
Zle 3 To yu
Red Chirecz frawo icrc U'? 7 AM
0
shadoW Ylnlo"
1Sy i.rncst %ve-Mlcrali
Special correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
911111V W C "' 1~11U 11 IQ,
being played out in e Indian Ocean and
some adjacent countries between,the Soviet
Union and Communist China.,
Several freighters arriving here have re-
ported that :Soviet warships have been
shadowing Chinese Communist vessels
1hcacled for .T.r:Ir es Salaam, Tanganyika.
The Chinese ships, suitably adorned with
quotations from "the thoughts of Chairman
Mao" along with his portrait, are carrying
-quipment for Peking's major world-prestige
project-the 1,100-mile railway line between
Tanzania and Zambia.
Since the Soviets are building up their'I::-
d1an Ocean fleet, which is concentrated in
the Arabian Gulf off the Indian Ocean, the
Russians can readily keep track of all
Chinese shipping headed for Dar es Salaam.
Mcnnwhilc, the Russians have been exert- but since the soundings indicated they ere
a base 1?ci aysc at present its fleet is supplied beIicved they are Chinese. I
,711 o be made thousands of miles away in that Peking will give Pakistan five con cn?
the ack Sea or at the Siberian Port of tional submarines for its naval fleet. P ki-
Vlado ostok. stan has only a small training subma ine'
agree to help the islapd to industrialize, so tual,defensc _pnci that evaporated when lie
fling "one-crop economy" -- sugar. . lyUa war against ir:ala.
The e also haNc be r3' reports that the India is phasing out its old V/orld Wa II
hine c have mc'ved into the Indian Ocean warships which New Delhi received fr m
the British after independence. Scher) ed
n a small way. Pjking's trawlers have been . . .. ,
er.
stand where New Delhi Is buildin fleet, the Vikrant, the only aircraft car,
Delh is buil
a n
v
l
g
a
a
aciiii . Thc`ivlers seemed to be more in all Asian navy.
ntere Led in inking soundin s an listetlin According to Adm. A. X. Chatterji, he
S -- - g Indian Navy is to be comprised of small,'
o 11 1( naval radio.traffic_.than-fishinghard?hitting rocket?e
ui
ed shi
s
l
~
q
pp
p
a
ng
rom he-lpoks
of their elect roni
c gear. . with submarines Their mission" will be to
e_
Uni entified S u;.~mar'rnes have also been protect India's thousands of miles of coast."
V C1. -CSC Cott a pVIG , -1-in-a and shipping . '.
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BALTIMORE SUN
8 June 1970
14;Vjiti-"trrt,: nlimaarines
In !itd it1 For Repairs
say V'RAN SAIBIiARIVML
CDre,* Delhi Bureau of Tits Sun]
lraew Delhi, June 7-Two
_,ovi??
'latest vessels in Egypt's flee
:.alt of Suez to put in for repairs
at Indian naval bases.
1 he submarines, escorted by
the former British warship
Rasheed, are being refitted a
the Indian Navy's submarine
base at Visakhapatnam.
Egypt has been using Indian
naval facilities since its war
with Israel' in 1967, when the
Suez Canal was shut down and it
became difficult to get ships sta-
tioned east of Suez to Alexan-.
is the Cape of Good Iiope.F
Las month a former British.;
destr er El-Qaher, was refitted
in an Indian navy dockyard in
Bomb y. The destroyer, after
stayin in India for almost three
as sunk by the Israel
w
m9ntl F
is wit n 15 days of its return to,
duty.
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
22 June 1970
CPYRGHT
CANAL
THE
Soviet-supported efforts to
push Israel from the Suez Ca-
nal are taking on an added di-
mension. As some experts see
it: Controlling that vital water-
way is Moscow's true target.
Reported from,
LONDON and WASHINGTON
Near the top of Me ME Of trMN
questions" on Richard Nixon's desk it;
mid-June was this one:
is reopening of the Suez Canal Rus-
sia's next goal in the Mideast?
bitter fighting between Arabs and
Israelis is taking place on both sides of
the 103-mile Canal, shut tight to all
shipping since the 1967 war.
i gyptian commandos-emboldened by
increasing Soviet aid-are crossing the
Canal regularly, taking a heavy toll of
Israelis on the east bank. An estimated
1,000 heavy Egyptian guns have been
massed to pound Israeli positions.
Israel is responding almost daily with
aerial strikes-some lasting from dawn
to dusk-on Arabs in- the Canal zone.
In a 10-day span in early June more
bombs were dropped on Egyptian tar-
gets than were used by all sides in the
six-day conflict' in 1967, according to
Israeli military sources. i
Another former British de mer subrnarine commander, Is
stroyer, now called El Fatch by military attache in New Del I.
Egypt, also is undergoing re That post had been vacant sin (a
pairs in India, the 1967 war.
Indian officials maintain that .It is not known if any Ru -
the base facilities are extended: sfans were on board the sus
to the United Arab Republic on' now at Visakhapatnam: Ho -
a purely commercial b:,sxs.: twer, there are Russian tee -.
They assert that these faciiitie,' nicians at the base to look aft r
are open to all friendly countries` the Suvict-made Indian subma -"
and are used by many nations. .fines there. The Indian gover ,
Egypt's dependence on Indian; ment also is building a nay I
bases was underscored two. ;base` at Visakhapatnam.
months ago when Cairo appoint-' :help of the Soviet Union.
ed Cmdr. M. G. Kaptan, a for-
L. ~,,I(r '~.H
`'E:AS QC'''SlE'1
,, Suet Crutal--Rey link fos Russia's`e>t) million dollars and take two years
to make the channel ready for traffic.
The time lag is all the more reason the
Russians are. anxious to press ahead now.
The. gamble might be risky for the
Kremlin. But the rewards, Western an-
ivsts agree, would be high.
T?ven without access to the Canal,
the Soviet Union in just two years has
il' de striking progress in building its in-
i?uence. and military presence in the In-
iii n Ocean area. For the first time since
Czarist days, Russian ships are plying
waters long regarded as a British lake.
A r?ajor drawback for Moscow has
been the fact that to reach those waters,
Soviet warships must travel enormous
distances.
At present, the Red Sea is the farthest
point on earth by sea from the Soviet
if the Canal were reopened,
tussia would have a direct and easy link
between its Black Sea fleet and the
Indian Ocean.
The strategic worth. The strategic
meaning is that expansion of Russia's
military presence and political influence
would be considerably simplified. Brit-
ain's Institute for Strategic Studies as-
sesses a Russian "breakout" through the
Canal this way:
"If the Canal is reopened, the Soviet
Union may try to use Egypt as a way
station and to extend her control there
in further exploiting opportunities on
the other side of the Canal-in the Su
clan, Southern Yemen.and the Horn of
Africa, and perhaps also in the Persian':
Gulf, the Indian Ocean and the Indian
subcontinent."
The Russians are showing 'great de-
termination to establish themselves as a
major if not dominant power in the In-
dian Ocean, now that the British are
withdrawing from "east of Suez."
Evidence of this Russian strategy is
.found in the growth of Soviet naval
strength east of Suez since Britain an-
nounced in early 1968 that it was pull-
ing out. Russian warships have been
cruising the Indian Ocean regularly, the
first time they have done so since 1905.
Sailing in small units, usually built
around a guided-missile cruiser, the Rus-
sians are paying "good-will visits" all up
and down the African and Indian coasts.
Soviet ships also, have called at Basra
in Iraq, at the head of the oil-rich Per-
sian Gulf.,
Psychological factors. Most strate-
gists view Soviet operations as basically
political and psychological so far-exer-
cises to "show the flag," to demonstrate
Russia's success in establishing a pres-
ence in the area.
There is also evidence, however, that
the Soviet Union is developing a chain
of naval facilities that will enable it to
expand its maritime operations.
From military and political' experts
come these observations.
m In the Yemer: It;.pui,l, le,s Rus-
sians are helping to build a modern port
at Flodeida, a city that dominates the
mouth of the Red Sea. The Russians
maintain 50 MIG-I7 and IL-28 aircraft,
along with Soviet pilots, in Yemen and
have several hundred advisers working
in the northern part of the country.
In Southern Yemen, the Russians
have been moving in ever since British
forces withdrew in 1967. With an eye
obviously on the strategic port of Aden,
Moscow has built up the biggest diplo-
matic mission of any foreign nation in
Southern Yemen. Arms, including 10
MIG planes, are being. delivered to the
anti-Western regime.
Western strategists make this point:
With an air base in Southern Yemen,
Russia could rule the maritime ap-
proaches to the Red Sea in the sputh
and could control the Suez Canal ap-
proaches in the north. through its in-
fluence in Egypt.
o Across a' narrow gulf from Aden,
Moscow is establishing a strategic foot-
hold in the' Somali Republic on the
East African coast. Russians' are helping
Somalis build a new-port at Berbera at
the entrance to the Red Sea. They also
are reported to be supplying the Gov-
ernment with 150 MIG's, 20 helicopters
and enough tanks to form an armored
brigade, an impressive arsenal for a na-
tion of just 2.7 million.
? Russia last year signed a fishing
agreement' with the island republic of
Mauritius, which was granted independ-
ence from Britain in 1968. Now Mos-
cow is said to be seeking refueling fa.
cilities in the capital of Port Louis or
on the tiny coral island of St. Brandon,
under Mauritian control.
? Soviet interest in India mounts.
Over the years Moscow has furnished
New Delhi with great stores of jets and
arms. Now Russia is helping to construct
a naval base on the east coast, at Vis-
hakhapatnam on the Bay of Bengal, in
return for access to bunkering and other
facilities.
e Election of a pro-Communist coali-
tion in Ceylon under Mrs. Sirimavo Ban-
daranaike paves the way for expansion
of a Soviet presence there. In 1963, be-
fore the Russian thrust into the Indian
Ocean, Mrs. Bandaranaike signed a mar-
itime agreement granting Red China
full use of Ceylonese ports. In view of
that, observers doubt that she will resist
Soviet pressures for similar facilities.
? In Singapore, once Britain's major
East Asian bastion, Soviet ships
could be dropping anchor at facilities
formerly utilized by the Royal Navy.
Prime Minister Lee ICuan Yew, who is
anxious that his huge dockyards not
stand idle as a result of British with-
drawal, has offered the Russians ac-
cess to them, on a commercial basin.
Already a joint Singapore-Soviet Ship-
ping Agency has been set up to serve(
as agent for Russian vessels using repair]
and other services in the port.
Seizing the opportunity. Three main
objectives are seen behind these Soviet
moves:
First, the Soviet naval build-up is an
integral part of Moscow's policy to rival
the U. S. as a world power. Essential
to great-power status is a global navy.
This is summed up by Admiral Sergei
Gorshkov, commander in chief of the
Soviet Navy:
"The flag of the Soviet Navy now
proudly, flies over the oceans of the
world. Sooner or later, the U. S. will
have to understand that. it no longer
has mastery of the seas."
Second, the Russians find set before
them a rare opportunity for expanding
their influence.
Britain's decision to pull out of the
Indian Ocean creates a power vacuum
which the U. S. is reluctant to fill. No
other power can do the job. Thus, Russia
would be in a position to support direct-
ly a take-over by a revolutionary govern-
rent in the Arabian Peninsula, with its
vast oil wealth, or on the cast coast of
Africa.
Third, establishing a Suez route to In-
dia is part of Soviet strategy to contain
Communist China. The Russians are felt
to have a real stake in underwriting the
security of India against the Chinese.
A safe, convenient route from the Black
Sea, through the Suez Canal and into
the Indian Ocean is regarded as essen-
tial for this purpose.
And the Russians are apparently in=
tent on neutralizing any attempt by Pe-
king itself to move into the Indian
Ocean.
A cool response. The West's re-
sponse to Soviet inroads east of Suez has
been surprisingly calm so far, in the
view of most observers.
The U. S. has had just three vessels
in its "Middle East force"-two destroy-
ers and a seaplane tender serving as
command ship-operating out of the is-
land of Bahrein.'
American military planners say the
U. S. has no current plans to beef up
this small force.
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Many American military men feel
that expansion of U. S. naval forces in
the Indian Ocean is desirable to meet a
Soviet threat. But they also acknowledge
,that with the Vietnam war and with
strong pressures at home to cut U. S.
commitments abroad, there is little like=
lihood for such expansion.
British officials make this point: U. S.
naval power operating from bases in the
Western Pacific could easily move into
the Indian Ocean to neutralize any real
Soviet threat. The U. S., these officials
add, also has authority to build facilities
on the British-owned Chagos Islands if
the need arises.
Weighing alternatives. Despite this
lack of public hand-wringing over Rus-
sia's presence in the Indian Ocean,
neither the U. S. nor Britain is anxious
that the Suez Canal be opened. The
reason: dwindling economic advantages
of an open Canal are more than offset.
by the strategic advantages of keeping it
closed.
As a practical matter, for instance,
the U. S. knows that a closed seaway :
forces Soviet ships supplying Communist
North Vietnam to take the long, ex-:
pensive route around the southern tip
of Africa.
In any case, what is of most concern
to the U. S. at the moment is not Rus-
sia's future influence in the Indian
Ocean. It is rather the escalating vio-
lence on the banks of the Suez Canal
itself-and how much danger Russia will
court to get Israel dislodged, and the
waterway reopened.
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July 1970
ANOTHER OPINION ON MOSCOW'S INTERGAZ-70
From 8 to 23 June an international spectacular called "Intergaz-70"
ran in Moscow with about 100 firms from 18 countries displaying equipment
in seven open-air pavilions. The opening of the exhibit was timed to co-
incide with the International Gas Union-sponsored Eleventh Gas Congress
held in the Kremlin 9 to 13 June. Some 5,000 scientists and technicians
from 50 countries attended the Congress.
According to Soviet official statements at the time, "the USSR holds
first place in the world for proved reserves of natural gas; Soviet en-
gineers hope to have wells in Siberia, in the nearest future that will yield
3-5 million cubic meters of gas in 24 hours."
Eugenio Cefis, president of Italian National Hydrocarbons Association,
ENI, told the Kremlin gathering that. "judging by the agreements (the USSR
has recently concluded to export natural gas to Italy, West Germany, Austria,
and France), the total volume of natural gas exported will amount to 100,000
million cubic meters by 1975." But, will it?
Western Siberian Experience
At the Punga natural gas fields of Western Siberia the Soviet "experts,"
according to Komsomolskaya Pravda of 10 March 1970, overestimated gas re-
serves by 100 percent. As a result, gas has been extracted from the Punga
deposit and shipped through the West Siberian-North Urals pipelines at an
excessive rate for the last seven years. Industrial activities in Sverd-
lovsk and several other cities in the Urals apparently had been planned on
the assumption that the Punga wells would flow until about 1982. Now, sa.y
Western experts, continued overprcduction at Punga will shorten their life
by some 50 percent. In other words, because reserves were overestimated,
the Punga wells have had only a nine to ten year production life instead of
their promised 18 to 20 year production period and consequently in those
Urals industries which depend on natural gas, activity will grind on at d
slower and slower rate.
Meanwhile, pressure at the Punga deposit is already declining so severe-
ly that the present flow of gas cannot be maintained through 1970 without the
aid of a compressor. According to the Soviet press, a compressor station we,
authorized for construction at Punga in 1965, but has not yet been built.
When official alarm was sounded last spring, about 150,000 tons of compressoz
equipment was hastily diverted from another site, but was stranded en route
to Punga when thaws caused the northern roads to become impassable.
Sakhalin Experience
In February of this year a Japanese delegation went to Moscow, pens
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400070001-5
primed, to finalize the Soviet-Japanese agreement under which Japan was to
import Soviet natural gas in exchange for large-diameter Japanese pipe.
This agreement, which has been under negotiation since 1966, involves also
Japanese aid to the USSR in developing the Soviet gas reserves on Sakhalin
Island.
The Soviet "experts" outdid themselves on Sakhalin. Platt's Oilgram
news service of 20 February 1970 reported from Moscow, 19 February, that
"Soviet Premier Kosygin himself had to step into the breach. with a personal
proposal to Japan for a completely new gas export scheme." Kosygin had to
confess to the Japanese delegation that his "experts" had blundered and had
overestimated the reserves available on Sakhalin. According to Kosygin,
while the "possible" gas reserves on Sakhalin were as high as 60 billion
cubic meters, the "proved" reserves were only 16 billion cubic meters.
Platt's described the Japanese delegation as "registering complete shock
at hearing the Soviet Premier's news." The Japanese said the whole scheme
needed to be reevaluated and considered anew. Soviet-Japanese negotiations,
begun in 1966, now are dragging on through 1970.
Attached are reprints of newspaper clips with Soviet and Western
coverage of the International Gas Congress and other related topics.
Nobody wants to make hot gas into a cold war issue, but it behooves the
Free World to take a hard look at the facts and to make them more gener-
ally known than they are.
 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400070001-5
NEW YORK TIMES
15 June 1970
x ~E Recor is
SS~cciai to The New York TImcl
MOSCOW, June 14-The So-
viet Union is experiencing a
boom in natural gas and some
Western experts predict that
in coming decades Moscow may
turn out to be the major source
of this cheap, efficient, non-
polluting fuel in Europe and
Asia.
Soviet officials told delegates
to the 11th International Gas
Conference, which ended yes-
terday, that proven gas reserves
of the Soviet Union now
amounted to 12.1 trillion cubic
,peters. This is the largest in
t.he? world, Alcksei I. Sorokin,
the Deputy Minister of the So-
viet Gas Industry, said. One
cubic meter is about 35 cubic
I. cot,
Production Is Lagging
Moreover, he declared in an
interview in the press, it is es-
timated that potential reserves
of 83 trillion cubic meters lie
under Soviet land and waters.
Only two years ago, Alekseil
K. Kortunov, the Minister of;
the Gas Industry, reported.
proven reserves of & trillion,I
thus indicating a 50 per cents
rise in that period.
The actual production of gas,`
1 however, has lagged behind the)
geological discoveries. Despite)
spectacular growth in this dec-1
ade, recent production, figures'
have been disappointing to of-'
ficials.
The chief problem has been
that the richest gas area lie
TASS, Moscow
8 June 1970
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
Has Largest Proven Reserves
c-c ter -n ct rrozen norm ot
Western Siberia or in the dry
deserts of Central Asia, far,
from indutrial and populated'
centers.. This has required)
heavy investment in pipelines.
The initial plan for 1970,
made public in 1966, called for
225 to 240 billion cubic meters,
but last year the figure was
revised to just short of 200
billion.
The growth in gas as a ma-
jor fuel, now representing
about 20 per cent of total fuel,
reflects a decision taken by
Soviet leaders to alter the fuel
pattern away from coal and
toward more economic fuels
toward more economic fuels
such as oil and gas. In 1955,
total mitural gas production
was only 10 biliior. cubic meters.
About 39,000 miles of pipe-
lines have been laid to carry
the gas from the far-off areas.
Western Siberia, where about;
57 per cent of the ? total re-I
serves lie, is to be developed
in the coming decade.
Mr. Sorokin said that about
half of the gas was used in
industry and a quarter in power
stations. The rest is used' for
household needs. About 100
million people use gas in the
Soviet Union, he said.
The Soviet Union is- deliver-
ing gas by pipeline to Poland,
Czechoslovakia and Austria.
Contracts have been signed
with West Germany and Italy
to deliver in exchange for
wide-diameter pipe.
There were more than 5,000
delegates from virtually every
gas-oroducinz or using country
of Natural
at the congress, including a'
delegation from the United)
States. Many of the speakers 1
stressed the "international"
quality of gas, with increasing;
use of pipelines making it easy,
for the transport of the fuel
across 'frontiers.
A prominent French busi-
nessman. who, asked not to be
identified, said in a private
conversation that the rapid un-
covering of Soviet gas reserves
made it only "a matter of
time" before Soviet gas was
used throughout Western
Europe. He said much depended
on maintaining a good political
atmosphere and also on
Moscow's getting the pipes and
equipment it needs to ship the
fuel the long distances to West-
ern Europe.
He said that the deals made;
recently with Austria, Italy and'
West. Germany could be the
start. At present the Nether-
lands and North Africa are the
Soviet Union's main gas com-
petitors in Europe.
An American specialist noted,
that Soviet gas reserves werei
increasing at, a time when the
United States, the world's law-
est producer, was looking to,
Canada and the Arctic for ad-
ditional reserves.
GIVE A HAY IME
VIA FRESH AIR FUND.
--The international Intergaz-70 exhibition wps opened in
Moscow today. Over 100 firms from 18 countries display gas equipment,
Mikhail Yefremov, the vice chairmazi of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, -opening
the exhibition, said that business contacts in thq gas industry had of late been
successfully developing between the USSR and many other countries. The Soviet Union
is exporting gas to Czechosivakia, Poland, and Austria, is designing gas
pipelines in Bulgaria and the GDR. Contracts hav> (...) A R. Garaudy se sont
associes trois hommes dont le
trait commun est d'avoir, a des
epoques differentes et pour des
raisons differentes, combattu la
politique adoptee et pratiquee par
quasi - unanimite du parti.
Quatre personnes qui ne semblent
guere avoir trouve beaucoup d'ap-
puis. Discuter entre communistes,
en effet, debattre de tel ou tel
autre point, ne pas approuvei! -en-
tierement la politique voulue par
la majorite, est une chose ; pas-
ser aux actes d'hostilite contra le
parti en est une autre, et les
communistes s'y. refusent. v
Messrs. Garaudy, Kriegel-Valrimont, Pronteau,
and Tillon Challenge the Operation and Policy of the French CP
tionnel]e >. a itepiace a la base >),
it ava.it ete r6tabli daps tons ses
uroits de membre du parti com-
tnuniste en 1957.
Sous le titre, all West plus pos-
su;;e.w, .,,, aire>>, l'a.ppel declare
a ilernbres de, lit directio,~ dot
P.C.F. perta nt de nombreuses
annees, noire obiectif common est
le combat Pour le socialisme dans
les conditions nouvelles propres
a noire temps. Les problemes qui
se sont poses depuis le vingtieme
congres du P.C.U.S., et plus en-
core Bans la derniere periode., ont
revele avec eclat que le fonction-
nement actuel du parti consti-
tue un obstacle a la realisation
de cet objectif. Apres avoir ? re-
.prouve > l'intervention en Tche-
coslovaquie, it est inconeevable
d'en accepter toutes les conse-
quences, c'est-a-dire la a nor-
malisation ?, la raise au pas.
>> A l'egard de la jeunesse, l'im-
portance donnee a certains exces
et une mefiance systematiquebat
emp@che de comprendre les rai-
sons profondes de son mouve-
ment.
> Un centralisme democrati-
n.:.te. ont rendu public le
Cu _ ;ppc] rz fires (11-14 mai
?me MM. Servin
uva. cwont ils avaient par-
!o:rations in c?unhodia .. ,
"The scale of the victory could even
1 ad to some sort of genuine peace ryeo-
t ations-but on very di ?erent terms
'om those being discussed three weeks
when the offensive began."
This is not the reporting of some
ung-ho American correspondent or the
nclusior: of some "brainwashed" Amer-
i an politician desperately clutching for
metlrin, to justify his support of W Ite
ouse policy. It is the opening of a dis-
atch from Murray Saylc, perhaps the
Most outstanding and seasoned of the
CPYRGHT
. able of younger correspondents main-
hocd by The Times newspapers in Lon-
on. He was filing from Phnom Penh. His
ssessrnent is all the more rerrarksble
ecause there is a pei haps built-in British
ndency to be astringent in judging
-morican actions overseas, and because
he Times initially voiced the opinion
at President Nixon's Cambodian deci-
. ion was "one more step to disaster."
Gf course none of this mea is the U :ii d
totes or the Smith Vietnamese are cut of
he woods in the struggle in Indo-China.
he other side is still too resourceful for
hat. Neither does it mean President
ikon's confrontation with the protest
novenient is likely to be over by the end
f the surrmaer. What it does mean -- as
'fr.Sayle says -is that there could r..ow
e "some tort of genuine Dcace negotia-
ions." But where?
There is already the forum of the talks
a Paris, invclving Hanoi, Washington,
Saigon and the South' Vietnamcse Na-
oval Liberation Print (NLF). The
NEW YORK TIES
20 May 1970
An Asian Peace Plea
weekend to discuss the Cambodian crisis showed good
judgment in focusing their efforts on a broader search
for a peaceful settlement of the over-all Indochina
problem.
Although a majority of the participants are, or have
been, actively engaged on the side of the anti-Commu-
nist forces in the Indochina conflict, the Djakarta
meeting brushed aside appeals for concerted military
intervention in behalf of the Lon Nol Government In
Pnompenh. This refusal may have disappointed hopes
for a move -toward collective security in Asia, such
as President Nixon and others have been suggesting.
But-the Asian leaders appear to have recognized, as
Hanoi%NLF team called off last week:
session of the talks in protest agains
American/South Vietnamese operation
in Cambodia. Significantly, however,'th
other side gave no inrllcation of brcalsin
off the talks for good-perhaps becaus
they recognize that, with their setbacks i
Cambodia, they might now be bette
served by a compromise solution than b
continued stalling.
But the Paris talks are concerned onl
with Vietnam, and the war has no
clearly become an all Indo-China war an
not just a Vietnam war. Should the fora
then be a revival of the 1954 Geneva con
ference on Indo--China? For many reason
this would be better than Paris. It is i
fact what Washington. has thtermittenti?
suggested and what one of the conferene
cochairmen (Britain) has sought to inter
est the other ;(Russia) in. But the Russian
have repeatedly stalled. In any case, titer
is some doubt, in today's circumstances
whether China-whose participation .i
essential - would join in a' meeting undoi
part-Russian sponsorship to settle th
affairs of Southeast Asia. So what else
Well, there is always the team of thre
-Indonesia, Japan, and Malaysia - sc
up at,last week's 1.2-?nation Jakarta confer
ence on Cambodia. The conference had it.
ups and downs from the moment the Indo
nesian Government pronoc d it. Comma
nisi countries, although: invited, boycotte
it. But the gathering wisely kept. itself i
a low key and ended up by establishin
the team of three to work or peace. I
both Indonesia and the three-mars tear
can he seen to be working independent!
of the Americans, this me-'test initiative i
Jakarta could yet prove one of tie 11 "1
acorns out of which great oak trees grow
CPYRGHT
increasing numbers of Americans are beginning 0
do, .that the situation in Indochina does not lend itself
to Al military solution. The introduction of additional
fan troops into Cambodia-some of them from
s tes that are traditional foes of the itmers--would
o ly further complicate the political problems that lie,
a the root of the Southeast Asian conflict. A wider
ilitary intervention by Asian states would heighten
t e danger of a wider Asian war.
The Djakarta gathering delegated a task force
composed of representatives. from Japan, Malaysia and
I donesia to, seek a broader meeting on Indochinese
p ace through the Geneva co-chairmen and U.N. Secre-
t ry General Thant. This Asian appeal for negotiation
r trier than confrontation in Southeast Asia deserves'
a positive response, especially from the combatants
a d their, supporters on both sides.
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 CPYRGHT
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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR CPYRGHT
17 June 1970
s E e
r
By David K. Willis
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
The immense task of forging a sense of
unity in Asia moves slowly ahead.
That it does so-despite the thunder of
the Indo-China war, despite vast differences
among peoples scattered across a third of
the globe-is counted in many an Asian capi-
tal as one of the main hopes for the future.
Suggested in '66
The latest indication is the gathering of
nine nations (plus Laos in "observer"
status) spanning East Asia, Southeast Asia,
and the Pacific in the Asian and Pacific
Council, or ASPAC.
ASPAC, holding its fifth annual confer-
ence in Wellington, N.Z., June 17.19, is the
only regional diplomatic grouping in Asia of
its type.
First suggested in 1966 by a South Korean
government with an eye to drumming up
iew anti-Communist feeling, it has devel-
oped instead into a valuable diplomatic soap-
box for its member nations: Australia, New
Zealand, Malaysia, Thailand, South Vietnam,
Philippines, Nationalist China, South Korea,
and Japan.
ASPAC exists mainly to let foreign min-
isters and their staffs talk freely to each
other. Unlike other regional groups, it is not
purely economic (though it will approve an
economic cooperation center in Bangkok this
year, and maintains other offices); it is not
security minded, nor narrowly subregional..
This year, ASPAC gives every indication
of continuing its low profile, rather than be-
ing transformed into a more hawkish, anti-
Communist group by such thrusters as Seoul,
Saigon, and Taipei.
The main reason is that its unofficial
leader is Japan-and that Japan is deter-
mined to keep it as flexible as possible. _
From Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi down,
the Japanese believe ASPAC's usefulness
lies in discussion, rather than confrontation.
Tokyo believes a strong anti-Communist,
pro-United States communique would hardly
strengthen ASPAC or keep the door open to
new members, such as, it is hoped, Indo-
nesia, Singapore;,or even India.
Jakarta meeting held
An additional factor this year is that most
of the ASPAC members met in Jakarta last
month (May 17-18) to take their own initia-
tive to end the fighting in Cambodia.
Even while ASPAC ministers are meeting
in the gray wood and stone of New Zea
land's Parliament buildings, emissaries
from Indonesia, Malaysia, and Japan will
be seeing Soviet leaders in Moscow to try to
fulfill the decisions taken in Jakarta.
Having signed a resolutely middle-road
communique at Jakarta (thanks mainly to
the forceful role played by Japan), the same
nations would only prejudice the success of
their own effort by following up with a blast
at communism in Wellington, it is felt here.
Japan, at any rate, remains set against
any such thing. Japanese newspapers have
been playing up reports that Seoul, Taipei,
and Saigon might well try to say all the
hawkish things in a Wellington communique
that they found themselves unable to say in
Jakarta.
Inside the Foreign Ministry here, calm
officials concede that Taipei was not at the
Jakarta meeting, and that Singapore -
counted a "dove" - was in Jakarta but is
not in Wellington.
Nonetheless, the officials assess the pros-
pect of a strong communique as "possible
but not likely." In fact, Tokyo and Kuala
Lumpur, aided by New Zealand, seem to
'have the situation well in hand. Tokyo and
Wellington were largely responsible for
staving off South Korean demands for a
stronger communique last7 year, when
ASPAC met at the scenic Kawana Hotel in
Ito City south of Tokyo.
Clearly, Bangkok, and Canberra (as well
as Saigon) will carry their own brand of
anticommunism into the Wellington meet-
ing, But Japan's example and influence are
large, and its policies are thought almost
certain to prevail.
Jakarta goes it alone
Japan wants Indonesia to join, but Ja-
karta prefers its own kind of low profile to
ASPAC's.
If Cambodia is mentioned at all in the
communique, it will be only in general
terms. As in the past, sympathy and even
perhaps deep sympathy will be extended
to Saigon for its "firm stand to preserve ...
independence and freedom."
The Wellington meeting could provide a
useful follow-up to the Jakarta conference
on Cambodia. While few expect the latter
to have any . effect on the Indo-Chinese
fighting, it did give Asian regionalism a
new focus. It generated a concrete, local
initiative to end the war. It marked Japan's.
firm entry into a security issue for the first
time since the war.
Now ASPAC in Wellington adds to Japan's
new role, and to non-Communist Asia's con-
+;,,.,;rg 'ogi 'ra? cen*ersatien -4