CA PROPAGANDA PERSPECTIVES SEPTEMBER 1970

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000400050001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 95
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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 CPYR pTroved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400050001-7 CPYRGHT
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
24 August 1970
CPYRGHT
CAMBODIA'S "MINIMIRACLE"-- CAN IT LAST?
PNOMP?NH
untrained, -e u ppe am an
Army, backed by U. S. air power and
South 'Vietnamese ground forces, has-for
the moment-created a "minimiracle" in
this Communist-threatened land.
When American troops pulled out of
Cambodia on June 30 after smashing
Red sanctuaries, predictions were wide-
spread that the Government of Premier
Lon No] would fall in a matter of days
or weeks.
At the time, Cambodia had a virtual-
ly unarmed force of 35,000 men. Hard-
ened North Vietnamese and Viet Cong
troops were unopposed in Northeast
Cambodia and moving out across the
country.
The former dictator, ousted Prince
Norodom Sihanouk, was calling for
revolution.
Encouraging signs..In mid-August,
the situation is still critical. But most
observers here are vastly encouraged by
recent developments.
The Government in Pnompenh is
stronger than it was six weeks ago. The
Army shows signs of developing a back-
bone, having withstood two Communist
offensives since the Americans departed.
And, so far at ' least, Prince Sihanouk's
cal for_ revolt in the countryside has
he big factor is morale. Says one
erican: "I haven't seen this kind of
1l4ity since Pearl Harbor."
tudents, bureaucrats, the middle
ss, and even peasants, have enthusi-
ically joined the struggle against the
my.
he Government called for 200,000
inteers-and got them. In small but
nist forces, the Cambodians are throw-
themselves into the fight. Often, it
e more valor than finesse.
rse. South Vietnamese troops are bar-
ing the Reds in Eastern Cambodia.
erican air power-both B-52 bombing
ply lines, and tactical support of
mbodian troops-plays a big role. One
itary source says that, without this
support, the Cambodians could not
e held on-and would not be able
ed problems. The Communists have
er difficulties. Their old sea-supply
through Cambodia-which in the
past few years supplied
most of their ammunition
and arms for the fight in
Southern South Vietnam
-has been cut off. So has
most of their rice supply,
which used to come of-
ficially through Siha-
nouk's Government.
And Cambodian villag-
ers are hostile to the Red
invaders, giving the Lon
Nol forces more intelli-
gence than they can use.
There are still the
equivalent of at least
four divisions of Commu-
nists inside Cambodia.
That means as many as
50,000 fighting men.
Their command structure
Is intact and they are
consolidating in the
Nnrtlwa_nt, sent of the Me.
kong River and west of the Vietnamese
border.
What are Cambodia's chances of sur-
viving over the longer nun?
Much depends on Communist strata'
y. Most observers believe there will
e no all-out attempt to bring down the
on Nol Government by massive mili-
ary action against this capital.
Rather, the Hanoi-Peking strategy
ppears to be to consolidate in the North-
ast-which the Cambodians have tem-
orarily abandoned. From there, the
ar against South Vietnam can be
continued.
Puppet front. A long, hard war of
ttrition-using the puppet government-
n-exile of Sihanouk as a front-has start-
d against Lon Nol's Cambodia. Targets
f opportunity will be exploited around
he countryside, with priorities given to
eizing rice and-more important-to re-
ruiting Cambodians for Sihanouk.
The Government is settling in for a
ong haul, hoping to maintain the initial
nthusiasm and support of the people.
The Government hopes to turn 60,000
o 70,000 men into a first-rate righting
orce. The rest of the new manpower
will be used to guard villages, to police
nilitary installations and to counter Red
errorism. More American aid-not only
he 8.5 million dollars in arms and equip-
ent already promised and arriving-will
needed.
So will continued U. S., South Viet-
amese and Thai air support. Especially
ought will be American economic aid to
?ebuild Cambodia's economy, which was
ankrupted by Sihanouk's policies be-
ore be was ousted last March.
Peasants hold key. Biggest question
s whether or not the Communists can
eke progress enrolling the peasants in
heir ranks. The Communists "hold"
ore than a third of the country-the
egions east of the Mekong River. But
hese are largely uninhabited. The Gov-
rnment's challenge is to protect the
peasants in more densely populated
eas from Communist thrusts south-
ward and westward.
Confidence may be misplaced, but
'ght now the Cambodians-and many
erican here-believe Lon Nol just
night survive. They say that only time
tell if the "minimiracle" of the
ast weeks can continue.
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400050 OF RGHT
THE OBSERVER, London
9 August 1970
P, lie
01,
from GAVIN YOUNG:' Skutt,
SKuN, Cambodia. S August
A SCORE of young Cambo-
dians killed in an ambush a
day ago lie in the sun today
just down the road from here.
They are behind us-on what
shoal;' be our ' safe' side.
Ahead, round. the' next bend
in the road, funnels, of smoke
rise from the little red-roofed
,town- of Skun. The crash and
rattle of rockets and. machine-
guns. extend into the great green-
ness around us, even at our
backs on the way to Kompong
.sham, the key base.
Cambodian regulars . and
volunteers are now fighting
hand-to-hand and ? house-to-
house with Vietcong and North
'Vietnamese troops who occupied
Skun a week" ago. . I saw
American and South Vietnamese
jets machine-gunning and rocket=
ting outside the town. Skun
may be recovered today or to-
?niorrow. It sits on a vital cross-
roads on the main northern'high-
'way only 35 miles from Phnoni
.Penh, but the situation in this
important region of Cambodia
will still be serious.
I was plummeted down to the
gales of Skun by a helicopter
manned by South ? Vietnamese
pilots, cool as ice in slinky black
Orin, , suits with tiger-head
bad es, , accompanied by a
Vietnamese colonel and the
gentle-looking Cambodian com-
mander, General In Tani ; two
years ago, an unbelievable com-
bination of nationalities. ,
We landed on? a cratergd road.
The helicopter soared prudently:
away. And something. amazing
happened. Despite the Vietcong
milling around in the tinder=
,growth, about 50 sweating
;Cambodian soldiers, in motley
battle-dress or . khaki shorts,
charged out of their foxholes,
flcah n eon
e i-ts, -, .~, f ire
Cambodia, 8 August
cheering, clapping their hands
above their heads,, jumping ,in
,the air with glee, rushiiig',to
,shake the General's hand. In
,one of the hottest war zones'in
,Cambodia, we were suddenly- in,
a.sea of damp smiling faces.'
Army morale . r.
astounding '
i The high morale 'of Cam-
bodia's under-trained :Army is
astounding. It seethes through
an increasingly battered country
like high-tension electricity:'
These men have been fighting+
around Skun day and night for
110 days. Some are peasants
others are students, labourers,
teachers. ? All are volunteers.
'They have been badly
knocked about. ;Ihe ' North
Vietnamese had infiltrated
around and behind them. A
column from Kompong Cham
that was to have relieved therti
was caught in the ambush that
Yet 'they had held-with
sporadic air support and no hell
copters. Now they proudly
pointed out their battered slit'
trenches. Some had Vietcong
rocket craters only six feet away.
All were ripped with bullets.
'They kept creeping up in the
dark,' a Cambodian corporal
said. 'They shouted " Lay. down
your arms ! " and we opened up
on them crouching- there only 20
yards away.' I saw the blackened:
grass and-bushes where Vietcong
or Cambodian grenades had ex-'
ploded and the traces of 'Viet-
cong blood. I asked a boy, beam-
ing and clutching his Chinese
'
sub-machine gun : 'Are you
scared? ' He said: ' i was.? But
now I know;what'the .Vietcong'
are like, not any moro.'. He cer-
tainly saw a battle here. The
General gave each man a.wcek's,
pay, on the spot.
General In Tam' is a remark-
,able man. Over 50, he is an
administrator by profession, now
a soldier by choice-'to save the
country against this foreign in-
vasion.' He is Governor of Kam-
gong Cham province where he
was born and which he loves and
used to tour .regularly. He is
balding, looks more like. an
academic than a soldier, never
carries ?a weapon, and has a
wrinkled dark face like a friendly
walrut. Ile could be safe in the
capital; his duties as President
of the National Assembly could
keep him there. He prefers to be
with his men. He has already lost
a brother and five nephews in a
war that is only four months old.
Today his staff tried to stop
him going to Skun in a vulner-
able helicopter--' The general is
far too rash.' But he said the
soldiers should see him. He said
it like a professor talking about
his favourite class.
He had already spent three
',days and nights under shot and
shell with his front-line troops at
Skun earlier this week. He had
personally extricated an encir-
cled battalion.
Like all Cambodians, without
exception, he complains mildly
but with justice of the lack of
modern equipment for his men.
Earlier, at his base in Kotn-
pong Chant, which is itself under
rocket attack, I asked him if the
Cambodians could hold up under
the recurrent if limited losses in
the week-old wave of Vietcong
attacks across the country. ' Oh,
Yes. With time we can train and
(reorganise the ridiculous army
Sihanouk left us.' When he saw
Cambodians killed, did he feel
angry at the obvious delay in arms
deliveries 'from Cambodia's
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CPYRGHT
'Well, a little of that.' lie
miled. 'But it soon passes. We
point. Men, women, girls and
toys are in uniform, deter-
minedly clutching guns. I saw
a dignified old man of about 60
with white hair and Ho Chi Minh
beard being .pedatlcd along in a
cyclo, nursing is carbino. In
the big lycee, alrepdy twice hit,
by long-range Vietcong mortars,
while some students play basket-
ba'll or study, others in rotation
man well-protected gun emplace-
ments in which they sleep. A
professor, strapped about with
ammunition belt, grenades, and
carbine, pointed to himself and
said smiling: 'The; Duke of
Marlborough goes to war, n'est-
cepcs?'
In a small house in. a back
sMcct flanked by scarlet hibiscus,
two French priests, the only
foreigners left in the city since
it was cut off, told me: 'There's
'no panic here. The people seem
relaxed. They've been expecting
an alttack for weeks and they're
becoming used to it. Much
better disrciptine, too. Before, if
a shot went off, everyone in the
town would be blazing away.
They laughed at the recollection.
One does not get the feeling
that the Vietcong and North
Vietnamese arc achieving a
major breakthrough in this essen-
tial heartland, though as the Viet-
namese liaison officer with the
troops at Kompong Cham says
of the si;tuation: ' It's not
pretty, eh ? '
The Cambddian strength is in
their will to fight and the fact that
this is not a civil war. But there
are major North Vietnamese
units moving down, by river and
truck, They are desperate for a
really big psychological victory.
Food prices are beginning to
creep up in Kompong Cham.
The Cambodians have other
disadvantages beside a shortage
of weapons. General In Tam,
that unusual man, will not allow
Napalm in his region. Again.
other towns have been destroyed
by air attack before bcing1retaken
from the Vietcong. The general
here says. 'I must at all costs
protect our civilian lives and pre-
vent material damage. So the
fighting has been very hard in
Skun. The enemy gets into the
build ngs-even pagodas-and
want to destroy our own houses
and temples, so it takes longer to
retake a town and our losses may
be greater as a result. I would
not allow aircraft to brmb Skun.
Meanwhile Skun will be retaken
and tho main road opened again.
But only tentatively. It will be a
risky drive from Phnom Penh to
Kompong Cham for sonic time.
Today as I stood with the General
with his joyful troops yn the edge
of Skun, two big trucks encircled
by a strongly armed escort were
creeping down the road behind us
at walking pace. Because of the
lurking enemy, it . would take
them six hours to'-pick up the
poor ambushed bodies, the gay
scarves made up from the Cam-
bodian and Buddhist flags still
around their necks, and deliver
them to the incinerators in Kom-
pong Cam only 15 miles away.
nderstand that this war hap
encd very quickly. We were all,
ncluding our allies, taken rather
y surprise. It lakes time to
unea back.'
Cambodianshave been largely
inned on the defensive in the
resent hefty Vietcong and North
Vietnamese push from the north
owards Phnom Penh thait has led
o heavy fighting around Koni-
ong Cham and even inside a
Major town dike Kon-Npong
hom from which the Vietcong
ave been ejected. There have
Ben setbacks at Vkirirom,
attles around Takeo in the
oath, and shelling of places
Barer to the capital. Bridges
ave been mined. 'Cambodian
ivilians were killed in a major
ietcong a.mbuIh on the main
oad to the port of Kompong
om.
:.Volunteers '
turned away.
All the time the Cambodian
rmy-turning away hundreds of
olmvteers by now-is feverishly
raining. It is oulnianouvred and
utgunned. But it is-not collaps-
g. It is even hitting back in
reas like Skun. And though it
is a small country, Phnom Penh
does not seem threatened today.
Cambodian soldiers may look
gaggle-Maggie, but they have
seldom run away. Here I have
met 15-year-old veterans of two
or three battles. And their
morale is higher than any I have
keen in a:nybody',s army in 10
years of visiting wars,
It is a strange and rare situa-,
tion. Kompong Cham, the lush
green ' second city 'of Cambodia,
is cut off from Phnom Penh since
Skun was lost last week. This
week it was more dike a city that
welcomes attack more than it
fears it.
Two nights ago the crash of
Cambodian heavy - mortars and
the drone of low-civoling Ameri-
can planes dropping flares over
the Mekong rryer made sleep
difficult. Every street corner has.
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 CPYRGHApproved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000400050001-4PYRGHT
BALTIMORE SUN
16 August 1970
Lon Not. Slowly Introduces
'A Greater Freedom To Cambodia
An Increased Pluralis
I Over Sihanouk's Era
Is' Bringing StIppor
By MICHAEL PARKS
[Sun Staff Correspondent]
Phnom Penh, Cambodia, Au .
gover -
rnent? which many expect
would quickly become another
American-supporteV milita
dictatorship, so far seems to e
freer, more open and tolerant if,
dissent than the regime
-Prince Norodom Sihanouk wa I LAY,
The government of Gen.
Not, 'the premier, also is p
needing gingerly to broaden i
political base, partially, throug
patronage, partially throug
community-development - p
grams but mostly by appealin
to the patriotism and solicitin
the support of the peasant an
laborer.
The efforts are cautious an
often tentative, and they can b
undercut at any time, of course
by serious military reverses:
By most estimates, the Phno
Penh government controls oni
a third of the countryside, but
perhaps .,two-thirds of the pr
government population is con
centrated in the provincial capi-
tals and towns. .
Within this context, the gov
ernment Js firmly in Charge
within the territory it holds, bdt
even its critics acknowledge it
to be more responsive to local
needs than was the Sihanouk re-
gime.
Buddhist groups, basically ' to the Cambodian who is not a'
now-political here but closer to member of the French-style'
the peasantry than any other elite of civil servants, Army offs.
gr'oup,, also support it. cers, university teachers, pro-
The government's parliamen. fessionals and businessmen, al-'
.tary critics, who had won only a though the government is mak-
iew grudging changes from ing plans to win the average
Prince Sihanouk over a decade, Cambodian's allegiance lest it
say they have no quarrel with revert to Prince Sihanouk,
the cu
re
r
nt governmet'sol
n gas,
only its methods.
Generally they feel it is too
moderate, too cautious probably
reflecting-the personality of Lon
Noi.
So far, the. critics have per-
suaded the government to end
end the practice of concentrat.
ing all power in the hands of two
or three men,' each running
three or four ministries. While
Lon Nol has kept the defense
portfolio, he and Naj. Gen. Siso-
wath Sirik Matak, the deputy
premier, have given up their
form with a strong president, orF
whether it will be modeled upon:
the old post-war French repsalic
with a figurehead president and
a basically parliamentary form
of government.
Predictably, the Lon Nol gov-
ernment favors the strong-presi-
dent concept and his parliamen
Elite Approves, Too mrY opponents favor the other
Most of the members of the' 'form.
political elite, whose viewpoints Questions of unicameral ver-
range from the near-monarchist sus bicameral legislatures, de-
.to radical socialist, have said centralization. of governmental
almost unanimously in private functions, and the election of ai-
oonversations recently that they most ail local officials also are'
believe the in No] government being vigorously debated by pot-i
has moved significantly toward iticians here in a style that they
republican democracy with a say was never permitted before.
dreat deal of speed. Whether this.constitution will be
Similarly, most Western di io? drafted by the present national
mats here say tare ur- assembly or a new constituent
mised a the stability they of the assembly has not been deterg mined because of the impossibil-
ernment, and the speed of its ity of holding elections through-'
;liolitical reforms. out the country. For the same
"Given that this is a countr
reacnn the
over
t
_ c_
y
g
nor n
x
pi b
on
rise bl
--
y - r e,
o
.o: a year or per-
deputies,, an Army general, and its enemy and a country that baps two the national assembly,
-two popular university profes? had an abrupt change of govern- elections scheduled for this fall,,
sors. ments five months ago," a polit- "a move accepted by all' here as
They also have created 1 spe- balsa said t "I at a
find amazing sta? Another significant change`
refugees, veterans, planning and bility. Moreover, I think the po. from the last Sihanouk years is,
Cher matters at the sub-Cabinet' litical reforms are considerable the organization of several Pont-,
level. given the time period." lea] parties now under way. For
The essential, policy-making The current debate among the several years, there had been
wens remain in the hands of politically aware centers on only the Sangkum party, which
on Nol and Sirik Matak, but when to, declare Cambodia a re? had its factions but no external
neither local nor foreign poIiti pulbkc and what form of govern-' opposition.
al observers here relieve: that went to embody in the new cord It was growing dissatisfaction
iher man wants to be a dicta- stitution which is being drafted. within the Sangkum, however,
r in the classic sense ; Lon Nol `said he expects the over the country's stagnating
The Cabinet members from a constitu- economy and the government's
tubers and the tional monarchy with many increasing deficits that forced.
fficials appointed " to run the remn
t o f
Sih
k
' Vi
k
an
nce
anou
ang
to install Lou
orean god
, Intellectuals and' students ew commissariats say they kings to ,,a repllblic,;wlthin two. Nol as premier last August in.,
who in most countries would Ve greater day-to-day operat- months.:.: what the prince called "the gov
tend to be anti-government, g authority than was ever at. t ernment of Salvation. ,
ebate fk oder~ whether "
rince Sihanouk. I%-,
firmly suPport theouupandne~v wed under PAjL_
onie
government, of tW mepns.ll#le so fay,. wed upon the U.8%ettcherbated lay, the strains, of >ivaX ., ,
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THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
18 August 1970
VOL. CLXXVI NO. 35
Turn for the Good?
It Has Its Troubles,
But Cambodia' Proves
It's Not Any Pushover:
Hanoi Said to Be Too Weak
To Fight Two Wars; Meets
An Unexpected Resistance`
A Tale of Two Ferryboats;
By PETER R. KANN
Stof! Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
PHNOM PENH-The Bulgarian embassy
ere is
upholstered in plastic leopardskin. Its walls are
decorated with travel posters showing beefy
peasant girls harvesting grapes for the pro-
duction of wines like "Bulgarplod."
On one wall of the office of the Bulgarian
charge d'affaires is a large road map of Cam-
bodia, festooned with several score little red
flags. The flags mark scenes of battle, but the
map is sadly out of date. There, are no red
flags on the towns of Kampot, Kompong Thom,
Kirirom or a dozen other sites of recent com-
bat.
"It is unfortunate," says the . charge
d'affaires, "but we have run out of flags."
The Bulgarians aren't the only ones who
have been unable to keep pace with recent
events in Cambodia. Four months ago Cam-
bodia was the most peaceful and cohesive little
country in Southeast Asia. Today it is barely a
country at all.
Within two months of the mid-March coup
that toppled Prince Sihanouk, North Vietnam-
ese and Vietcong troops had spread across
most of Cambodia, even occupying the towers
of the ancient Khmer kingdom at Angkor Wat.
Today they are in full control of all of north-
east and most of northern Cambodia-more
than half the country's land area.
Bone Hope
What's ,more, the South Vietnamese effec-
tively took control of large parcels of southeast
Cambodia. Thailand currently is debating
when to move troops into western Cambodia:
American and South Vietnamese planes _fly
bombing raids throughout most of the count
as the Cambodian army lumbers from one db.
fe*t to another in Pepsi-Cola trucks and gaylli
painted buses. , , ? .
Most of Cambodia's rural population lives
under the control of neither the Communists
nor the new Cambodian government of Pre-
mier Lon Nol. They live in political vaccuums
that are gradually coming to be called "con-
tested areas."
"We are witnessing the Congolization of
Cambodia, a country, disintegrating before our
eyes," says a European diplomat. He notes
that the tough and resilient South Vietnamese
have been fighting continually for 30 years, but
still, South Vietnam is in better shape than
Cambodia, which has been at war for only four
Months.
But if Cambodia is far worse oft than it was
tour months ago, most observers here now feel
that its prospects of resisting a Communist
takeover look a bit brighter than they did two
months ago. At that time there was talk here of
the siege, and even seizure, of Phnom Penh,
and of the hopeless incompetence of the Cam-
bodian army.
Communist Aim Unclear
Now observers speak of the isolation, rather
than siege, of the capital ("Lon Nol looks
pretty secure as mayor of Phnom Pehn;" says
a Western envoy). They still talk of Cambodian
military incompetence, but the word "hope-
lesO often is dropped ("The Cambodian army
used to run on rumors of a Vietcong attack,
now it only runs when the VC start shooting,"
says a foreign military attache). And they now
tend to stress the problems and weaknesses of
the Communists, as well as their strengths.
These shifts in attitude may seem overly
subtle. But this is a country where the word
"uncertainty" takes on a definitive ring, where
Westerners resort .to humor and cynicism to
try to blot out the tragedy, where an "optimis-
tic military assessment" translates into more
death and destruction for a country that tum-
bled almost by accident into the eye of the In-
dochina war.
It's not entirely clear whether the Commu-
nists' aim has been to topple the Lon Nol gov-
ernment, to pressure it into a sort of accommo-
dation, or simply to gain time while they set
about consolidating vast new sanctuary areas
In the northeast.
f "I think Charlie has been hoping to pick up
Cambodia on the quick and cheap, and it hasn't
quite worked," says a Western military at-
tache.
'A Tough Decision
This official and others now believe the
North Vietnamese face a tough decision.
Should they make Cambodia their top military
priority and concentrate their 35,000 or so com-
bat troops .on conquering the country? Or
-should they just continue harassnients to keep
the Cambodians off balance while concentrat-
ing their energy and forces on the war in South
Vietnam? Few observers here believe that the
Communists can, at the same time, take all of
Cambodia and seriously threaten the crucial
southern areas of South Vietnam.
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Several analysts here think the Communists
will concentrate first on Cambodia. They argue
that the enemy for months has been scaling
down to a low-level "protracted war" in most
of South Vietnam and that it's in their interest
to lie low there for another year or two until
U.S. combat troops are gone. They stress the
relative ease with which Communist troops can
win victories in Cambodia, to the extent, they
contend, of toppling the Lon Nol government if
they really try.
The majority of diplomats, however, seem
to be betting the other way. They argue that
Hanoi is committed-both by its ideology and
Its nationalism-to concentrating on winning
the war in South Vietnam. They suggest that
victories over the Cambodian army may be
easily won, but lack the Impact of defeats of
South Vietnamese forces or infliction of heavy
casualties on U.S.'troops. They say the war in
South Vietnam's southern corps areas is cur-
rently going so badly for the Communists that
they must commit more forces there. And they
add that Cambodia will inexorably fall to the"
Communists if the Thieu government can be
defeated in Vietnam.
Idoreover, there's a g~owing realization
here that Cambodia would be no pushover for
'the Communists. The dispersal of Communist
forces across so much Cambodian territory al-
ready is said to be causing supply shortages.
More Important, the Communists are outsid-
ers-and unpopular ones-in Cambodia. Cam-
bodians traditionally hate Vietnamese of any
sort and have been trying to resist various
Vietnamese Invasions for centuries. Here the
Communists cannot follow Chairman Mao's
dictum to move among the people as fish in the
ocean; so far they look more like piranhas in a
goldfish bowl. Even diplomatic sources
vaguely sympathetic to the Communists set the
number of Cambodians fighting on the same
side with the North Vietnamese and Vietcong
at less than 10,000. Other Western diplomats
say even that figure is twice too high.
Whatever their problems, the Communists
are master organizers and have a potent prop-
aganda line in reminding the peasantry that
in the good old Sihanouk days peace reigned in
the rice paddies. And though the Communists
are having only marginal success in turning
the Cambodian conflict into areal civil war,.
the Lon Not government-despite some signs of
growing competence-is hardly moving to win,
mass allegiance in the countryside.
The New Helmet
The new government has strong support
among organized urban groups: Army, civil
service, 'students, intellectuals, businessmen
and, some say, the Buddhist clergy. Civil ser-
vants in,, paramilitary dress walk proudly
around the city. Nearly everyone in the capital
wears some,scrap of military uniform, Includ-
ing the teenyboppers who outfit themselves in
khaki bell-bottom slacks. It's not unusual to'
find a portly Cambodian soldier beaming with
pride as he sits down to dinner at a French
restaurant with a new steel helmet perched on
his head. Other soldiers then wander by his
table. to admiringly tap the new helmet.
All this esprit fades rapidly as one leaves
the capital. Only 20 miles away is the town of
Saang, four times battled over and now largely
In ruins. All but a few score of its 2,000 inhabi-
tants have fled. A Cambodian battalion, com-
manded by a major who was teaching primary
school three months ago, Is based in Saang.
Three kilometers down the road the Vietcong
are taxing, propagandising and conscripting
villagers. The VC have been there for three
months.
It is midafternoon and the Cambodian bat-
talion has scattered to sleep among the
charred remains of shops and homes. The pro-
prietor of a soft drink cart seems to be doing
a booming business selling limeade to the
troops, but he says he is scared and plans
to leave.
Between attacks the Vietcong send small pa-
trols to snipe at the Cambodian troops, most of
whom are barefoot. The Cambodians also send
out occasional patrols, but they never venture
farther than two kilometers from Saang. The
schoolteacher major seems perplexed when
asked why his troops don't venture one kilome-
ter farther to harass the enemy. "We are wait-
ing for heavy rains so the countryside will
flood. Then perhaps the Vietcong will move to
high ground, and maybe we can find some
-boats and attack them," he finally replies.
While he talks, a chicken nuns Across his feet.
It is by far the most animated creature in
Saang.
Saang notwithstanding, the Cambodian
army is starting to fight, better. Observers here,
are Impressed with the personal courage of
Cambodian soldiers, willing to go into battle
with ancient weapons, inadequate ammunition
and negligible training against experienced
'Communist troops, with superior firepower.
Many Cambodian retreats have been incon-
testable cases of discretion being the better
part of valor.
The Cambodian army is greatly expanded
-from 35,000 troops four months ago to about
150,000 now, though fewer than 100,000 have
any arms at all and fewer yet have anything
approaching military training: But, even at its
;best, the army Is fighting a defensive, urban-
ioriented war, trying to, prevent the enemy from
'occupying or harassing towns.
-Admirable Calmness?
Politically, the. Lon Nol government has dis-
played what diplomats consider s., suprising de-
gree of internal unity. The national crisis
seems to be keeping personal politicking at a
every low level, and the Phnom Penh rumor
-mill is devoid of coup scares. "The coup stage
will come later, after the colonels have won a
few battles," says one European envoy.
Some diplomats also credit the government
with admirable calmness In a situation where
many men might panic. Other analysts attrib-
ute the seeming composure to simple Cambo-
dian inertia. War or no war, government of
flees still close for the day by 2 p.m. and cabi-
net ministers are easily located in Phnom.
Penh's few good French restaurants after;
dark. , I
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CPYRGHT
In its relations with outside world, Cam-
bodia has displayed both sagacity and naivete.
It has wisely managed to maintain at least.the
pretense of neutrality by avoiding any formal
military alliances with its South Vietnamese
and That neighbors.
The Cambodians, however, have been wildly
over-optimistic in their expectations of Ameri-
can military assistance. To date the U.S. has
provided only captured Communist weapons
and $8.9 million worth of radios, trucks, car-
bines and other modest equipment. The U.S.
presence in Phnom Penh is still so "low pro-;
file" that there is no American ambassador,
and a senior member of the American mission
travels by pedicab from the tiny hotel room
where he lives to the cramped little office
where he works.
The U.S. has been so tightfisted that when
two Cambodian ferryboats were sunk by the
Vietcong and later raised through American ef-
forts, they were towed off to South Vietnam.
The ferries sat in South Vietnam for nearly two
months because some U.S. Navy officials there
hoped to trade them back to the Cambodians
for an American river patrol boat that the
Cambodians had captured inside Cambodia
during the Sihanouk days. The total value of
the river patrol boat, Which the Cambodians
presumably need more than the Americans
anyway, is less than ;50,000. Yet for two
months Cambodian military and civilian traffic
was hampered by lack of ferries on the Mekong
River. The ferries finally were returned late
last month and the Cambodians, it seems, will
get to keep the patrol boat-the only one in
their navy.
American pennypinching is difficult for the
Cambodians to comprehend, particularly when
they look at U.S. extravagance in Vietnam,
where $8.9 million can be expended on artillery
shells and bombs in a single day. Cambodian
officials who had expected American bases and
combat troops and a cornucopian outpouring of
airplanes, helicopters and other wondrous
'weaponry, now find themselves being turned
'down on a request for 100,000 ponchos to keep
their troops covered in the monsoon rains.: ,
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EwiiDy September 1970
MIDEAST CEASEFIRE
A ceasefire between the UAR and Israel became effective at 2200
GMT, 7 August 1970. An integral part of the ceasefire on the UAR-
Israeli front is a military standstill to be effective 50 kilometers
wide on each side of the ceasefire line. This arrangement was made
only for the Israel/UAR front because the LIAR was the only country to
repudiate the ceasefire resolutions of 1967; therefore the Suez
Canal represents the main military front. On the Jordanian and Syrian
fronts the 1967 ceasefire agreements still apply; these agreements have
not been renounced by Syria and Jordan.
Subsequent to the announcement of the ceasefire U Thant reacti-
vated the mission of UN Special Representative Gunnar Jarring to work
for a peace settlement under UN Security Council Resolution 242, dated
22 November 1967. Jarring, at this writing, is consulting with the
UAR, Jordan and Israel to initiate political talks. The principles
of the UN Security Council resolution are: Israeli withdrawal from
occupied Arab territories; the right of Israel and other countries of
the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;
freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
a just settlement of the refugee problem; and a guarantee of terr-
torial inviolability.
An irritant to the ceasefire and to political talks will be the
activities of the 'fedayeen'. The 'fedayeen' do not want peace, they
do not seek peace and to them the idea of a ceasefire is anathema;
their aim is to destroy Israel. Nonetheless, in spite of their
capabilities for raids and harassment they have no political base
and there is some reason to believe Arab governments may ignore
military actions between them and Israelis as long as Arab interest
in maintaining the ceasefire continues. Nasir has deprived Palestinian
organizations in Cairo of radio frequencies and broadcast facilities.
Nasir's foreign policy publicist Mohammad Heykal, editor of Al-At-hram,
in his influential Friday column on 7 April, wrote that the Palestinian
organizations could not possibly liberate Palestine "from the river
to the sea." Heykal discredited the comparison often made between the
Palestinian and Algerian situations and said that liberation was
possible in Algeria, but was not possible in Palestine.
Iraq opposes the ceasefire. Iraq opposes the LIAR policy of
acceptance of the ceasefire. The USSR has failed to change the
Iraqi attitude. Historically, Iraq has always opposed Israel and,
technically, has been at war with Israel since the first Arab-
Israeli war. Iraq has no common border with Israel and Baghdad is
600 miles from Tel Aviv. Syria has given lip service to opposing
the ceasefire but has privately let it be known that it will support
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the UAR position.
Gunnar Jarring is trying to bring Israel and Egypt to a meeting
place; Israel wants the talks to be conducted by Foreign Ministers and
has suggested Cyprus as the conference site. Jordan and Egypt want
negotiations to start at a lower level, an Ambassadorial level with
New York as the site and with the option of upping the level of partic-
ipation to include Foreign Ministers who will likely be in New York
for the UN General Assembly beginning 15 September.
21 September is the half-way point of the ceasefire period.
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Distinguishing the Palestinian Commando Organizations
All Palestinian commando organizations have the same basic aims:
(a) the regaining of all of Palestine, including present-day Israel, and
the establishment of a Palestine state which would include Muslims, Christ-
ians, and Jews; and (b) the rejection of a peaceful solution of the Arab-
Israeli impasse, and the use of armed force as the chief weapon against
Israel.
The Major Palestinian Organizations:
1. The Palestine Liberation Movement (Fatah), the largest commando
organization, has no special allegiance to any particular state or political
party. In contrast, other major commando groups are sponsored by either an
Arab government or a political party (sometimes both).
2. The nucleus of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP) comes from the George Habbash wing of the leftist Arab Nationalist
Movement (ANM). The ANM's more extreme Marxist-Leninist faction, led by
Nayif Hawatmah, controls the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PDFLP).
3. The Vanguard of the Popular Liberation War and its military arm, al-
Saiga, are sponsored and controlled by the Syrian Government and the Syrian
Ba'th Party.
4.' The Arab Liberation Front (ALF) was created by the Iraqi Government
and the Iraqi Bath Party.
5. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was founded in 1964 by
the Arab Summit conference as a quasi-governmental organization. It has a
regular army of its own, the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), and a commando
unit, the Popular Liberation Forces, which was formed after the-1967 Arab-
Israeli war.
In February 1969, after al Fatah succeeded in taking over its control,
the PLO began to function as an umbrella for the various commando organiza-
tions and other Palestinian groups. Its Palestine Armed Struggle Command
(PASC) coordinates the release of information concerning fedayeen commando
operations, and is also to coordinate_their military activities. PASC now
includes eight commando organizations. The PFLP is the only.major fedayeen
group which has not yet joined and which still continues to operate inde-
pendently of PASC. Efforts are being made to bring PFLP into both the PLO
and PASC, but so far no agreement has been reached..
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Differences between the Commandos:
1. Party affiliations and sponsorship.
Arab governments sponsoring commando groups have tended to give their
time and effort to their own rather than to Fatah and other groups. They
have also'been suspicious of commandos sponsored by a rival government or
political party and have at. times deported them or curtailed their activities.
2. Nature of cooperation.
Disagreements have arisen over reorganizing the PLO and over representa-
tion,in that body. Fatah favors proportional representation, depending on
the size of the commando organization, and is against equal votes for each
commando group because t)ie,small groups could then paralyze action with their
veto.
3. Smaller vs. larger groups.
Fatah is against the formation of smaller groups because it feels that
these are being used to'sap the energy of the, bigger organizations. In con-
trast, the small commando groups feel that they serve a useful purpose and
reflect differences of opinion.
4. Class struggle.
Most commando groups consider themselves representative of progressive
national liberation movements. The PDFLP believes that the commandos should
only include the workers and peasants because of the collusion between im-
perialism and the big bourgeoisie. Fatah believes that this class limitation
would weaken the movement and that Marx?s class breakdown is not applicable
to the Palestinian situation anyway.
5. Palestinian vs. Pan-Arab movement.
Some groups such as the ALF emphasize the Pan-Arab nature of the struggle.
Others such as Fatah consider the conflict as primarily a Palestinian one
linked with the Arab revolution.
6. PFLP strategy.
Although the commandos sympathize with any attacks against Zionist, im-
perialist, and Israeli interests, only the PFLP has engaged in terrorism
against these targets abroad. Fatah has registered its opposition to those
activities, and at this time the PFLP is alone among the commando groups in
undertaking them.
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Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt
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Y
September 6
- 10
Lusaka, Zambia
September 7
- 17
Fontana, Wisconsin
September 11
Peking
September 15
New York City
September 25
- 27
Belgrade
September 28
-
October 1
Varna, Bulgaria
October 1
Peking
October 3
Paris
September 1970
Non-aligned Nations Conference; organized.
at last session of UN General Assembly
to determine, prior to UNGA session in
September, common positions among non-
aligned states on world.issues. Last
such meeting was in 1964.
Annual Pugwash International Conference
Brings together scientists from East
and West.
to cool tensions between two-communist
countries. Agreement was reached to
begin talks on settling border problems
but after a year of intermittent and
desultory meetings no solutions have
been found.
One year ago Premiers Kosygin and Chou
En lai met at Peking airport in attempt
UN General Assembly convenes. This
will be 25th session. Celebrations on
25th anniversary will be held 14 - 24
October. About 50 heads of State or
Prime Ministers will attend, including
Nixon, Kosygin, and Heath.
Arab-European Seminar on Middle East,
sponsored by communist World. Federation. of
Trade Unions.
Executive Council meeting of communist
World Federation of Scientific Workers.
2nd International Conference on Problems
of Young Workers, sponsored by communist
World Federation of Trade Unions.
Peoples Republic of China National Day.
Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). Founded
25th anniversary of the Founding of World
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in 19+5 as an organization for international
labor cooperation, it was subverted by the
communist members who took complete control
in 19+9 and turned the WFTU into an instru-
ment of Soviet foreign policy. The non-
communist members withdrew and formed the
International Conferoftce of Free Trade
Unions.
October 10 Taipei, Taiwan Republic of China National Day.
October 16 - 18 New Delhi Presidential Committee meeting of the
communist World Council of Peace.
October 19 Japan Anniversary of the signing of a protocol
in 1956 by the USSR and Japan ending
the state of war. The protocol, signed
in lieu of a peace treaty, left hanging
the question of the Kuril Islands which
the USSR seized in the closing days of
World War II and now refuses to return.
a ove or ease 1-999/09702 : 1 4
 CPYRGHT
.$ CYPRUS = -
LEBAN
ISRAEL
POPULATION: 2,900,000
Tel Aviv
SUEZ CANAL Jerusalem
Alexandria-.
E111IC1 IN EGYJ
SICLUDING
IN
EW=
a w
Red Sea
ARMED FORCES:
(Combatants in
1967 war)
ISRAEL 290,000
EGYPT 185,000
IRAQ 70,000
SYRIA 60,000
JORDAN 57,000
AIR FORCES:
ISRAEL 350 COMBAT AIRCRAFT,
800 FULLY QUALIFIED PILOTS
EGYPT 400 COMBAT AIRCRAFT,
50 FULLY QUALIFIED PILOTS
IRAQ 200 COMBAT AIRCRAFT
SYRIA 145 COMBAT AIRCRAFT
JORDAN 36 COMBAT AIRCRAFT
PALESTINIAN POPULATION:
OCCUPIED GAZA STRIP 307,824
OCCUPIED JORDAN 269,065
JORDAN (EAST BANK) 478,369
SYRIA 151,730
LEBANON 168,9427
Baghdad 0
IRAQ
Aft
,. Dhahran
Gulf o t Ade
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Mideast: Arms, Oil
USSIAN naval strength in the eastern Mediterranean area now
Rrivals America's. The Soviets have an estimated 8,000 advisers
and technicians in Egypt, including about 100 pilots and an unknown
number of missile specialists. Soviet surface-to-air (SAM) missiles
protect Cairo, Alexandria, and the Aswan High Dam. Israel retains
clear air superiority but that advantage could be reduced if the
Russians step up training of Egyptian pilots. Only about 3 per cent of
America's oil comes from the Middle East and North Africa but the
area supplies over 80 per cent of Western Europe's oil, and almost
all of Japan's.
Persian Gulf
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September 1970
THE COMMUNIST SCENE
(18 July - 21 August 1970)
The Communist Dilemma in the Non-Communist World
A Communist party which sets out on the parliamentary road to
power may have to repudiate the Soviet Union in order to prove its
own independence. To do so is to risk loss of Soviet support,
guidance, and funds. To build a democratic, vote-getting image, a
national Party may have to open a small crack in the Party to dissent.
Yet no Communist party could long survive real debate. So compromise
is inevitable. How the Japanese, French, and Italian Communist
parties are faring in this dilemma is described below (see also the
attached press materials on these parties).
Japanese Communism's Seductive New Look
"In a country like Japan, where the parliamentary
system is established... it is preferable to rely
on peaceful and democratic means, through parlia-
ment, to establish a democratic government by
gaining the support of the majority of the people
".... It Editorial from Akahata, organ of the
Japanese Communist Party (JCP).
In support of this new look, Japan's small but growing Communist
Party held the first "open" Party Congress in history from 1-7 July.
Unaccustomed as the newly proclaimed "friendly party" was to a really
open meeting, it showed the public and press a picture of disciplined
unanimity and sterile self-criticism which scarcely enhanced its
democratic image. To support its new and "forward looking" attitudes,
it has condemned the extremist leftwing students, announced that
opposition parties would be permitted to function in a Communist
Japan, and demanded that the USSR return the South Kurile Islands to
Japan.
The latter demand is consistent with their calculated and
politically strategic independence from both Soviet and Chinese
Communist parties. The long-standing rift with Soviets, although
exacerbated by the Soviet takeover of Czechoslovakia, has no moral
or ideological basis. The JCP denounces the CPSU primarily for
supporting a dissident Japanese Party faction expelled some seven
years ago. On the eve of the recent 11th JCP Congress the Soviet
magazine Party Life accused the JCP of plotting to form a third
force in the international Communist movement and, worse than that,
of supporting Chinese efforts to split the movement. (The Akahata
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reply of 29 June is attached.) The JCP, however, has also attacked
Mao and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for "ultraleft opportunism"
because the CCP also supports a dissident Japanese faction, one
whose sympathy for militant students and urban guerrilla tactics
clashes with the JCP's new image.
This independent stance (without diminution of JCP participation
in international Communism) and their lip service to bourgeois freedoms
of speech and assembly may have been factors helping to increase the
JCP's Diet representation nearly threefold in December 1969 elections
and in raising membership figures to make the Japanese among the three
largest CP's in the non-Communist world.
Schizophrenia in the Italian Communist Party
"Tell the Italian Communist Party to reject the
role of an agent of foreign Communism and try
sincerely to construct an Italian socialism,
Italian in all its aspects." Josef Smrkovsky,
Czech parliamentary leader under Dubcek, in Il
Resto del Carlino, Bologna, 30 June 1970.
Within the largest of all non-ruling Parties are two serious
splits which prompt the PCI to play both sides of the political
street. The first split is between those habitually loyal to the
Kremlin and those who recognize the political necessities of the
Italian political scene. The second is between the "internationalist"
group of the Party under Luigi Longo and the Soviet-supported
right-wing group plotting to succeed the aging leader. On the one
hand Italian Communists have repeatedly defended "national roads"
to socialism and have called for autonomy for all. Consequently they
have also denounced the Soviet takeover of Czechoslovakia--that
touchstone of loyalty to Moscow--deplored Dubcek's ouster, and continued
a polemical exchange with the present Czech regime. Their words
no doubt strengthen their appearance as an autonomous Party which is
occasionally tested by other Italian parties as a possible coali-
tion partner. On the other hand, the PCI retains close ties to
Moscow, has not rejected the consequences of the Brezhnev doctrine,
has ousted its Il Manifesto group of Moscow-baiters, retains numbers
of old line Stalinists in its middle ranks, continues to depend on
t'he.CPSU for financial support and is occasionally caught doing the
Soviets' subversive business (the arrest of an Italian courier in
Venezuela a few years ago revealed PCI funding of Latin American
CP's for the Soviet Union).
This "democratic, independent" PCI has recently hinted that it
may consider a coalition offer but its self-proclaimed strength with
the voters may have been somewhat damaged in the 7-8 June elections.
They scarcely maintained their 1968 voting strength of 28%. The
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Party's failure to divorce itself from Moscow may have helped to hold
down the vote. Their hypocrisy may underlie the trend of decreasing
numbers of members (down 640,000 since 1954) who are increasing in age
(only 20% are now under 30).
A Torpid'Fench Communist Party Clings to Moscow
"In the Communist Party, the only democracy is
that of the wringer." Charles Tillon, life-long
French Communist.
The stagnant French Communist Party (PCF), losing trade union
control, unable to increase its strength at the polls, and desperate
for a political alliance with which to face the 1970 Spring elections,
shows the great strain of the need to appear to be everything it is
not. Subservient to Soviet policy since its founding, the February
Party Congress rejected the principle of national roads to socialism
and upheld the USSR as the only Communist model. The Stalinist
nature of the French Party is the very reason why the social democrats,
whom the PCF is wooing, have consistently refused the overtures.
Two prominent French Communists are making the suit even more difficult.
Roger Garaudy, long a critic of the PCF leadership, and now
expelled from the Party, forced the PCF into publishing notes of a
1968 conversation between PCF leader Waldeck Rochet and Dubcek in
which the former expressed his disapproval -- echoing the Kremlin's --
of press 'freedom and of the revival of the social democratic party
which Dubcek permitted. These were damaging words at a time of
negotiation with French social democrats. Garaudy relentlessly
continues his attacks on the PCF, challenging them to denounce the
Soviet rape of Czechoslovakia. In June Charles Tillon, former
freedom fighter and former cabinet minister, unable to stomach his
Party's submission to Soviet diktat any longer, spoke out publicly
on the same issue. Tillon agrees with Garaudy that PCF silence on
Czechoslovakia denotes complicity rather than "noninterference.'.'
By July the Party reacted in standard Communist fashion for treating
the unanswerable critic: they again revealed their "democratic"
procedures by ousting the 73-year old Tillon from the Party.
Despite the furor over these public challenges, the PCF was still
unmoved in late summer, permitting only one brief comment that they
did not approve all that was happening in Czechoslovakia. To concede
more to their own heretics -- even for eventual gain -- may be too
bitter a pill. And the risk of losing Moscow's support for the
multitudinous French Communist fronts and activities may still seem
too great.
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THE "PRAGUE CRISES" OF WESTERN COMMUNISM
By Arnold Kuenzli
Frankfurter Rundschau (Frankfurt Review), Frankfurt/Main,
December 1969, 2 January 1970
Controversy Constitutes an Ordeal --;Neo-Stalinism Has The Parties
in a Schizophrenic Position
Editor's Note:
"Western communism is in crisis. Since the invasion of
Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact troops there is growing criticism of
the methods of the Soviet Union. In many countries, new groups
are forming within the communist parties, or seceding. On the
other hand,opposition members are barred from party membership.
Our correspondent Arnold Kuenzli reports in a series of three
articles on extent and significance of this crisis."
The intervention by the Warsaw Pact countries in Czechoslovakia
dictated by the Soviet Union has produced a series of shocks in
the European communist parties which resemble a permanent crisis
the consequences of which cannot yet be estimated. This crisis
is the more dangerous to those concerned because they are already
in the process of losing their identity as revolutionary Marxist
parties due to their loss of revolutionary momentum and because.
_
of their drifting toward the democratic parliamentary system in
the sense of "social democratization." The neo-Stalinism practiced
by the present Soviet leadership has practically maneuvered these
parties into a schizophrenic position.
Whereas they lean at the national level more and more toward
democracy, parliamentarism, multi-party system, and'political
pluralism -- like the Italian Communist Party in particular --
at the international level they still cultivate unwavering
loyalty to an increasingly neo-Stalinist Soviet Union whose
intervention in Czechoslovakia they had officially condemned.
And this schizophrenia does not only threaten the party, but also
the Marxist mdvemont es suc}h. Ernest Mandel, for instance, --
possibly the smartest Trotzkyite to be found today -- in an address
at Basle recently condemned the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia
as a crime, but that did not keep him from continuing to address
the authors of this crime as '"comrades." According to the rules
of logic he should really have been'referring to 'comrade criminal'
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At least four major factions may presently be distinguished
within the communist movement with respect to Soviet moves in
connection with the 21 August 1968 in Prague. The first faction,
which includes primarily the old party cadres of long standing
but also some of the older party members, as always considers
the Soviet Union the praised fatherland of the workers.which to
criticize would be the same as betraying socialism. The second
faction is represented by the party leadership and consequently is
for the time being the official party line. The latter is character-
ized by a hodge-podge of more or less unmistakable criticism of the
intervention in Czechoslovakia and of unconditionally sticking to
the friendship with the Soviet Union and to the close action
alliance with the Soviet bloc.
The third faction is represented, above all, by prominent
party intellectuals like the Frenchman Roger Garaudy. They do
not merely criticize intervention in Czechoslovakia_ as such,
but they also point to the neo-Stalinist roots'of this intervention
and demand a radical theoretical overhaul of Marxism which ought
to be finally adapted to the 20th century without, however, completely
breaking with the Soviet Union which they still see as the light
of hope for socialism even though it may be temporarily hidden.
The fourth faction finally -- disregarding the China of Mao
-- is primarily at home in Yugoslavia, but is also represented in
Western Europe by individual intellectuals such as the Austrian
Ernst Fischer and by the Italians Rossanda, Pintor, and Natoli.
To them, the Soviet system is not even socialism anymore, but
rather -- in the words of Yugoslav Aleksandar Sekulovid -- a form
of medieval "popism" which exploits the workers even worse and grants
them even less rights than capitalism.
At the present time, there is fierce controversy between
these various factions in almost all West European parties that
almost.approaches an ordeal.: In France, this controversy is,
focused . on the person of politburo member Roger Garaudy who,
himself a former Stalinist, as a professor of philosophy is one
of the most prominent Marxist theoreticians. in Europe, who has
for years fought for "modernization" of Marxism, who is one of
the initiators of the dialog between Marxism and existentialism
and above all of the dialog between Marxism and Christianity, and
who is equally well familiar with practice owing to the long time
he spent in the Soviet Union and in Cuba.
Garaudy's criticism of the dogmatist perversion of socialism
is relentless. His book.on Marxism in the 20th Century closes with
the sentences, "There is a Buddhist proverb that warns us against
this dogratist temptation,'When the finger points to the moon, the
fool will contemplate the finger."' But the present controversy
was primarily started by an interview Garaudy granted the
Yugoslav.party organ Komunist, which the latter printed on
4 September 1969.
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In this interview, Garaudy said the socialist world movement,
was in a crisis, and not just solely because of the Sino,-Soviet
arguments. This crisis, he said, had first of all become evident
at the Moscow conference of the communist parties in June of 1969
because the partial agreement reached there had been possible only
because all important problems -- namely China, Czechoslovakia, and
the. different approaches to socialism -- had been swept under'the
rug.
That there is so much stagnation in socialist thinking today
was first of all due to having failed to analyze the situation in
the capitalist countries. The Moscow document talks in almost
ritual form about the inconsistencies in the capitalist world,
without pointing out, however, that these inconsistencies are
no longer those of the 19th century, but rather new kinds of in-
consistencies. These new inconsistencies are not being considered
and are not being analyzed, particularly not those brought about
by the new scientific-technical revolution. Neither are the structural
changes being analyzed in the working class, in the relation of
production and markets, or in the increasing importance of science
for the development of production. If all this were to be treated
as superficially as in the Moscow document of June 1969, one is
bound to get the impression that socialist thinking is affected
by sclerosis.
But the same type of stagnation prevails with respect to
analysis of the socialist world. The Moscow document confirms a
tendency to deny the existence of dissension in the socialist camp.
The "spring of Prague" had been an attempt by the. Czechoslovak
Communist Party in a developed country to construct and implement
a model of socialism in accord with the scientific-technical
revolution. The revolutionary forces in the world today are
stronger than ever, but these forces are in vast areas outpacing
the existing communist parties. In Latin America and in Africa
there are national liberation movements which are partly inspired
by socialist ideas, but without there being any Marxist parties.
He had been particularly shocked, however, by the fact that
on the occasion of the anniversary of the intervention in
Czechoslovakia both Prague and Moscow had blamed all difficulties
on some sort of imperialist plot. He would certainly not deny
the presence of counter-revolutionary forces in Czechoslovakia,
but it would be overlooking the real problems if all difficulties
were to be blamed on some imperialist conspiracy. Such an attitude
would resemble that of President Nixon who blamed all demonstrations
against Rockerfeller whom he sent as an envoy to Latin America
on a handful of students. "This reminds me of the time in France
when the capitalist press and the bourgeois press was after each
strike searching for 'some hidden conductor.of.the orchestra'."
At the October meeting of the central committee of the French
Communist Party, Party Secretary Waldeck..Rochet subsequently used
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this Garaudy interview as pretext for a whitewashing job. Garaudy
-= who at the meeting was given a chance to defend his opinion he said had used the events in Czechoslovakia "to promote anti-
Sovietism and to foster the opportunist factions." Although the
French Communist Party had expressed its disagreement with the
intervention in Czechoslovakia, it had in the same resolution called
for firmly combating the anti-Soviet campaign, and it had resolved
"to continue and intensify its efforts to maintain and strengthen
the bonds of solidarity with the brother parties and particularly
with the Soviet Union."
Disagreement on a particular question should never be allowed
to raise any doubts in the fundamental solidarity in the fight against
the common imperialist enemy. "By contrast, if Garaudy's attitude
were to be followed, it would lead-to intensification of the dissension
in the international communist movement, and to weakening of the
international communist movement as'well as to division of our party
. .." The Communist Party of the Soviet Union on.an international
scale is the crucial force in the fight against imperialism and in
,the fight for socialism. Garaudy, he said, was systematically continu-1
ing to confuse the question of the approaches to attaining of socialism
with the concept of the "model" socialism.
Use of the term "model would open the door to all kinds of
interpretations, including rejection of the general laws of socialism."
Finally, Garaudy were violating the principle of "democratic centralism"
and therefore was also in disagreement with the central committee,.
f
i
on o
on the question of the role of the party and in the quest
rinciples of the party. In this manner
nal
ti
i
p
o
za
the organ
wered" Garaudy's doubtlessly justified
"
i
ans
n
Waldeck Rocket aga
criticism in the long familiar.neo-Stalinist jargon. To him the;
world is still ma nichaeistically divided into good and bad,which.
is a pleasantly simple situation. Whoever does not support one.,
side, must be.supporting the other side or at least play into
its hands,
It was in this very manner that all of Stalin's crimes
d to be accepted or made into fabrications by the bad; and
use
thus the intervention in Czechoslovakia becomes a minor error
which might lead to some differences of opinion in the camp of
the good, but which would never be reason for fundamental reappraisal.
so far
event
n
I
,
y
n a
When the finger points to the moon, ....
no serious "administrative steps" have been initiated against
Garaudy who himself certainly does not in any way advocate a
break with the Soviet Union. So far Waldeck Rochet let the matter
that
h
ope
rest with a warning, "in the name of the politburo I
fend
ill d
e
Garaudy will change his. attitude, that -is,?that he w
the policy of the party.$0
-7 Ow
9(MMUM-01 000400050001-7
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fighting the Authoritarian Spirit in the Party -- Manifesto Group
Wants to Reform the Italian Cotmunist Party -- Mao Ts Cultural
Revolution to be the Model
The Italian Communist Party stands out in international
communism for two reasons: in terms of membership it is the largest
of the communist parties in the world that are not in power, and
with the possible exception of the Swedish Communist Party it is
the most democratic party both with respect to its internal
structure and its political program. It has abandoned the program
of revolutionary takeover with subsequent one-party dictatorship
in favor of a theory which is committed to radical structural
changes, and which aims at establishment of a coalition of all
forces that are considered progressive, including left-wing Catholics..
It has wholly condemned the Soviet intervention in
Czechoslovakia; but like the French Communist Party it nevertheless
still considers the Soviet Union the most important. ally in the fight
of international communism, and it has no intention of breaking with
this ally but merely wants to maintain its autonomy.
This policy has now come under serious attack from a group
which formed around the pape l 11 Manifesto and which is headed by
the three prominent party members Rosan a, Natoli, and Pintor. Thee
spiritual head'of this group is Rossana Rosanda, an equally smart'
and energetic lady who during the past 20 years has made a name for
herself internationally as the leading ideologist of the Italian
Communist Party. Merely the fact that Rossana Rosanda has now
assumed the role of chief partisan in the fight:against the party,
establishment indicates the seriousness of the crisis that grasps
the Italian Communist Party.
In its opposition against the course of the party, the
manifesto group is incommensurably more radical than. for instance,
Roger Garaudy in his party. This group would like to re-commit
the Italian Communist Party to a radical revolutionary course
in domestic and foreign policy, and to transform it into a
"new party" through a cultural revolution within the party. It
fights against authoritarianism in the party and demands a "group
dialectic" which would do away with the existing so-called democratic
centralism that is fashioned after the party model of Lenin, and
which would allow truly dialectic interplay of the opposing forces.
This is supposed to be instigated by openly demanded insubordination
and disobedience by the party membership. This then means the
manifesto group takes a similar attitude toward the party. establish-
ment as some radical student groups take toward the establishment of
their universities. They are obviously guided.by the idea of
the cultural revolution that Mao Tse-tung himself used to destroy
his own rusty party machine,in order to revive the revolutionary
zeal in the party.
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Possibly even more drastic are the foreign policy demands
of the group, for it plans on no more and no less than ouster
of the existing governments in the Soviet Union and in the Soviet bloc. It calls for the Italian Communist Party to break with the
party and the government of the Soviet Union which in the opinion
of the group have betrayed the revolution. The group demands
"formation of a left-wing, revolutionary alternative within the
social' t camp," and "defeat and replacement of the leading groups
in the fSSR and in other socialist countries by the initiative
of a new bloc of social forces under the leadership of the working
class." Here again the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia.
furnished the deciding motive for the formulation of these extremist
demands. In the opinion of this group, the revolution in the
European East can, if at all, be saved only if the revolutionary
process in the West is intensified and-accelerated, and when the
West in 'this'`manner helps initiate the ouster of the leading groups
in the East.
Since the manifesto group began to draw more and more support
from the party membership and primarily from the youth, the party
had to react, even more so because Rossana Rosanda,.Natoli and Pintor
were members of the central committee. The central. committee ordered
a control commission that had been especially established for this
purpose, to investigate the activities of.the Manifesto group. The
three cultural,revolutionaries.were given an opportunity to defend,
their opinions before the control commission. Toward the end of
October the report prepared by this control commission was then
submitted to the central committee which took several days to
'discuss the report, and which finally ratified the report --
against the votes of the three villains,with Chiarante, Luporini
and Lombardo-Radice abstaining..(Luporini and Lombardo-Radice advocate
an enliihtened, democratic Marxism and are prominently involved in
the international dialog between Marxists and christians).
The control commission report submitted to the central
committee by chairman Alessandro Natta in its basic political
attitude is largely identical to the stand taken by French party ! :
secretary Waldeck Rochet in his controversy with Roger Garaudy.
Natta denounced the policy of the manifesto group as being
reckless, futile, and impotent, saying it did not constitute a
critical, scientific contribution to the reality of the socialist
countries. This policy would isolate the Italian Communist Party
from the Soviet Union and from other socialist countries, and this
would also mean isolating it "from the anti-imperialist fight of
the Vietnamese people, and of the people of Asia, Africa, and
of the Near East, because it is just this relation to the USSR
s:
and to'the socialist countries that is the key to this fight." It
would."largely destroy the unity of the party.!' Therefore, anti-
Sovietism in any form or shape should be rejected. In fact, what
was involved in the group's criticism was not "criticism from the
left," because it "did not in any manner differ from the positions
of the right firing, that is, of ultra-social democraty."
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Enrico.Berlinguer, the "crown prince" of thetparty, on a
conciliatory note subsequently sought to leave the door open for
the manifesto group. He assured there was no desire to proceed with
administrative measures against the group but ratheir in the contro-
versy with the group "to see the most democratic way through to the
end." A gesture of obedience would not be required! nor would.
silence, but the controversy would have to remain within the party,
and there was.a limit to forming factions that.shoild not be exceeded.
He finally charged the group's call for breaking with the socialist
countries were "tantamount to dragging the heritagb of the October.
revolution through the mud."
We will not explore any further in how far the unshakeable
,pro-Soviet attitude of the western communist parties is a result
of their financial dependence on Moscow (just one ekample: in Austria,
-Moscow has aa~ubstantial financial interest, in the, ubl.ishing house
and in the press which publish all publications. of the Austrian-
Communist `Party). Berlinguer's stand makes clear that taking
this pro-Soviet attitude at its ideological face value is tanta-
mount to equating the goals of the Russian October revolution --
which claimed Marx as basis -- with the present Soviet system.
But this is precisely what the growing opposition within
the western communist parties contests; in the eye:; of this op-
position, the present leadership in the Soviet Union has'so
obviously betrayed the goals and the spirit of the October
revolution and of Marxism (even Trotzky had already written of
a "betrayed revolution") that a break with these traitors ought
to be made for the sake of these goals and for the sake of this
spirit, particularly after the intervention in Czechoslovakia and
the developments there since then. To accuse instead the
opposition of treason would be the same as hitting the barometer
because it indicates bad weather.
The mediation efforts of Berlinguer were not to be successful.
The manifesto group stuck strictly to its view, and the party in
its bad predicament did resort to disciplinary measures after all:
the three cultural revolutionaries were first expelled from the
central committee, and finally also from the party. It is not
yet possible to say what further course this crisis may take, but
there is every indication that this expulsion, which was already
followed by further expulsions, intensified the crisis even more.
The Controvers Over the Character and Function of Moscow --
Fisc er s?Revolt Against Uni orme Dogmatism opposition
In Sweden and in Japan
The regime of the Soviet Union is "tyranny to which the
working class is subjected by a bureaucratic.bourgeo:Lsie of
fascist character." The man who said this -- in the presence of
Soviet delegates who thereupon left the auditorium in protest --
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was a spokesman of the youth organization of the Swedish Communist
Party. This incident -- and it was not the only one -- occurred
in September 1969 at the 22nd Party Congress,,of the`Swedish
Communist Party.
C. H. Hermansson, chairman of the Swedish party, in recent
years went further than any other communist leader in the matter
of the party moving toward democratic-parliamentary methods.
He went as far as declaring publicly that his party if it should
come into power through elections, would in democratic manner go
back into opposition in case it should as,a government party be'
defeated in subsequent elections.
This policy is opposed on the one hand by a hard core of
old Stalinists, and on the other hand by communist youth who --
similar to the "manifesto group" in Italy -- rejects both the
Soviet system and the policy of "growing into the capitalist system"
of its own party. But even Hermansson could not make himself
immune against the schizophrenia.of on the one side in domestic
policy supporting the parliamentary system and on the other side'
continuing to promote the cause of unconditional solidarity with
the Soviet Union despite all outright' criticism of the intervention
in Czechoslovakia.
At the party congress he declared, for instance, ""solidarity;
with the people of the socialist countries to our party has always,
been something that was self-understood. It still is a matter
that goes without saying. Developments in the international
f
our
situation havebrought some complications in the form o
relations to these countries. Differences of opinion . . . have
become strongly evident." But "we do not wish to participate
in any manner in the anti-socialist propaganda that constantly
tries to discredit the socialist countries. Those who believe
that our party will howl with the wolves against the socialist
Equally disappointed will be
ointed
disa
ill b
i
.
pp
e
es w
countr
those who believe they can lead the party back to that period in,i
the past when some tried to replace clear and truthful analysis
with blinders and duplicity." The party will be "threatened by
consumption and decay unless we sharply improve our party work."
The party congress became quite turbulent because particu
larly the party youth did not mince any words. As a result,
past party secretary Bridjof Lager accused the party youth --
of anarchism, "the young anarchists are characterized by a
pronounced negativist attitude. They oppose everything that'is
proposed or said by responsible party sources. These young
delegates behaved like a bunch of sparrows . . .." The "official"
party.line'was finally adopted -- after renewed demands for
withdrawal of all foreign troops from Czechoslovakia -- but the
sharp internal conflicts persist.
Hardly anywhere has the drama of communist self-destruction
taken such irrational turns as in the Austrian Communist Party.
Ernst Fischer, an old friend of Dimitrov and Togliatti and the
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most prominent intellectual of the party who had faithfully served
the party during an eventful life. described with uncompromising
honesty in his fascinating recently published autobiography, was
after much hem and haw finally expelled from the Austrian Communist
Party. Since the famous Kafka Conference at Liblice Palace near
Prague, Fischer had been prominently involved in pr`bparations for
the "spring of Prague", and no communist condemned Soviet inter-
vention in Czechoslovakia as relentlessly as he did.
He declared on Austrian television that a dictate were
no agreement because there could be no agreement between wound
and knife. He called for formation of a new left in opposition
to the intolerant and monolithic old left, and said in answer
to questions put to him by the party arbitration commission charged:
with dealing with his "case", among other statements, "I have
frequently erred along with the party (when I thought of Stalin
as the legitimate successor of Lenin, when I defended the Moscow;
trials, when I opposed Tito, and so on). I may also be in error`.
inkopposition to the party; and I reserve this right. I will
never be prepared to accept the desolate conditions caused by
the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia as 'normalization.' The
anti-Semitism ordered and organized by the power machine in
Poland forced an exodus of Jews. I will, whenever and wherever
I can, contradict the lie that this anti-Semitism is due to
the existence of Isreal or due to a 'Zionist conspiracy', and
I will brand the methods practiced by the Polish power machine
as being fascist. There is nothing that is as revolting to the
young generation as uniformed dogmatism and ideology standing at
attention in strict formation. An intolerant machine only serves
self-satisfaction."
With a Kick in the Back
Fischer's friend Franz Marek, a highly intelligent man who
was heavily influenced by Antonio Gramsci, and who as chief editor
of the party journal Weg and Ziel had published the only really
alive and interesting German-language communist journal, was fired
with a kick in the back, without regard to his financial situation.
This had the result that the opposition now has established its
own paper called Wiener Tagebuch which now continues the tradition
that Marek established with Weg and Ziel in refreshingly unorthodox
manner and unfettered by party dictates.
Since youth in the Austrian Communist Party is also rebelling
against the,party machine, the latter has made preparations to
dissolve th youth organization of the party. About one-third of
the central committee is on Fischer's-and Marek's side, and the
already inconsequential party is threatened by.ruin. The'Wiener
Tagebuch has this to say on the matter, "Artists, in whose state
medals ne had exalted, are leaving the party; plant union leaders,
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who had been remarkably successful even in this years plant union
electionsfl are resigning their party functions; locals are closing
down; and most of the young activists are, in the true sense of
the word,.driven away -- but one continues unperturbed along the
course of the.Prague example."
The example of the Japanese Communist Party is highly
interesting by contrast. After the Italian party, this party
is the second largest of the communist parties in the world
that are not in power. During the past five years alone it.
raised its membership from 150,000 to 300,000. After Khrushchev
tried, with the support of a particularly pro-Soviet faction
within the party, to gain influence over the party itself,
the leadership of the Japanese Communist Party began'a "war on
two fronts" by dissociating itself both from the "modern
revisionism" of Moscow and from the "dogmatist factionalism"
of Peking. The intervention in Czechoslovakia was subsequently
instrumental in further worsening relations between the
Japanese Communist Party and Moscow. As a'result, and in contrasts
to the European communist parties, the.Japanese Communist Party
finally refused to participate in the June 1969 Moscow conference
of the communist-partieso
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WASHINGTON POST
19 August 1970
CPYRGHT
Cmninunist Party Emerging as
`H- ma :.' Challenge to Soviets, Chinese
By Vincent Buist
Reuters i
VIENNA,-THE emerg-
ence o e uonimunisL
Party of Japan as one of the
biggest non-ruling Commu-
nist parties in the world
confronts Eastern Europe
with a major new factor in
the world Communist move-
ment.
East European countries
like Romania and Yu ,osla-
via seeking some counters
to Soviet pressure tend to
look toward China. But Pe-
king's militant ideology is
not an ideal alternative for
East European Communist
parties which hope for in-
creased stability.
. The "Communism with a
human face" program now
adopted by the Japanese
Communist Party in the
long run will probably be
more acceptable 'to the neu-
tralist wing in Communist
Eastern Europe.
Japan's Communist Party
advocates freedom of
speech, assembly and reli-
gion. It has condemned both
Moscow and Peking for in-
terfering in the affairs of
other Communist parties
and for their big-power poli-
cies.
It defends national inter-
ests and would appear to
come closer, for example, to
the Romanian wish for sov-
ereignty, independence and
non-interference in relations
with other states and par-
ties.
Behind the Japanese Com-
munist Party and its grow-
ing; electoral success'looms
the economic potential of
Japan. Expert speculation
has projected Japan's eco-
nomic buoyancy into a time
toward the end of this cen-
tury when it may become
he world's second biggest
ndustrial power, far ahead
if China.
If the Japanese Commu-
ists continue to win sympa-
hizers, observers in Eastern
urope believe that the Jap-,
nose party will emerge
ater in this decade as a
hallenge to both the Sovitjt..
nd Chinese movements.
In any case, lthe Japanese
arty is already a considera-
le force in the divided
orld movement, and has
chieved a new position of
trength during the past few
ears.
Since 1966, party member-
hip has risen by 100,000 to
ell over 300,000.
In- elections last Decem
er, the Japanese party won
he backing of 3.2 million
oters-one million more
han in the January, 1967,
lection-and increased its
epresentation in the lower
ouse, of parliament from
our to 14 members.
This is still relatively
mall in a nation of 100 mi1-
ion with a 486-seattlcgisla-
ure, but it is significant as
art of an overall trend.
In Eastern Europe, the at-
cntion of the communist
ulers.has increasingly been
ocused on Asia. This is due
in part to an easing of Euro-
pean tensions, and in part to
China's new efforts to wild
friends and influence peo-
ple.
New and better East-West
relations are shaping up
under the determined drive
by west Germany to open
doors to Eastern Europe by
settling, frontier and related
problems still left over from
World War II.
JAPAN TIMES
10 July 1970
The 'Miyamoto' Communist Party
The 11t apan Communist Party Congress, which
ended a week-long session last Tuesday, saw Dir. Kenji
Miyamoto, the strong-armed leader, complete his takeover
of the party. Special Interest was also focussed on this
convention, which was last convened four years ago.
because It was widely publicized as being the first, ever to
'1e opened to the press and the public.
It had a significance also in the fact of its being held in
the opening months of the 1970s-which the Communists
have claimed will see a final showdown between the JCP
land the Liberal-Democratic Party. For this purpose the
Communists had promised allout efforts to build up a new
Image as the "friendly party."
Mr. Miyamoto himself was named to the newly created
post of the chairman of the presidium of the party's central
,committee. Mr. Sanzo Nosaka, the veteran JCP leader,
was selected for his fifth term as chairman of the central
committee, but Frignificantly, he has been dropped as a
member of the very organ of which he is the chairman.
This. Is one of the signs that Dir. Miyamoto has now taken
over full control of the Communist Party.
A surprise selection, though not wholly unexpected,
Was Mr. Tetsuzo Fuwa's emergence as the director of the
central committee secretariat. This is also a newly created
post which is equivalent to a secretary general in other
.parties: For Mr. Fuwa, a House, of Representatives mem-
ber, this Is a four-rank promotion over his seniors In the
,arty. But he Is a bright young man whom some journalists
`have already named "the prince of Yoyogi." He is naturally
'one of Mr. Dllyamoto's group of youthful proteges, many
.of whom have now advanced into the central committee.
With Dlr. Nosaka relegated to a position of figurehead and
with no other rival in sight, It is now clear the JCP Is the
?'Miyamoto" Communist Party.
It may be partly because of 'Mr. Miyamoto's confidence
tof being in complete control that the JCP Congress was
?'opnded" for the first time in its history. This may be con-
?sldered a remarkable "progress" for the Communists. But,
.of course, they had no other choice, since they wanted so
much to change their public image.
It should be noted, however, that the meeting was.
"open" In only a.limited sense. The party leadership's pro-
?ISosals and the comments of the delegates were made pub.
Ile. But the selection of? the officers and the reading of the
financial report and other matters which get at the core.
of the party operations were held in complete secrecy. It
would seem the JCP.s-till' has many things they dare not
1tjring out into the open.
The comments of the delegates also went no further
'than to recount past actlvltles and to Indulge In much eelf-
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criticism. Not one critical word was spoken against th
reports and resolutions of the central committee. The lac
,of even a single dissenting voice made for a sense 0
unreality at the public sessions.
. But then it should not be surprising that the leopar
cannot change its spots. Although it has expressed it
'desire to become a "friendly" party, the JCP has yet t
deny the possibility of its ultimate resort to armed and vi
lent revolution to set up a dictatorship of the proletariat
11r. Fuwa, the party's eloquent and rising theorist, ha
skirted around the issue by saying that "there has been n
example of an armed revolution taking place In a highl
developed capitalistic nation," and that the JCP wool
strive "to become the majority party in the Diet."
Yet, the party program still retains the statement tha
the final guarantee of liberation depends on the establish
ment of a proletariat dictatorship." Indeed, what prevent
the Communist leaders from coming right out to rejec
the resort to an armed revolution and the setting up of .
dictatorship of the proletariat? Is it because they wool
lose their raison d'etre? But unless they make the pledg
against a resort to an armed revolution, they cannot expec
popular support.
For the 1970s, the JCP goal Is said to be a growth whit
-will enable it to engage the LDP in a showdown battle fo
power. But in reaching that stage, the Communists see th
need of going through the interim process of setting up
?'United Front-Democratic Coalition Government," whit
would bring the parties of the left opposition togethe .
against the Liberal-Democrats. This grand coalition of th
]eft would naturally, as far as the JCP is concerned, b
under Communist domination, although the other partle
may have their own ideas. But it would be. presumed tha
the Communist plan would be that by the. latter part o
.the 1970s they would have absorbed their erstwhile coil
leagues to pave the way for the final confrontation with th
LDP.
The question which this prospect raises is what wil
happen after the Communists take over. They make n
mention of this, of course. But can we really trust th
Communist claim the JCP is now an "open" party believln
in such democratic processes as elections, parliament an
multipolitlcal parties? Mr. Miyamoto has said, "The impo
tant thing now Is tojjestablish a democratic coalition throug
the Diet and elections."' The "now" in his statement sound
ominous. We would say that the "friendly" image the JC
Js trying to sell is a sham. We say this because the "Miy
ntoto" Communist Party is putting on a soft-sell while stil
retaining every bit of its old-fashioned Marxist dogmas.
We must not' lose sight of the steel armor which lie
under the JCP camopflage. `
THE ECONOMIST,
London
11 July 19TO
CPYRGHT
Japan
Communism with
a democratic face
Japan's communist party is out to prove
that it is a communist party of a new
democratic breed. Last week, as the
first step in an image-building campaign,
the party opened the doors of its tradi-
tionally secret congress for the first time
in its 48-year history. The congress went
on to commit the party to seek power
by winning votes and to remain indepen-
dent of both Moscow and Peking.
The communists' vision of their role
in parliamentary politics could hardly
be faulted. They declared that they
government when they come to power
publication, association, assembly and
showed that their metamorphosis into
a new party constitution which will
tighten control over the party by an
expanded presidium and increase the
personal power of the party leader, Mr
Kenji Miyamoto. Mr Miyamoto
promised, however, that the stereotype
be changed ; he pointed to the selection
of a 49-year-old Tokyo University
graduate, Mr Tetsuzo Fuwa, for the new
post of party chief secretary as an
example of the new-style communist.
The party's decision to concentrate on.
election drives follows a 15-year
struggle to strengthen the party
organisation. Party membership has
estimated 300,000 and party finances
are reported to be in better shape than
ever before. With only 14 members
in the Diet, the party is still tiny in
parliamentary terms. But it won a
its representation in December's general
election and scored again in April when
the communist mayor of Kyoto was
The next important electoral test for
the communists will be in Tokyo next
April when the present socialist governor,
down with both socialist and communist
backing. Last week the communists
forces with the two more conservative
opposition parties, Komeito and the
campaign but they did not rule out
For all their revisionist approach to
domestic politics, the Japanese com-
munists have some revolutionary friends
abroad. The North Vietnamese and
North Korean communist parties both
planned to send observers to the Tokyo
government. The Japanese communists
. are still. feuding with Russia after a
break some seven years ago, mainly
'because Moscow continues to support a
during the cultural revolution and have
that he hopes for a return to normality
with both communist giants. But mean-,
while the Japanese communists will
go their own idiosyncratic way.
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AKAHATA, Tokyo (Organ of the JCP)
29 June 1970
Soviet Communist Part ~urnal "Para Life" Caries Treatise Criticizing JCP
According to newspaper reports and.a Soviet News report, the 13th
Issue of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee's organ journal
"Party Life" carried a treatit3a which severely criticizer] and attacked
the Japan Communist Party in connection with tho,gontsntq of the 13th,
Party Congress draft resolution.
This treatise took up such points as that the Japan Communist
Party did not attend the Conference of the Variout.Pertie~s held in Moscow
last year, that it-does not stand on the theory of the completion of
the revival of Japanese militarism, that it takes a critical attitude
toward the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, that it opposes big power-
ism and is advocating an autonomous and independent standpoint, that it
opposed the aggression against Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union and
others, and that it calls for a fair and just settlement of'the Kuriles
question; and it criticizes the Japan Communist Party using the severest
terms, such as that "objectively viewed, it is lending a hand to the
enemy of the unification,of the communist movement," that "the Japan
.Communist Party is following a policy line which isolates it from other
Marxist-Leninist Parties," that "this is, a new attack of anti-Sovietism."
that "there is a danger of making the Party itself a slave to the views
of bourgeois nationalism," and that "the possibility of Its becoming a
,tool of the imperialist ambitions of Japanese monopoly capital cannot be
ruled out completely."
Six years ago, when the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committtee
one-sidedly announced the letter, dated April 18, 1964, in which it it rudely
and slanderously attacked the Japan Communist Party and its policy line, in
the days when KHRUSHCHEV was the First Secretary, it was also announced in
this same organ paper called "Pcrty,Life.."..The criticism this time
'takes exactly the same rethod as the way followed in the dayn of KHRUSHCHEV,
not only in the point that it was carried in the same journal, but also.:
!in such points as that it criticizes. everything that is not in complete
accord with the assertions and standpoint of the Soviet-Communist-Party.
as "the enemy of unity" and "bourgeois nationalism," and in its contents.
The, point to be especially noted is the fact that the'treatise
appearing in this journal "Party Life," says that "no one is infringing
on the Japan Communist Party's independence and autonomy," that "the
'Soviet Communist Party has no iptention of interfering in the Japan.
Communist Party," and that it says noticing at all about the problem of
the attitude of the Soviet Communist Party toward the anti-Party
schismatic elements of the SHIGA Factionq which is the biggest-problem
worsening the relations between the Japan Communist' Party and the Soviet
Communist Party.
To begin with, the anti-Party organization of the SIIIGA Faction
was the product of the big-power-type interference by KHRUSHCHEV and
others of the Soviet Union. When the SHIGA Faction formed the anti-
Party organization of the "Voice of Japan," six years ago, the Soviet
Communist Party's organ paper "Pravda" highly praised SHIGA, saying that
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he is "a patriot, a loyal son of the people, an internationalist, and hn
activist devoted to the project of peace, democracy and socialism." That
the Soviet Communist Party openly supported these elements' anti-Party
activities is a historical fact which no one can erase. Furthermore,
the relations between the Soviet side,ard the "Voice of Japan" faction
have still not been clearly liquidated,, o''er, after the Japan-Soviet
Communist ' Party Conference in February, 1B, `s,here the Soviet delegates
firmly declared that there will be no relations with them in the future* Finally, as we criticized in the May 5 edition of Akahata, they finally
increased their interference, even to the point of persons connected with"
the Soviet Embassy openly attending-a meeting of the anti-Party SHIGA
Faction, and encoui+aging it. The basic cause (O1.the worsening of
relations between the Japan Communist Party and the Soviet Communist Pex'ty
lies i n this .
On' this, question, tbo, however, the -"Party Life" treatise says,
in regard to Akahata's criticism, that "thiaT'was done by persons working
in the Soviet Pavillion at the World Exposition in'Osaka" and that it is
not worth criticizing as interference,;. It'also said that the fact that
it can list ?"only'such a laughable reason," "proves better than anything
else the Soviet Communist Party's position, based on principles, and the
fact that the Soviet Communist Party,is strictly upholding the rules'
concerning relations between parties." It puts forward the above
"refutation." However, none of the events concerned were connected
with the World Exposition. Especially, tthe,rally in Tokyo, attended by.
the members of the Soviet Embassy, was a meeting directly sponsored by.
the anti-Party organization of "the Voice of Japan." Furthermore, at
that meeting, Yoshio SHIGA, who calls himself the National Chairman of
this anti-Party organization, personally delivered a "commemorative
lecture," attacking the Japan Communist Party. To attend such a rally
and to deliver an address of encouragement is nothing but.
encouragement of and support for activities to overthrow the Japan
Communist Party. It is clear to anyone *ho has even a small understand-
ing of "Party life" for a Marxist-Leninist Party, that this is ,not
simply a "laughable" minor matter, and that it is a grave infringement-
of "the Japan Communist Party's independence.and autonomy," and that it
is the worst possible "interference." Does the "Party Life" journal
really think that it can' make others, believe that this-was not inter-
ference, by bringing up the "World Exposition," as -an excuse for this
serious interference? "
If the "Party Life" journal persists in asserting that this
interference is within the scope of 'activities of the Soviet_Communist'
Party, "based on its principles," than it means that it is declaring
itself that the "principles" of the ? Soviet' Communist?Party run counter
to the accord reached by the international communist movement in the 1960
Declaraition o' and that they ars based .i an anti-Harxist-Leninist stand.'*
14
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L?UNITA, Rome (Organ of Italian CP)
29 June 1970
BOFFA COMMENTS ON DUBCEK PARTY EXPULSION
By Giuseppe Boffa
Slightly over a year ago, the CC of the Czechoslovak Communist
Tarty showed that, when Dubcek was replaced by Nusak, it held the
outgoing first secretary in high esteem. A few hours later the
country's President Svoboda made himself the interpreter of this
esteem by a speech that was transmitted over radio and television.
Confirmation of this homage did not appear to be a mere formality,
for Dubcek retained his post in the party Presidium and was, more-
over, assigned another authoritative political post -- chairman of
Parliament. The other day Dubcek was deemed unworthy of being even
a party member.
It is true that this year, beginning last summer, an intense
campaign of accusations was conducted by a part of the Czechoslovak
press against the leader who had guided the party during the "new
course." Dubcek was never able to reply to these charges publicly.
At any rate nothing that was substantially new was said during that
campaign, i.e.,(nothing that had not been carried in preceding
months by the press of the 5 powers which intervened in Czechoslovakia
and hence that; was not known a year ago, when esteem for Dubcek was
expressed and he was retained as a party leader.
Nor, judging from what we have seen in the Czechoslovak press,
has Dubcek been involved in actions that could have modified so
drastically the judgement of him. Nor is it possible to understand
how even the criticisms directed against him could imply the impossi-
bility of his continuing to work for his country in a post like
ambassador to Turkey, which Dubcek had accepted as a disciplinary
measure and to which he had been assigned a few months ago.
We know what Dubcek was and has been.I His soldiering on
behalf of the party lasted for 30 years. He came from a family of
old communiato, and he was shaped by the party during the Slovak
resistance, above all In his country, then in Soviet higher political
education institutions, and finally during the work to construct a
socialist society. To be sure, few individuals outside his country
knew who he was in January 1988, when the crisis involving the Novotny
leadership exploded, and he was called to fill the party's highest
post. We know, instead, that in that situation, which was difficult
because of,its long deterioration, his task was anything but simple.
It has been said that in that delicate situation, when work
was directed at steering Czechoslovakia out of its profound crisis,
leader Dubcek showed himself to be hesitant. It should be added
immediately, however, that this criticism has come from 2 opposite
directions. It was launched by those who wanted Czechoslovakia in
the summer of 1968 to oppose with other forms of resistance, including
extreme ones, the incursion by the troops of the 5 Warsaw Pact
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countries. As to the other direction, it was launched by those who,
instead, reproached Dubcek for not having intervened with repressive
measures not only against the resurfacing of rightist forces that
tried to profit from the crisis but also against the expressions of
dissent that were manifested among the very ranks of the supporters
of. socialism.
In reality, Dubcek and all those who shared leadership respon-
sibility in that period did neither consciously. They were aware,
as documents show, of the dangers and traps that lay along their
road. But, just as we are able to take into account events by
observing them directly, so they did not see this as reason to-
reject the concurrent posing of 2 objectives. The first was that
of convincing the country that it would finally be governed in a
way differing from the past: they proposed the consistent develop-
ment of socialist democracy. The second was that of maintaining
Czechoslovakia, with its own autonomous aspect, within the alignment
of socialist states in line with the determination of history and
in complete fidelity to assumed commitments.
It was not easy, we know, to operate in the circumstances
of the 2 objectives. Yet a tenacious attempt was made to reject
neither one nor the other. However contrary we are to idealizing
the single personality, we do not think -- and we believe that;
Dubcek himself did not think -- that the Dubcek leadership was able
to handle every crisis. There might have been weaknesses and errors.
But nothing permitted one to forecast that the situation had been
compromised. Under Dubcek's leadership the Czechoslovak Party
enjoyed in the country broad popular support, which was the only
factor guaranteeing the attainment of those dual objectives. What-
ever one may think about the Dubcek leadership, he must demonstrate
that those objectives, both essential, could have been attained and
are attainable through methods differing from those laboriously
tried when Dubcek headed the "new course."
:
There is ample evidence of a great consensus behind the party
leadership, a consensus that wound up polarizing around several.
names, the first of which was precisely Dubcekfe. This vast popular
movement represented a precious patrimony. It would be damaging to
conceal the fact that the popularity and prestige of the man remain
very high in Czechoslovakia. Perhaps even beyond his own desideratum
and inclinations, Dubcek had become a Symbol. With the measure of
expulsion, a blow is inevitably struck at the Dubc'ek symbol,-not to
speak of the political figure Dubcek. _
A year ago, when it was decided to retain Dubcek in the party
Presidium though depriving him of his post as party leader, that
decision appeared as a well-conceived effort to retain the political
patrimony that had been accumulated under his leadership and to
reassemble the various trends that had manifested themselves in the
Czechoslovak Party, with a view to facilitating Husak's work. But
this direction was of short durations To point up the contrast,
the expulsion announced on Friday evening assumes the grave significance
of surgery, What is now eliminated is precisely what the laborious
effort tried to salvage last year, ioe., the recovery of the vast
 CPYRGHT
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strength that had been manifested by the Czechoslovak people and that
had been believed to have been expressed in the "new course" and in
Dubcek. We are thus far removed from even the change that was
effected in April 1969. For us, it is impossible to believe that
this is the path leading to the overcoming of the Czechoslovak crisis.
Recently the press has frequently referred to voices coming
from Prague on the contrasts that occurred in the party Presidium
with respect to expulsion. There has also been talk of a contrary
opinion on the part of the highest party and state authorities.
We do not know how credible these voices are. At this time there
has been neither confirmation nor denial in Prague. They are hence
destined to be largely believed from the standpoint both of the
significance of the act itself and of the manifest contrast with
the decisions that were made slightly over a year ago and have been
gradually modified over the past 14 months to confirm a crisis which
cannot be said to have been overcome.
As to the judgement of us Italian Communists, it was expressed
immediately with great clarity by the general secretary of our party.
It is a judgement dictated by a profound internationalist preoccupation.
The Czechoslovak events involve us as militants of a large world move-
ment through the international significance that these events have
inevitably assumed. Against this backdrop we have always expressed
our concern. Nor can we remain silent today. Defining our position
is our duty: it means assuming our responsibility to the workers
and people of our country. The decisions made may be the prelude
of even worse ones. It would be dangerous if the negative reactions
in Czechoslovakia and the international workers+ movement were not
considered for what they really represent.,
NEW YORK TIMES
19 July 1970
Long-Time French Communist
Embarrasses Party on Ouster
By HENRY GINGER
$yret?I to The \r.r Y zk Tlmea
PARIS, July 18 - An of
ai
reer dates from a Black Sc
mutiny o1 1919 has caused hilparty embarrassment by ope
dissidence before several mit
lion television viewers.
Charles Tillon, a white-hair-
ed 73-yaer-old militant who 2
-years ago was a minister in a
provisional Government run by
Gen. Charles de Gaulle, an-
nounced on the air last night
that he had been excluded
from ibis party cell in Aix-en-
Provence by its young leaders,
acting on orders from above.
Mr. Tilton delivered a strong
attack accusing the present
pary leadership of "Stalin-
Jim." using of anti-democratic
methods and failing to take a
trong stand against the So-
let-led repression in Czecho-
lovakia.
L'Humanlt&, the official par-
newspaper consigned a short
rticle on Mr. Tillon to the
ottom of its fourth page to-
ay. complaining mildly that
e had chosen to speak on
television rather than to .his
wn party.
Charge Not Denied
The paper did not deny that
e local cell had taken action,
ut said no request for exclu-.
on had reached higher bodies,
f eluding to Cehntral Commit-
e.
The exclusion was believed
have been provoked by the
issuing of a statement last
month by Mr. Tillon and three
other prominent Communists
now in disgrace.
They were Roger Garaudy,
the French party's best-known
Intellectual until his exclusion
a few months ago, Maurice
I{riegcl-Valrimont and Jean
Pronteau, both former members
of the Central Committee.
All had taken exception to
the party's attitude on Czecho-
slovakia, its purported lack of
understanding of militant left-
ist youth movements, and to
centralization based on the So
viet party that left no room for
debate.
Pressure for Change
Among Western" Communist
CPYRGHT
parties, the French party is sec-
ond -only to the Italian in its
electoral strength. Despite fre-
quent attacks on Its "Stalinist"
methods over the years and de-
clining membership, it has suc-i
ceeded in keeping about 20 pert
cent of the vote year in. years
out. But lately the party has
felt strong pressure from within
and without for a wholesale
change.
The inside pressures are typi-
fied by the attacks of Mr. Til-
ton and others. He has consid-
erable standing, particularly in
the older generation. 'In 1919,
serving as seamen aboard a
French warship, he and Andre,
Marty, another Communist who!
was to fall into disfavor, led a:
muting in an effnrt to ht..-t.'
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Westtrrn intervention against
the Bolshevik Government In
Russia.
During World War 11. he was
[one of thu best-known resist-`
ance Icadms, and when General
de Gaulle took Communists into
his provisional Government in
1944, Mr. Tilton was named
Minister for Aviation,
Party Leader Attacked
Last night, Mr. Tillon delivered
a personal attack on Georges
Marchals who, as assistant gen-
eral, is running the party during
the current illness of Waldeck
Rochet. Mr. Tillon charged that
Mr. Marchais had deliberately
falsified his biography to show
that he had been in France dur-
ing the war when, Mr. Tillon
contended, he had been dc-(
ported to Germany as a labnrer.i
Outside the party, pressures
are building up on Its left and
right. The new militant left,
composed mostly of youths, has
been seeking'labor support in
competition with the Commu-
nist-dominated General Confed?j
eration of Labor.
The youthful revolutionaries,
mainly Maoist oPTrotskite, dis-
dainfully refer to the Commu-
jnists as part of the bourgeois
establishment and little better
than "reformists."
On their right, the Commu-
nists are continuing to try to
end their relative Isolation and
form a common electoral front,
primarily with the Socialists.
The Communists are aiming
particularly at such an alliance
for the municipal elections next
spring.
But. the Socialists are badly
split on the issue with a large
faction reluctant to pofn with
the Communists, particularly
after what happened in Czech-
oslovakia. The attacks by Mr.
Tilton ? and, other Communists
on their own party are expect.
ed to encourage this faction
to resist the Communists'.
overtures.
LE MONDE, Paris
24 July 1970
FUNDAMENTAL CONTRADICTIONS SEEN IN FRENCH CP
by Maurice Duverger
The internal unity of the French Communist Party is hardly
being more weakened by the Tillon affair than y the Garaudy issue.
The exclusion of the former chief of the FTP expansion unknown7
concerns broader segments of the party than the exclusion of the
former director of the Marxist Studies Center. The problems of the
resistance have a greater'impact than intellectual discussions. l3ut.
the mass of militants are too accustomed to discipline, too persuaded'
that discipline is necessary for the party to be effective, and too
biased against "splinter intrigues" for them not to accept their
leaders' decision. Any highly structured and hierarchical organiza-
tion reacts in the same way under similar circumstances.
In this area, then, Georges Marchais may feel at ease. The party,
will not lose many supporters or many voters in this new crisis. As
for its effects outside the party, consequences there will probably.
be different. The image of French communism is now deteriorating a
little more, as it has not ceased to do since 1968. The climate is
becoming still less favoiable to a reconciliation with the Social
Democrats and to the development of an alliance of the left. The
centrist movement, which also has the advantage of an unusually, dy-
namic and efficient manager, is favored by the communist decline.
And the progress made by the centrist movement is now more dangerous
for the French CP than a possible loss of supporters or voters.
Accusing Roger Garaudy and Charles Tillon of favoring;.. this move-
ment is staying on the surface of the issue. The promoters of tho
centrist movement, of course, grasp such opportunities to feed their
anti-communist campaigns and to divide the left a little more. This
is obvious ahd.completely natural. But such maneuvers remain of
secondary importance when compared to the essential fact which has
favored the centrist movement for the past 2 years -- the invasion
of Czechoslovakia by the itussiane and the crushing of a humanistic
brand of socialism. In this sense, Hessrs Rrezhnev and Rosygin are
the true "objective allies" of Jean-Jacques Servnn-Schreiber. Or to
be more exact (for the Soviets must obviously.be more concerned with
the USSR than with France), his true objective allies are the leaders
of, the Communist Party who underrate the importance of the Russian
invasion for public opinion in our country.
18
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Such a misinterpretation probably constitutes the fundamental
strategic error of the French CP. If communists as dedicated as
Garaudy and Tillon, who accepted for such.a long time such rude humili
ations in the name of discipline are now deciding to throw off this
discipline, it is less to liberate their conscience than to draw at-
tention to this error. Waldeck Rochct appraised the situation well in
August 1968. The "censure" expressed at that time kept the party from
cutting itself off from the rest of the left. This censure was never
disavowed. But it is now too isolated and too weak after later develop.
ments in the affair. The silence maintained since that time by the
Politburo and the central. committee has made the French CP the accom?
p Place of Prague's neo-Stalinism in the eyes of non-communists.
There reside both the major obstacle to the development of the
alliance of the left and the fundamental aid "objectively" given.to?
the centrist movement. They can not easily be abolished, for a com-
munist party can not rise up against the USSR, to which the fate of
world communism remains linked. 'But in comparing the present attitudes
,of the French CP and the'Italian CP, one finds that the French party
is hardly concerned with the problem, while the Italian party is activew
,ly involved with it. This permits the Italian CP to maintain much
better relations with the left, without betraying its Muscovite big
brother. The regrets expressed by L'Cnita about the exclusion of
"comrade" Uubcek make the silence of L'Humanite even less justifiable.
The official theory of the French CH' -- according to which one
party must not get involved in the affairs of fraternal parties -- is
doing it incalculable harm. If in Prague they are again beginning to
use the procedures of L'Aveu, if the Siberian deportation camps are
being multiplied, must the other Communist parties be silent just as
they were in the 1950's? Such a silence would appear to be complici-
,ty, just as today silence about Czechoslovakia appears to be compli-
city. Nothing is more opposed to the idea of the solidarity of fra-
ternal parties, to the notion of proletarian internationalism, than
not criticizing one's brother when he deserves it, than not passing
Judgment on one of the. members of the Internationale when his behavior
is harmful to the others. The large western communist parties -- the
Italian and French parties -- do hold some possibilities of influ-
encing the Soviet Union and the popular democracies. By refusing to
use this influence, the French CP is favoring the present evolution
of neo-Stalinism, which hurts all the communist parties, eApecially
the French party.
Silence concerning Prague and Movcow is only one a::pect of the
problem, however, and not the motet important one. The most serious
matter is not that the 'French C1' remains silent when confronted with
the present hard line of the USSR and'of Czechoslovakia, but that it
is itself acting as people acted in 114oscow in the time of Stalin and
in Prague at, the time of the London trial. Public opinion has the
impression that the French party is not using its full force against
Garaudy or Tillon only because its distance from power prevents it
from doing so. It hardly matters whether this impression is true or
false. The-essential is that it may be resented, and it is.
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Of course, it has almost always been like this. Even in the
60's, when liberalization was beginning to develop, the French CP did
not go very faro But then it was part of a general evolution leading
to the de-Stalihization of the communist world. The rigidity of the
French Cl' could then be considered a holdover from its former con-
dition that the new situation's development would cause to disappear
little by little. The French party did not change very much. Still
it did change a little under the guidance of Waldeck fochet. Above
all, it was part of a whole in movement. Today, it can no longer be
hoped that it will in the end be carried away in the surrounding thaw,
for the present atmosphere is opposed to this, and a worldwide harder
line is developing. The hard stance of the French CP -- which is in-
creasing -- thus takes on another meaning.
Also, French public opinion is less.tolerant of a contradiction
between words and deeds. A great cleansing has been going on since
May 1968, and the French Communist Party itself is also undergoing its
consequences. In the last few years it has made uncontestable efforts
in the doctrinal sphere to define an "advanced democracy," to find a
French path to socialism, to reject the thesis of a single party, and
to assert its attachment to pluralism. These efforts can hardly be
effective since they are not accompanied by a similar change in be-
havior. The freedom given to Garaudy to express himself before the
congress remained too isolated a swallow to lead to a belief in
spring, while on the contrary so many signs are confirming winter's
aye turn.
The primary force in the centrist movement -- enemy number one
of the French CP -- is linked .,o the fact that the alliance of the
left appears much less "plausible" today than it did in 1966-1967,
the era when public opinion surveys revealed that it was acceptable
to many citizens, even moderates, even concerning the participation
of communist ministers in the government. This is related in part
to the weakening of the Social Democrats, which prevents them from
bringing a counterbalance to bear on their partner. But it is due
even more to the evolution of communism in general and to the evolu-
tion of French communism in. particular. For the French CA' to con-
tinue in its prevent path means increasing the risk of finding itself,
once again isolated for a long period, thus turning its back to its
basic goal -- preventing its enforced return to the ghetto and the
developing of a union of the left.-.,This fundamental contradiction
between the goals of the party and the strategy that it is-applying
to reach its goals i.n the end carries a greater weight than the at-
titude of any one of its leaders during and after the occupation. -yt
will'not be overcome so *&silyo
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 CPYRGHT
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CPYRGHT
WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS
1.7 August 1970
Terrorists are
Castro-inspired
RUGUAY leftist terrorists,
In kidnapping a Latin Ameri-
can consul and U.S. techni-
cians, are going for the jugu-
lar vein of hemisphere rela-
tions. When they hit upon this
combination of victims, they
hit pay dirt.
To Illustrate where this can
lead. Elratii raintorced its mil-
Itary forces along Uruguay's
ens us, but something much closer to 10 per
cent.
Uruguay's Tupamaro terrorists have been
called In the U.S. press everything from ro-
mantic revolutionaries to fascist bully-boys.
The Tupamaros are In fact part of an exten-
sively-documented e x t r e m I s t wave openly
? formed, trained and supported by Cuba's Cas-
tro. A British journalist recently In Havana
reports the; the man who calls the tune for
Castro today is Russia's Ambadredor Alexan-
der Soldatov.
owever tnat may be, botn a urganization
o( American States and the U.S. Senate Sub-
committee on Internal Security of the Judi-
ciary committee have documented Havana
meetings to plan and inspire such subversion.
Castro's recent speeches reaffirmed his sup-
port for it. The subversives' declared goal Is to
destroy "Yankee Imperialism."
It should be retailed that when Molotov
cocktails were being tossed around Washing-
ton apropos of an OAS meeting here, some of
the terrorists leaflets were signed "Tupama.
ros."
In Uruguay, the eventual Tupamaros goat is
to implant a Castro-like dictatorship. For dec-
ades the country has been South America"s
closest thing to a democratic socialist state. It
has a living standard and literacy -rate among
the underdeveloped world's highest. Wealth 19
to a commendable degree distributed by aa'
advanced welfare system.
Urugvv,,, fnr years was communist organiza-
tions' m; South American headquarters.
Nune of 1i i4 s,~ves It from the subversives now
presaing Ilr]varta'a rule-or-ruin strategy.
Uruguay to ransom the kidnapped, Brazilian
consul. The consequences could be disastrous
If the pattern were repeated In tinder-box sit-
uations - as between Bolivia and Chile, Peru
and Ecuador, Venezuela and Guayana or Hon-
duras and El Salvador.
The U.S. government can paralyze Its rep.
resentatives in Latin Americo by wrapping
them in ponderous -- and dubious - security
systems. Or Washington can reduce thler num-
ber drastically. But the Uruguayan terrorists
kidnapped a U.S.technician working for the
Uruguayan government, not ours, In Bolivia,
two German mining experts were kidnapped
from privately-owned mine. Such technicians
are necessary in Latin America's fight for de-
velopment.
A huge official and business machinery
manned by North Americans In Latin America
makes possible the enormous hemisphere
trade relations that help sustain our high U.S.
living standards. Destroy.this fabric -- and It
U under terrorist attack-arid we will have not
o* the I per cent unemployment that WON
YAI, Montevideo
111 August 1970
F
jk~
. R1
VAII este nlel iodic en forma exclit Siva of SuF.secretario tic Relaciones Dr. Amcr+svo
Ricaidoni, quien se presto gustoso al reportaje gene into de nucstros cronistas le realizara eu el Palacit~
Santos sobre asuntos relacionatlos con Ins )iechos de aetualidad. La position de In U;,itin Sovit'tica
frentc a In actitud de nuestro gobieruo, In niovilizaciott de tropas brasilcnas en la Cromer. v 1?S In fin de 1955, les Sovietiques avalent
fait a Nasser des offres de service pour'
fournir l'Egypte d'armes. La premiere guerre
d'Isracl. moins d'un an plus tard, Ieur a per-'
mis d'accroitre considdrablement l'influence
qu'ils commcncaicnt a prendre en Egypte sur
lc plan militaire, d'autant plus quits pou-
vaicnt arguer que c'dtait la menace de
Khrouchtchev de se scrvir de la bombe ato-
mique qui avait arr@tE 1'avance des armees
iisradliennes. La seconde guerre fut catastro-
phiquc pour I'Egypte.
Dans ces deux rencontres, les armdes ara.
bes, a commencer par l'armde dgyptienne, per.
dirent la quasi-totalitd de lours materiels. Sans
sourciller, les Sovietiques les remplacerent. A
l'origine, 1'essentiel de ces materiels dtait d'ori-
gines europeenncs. Apres ces deux campagnes,
ces armdcs nc disposent plus que de matd-
rigIs de provenance sovidtique, ce qui, daps
uric certaine mesure, facilite ('instruction et,
plus encore, 1'ingerence sovidtique.
Apres la premiere campagne, cette ingd-
rence fut rclativcment discrete et faible. It
n'y cut pas de commandcment sovidtique ins-
talls a demcurc en Egypte, mais sculement des
. conseillers . qui diffuserent des instructions
et elaborerent un plan d'opdrations qui se
rt vela pcu brillant et plut6t timord. Peutktre
lesdits a conscillers . I'avaicnt-ils connu en
fonction du personnel militaire dgyptien, Bien
pcu prdpard a sescrvir des materiels de guerre
complexes.
La scconde guerre - assez humiliante
pour les Sovietiques, pulsqu'on dit que cer-
tains de leurs conscillers furent entratnds daps
la ddbandade -- entraina une aggravation de
I'ingdrence sovidtique, On respecte la fiction
d'un commandenient autochtone, mais cha-
que commandement dgyptien est double d'unc
dquipe d'officicrs sovietiques. La preuve dtant
faite que les forces egyptiennes, cmpctrdes
dans le materiel moderne, ne peuvent se di-
riger elles-memos, a moins d'aller volontaire-
ment a un troisiepne ddsastre, on en arrive
pcu a peu a unc commande directe, du moins
dans les pontes lei plus importants.
LES FORCES ASSISTEES
II ne parait pas que les forces dgypticn-
nes et cellos des autres nays arabes aicnt
connu tine amplification de\.lcurs effectifs
11 serait d'ailleurs'difficile de lever davantage
de troupes et de les instruirc. Au demeurant,
c'est surtout et toujours d'armemcnts, et des
plus modernes, dont on a besoin pour abattre
Israel, car les Arabcs, qui pourraicnt ddploycr
toutes Icurs qualitds dans unc guerre do par.
tisans, sont obliges de sc preparcr pour des.
operations d'un style tout different et qui
leur convient beaucoup moins.
II semble done que Ics forces arabcs aicnt
dtd reconstitudes a pcu pros tcllcs qu'cllcs
dtalent, quant au nombrc, avant )a gucrrc dcs
six jours, environ 100.000 hommes pour cc
qui est de I'Egytc, pout-titre un pcu plus, mais
leurs moyens ont etC considcrablement accriis.
notarnment en chars. L'Egypte en aurait T}n
(dont unc forte proportion de T 54 ct 55).
N ric 400 (dont 250 T54), l'Irak, (?;. e,'
0 T 54). Cola fait environ 1.700 chars. Isr:
en possedc sculcment In moltid, malgrd toutes
les prises de guerre que son armdc a pu faire,
mais les formations blinddes isradliennes sont
entrainees et commanddes d'une manitre au-
trement efficace.
Dc plus, l'Egypte a etc amplement dotde
en artillcric pour contrcbattre les installations
isradliennes sur la rive occidentale du Canal
de Suez. L'Egyptc aurait place Ic long du
canal environ un millier de bouches a feu des
modcles a longue portdc sovidtiques de
122 mm. et 130 mm. Les tirs ont commence
en janvicr 1970; its ont inflige des pertes aux
Isracliens, unc trentaine d'hommes par mois,
rdduites au tiers apres les attaques de re-
presailles des Isracliens. Ceux-ci 3n'auraient pas
du tout la m@me puissance en artillerie sur le
canal.
On manque d'informations sur In valeur
offensive quc pourraicnt avoir les grandes
unites terrestres de i'Egypte, si, un jour ou
l'autrc, cues tentaient de franchir le canal et
de pdnetrcr a nouveau dans la region du Si.
nai. Cependant, M.R.S.S. a livrd a sa pro-
tdgec des fusses tactiques, a charge classiquc,
dune portde dc 65 km., ce qui ddnoterait deja
unc intention, ou du moins une possibilitd,
offensive. Enfin, d'une manierc generale, on
estime quc les forces dgypticnnes de terre,
ainsi quc les autres forces, sont une fois et
demi cc qu'cllcs etaient avant la guerre. Tout
semble indiqucr que ce potentiel sera encore
augmentd ; et ii 1'est ddja de fait par les nou.
velles armes introduites recemment sur ce
thddtre en haute tension. Scion unc opinion
sericuse, it faudrait que les dotations a I Egyp.
to se poursuivent au moins deux ans avant
qu'il soil possible d'envisager une action.
En cc qui concerne les forces terrestres,
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on pourrait encore signaler de Ia part des
i pays arabes un ddveloppement des procedes
de guerilla, notamment par I'cngagement de
coups de main. Les commandos isradlicns
ont procddd pour leur part A es actions fort
tdmdraires A 1'intdricur ?du disositif dgyptien.
Avant de passer aux autrcs acmes, signa-
Ions encore quc 1'EMpte fait prdsentement un
effort financier constderabic pour ses arme?
mcnts, plus do 50 36 do on budget gdndral.
Et les achats faits en U.R.S.S. sont rembour-
sables en dix ans. a un faux d'intdr6t de 2 46,
contre marchandises.
LES FORCES AERIENNES
Elie-, seraient aux niveaux ci-aprds :
Egyptc : cffcctifs : 15.000 hommes, 500
apparcils do combat, Mig 15, 17 et 19 ; dont
unc centaine du type le plus dvolud, Mig 21 ;
plus quciqucs dizaines de bombardiers 111 28
ct Tu 16. La totalitd des apparells est main-
tenant sovidtique.
Pour la Syrie : 200 apparells, dont 100
Mig 21.
L'anndc dcrnii re, ('aviation dgyptienne
dtait estimde A 150 % dgalemcnt de cc qu'elle
d.tait avant Ia dcrniZrc campagne. C'est done
environ 700 tvior. , de combat qui ont did
fournis aux trois principauN pays arabcs :
. ptc, Sync et Irak. Le taux d'augmentation
~ ,: us donne se rdf%re au nombre des ap.
rciL F-m fait, la valour des nouveaux appa-
rcils, i,otaniment les Mig 21 et les Sokhoi 1
,'orte cet accroissement A in taux superieur.
Les Mig 21 out une vitesse transsonique ; ils
'nt acmes d'un canon de 23 mm., de deux
gins air-air autoguidds It l'infrarouge. Les
. ayons d'action sont sensiblement plus dlevds,
done de capacitd offensive.
Numdriquement, Israel se trouve de memo
a. la moitid des forces adriennes, do ses adver-
snlres. Ndnnrroins co pays a engag6 d6s las
premiers mois de 1970 des attaqucs en pro-
fondeur au-dela du canal. Certains avions se-
raient passes impundment au-dessus des de-
fenses. Des destructions ont etd operdes It Pin-
tdrieur du delta : camps militaires, rampes
de lancement de fusdes de defense des vv lies
et ddp6ts divers. En outre, plusicurs g gyp-
l.iens auraient dte abattus.
Cependant, en matiere d'aviation, le fait
capital est la Vrdsenoe de forces sovidtiqucs
(on a pane dung division adrienne) et de
pilotes egalernent sovietiques, une cinquan-
taine sans doute, peut-titre meme une centaine.
Leur nationalitd ne fait pas de doute, les Is-
radliens ayant captd des messages emis par
eux en langue russe au cours de lours vols.
Qu'ils I'aient voulu ou non. les Sovidtiques se
sont trouvds pris dans une sorte engrcn .
tit
re
Ayant fourni des apparcils qui no peuvent
pjlotes par des Egyptiens, ils ont dtd obliges
aussi de fournir des pilotes.
Il sembic qu'un accord tacite soit inter-
venu entre les belligdrants pour que les appa-
reils pilotes par les Sovietiqucs ne soient pas
engages contre les forces aeriennes d'Israel,
celles-ci rcnonccaant do Icur c6td It certaines
operations do bombardement en Egypte pour
ne pas risquer de se heurtcr aux avions so-
vittiques.
C'est dans le meme esprit sans doute que.
les principales responsabilitds en matidre ad-
rienne sont entre les mains des Sovidtiques, i
qui laissent 6. l'aviation egyptienne les t5ches
de caractere offensif, pour le moment les
moms importantes.
Ainsi, l'aviation pilotCc par les Sovidtiques
fait figure pour le moment d'unc sorte d'dcran
protecteur de I'Egypte. L'ensemble de la de-
fense anti-adrienne aurait dte dgalement prisc
entierement en main par les Sovidtiques : de
nombreux spdcialistes seraient arrives en
Egypte A cet effet.
Ndanmoins, la presence d'cscadrilles so-
vidtiques, prdvues pour I'attaque au sol en
basse altitude (lei appareils dtant dotes d'en-
gins air-sot) pout titre d'un poids considerable
dans une guerre future. Et ces apparcils ant
incontestablement une vocation offensive.
Signalons encore la crdat:ion de plusicurs
bases adriennes entierement sovidtiques.
On dit que des diffdrends seraient surve-
nus entre les Egyptiens et les Sovidtiques sur
l'utilisation de l'arme adrienne, les premiers
so montrant presses de partir A l'attaque, les
autres prechant la moderation, en vue notam-
ment d une preparation longue et mdthodique.
Les Sovidtiques out dgalement installd soit
vingt, soil, scion d'autres, un peu plus de
quarante bases de lancement de fusdes Sam 3,
qui demeurcnt dgalement enttre lours mains ;
ils ont, en outrc, amend environ 15.000 spdcia-
listes. Les livraisons auraient did de 1.500 fu-
sdes ; ce sont des engins de defense adrienne
. contre l'aviation attaquant A basso altitude.
On a e clement signald la presence d'engins
Sam 2, de memo emploi, mais contre I'avlation
en haute altitude.
LES FORCES NAVALES
Les pays arabcs du Proche-Orient n'ont
ggere de forces navales,. quelques bAtiments
tiors et uclques sous-marins, ces dernleri
fournis par I'U.R.S.S. On a signald depuis quel?
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CPYRGHT
que temps un accroisscment des unites de
dttcttsn cdtiorc, egypticnncs of syrtonnas. Cola
rcntrerait dans un plan renforcd de defense
navaic de l'Est. Le hombre des vedettes rapi-
des nurait W. augmente ; celles-ci patrouillent
activement la long des cotes africalnes. L'Pgyp-
tc possede une vingtaine d'unitds des types
soviCtiques g Osa A et a Komar *, lanceurs
d'engins.
Par contre - point devenant trl's impor-
tant - la flotte sovietique en ML'ditcrranee
scmblc en net dtveloppcment ; ells est d6-
nommCc c'galement He Escadre. Elie n'ttait
qu'a quclques unites en 1964. Elie a quadru-
ple des lors. ComposCe de 47 batiments, la
plupart de faible tonnage, lors de la guerre
des six fours, ells s'est agrandie rCgulierement
et scrait maintenant de 60 a 70 unites, salon
les periodes. Elie a trout/ des points d'appui,
avcc couvcrture do D.C.A., en Egypte.
Darts cetle flotte se trouve presque tou-
jours un porte-helicopters sovibtique, de nou-
velle creation. transportant un bataillon de
fusilicrs-marins de dCbarquement. Des croi-
scurs ont Cgalement-CtC signalCs, ainsi que des
destroyers, notamment de la classe a Kotlin a
(dont un est charge de suivre cote At cote les
navires des flottes alliCes en MCditerrande
durant lcurs manoeuvres). D'autres destroyers
sont de la classc cc Kynda ?.
Au point de vue naval, Israel nest pas
particulierement pourvu, tout I'effort portant
sur ies forces terrestres et aCri'ennes. On lui
connait 4 sous-marins et 2 escorteurs anciens,
ainsi que des navires de dCbarquemcnt. Un
sous-marin a ate perdu en 1967 par two fuzee
lancCe dune vedette de type soviCtique. Israel
a done cherchd a augmenter ses armements
navals grace aux 5 canonnii res de Cherbourg,
qui en ont rejoint 7 autres parvenues en Is-
rael avant l'embargo. Elles sont armCes d'en-
gins israCliens dits < Gabriel A. Cette marine
possede Cgalement des vedettes rapides. Mais
ses fronts de mer, y compris celui du Golfe
d'Akaba, sont devenus tres vastes.
I..e general Moschd Dayan, ministre de la
Defense israelienne, a convenu dans une de-
claration, que les forces combinees des pays
arabes etaient deux fois plus a levees que cc
qu'elles Ctaient avant la guerre des six jours.
Et meme ii a attribuC un coefficient d'au-
mentation de leur, valour, sans doute quali-
ficative, encore beaucoup plus elev.
LE COMMANDEMENT SOVIETIDUE
La grande nouveautd, cc nest pas la re-
constitution at le dCveloppement des forces
arabes, notamment dgyptiennes, grace It 1'alde
en materiels et en techniciens octroyCe par ics
Sovidtiqu-s. Elie reside dans I'implantation
lente, mais continue, d'un commandcment so-
vietique, non plus seulement parallels, mais
place au sommet, avec des ramifications
qui iraient jusqu'au nivcau des bataillons
ou des unites correspondantes. Chaque fois
q~ue les Egyptiens veulent engager une action,
its doivent demander I'autorisation aux So-
vietiques. La nouvelle aviation dite Cgypticn-
ne, mais pilotCe par des SoviC.tiques, a ate
inspectdc par le Chef d'dtat-major egyptien
pour sauver la face, mais else demeure sous
le commandement effectif d'un gCnCral so-
viCtique qui decide des operations a effee-
tuer et de In rCpartition des missions entre
unites soviCtiques et unites egyptiennes.
Ce commandcment sovietiquc volt son au-
torite renforcCe du fait de la presence d'unitds
constituees entiercmcnt soviCtiqucs, une gran-
de unite d'aviation de la vaicur d'unc armdc,
In D.C.A. de protection des grandcs agglome-
rations urbaines, Ics formations de fusCcs anti-
aCriennes dans la zone du canal, de la valcur
approximatlve d'una brignde, etc. On pent y
inclure 1 escadre soviCtique en MCditerannCe
orientale, du -'moins les elements stationnCs
pres des cotes arabes.
Si Von ajoute a cela le nombre sans cesse
accru des 4 conseillers a (peut-Ctre 30.000),
on conviendra que le commandcment soviCti-
que se trouve, militairemcnt parlant, le maitre
absolu de la situation. Les forces terrestres ne
peuvent que se sournettre a cc commandement
qui ddtient les armaments majeurs, m@me si
elles conservent nominalement leurs apparte.
stances nationales,
. C'est la rdplique, sur une moindre echelle,
bien entendu, du sort qui est celui de la
soixantainn do. divisions du Pacte de Vat,
COWL
Jacquard PERGHW.
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"J US FROM THE RUBBIAN UNDERORQU1 D_
CBS TELEVISION NETWORK
Tuesday, July 28, 1970
10:00 - 11:00 PM, EDT
With CBS NEWS 'Correspondents Harry Reasoner and William Cole
PRODUCED BY CBS NEWS
EXECUTIVE PRODUCER: Perry Wolff
REASONER: Good evening. You are about to see some extraordinary films. They
are interviews with three Russians, filmed in Russia, about their dissatisfaction
and dissent, and there is also a moving voice message, recorded in a prison camp
and smuggled out.
Some few Westerners living in Russia occasionally get to know a Russian well
enough to hear criticism of the government. Some few Russians, having escaped
to the West, have talked about what'they feel is the early decadence and vicious
repression of their government. Some few Russians, including one man we will
hear from, have had critical books published abroad.
But the men you are about to see talked for the camera in Russia, and they are
still there. They are most exquisitely aware that their government knows of
these interviews, and that officials of the Soviet Government in the United States
have television sets. They are aware that in the crowded 53 years of Soviet his-
tory, terrible things have happened to Russians for less than these men do to-
night. But they want these films to be broadcast, because they feel this will
focus attention on what they believe is increasing repression of themselves and
other dissenters.
These films were made by CBS NEWS Correspondent William Cole who, a short time
later, was expelled from Russia, perhaps coincidentally. Bill Cole is a reporter,
not a photographer. On the technical quality of the films, the kindest thing we
can say is that he really did very well. The key thing was his relationship with
the men. We will hear from these men, and Bill Cole, in a moment.
ANNOUNCER: This is a CBS NEWS Special Report: Voices From the Russian Underground,
with CBS NEWS Correspondents William Cole and Harry Reasoner.
(ANNOUNCEMENT)
REASONER: This .1s Bill Cole who, until very recently, was Chief of Bureau and
Correspondents for CBS NEWS in Moscow, and filmed the interviews we're going to
see tonight. Bill, why tlid you get kicked out of the Soviet Union?
COLE: Harry~p I was told that my activities there were incompatible with-my states
.as a journalist. Actually, the authorities gave me no explanation, and I didn't
expect one.
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REASONER: It could have something to do with these interviews?
COLE: I think it did.
]REASONER: How did you get these films?
COLE: I got to know the Russians in these films, and they wanted these films
made, to let the outside world kr;:w what's happening in the.t country.
REASONER: Who are they? What-is it? Is it a large group of revolutionaries?
COLE: Not at all. They're not revolutionaries at all. They're good - they're'
good Russians, but they want change. They are members of what you - what they
call the democratic movement, a movement fighting for basic human rights, civil
liberties in the Soviet Union.
REASONER: How do they keep in touch with each other in a state like Russia?
COLE: They have an underground press, which they call Samizdat. They have a
newspaper, for example, called the Chronicles. I've got an example of it here.
It's not a newspaper, actually, it's - it's a typed letter, and it circulates in
the thousands. One man gets a copy of it, and he types four more copies and
gives them to his friends. Of course it's illegal, and it's dangerous to be
caught with it.
REASONER: For these men this will be the biggest samizdat they've ever had, then?
COLE: It will, and that's what they want it to be.
REASONER: Who are we going to see and hear?
COLE: Well, the first man you'll see is Pyotr Yakir. He's 48 years old and a,
dedicated Communist. He wants change from within. He has spent 13 years in con-
centration camps, and he is what you might call the non-titular head of the demo-
cratic movement. He was put into a camp the first time when he was 14, because
he was his father's son. His father was General Jan Yakir, a very celebrated
general of the Soviet Army. Stalin decided that Yakir should be shot. He was
taken out of bed one night and shot,..
REASONER: Yakir begins by speaking of a famous recent trial.
COLE: Yes, Pyotr believes that a change came in Russian opinion in 1966, with
the illegal trials of two well-known Russian writers, Sinyavsky and Daniel..
REASONER: He also, of course, speaks in Russian, but as we listen to him, and
in these other interviews, the translation will be by David Floyd, of the London
Telegraph, an ecpert on Soviet affairs. Let's listen to Mr. Yakir.
YAKIR: (Speaks in Russian)
FLOYD: (INTERPRETING): The most important turning point in the way people are
thinking was when Daniel and Sinyavsky were arrested. Many educated people thought
Daniel and Sinyavsky had done wrong by sending their writings abroad, and follclw-
ing their trial and after Samizdat - Samizdat refers to the system by which people
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simply reproduce and pass from hand to hand various writings - published the first
speeches of Daniel and Sinyavsky, there came about a striking change, because both.
Sinyavsky and Daniel spoke about what they thought. They had written down what
they believed, and didn't consider themselves guilty. And many people began to
think: really, why should poeple be tried for their convictions? Why, simply for
what he thinks, does a man have to be arrested? It was very similar to Stalin
times, when people were sent to prison not even for what they thought, but for
?? what they were thought to believe, and had not said to anybody, but it had some-
how been proved that they were dissenters. So from that time on there were pro-
tests.
And then there was the trial of Galanskov and Ginzburg, and that was the time of
the greatest enthusiasm, because firstly a great many people protested against the
fact that the trial was held illegally and behind closed doors. During the trial
the situation changed a great deal. Whereas during the trial of Sinyavsky and
Daniel it had been impossible to approach foreign correspondents - the vigilantes
would take people straight off to the police - at the Moscow City Court we all
discussed the affair with the correspondents. True, they wouldn't let us in any-
where, but a certain contact was established, and everything we learned we passed
on immediately to the correspondents. The trial ended, and against-it there were
a great many protests. More than 2,000 people put their names to various letters
of protest against conviction of people for their beliefs. Sometime - about the
same time, during the trial, Larissa Daniel and Pavel Litvinov handed correspond-
ents a protest against the trial and. appealing to world public opinion. That was
the first, major step, which was a breach with all previous traditions. Never be-
fore in Russia had there been a case of people appealing to the West with a pro-
test against unlawfulness in our country.
This is a great stride forward compared with Stalinism. Under Stalin there was
always an iron curtain, and no one knew what' was going on here. Millions of
people were destroyed and nobody knew about it. Now we're trying to publicize
every,arrest, every dismissal. This we consider our main function - that is, in-
forming people about what is going on and of those illegal acts. We consider
this the main task of the day.
Here is what I think. We are all being arrested - those who took part in the
democratic movement - but that's not the point. We are apparently being arrested
because it doesn't suit the authorities to have people about who criticize them.
But there's no going back. If we're not here there'll be others; there are al-
ready many of us, many young people, and no independent thinking people in the
Soviet Union will go back to what used to be. They'll beat us and they'll kill
us. All the same people will go on thinking differently.
REASONER: Pyotr Yakir, one of three Russian dissenters, interviewed by Corres-
pondent Bill Cole. Bill, Yakir said "they will beat us and they will kill us."
Has anything happened to these men?
COLE: Yes, Harry. The man you are about to see next was picked up by the KGB,
the secret police, only a few weekd ago. He's now in prison awaiting trial.
His name is Andre Amalrik. He's a 31-year-old historian and writer, who's been
published all over the world, never in his own country, and he's just published
an amazing book, called "Will the Soviet Union Survive until 198J?" This is an
amazing book because it was written in Russia. Other writers -other Russian
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writers have written such books criticizing the system and telling exactly --
telling about it as. it is, but mostly from abroad, in safe places, and Andre
has been awaiting arrest, and - and now it's happened.
REASONER : You had some trouble getting part of the film of this interview out
of Russia, didn't you?
COLE: Yes, I had a great deal. I had Andre an film, and I tried to take it out
not long ago and I was searched very thoroughly in customs. The film was seized
and developed. I've heard in Moscow that it's going to be used at his trial.
REASONER: Will we hear about that trial?
COLE: I'm beginning to wonder. The secret police have a new trick now. They
don't have trials in Moscow. Andre was not taken back to Moscow, where he lives,
but he was taken down to a provincial city, Sverdlovsk, and we may never bear
what happens to him.
REASONER: Now, the fact that you had to re-shoot this interview will account for
the change of scene that we'll notice, and also there's a lady in the film.
COLE: That's his wife,' Giselle. She's a charming girl,-and a painter. She's
never been allowed to exhibit in her own country, because her art is not - doesn't
fit the party line.
REASONER: Let's look at Mr. and Mrs. Amalrik.
COLE: Mr. Amalrik, why did you decide to write this book called "Will the Soviet
Union Survive Until 1984?"
AMALRIK: (Speaks in Russian)
FLOYD: (INTERPRETING).-' I think there were three main reasons why I decided
to write that book and to try and - try and get it published. The,first was
my concern for the fate of my country. It was, alas, some years ago that
I started to be concerned at the fact that my country was heading for a
catastrophe in the not too distant future, and I wrote about it on two
occasions to the editors of Russian newspapers in Moscow, but I received
the most unconvincing replies, and then I decided to find another way
of gaining publicity for my views. In the second place, since, as I under-
stand it, my book would appear abroad mainly, and would be distributed
principally there, I set myself the objective of refuting those current
and inaccurate ideas about my country which are widespread, mainly in the
United States, that is, about the liberalization of the Soviet regime
which is allegedly taking place. And thirdly, I had the same reason as
any author has who writes a book: given that these ideas had come into
my head, it was natural that I should want to write about them.
What is really happening in the Soviet regime, in my opinion, is not that it
is getting more liberal but getting more senile. Liberalization would pre-
suppose conscious reform, whereas in reality the regime is more and more
losing control over the situation in the country. From the point of view
of the Americans the Soviet regime exercises far greater control over its
country than, say, the American country does over its. But for a totali-
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tarian regime the degree of control is already insufficient. Well, as an
example I can cite the unusual popularity of Samizdat. That's the distribu-
tion in typewritten form of uncensored writings. This doesn't happen be-
cause the regime takes a liberal view of such things or deliberately permits
it, but simply because the regime can't do anything about this problem,
mainly because there's been an extraordinary increase in the number of people
with education, and in the importance of the role played by educated people
in - in modern society, and this intelligentsia can no longer and will no
longer be satisfied with the miserable official writings which are offered.
COLE: What do ordinary people think of this regime?
AMALRIK: (Speaks in Russian)
FLOYD: (INTERPRETING): I have had 'a lot to do with factory workers and farm
workers, and it seems to me that they haven't really begun to think over the
nature of this system at all - it seems to them it's always been like this and
it always will be. But at the same time there's evidence of very deep dissatis-
faction with particular aspects of the regime, and, well, this can assume the
most varied forms. Some are dissatisfied because they. receive extremely little
money by comparison with others, so they don't have enough to live on. Others
are dissatisfied because they can't buy anything for the relatively high wages
they earn. The farm workers are dissatisfied with their lack of civil rights,
in that they cannot leave the villages. The factory workers are dissatisfied
with their complete dependence on the factory managements. People living in
small towns are dissatidfied because they can't - they don't have the right to
move to bigger towns when there's no work in the small ones. And gradually some
people, at all events, begin to have the idea that all of these local, smaller
problems have their origins in the imperfections of the political system under
which we live.
What may lead to a revolution is the utter lack of good sense in the upper class
which is trying to avoid any change and'to prevent society from having any mo-
bility, which is always!x1civing to preserve and make permanent the breakup of
our society into tightly closed castes.
COLE: Mr. Amalrik, the United States is vilified every day in the Soviet press,
on Soviet television, and on radio here. America is pictured to Russians as a
land where everyone's starving, where there's no freedom, and as the enemy.
Why is this?
AMALRIK: (Speak in Russian)
FLOYD: (INTERPRETING): If the regime is to make itself look attractive in the
eyes of its own people, it must constantly depict in the most repulsive light
all other countries, especially the economically advanced ones. And it has to .
be said that.for a considerable time now, this - this approach, this method,
has been effective. For example, I have had occasion to hear Russian farm
workers saying' something like'this: "Oh, well, life's very bad for us, but we
are at least able to eat potatoes every day, and sometimes they bring us some
kerosine. But how on earth do people live in the capitalist countries? There's
probably nothing at all to eat, there."
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COLE: What did the average Russian think when Americans landed on the moon?
AMALRIK: (Speaks in Russian)
FLOYD: (INTERPRETING): I think people reacted in different ways, various ways.
Some rejoiced at it, as a great victory, not just for the Americans but for the
whole of mankind. Others took it rather badly, because for ten years the Soviet
people had had it drummed into them that the first man to set foot on the moon
would be a Soviet man and that this would be final, complete proof of the super-
iority of the socialist system.
COLE: Is it true that opponents of the regime here are put into mental hospitals
to get'rid of them?
AMALRIK: (Speaks in Russian)
FLOYD: (INTERPRETING): Yes,-it's true. I think it's the most disgusting thing
that this regime does. At the same time, it seems to me this is a clear indica-
tion of the complete ideological capitulation of the regime in the face of its
opponents, if the regime can't find anything else to do with them but to declare
them to be out of their minds. I am very well acquainted with a number of people
who have been put into psychiatric hospitals and certified as being not respons-
ible for their actions. There's General Grigorenko, then there's Ivan Yakhimo-
vich. The same fate now threatens Natalia Gorbanyevskaya. And I want to say
that these are perfectly normal, clear-thinking people, and they have been meted
out a terrible fate. They have to live there among genuinely deranged people,
and moreover for an utterly undefined period, since the period of detention in
a psychiatric hospital is not laid down in the sentence of the court. -
But I consider that no system of rule by force can exist without-people who are
ready to submit to that rule. And if we don't want the rule of force to,prevail.,.
we must all fight against it, and not just say the regime is bad, that we have
to suffer, and so forth. It - it is a bad system, but that doesn't absolve us
of blame for it's being bad.
COLE: You seem rather dissatisfied. Would you like to leave the Soviet Union?
AMALRIK: (81peaks in Russian)
FLOYD (INTERPRETING): I'm dissatisfied with this political system, but this is'
the country in which I was born, and I hope that in due course everything will
change. No, I don't want to leave this country. It's another question . whether.
if I'd been able to make a choice before my birth, then I would have preferred
to be born in another country.
(ANNOUNCEMENT)
REASONER: Andre Amalrik, the author, the second of the three Russians'that we're
watching tonight, spoke of the use of mental hospitals as a kind of a prison for
dissenters. We've heard about that in this country. Is it fairly common?
COLE: It's widespread in the Soviet Union, and actually, the man you're about
to see is a man who, knows insane asylums very well. He's a young dissident,
27 years old. He spent six of those 27 years in insane asylums, ;prisons, con-
centration camps. His name.is Vladimir Bukovsky.
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REASONER: What was his offense?
COLE: Well, his crimes were poetry readings - the first time he was sent to an
insane asylum was because he was found to possess a book, an anti-Communist book
written by a well-known Communist of the time, a book called "The New Class" by
the Yugoslav, Milovan Djilas.
REASONER: He went to prison for that?
REASONER: You interviewed him outdoors. Why, Bill?
COLE: Well, by that time the secret police knew that I was filming, and I was
under close surveillance, as Bukovsky is right now, as he's been for - ever
since last January, when he got out of his last stretch of prison. So we found
a secluded wood outside Moscow, screened in by - brush, and we filmed there.
REASONER: Let's go to the Moscow woods and Mr. Bukovsky.
COLE: What is life like for a dissident like yourself inside an insane asylum?
BUIKOVSKY: (Speaks in Russian)
FLOYD (INTERPRETING): Imagine to yourself a prison - an old prison, which was
a prison even before the Revolution - in which there are something like a thousand
prisoners, more than half of them murderers, people who've committed serious
crimes at a time when they were out of their minds, people who are genuinely sick,
and the remainder who are political prisoners, dissidents, for whom no article -
could be found in the criminal code, whom they could find no other way of treat-
ing but in such a place.
The fact is that the inmates, the patients in that hospital, the prisoners, are
people who have done such things which from the point of view of the authorities
are crimes, but which are not criminal from the point of view of the law. And
in order in some way to isolate them, to punish them in some way, such people are
declared to be insane and are detained as patients In these mental prison hospi-
tals. Some time passed before I understood this and before I got to know my fel-
low prisoners. I believe this is the usual fate for a person who wishes to be
himself, who wants to say what he thinks, to.act in accordance with his convic-
tions and his ideas. Events of recent years confirm my supposition. Many people,
tens, hundreds of people, have been declared insane and committed to various hos-
pitals, mainly special ones, like those in Kazan, Leningrad, Chernikovsk,
Sec:hyovka, and so forth.
Its very much more difficult to get out of that place than it is to get into it.
Firstly, in order.-to get out you must declare openly and officially to the doc-
tors that you admit that you are sick - "Yes, I was - I'm ill. I didn't know
what I was doing." And the second condition is to admit you were wrong, to dis-
.avow what you did. I know of several cases of people who refused to say that
they had done wrong and spent many long years in the hospital.
Nikolai Samsonov, for example, a geophysicist from Leningrad, who was kept there
simply because he refused to admit he was a sick man. Another of my friends in
the madhouse was, for example, a French Communist of Rumanian origin who had
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 lived lPPx 4,FRrtR91pm IA9N9s%9le 'P#QP9&9194APO Mo5M1 tb
learn, to see what Communism was like in practice. He went to work in. a foot-
wear factory in Moldavia, and worked there for a long time. But he was dis-
pleased that the workers there received such low wages. He told his workmates
that they ought to fight for better pay. They went on strike. He was arrested
and declared insane. In the hospital he just couldn't understand what had
happened to him, how Communists could do such things. For him, Communism and
the struggle for a better life were more or less the same thing. He just
couldn't understand, and towards the end of his stay he really began to go out
of his mind, it seems to me, because he was telling everybody that the Soviet
government was under the'influence of the Vatican.
I had a lot of friends there and their fate, all of their cases, were proof for
me that the people who landed up in that hospital were those who had done things
for which they couldn't be brought to court, who had committed no offense, and
the hospital was simply a means of getting rid of them, of putting them out of
sight. The hospital regime was similar to any prison regime. An hour's exer-
cise a day, locked cells, outside visitors once a month, one letter a month to
relatives, one parcel a month, exactly the same as in a prison. The doctors
themselves realized that it was not a hospital but a prison, and sometimes they
said so openly. If a patient misbehaved, he could be punished.
COLE: How are dissidents treated in an insane asylum?
BUKOVSKY: (Speaks in Russian)
FLOYD (INTERPRETING): It was very easy to get into trouble in that hospital,
and the punishments were very severe. There are three kinds of.punishment which
are most commonly applied there. The first type is carried out by medical means.
I think people know about a preparation known as Sulfazine, which is used if one
of the patients, one of the prisoners in the hospital committed some offense,
gave a doctor a rude answer to some question or declared that a doctor in the
hospital was no better than an executioner in a white smock. Such a remark
would be sufficient to involve punishment. Sulfazine is a pretty painful form
of punishment. It causes your temperature to rise to about 40 degrees Centi-
grade, you feel you have a fever, can't get out of bed or move about, and it
goes on for a day or two. If the treatment is repeated, then the effects can
last a whole week or - or even ten days.
A second form of punishment involves the use of the preparation Aminozine, used
in psychotherapy, also known, probably, in other countries. It causes the pa-
tient to feel drowsy, sleepy. He may sleep several days on end, and if the
treatment is given regularly he may go on sleeping for as long as it is continued.
The third form of punishment we used to call - to call the "roll-up". It in-
volves the use of wet canvas, long - long pieces of it, in which the patient is
rolled up from head to`foot so tightly that it was difficult for him to breathe,
and as the canvas began to dry out it would get tighter and tighter and make the
patient feel even worse. But that punishment was applied with some caution.
There were medical men present while it was taking place who made sure that the
patient did not lose consciousness, and if his pulse began to weaken then the
canvas would be released.
Altogether, the medical forms of punishment were pretty widely used, and it
was sufficient for a patient to appear cheerful or, on the contrary, miserable,
show dissatisfaction or too calm - any deviation which might appear suspicious
to the psychiatrists - to give them grounds for believing that he was ill -
that would be sufficient for them to start using those treatments.
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COLE: Well, what is life like for you here now? Are you harassed by the secret
police?
BUKOVSKY: (Speaks in Russian)
FLOYD (INTERPRETING): I was released from the camp in January 1970, but I did
not change my opinions, and I did not give up my activity. I continue to do what
I was doing before, and therefore it's possible that I shall be arrested any day.
I can be arrested at any moment, when I meet foreign correspondents, when I am
distributing written material forbidden in the Soviet Union, and in other circum-
stances. It doesn't matter what excuse the authorities find for arresting ma.
The reason is unimportant for them. There's a saying in the camps so long as
they've got the man, they'll always find the law to fix him. Of course, I know
I am being followed, my telephone is always tapped. I feel that I am constantly
under observation by the authorities. When I have to do something that I don't
-want the authorities to know about I manage to get away from them. But it's
pretty difficult in general. I am unable to get the sort of work I like doing,
if only because I an sufficiently well known, or because in my identity card
there is a mark which tells anyone that I've been in prison.
I an atten &clsLea about the prosp,~cta for change In this country , 'what wee hope
to get from ,our activity, how many supporters we have and these are understandable,
legitimate questions. But they are very difficult to answer. You have to under-
stand first of all what's the essence of our struggle. The essence of it is, in
my view, the struggle against fear, the fear which has gripped the people since
the time of Stalin, which has still not left people, and thanks to which this
system continues to exist, the system of dictatorship, of pressure, of oppression.
It's into the struggle against fear that we put our greatest efforts, and in that
struggle great importance attaches to persopal example, the example which we give
people. I personally did what I considered right, spoke out on those occasions
when I wanted to, and I'm alive, I am now sitting here and not in prison. I'm
alive, I can get about,' I can live. For me and for many people that's very im-
portant - it shows that it's possiblb to fight, and that it is necessary to fight.
REASONER: Bill, we've seen three Russians who willingly put themselves into
hazard to make these films. What's apt to happen to them?
COLE: Harry, I think these three men are in serious trouble. The Soviet state
simply does not permit criticism. Of course, the authorities might wait six
months, maybe a year; they'll wait until the furor dies down, and these men will
be picked up. They'll go back to the mental hospitals or to the concentration.
camps where they were before.
REASONER: They knew that was going to - it was a possibility, when they agreed
to and urged the interviews?
COLE: Actually, a couple of times I said, look, let's - let's throw this film
away. They said, no, regardless of the consequences, we want it shown.
REASONER: Bill., you brought out a message from a man who went through something
like this, didn't you?
COLE: Yes, Harry. When I was expelled from Moscow I brought out on my person
e. small tape that came, from the labor camps in the far north. It was a tape made
by a very celebrated Russian writer, Alexander Ginzburg, who was imprisoned in
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1967 for protesting other trials of other writers. And you asked me what these
three Russians you saw tonight can expect. I think that this message tells what
they can expect.
REASONER: How did you know this was Ginzburg,on the tape?
COLE: I played it for friends of his in Moscow who verified, who confirmed that
it was his voice.
REASONER: And the first,voice we hear is another - another prisoner, a Lithuanian? '.
COLE: Yes. A Lithuanian who spoke a little bit of English, who introduced Ginsburg.
REASONER: Let's hear some of.this message from inside.
VOICE: This recording was made under complicated camp conditions.
GINZBURG: (Speaks in Russian)
FLOYD (INTERPRETING):, In this concentration camp, for lack of. medical aid, six-
teen political prisoners have perished recently. Here there is only one doctor
from amongtthe prisoners, the rights of man are violated, thousands.of people 'are
deprived of their freedom, and everyone goes in danger of his life.
I have just accompanied on his last journey my friend Jan Matusha. Three months
ago the Estonian Ans Frants died.
For six months now have been languishing in the Vladimir prison - that living
grave - my friends Yuri Daniel and Valeri Ronkin. Several dozen of our friends
were arrested in Moscow' recently. Camps, prisons, and the death of those near
to us - that is what we are surrounded by, and nevertheless we hope to hold out.
We are sustained, not by the so-called decisive stand of the Soviet Union, nor
by the good will of the governments of the great powers, but by the wrath, pro-
test and solidarity of all honest people, of all who, hold dear the dignity of
man, democracy and peace. In decisive resistance to modern barbarism I see the
only real guarantee that the rights of man will be observed, here and through-
out the world.
(ANNOUNCEMENT)
REASONER: Any of us who have seen a Chekov play know that understanding Russia
and the Russians is hot always easy. Here to try to help us understand better
are two authorities on Soviet politics and literature who bring a special knowl-
edge of the voices of dissent that we've heard tonight. Patricia Blake is an
authority on Russian literature. She has written extensively on Soviet dissent,
and is the author of several books, including "Dissident Vocies in Soviet Liter-
ature." She is a,contributing editor to Time Magazine. Abraham Brumberg pro-
bably is as familiar as any American with the dissident movement in Soviet
Russia, and he is now writing a book on political opposition in the Soviet Union.
For-many years editor of the journal, Problems of Communism, he most recently
edited a collection of Russian documents entitled "In Quest of Justice: Protest
and Dissent in the Soviet Union Today." We asked the official Soviet news agency
in New York to send a representative to comment on these interviews. They de-
clined.
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One thing that interests me, with two people who know about as much about Russia
as you can from this far away. What was the - what was the impact of those
interviews? Miss Blake?
BLAKE: Shattering, really. One has the impression of such nobility and purity
and heroism. I felt that viewing and hearing them speak was an ennobling experi-
ence, I think, for Americans.
REASONER: Who are the people.that we're talking about? What do the three people
that we saw and the one that we heard represent? Mr. Brumberg?
BRUMBERG: Well, I think we saw three representatives of what I would call the
free, untrammeled spirits of Russia. It is a phenomenon which is as characteristic
of the Soviet Union as it was of pre-Revolutionary Russia. These are people who
are fired by a passion against injustice. They may endure injustices for a long
time; they may be silent, but when they do finally speak out, nothing-is going
to stop them. They will court arrest, imprisonment, exile, possibly even execu-
tion, for their beliefs. I think this is a very, I think, as Pat said, a very
ennobling phenomenon, and a very moving and a very-typical Russian type that we
saw.
REASONER: Well, now, if they're characteristic of a type of Russian, what about
the reaction of the regime to them? Is that characteristically Russian?
BRUMBERG: Well, I would say that too is characteristically Russian, yes. Of
course, we have to distinguish between the reaction of the regime in Stalin's
days, and the reaction to - of the regime since Stalin's days. Understand, any
dissent would have been absolutely unthinkable, even the slightest flare of
skepticism or disagreement would be suppressed, so that speaking up was unthink-
able. Since Stalin's death, we. have seen the rise of what might be called a
public opinion in the Soviet Union. It is-still very small. These people still
are very much pereecut'ad by the regime. In fact, if anything, there has been a
reversal from a relatively lenient policy that existed in the last years of
Khrushchev's reign, to more - more repression. It is not the kind of repression
that was practiced by Stalin, but it is - has still very grievous effects.
REASONER: They spread the word among themselves by means of this underground
newspaper. How many of them are there, would you guess, in percentage terms.
If there were an election, a free election, in Russia today, would they be a
major third party, or second party?
BLAKE: You know, it's very hard to judge - incalculable, even-it there were
sociology, even if there were polls in Russia, it's really hard to measure the
thrust and influence of ideas on people. And sometimes ideas take a long time,
to mature. But in the words of Leo Tolstoy: "A word is an act," and will cause
reverberations and resonances which will not be seen immediately. But later on,
and we've seen this movement develop in an extraordinary way. The numbers -
it's hard to say'- you can have numbers from a hundred to ten thousand, just hard
core people engaged in an active way in this democratic movement.
BRUMBERG: May I, perhaps, add one other thing, that we ought to distinguish be-
tween the active dissenters and their passive collaborators. I think that the
very existence of a newspaper such as the Chronicle of Current Events attests to
the fact that there are people who?,-while they may not be necessarily willing to
put their signatures on some of the petitions printed, nevertheless will help
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out a great deal in circulating, informing the editors of this newspaper of re-
prisals, of what has been going on in the camps, which is one of the most fasci-
nating items that we read in this Chronicle, are hunger strikes., political pro-
tests within the labor camps in the Soviet Union. How do these items get out
from the camps? We don't know. But I think it's safe to assume that there are
quite a few people who are willing to collaborate with the dissenters in making
their word known throughout the world.
REASONER: How typical is a - is a fairly harsh punishment? Mr. Ginzburg spoke,
in the tape from the labor camp, of dozens of his friends, of more than a dozen
deaths in recent months. Does a Soviet intellectual stand a fair chance of wind-
ing up in jail?
BLAKE: A Soviet dissident intellectual, certainly.
REASONER: Part of what the people we heard from tonight are saying is that they
are merely demanding the freedoms that they technically have. Is that correct?
There's nothing unconstitutional about what they did?
BRUMBERG: They do some see as their main -their strongest weapon, the exist-
ence on paper of legal rights. The constitution of the Soviet Union is one of
the most democratic and liberal constitutions in the world. It promises freedom
of speech, freedom>of assembly, and when these dissenters speak up, they point to
the fact that what they are demanding is in effect the observance of Soviet laws.
They know very well thlat these Soviet laws are not observed, are violated and
abused continuously.
BLAKE: This, by the way, is a completely new element in Russian dissent. I say
Russian, not only Soviet dissent. In the absence of any institutions, any demo-
cratic institutions, pressure groups and so on, in which you can make yourself
heard, what you - since you're helpless to do anything else, you take these ex-
isting institutions and try and make them fulfill their ideal original function.,,
And this is the strategy.
REASONER: They - they also don't seem to be internationalists, particularly,
are they? They're very Russian.
BRUMBERG: Well, in a lot of the major-areas of dissent, not the most, but one
of the causes the dissenters have taken up is the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
This is - this was very important about a year ago. We have quite a few docu-
ments protesting, and cases of individuals and groups, and even a demonstration
in Red Square. Small; to be sure, but typical of the passion.
REASONER: What do you make so far of the reaction of the government? Do you -
how do you judge which way they will go? Will they tolerate more dissent or less?
BLAKE: You knows these do leave us in a terrible dilemma. What - what we see in
the last year suggests that without far greater doses of power, the influence of
these people cannot be controlled. It's not sufficient to arrest two or three.
As Yakir said himself: "They will kill us, they will beat us, but people will
go on thinking differently." But if they choose to re-institute the whole
machinery of mass police power that we had under Stalin, then they would pay a
very high price for it. And I think they are very much aware of that. For one
thing, those people who are living in the Kremlin today know full well that if
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they re-institute this machine of power, they may be among the first to be de-
voured by it. And secondly, the whole thrust of Soviet policy in the '50s and
'GCs has been to try and give Soviet citizens some incentives for creative tech-
nology, in the sciences, for the worker, and if you re-impose power, then you
have a - a submissiveness which lacks any sort of dynamic. You cannot rule with-
out an internal dynamic of some sort.
REASONER: What about the Russian man on the street, if there is such a thing?
What would - what would these interviews mean to him? Would he sympathize, or
is he - is he happy with a generally better material lot?
BRUMBERG: Well, it's very difficult to answer this question. I'm sure there
are those who would regard some of these people as - just as intellectuals, which
means the ordinary people have very little in common. On the other hand, I think
we have to remember that there exists a vast reservoir of grievances and dis-
satisfaction - Amalrik spoke about it. The peasants are dissatisfied, the work-
ers are dissatisfied. And not only because of economic grievances, but also be-
cause of social and political repressions that are practiced against them. And
I think the future, in my opinion, of this whole movement of dissent, the demo-
cratic movement, will depend very largely on the links that the intellectuals
will or will not be able to establish with the ordinary people.
REASONER: If you could put yourself into somebody-else's shoes; suppose an offi-
cial and believing member of the Soviet regime was in our group tonight. What
would his reaction be? How would he explain those films?
BLAKE: I think the refusal of Soviet officials to come here suggests that they
would be unable to cope with the questions raised so eloquently by those three
dissenters and by Ginzburg in prison.
REASONER: What will the - what will the reaction be, officially and in the Soviet
Union, to this broadcast, and to other television use which will probably be made
of it?
BRUMBERG: Oh, I think the Soviet authorities. are going to be very displeased.
They usually tend to dismiss the dissenters more or less as psychiatrically -
more or less as misfits, as social misfits, and as representing nobody but them-
selves. This is their usual way of coping. But they are very well aware that
these people are not misfits, but on the contrary they are the most - they are
the most articulate, perhaps the most intelligent of the Soviet intellectuals to-
day, and that they are faced with a very serious ferment within Soviet society.
And this is why they are going to be quite displeased with bringing that ferment
out on the television screen.
REASONER: Will the - will wide attention for these men help them?. I mean,.will,
it protect them?
BLAKE: Well,. who knows, it will probably protect them for a time. Certainly
people like Pasternak, for example, who was protected by his winning the Nobel
Prize, by publicity in the West. But sooner or.later, the KGB, which operates
in some ways independently from the political leadership, that prepares its
cases, and it waits until the political time is right for them to move.
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BRUMBERG: I would say this, that the more formidable the stature of the dissen-
ter, the greater the chances of an outcry in the West as a deterrent to further
reprisals. A man like Solzhenytsin, though deprived of any possibility of pub-
lishing, and making himself known within the Soviet Union, nevertheless because
of his worldwide reputation, and also because of his reputation inside the Soviet
Union, has thus far been left relatively alone. The smaller, the less signifi-
cant the dissenter, the greater will be the weight of the police apparatus upon
him.
BLAKE: It hasn't saved Amalrik, has it?
REASONER: Amalrik charged his government with a kind of a senility which is a
strange thing for a revolutionary movement to be in - in half a century. Is this
a characteristic of communism, do you think, or a characteristic of Russia? .
BRUMBERG: Oh, that's a very difficult question to answer. I think it's a
characteristic of Russian communism.
.:REASONER: Thank you very much.
ANNOUNCER: Voices From The Russian'Underground will continue.
(ANNOUNCEMENT)
REASONER: We have seen three unique interviews with Russian dissenters filmed in
Russia, filmed by William Cole before his expulsion from Moscow - CBS NEWS Cor-
respondent who makes rather a good photographer. Thank you, Bill,.
The Russians have compressed whole eras of national development into their half
century of communism, from the rough, new enthusiasm of revolution through the
terror of psychotic dictatorship to a period of great pride in material achieve-
ment, and now, these Russian critics of the government say, to a kind of old age
of communism, a stultification of bureaucracy and repression. The critics ob-
viously hate to see it happen. They spoke their risky pieces to Bill Cole's
camera out of patriotism and love, not enmity. Even though some of the senti-
ments of these dissenters sound like a highly intensified version of what our
dissenters say about the United States, it's difficult for Americans to under-
stand a society where criticism of the government .is a crime. But in the next
;few years, how well America understands Russia-could make. all the difference to
the world. Tonight, Comrades Yakir, Amalrik, Bukovsky and Ginzburg have helped:
ANNOUNCER: This, has been a CBS NEWS Special, Report: Voices From The Russian
Underground.
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_Nipy September 1970
YULI DANIEL DUE TO BE RELEASED
On 20 September 1965 Yuli Daniel was arrested in Moscow by the KGB
while at the same approximate time Andrey Sinyavsky was arrested in Novo-
sibirsk. The two authors were given a rigged trial for "slandering" the
Soviet system and sentenced in February 1966, Sinyavsky to seven years
at hard labor and Daniel to five years at hard labor. Inasmuch as terms
in Soviet labor camp or prison customarily start from the time of arrest,
Daniel's term should be up on 20 September, 1970.
Daniel was sent to the Potma Camps in the Mordvinian Republic, to
join thousands of other political prisoners. He withstood the efforts
of his keepers to break him with heavy work that overtaxed his war-
wounded shoulder, and with shop work under such noise conditions that
he was deafened. According to Anatoly Marchenko, a fellow prisoner,
Daniel maintained such high spirit that he earned the respect and ad-
miration of even the hardest, most anti-intellectual of the other pris-
oners. The Soviet authorities, evidently frustrated by their inability
to break Daniel in the labor camp, transferred him in September 1969 to
the Vladimir Prison where he is believed to be presently.
The Free World's press unanimously and spontaneously charged the
USSR with reverting to Stalinism. Intellectuals at all levels and in
large numbers petitioned for the immediate release or, alternatively,
a fair trial of the two. The media of twelve Communist Parties in Free
World countries (Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, UK, France, Italy,
Austria, Uruguay, US, Iceland, Chile) protested (albeit belatedly) that
the Sinyavsky-Daniel case was hurting their image.
Within the USSR the treatment of Sinyavsky and Daniel was regarded,
according to Pyotr Yakir, one of the articulate voices of the Russian
underground, as "the most important turning point" in the thinking of
the Soviet people. Why, they asked, should people such as Sinyavsky
and Daniel be arrested for speaking about what they thought. However,
in practical terms, there were only weak forces able to oppose the op-
pression of persons for their convictions. For example, samizdat, or
self-published writings distributed from hand to hand, was effective
in raising and spreading indignation but totally without influence on
Soviet policy-makers who persevered in tightening up their control over
the Soviet people during the following years.
Also with the passage of the years less and less concern has been
voiced for Daniel and Sinyavsky as the Soviets have made every effort
to keep information on them to a minimum. The Soviet authorities are
undoubtedly deluding themselves, however, if they think that the two
jailed authors have faded from the memories of freedom lovers in the
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USSR and around the world. For, as another Soviet protester, Alexander
Ginzburg, said on a tape smuggled out of his concentration camp, "We
are sustained. . .by the wrath, protest and solidarity of all honest
people, of all who hold dear the dignity of man, democracy and peace."
Whereas it's difficult and risky (but not impossible) for Soviet citi-
zens to note that Daniel ought to be released when his term is up,
there is no obstacle hindering the Free World press from going on
record that it is vigilantly watching for solid evidence that Yuli
Daniel will regain his freedom.
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Cr , WILY.
September 1970
SOVIET CARTOGRAPHIC INDISCRETIONS AT HOME AND ABROAD
"9oviet Atlas ? Look under
'Eictlon'l"
Sudhir Dar in
New Delhi
Hindustan Times
7 August 1970
CPYRGHT
Earlier this year the Western. press carried stories about. West European
and American cartographers having discovered how their opposite numbers in
the USSR were keeping the Soviet Union on the move by falsifying all official
maps available to the general public. According to the specialists, Soviet
charts and atlases published in recent years have been designed to move coast-
lines, towns, rivers, and other map features at random by as much as 25 miles.
(A sampling of those press clips is attached.)
Since the first articles appeared, it has been noted that other towns
sometimes disappear for years and then suddenly pop up again -- as in the case
of Sarova. It is not only Western cartographers who are alarmed by the Soviet
mappers' callous disregard for accuracy, the Estonians too are complaining of
short shrift given them in the newest maps of the Estonian Republic. When the
Soviets consider it politically expedient, international borders can be shifted
with equal callousness -- and not only Soviet borders: in 195+ the USSR carto-
graphically gave China some 50,000 square miles of territory belonging to India.
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To date, the Soviets refuse to give this territory back to India.
Simultaneously, though generous with Indian territory, the Soviets
have no qualms about arrogantly laying claim to some of the disputed
islands along the Sino-Soviet border, as they did just last month.
The Mystery of Sarova
About 300 miles east of Moscow in the Mordvinian Autonomous
Soviet Socialist Republic is the mysterious little town of Sa:rova
-- mysterious because after 1958 it vanished and in 1969, reappeared.
Sarova is a famous old landmark. According to Baedeker's Russia of
1914, on an excursion from Moscow to Kazan one might well stop off
at Arzamas, enjoy its railroad restaurant, and make a short side trip
to the Sarov Convent. The following description is given: "About 50
versts (33 miles) southwest of Arzamas lies the Sarov Convent
(Sarovskaya Pustyn) founded in the 17th century and containing the
wonder-working remains of Seraphim, who died in 1833 and was canonized
in 1903." Things have changed. Undoubtedly the convent still stands,
but today the entire Mordvinian Autonomous Republic is "off limits" to
all foreigners and the area around the Sarov Convent is a Natural Re-
serve and as such is "off limits" to all but a handful of Soviet
scientists, none of whom would concern themselves with the "wonder-
working remains of Seraphim."
The desecration of the Sarov Convent is cited by many older-
generation Russians as typifying the way in which the Soviets wage
propaganda against religion of any kind. In 1935 the Soviet govern-
ment officially designated the area surrounding the Sarov Convent
as the Mordvinian Natural Reserve (Mordovski Zapovednik) "for pro-
tection of particular kinds of landscape for the southern forest belt."
The area is over 95 percent forested. According to a 1969 publication,
the USSR has some 91 Natural Reserves set aside to preserve nature and
open only to scientists.
But why did the Soviet map makers bother to take Sarova off the
map -- and then last year put it back again? The Sarovka River, which
crosses the Natural Reserve area, has now disappeared too. In Soviet
atlases and on Soviet Territorial Administrative maps published in 1939
Sarova appears as a town with a population of approximately 500 and
nearby roads and a rail line are depicted as is the Sarovka River; no
indication is given of the boundary area for the Natural Reserve. In
both the Atlas Mira of 195+ and a Territorial Administrative map of
1958 Sarova is a town with a population of less than 10,000 located
within the approximately 80,000 acre area (indicated by,-!J 4- lines;
see the attached map insert illustrations) designated for the first
time as the "Mordovski Zapovednik." There is no Sarova in the Soviet
atlases published in 1962 and 1967 or on Territorial Administrative
maps issued in 1959 and 1966. On the 1966 map the area incorporating
the Natural Reserve has been expanded and the Sarovka River has dis-
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appeared. A Territorial Administrative map published in 1969, however,
puts Sarova back in its previous location and shows it again to be a
town with a population of slightly under 10,000; the Sarovka is still
missing.
The Sovietization of Estonia
In the attached article reprinted from the 7 February 1970 issue
of Sovetski Estonii, an outraged Estonian Docent at Tartus State Uni-
versity takes Soviet cartographers to task for their callous disregard
for accuracy in a series of newly published Administrative maps of the
Estonian SSR. Without coming right out and saying it, the author's
chief complaint is that the map makers have Sovietized Estonia. This
they accomplished through misspellings, erroneous transliterations of
Estonian names, and by omission of the names of some 98 populated places
which are centuries old. Errors in drafting the drainage network, the
appearance of a "mythical gulf which has 'flooded' two villages," and
the unfortunate selection of insignificant hamlets to list as secondary
populated areas are among the many other shortcomings scored by the
author.
"Cartographic Aggression" Against India
The USSR's reissuance again four months ago of an official map of
Asia which continues to cede some 50,000 square miles of the Sino-
Indian boundary to China caused indignant walkouts this summer from
both houses of India's Parliament. The attached clips from Indian and
other news media tell how this Soviet provocation, which many Indian
Members of Parliament view as "blatant Soviet cartographic aggression,"
has rankled India for the past 15 years.
The objecting Members of Parliament charged the Government with
failing to make the Soviet Union revise its maps containing the errone-
ous delineations of India's northern territories and walked out after
they in turn failed to get any assurances from the Minister of External
Affairs, Mr. Swaran Singh, that the Government would ask the Soviet
Union to issue a corrigendum to its newest map. The Minister told Par-
liament that the USSR had assured India that the wrong depiction of
India's boundaries did not "in any way affect or reflect the Soviet
Government's understanding of and respect for India's frontiers." As
one correspondent points out, however, all East European countries, in-
cluding Yugoslavia, use official Soviet maps.
During the last few years the Indian Government has come across
several official Soviet publications, all of them corroborating Chinese
claims to regions along India's northeastern and northwestern frontier.
These publications included all editions of Atlas Mira since 1954, a
map of India published by the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1956, educa-
tional atlases published in 1967 and 1969, and a wall map based on a
Soviet cartographic survey issued in 1967. Also during the last few
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years, Indian representations failed to elicit from Moscow anything
more than a standard reply that matters "would be looked into." The
final affront came in May this year with the publication of Volume I
of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia which includes an official map of Asia
that shows the same 50,000 square-mile area still cartographically ceded
to China.
"Cartographic Imperialism" Against China
Last month the Soviets announced plans to develop two of the many
islands along the disputed Sino-Soviet border. An announcement which
in effect signals Peking that these particular: islands are incontest-
ably Soviet territory and that they are not to be negotiated. The is-
land area, at the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri Rivers, is by far.
the most important of the more than 700 border islands claimed by both
China and the Soviet Union. It lies just opposite the strategic city
of Khabarovsk, Headquarters of the USSR Far East Military District.
Soviet maps depict the area as including two islands, the Tarabarov and
Big Ussuri. The two are separated by a narrow channel. So narrow is
the channel that on Chinese maps the island is one, Hei-hsia-tzu or
"Blindman's Alley."
The Soviet development plans were published in an article in the
2 August issue of an important Party newspaper, Sovetskaya Rossiya, in
which Soviet planners proposed extensive agricultural development of
the area through the establishment of three large collective farms to
produce milk, meat, potatoes and vegetables for Khabarovsk. The article
describes the projected plan as an outgrowth of decisions taken at the
July plenum of the Party's Central Committee, thereby reinforcing Soviet
claims to ownership of the territory. The article also alludes to the
area as important for the defense of Khabarovsk and refers to Chinese
use of the island area as an operational base for Red Guard detachments,
thereby reinforcing the impression that the area is of more strategic
than economic value to the USSR. A translation of the Soviet article
is attached. To date, Chinese media have not reacted to the Soviet an-
nouncement.
Note: Comparison of the attached reprints from four Soviet maps de-
picting the area of the Mordvinian Natural Reserve illustrates
paucity of data given on maps and map legends in the later series.
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CPYRGHT
SAROVA IN 1939
M7?N ~~ IISMIRN
~. ~ CA T~aiG+ fr y
d ~. , aj L.
wa
/an waani
~??sw ? Sri
Legend:
Cities with less than 10,000 persons b
Settlements with less than 500 persons $0
Narrow Gauge Railroad
Paved Roads
Unimproved, unpaved roads
ASSR and Oblast boundary Alilx~~ai-1~?~a~ia.
Source: Mordovskaya ASSR Administrativnaya
Karta, Glavnoye upravlenye geodezii
i kartografii, 1939.
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CPYRGHT
SAROVA 71N 1958
s to tpKM.
Legend:
Populated places
Chief roads
Other roads
Zapovednik (Natural Reserve)
ASSR and Oblast Boundary
- , IAI~t-_rr
Source: Mordovskaya ASSR Administrativnaya
Karta, Glavnoye upravlenye geodezii
i kartografii, 1958..
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CPYRGHT
SAROVA IN 1966
4 to to Km
Legend-
Less than 10,000 persons
Roads
Zapovednik (Natural Reserve)
ASSR and Oblast boundary
Source: Mordovskaya ASSR Administrativnaya
Karta, Glavnoye upravlenye geodezii
i kartografii, 1966.
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CPYRGHT
SARDOVA IN 1969
Legend:
Less than 10,000 persons
Roads
Roads with bus service
Zapovednik (Natural Reserve)
ASSR and Oblast boundary
Source: Mordovskaya ASSR Administrativnaya
Karta, Glavnoye upravlenye geodezii
i kartografii, 1969.
MWI
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 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000400050001-7 CPYRGHT
NEW YORK TIMES
18 January 1970
CPYRGHT
New SovieGive Distortion
National Security Is!
,Believed Reason for
Altered Features
8peclal to The New Yor% Tmeo
%1A UTA(r"'I'rl ~~ 1~n 17
Governrnent'cartographcrs have!
gliscovcred puzzling locational
phifts in recent official atlases
that seem to indicate distortion
of'the entire map or the Soviet
Union for national security.
According to the specialist
the Russian charts and atlases,
once renowned for their stan-
dards of excellence, have been
designed in the last few years
to move coastlines, towns, riv-
ers and other map features at
random by as much as 25 miles
,in an apparent attempt at de-
ception. l
? in one of the most unusual
,cases of such deformations,
`which have also been detected
by West European analysts, a
transport center in Western
Russia was moved 10 miles
from its true location. on a
lake shore, and converging rail-
road lines were twisted out of
elir nment to conform.
The possibility that the re-
vised map locations are based
on new surveys Is ruled out by
United States analysts on the
ground that most of the Soviet
Union, particularly the. Euro-
pean section, had already' been
'surveyed with a high degree of
accuracy.
L Information. Omitted
The Soviet authorities, re-
nted to be among the most
security minded in the worm
have traditional) omitted sensi-
tive defense information from
their published general n:^--
and have altogether prohibited
the dissemination of detailed
topographic sheets.
A further tightening of se-
curity sometime after 1964 has
,now affected the publislic'_
maps.
United States analysts say
they wonder wh the Russians
should have undertaken an in-
tricate program of distortion at
what was evidently a heavy
cost in time and money. If the
intention was to mislead West-
ern strategic planners In the
guidance and targeting of inter.
continental ballistic missiles,
the Americans say. atf expensive
effort was wasted because the
TM New York Timpe Jon. Is. 1970
Map above shows deformed
Soviet coastline (broken),
as It appears on current
official maps, compared
with correct line (Solid).
Finnish coast (heavy line)
remained unchanged. Map
at left shows shift of the
rail town of Novel (white
dot) from its correct lake-
side location (black dot).
atlas in their own map Com-
pilation work.
Although we drformatlon ef-
spired by sc.;:rlty cons era?
tions, it meets not only stra-
tegic places but all parts of
the Soviet Union. even to the
most remote tminhabited areas
of Siberia.
The mislocation of the West
Russian rail town of Novel is
cited by the Government spc-
alists as nrohably ones of the
ost extreme cases. The town,
t gether with the new grid'
s stem, wrs shifted 10 miles'
~t the northwest, but for an
explained reason the small
'I ko on which Novel Is situated
as not moved along with the
her map features.
According to the analysts,!
t e discovery of such discrep-1
dies led to the detection of!
t e entl:c sales of map defor.I
ations, I
United States can use older, un The first edition was regard-
altered maps and modern tech- ed as one of the finest typo-
niques, presumably intelligence- eraphic products when It ap?
gathering earth satellites, if peared in 1954. The maps of
necessary. the Soviet Union in the second
ment circles is that the Soviet
deception program may have
been directed at another poten-
tial adversary, sych_-as _Ccun-
ImunLt_ China. with less ad-
Vanccd lnfo`rnSatlt3tf and means
1to obtain,it.
It1 the-%'iew of officials here
the tightened Soviet mat) con-
trols may have been prompted,
Eby what the Russians regarded;
as breaches of their security.!
These could have included high-
altitude aerial photography byl
American U?'3 planes, one of
which was shot down in 1960,
and information supplied byy
Oleg Penkovsky, a Soviet nffi-
,i I who spied for the West
and was tried and executed in
?
?crOW in 1963.
WA d e
1 n t
we
on
s-7
totted although foreign areas'
remained unchanged.
The distortion program In-
volved two steps, according toI
Government analysts. The first
was the scrapping of a well-
,mown Soviet map projection,
the network of geographical co-
ordinate lines by which . the
earth's surface can be mapped.
Random Mislocations
The map grid, called Kavrai?
Sky's Conic Projection, for its
dcsignef, was replaced by one
that is unidentified and is un-
familiar to United States spe-
cialists. They contend that the
new system Is mathematically
inconsistent and is not a true
projection at a11.,.
The second step is described
'as further deformation by ran
accts
ep
a an
The decision to alter the 1dom mislocation of -map fen-I
,maps Is believed to have been; !tunes with respect to the new
made some time between 1964 grid. These small shifty, which
when the last Soviet atlas with' 'would be of little practical sIg-
true locations was printed, and .nificance to the casual MAP
1967, when Moscow published user. were detected by Ameri-
the second edition of published
World can and West European ex-
Atlas. perts when they used a Soviet
25 January 1970
Distorted Soviet Maps
Lions, particularly in northern'
while in the U.S.S.R. In 1966.
to Leningrad report the samel
problem.
of Nevel is ten miles north-
tion (along the Gulf of Finland
pyR H I
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NEWSWEEK
2' February 1970
SOVIET UNION:
Atlas Shrugged
-e ussians almost got away %v-t r it.
If it hadn't been for n tcani of shnrp-
e-yed U.S. Government experts, the at.
est edition of Moscow's famed World
Atlas would still be considered the best.
But during a routine review, the Ameri-
cans stumbled upon some glaring inac-
curacies in the otherwise im recable
maps. And last week they revealed that,
in their judgment, those distortions were
,no accident but part of a conscious Soviet
attempt at deception.
What led the U.S. experts to this con-
'elusion was the fact that the Russians
are hardly neophyte cartographers. On
the contrary, they have long enjoyed a
worldwide reputation for their pinpoint
precision. Yet, in the second edition of
the World Atlas, which was published
in 1967, several Soviet towns, railroad
lines, lakes i{nd rivers have been moved
,from their true locations, in some cases
by as much as 25 miles. The vital rail
junction of Nevcl in western Russia, for
'example, was shifted 10 miles away from
its lakeshore location. Stretches of Soviet
coastline bordering the icy Gulf of Fin-
land were extensively distorted. And in
remote Siberia, Bratsk, a city of 300,000
people, underwent a major cartographic
.transformation (map). The site of the
Ovorld's largest hydroelectric plant, Bratsk
is a key outpost in Moscow's attempt to
develop its Siberian resources. It also,
presumably, is important enough to be
targeted for an intercontinental-ballistic-
1uissile strike should the U.S. or China go
to-wart with Russia In the future...
There was little doubt that the securi-
ty-conscious Russians had distorted the
maps in an effort to mislead strategic
planners in Washington and Peking.
Work on the new maps began sometime
in the mid-1960s, a tin-c when Moscow
knew little about the sophisticated tech-
niques of U.S. satellite photography. By
now, of course, spy satellites have made
it virtually impossible for Russian cartog-
raphers to pull the wool over the eyes of
their counterparts in the U.S. As for the
Chinese, they presumably possess old-
but perfectly accurate-Soviet' maps of
their own. Thus, in order to deceive
-anyone; the Russians will have to m:.-:e
their cities rather than simply tinker with
their maps.
`ones. The only explanation that has been
suggested relates to another old Russian.
tradition, an obsessive preoccupation with,
military secrecy.
But, though it was understandable that
'wartime Britain should remove its sign-
posts to ensure the benighting of all those
nuns who might be disguised German
parachutists, the military value of the
Soviets change the map: Red Soviet ploy is far from clear: It is true
line traces ,shifts in Moscow. that, whereas in Stalin's time nobody in
Russia could ever see a detailed n-ap
without military permission, the atlases
published in the Khrushchev. period were
quite accurate. The accuracy attained
between 1954--and 1964 may well have.
frightened the defence authorities. But
-their nervous tinkering with geographical
facts now seems quite pointless. Neither
the Americans nor The Chinese can be
fooled into pointing their missiles in the
wrong direction, for bdth have had ample
time to obtain the earlier unfalsifred
maps. The only result that this bit of
apparent military madness looks like
having is that it may leave a bid dent in
the "reputation of the ; Academy of
Sciences among international scholars.
THE ECONOMIST JANUARY 24, 1970
Map reference 1984
Stands Leningrad where it did ? Not on
the latest Soviet snaps it doesn't. Undo-
ing all Peter the Great's labours, these
maps appear to shift the whole city east-
ward and let the waters of the Gulf of
Finland cover the site on which it was
once so painfully built up out of the sea.
. As Leningrad goes, so goes the whole
nation. Sharp-eyed cartographers in other
countries have detected apparently delib-
erate distortions of up to sg miles applied
to the positions of towns, rivers, coast-
lines, railways, hills and other features
on the new maps-for which the
Academy of Sciences in Moscow is
responsible.
Russia, tsarist and communist, has a
.long tradition of the building of " Potem-
kin villages "--impressive facades, usually
erected along a route to be travelled by
some gullible but important personage,
with the aim of concealing the dr' ary
reality that lies behind them. But this
is something different. The new maps do
not seem to show fictitious towns or
l villages ; they merely juggle with existing
pprovea i-or Kelease
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7 February 1970
SHORTCOMINGS OF A ,NEW MAP
From the mail of "Soviet Estoniya"
After more than a ten-year interval, a new administrative map of the
Estonian SSR has finally appeared. 1/
A total of 92,00 copies have been issued, of which )0,000 have appeared
on the book market and were quickly sold out. One might conclude that the
new map has fully satisfied its customers. However, there is no basis for
such complacency.
It is true that the first impression of the map design is favorable.
A dense network of highways, a large number of populated places, rayon
boundaries, and a schematic depiction of the rivers and large lakes are all
found on the map.
However, in the course of working with the map mistakes and defects come
to light, deficiencies which should be corrected in the next edition. Names
are distorted, as in Cape Purekkari and Kassare Island, and also errors have
been made in the transliteration of Latvian names into the Estonian language.
There are mistakes in the drafting of the drainage network: the basin of Lake
Vyrts'yarv is shown connected in two places (along the rivers Ykhne and
Tyanassil'ma) with the rivers of the Riga Gulf basin, which does not correspond
to the truth in either case. On the western shore of Lake Vyrts'yarv is shown
a mythical gulf which has "flooded" two villages (Kivilyppe and Yarve).
There are also inaccuracies in the spelling of populated places. In
Valgaskiy rayon, Igaste is given instead of the correct Iygaste. In Vyruskiy
rayon, Obiniste is given in place of Obinitsa; in Yygevaskiy rayon, Pudukyula
instead of Pudivere; in Kokhtla-Yarveskiy rayon, Viluze instead of the correct
Viluzi, and in place of Tarumaa--Taruma. In Pyl'vaskiy rayon, Maritsa is shown
instead of the correct Maaritsa, and Maekyula instead of Myaekyula; in
Pyarnuskiy rayon, Yukhasel'ya is given instead of Yukhassel'ya. In Tartuskiy
rayon, the Tyakhtvereskiy sel'soviet is located not in Rakhinge, but in
Il'matsalu. On Mukhu Island, the Kuyvastu settlement and landing for ferry
boats plying the strait is represented as the unknown hamlet of Vyykyula. But
all these errors are insignificant in comparison with the absurd choice of
populated places to be represented on the map.
The most annoying shortcoming of the map is the fact that, out of 237
sel'soviets, only 139 are named on the map. The vast majority (90%) of the
Estonian sel'soviets carry the names of centuries-old populated places. These
1/ The Estonian SSR Administrative Map. Scale: 1:600,000. Editor: N.N.
Timofeyev. Technical editor: N.V. Kbvedcheniya. Issue: 20,000. Moscow 19,68.
The Estonian SSR Administrative Map. Issue: 52,000. Moscow 1969.
The Estonian SSR Administrative Map (in the Estonian Language). Issue:
20,000. Moscow 1969.
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400050001-7
are ancient villages and towns, whose names were later used by churches and
parishes, then by volosts, and finally by the sel'soviets. Under the names of
these sel'soviets (parishes)have been organized the valuable collections of many
of the Estonian SSR's institutions: the State Historical Archives, and treasures
of the Ethnographic Museum, the collections on dialects and phonetics of the
Institute of Language and Literature, and the materials of the Commission on
Regional Studies of the Academy of Sciences and of other institutions.
Why, then, do we not see on the map the names of such well-known
populated places, for which sel'soviets are named, as Alatskivi, Val'yals,
Kaarma, Karksi, Myniste, Paystu, Rannu, Ridala, Khummuli, Emmaste, and at
least 80 others? The "secret" lies in the fact that these sel'soviets are
"'encoded" under the little-known names of Lakhepere, Kiriku, Kaysvere, Kaali,
Rooksoo, Aydu, Valla-Palu, Kyabla, Soe, Viyterna, and others. As it happened,
however, the executive committees of the rural soviets, about which we are
speaking, are located not in the well-known settlements mentioned above, but
in their outskirts, where there were vacant houses. The map, however, denotes
only their addresses--that is, the names of farmsteads, hamlets, and crossroads
where these buildings stand. Thus, in order to find the true names of the
sel'soviets, one has to refer to the handbook of administrative-territorial
divisions, and, from the addresses written on the map, reconstruct their names.
The second major shortcoming of the map is the unfortunate selection
of "other" (secondary) populated points. For the most part, these are completely
insignificant hamlets, places where the finger of the compiler happened to
stop in his perusal of the source materials. To make matters worse, his
approach has turned up names which have nothing at all in common with the
socialist transformation in the republic's rural economy, although it would seem
to be time to consider carrying on the map the names of the new, well-
established central settlements of sovkhozes and kolkhozes.
Near Tallinn, there is a suburban sel'soviet bearing the name of the
ardent revolutionary A. Sommerling. More than 500 people are already residing
in the central settlement of this sovkhoz. The sovkhoz is the place of
pilgrimage for numerous foreign delegations and is well known abroad. However,.
neither the sel'soviet nor the settlement is designated on the map; only the
sel'soviet's location is given--the settlement of Lekhm'ya.
In designating populated places on the map one ought to take into
consideration their economic significance as well as their population size.
To do so, it is necessary to have a good knowledge of the geography of the
republic and to use various sources of information. The cartographer who
compiled this map is evidently not well versed in the subtleties' of the
republic's geography and economy.
One cannot help but conclude that the preparation of such maps requires
the aid of persons well versed in the geography of the republic. 'T'here are
sufficient-numbers of such specialists in Estonia. Furthermore, they should
participate in the initial compilation of the map,.not after the completion
of the proof when only minor corrections are permitted. For this, the
cartographic enterprise ought to send a copy of the original draft, as well as
a list of specific features, to other geographers for review and revision
pproved or a ease 702 CIA-RDP
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(for example, to Tartu State University or the editorial board of the
Encyclopedia of the Estonian SSR); a copy should also be sent--for checking
the transliteration--to the linguists in the Institute of Language and Liter-
ature of the Academy of Sciences of the ESSR. The administrative map is,
necessary as a reference aid for the organization of workers in the most
diverse professions. The improvement of its quality requires the joint
efforts of cartographers, geographers and management personnel.
L. Vasilyev
Docent of Tartus State University
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 CPYRTroved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000400050006p7YRGHT
HINDUSTAN TIMES, New Delhi
7 August 1970
Walk-out In Rajy a Sabha'
on Soviet maps
Minister's explanation fails
to satisfy MPs
Hindustan Times Correspondent
New Delhi, Aug. 6-The External Affairs Minister, Mr Swaran Singh, today
(N) benches made a scathing attack on the Government for its failure to make
the Soviet Union revise its maps containing wrong delineation of ' India's northern,
boundaries.
The issue was raised through a calling- attention motion, notice for which was given
by Mr M. K. Mohta (Swa) and 15 others who pointed out that the Soviet map had.
4llhowrl. large chunks of Indian territory as Chinese.
Having failed to secure an assurance from the Minis-
ter that the Government of India would ask the Soviet
Union to bring out a corrigendum, almost the entire-
Opposition walked out. Several members took notice of
an "otherwise so vocal" CPI group leader, Mr Bhupesh
Gupta, who remained behind, completely indifferent to
the question.
Sharing the members' senti-
ments, Mr Swaran Singh express-
ed his "disappointment" with the
Soviet authorities who had not
fulfilled -their earlier promises
and reproduced faulty maps even
In the latest edition of the "Great
Soviet Encyclopaedia." But he
pleaded with the members not to
be unduly exercised over it since-
the USSR representatives had ex-
plained that the matter had been
dealt with in a "technical man-
ner by their cartographers and
specialists."
The Soviet Union had further.
assured India that "this' has no,
political significance" inasmuch as
.'the USSR continued to "respect";
India's territorial integrity and 4
that wrong depiction of India's.
boundaries in such maps did not
"its any way affect or reflect the
goviet Government's ,1ttiderstanct
.Aug of and '.- N* __ -Ior?,.India
drontiers."
,.,_"WQ hope' and test,"~$4d. tiff
External Affairs Minister, that the
Soviet authorities would be able
to take suitable steps for remov-
the technical difficulties,
whatever they might be so that
"our territory is correctly. shown
In their maps." The issue was
being pursued through diplomatic
channels and at '-igher levels.'
While walking out, the opposi-
tion leader, Mr S. N. Mishra. des-
cribed the Soviet action as "car-
tographic aggressior" on India
The fact that the USSR had been
persistently flouting tb- friendly
relations since 1956' without caus-
ing any serious concerts in the
Government. of India, slowed how
come to the Soviets, according
Mr Mishra,
Mr Mohta was surprised that.
e External Affairs Minister had
ccepted the explanation giver by
he Soviet authorities when the;
ublication itself said that the
ontents had the approval of the
-entral Committee of the Corn-;
unist Party of the Soviet Union
nd the Russian Government. He,
so wanted to know why In reply
o an earlier ouestion, the Gov-,
rnment had not included the
atest Soviet map in the list of
aps named in the statement,
Mr Swaran Singh refuted the'
harge that the Government had
shown any softness towards the
viets, but the acts of friendly
ountries could not be equated
ith unfriendly countries since
otivation was a material factor.
111 the same, the Government of
dia had taken strong ob.iection
it. He was "sorry" that the
test map was not mentioned In.
e Government statement re-
rred to by Mr Mohta. But there
as no intention to hide any-
ing. The list given was not ex- 1
He repeatedly asked the mem-'
rs not to reject the Soviet ex-
3
anatiori which admittedly was
I favour of India.
r K. P. Mallikarjundu (Cong.-.
), Mr Niranjan Verna and Mr
gdambi Prasad (Jan Sangh), Mr
anka Bihari Das (PSP). Mr Bal:
rishna Gupta (SSP). Mr Chitty
asu (FB) and Mr Krishna Kant-
( ong.-N) were among the mem-
bers who demanded more precise
.tiou to rectify the mistake. In
articular, they asked why the
vernment was shying from ^
written protest on the issue. As
.garde the oral assurances, It
as pointed out that at one time
t e Chinese were also forthright.
ut ultimately they backed oUt.
abbing the Indian territory.
Mr Swaran Singh saw nothing
rong in the "usual practice" of,
ndueting diplomacy through;
al negotiations. It was unfor-
nate that even after so many
ears the mistake had not been
rrected. There was no destre~
the part of New Delhi to con-;
ne it. But he did not want to
11 it an "unfriendly 'act of a
iendly country" as cta'led by
me members. However, fresh
forts would be made to get the
aps revised by the Soviet, au-
orities. He agreed with the
uestionere that the wrong deli-
ation of the Indian territory In
e USSR maps had long range
plications.
The External Affairs Minister
omised to consider the suggea-
n of Mr Krishna Kant that the
evict Union should. be eskeei to
?rify its position It, resard ttt
these maps through their newt
11-01 0646 -
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 WAbHIRUTU1I VUS'J
CPYRGHT 3 August 1970 CPYRGHT
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THE HINDUSTAN TIMES,.New Delhi u,J ~(,~/ u~(!
6 August 1970
Indian areas
given to China
in Soviet map
By Prithvis Chakravarti
Hindustan Times Correspondent
New Delhi, Aug. 5-The Foreign Office here is baff
the boviet Union's latest official map of Asia w eie
an estimated 50,000 square miles of territory in India's
north-east and north-west frontier regions has been
cartographically gifted away to the Chinese.
Chin, Demchok and Nilang Jla-
dang in Ladakh and the whole of
the North-East Frontier Agency.
The map is included in the First
Volume of the Great Soviet En-
cyclopaedia published in May
this year under the authority of
the Council of Ministers of ? the
USSR and the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union,
The Soviet map was brought to
the notice of the Foreign Office by
Swatantrna MPs, Mr Dahyabhal
Patel and Mr M. K. Mohta. Ex-
perts in the Foreign Office devo-
ted several hours today to get a
clue to this display of unfriendli-
ness by Moscow but seemingly
failed to get one.
The Moscow action has been
particularly shocking as New
Delhi had been led to believe that
,.the Soviet Union would no longer
,try to please China. its professed
?advcrsary in the larger ideologl-
cal and territorial conflict, at
India's expense.
US paper's comment,
A surprising side issue is the
failure of the Indian mission in
Moscow to furnish the Foreign Of-
fice with a copy of the Soviet pub-
lication, although the First Volume
of the "epoch making" Great
Soviet Encyclopaedia was offi-
cially released in Moscow three
months ago. It is epoch making
because the First Volume of the
current third edition has been
accomplishments. The characte-
risation of bourgeois public figures
no longer contains all the former
vitriolic denunciations,". Rather
ominously this healthy non-Ideo-
logical ,udgment of men and
matters did not take into account
India's Interests and susceptibili-
ties despite repeated official re-
presentations by New Delhi to the
Soviet Union during the last seven
years.
The Soviet Union's official
rhaps concerning the Sino-Indian
boundary were delineated to
China's advantage (at India's ex-
pense) for the first time about 15
years ago, in the halcyon days of
"unbreakable friendship and bro-
therhood" between Moscow and
Peking. - India became uncannily
conscious of these Soviet publi-
cations in 1963. in the wake of the
October 1962 Chinese aggression,
The Government during the
last seven years has come across
five different official Soviet pub-
lications which corroborated the
Chinese claims to Aksai Chin,
Demehok and Nilang Jadhang in
India's north-western frontier re-
gion and the entire NEFA terri-
tory in the north-east. These In-
clude (I) all the editions of the
Atlas Mira (World Atlas) since
1954, (ii) Map of India published
by the Institute of the Academy
of Sciences in 1956, (Iii). Atlas for
Middle School children published
in 1969, (iv)' a wall map based
on a survey by Russian carto-
graphers in 1961 and (v) Atlas
edition. for the use of teachers, prepared
Some Journals In the United' in 1967.
States have already reviewed the, Indian representations hitherto
First Volume-the series to he failed to elicit from Moscow anr-
completed in 30 volumes by 1974-,thing more than a standard non'
and, at least one of them, t)>A 'committal reply to the"effect that,
Christian Science Monitor. has
ipecifica``ly pointed out the Mos-
cow endorsement of the Chinese
)claims to Indian territorryy
A passage in',the Monitdr's re.
,view In praise Of the First Volume
should canoe genuine anxiety In
)dew DelhL It says: rbugtllout
Lift ttdltias 1" l.ia
-an
standard' for their - o"fiefs) publi=i
ationa. India, took 'up the issue;
with aoraa of .tbeaa Qorernmente.
.bit .rltby>e.~
The territories include Aksai ; Ideology and more on practical
.China-Border Isles'
By Holger Jensen
/toeIs sd Freu
MOSCOW, Aug. 2- ? e Soviet Union has embarked on
a high-risk policy of "Island reclamation" tar EasLiciva
.rivers bordering China. Its announced purpose is agricul-
ture, but it could spark a confrontation between the'
Communist powers.
The Amur and Ussuri rivers, which wind 2,000 miles
'between Chinese Manchuria' ing rivers change course,.
and the Soviet maritimes, are flooding old islands and form-
dotted with hundreds of fertile Ing new ones.
islands. Some belong to the , The crunch would come
Russians, some to the Chinese,. 6-1-A
troop of both sides. a Chinese and " a RusslafJ
I
No the Russians want to name.
the river islands to feed their: lously kvoid disputed terrl
easte provinces. Western tory, their presence on 'pre-i
diplo ats cannot help wonder- viously uninhabited islands is'
itive res. l would also goad them into
The decision apparently was, claiming islands in which
}taken in July at a meeting of China has had no Interest upp
he C mmunist Party Central r, now.
kSovet kaysi' Rossiya reported, would not be sent.to'b?rder Is-
"
today that
resolutions of ands without protection., This
plena envisage widening means troop' movements, and if:
reels ation works in the J new array of military Installa-
Far ast," more, specifically tions under the' noses of --the
"stre thening the role of is- Chinese.
lands supplying food:' Russian and Chinese, fron
XJssurl River project planned
and Z ig Ussuri. The city is
Mane Irian border and the Is-
lands are upstream, even l
Soy tskaya Rossiya said'
three large collective farms to-
devel ed on the two islands
to p duce- milk, meat, pota-
toes a d vegetables for Khaba-
rovsk. About 17,290 acres will
be pl ed and the rest will be
`used graze 6,600 cattle.
Th e is no question about
being) in Soviet territory, but
Chine
err, db not agree so readily'
about) other Islands in the vi-
e Chinese gay they do not
recog ize the old czarist'treat-
les ' t 'at established 'gireieiit
boundaries and ,-cost. theme
large chunks of territory. Na-
tier troops have fought over
less than that.
Both sides acknowledged
four major skirmishes last;
year, three of them on a dis??,
puted island that the Russians.
call Damanaky and ? the
Chinese Chinpao. Moscow and
Peking accused each. other of
starting the hostilities, and.
both claimed many dead and;
wounded.
Hundreds of minor clashes
apparently go unreported. The
Soviet Union recently accused
China of staging 488 border,
provocations between June
And August last year.
Talks to resolve the border)
disputes and territorial claims,
are stalled. In ail apparent Cl fort to get them off the,
ground, Moscow,, and 'Peking
are reported ready' td t-s-
change . ambassadors after.
`three' Years' rt ''tlte-? Chstg
i'd'affalres level. - : , ' .
,two 41M pUiy$, tflcks 1W Oak.
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SOVIET RUSSIA, Moscow
2 August 1970
TEXT OF SOVIET RUSSIA ARTICLE ON AMUR ISLANDS
[Article by Far East Agricultural Scientific Research Institute Director, Doctor
of Agricultural Sciences S. Kazmin and USSR Geographical Society full member,
USSR Oeographiaal Society Priamurskiy (Khabarovsk) Branch Scientific Secretary
A. Stepanov ; The Orbit of the Large City"]
[Excerpts] Khabarovsk has a great history, it is filled with strikes and bitter
class battles before the revolution. In the years of foreign military
intervention the city -suffered heavy destruction, but it was built anew and
became even more beautiful. The free labor of Soviet people and the enormous
help of the Communist Party and the entire country created in the same, but
greatly expanded region, where, once single-story huts huddled together, a new
Khabarovsk, which conceded'nothing in appearance to the newly constructed
cities that had risen up in the country in the years of socialist building.
It is necessary to begin in 1922, when the occupiers were driven into the
ocean. The Khabarovsk inhabitants were at that time 30,000 strong; whereas
now the city's population is approaching the half-million mark.
Modern Khabarovsk is a city with a highly developed industry and the cradle
of Par Eastern machine building, which is represented by machine-tool building,
electrical machine building, diesel production shipbuilding, and other branches.
The industrial output of the city, which has about 100 combines, plants, and
factories, includes the most varied products, a part of which is exported to
over 20 foreign countries.
However, the city is not only the chief worker of Priamurskiy but is also a
mighty generator of Soviet culcure. Suffice it to say that a considerable section
of the Far Eastern intelligeni..,ia received training in Khabarovsk. Here there is
now an extensive network of higher and specialized secondary academic institutions
providing specialists not only for the district but also for other regions. The
resonance of the scientific work and the sphere of interests of the integrated
academic and industrial scientific research institutes that have been created in
Khabarovsk extends far beyond the4istriet's.confines..
The present-day Khabarovsk reality is a true road to a still more glorious future.
No matter how wide the Amur is as it flows around the city, from the bank opposite
Khabarovsk one cannot completely view this 40-kilometer right-bank city lined
with high buildings, masses of 5-story apartments, and splashes of park. The
intermittent clearings in this line represent reserved. areas for erecting new
industrial enterprises and housing and green zones. The dotted fencing of the
tower cranes on the left signifies the construction of the new northern
microrayon where thousands of new settlers have already moved. The groups of
accumulated cranes on the right signify the sites of the enterprises of the
southern, industrial area, which are being expanded and reconstructed.
Khabarovsk is also creating its own academgorodok. The USSR Academy of Sciences'
Par East.Center intends to open several scientific.-research institutes on the Amur.
The development of Khabarovsk has changed manes age-old attitude toward the Amur
and has included the river's left bank and particularly the islands within the
orbit of iamediate urban plans. They are a plane of relaxation and.an important
11* In the suburban agricultural. base which feeds.;the residentsd
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The fact that the river has been creating the soil for thousands of years and feeding
it makes the floodlands especially valuable for the city. It remains only to protect'
the most valuable portion from the advance of the highflood waters. Age-old experience
tells us where it is necessary to do this....
Above Khabarovsk the great Far Eastern river divides into two branches, as if preparing
a gift for the city by its path. on its right channel, the Amur receives the blue
waters of the Ussuri at the Kazakevichev?? settlement. The left channel washes the
islands--suburbs of Khabarovsk--on the wostern and northern sides.
A garland of flood islands, Khabarovsk's distinctive suburb is spread between the
channels. The largest of them are called Tarabarov and Boishoy Ussuriysk. Their
total area is more than 30,000 hectares,
These islands are particularly important as a part of the city's "lungs" and its
outside green zone. Here are the summer and winter fishing places which the residents
love, the golden beaches filled with thousands of bathers in summer, and the highly
popular winter ski runs. The first settlers of Khabarovsk recognized the Islands
as an agricultural suburban base because of their fertile lands. The best hay and
pasture lands in the area are found here. The young animals and the dairy herds of
the "Oarovskiy," "Druzhba," and "Krasnorechenskiy" Sovkhozes are kept on the islands
in summer camps, The heights, covered by floodwaters only in rare years, are covered
with kitchen-garden crops. The kolkhoz fishermen also have their interests on the
islands--their fisheries, which yield quintals of large small-mesh fish (chastik),
are located here,
Industrial shops and city quarters have long since crossed the Amur channel and settled
in part of Bolshoy Ussuriysk Island. The settlement, which is an island suburb of
Khabarovsk and was created as a result of the development of shipping on the Amur,-
was named Ussuriyskiy. Mechanics, metalworkers, woodworkers, boilermakers, and people
with dozens of other specialities, the "healers" of the Amur River fleet, live there.
Senior engineer of the cadres section of the Khabarovsk Technical Communications Sector
Zoya Ivanovna Ivanova says:
Ship- repair shops are located here which give new life to the entire communications
fleet of our sector: motor launches and dredgers. Good quality welding, carpentry,
and boiler shops have been built. There is everything for work. Of course we in the
settlement have a full range of cultural, everyday, and educational establishments
without which city life is inconceivable: a school, club, library, kindgarten and
day nursery, and canteen, radio, television, asphalted streets all are common here.
We are even building more. Recently, two brick apartment houses were commissioned
and a third'begun.
Some of the settlement's inhabitants work in Khabarovsk, and the journey there by
launch is short and pleasant. But the majority find work locally. The settlement
quarries sand and other local building materials for Khabarovsk construction sites.
The settlement gives hospitable anchorage to and undertakes repair work on many dozens
of Amur ships wintering in the creeks and canals of the island. The river workers'
heavy crane operations are done here.
The Khabarovsk people love their islands just as the Leningrad people love theirs;
this love has Andured much suffering, for the islands have a military history of
glory as well as a working history.
pprovea i-or Keiease
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During the Civil War and the struggle against foreign interventionists, the
revolutionaries' underground communication lines passed through here, and Red raiding
detachments operated here. A monument in the Kazakevichevo settlement recalls the'
immortal feat of communists and Komsomol members who barred the White Guarr]3' path
to Khabarovsk-
The ialanda hive played their part in repulsing agg~Qaaion. In 1931 Japanose
imperialists seized northeast China-Manchuria. They broke through from the Chinese
left bank of the Ussuri to the Soviet right bank in order to create a bridgehead
on it for new provocations. Particularly attractive to the invaders were Taraborov
and the Bolshoy Ussuriysk Islands, which faced the waterfront of the hated
Khabarovsk, which was one of the main organizers of Soviet aid to the Chinese
people in the anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist struggle.
Many times in those years the sacred blood of Soviet people was shed on the islands,
blood of the Border Guards fighting enemy landing forces on the ice or in the water.
Border Guards hero Mikhail Zhidkov gave his life in battles with Japanese brigands
on the Ussuri in 1939.
At the same time, seven border guards at a neighboring outpost put to flight
an armed band of 22 men. Machinegunner Ivan Telegeyenko was awarded the medal "'for
valor" for bravery and resourcefulness.
The realistic plans of the city's working people are linked with the Tarabarov and
Bolshoy Ussuriysk islands now, when every region of the country is so widely and
practically discussing specific ways to implement the CPSL Central Committee July
Plenum decisions on the further development of agriculture. In accordance with
the plenum's materials, an extension of reclamation work in the Far East is envisaged.
The Khabarovsk people see this as the prerequisite for strengthening the islands'
role in supplying the city with provisions.
The Far East State Institute for Planning Water Resources Projects [Dalgiprovodkhoz]
has proposed for implementation a detailed general project for further assimilating
the Tarabarov and Bolshoy Ussuriysk Islands by building on them three large highly-
intensive sovkhozes. Dairy and potato-vegetable production will be the main
trend of their work. Of the 30,000 hectares of the islands' agricultural pastureland
planned for utilization, some 7,000 hectares will be used as arable land, and the rest
of the area will remain as meadows and pastures.
The Khabarovsk citizens' increase in health and cheerfulness cannot be measured
numerically. The possible increase of agricultural potential in connection with the
creation of sovkhozes on islands would be decisive for satisfying the city's
requirements. Island sovkhoze& will be able to satisfy 50 percent of the city
population's requirements for potatoes, even if it grows considerably, and a large
proportion of the city's requirements for vegetables. The "Pioneer" strain of
potato which is cultivated in the island's light soils is distinguished by its
fine-tasting qualities and its starch content of up to 18 percent. With the building
of local repositories, no additional transshipments are needed. Any place in the
city--restaurant', dining room, store--will always have fresh potatoes only 15 minutes
away by motor vehicle in winter. The island fodder base will permit the upkeep of
an additional 5,600 head of livestock, including about 3,000 cows. An annual increase
of about 10,000 tons of milk, and 700 tons of meat--produce so essential for
Khabarovsk--is expected.
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The practicability of the planned "Dalgiprovod};hoz" project is confirmed by
the data of the Far East Scientific Research In?titute of Agriculture, which
over a number of years has conducted experimental work on assimilation of lands on
the islands for mowing-grass, long-term pastureland, sow fodder crops, potatoes,
and vegetables. Apart from the advantages in the grain of the soil and fertility,
island soils, compared with those of the mainland, receive somewhat more warmth
during the vegetative period. The annual norm for precipitation is about 760
millimeters. The heat resources and moisture supplies of the islands, as confirmed
by man9 years of experience, permit the growing of tomatoes, cucumbers, aubergines,
marrows, watermelons, and melons, not to mention crops in lesser demand. The
proximity of water insures good irrigation in the dry half of the summer, while
the light composition of the soil provides for draining away excess moisture in
the second half of the summer, which is accompanied by the monsoon rains.
The favorable conditions in combination with the application of ridge-and-bed
[grebne-gryadkovaya] agrotechnology which has been devised by the agricultural
institute permits potato and vegetable harvests that are at least twice as large
as the present harvests gathered throughout the kray. As has already been noted,
it is advantageous to use a large proportion of the island territory for fodder-
growing land. A system of agrotechnical and improvement measures for the radical
and surface improvement of meadows has been worked out and a technology for
creating highly productive mowing-grass lands and pastureland has been proposed.
In the conditions of a rainy summer it is extremely farsighted to utilize the
island grasses to prepare valuable albumin, vitamin grass meal, cured hay, and
early silage. In our view it would be advisable for this purpose to envisage the
construction on the islands of a plant for grass meal production. In such a case
the procurement of fodder would cease to be restricted by the unfavorable climatic
conditions taking shape on the kray precisely at this time. Part of the fodder
will be obtained from the now unutilized aftergrowth.
On these islands sown fodder crops, primarily corn, are beneficial in the long
term.
Naturally, the assimilation of the island land tracts demands additional capital
investments. But would it really cost little now to assimilate the heavy taiga
.soils which, moreover, are situated at a great distance from the kray center? One
can say that generations of Khabarovsk dwellers have dreamed about large-scale
agriculture on the Tarabarov and Boishoy tlsiriysk Islands. Now,the inhabitants
of the Par East have at their disposal equipment which is capable of lifting them
out of the flood zone relatively cheaply. The islands of nature's treasure house
will become shops of health and produce for the great Far East city,
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