CA PROPAGANDA PERSPECTIVES NOVEMBER 1970

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000400020001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 184
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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PERSPECTIVES
HIGHLIGHTS
Priorities:
Short Sub jec
Mid-East:
Prague:
France:
Europe:
Cuba:
USSR:
November 1970
Indochina
ts:
Brezhnev Reiterates Support of Fedayeen
Ulbricht: Reduce Occupation Troops
On Solzhenitsyn: Communists Disagree
Solzhenitsyn in Russian
Aftermath nf Sugar Harvest Failure
Ready or Not, Russia, Here They Come
Dates Worth Noting
THE COMMUNIST SCENE
Venezuelan Communist Petkoff Seeks Break with CPSU
Split in Italian Communist Party
THE SOVIET HAND IN THE SUDAN
SOVIET EXPLOITATION OF MID-EAST OIL
SOVIET ESPIONAGE IN CHILE: THE KUNAKOV FILE
SOVIET ARMS AND COLONIALISM
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CPYRGHT
1.1.111110 November 1970
THE COMMUNIST SCENE
I. Venezuelan Communist Petkoff Seeks Break With CPSU
Earlier this year, Teodoro Petkoff, a leading Venezuelan
Communist of Bulgarian descent, wrote a book called
Checoeslovaquia: El Socialism Como Problema (Czechoslovakia:
The Problem of Socialism), in which he condemned the Soviet
. .
invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and subjected the
Soviet Union, as a supposedly socialist state, to searching and
critical examination. The book brought him into open conflict
with the orthodox, pro-Soviet leadership which dominates the
Party, and his book was officially denounced by the Party.
He has now produced what may be regarded as a logical sequel
in a slim volume called: Socialismo para Venezuela? (Socialism
for Venezuela?), I in which he rejects the orthodox Soviet
doctrine concerning Communist seizure and exercise of political
power, a doctrine which the CPSU regards as mandatory for all
CF's. In its place he advocates his own solution of how to
achieve socialism in,Venezuela based on a completely original
analysis of Venezuelan society in terms of its economy, class
structure, social forces, and recent history, with particular
attention to the historical and current role of the Venezuelan
Communist Party (PCV).
In effect, Petkoff ends by rejecting the Soviet model
and along with it the stagnation which afflicts-the PCV
leadership. His criticism .of this leadership, voiced in the
prologue of the book, is familiar to anyone acquainted with
the criticism of the numerous Communist dissidents throughout
the world. His characterization of the PCV leadership applies
with equal force to practically all Latin American Communist
leaders, and for that matter to the leadership of every Communist
Party ?that voices its allegiance to the Soviet Union, and
is worth citing at the outset:
"On the road toward setting up this organization, we
face problems which we could categorize under the following
headings: reformism or revolution? renovation and modern-
ization or maintenance of the organizational status quo?
I. Teodoro Petkoff. Socialism? para Venezuela?
Editorial Domingo Fuentes, Caracas, 1970; 139 pp. It calls
to mind French Communist dissident Roger Garaudy's book, Pour
un modele frangais du socialisme (For a French Model of Socialism)
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an independent and national party or an alien and vgssal
party?...
"Will the party, as it is now constituted, in: tsrusty
condition, with evident signs of sclerosis, of petrification,
of corruption at some levels, of softening up, of ideological
impoverishment, with leadership organs which to a large extent
do not reflect the reality of our militancy and the degree of
its development, will such a party be in a condition to take
an effective part in the revolutionary process?...
"Is a party which has abdicated its right to independent
criticism on the international plane, in a position to develop
and advance a genuinely revolutionary policy?...
"This is the basic meaning of the discussion which, in the
final analysis, simply involves two options: to become a party
of the revolution or to remain a party that thrives on the
cyq-l-Rm." Fpo 6-7; emphasis added.]
Much of what Petkoff proposes for PCV policy has little
relevance outside of the local Venezuelan scene, but a summary
of some of his views will serve to illustrate his independence
of outlook and the extent of his break with Soviet-approved
orthodoxy.
First of all, he criticizes Stalinism as responsible for
the "world crisis" in which Communism finds itself at present.
Though implicit, such criticism can only refer to the continued
existence of Stalinism within the current Soviet leadership, placed,
as it is, in a contemporary context and having reference to the
Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. He then advocates the
adoption of a platform for the PCV whereby the Partywill be
unequivocally dissociated from the Soviet brand of Communism.
Included in his platform would be guarantees for the
preservation of the various essential democratic, political and
personal freedoms and preservation of a "pluralistic" society,
whose opposite, of course, is the Soviet monolith.
Corollary to this dissociation is his insistence that the
PCV pursue its own specific, national form of socialism. The
achievement and content of this socialism are totally unortho-
dox. It is to be achieved, according to Petkoff, not by the
traditional alliance of workers and peasants, but by a different
constellation of forces, which includes as the most revolu-
tionary ally (1!), the "middle-level and poor petittourgeoisie,"
followed in importance by what Petkoff calls "fringe" sectors
(large masses of displaced, unemployed persons in the cities)
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and finally as a poor third among allies of the proletariat,
poor peasants. Even more unorthodox, Petkoff considers as
potential revolutionary allies elements of "the most varied
social organizations: the armed forces, the church, and political
parties," plus students. "To come right out and say it, we
are simply proposing a critical revision of the old formula
of the worker-peasant alliance as the axis of the revolutionary
movement. [p 10011
As if this were not enough of a challenge to Communist
orthodoxy, he also discards the notion, sacred to all orthodox
Communists, that the Communist Party must lead the revolution
CPYRGHThe "vanguard" exercising hegemony (i.e. absolute control)
nwpr wh+pvpr Ilipq it pnlitc, in it rpvn1Htinnar/ pffnrt.
"However, in concrete political practice, the vanguard
and the leadership are provided by the revolutionary movement
(and this could very well be a Communist party such as the
Chinese which based itself on the peasant masses, a
heterogeneous movement such as the 26 July in which the petit
bourgeoisie played a primary role, or a group of conspiratorial
high officers not organically linked to the masses as in the
Egyptian case and Nasi r)
"The historic experience of all modern revolutions
demonstrates that the concept which Marx had --- a class as
such playing the active leading role --- and which Rosa
Luxembourg opposed to the theory of Lenin's party, in which,
not without reason, she saw an organization above the working
class, is no longer valid...." [pp 100-10111
Shecr h r Y.
(Attached are a number of additional excerpts from
Petkoff's book illustrating his break with Soviet Communism).
Petkoff's theories in themselves are relatively unimportant.
What is significant is that, as a full-fledged Communist, a
major leader among Venezuelan Communists, he should plead
independence of Soviet tutelage, that he should make an earnest
case for a specific Venezuelan national road to "socialism."
While he may be very nearly unique amohg Communists in Latin
America, his plea is that voiced by several individual Communists
in the free world such as the French Communist Roger Garaudy
and many of his fellow dissidents, the Austrian Communists
Ernst Fischer and Franz Marek, the Italian Communists of the
"II Manifesto" group (see item two below), -forme a handful;
and by free world Communist parties on other continents: the
British, the Swedish, Spanish, Australian, Japanese, various
Indian parties, etc. etc. Petkoff is one more representative
of that growing "community of Communist dissent," a growing
centrifugal force spinning away from the Soviet center.
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In the growing community of Communist dissent must be
reckoned also the number of ruling Communist parties that have
succeeded in following their "own road to socialism," or are
attempting to do so, against the Soviet drive to keep them
closely tied to the center: The Chinese, Yugoslav, Albanian,
North Vietnamese, North Korean, Rumanian. Czechoslovakia
represents the tragic instance of a Communist regime whose efforts
to follow its "own road to socialism" was crushed by Soviet
tanks. The only reason that others have not been similarly
crushed is that they were geographical lycr geopolitically
beyond the reach of Soviet arms. In the free worldlbe Soviets
for the most part have succeeded in extinguishing the attempts
at independence by maverick Communists by getting the parties
to expel them (at a threat of withdrawal of financial support,
without which most parties could not survive). It will be
interesting to see whether heretic Petkoff and hissupporters
in the PCV leadership will continue to hold their positions
in the party. So far they have succeeded -- which means less
that the Soviet Union and the pro-Soviet faction in the PCV
accept or tolerate "Petkovianism" than that the alternative,
i.e. expelling him, is an even less palatable measure at
this time.
2. Italian Communists of "II Manifesto" Group to Form Own Party.
An example of the resistance to the Soviet brand of Communism,
and even more to the Soviet compulsion to force itsviews on
subordinate parties, is the case of the so-called "II Manifesto"
group of Italian Communists. Known to the Italian Communist
Party (PCI) as the "Chinese" for their criticism of the Soviet
Union since its invasion of Czechoslovakia and for its advocacy
of a return to pure, revolutionary Communism, the Manifesto
leaders were first suspended and then (in November 1969)
expelled from the PCI. Recently, the group seems to have
undertaken moves to form a new Communist Party, according to
the attached item appearing in the New York Times. Independent
estimates suggest that their membership is growing rapidly so
that the party may soon constitute a political factor of some
significance, at least as far as the PCI is concerned.
3. Briefly Noted
a. WAIC Preparatory Meeting
A brief nondescript "communique" (attached) issued
from Budapest revealed that 45 Communist parties had met in
Budapest 28-30 September to discuss the possibilities of
convoking a World Anti-Imperialist Conference (WAIC). The
WAIC was launched as a goal during the June 1969 World Communist
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Conference (WCC), which appointed a I3-party commission to make
preparations for the larger conclave. The commission consisted
of representatives of the Soviet, Polish, Hungarian, Mongolian,
French, Italian, British, Indian, Syrian, Chilean, Uruguayan,
South African, and U.S. parties. Presumably the commission has
met one or more times since June 1969, and while the presence
of 45 parties at the recently announced Budapest meeting is
unexplained, it may be that this meeting was thrown open to
any CF's that wished to participate. Compared with the fanfare
that accompanied almost two years of preparatory meetings for
the WCC, the silence surrounding the current meeting is
deafening. Even the participating parties were not identified.
The silence can only mean that the usual quarrels took place
between the CPSU along with its supporters and those parties
which resist the effort of the CPSU to force acceptance of its
requirements by such conferences. It is not difficult to
surmise that the Soviets want a conference represented by delegates
over whom they have complete control and that parties like the
Yugoslays (who are known to have taken part in thisffidapest
meeting) are resisting and looking for a conference represented
by a wider and more independent spectrum of leftists.
b. European OP's Hold their Own Meeting
In another curious "happening," the French and Italian
Communist dailies (see attachment) announced that several
European parties had met in London on 21 September to discuss
problems arising for the development of "multinational societies"
(presumably multinational organizations like NATO, EEC, etc.).
They are to meet again in London 11-13 January 1971. European
CF's met for the first time as a regional grouping of CF's
last May, apparently on the joint initiative of the Italian
and French CF's to discuss common problems, but ended up with
a bland, routine communique condemning the Vietnam conflict.
How the Soviets view this kind of meeting is not known. It
appears that the Soviets were not represented in either instance.
c. Upcoming French Dissident Communist Congress
A brief article in Le Monde of 16 September (attached)
summarizes an article in the French bulletin Synthese-Flash
which claims that French Communist dissidents, including
Roger Garaudy, Charles Tillon, Jean Pronteau, Maurice Kriegel-
Valrimont, and a dissident group called "UnirD6bat"
will assemble in congress in December on the occasion of the
50th anniversary of the founding of the French Communist Party
(PCF). With so many eloquent critics of the PCF, this should
prove a very interesting occasion.
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Excerpts from Teodoro Petkoff, Socialismo para Venezuela?, Editorial
Domingo Fuentes, Caracas, 1970, 139 pp.
Prologue
"...This [Communist] world crisis is the crisis of Stalinism whose
rigid ideological, political, organizational and even moral standards
are today being thrown into the arena of opposing currents which have
become ever stronger, clearer, and more important, born within Communist
Parties themselves which have succeeded in appreciating that Stalinism
--- after a certain point --- is not only an obstacle in the way of
development in any society or societies where the Communist Party holds
the reins of power but is even the equal of Trotskyism --- which in its
time had tried to be the negation of Stalinism --- and which no longer
provides the answers required by a revolutionary force struggling for
power.
"It is not a matter of negating Stalinism as a whole nor of not
recognizing that it was a historical necessity, but rather of accepting
that its outdated patterns --- whose brand during the course of the
Third International was borne by all Communist Parties in the world ---
are today to all intents and purposes unusable. Communist Parties forged
in the mold of Stalinism and which cannot break out of it have virtually
blocked their road to power for reasons that are absolutely of their
own making, congenital, and which prevent the overcoming of external
obstacles. It is not a mere accident that, after Lenin's Bolshevik
Party, only the Communist Parties of China, Vietnam and Yugoslavia have
been able to achieve power through their own efforts. These are three
CF"(Wiles which, through methods involving an attitude that 'one respects
but one does not carry out,' made a dead letter of directives issued
by the Third International and by Stalin himself and were therefore able
to transform themselves into national forces, able to interpret and become
an expression of the most deeply felt sentiments among their respective
peoples and to bring them to victory.
"If our generation of Venezuelan Communists hopes to be something
more than a mere group of propagandists and mere forerunners of socialism,
rather than the builders of a new society, they must face up to --- and
win --- the challenge represented by breaking with the Stalinist mold
of Party and policy....
"What we say in these pages may seem to be tantamount to an attack
and even a bitter attack --- against a substantial segment of our past
as a Marxist revolutionary party and therefore we have taken all possible
care as to how to say these things, as our objective is not to hurt
feelings but to promote a fruitful discussion. It is only at the cost of
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painful review, however, that we can recover our sense of self criticism,
getting away from mere 'descriptions' of past errors with that tedious
and repetitious reference to their 'petit bourgeois origin' and to make
it into an instrument which, by probing as deeply as possible, gets 11s
to discover the nature of the roots of reformism, of collaboration
between classes, of rightist and leftist deviations, in order to eliminate
them and to make it possible to expand the Party's revolutionary potential.
Of course, any review of this kind tends to be painful because it involves
questioning a lot of our own individual greater or lesser contribution
to those [political] struggles which we always undertake, guided by the
most noble of feelings. But there are corssroads in the life of any
revolutionary movement where only a deep and violent doubt about what
has been done can make it possible successfully to avoid the traps of
the real dilemma of life: reformism or revolution; to be or not to be....
11 ...only 5 months after two spaceships docked together in space,
creating the first orbital space station, the Soviet Union and four
other countries of the Warsaw Pact took the decision to intervene with
military force in another small socialist country, under the pretext of
ill
-preventing a counterrevolution. At the same time, four members of the
socialist community --- China, Albania, Yugoslavia and Romania ---
each for different style, condemned this move. From the Socialist
'little entente,' Vietnam issued a very circumspect and laconic communique
in support. Korea did likewise and, in Cuba, Fidel --- after a vigorous
attack on Soviet foreign policy and on European socialist models ---
C 01-11/..ve his support to the invasion. For their part, almost all
European Communist Parties, including the three leading ones --- the
Italian, French and Spanish parties, together the Japanese Communist
Party, --- unequivocally condemned the intervention.
"The conflicts which broke out in the Socialist world and within
the Communist movement reached their climax-at that time and the evidence
it brought out was conclusive: socialism is facing a grave and profound
crisis....
"That phrase of Terence --- which the universal and alert mind of
Marx was so keen on quoting --- 'nihil humanum alienam puto est' ---
nothing human is alien to me --- must be one of the mottoes of any
revolutionary, today, not because revolutionaries should not at all times
have been like this but because, in practice, they have not been...because
the aberration and police state bureaucratic deviationism which Stalinism
represents succeeded in causing a kind of fossilization in the minds of
millions of Communists, of the best men in this humanity of ours, of
men who without question in their time were the salt of the earth, the
hope for the world, forcing them under a monstrous yoke which held
that 'everything that is not of my party is alien to me....'
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"On the road toward setting up this organization, we face problems
which we could categorize under the following headings: reformism or
revolution? renovation and modernization or maintenance of the organiza-
tional status quo? an independent and national party or an alien and
vassal ,party?....
"Today we are at a crucial point, at a crossroads in the history of
the PCV. It is the outcome of two consecutive defeats: one growing
out of the period of armed struggle, the other resulting from the
elections. Now, we are opening up a new historical stage, calling for
major political and social changes, a stage within whose framework we
must find our means to development.
"Is our party to became one which gradually gives up its great
revolutionary traditions of the last 10 years, to became assimilated
into the system by transforming itself into a reformist force or, on the
other hand, should it break radically away from this kind of prospect,
establishing its policy as involving confrontation with the system, of
continous opposition, of preparation for a new revolutionary onslaught
at some undetermined but inevitable date?
"Would the party, as it is now constituted, in its rusty condition,
with evident signs of sclerosis, of petrification, 'of corruption at
some levels, of softening up, of ideological impoverishment, with
leadership organs which to a large extent do not reflect the, reality
of.pur militancy and the degree of its development, would such a party
CPYRV4-1 in a condition to take an effective part in the revolutionary process?
"Is a party which has abdicated its right to independent criticism
on the international plane, in a position to develop and advance a
genuinely revolutionary policy?
"This is the basic meaning of the discussion which, in the final
analysis, simply involves two options: to become a party of the
revolution or to remain a party that thrives on the system...."
Dependent Capitalism and Political Power
"...The objection is frequently heard that a socialist or anti-
capitalist pronouncement arouses too much resistance among alleged
allies, it 'frightens' some sectors which would be more reasonable toward
less radical statements.
"Perhaps it would be useful to discuss this. Above all, it is
surprising that such concern at the possible resistance to a socialist
program does not consider the fact that the mere name of the.partyg
Communist, is a complete program and definition which associates us
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CP
with a new society already under construction in other countries. From
the point of view of masses, our very name presupposes socialism ---
although what we say may seem contradictory. If we are speaking of
'fright' our very name is enough to cause 'fright' regardless of the
program we present.
"In the second place, the name links us in the imagination of the
common man with the version of socialism spread about by the bourgeoisie
and imperialism. For many Venezuelans, Communist Party means things
ranging from the notion that socialism 'kills' God to the idea that it
is a cruel dictatorship which does away with all freedom, and that it
adovcates such things as the abolishment of ownership of tooth brushes,
proclaims free love, delivers children to the state, etc.
"In brief, those who worry about the resistance which is alleged
to result from the idea of socialism, should also ask themselves for
the sake of consistency if the best way to confront that problem might
not be to change the name of the party and disassociate it from the
world Communist movement as well as from the Soviet Union, China, and
Cuba. However, would this not be the solution of 'selling the couch?'
(Ed. note: reference to the story of a man coming home unexpectedly
and catching his wife in flagrante delicto on the couch with another
man. His enraged reaction was to sell the coudhj
"To the contrary, let us view Venezuelan socialism as a result of
converging and common action of various social forces and sectors ---
sm will have to be what the roup of forces and sectors want it
--- and let us bring socialism out from under the table and air
its problems freely. Discussing it with all those other sectors who
in one way or another aim toward the socialist solution, or toward one
like it, is much more useful and effective than the vain attempts to
'prettify' the program and slogans of a party whose mere name places it
in a status of capitis diminutio, in a position of inferiority which
it is forced to accept whenever its participation or alliance in fronts
is considered.
?
dB Nam do
Mr11
"By taking measures which leave no roam for doubt, let us do away
with the fable (Which nevertheless is based on objective events that
can easily be misleading) that our revolutionary Party is an aggia of
any socialist power or country, that its policy is part of an international
strategy of that power or country, and we will see whether socialism
seen in this way continues to 'frighten.' An internationalist policy
of support and solidarity with all the world forces which are struggling
for revolutionary change in an independent and critical manner, (but
which at the same time recognizes divergencies among these forceiriuffices
to help destroy the idea that socialism is nothing more than an export
product of the Soviet Union, China, or Cuba.
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"If we agree that of those forces which proclaim the need for
socialism, none is capable of achieving it by itself, we implicitly
recognize that to be able to achieve a socialist society the united
action of all of them is necessary. In order for Venezuelan socialism
to materialize it must be Willa or it simply cannot exist. This plurality
pre-supposes a revolutionary power which guarantees the autonomous
contribution of other sectors to the construction of the new society,
a contribution which can only be articulated on the basis of a democratic
dialectic among the revolutionary forces that precludes a political
monopoly by any of them.
"If the transition toward the new society makes a dictatorial power
compulsory, it will have the characteristics which the revolutionary
forces will want it to have. A revolutionary dictatorship in Venezuela
has no reason for being similar to that of other countries because
our country has peculiarities which inevitably will place their stamp
on the forms of government. However, as of now we can clearly proclaim
that pur socialism does not carry with it the death penalty, arbitrary
imprisonment, torture, or make it a crime to express an opinion. It
does not carry this with it because a democratic revolutionary power,
even if it is dictatorial, makes such practices very difficult because
our own principles are against them....
"A plural socialist society by definition excludes all monolithism
concept of its political life and its cultural and artistic life.
C P d not propose Marxism-Leninism as a sort of substitute for religion,
which would be learned in schools as the catechism is learned. (This
of course is not in contradiction with the fact that the scientific
nature of education must mean methodology and a dialectic materialist
analysis). Neither could we propose an administratively directed culture,
nor one monopolized by 'official' interpreters of the thinking of the
regime. A political culture emanating from the base rejects, of course,
the attempts by any bureaucratic office to dictate the orientation of
artistic creation..."
, . .
The Motive Forces of Revolution
"Under this very 'orthodox' title, we would like to discuss a
relatively 'heterodoxical? point of view on this subject of the forces
which in one way or another could impel the Venezuelan revolutionary
process.
"The usual manner of handling this aspect consists of presenting
the motive forces of the revolution solely from the purely class angle,
that is, pointing out the abaial_auggp interested in advancing the
revolution. This manner of analyzing things entirely correct and
which we are, not going to give up does not, however, cover all the
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wealth of possibilities offered by a society such as the Venezuelan.
"In it there exist, not only a group of social classes objectively
favorable for a nationalist and revolutionary change, but there have been
formed interclass sectors ox groupings whose members are linked by
some institutional reason --- political or professional --- and they are
scattered throughout the most varied social organizations armed forces2
church, and political parties? Because of their awn nature, their
direct links with national problems and with the ?spheres of Ipolitical
?oweT, make viable the appearance in some of their sectors of a socio-
political awareness implicitly or explicitly nationalist and revolutionary....
...In all political parties of the country, the long years of
revolutionary demagogy gave rise to a popular base and a group middle-
level and technical cadres, thwarted but motivated in favor of social
change and a break with dependency. In the Catholic Church, the post-
council trends, the return to the sources of Christianity, the revival
of social preoccupations, which in some places acquires profiles of
great radicalism, have generated the appearance of sectors which
attribute to the church the earthly mission of helping to transform
society. In the army --- the main support of power --- the reflection
of this trend, which incorrectly been given the name of tnasserism'
and which today finds notable expression in Peru, the very experience
with the problem of being a dependent state (-along with other factors]
...forces us to reconsider the problem from a different point of view
than the traditional. This is particularly so if one takes into account
that the armed forces as an_inatitutim have been assimilated by the
CRYFIGHIjiment and therefore, it would not be strange if dissidence in
their midst had a sign of progressive protest, of the left....
.Of course, this linkup Cof social sectorsj would be
feasible if one recognizes the revolutionary potential of these sectors
and if their view of the process of revolutionary change is respected.
This supposes not only a pluralist concert of the future society but
also a pluralist concept of the struggle for it. This excludes all
hegemony decreed a priori and an absolute respect for the autonomy
and contribu ion of eac sec or.
"In other words, an attempt would be made to work with the idea that
in the policy of alliances no one is to be used. If there is no a priori
reason which makes us the sole depositories of the revolutionary truth
or monopolizers of valor, initiative, or capacity for sacrifice to bring
it about, we have no reason to be the ones to establish the standards
which measure the revolutionary legitimacy of the rest. Dependence with
respect to imperialism and the traumas of dependent capitalist growth,
today affect not only the popular classes but the most varied sectors
and therefore the awareness for social change is not the exclusive
patrimony of agy 'vanguard' which arrogates it to itself more or less
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arbitrarily. up to now the opposite concept, which attributes only to
Communists --- or Marxist-Leninists in general --- the steadfastness
required to carry out the revolution to the end, is the conCept which
allows the enemy to use the ideas of 'fellow travelers,' and 'useful
dupes....'
"A policy of this nature rof linking various revolutionary forcesl
has to insist that the alternative to what exists today:..cannot be
anything but a socialist way of development and a new political frame-
work which disavows the present one. In this sense only a 'vastly
original' policy --- as Ienin said -- can help us to form our own
force capable of playing the role of 'link' among a group of revolutionary
sectors and classes which united can promote the social change the
neocolonialist status of our country demands.
"This said, let us glance at the driving forces of the revolution
from the angle of the social classes in play. From this point of view,
we believe that the revolutionary process possesses a popular content.
This means that the social forces on whom it must rest are those which
make up what are generically known as the people: the working class,
the poor peasant, -4222112212:12y21_2111.120x_221.11222=2alp, the
students --- who can be considered as a discriminated against sector ---
and the so-called 'fringe' inhabitants, with the explicit exclusion of
any sector of the bourgeoisie....
"We have wanted to point out the vital role which the working class
cplquaNHnotentially play in the course of the Venezuelan revolution, but
at the same time we would like to warn against any 'worker' concept of
the Venezuelan revolution. Any comparison of the situation of our
country with that of a 'classic' capitalist country could be lamentable.
Under the conditions of Venezuela, to rest all the weight of the revolution
on the working class could simply mean closing the path to it. There
are other social sectors which must be stimulated --- and at the same time
the middle-level and poor petit bourgeoisie, the 'fringf sectors,
find'sses of displaced unemployed persons in the citiesi and the ,poor
peasants must be motivated by the revolutionary upsurge. The order
of listing indicates the relative importance which we attribute to them....
"In conclusion, a few words on the poor peasants. It is obvious
that our thesis on the revolutionary process --- which surely will
depend on the urban sectors of the population before any other ---
considerdbly reduces the importance which is traditionally attributed to
the peasant sectors. To came right out and say it, we are simply proposing
a critical revision of the old formula of the worker-peasant alliance as
the axis of the revolutionary movement. Such a way of putting things
does not appear to be in consonance with the complexity of contemporary
reality. In truth, to continue the discussion "of the motive forces of
the revolution in the terms of absolutely pinpointing a social vanguard
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and a basic alliance of classes, does not appear to fit our case.
According to all evidence, a revolUtionary process in Venezuela requires
the participation of that conglomeration of social forces which we call
the people and of some interclass sectors which are not exactly 'people.'
Among them, the working Clion because of its specific weight, its
organization, and potential awareness, and the petit bourgeoisie
because of their importance and degree of awareness and radicalism,
=1st occupy a front rank position and undoubtedly must play the role
of guide for the fringe masses and the poor peasants. Viewed in an
over-all manner, from a general historic angle, the crystallization
of the entire process expresses the interests of the working class and
at the same time the change leads to socialism.
"However, in concrete political practice, the vanguard and the
cl leadership are provided by the revolutionary movement (and this could
well very we be a communist party such as the Chinese which based itself
on the peasant masses, a heterogeneous movement such as the 26 July
in which the petit bourgeoisie played a primary role, or a group of
lop&ratorial high officers not organically linked to the masses as
fiblEgyptian case and Nasir).
"The historic experience of all modern revolutions demonstrates
that the concept which Marx had --- a class as such playing the active
leading role --- and which Rosa Luxembourg opposed to the theory of
Lenin's party, in which, not without reason, she saw an organization
above the working class, is no longer valid. The last revolution in
which the working class acted as such, without interposed 'apparatuses,'
was that of the Commune of Paris. After it the rower of the bourgeoisie
acquired such a technical nature that a specialized revolutionary organi-
zation is required to overthrow it. Although Lenin created such a
specialized organization for the Russian circumstances of the beginning
of the century --- and in that sense some of its characteristics are
completely Russian --- in the light of contemporary capitalist and
imperialist conditions, the universal validity of the concert of
?
specialized and 'professional' revolutionary organization is undeniable..
(The more significant passages have been underlined for emphasis; the
double underlining represents emphasis by the author Petkoff.2
8
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TEODORO PETKOFF
Prolog?
Socialismo para Venezuela?
;
El capitalism? dependiente y
el poder politico 4 :
" La ruesti6n de la burguesia ..;
nacional 6
La cuesti6it de las etapas de s
la Revolucion y otras cosas
conexas
Las fuerzas motrices de kt
revoluciim.
11.10iimemi
gnal
sz:1
EDITORIAL DOMINGO FUEN'Tgi,
CARACAS 1970
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Esa crisis r9undial es la crisis del stainusmo,
,cuya rriai?armazon ideolOgica, politica, organizativa y
hash' moral, esti sometida hoy a los embates de corrien-
tes cads vez ,ms fuertes, 16cidas e importantes nacidas
de los partidos- comunistas y que han llegado a compren-
der que el stalinismo a partir de un cierto moment? no
solo obstaculiza el desarrollo de las sociedades donde el
partido comunista esti en el poder, sino que, al igual que
el trotskismo ?que quiso ser su negacidn en una epoca?,
ya no proporciona las respuestas que demanda una fuerza
revolucionaria que lucha por el poder.
No se trata de negar en bloque al stalinismo, ni des:
conocer aquello que en el fue imperativo historic?, sino
de aceptar que sus viejos esquemas ?los cuales a traves
de In III Internacional marcaron- a fuego a todos los parti-
dos comunistas del rnundo? ya hoy son prticticamente in-
servibles. Los partidos comunistas fraguados en el crisol del
stalinismo y que no logren romper dste tienen virtualmen-
,
te bloqueado el camino hacia el poder por razones que
les son absolutamente propias; congenitas, y que les im-
piden superar los obsticulos ex6genos. No es una simple
casualidad que despues del partido bolchevique de Lenin,
solo los partidos comunistas de China, Vietnam y Yu-
goslavia hayan podido akanzar el poder pot sus propios
rnedios. Se trata de ties partidos que mediante in modali-
dad' dc "se acata, pero no se cumple" hicieron tetra muer-
, la de las directivai de In III Internacional 'y del propio
Stalin y fueron capaces de transformarse, por ello mismo,
en fuerzas nacionales, aptas para ?interpretar y encarnar
- los mis profundos sentimientoi 'de sus respectivbs pueblos
y Ilevarlos a la victoria.
Si nuestra generacian .de comunistas venezolanos
pretende ser algo ma's que un grupo de propagandistas y
precursores del socialismo, en .lugar de onstructores de
una nueva sociedad, tiene que enfrentar. ganar? cl
_ .
reto que representa la ruptura del molde- partidistc.y
.politico stalinista.
En estas piginas hay algunas cosas que constituyen
una impugnaciOn, si se quiere dura, de buena parte de
nuestro pasado como partido marxista revolucionario ?y
pot lo mismo hemos cuidado, hasta donde ha sido po-
sible, la forma de decirlas, porque nuestro objetivo no
es herir susceptibilidades, sino promover una discusion
fructifera?. Pero solo al precio de estas revisiones lace-
rantes es como puede recuperar su sentido la autocritica,
haciendo que deje de ser In mera deicripcion de los ermres truosa: "todo lo ,que no es de mi partido me es extrario"
cometidos, con la inefable referenda al "origen pequefio-
En el camino de crear esa organizacion confronta-
burguds" de aquellos, y devenga el instrumento que hur-
mos problemas que estan colocados bajo et signo de
gando con tal profundidad en nosotros mismos, nos .
tas disyuntivas: eReformismo o revolucion? ellenova
neve a descubrir las rakes del .reformismo, de la chin y modernizacidn o mantenimiento del statu quo or
colaboradon de dases, de las desviaciones de derecha e ganizativo? iPartido independiente y nacional o particle
: CIA-RDP79-011 94A000400.020001
izquierda, a fin de extirpartas y taamtar -Ls piths expan-
sion de las potencialidades revolucionarias del partido.
Por .supuesto, revisiones de esta tclase son siempre dolo-
roses porque significan poner en cuestiOn buena parte
de nuestra, propia, individual, pequetia o grande, contd.
bucion a luchas que siempre emprendimos guiados por
los mis nobles sentimientos. Pero existeri encrucijadas en
la vida de un movimiento revolucionario en que solo
is duds, profunda y desgarradora, acerca de todo lo qua
se ha hecho, es lo que permite sortear.con exito las tram-
pas de ese dilema existencial,: ,reformismo o revoluciOn.
.Seto no ser,-
. De otro lado, arenas cinco meses despuOs de que
:dos de sus ingenios espadales se scoplaban pars crear is
primera estaciOn orbital, la URSS y otros cuatro 'takes
del Pacto de Varsovia tomaron la determinaciOn de in-
tervenir militarmente en otro pequeilo pais socialista, con
el pretext? de impedir una contrarrevoluci6n. Empero,
cuatro miembros de la comunidad socialista, ?China, Al-
bania, Yugoeslavia y Rumania?, por rezones diferentes,
on lenguajes y estilos distintos, condenaron la medida.
De la "pequefia entente" socialista, Vietnam emitio un
muy circunspecto y laconico comunicado de apoyo; Co.
tea procedi6 de igual manera y en Cuba, Fidel apoyet,
despues de una vigorosa requisitoria contra in politica
exterior sovietica y contra los modelos socialistas eu-
ropeos. Por su parte, virtualmente todos los partidos
munistas de Europa, incluyendo los tres mayores y de
mayor .autoridad ?italiano, frances y espaiiol? conde-
,mtron inequivocamente la intervenciOn, al igual que el
partido comunista japonds. Las contradicciones que des-
garran al mundo socialista y al movimiento comunista al-
canzaron su climax en aquel period? y las evidencias se
hicieron concluyentes: el socialismo esti sumido en una,
grave y profunda crisis..
La frase de Terencio, que tanto gusta-
ba citar esa mente universal y alerts que era Marx, nihil
humanum alienam pub o est, "nada de lo que es humano
me es extract", tiene que ser una de las divisas del re-
volucionario de hoy ?no porque no haya debido serlo
del de todos los tiempos, sino porque en In prictica no
lo ha sido; porque esa aberrante desviacian burocritico-
policial que es el stalinismo realiz6 una suerte de lobo-
wink en los cerebros de millones de comunistas ?de
los mejores hombres de esta humanidad, de los que tins
vez fueron sin discusion Is sal de in tierra, Is juventud
del mundo-- encuadrindolos bajo una consigns mon-
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aliened? y vasallo? De las respuestas que se den a esas
preguntas depende el que este contimie siendo un partido
revolucionario, dispuesto a la lucha por un cambio re-
volucionario, o un partido Inas del sistema, una pequeiia
fume, domesticada y asimilada, un "partido cronico",*
? para decirlo con la feliz expresion de Eloy Torres, un
partido de "sindicaleros" de la politica.
Hoy estamos en un punto crucial, en un punto de
inflexion de la historia del PCV. Sc viene de la asimila-,
cion do dos derrotas consecutivas: una, la que cones-
ponde at period() de la lucha armada, otra, la de las
? elecciones. Se abre ahora una nueva etapa histOrica;
sig-
nacla por grandes modificaciones politico-sociales, dentro
de cuya marco debemos desenvolvernos..
e Va a ser el nuestro tin partido que progresivamen-
te renuncie a su belle tradicion ? revolucionaria de los
6Itimos diez aflos, pare dejarse asimilar por el sistema,.
deviniendo en una fuerza reformista, o, .por el contrario,
romper a radicalmente con tal perspective, trazando una
;politica de enfrentamiento al sistetna, de impugnacion
?continua,? de preparaciOn para una nueva embestida re-
volucionaria ? a un plazo indeterminado pero inevitable?
eEl pertido, tal como.estd hoy, bastante "oxidado",
con evidentes. signos de esclerosis, de petrificaci6n, de
corrupciOn a algunos niveles, de ablandamiento, de pa
breza ideolOgica, con organismos dirigentes que en gran
? medida no corresponden a is realidad de- la militanCia y
.al grad? de desarrollo de ells, estarfa en condiciones de ,
participar eficazmente en el proceso revolucionario?
eUn partido que abdique de su independencia crf- 1
,
tica -en el piano internacional, esti en condiciones de ela-
borar y adelantar una verdadera politica revolucionaria?
Tel es el sentidO profundo de una polemica que en
definitive no envuelve otra cosa que dos opciones: parti-
do pare la revoluciOn o lo pa p
rtido ara medrar en el sistema.
'
puro nombre encarna ?sisi en un supuesto negado digamos
lo contrario-- el socialismo. Si de "sustos" se trata, nues-
tro solo nombre basta para "asustar", cualquiera sea el
programa que presentemos.
En segundo lugar, el nombre nos vincula, en la
imaginacion del hombre corriente, con la vershin que
dan is burguesfa y el imperialism? sobre el socialismo.
Para bastantes venezolanos, partido comunlsta significa
desde la idea de que el socialismo "mato" a. Dios hasti
la de que se trata de una dictadura atroz, que liquids
toda libertad, pasando pot. -consejas como la de que su-
prime incluso la propiedad de los cepillos de dientes,
proclama el amor libre, entrega los hijos al Estado, etc, etc.
En resumen, quienes se prepcupan por d rechazo
que supuestamente produciria la idea del socialismo, pard
set consecuentes con su pensamiento deberian preguntarse
tambidn si Is mejor manera de enfrentar ese problems no
Beds la de cambiarle el nombre al partido y disociarlo tan-
to del movimiento comunista mundial como de In Union
Sovidtica, China y Cuba.
Sin embargo, no serfa 4sto la solucion de "vender el
divan?
Por el contrario, veamos el socialismo venezolano
como un resulted? de la accion convergente y comb de
? .distintas fuerzas y sectores sociales, ?por lo cut' tendrif
? que ser como el conjunto de esas fuerzas. y sectores quiets
? que sea? saquemos el socialismo de debajo de in mesa y
ventilemos su problematica libremente, discutiendola con
todos aquellos otros sectores que de una u otra forma
se orientan hacia esa soluci6n, o hacia alguna seinejante
y ello?seri much? ms6til y que los baldfos intentos
de "matizar" el programa y las consignas de un partido.
cuyo mero nombre ya lo coloca en una situaciem de capitis
diminutio, en una situacion? de inferioridad que se ve
forzado a tolerar en is practice, mum& se considers au
participaciOn en alianzas o frentee.
Perfilemos nftidamehte el carActer nacional de Is hi-
? ha por at socialismo, establezcamos claramente que el
reconocimiento de Is pluralidad de contribuciones a is
lucha por el socialismo niega la posibilidad de qua el re-
sultado de elle signifique, como se dice corrientemente,
un "cambio de amo"; rompamos mediante una practice
que no deje lugar a equivocos la patraiia ?que, sin
embargo, se apoya en hechos objetivos facilinente enga-
fiosos? de que el partido revolucionario es una agenda de
una potencia` o pais socialists cualquiera, de que su poli-
tica forma parte de is estrategia internacional de ass po-
tenda o pais, y ya veremos si, en este aspecto el socialis-
mo "ssusta" tanto como algunos plenum Una politiCa
? A este respecto con fre era se escucha la obje:
don de que un planteamiento socialista o anti-capitalists
despierta demasiada resistencia en presuntos aliados; "sous.
ta", por as( decir, a algunos sectores que ante formula.
clones menos radicales sedan ms sensibles.
Tal vez resulte 0th discutir esto. Ante todo, no
deja de ser sorprendente que tal preocupaciOn por la pa..
sible resistencia ante un programa socialists no tome en
cuenta el hecho de que el puro nombre del partido, parti.
do comunista, es todo un programa y una definicion, que
? nos asocia a tins nueva sociedad ya en construction en
'autos paises. Desde el punter de vista de mesas, nuestro
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internacionalista, de apoyo y solidaridad con todas las
fuerzas que luchan en el mundo pot un cambio revolu-
cionario, pero que marque las distancias, de manera incle-
pepdiente y critica, es suficiente para ayudar a destruir
la idea de que el socialism? no es otra cosa clue un pro-
ducto de exported& de In Union Sovietica, China 0
Cuba.'
Si admitimos que ninguna fuerza de las que pro-
daman la necesidad del socialism?, pot si sole, es capaz,
de lograrlo, implicitamente reconocemos que pare poder
akanzar una sociedad socialista se precise in acciOn unida
de todas ellas; luego, para que el socialism? venezolano
puede materializarse tendri que ser plural, o sencillaMente
no podri existir. Este pluralidad supone un poder revo-
ludonario que debe garantizar in contribuci6n aut6noma
de otros sectores a la construed& de in nueva sociedad,
aportaci& que aalo puede articularse sobre la base de
una dialectica democritica entre las fuerzas revoluciona-
rias, que excluye el monopolio politico de cualquiera de
elms.
Y si In transicion hacia la nueva sociedad hace obli-
gatorio un poder dictatorial, este tendril las caracteristicas
que las fuerzas revolucionarias quieran que tenga. Una
dictadura revolucionaria en Venezuela no tiene pot que
parecerse a la de otros paises, puesto que el nuestro posee
particUllaridades que ineyitablemente dean su sello a las
formas de gobierno. Pew, de una vez podemos proclamar
claramente que nuestro socialism? no comporta la pena
de muerte, ni la prisi& arbitraria, ni in torture, ni el
delito de opinion. Y no lo comports porque un poder
revolucionario, democrsitico aun si es dictatorial, difi-
cuita grandemente tales prikticas, amen de que nuestros
propios principios win en contra de ellas.
Una sociedad socialism a plural excluye pot definici&
todo monolitismo en la concepci& de su vida politica, de
su vide cultural y artistica. No podriamos proponer el
mailcismo-leninismo como una suerte de sustituto de
la religion, que se aprenderti en las escuelas como se
aprende el catecismo. (Lo que no esta en contradicciOn,
desde luego,. con el hecho de que el carsicter dentifico
de in educaci& debersi suponer la metodologia y el and-,
lisis materialista dialectico). Tampoco podriamos proponer.
una culture dirigida administrativamente, ni monopolizada
pot los interpretes Poficiales" del pensamiento del r?;
men. Una politica cultural que arrinque desde la base
niega, pot supuesto, las' pretensiones de cualquier oficina
burocritica de dictar las pautas de in creacidn artisticasw,,v,
jS FUERZAS MOTRICES Dff LA REVOLUCION'
61-63;
Con este titulo tan "ortodoxo" quisieramos someter '
a la discusiOn un punto de vista relativamente "bete-
rodoxe sobre esta cuestidn de las fuerzas que de una
manera u otra podrian mover el proceso revolucionario
venezolano.
La forma acostumbrada de manejar este aspect? con-
siste en presentar las fuerzas motrices 'de la revolucion
solamente desde el Angulo puramente clasista, es deck,.
setialando las clases sociales interesadas en adelantar el
curso revolucionario. Esta forma de analizar las cosas '
?enteramente corrects y a la cual no vamos a renunciar?
no cubre, sin embargo, toda In riqueza de posibilidades
que ofrece una sociedad coma la venezolana.
. En este no solo exiite tin conjunto de dues sociales
objetivamente favorables a us.; cambio nacionalista y re-
volucionario sino que se ban ,constituido sectores o agru.
pamientos interclesistas, cuyos miembros estdn vinculados
pot alguna razors institucional ?politica o profesional? y
se encuentran dispersos entre las mis variadas organizacio?
nes sociales: fuerzas armadas, iglesia, partidos politicos. Es.
,tas organizaciones, por su propio carikter, pot su vinculacion
directs con la problemitica nacional y con las es/eras del
.poder politico viabiliian la aparici6n, entre algunos de
sus sectores, de una conciencia socio-politica implicita o
explkitamente nacionalista y revolucionaria. ?
En todos
los partidos politicos del pais los largos lustros de dr:na.
gogia revolucionaria arrojan como saldo una base popular
y un conjunto'cle cuadros medios y tecnicos frustrados
pero tnotivados hacia el cambio social y hacia 14 ruptura
de la dependencia. En in iglesia catdlica lu corrientes post-
conciliates, el retorrio a las fuentes del cristianismo, el
. ? . .
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renacimiento de una preocupaciem social que asume en
algunos sitios perfiles du gran radicalism?, han generado
la apariciem de sectores que atribuycn a la iglesia In mi-
siOn terrena de ayudar a la transformaciOn de la sociedad.
En el ejercito, ?asiento principal del poder--, el reflejo
de esa corriente que impropiamente se ha venido designan-
do con el nombre de "nasserismo" y que hoy encuentra
una notable expresiOn en Peril; el propio contact? con los
problem as de una dependencia que niega toda la forma-
ciOn patriOtica de los oficiales; Incluso, la aproximaci6n
a la revoluciOn por la via de combatirla; el recuerdo de
los alzamientos de Cartipano y Puerto Cabello, en 1962,
y, nuis atnis, el fenOmeno trejista de 1958; nos obligan a re-
considerar su problemitica segtin tuna optica diferente a la,
trodicional., Sabre todo, si se tiene en cuenta que las fuer-
zas armadas, como institucidn, han? sido asimiladas por el
establishment, de manera que las disidencias en -su seno
no sera extratio que tuvieran un signo de protesta pro-
gresista, de izquierda.
La vinculacion entre estos sectores interclasistas y
las clases sociales que objetivamente necesitan una trans-
formaciOn revolucionaria en el pals, potenciaria la capaci-
dad de estas i1timas para desarrollar una conciencia re-
volucionaria y al mismo tiempo multiplicaria las posibi-
lidacles de creaciOn y acciem de un vasto, amplio y pro-
fund? movimiento revolucionario. Desde luego, esta vincu-
lacien seria factible si se parte de reconocer la potencia-
lidad revolucionaria de esos sectores y se respeta su vision
del proceso de cambio revolucionario. Esto supone no
solo una concepcion pluralista de la futura sociedad sino
tambi6n una concepciOn pluralista de la lucha por ella;
? lo cual excluye toda hegemonia decretada a priori, y un
respeto absoluto. por la autonomfa y la contribucion de
cadli sector.
En otros tirminos, se trataria de trabajar con una
concepciOn no instrumental de la politica de alianzas.
Si no existe ninguna razOn aprioristica que nos .haga de-
pocitarios tinicos de la verdad revolucionaria ni monopo-
lizadores del valor, la iniciativa y la capacidad de sacrificio
para plasmarla, no tenemos ninguna razor" para ser quie-
nes establecen los raseros que miden la legitimidad revo-
lucionaria de los demis. La dependencia con respect? al
imperialism? y los traumas del crecimiento capitalista de-
pendiente afectan boy no solo a las closes populares sino
a sectores muy variados, de manera que la conciencia
del cambia social no es patrimonio exclusivo de ninguna
"vanguardia" que se la arrogue ms o menos arbitrariamen-
te. Hasta ahora, In concepcion contraria, la que atribuye s6lo
a los comunistas ?o naarxista-leninistas en general? Is
consecuencia para Ilevar la revolucion haste el final, es la
que permite al enemigo manejar las nociones de "compaile-
ros de viaje" y de "tontos Utiles": porque, efectivamente,
quien no,reconoce sino en si mismo la sinceridad revolucio-
naria, en los demis no puede ver sino aliados circunstan-
ciales, acompailantes hasta un cierto punto del camino,
gente a la cual se puede instrumentalizar, utilizar. Y
aunque la intend& no sea isa,'objetivamente se tuts a
esos "aliados" como "tontos titi1es".464,
Una politica de esta naturaleza tienc que insistir
en que la alternativa a lo' que existe boy ?que no es sino
el crecimiento capitalista dependiente y subdesarrollado,
con su correspondiente superestructura?, no puede ser
sino una via de desarrollo socialista y un nuevo marco
politico, que niegue el existente. En este sentido, solo una
, politica "vastamente principista" ?como dirk Lenin?
puede ayudarnos a conformar una fuerza propia, capaz
de desempefiar ese papel de "eslabon" entre un conjunto
de sectores y clases revolucionarias que unidos pueden
? promover el cambio social que demands la realidad neo-
colonial de nuestro pats.
Dicho esto, echemos una ojeada a las fuerzas motri-
ces de la revoluciOn desde el Angulo de las clases sociales
en juego. Desde este punto de vista pensamos que el
r proceso revolucionario posee un contenido popular. Esto
significa que las fuerzas sociales sobre las cuales deberia
descansar son aquellas que componen lo que gen&ica-
mente se conoce como pueblo: la clase obrera, el campe-
sinado pobre, la pequefia burguesia media y baja, 1 estu-
diantado --que puede ser considerado como un sector
diferenciado-- y los llamados pobladores marginales, con
exclusion explicita de cualquier sector de la burguesia.
Conviene detenerse un tanto sobre ci papel de la da-
te obrera, porque reciehtemente diveysos sectores y perso-
Hemos querido destacar el papel vital que la clase
obrera podria, potencialmente, desempefiar en el curso. de
la revoluciOn venezolana, pero al mismo tiempo gutsier's-
mos precaver contra toda concepciOn "obrerista" de la
revoluciOn venezolana. Cualquier asimilaciem de la situa-
don de nuestro pais a la dc un pais capitalista "clisico"
poelrfa resultar funesta. En las condiciones de Venezuela,
pretender apoyar sobre la chase obrera todo el peso de la
revolucion podria significar sencillamente cerrarse el ca-
mino de ella. Existen otros sectores sociales que deben ser
impulsados ?y motivar a su vez-- por el enviem revolu-
cionario: la pequefia burguesia media. y pobre, los pobla-
dores marginales y el campesinado pobre. El orden de la
enurneraciOn indica la importancia relative que les atribul-
mato laaviaspaiosipaambisiamiabouasisamaaus
104-6 108; 128
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CPYRGHT
Finalmente, unas pocas palabras sobre los campesinos
pobres. Es obvio que nuestro planteamiento sobre el pro-
ceso revolucionario --que seguramente se apoyarA en los
sectores urbanos de la poblad6n antes que en ningtin
otro? reduce considerablemente la importancia que tram
dicionalmente se atribufa a los' sectores campesinos. Para
decirlo de una vez, estamos simplemente proponiendo
revisi6n critica de la vieja formulacion sobre la alianza
obrero-campesina como eje del movimiento revolucionario.
Tal modo de postular las cosas no parece corresponder a
la complejidad de la realidad contemporAnea. En verdad,
continuar la discusiOn acerca de las fuerzas motrices de
la revoluciOn en los tOrminos de precisar absolutimente
una vanguardia social y una alianza de clases fundamental,.
no parece venir al caso. Segtin todas las evidencias, un
proceso revolucionario en Venezuela requiere Ia participa-
chin de tse conjunto de fuerzas sociales que llamamos pue-
blo y de algunos sectores interclasistas que no son exacta-
mente "pueblo". Entre aquellos, la. clime obrera, pot su
peso especffico, por su organizackin y por su conciencii
potencial, asf como la pequefia burguesfa, tambiin por su
importancia y su grado de conciencia y radicalism?, deben
ocupar un lugar de primer orden, y, sin duda, deben ejer-
cer un papel de gufa sobre las mesas marginales' y los
campesinos pobres. Visto el conjunto desde un Angulo
historic? general, la cristalizad6n de todo el proms? express;
los intereses de la close obrera, en tanto que el cambio
conduce al socialism?.
Perb, en /a practica politica concreta la vanguardia
y la direccion las proporciona el movimiento revolucionario
(y Este puede ser bien un partido comunista, como el
chino, clue se apoy6 en las masas campesinas, bien un mo-
vimiento heterogeneo como el "26 de julio", donde Ia
pequefia burguesfa desempefi6 un papel esendal; bien ufl
gitipo de altos oficiales compiradons, orginicamente des-
ligados de las, mum, como en el coo egipcio de Nasser).
La experiencia historica de todas las revoluciones
modernas demuestra que Li concepciOn que privaba en
Marx clase como tal ejerciendo el papel dirigente
activo--, y que Rosa Luxemburg? oponfa a la teorfa del ,
partido de Lenin? en el cual, no sin raz6n, yea on
organism? por encima de la clase obrera? ya es inoperante.
La Ultima revolucion en la cual la clase obrera actu6 co-
mo tal, sin "aparatos" interpuestos, fue la de la Comuna
de Paris. Despu6s de ella, el poder de la burguesfa ha ad-
quirido tal naturaleza tecnica que hace indispensable una
Grganizacian revolucionaria especializada para derribarlo.
'Aunque Lenin cre6 esa organizacion especializada para
las condiciones rusas de comienzos de siglo ?y en ese
sentido algunss de sus caracteristicas son totalmente ru,
sas?, a la luz de las condidones del capitalismo y el
imperialism? contemporineos, resulta indiscutible la va-
lidez universal de la concepcian de la organizacion revolu-
cionaria especializada y "ptofesionar.
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THE COMMUNIST SCENE
(21 February - 20 Mar0 1970
1. Leading Venezuelan Communist Denounces SoViet Model
Teodoro Petkoff, Venezuelan Communist leader of Bulgarian ancestry and
until recently a member of the Party's Polit*ro, is persisting in his criti-
cism of the Soviet Union for trying to impose its will on the international
Communist movement. In thelong 15th p1enary sessioii of the Central Committee
of the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) from 16 Febr ary to 6 March, Petkoff
was castigated by the dominant pro-Soviet faction fo such heresies as his
condemnation of the Soviet invasion of CzechoOlovaki . (In the PCV, orthodox
pro-Soviet Communists are sometimes referred to as "' oft-liners" for their
espousal of the Soviet-approved tactic of legal non-, iolent political activi-
ty in contrast to the "hard-line" characterized by CI, stro-inspired tactics of
violence, insurrection, and guerrilla warfare.) The' PCV's condemnation of
Petkoff centered on the ideas expressed in his book hecoeslova uia: El
Socialism? Como Problema (Czechoslovakia: The Problem of Socialism) published
last fall. Attached are excerpts from his book ill+rating hi q heresies.
Petkoff's main thesis is that the socialism rep
Union cannot be and should not be looked upon as the,
Venezuela must adapt socialism to its own national p
jets invaded Czechoslovakia essentially because Czec
its own model of socialism on its own traditions, no
Union. (This independent road to socialism has alwa
be intolerable to the Soviets, since it challenges t
Soviet ideology and consequently the Soviets' claim
world Communist movement.)
While derived independently, Petkoff's ideas as
in the Party, bear striking resemblances to those of
inent French Communist, as well as a number of othe'
esented by the Soviet
model for Venezuela.
culiarities. .The Sov-
oslovakia was building
on those of the Soviet
s been and continues to
e ultimate wisdom of
o leadership of the
well as his position
Roger Garaudy, the prom-
European and Asian Com-
munist intellectuals and leaders, whose breaking poi it came with the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia. Both Petkoff and Garaud* were recently dismissed
from their respective Politburos. Both are prominet4 intellectuals in their
own right -- Petkoff as a trained economist, Garaudylias the acknowledged lead-
ing ideologue of French Communism. Both are tested ,b.nd proven militants of
Communism, Petkoff until recently as a "hard-line" aCtive guerrilla, Garaudy
as along-time promoter of Soviet orthodoxy in the French Communist party (de-
fending the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, for )5amp1e). Both risked
their careers in the Party by espousing a position c itical of the Soviet
Union against an orthodox majority of their leadersh p colleagues. Garaudy's
crusade ended y his expulsion from the Politburo an from the Central Com-
mittee at the 14th Congress of the PCF in Feb uarr liHe also resigned from
his post as head of the .Partys Center for Marxist S udies shortly thereafter.
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Petkoff earlier lost his Politburo post, and a careful campaign is currently
afoot in the PCV to neutralize him even further by maneuvering him out of the
Central Committee (see attached accounts of the recently concluded Central
,Committee Plenum).
There are differences, too. Despite his minority!
substantial support in a small Party with littl influ
tics (typical of Latin American Communist parti s), an
leader; whereas the much older Garaudy has mobi ized 1
cal support in a large and potentially influential mas
difference is that Garaudy was merely one of the most
number of European Communists taking the Soviet Union
sion of Czechoslovakia, whereas Petkoff's is a one vo
Communist parties, which in obedient chorus all (excep
sang their approval of the Soviet action.
The power of these two men lies in their realisti
aims and pretensions in the world Communist movement,
by reflection on the underlying meaning of the Soviets
humane socialism undertaken in Czechoslovakia in 1968.
inability of the Soviet leadership to adapt to the req
temporary world outside the Soviet Union (and even witl)in the Soviet Union).
They also are aware of the obsolete Soviet insistence dn the necessity of ad-
hering unquestioningly and undeyiatingly to the Soviet Imodel. This obligation
thinking Communists recognize as a barrier to the advarce of the very Commu-
nism they support, while the "apparatchiks," thinking r not, give precedence
to their own .political survival, which in turn depends directly on the finanft.
cial support the Soviet Union provides in exchange for Iblind obedience.
position, Petkoff has
nce in national poli-
is a dynamic, young
tle practical politi-
party. Another vital
loquent of a large
o task for its inva-
ce in Latin American
for the Mexican CP)
reappraisal of Soviet
reappraisal triggered
crushing of the new
They recognize the
irements of the con-
2
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20 October 1970
CPYRGHT
wasinev: "On the Eve of the Fourth Congress of Venezuelan Communists"
Venezuelan communists are actively preparing.to hold the. next, 7fourth,party-eon,
gress, scheduled to open on 4 peeember this year, The,congress is to sum tap the results
of the party's activity in the 10 years,that havi'elappeesinee the third congress (in
March 1961) to adept a Program document and party'rUlei:to elect new persce,ael tor the
leading organs. and outline the political polioy for the next few years
The last decade has been an Important stage in the development of the revolutionary
process in the countries of Latin America. A historic event in this period was the
emergence and'eatablithment of the first socialist state on the American continent?the
Cuban Republic.i: Despite.all the desires of U.S.. Imperialism and the reactionary forces
of the Latin AmeriCan countries to isolate Cuba, its example has penetrated deeply into
the consciousness of the Latin American working people, who have been convinced by their
bitter experience of the "charms" of the capitalist "paradise." Recent events in Peru,
Chile, and Bo1iVia?whiCh have been very varied in the forms and methods of the struggle--
are evidence of the new, broad,upsurge in the struggle of the working masses-.of Latin.
America, who are opposing US. supremacy and advocating national sovereignty. and complete
Independence, the vital needs of the people,: democracy, and social progress.
In Venezuela itself the 1O-rear interval between the two party congresses of communists
' has been distinguished by a particular intensity of, the class struggle, in the course of
which the Communist Party, together with the other parties of the left, rose in armed
struggle against the antipopular, terroristBetancourt regime, which enjoyed the support
of U.3. oil, and steel trusts. .Despite the enormous courage and heroism displayed by the
Venezuelan communists, the 5-year armed struggle ended in the defeat of the revolutionary
forces.
In April 1967 the eighth Venezuelan Communist Party Central Committee plenum took.place
Under strictly tonspiratcrial conditions. Having exposed the mistakes committed in the
course of the armed struggle and recognized that the third congress thesis on the non
peaceful nature of the Venezuelan path to complete national liberation and STobialism in
the modern framework retains its validity, the plenum came to the conclusion.that it was
necessary to suspend guerrilla aetions under the given concrete conditions and to
transfer the center of gravity of!the party entire struggle to work.among the masses.
The Central Committee called on all communists to close the ranks on the basis of
Leninist organizational principles and to participate in the intraparty discussions which
was to develop in connection with the annaunoed preparation for the Fourth Party Congress.
Broad discussion has begun in party organizations about the party's combat experience.
questions of party building and tactics under the new conditions, and ideological
problems. The draft program document and party rules published 'by the Central Committee
were adopted as the basis for discussion.
Analysis of the concrete socioeconomic and pokitical conditions of modern Venezuela
carried out by the Communist Party on the basis of Marxist-Leninist dialectical methods
permitted it to,draw conclusions on the nature of the Venezuelan revolution at-the
present historical stage. The program dopument.defines it as an anti-impertalist?
primarily anti-U.S.. imperialism, anti-oligarchy, anti-large landed estate, patriotic,
popular revolution with the prospect of.a transition to socialism. The main tasks of
the present 'stage are set forth as follows: -to end U.S. ,supremacy. to eliminate the
economic and political power of the haute bourgeoisie, which is in Its service, to
overeome the country's socioeconomic backwardness, to liquidate large landed property9
and to create an independent economy.. These tasks can be implemented only by a
democratic, patriotic, 'popular government created in the coursev.of a victorious
revolution.
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CPYRGHT
The program document points out that theP\
triotic forces, particularly the working
class and its allies, are faced with the ta k of mastering all forms of struggle tis.q.
rebuff the enemy and defeat it on all fronts. It stresses that "the path of the yWiiii4;
zuelan revOlUtion is the path of the struggle of the masses under the most varied
forms and manifestations, the path of their unity, organization, and allitancyli
Now, With hardly six weeks to go before the fourth congress, the discussion has
assumed an exceptionally acute nature. A group advocating anti-Leninist' positions
on several of the most important problems of the Venezuelan revolution and also of-
the international communist movement has become active in the party. Under the
; pretext of calling for the "renewal" of the party, this group led by Central Committee.
I member Teodoro Petkoff, is trying to revise Marxism, to pervert its most --
tenets, to discredit the most devoted and tempered party leaders, and to demoralizer:a
the party from within by rejecting the Leninist organizational principles. In . aT
articles published in the bourgeois press and in twc; books Petkoff sets forth his
renegade credo and attacks the Soviet Union, the international communist movement;
and thcr.communist parties-Of.theLatin:Aterican:countries;and.the.socialist countries .
of Europe. He talks of the ;Soviet 'union with'particular, unconcealed hostility, '
wickedly distorting communist blinding in the Soviet Union. :
In his book "Czechoslovakia--.Socialism As a Problem': "Petkoff tides Completely with3)
i the imperialist circles in evalimting the events in that country, speaks in defense
1
of the anticommunist, counterrevolutionary forces who were trying to tear CzechOslos
vakia away fom the socialist camp, and defends the authors of the counterrevolUtiOnary
appeal "2,0001 Words."
As everybody knows, by a decision of the 10th Central Committee plenum, which tod.k.:)a
place in August 1968, the-IVenezuelan Communist Party supported the actions of the'Ll'ils
socialist community countries aimed at de'ending.socialism in Czechoslovakia and
thereby confirmed 'its loyalty to the principles of proletarian internationalism.
But Petkoff and the small. group of his minion, calling themselves. Marxists and
revolutionaries, continue the slander campaign against,socialism and its main bulWarle
--the Soviet Union--a campaign organized by the imperialisteircles. 'Lc
Petkov's writings are permeated with an open hatred of the world's first socialistv
state--the Soviet Union--and Lenin's party. As is rightly noted by eminent VenezuelSh ;
Communist Party figures PI Ortega Diaz and A. Garcia Ponce,? rebuking the renegade-:co
in their brochure-"T. Petkofr's Antisctialist VieWs," "Anti-Sovietism is the thread
which runs through Petkoff's book from the first to the last page." It is absolutelkl-
right to say, the authors note, that the Czechoslovak theme is.merely an occasion for
anti,.Sodetism, Tor expressing the most absurd and slanderous fabrications about.thOi.
USSR, and for falsifying the development of the Russian revolution. Not having fa:citicl
to support his slanderous assertidns, Petkaff call's as witnesses the most invet6i'atd2'0
troubadours of anti-Sovietism from Trotskiy;tO Deutscher, Garaudy, and Sik. -
In deserting to the pesitiong of socialism's enemies, Petkoff deliberately.distortssb:
the process of its creation in the USSR and the other socialist countries for the-:4Y10
purpose of discrediting it. He tries to show that socialism in the Soviet Union.Was'lq
developed ostensibly "in aCcordance with inimitable and special features," and that".
the Soviet Union is "a model Of socialism specificially and absolutely limited by
its own historic framework."
2
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Meanwhile the Soviet people, having completed the building of the first phase of a
classless society, are successfully solving questions of building the material and
technical base of communism, the creation of communist social attitudes, and the
education of the new man. The experience which the Soviet people have accumulated
is of permanent international significance, acknowledged by true communists throughout
the world.
Petkoff goes as far as to monstrously assert that the forces of the sooialist countries
are not unified but shattered and isolated. According to him, the shattering of the
'vsoelalist camp "would create new starting points for the development of a revolutionary
illovementl" In his hatred .of the socialist countries the slanderer goes as far as to
say that changes of power are needed in these countries. And with all this Petkoff tries
to appear to be a communist, a "friend" of the socialist countries. Venezuelan
Communist Party General Secretary Jesus Paria was right when, in answer to attacks
1by pne of Petkoff's supporters, he said: "If these are our friends, who are our
1 enemies?'
Petkoff lifts his hand against the principles of party building. Here he does not
; stop at falsifying the CPSU's historic documents. He states that the Tenth RCP
(3)s.Congress resolution on party unity, which strictly forbade factions and groups in
i the party ranks, was a temporary measure, and that V.I. Lenin advocated "pluralism" in
the party, in questions of building socialism, and in the interpretation of proletarian
literature. This is the most blatant distortion of the Leninist doctrine on party
1 unity.
Theeuthor of the libel subjects the fraternal parties of 'Latin America and Europe to
abuse. His appraisal of these and others means, Substantially, the denial of their
role as the fighting vanguard of the working class. In place of the existing parties,
, which have in fact demonstrated their vitality and combat capability, he proposes the
! creation of rightwing opportunist parties with a minority and a majority, rejecting
the ;principle of democratic centralism and the Leninist doctrine of the dictatorship
of the proletariat. Petkoff subjects the fundamental principled tenets of Marxism-
Leninism to distortion. He denies the historic mission of the working class and its
vanguard role in the struggle to overthrow capitalism and in the building of a new .
_society. The working class, in Petkoff's view, "is striving to become a factor of
conservatism," and the "revolutionary intelligentsia" and the youth are ostensibly
the real revolutionary force which "infects" the working class with a revolutionary
nature.
Petkoff criticizes the aim of the Seventh Comintern Congress to create antifascist
people's fronts. He categorically states that the creation of peoples' fronts provided '
capitalism with an opportunity of "gaining a respite" again! He ignores the fact '
that in many countries, long before the war with Hitlerite Germany, the policy of
antifascist peoples' fronts helped strengthen the unity of the working class and of all
democratic forces. Why is it necessary for Petkoff to make such an assertion? In
order to reject the necessity of the Venezuelan Communist Party's struggle at the
present stage for the creation of a broad anti-imperialist people's front. ' There
can .be no doubt as to who is interested in this.
Petkoff needed such fabrications to put forward his own of socialism, What
kind of socialism is it that Petkoff describes in his book "Socialism for -Venezuelasii
It Is socialism without the dictatorship of the proletariat, without the leading role'
of the Communist .Party, with complete freedot to disseminate bourgeois ideas, Which
is precisely what' the counterrevolutionary fercee.tried to do'in'Czechoslovak.ii.'''IT4.
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CPYRGHT
Having met with a decisive rebuff in the party, Petkoff appeals to student youth-anel.
tries to gain support for himself among a certain section of the young commulliati
In publishing his concoction he tries to blackmail the party leadership and the rank
and file communists with the threat of a split. As is noted in a Venezuelan Communiat
?arty Central Committee Politburo statement, PetItoff even dares to put forwird
!conditiOne of unity, which are that the party should reject the Leninist organizational
;principles and the principle of democratic centralism! as the law of the party's-
linternal life,, allow the existence of factions, and' rejectunity based on programs
;and regulations.
?
;The renegade's claims are being rejected both by the leaders and'by the lower party"1 ,
'organizations.- A Central Committee _Politburo statsmentsays that.Petko?Ts machinationSj
;have encountered universal condemnation. The Venezuelan Communist Party feaelership',!!!:?
;having shown the real essence of Petkoff 1s inclinations,, called on all party and' '13 '
;young communist-party organizations to energetically defend the unity and cohesiOnOP
the party. It. noted that Petkoff openly opposes the party and its political lin-,
obviously
;obviously trying to creAte the foundations for forming a new organization. It called-
!on communists.of the lower organizations and local and district committees to:giyS
;an appropriate rebuff to Petkoff's antiparty-aspirations. ?
;The provocative activity of Petkoff and his group cannot fail to create certain -
;difficulties for the Venezuelan revolutionary movement. However, the internatienal.:Ii
;experience of the communist movement shgwa that wherever a decisive struggle is PrOi.
;claimed. against opportunism, a struggle-based on the principles of Marxismieninisly
;.coupled with, the- rallying of all the party's healthy forces round the leadership;
;any attempts to lead it off the correct Leninist road Win Pnd in failure. The
!Venezuelan communists' Many years of experience, !devotion to their Marxist-Leninist
;cause, and?the political maturity of4the leadership will permit the Communist j'aPty'T !
!to overcome all obstacles. The Venezuelan Communist party Fourth ;Congress 17a
become an important landmark ph the road Of strengthening and developing.thc,Comiuniit'
Party?the real vanguard or working class: and' of all VenezuelOs'working people,'1
4
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Excerpt from Jiri Pelikan's Introduction to
IOr Piller Bericht: Das unterdruckte Dossier
Europa Verlag, Vienna, Frankfurt, Zurich, 1970, 442 pp.
... Today we know that the Cominform was supposed to be and did
operate as an instrument for the domination of the communist parties
in the socialist countries by the Soviet Communist Party and Stalin
personally. By declaring the Soviit model of socialism as the only
correct model, the model obligatory for all countries, the Cominform
expressly discarded and condemned all ideas as to the possibility of
individual, specific roads to socialism, which even Lenin had predicted.
This cleared the way to the mechanical imitation and transfer of the
Soviet model -- which had emerged from entirely different historical
preconditions -- to the other socialist countries. This rejection of
nationally differentiated ways to socialism was expressed in a partic-
ularly dramatic form in 1948, in the conflict between the Cominform
and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, which was supposed to be force
to capitulate through an economic blockade but which resisted bravely....
"It thus seems that Stalin, (Polish Communist leader)IBierut, and
other dogmatists were offended by Czechoslovakia precisely because the
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia had deep national roots and was thus
capable of developing its own way to socialism, a way which was in
keeping with the conditions of the country and the mentality of the
people and which was therefore tt, promising way that would lead to success.
They were obviously afraid that the Czechoslovak example, if it were
indeed to be successful, could have a contagious effect and could trigger
similar tendencies in their countries.
"The extraordinary pressure, against Czechoslovakia, of all countries,
and the enormous proportion of political assassinations and liquidations
in that country, of all countries, can only be explained by saying that
Stalin and the Soviet leadership had no use for a Communist Party of
Czechoslovakia (CPCZ) which had strong bonds with the masses, which
en oyed their confidencei and which had a cadre of experienced, respected
politicians. Instead, it was obviously much more in keeping with the
intentions of the Soviet leadership at that time -- and it is like-
wise in keeping with the present Soviet leadership -- to make sure that
the parties will be compact and closed off in themselves, that they will
be based mostly on administrative power, that they will not have any
real personalities around, and that they will depend completely on Soviet
power, wherever possible also on the presence of Soviet troops, which
the CPSU obviously considers the only reliable guarantee for socialism.
?
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CPYRGHT
"This is why the Soviet leadership has always looked with dis-
trust toward countries which liberated themselves in their own re-
volutionary struggle, such as Yugoslavia, China, Cuba, and also
Vietnam. Wherever the country had a revolution of its own which
carried the national leadership to the top from the bosom of the
movement, it is by far not as easy to obtain obedience and subordin-
ation toward the center, that is, the CPSU, as it is in countries
where the governments had come to power under the protection of the
Soviet Army which bore the brunt of the liberation. One might say
that the common denominator of this Stalinist view is the lack of
confidence in the force of the revolutionary movement as well as the
overestimation of the Soviet role or the endeavor to control every-
thing and to decide everything according to subjective Soviet views
as to what is good or bad for socialism -- and this in reality is not
always identical to what is in the interest of Soviet big-power policy.
"Herein lies the key to the answer to the question which many
people throughout the world have asked: why was it impossible, after
the August 1968 invasion, to salvage at least a portion of the post-
January reforms in Czechoslovakia, and why was this development re-
versed so abruptly and thrown back not just to the time prior to
January 1968 but much further back? Why -- after 20 years -- have
the old accusations been brought out again? Why were they raised
this time primarily by the GDR, Poland, and Bulgaria and of course
also Moscow? Why was Czechoslovakia accused in 1968 -- after the
CPCZ had once again won the full authority and support of the popula-
tion, when the people had spontaneously pledged themselves to socialism,
when not a single enterprise had been given back to the capitalists,
when not a single agricultural cooperative had collapsed, when a
communist leadership, which enjoyed general popularity and natural
authority, had developed? Very probably because the Soviet leader-
ship, that is to say, its dogmatic wing -- as it had in the years 1948-
1950 -- did not want to tolerate any other model of socialism. The
Czechoslovak experiment had to be punished, as an example, as a warn-
ing to all others, because the Soviet leadership was now afraid that
the Czechoslovak road to socialism could lead to success and could
have repercussions on the USSR and other socialist countries.
"Yugoslavia is a tolerated exception because it had won its
right to its awn road through its own struggle in the past and be-
cause it is obviously not prepared to drop its awn road; China is
the excommunicated heretic and China is too strong for the Soviets
to risk a Czechoslovak-style intervention; and Romania is left un-
touched for the time being because it proved to be determined to de-
fend its independent policy and because it proceeds very cautiously.
in doing so. The tragic mistake of the Czech leadership after January
consisted in the fact that it stuck to Gottward's old basic principle
of 1948 also in 1968, the principle that Czechoslovakia would not
2
CPYRGHT
Annrovd For RplpaspI Agging/f19 ? CIA-RI-WM-CH I c4Annn4nnn9nnni-n
become another Yugoslavia and would risk everything on one throw of
the dice: on the understanding of the Soviet Union, in the belief
that the "Yugoslav case" could not be repeated after the 20th congress
of the CPSU. This is why Czechoslovakia had tO pay all the more
dearly for its endeavor to walk its awn road to socialism.
"The fact is that the CPSU leadership today must itself play
the role which the Cominform used to play and therefore relies on the
discipline of the other parties. This is why it is angry not only
with the Czechoslovak communists and this is whylt wants to decimate
their party to a small but obedient sect; it is just as hostile
toward the Communist Party of Italy which, on the basis of its mass
character, its bonds with the people, its participation in the parl-
iamentary struggle, its strong political cadre and its independent
ideas of socialist upheaval, constitutes a potential heretic. This
is why the CPSU leadership without hesitation and consideration of
the tragic consequences, practically allowed the Communist Party of
Austria to fall apart and this is why it promoted the smashing of
the Communist Party of Greece against which it struck a blow at the
very moment when its leading representatives were jailed and tortured
by the dictatorial regime of the colonels. With equal distrust it
looks toward the Left in the West and the national liberation move-
ments in Africa, Asia, and lAin Aeric, to the extent that these
movements do not want to subordinate Miselves to MOSCOW and develop
their awn, local fighting and development forms."
[Underlining added]
3
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Das
unterdriickte
Dossier
Bericht der Kommission
des ZK der KPTsch Ober
politische Prozesse
und .Rehabilitierungenic
in der Tschechoslowakei
1949-1968
Herausgegeben von Jti Fenian
kniL
1/16
Europa Verlag
?Wien, Fraultflut ZUrich
'CV
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131eibt die Frage, ob die Anderung von Strategie und Taktik der
KPTsch durch die Sektierer innerhalb der Kommunistischen
Partei bewerkstelligt worden sein konnte oder vor allem
durch die Wendung in der gesamten sowjetischen Strategie und
Taktik nach 1947, als das Kominform gegrandet wurde. eu e
weiB man, daB das Kominform em n Instrument zur Beherrschung
der kommunistischen Parteieni in den sozialistischen Landern
durch die sowjetische KP und Stalin personlich hat sein sollen
und dies auch gewesen 1st. Indem es das sowjetische Sozialismus-
modell zum einzig richtigen und fiir elle Lander obligaten Modell
erklarte, verwarf und verurteilte das Kominform ausdracklich
elle Vorstellungen von der Maglithkeit eigener, spezifischer Wege
zum Sozialismus, die schon Lenin prognostiziert hatte. Damit war
der Weg frei fur die mechanische Nachahmung und Vbertragung
des sowjetischen Modells, das aus ganz anderen historischen Vor-
aussetzungen hervorgegangen war, auf die ilbrigen sozialistischen
Lander. Diese Ablehnung national differenzierter Wege zum So-
zialismus kam In besonders dramatiseher Form 1948 zum Aus-
chuck, im Konflikt zwischen dem Kominform und der Kommuni-
stischen Partei Jugoslawiens, die durch wirtschaftliche Blockade
zur Kapitulation gezwungen werden sollte, sich jedoch tapfer zur
Wehr setzte.
In der Kominform-Resolution gegen jugoslawien wurden
eigentlich bereits die Anklageptmkte far die kommenden poli-
tischen Prozesse angefiihrt: als Verrat oder Verschworung ver-
urteilt wurden biirgerlicher Nationalismus und Kosmopotitismus,
die Unterschatzung des Klassenkampfes sowie die Hervorhebung
nationaler Besonderheiten mid die Unterschtitzung des entschei-
denden Anteils der Sowjetarmee an der Befreiung.
Es scheint also, daB Stalin, Rakosi, Bierut und andere Dogma-
tiker an der Tschechoslowakei eben deshalb AnstoB nehmen, well
die Kommunistische Partei der Tschechoslowakei national ver-
wurzelt und also fahig war, einen eigenen, den Verhaltnissen des
Landes und der Volksmentalitat entsprechenden und daher er-
folgverheiBenden Weg zum Sozialismus zu entwickeln. Offenbar
fiirchteten sic, das tschechoslowakische Beispiel konnte, wenn es
erfolgreich ware, ansteckend wirken und ahnliche Tendenzen in
ihren Landern hervorrufen.
Der auBerordentliche Druck, gerade auf die Tschechoslowakei,
und die enorme Quote politischer Morde mid Liquidierungen ge-
rade in diesem Land 1st nur so zu erklaren, daB Stalin und die
sowjetische Fiihrung eine KPTsch, die mit den Massen verbunden
war, sich auf deren Vertrauen stiltzen konnte und einen Kader
erfahrener, angesehener Politiker besaB, nicht brauchen konnten.
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CPYRGHT
Vielmehr entsprach es den damaligen und es entspricht ebenso
den heutigen Absichten der Sowjetfilbrung offenbar weit
mehr, wenn die Parteien In sich abgeschlossen sind, sich haupt-
sac.hlich auf administrative Macht stiltzen, tiber keine wirklichen
Personlichkeiten verfligen und vallig von der sowjetischen Macht
abhangen, womoglich auch von der Anwesenheit sowjetisc.her
Truppen, in der die KPdSU offensichtlich die einzig verlaBliche
Garantie fiir den Sozialismus sieht.
Aus diesen Griinden hat die Sowjetfiihrung stets mit MiBtrauen
auf Lander geblickt, die sich durch ihren eigenen revolutionaren
Kampf befreit haben, wie Jugoslawien, China, Kuba und auch
Vietnam. Denn wo es die eigene Revolution gewesen 1st, welche
die nationale Fiihrung aus dem SchoB der Bewegung emporge-
tragen hat, kann man von der Fiihrung nicht so leicht Gehorsam
und Unterordnung gegentiber dem Zentrum, das heint der
KPdSU, erreichen wie dort, wo die Regierungen eigentlich unter
dem Schutz der Sowjetarmee, welche die Hauptlast der Befrei-
ung getragen hatte, zur Macht gelangt sind. Man konnte sagen,
der gemeinsame Nenner dieser Stalinschen Auffassung 1st der
Mangel an Vertrauen in die Kraft der revolutionaren Bewegung
sowie die Vberschatzung der eigenen Rolle oder das Streben, alles
zu kontrollieren und nach den eigenen subjektiven Anschauungen
zu entscheiden, was dem Sozialismus niitzt oder nicht ? und das
1st in Wirklichkeit nicht immer identisch mit dem, was im In-
teresse der sowjetischen GroBmachtpolitik liegt.
Hierin liegt auch der Schltissel zur Beantwortung der Frage,
die von vielen Menschen auf der ganzen Welt gestellt wird:
Warum war es nach der Invasion im August 1968 nicht moglich,
in der CSSR wenigstens einen Teil der Nachjanuar-Reformen zu
retten, und warum wurde die Entwicklung so jah, nicht nur vor
den Januar 1968, sondern nodi viel weiter zuriickgeworfen. Warum
sind wiederum nach zwanzig Jahren die alten Anschuldigungen
aufgetaucht, diesmal vor allem von der DDR, von Polen und Bul-
garien und natiirlich auch von Moskau erhoben. Warum beschul-
digte man die Tschechoslowakei 1968, nachdem die KPTsch neuer-
lich die voile Autoritat und die Unterstiltzung der Bevolkerung
gewonnen, das Volk sich spontan zum Sozialismus bekannt hatte,
wo kein einziger Betrieb den Kapitalisten zuriickgegeben warden
war, keine einzige landwirtschaftliche Genossenschaft zerfallen
1st, wo eine kommunistisc.he Fiihrung, die allgemeine Popularitat
und natiirliche Autoritat genon, sich herausgebildet hatte? Wohl,
well die sowjetisc.he Fiihrung beziehungsweise deren dogmatischer
Fliigel ? iihnlich wie in den Jahren 1948 bis 1950 ? kein anderes
Sozialismus-Modell dulden wollte. Well nun die Sowjetfiihrung
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CPYRGHT
fiirchtete, der tschechoslowakische Weg zurn Sozialismus kOnnte
zum Erfolg f?hren und auf die UdSSR und andere sozialistische
Lander zurilckwirken, mate du tschechoslowakische Experiment
exemplarisch bestraft werden, alien anderen zur Warnung.
Jugoslawien ist eine tolerierte Ausnahme, weil es sich das Recht
auf einen eigenen Weg bereits erkampft ht und offenbar nicht
bereit ist, darauf zu verzichten; China ist der exkommunizierte
Ketzer, zu stark, als daB man an ihrn einen tschechoslowakischen
Eingriff riskieren kOnnte, und Rumanien wird vorlaufig respek-
tiert, well es sich entschlossen gezeigt hat, seine unabhangige Poli-
tik zu verteidigen, und dabei sehr vorsichtig vorgeht. Der tra-
gische Fehler der tschechischen Fiihrung nachrodem Januar be-
stand darin, daI3 sie sich auch 1968 noch ariGottwalds alten
Grundsatz von 1948 hielt, die Tschechoslowakei werde kein zwei-
tes Jugoslawien sein, und alles auf eine Karte setzte: auf das Ver-
stg.ndnis der Sowjetunion, in der Meinung, nach dem 20. Parteitag
der KPdSU kOnne der Fall Jugoslawien sich nicht rnehr wieder-
holen. Urn so teurer muBte die Tsdiechoslowakei fur das Unter-
fangen zahlen, ihren eigenen Weg zum Sozialismus gehen zu
wollen.
Denn heute mu.B die Fiihrung der KPdSU die Rolle, die einst
das Kominform hatte, selber spielen und braucht daher die.Dis-
ziplin der anderen Parteien. Darum ist sie nicht nur auf die tsche-
choslowakischen Kommunisten base und will deren Partei zu
einer kleinen, aber gefiigigen Sekte dezimieren; ebenso feindselig
verhalt sie sich zur Kommunistischen Partei Italiens, die auf
Grund ihres Massencharakters, ihrer Volksverbundenheit, ihrer
Teilnahme am parlamentarischen Kampf, ihres starken politi-
schen Kaders und ihrer eigenstandigen Vorstellungen von der
sozialistischen Umwilzung, eine potentielle Ketzerin ist. Darum
liel3 die Fiihrung der KPdSU auch ohne Zogern und ohne Riick-
sicht auf die tragischen FoIgen die Kommunistische Partei Oster-
reichs praktisch zerfallen und forderte die Zerschlagung der Kom-
munistischen Partei Griechenlands, gegen die sie den Schlag in
einem Augenblick fiihrte, da deren fiihrende Vertreter vom Dik-
taturregime der Obersten eingekerkert und gefoltert wurden. Mit
gleichem MiBtrauen betrachtet sie die Linke im Westen und die
nationalen Befreiungsbewegungen in Afrika, Asien und Latein-
amerika, sofern diese sich nicht Moskau unterordnen wollen und
ihre eigenen, bodenstandigen Kampf- und Entwicklungsformen
erausbilden.
Was fur die einzelnen Linder gilt, das gilt auch fiir Einzelper-
sonen. Die harteste Repression richtet sich gegen jene Korrnnuni-
sten, die aktiv am Widerstandskampf daheim oder im Ausland
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L November 1970
JIRI PELIKAN: BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH
Jiri Pelikan was reported by the London Times, on October 1, 1969,
to have chosen "temporary exile" in the West. His decision is further
proof of the frustration suffered by many Communist intellectuals in
Czechoslovakia since the Soviet-led invasion in August, 1968.
Pelikan announced that he was unable to serve the present
Czechoslovak leadership, and that he believed he would be able to play
a more effective part in upholding the ideas of "progressive Communism"
if he remained outside Czechoslovakia. But he emphasised his continuing
loyalty both to his country and to his Communist ideals, saying that
he intended to return to Prague as soon as free speech was restored.
The Czechoslovak news agency, CTK, reported by the London Communist
Morning Star on October 3, described this statement as being "in full
contradiction to the teaching and policy of the Communist Party," and
accused Pelikan of having "misused" Prague television "to disturb the
Communist Party and the Socialist order." (Pelikan was for five years
Director-General of Czechoslovak Television.)
At 46, Pelikan is a striking example of a committed Communist
who supported the reforms introduced in Czechoslovakia after the fall
of Novotny in January, 1968, and the weakness of the charges brought
in the CTK statement indicate the embarrassment felt by the present
authorities at his defection.-
Highpoints of his Communist career are:
1940 Joined the Communist Party at age 16. Was jailed by the Nazis.
1940/1945 Escaped prison and spent the rest of the war fighting in the
resistance.
1948 Entered the National Assembly when the Communists took power.
1953 He became General-Secretary of the
Union of Students. (IUs)
1955/1963
He served as IUS President.
Communist International
1964 Elected to the Czechoslovak National Assembly, where he was
active on the Cultural and Foreign Affairs Committees.
1968
1963/1968
1969
Became President of the Foreign Affairs Committee.
He served as Director-General of Czechoslovak Television.
Served as Cultural Counsellor at the Czechoslovak Embassy
in Rome. ?
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25X1C10b
a u I a Li
SECRET
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FUR 1"1-W----- rNKIIW November 1970
SOVIET ARMS AND COLONIALISM
Vaudeville Is Dead
Does the impulse of the expansionistic Tzarist drive
toward empire beat on in the breasts of the present Soviet
leaders? Are they about to give birth to an idea, colonialism,
long after its death?
Historians and political scientists agree that the classic
era of Kiplingesgue empire building ended long ago, except
in the minds of Soviet idealogues and activists. These
worthies have the curious tendency to see in their principal
opponents a reflected image of themselves; time after time in
their propaganda they accuse the U.S. of faults inherent in
their own society, such as racism (They built a ghetto
university for their African students and cannot establish a
modus vivendi with their Chinese coreligionists) and
repressive police statism (Soviet dissenters will vouch for
their own government's preeminence in this field) -and lastly,
they accuse the U.S. of having aggressive global intentions.
They are sure the Americans aspire to world power and dominion over
foreign peoples, but they demonstrate by thier own acts that
the urge is within themselves.
The Germans, the French, the Italians and the British have
for one reason or another put away the uniforms and trappings
of overseas rule. The Portuguese empire, though diminished,
hangs on - for how long nobody knows. In the interest of
historical considerations, popular sentiment and economic
good sense the United States since World War II has entered
an era of retrenchment by taking a hard look at its great-
power commitments and obligations, both military and otherwise,
and by returning political self-determination to those from
whom it was taken, as in the case of the Philippines and of
Okinawa. America's objective is not one of control but of
enlightened self-interest and the mutual benefit of economic
partners. Colonialism, like vaudeville, has been confined
to the dustbin by most of the major powers.
But, incredible as it might seem, there is a mighty
bustling about in the wings and apparently ignoring the
change in times, the Russians are going to give a performance
in empire, in physical expansion, in overseas rule by
satraps. The main evidence of this lies in the pace of Soviet
rearmament, not just in strategic weaponry but in the field
of conventional arms as well. In the latter the Soviet Union
has long maintained a strong status in such landbased conventional
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weapons as tanks, artillery and mechanized infantry. However,
not satisfied with its current great-power status Russia,
historically a land power, now for the first time since her
defeat at the hands of the Japanese at the turn of the century
has begun to eye prizes across the oceans.
The Sun Never Sets...
To move out from home bases into wider areas of the world
Russia needs power, and power she has - more power than she
needs. Present Soviet nuclear stockpiles are awesome. Despite
their power the Soviets maintain a forced rate of missile
construction, the reason for which is quite obvious when one
thinks in terms of their colonial ambitions. A nuclear shield
nearly equal to that of the U.S. is adequate for a balance
of terror: neither side can move into an area of vital
concern to the other. But this is precisely what the Soviets
dream of doing - of being able to undertake any actions that
might suit them at any place in the world they chose. They
seek, in short, ultimate world domination, and for that they
need more than a balance of terror. They need a nuclear umbrella
over their conventional forces so large that no power or combination
of powers could even dream of brow-beating them into retreating
from an aggressive course of action, as was the case in Cuba
in 1962. Then they would be free to move their conventional
forces anywhere they chose at any time.
These conventional forces on land are already reaching
the point of providing two-front protection. Nuclear and
technical inferiority keep the Chinese infantry masses in a
respectful military posture to the east, checkmated by a
highly mechanized Soviet counterforce. To the west is NATO,
its forces just equal to the task of keeping the bear at bay,
but a force completely inadequate for any aggressive Western
designs on Eastern Europe, let alone the Soviet Union itself.
Left over in between are sufficient pools of military and
technical personnel to provide an increasing flow of manpower
for "advisory cadres" manning rocket and fighter aircraft
forces in countries like the Sudan, Egypt, and Cuba.
All that is missing to complete the image of a very
modern empire is a blue-water navy. Now with the appearance
of just such a Russian fleet in the Mediterranean, the
Atlantic and Indian Ocean, etc., we have a very convincing
image. As with the missile program, so with the ship
construction plans. While the Soviet navy still ranks
second to the U.S. navy in tonnage and overall combat
power, it has been steadily closing the gap and already has
sufficient forces to seize and secure continuing right of
passage through all the major sea lanes of the world.
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Without major naval bases on foreign soil all that has
been attributed to the Soviets above does not make them a
colonial power. But the bases are there - at Santiago in
Cuba, at Alexandria in Egypt, at Port Sudan and coming soon in
Mauritius and Socotra, and perhaps eventually at Mers el Kebir,
Algeria. So, the Soviet sea lanes already have secure terminals
in land areas firmly under political, military and economic
control. This structure has all the oddity of a live mastadon-
a classic colonial empire is evolving in our time.
White Man's Burden
The teachings of Marx and Lenin prove conclusively that
none of the foregoing can possibly be true. There is no
Soviet vaudeville show; there can be no mastadon. Colonialism
was a logical, historical outgrowth of the evils of capitalism.
Under the more advanced state of a Marxist-Leninist society
the exploitation of man by man is impossible, the exploitation
of a backward people by the Communist Motherland unthinkable.
Therefore our view of Soviet activities is a misapprehension.
What we take to be political control in, say, Cuba is simply
the provision of an opportunity for the disciplined study of
higher truths (for those who don't escape) beneficently supplied
by Russian comrades. What we take to be military control in,
say, Czechoslovakia is nothing more than a response to a plea
for aid in suppressing political hooliganism. As for economic
control, no right-thinking person would believe that Soviet
personnel would tell the Egyptians how to manage the Aswan
Dam or the Helwan Steel Works just because they were built
with Soviet capital, or tell the Egyptian army when, where,
and how to fight with its billions of dollars worth of
Soviet equipment.
When the French and British empires collapsed, the Soviets
felt a brotherly compulsion to come to the aid of destitute
peoples ill-used by centuries of exploitation. Whereas the
Western powers, during the post-colonial era, have supplied
billions worth of developmental capital and goods to these
peoples, the Soviet Union after half a century of scientific
planning, found itself short of both of these commodities.
It did, however, have sufficient military goods, and it could
present itself as a developmental example with people to advise
on its emulation. No thought of national gain was counten-
anced at any time. Fired by altruism, the Soviet economy,
half the size of that of the U.S. in gross national product,
has been making twice the effort of the U.S. to do that which
it could do best (or wanted to do most), build armaments with
which to strengthen its approaches to those less privileged
and fortunate peoples it wished to protect and advise.
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Russians are willing to do without consumer goods and adequate
housing as long as necessary so that these humanitarian efforts
can continue.
Of course there are commodities available in some of these
countries which could prove highly useful to the home economy,
oil, minerals and foods and fibers. So it is quite possible
that we will see iron galleons flying the hammer and sickle
beating home to Odessa, Leningrad and Vladivostok with cargoes
of the modern equivalents of Inca gold and plate in ever-
increasing numbers. They've already begun to move. When
these treasure fleets become large enough to enable the Soviets
to materially ease the impoverished situation of thier own
citizens they may be able to accumulate enough capital and
enough goods to treat with overseas nations on the basis of
modern economic internationalism. Until then (and if the
transition ever occurs it will be far in the future, to judge
from the present sluggish Soviet economic performance and the
scope of their ambitions) we have a grand old-fashioned show
onstage.
4
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THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS
CPYRGirITctober 1970
Russia and defense spending
THE series of articles on Russia's un-
precedented military buildup in peace-
time, written by Scripps-Howard de-
fense specialist Mike Miller and appear-
ing in The Washington Daily News, is
important and disquieting reading. (See
Page 3.)
Briefly, Mr. Miller's findings are that
r the Kremlin is making a massive mili-
tary effort right across the board. It has
either surpassed us or is rapidly catch-
ing up in strategic missiles, nuclear
submarines, naval surface craft and su-
personic fighters. Also, the Soviet Union
has long had a lead in such coventional
items as tanks, artillery and mecha-
nized infantry.
The implications of the Soviet buildvp
are disturbing. The United States clear-
ly had nuclear superiority in the mid-
1960s. The Johnson and Nixon adminis-
trations opted to freeze the building of
intercontinental ballistic missiles and to '
let the Russians close the gap.
The theory was that Moscow would be
satisfied with "parity" and the nuclear
arms race could thus be brought to a
halt. Unfortunately, in practice the Rus-
sians have shown few signs of slowing
down. Their momentum is such that
they threaten to move clearly ahead in
nuclear striking power.
Why is the Kremlin driving its sub-
; ?cts so hard? We don't pretend to
know, and we worry over these ques-
tions: If the United States had trouble
with the Russians in the 1960s, when it
had nuclear superiority, what will the
1970s be like when its advantage is lost?
Can the, Kremlin be trusted to. bave
military lead and not try pressure plays+
?
? against our allies in Europe or this;
country itself? 1
This should not be taken as a call toi
resume the arms race. The Soviet-4
American strategic arms limitation
(SALT) talks have shown signs of prog-
ress and remain a hope of mankind.
But if the SALT talks do not reach]
agreement in about a year and Russia,
maintains its thrust for primacy, the.
United States will have to rethink its'
defense
defense policy.
Ironically, President Nixon, often at-
tacked as a hawk, has been the only re-:
cent president to cut the defense budget
seriously. His proposed 1971 defense
spending of $71.8 billion is $6 billion un-
der 1970. . .0
Foes of defense spending in Congress \
? think the Pentagon can make further
savings and have cut $2 billion more
from its budget. Defense Secretary 1VIe1-
^vin R. Laird insists that the cut causes '
intolerable risk, that the 1971 budget.
was
\vas alr e ad y, "rock bottom, bare
bones."
Altho there usually is fat in Penta-
gon budgets, this time Mr. Laird may'
be right. We'll have more confidence in l
the bare-bones claims, tho, when the'
Pentagon starts firing brass hats who,
cover up costs overruns and not the au-
ditors who expose them.
There's a point of view in Congress
and the nation that regard defense'
mending as waste that robs money
from social purposes. But the way Rus-' ,
sia has been evidencing adventure and;
seeking arms supremacy, the defense,
.tulget looks like a life-insurance, press
. 44*Y/A nlYft PaY. ?
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CPYRGHT
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THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS
20 October 1970
Soviet pushing subs
0
fac s issile
By MIKE MILLER end other defense officials believe it might be heads in the Pacific on Both SS9 and $,5111
Scripps-Howard Staff Wolter designed as a first-strike weapon against the missiles, altho these warheads have not been1
The Soviet Union, after years of playing Minuteman force in its underground silos. This confirmed as separately targetable. Mr. Laird
c tch-up to the United States in numbers of led the administration to begin deployment of ,predicts Russia could have a MIRV (multiple'
ix tercontinental ballistic missiles, now is the Safeguard antiballistic missile (ABM) sys- independently targe,!able re-entry vehicle) ea-
p?unging ahead. tem to protect Minuteman. pability by next year.
The Russians have 700 intermediate- and DISCLOSE FEARS
A big question confronting U.S. defense plan- medium-range ballistic missiles ? 70 believed
nIrs is where the Soviet ICBM buildup eventu-against Red China and 630 In arguing for the Safeguard ABM and other
targeted against
a iy will stop.
Western Europe. The United States used
strategic programs, Mr. Laird and other to4e-
Simultaneously the Soviets have launched a maintain these types of missiles in Europe but fense officials describe this scenario:
drive to catch and possibly surpass the U.S. in Phased them out as obsolescent in viewof the' ? A massive force of MIRVed SS9 blockbus-
n-rmbers of strategic nuclear subrnarines and ICBM buildup. ters with multiple warheads and increased ac-
?
submarine-fired nuclear missiles. , Russia has deployed 13 of its latest model curacy could destroy all or most of the U.S.
Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird says the
ICBM force in a surprise attack.
Yankee-class strategic nuclear submarines.
? Submarine-launched missiles would des-
Like the U.S. Polaris force, these carry 16
United States will have to proceed with some
IT ajor new strategic weapons system, possibly missiles each. At least 15 more Yankee-class troy the U.S. bomber force before it could get
13-.ginning next year, if the Soviet buildup con- submarines are under construction, and the airborne. From off the U.S. coasts these rats-
ti ues unabated and no agreement emerges Pentagon estimates these will join the fleet siles would have a flight time of only six to
fi the rate of about eight per year. At that rate) ?
om the strategic arms limitation talks. nine minutes to the airfields not enough
Mr. Laird notes, the Soviet missile submarine
Already the United States is deploying multi-
p e warheads on some of its missiles in a giant
'skep forward in the arms race. Each warhead
o 1, these missiles can be fired at a different
rget.
The Soviet Union has deployed more than
1 300 ICBMs and is continuing at the rate of at
tim fn, th bo b
ve ra ar alerl
fleet will surpass the 41-boat Polaris fleet by and take off.
1973 or 1974.
? With the ICBMs and bombers destroyed.
All but 10 of the U.S. Polaris submarine as only the missiles of the Polaris/Poseidon fleet
will be converted to fire Poseidon missiles,
would remain intact in the U.S. strategic arse,.
weapon with 10 separately targetable war.,
heads. Thug each submarine, which now car- lid.,
ries 16 nuclear warheads on the same number
ast 150 per year. The United States has 1 054 of missiles, will be armed with 160 warheads
,
i and is holding at that level, altho 500 of these LEAD IN BOMBERS
to be armed with three separately targeta-
:b e warheads each. The 540 U.S. -.strategic bombers give this
country a big lead in that field, altho U.S.
. The Soviet monster SS9 missile concerns bomber strength has been reduced from 780
.S. defense officials most. The Russians have ?five years ago. The Soviets have 200 long-
-n ore than 300 SS9S operational and under con- range bombers, about 50 of which are confi-
s ruction. gured as tankers.
, The Soviet arsenal also Includes almost 800 Rep. L. Mendel Rivers, D-S.C., chairman of ,
S-311 missiles. These are comparable to the the House' Armed Services Committee, claims;
LS. Minuteman missile which carries a war-? to have intelligence reports that Russia is
h.ad of slightly more than one megaton. In building a new bomber fleet. The United
comparison, the huge SS9 could carry either , States has awarded a contract for some test
o e 25-megaton warhead or three warheads of models of a new bomber, dubbed the pi, 17.,uti
fide megatons each plus guidance equipment.. 1no final decision has been made on whether to
SPACE BOMBER TESTED build it.
Russia also continues to test-fire a potential' The Russians have an ABM system opera.
terror weapon known as a fractional orbital tional around Mompw consisting of 64 missile,
b nnbardment system (FOBS). This vehicle launchers. Some U.S. officials have warned'
achieves orbit like a satellite. It could be used :Russia might also be able tb convert some of ,
to orbit a nuclear warhead over the United Its more than 10,000 antiaircraft missiles to
St ates repeatedly. However. U.S. officials be-f ABMS.
live the Soviets would fire it down on the first The U.S. ABM system so far consists of con-
pass to achieve surprise and attempt to reduce;i structlon work on two sites and recent!
r.tclar warning time. The Soviets are also test- i .congressional approval for work on a third,
kg a low-trajectory ICBM with the like pur-' site. The system will not be fully operatIonall
pose of cutting down radar warning time. before tite mid-1970s, assuming continu
The United States has 1,000 Minutman mis- congressiohal approval.
sles and 54 older Titans. The U.S. arsenal" 7. The Soviet Won has tested multiple wa
locludes nothing comparable to the SS9. Be
cause the SS9 warhead is much more powerful4
thansoecessaty to destroy cities? Mto
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CPYRGHT
THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS
19 October 1970
Big Soviet expansion
orries U.S.
Vietnam war costs have not been disclosed for
- By MIKE MILLER this year, they apparently more than account
Scripps-Howard Staff Writer for the difference in the Soviet and U.S. budg-
Russia is forging ahead with what U.S. de- ets.
tense officials describe as the greatest peace-
time military buildup in history. Mr. Laird interprets the defense spending
figures to mean that Russia is making twice
From stategic nuclear missiles and subma- the defense "effort" of the United States be-
fines to conventional ships and planes, the So- cause her gross national product is only about
viet military effort is impressive. V.S. officials half that of this country.
view it with growing concern. Further comparison shows the United States ,
The United States still ranks as the world's spent $7.5 billion last year on strategic offen- I
foremost military power. The U.S. nuclear sive and defensive weapons systems ? the
arsenal is so powerful this country could des- hardware that figures in a nuclear war ?1
troy the Soviet Union in a nuclear exchange while the Soviets spent $13 billion for strategic
even if Russia hit first in a surprise attack. systems. Rep. Rivers says the additional $5.5
This power to retaliate should be sufficient to billion spent by the Russians for strategic
deter the Russians from attacking for the time hardware in one year would pay for about
being. 1,000 intercontinental ballistic missiles like the
But U.S. defense experts are concerned over U.S. Minuteman.
the momentum of the Russian effort on all RESEARCH CITED
fronts, particularly strategic nuclear missiles
Of greatest c'bncern to many officials is Rus-
and sea power. If the Russians continue to
s
build and the United States does not take someia's margin in spending for military research
and development. The United States will spend
countermeasures, the experts fear Russia will
$13 billion to $14 billion for that purpose thii
reach such a superior position in five years or
more that it might attempt nuclear blackmail year; the Soviet Union will spend $16 billion
of the United States. to $17 billion. The-US. research and deve1op-1
-FEAR SOVIET SUPERIORITY ment budget has leveled off and is declining; '
the Soviet budget for these activities is rising
"If present trends continue," President Nix- at the rate of 10 to 13 per cent a year.
on told a private congressional briefing during
the recent fight over the antiballistic missile "The picture here is a sobering one," says
Dr. John S. Foster Jr., the Defense Depart-
system, "the United States a very few years '
hence will find itself clearly in second position itient's research and developement chief. "It is:
?with the Soviet Union undisputably the today's research and developthent that pro-:
greatest military power on earth." vides tomorrrow's weapons ? for t975 and be.;
yond ? and provides also a capability to un--
"I am afraid the day has already arrived," derstand early and counter quickly the qualita-
said Rep. L. Mendel Rivers, D-S.C., the super- tive weapons Improvements on the other,
hawk chairman of the House Armed Services side."
Committee, in reference to the President's
warning during a recent House speech on the Military pay in the Soviet armed forces le
Soviet threat. lower than the compensation for U.S. service-.
men. Therefore, a. greater share of Russia
"If they (the Russians) keep this mottentum defense budget goes for weapons.,
When the late President John F. Kennedy:
demanded under threat of nuclear war that
the Russians withdraw their missiles from
Cuba, the Soviets had to comply because they
were an inferior nuclear power. Their navy
also lacked the power to challenge the
,blockade of Cuba so are from the Soviet home;
I land.
The. Russians suffered such extreme humill-
ation in the 1962 crisis that Soviet leaders re-
solved to build such a military power that they,
would never have to back down again. Now,
eaght years later, the United States is witness-
iftgihe results of that resolve.
...
going," says Defense Secretary Melvin R.
Laird, "they will be in a position where they Russia has about 3.3 million men in its regu-
will have a superior force and we will have a lar forces. The U.S. active military strength:
second-rate force. This concerns me because a has declined to about three million from a
high of more than 3.5 million at the peak of
'decision to build new strategic weapons takes the Vietnam buildup. The U.S. force is sched-
five to seven years to implement." uled to continue delining to somewhere be-*
' RUSSIA SPENDS MORE tween two million and 2.5 million. ? 4
_k
'
According to the best available estimates, MISSILE CRISIS RECALLED
,,annually, including the military aspects of its . In assessing relative military strengths ot,
Russia's military spending of about $60 billion
'space program, surpasses that of the united the United States and Russia, the comparisori4
'States if costS of the Vietnam war are dis- inevitably is made between today's balance
counted. The Administration's defense request and the situation as it existed at the time of
for this fiscal year is ,671.8 billion- While the the 1962 Cuban raissile crisis. ? _,,,a,:i
)
-C
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ppIuvu rut ictbG .
THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS
21 October 1970
Reds threaten sea supremacy
11y MIKE MILLER
Scripps-Howard Staff Writer
Russia's growing fleet of modern combat
ships and submarines poses a serious chal-
lenge to the U. S. Navy's supremacy of the
seas.
The Soviet navy already has seized a clear
lead in some important phases of sea power ?
principally total submarine strength and fast,
-missile-firing gunboats.
While the Red navy still ranks second to the
United States in tonnage and overall combat
power, it steadily has been closing the gap,
This trend is being accelerated by the Defense
Department's retirement of large numbers of
.'older vessels to hold down military spending.
. Russia's fleet is much more modern that
that of the United States. Only an insignificant
'number of Russia's more than 1,000 surface
combat ships and submarines are more than
20 years old. The U. S. Navy has had to oper--
ate in recent years with more than half of its
surface combat ships more than 20 years old.
Navy officials have estimated that a ship
construction program costing $35 billion over
10 years will be necessary to keep pace. Rep.
L. Mendel Rivers, D-S. C., House Armed Serv-
ices Committee chairman, says the Navyhas
,told him privately a faster crash program to:*
tailing $25 billion in the next five years is
needed.
Russia has more than 350 operational sub-
marines, including the 13 Yankee-class strate-
gic nuclear missile-firing submarines com-
parable to the U. S. Polaris. The Defense De-
partment says intelligence reports Indicate the
Soviets May be building a submarine base in
Cuba to serve these vessels. Yankee-class sub-
marines, carrying 16 missiles each, already
have begun patrols in the Atlantic within mis-
sile range of the United States.
Forty of the Soviet submarines ? nine of
them nuclear-powered ? are older models
which carry ?three ballistic missiles each.
These are believed to be targeted against Eu- -
rope and Asia.
Sixty-five of Russia's submarines ? 35 of
them nuclear-powered ? are equipped with
supersonic cruise missiles with ranges up to
400 miles. They are designed for firing at an
enemy's nayal and merchant ships. This mis-
sile is unique to the Soviet Navy. -
The other 240 Soviet submarines are attack
? models with the Wartime mission of firing tor-
pedoes at surface ships and other submarines; -
22 of these are nuclear-powered.
All of Russia's submarines are of post-World'
War'
War H vintage.
Based on information he says Was supplied
by the Pentagon, Rep. Rivers estimates the
Soviet nuclear submarine construction capaci-
ty at from 20 to 35 per year. The Soviets now
are producing 10 to 14 submarines annually,
One Russian submarine yard has greater ca-
pacity than all of the U. S. submarine yards`
- combined.
American admirals grimly recall in public
speeches that Nazi Germany had only. 57 diesel
submarines in early World War II but exacted'
a heavy toll of allied shipping and almost won
the battle of the Atlantic.
Other features of the modern Soviet navy
include two helicopter carriers used for anti-
submarine warfare maneuvers, 30 guided-mis-
sile destroyaers, 120 of the fast, missile-firing
gunboats and 700 smaller patrol craft and gun-
boats used for coastal defense.
Many Soviet vessels, including small patrol
boats, carry the STYX missile with which the
Egyptians sank an Israeli destroyer in the
Mediterranean Sea. The United States has no,
comparable missile and has been working'
? hard to develop a defense against the STYX.
Against the Soviet fleet of more than 350
submarines, the United States has 147 subma-
rines. Eighty-eight of these are nuclear-pow-
` ered ? the 41 Polaris strategic missile-firing
boats and 47 nuclear-powered attack subma-
rines. The remaining 59 attack submarines are
older Diesel models.
However, the United States has not tried to
match Russia in total numbers of submarines,
. nor does the Navy contend that this is neces-,
- sary. The United States relies on naval air-
craft and surface vessels for a major portion
of its antisubmarine warfare activities.
For years Russian admirals have boasted
that the United States will have to share the
world's oceans with its growing fleet. That al?
ready has happened in the Mediterranean,
where the Red fleet matches the U. S. 6th
Fleet in size altho not in combat power be-,,
cause of the U. S. aircraft carriers.
The Soviets also have begun penetrating the
? Caribbean with periodic voyages, held a mas-
sive 200-ship worldwide naval exercise earlier
this year and have extended naval operations
into the Indian Ocean and Widespread areas of
the Atlantic and Pacific far 'from their home,
'shores.
The U. S. Navy's principal margin in combatl
power lies in its force of 15 attack aircraft
carriers. The Russians have no aircraft car-
riers. However, the U. S. Navy, is under in-3
creasing pressure in Congress to reduce its
carrier fleet to hold down defense spending, ?
Carriers are extremely Costly. 4'1
Example: One nuclear aircraft carrier noir
under construction will cost about $000 million.-
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CPYRGHT
NEW YORK TIMES
12 October 1970
Italians Bolt Communist Party
To Join a New Ultraleft Group
By PAUL HOFMANN
Speolal to The New York Thoea
ROME, Oct. 11?A left-wing looked rather perfunctory and
caused no major disturbances.
The Communist party assert-
ed afterward that radical stu-
dents and Maoists had boycot-
ted its anti-Nixon rally.
Students and other ultraleft-
ists demonstrated on their own
against Mr. Nixon before and
during his sojourn here, attack-
ing American-operated offices
and cars, and rampaging in
downtown Rome. Some 1,000
rioters were detained, but most
of them were released after
questioning.
The official Communist party
also drew ultraleftist scorn for
an editorial in its main news-
paper, Lunita. The editorial said
that President Nixon, though
unwelcome in capitalist Italy,
might be welcome in Commu-
nist Yugoslavia, which he visit-
ed on the next stage of his Eu-
ropean tour.
During the last week, hardly
a day passed with the Com-
munist headquarters in Rome
receiving reports of new deser-
tions of individual party mem-
bers or entire groups.
The latest defectors were
eight prominent Communists in
Venice, including a secretary of
the local party federation, Piet-
ro Granziera, and the secretary
of the Giudecca district, Walter
Parmeggiani. The eight are said
to have taken a sizable follow-
ing in the rank and file over to
the Manifesto group.
Four days earlier? a group of
Bergarno Communists, includ-
ing a member of the Chamber
of Deputies. Eliseo Milani,
joined the Manifesto movement.
Mr. Milani was the sixth Com-
munist deputy to declare him-
ed in the demonstration, which self independent of the party
?revolt in the tank and file a
the Italian Communist party,
the strongest in the West, ap-
pears to be spreading.
Many members, especially
younger ones, are disgruntled
'over the way the party reacted
to President Nixon's visit here,
and this is cited as a major
reason for a spate of defections
during the last few days.
The Communists who have
left the party recently, includ-
ing some well-known local and
regional organizers, have gen-
erally joined a year-old ultra.
left group, known as Manifesto,
which seems well on its way to
becoming Italy's second Com-
munist party.
Manifesto is named after the
group's monthly magazine,
'which has a paid circulation of
'30,000, The growing splinter
movement accuses the Soviet
'Union of seeking an accommo-
dation with the United States,
and the Italian Communist
worty of seeking to strike a deal
with the Government to be-
-erne a part of the power struc-
mare.
The manifesto group has ac-
tused the Communist party of
tailing to commit itself during
President Nixon's visit, and the
party seems to be hurting from
'the criticism.
'[he party sponsored a parade
and rally in Rome on Sept. 26,
the day before President Nixon
arrived here, to protest against
what it denounced as his at-
tempts to implicate Italy in an
imperalist, pro-Israel plot in the
Mediterranean and the, Middle
East. A crowd estimated at 5,-
000 to 10,000 people partici at-
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IWorld Anti-Imperialist Conference (WAIC) Preparatory Meeting]
MTI (Hungarian press agency), Budapest
30 September 1970
Representatives of 45 communist and workers parties exchanged
views in Budapest 28-30 September 1970 on topical questions regarding
the anti-imperialist struggle.
The delegations expressed their parties readiness to make efforts
to strengthen the cohesion of the communists and other anti-imperialist
organizations, to widen their cooperation on the basic of equality,
and to intensify their solidarity in joint struggle against imperialism.
The meeting was conducted in an atmosphere of objectivity and in
a spirit of comradeship and solidarity.
L'HUMANITE, Paris
23 September 1970
MEETING OF THE CP'S FROM THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES OF EUROPE
Took Place in London
On 21 September 1970 a meeting of communist parties from European
capitalist countries took place in London. Representatives of the
FRG, Cypriot, Spanish French, British, Greek, Irish, Italian, and
Netherlands communist parties were present.
After discussing problems arising from the development of multinational
societies, these representatives expressed their opinion that a
conference of communist parties from European capitalist countries
should take place in London from 11 through 13 January 1971. "The
struggle of the working class in European capitalist countries with
regard to the development of multinational societies" is to be on
the conference's agenda.
The proposals advanced at the meeting are being submitted for the
approval of the central committees of the parties concerned, including
parties which were unable to participate in this meeting and which
wrote in order to make known their approval of the idea of such a
conference.
(The PCF was represented in London by Central Committee member Jacques
Denis).
2
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LE MONDE, Paris
16 September 1970
The French Communist Party "Opposition" Is
Going To Reactivate Its Operation
Announces Mt. Jean Poperen
In the bulletin, Synthese-Flash, published by the Socialist
Study, Research, and Information Clubs (ex-UGCS), Mr. Jean Poperen,
who is the moving spirit of this association, gives his opinion
on the internal situation of the French Communist Party. Specifi-
cally, he writes: "On the internal plane, the upswing of the
French Communist Party, begun in 1965, seems to have been halted
for an indeterminate period. The Communists are not retreating,
but must be content with exploiting the opinions of traditional
"malcontents." Recruitment is stagnating; militants are no longer
giving evidence of the same enthusiasm with respect to attending
meetings, distributing party literature, or pasting up posters.
Mr. Poperen continues: "This standstill could nevertheless
be jostled in forthcoming weeks. In fact, a sector of the left
which has been very discreet for several years within the Communist
opposition, has received new impetus after the expulsion of
Garaudy and of Tillon. These expulsions and the persistence of
malaise within the Communist Party seem to have galvanized tradi-
tional activists. In recent months, an initial regrouping took
place, first of all with GarauaY, Tillon, Jean Pronteau, and
Maurice Kriegel-Valrimont.
Sh9rtly thereafter, a majority of the militants of the
"Unir Debat" group, specifically Marcel Prenant and Jean Chaintron,
stated that they had joined the initiative of the above-mentioned
four in behalf of a "Twentieth De-Stalinization Congress"...
Mr. Poperen also specifies: "In December, the opposition will
hold a national conference where they will celebrate the fiftieth
anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party. On this
occasion, they will try to define their internal and external
Communist Party strategy. As of now, they have contacted other
groups, particularly the PSU (Unified Socialist Party). The
appearance, on 8 October, of Politique Hebdo, put out by activists
of all Socialist organizations, including former members of the
Communist Tarty, will provide possibly significant support to
these campaigns."
3
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IRMA N PPE Pftriv
CPYROHTllther 1970
Line reunion de ,
P.C. des pays
capitalistes
d'Europe
eu lieu
Londres
uNE reunion de Partis'
communistes des pays
capitalists d'Europe a
eu 11u a Londres le lundi
21 septembre. Etaient presents
des representants des Partis
t;..,communistes .d'Allemagne Fe- .
, derale? Chypre, Esp a g n e,
it Fran Ce, Grande-Bretagne,
1Grece, Mande, Italie, Pays-
Bas.
Apres avoir discute des pra-
t blemes pose par le developpe-
ment des societes multinatio-
. nales, 1es representants pre-
sents ont exprime l'opinion
' qu'une conference des Parts':
communistes ,des pays capita-
listes crEurope devrait se tenir
Londres les 11, 12 et 13 jab- 4
vier 1971 avec pour ordre du ;
!
jour: c La lutte de la classe
ouvriere des pays capitalistes
d'Europe devant le developpe- j
I merit des societes multinatio-, ?
nalea. -
L e s suggestions avanceeS
par la reunion sont soumises
l'approbation ?d e s comites
; centraux des Partis coneernes,
y compris aux Qui ne furent
pas en mesure de participer
cette consultation et cud ant 7
ecrit pour faire connaitre letir?
approbation de l'idee d'une.
telle conference.
.(Le Parti Communiste Fran-1 I
cais etait represente Londres 4
par Jacques Denis, membre du
Comite Central.)
MONDE, Paris
September 1970
Les I opposon:leis du P.C.F.
vont relancer flew Galion
annonce M. Jean Poperen
Dans le bulletin Synthese-
Flash, publie par les clubs Etudes,
Recherches et Information socia-
liste (ex-U.G.C.S.), M. Jean Po-
peren, qui anime cette associa-
tion, donne son opinion stir la
situation interne du parti cam-
muniste frangais. fl ecrit notam-
ment : ? Sur le plan interieur, la
remontee du P.C.F., amorcee en
1965, semble stoppee pour une
periode indeterminee. Les corn-
munistes ne reculent pas, mais
doivent se contenter dc capita-
liser les voix des ?mecontents?
traditionnels. Le recrutement
stagne, les militants ne font plus
preuve de la me= ardeur a
assister aux reunions. a distribuer
des tracts on a colter des eta-
ches.
M. Poperen poursuit : a Cat
immobilisme pourrait toutefois
bien atre bouscule dans les se-
maines a venir. En eff et, un see-
teur de la gauche, tres discret
depicts plusieurs annees, celui de
l'opposition communiste. a mu
nit tin If U 7fW1 (111011 reallittlifoll, at!
i et de Tilton, Cart ow/u-
nions et la persistence du malaise
4 l'interteur du P.C. semblent
4
avoir galvanise les militants tra-
ditionnels. Durant ces derniers ?
mois. un premier regroupement a
eu lieu, tout d'abord avec Ga-
raudy, Tillon, Jean Pronteau et
Maurice Ifriegcl- Valrimont.
?Peu apres, la majorite de5
militants du groupe Unir Debat,
not amment Marcel Prenant et
Jean Chaintron, declaraient s'as- '
socier a 'Initiative des quatre
precedents en f a veur d'un
vingtieme congres de la fiesta-
linisation ?...
M. Poperen precise d'autre
part ? Au mois de decembre,
les oppositionnels tiendront une
conference nationale oft Us f ?-
ront le cinquantieme anniversaire
de la fondation du P.C. A cette
occasion, Us tenteront de definir
leur strategic a l'interieur et a
l'exterieur du P.C. D'ores et defd,
ils ont pris contact avec trautres
formations et en particulier avec
le P.S.U. La sortie, le 8 octobre,
de PolitiqUo hcbclo, MHO par
des militants de toolca trs orga-
nise, lions socialist(' rt, aont eir m
anelons dti P.C., euratiturra un
? soutien eventual important 4 ern
campagnee u.
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1.IIiIflIUf II UI. IIIL. November 1970
November 7
November 9-11
DATES WORTH NOTING
Moscow Anniversary of the October Revolution.
Tripoli Meeting of the Afro-Asian Peoples
Solidarity Organization. AAPSO is
a Communist-dominated, pro-Soviet
organization based in Cairo and
headed by Yusuf el Sebai (AAPSO
Secretary-General) of the UAR. In
late dune in Rome, AAPSO co-sponsored
with the World Peace Council an
International Conference in Support
of the Fighting Peoples of the
Portugese Colonies.
November 10 Latin America
November 14
Latin America Student Strike for
Vietnam, being promoted by the
(Communist) World Federation of
Democratic Youth and the (Communist)
International Union of Students. The
date is to coincide with the 25th
anniversary of WFDY's founding in
1945. November 10 will also be the
eve of International Student Week
(Nov. 11-17) adopted by IUS after
WW II as an annual student commemora-
tion of the mass student demonstrations
in Prague in Nov. 1939 protesting the
Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia and
the death of a Czech medical student,
Jan Opletal, killed that week in a
street clash between students and
occupying forces. Thirty years later,
the Prague-based 1US was witness to
new mass student demonstrations and
the death of another Czech student,
Jan Palach, who set himself afire in
downtown Prague, January 16, 1969, to
protest the Soviet occupation of
Czechoslovakia.
Sino-Soviet Anniversary of the signing in 1860
border of the Treaty of Peking, by which
Russia gained 841,500 square kilo-
metres along the lower Amur River
and east of the Ussuri River, areas
initially penetrated by Russia
200 years earlier and thereafter
intermittently contested by
troops of the Tzarist and Manchu
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Empires. Communist China charac-
terizes the Treaty of Peking as
one of the "unequal treaties,"
and the Sino-Soviet border clashes
in recent years have occurred
along segments of the border
established by this treaty.
November 15 New Delhi
Mid-November New York
November 27-
December 3
Southeast Asia
December 4 Venezuela
2
4th Afro-Asian Writers Conference
sponsored by the Cairo-based, pro-
Soviet, Communist front, the Afro-
Asian Writers Bureau. This meeting
has been long-delayed (the 3rd
conference was in 1967), because the
Sino-Soviet split ruptured the Bureau.
The UN General Assembly will take
its annual vote on Chinese represen-
tation. Apparently, for the first
time, there is a possibility Peking
may gain a majority of UNGA votes,
but probably not the two-thirds
required for an "Important Question"
vote.
Pope Paul VI to visit Manila
November 27-29, Sydney November 30-
December 3, and possibly Ceylon on
his return to the Vatican.
The Venezuelan Communist Party is
to hold its 4th Congress. Interest
is focused on the outcome of long-
standing factional differences
between the majority pro-Soviet
faction and a faction led by
Teodoro Petkoff, Central Committee
member, who in a recent book advocat-
ed a Venezuelan national brand of
Communism and rejection of the
Soviet model. He earlier wrote a
book criticizing the Soviet invasion
of Czechoslovakia. On 20 October,
Pravda denounced Petkoff's "anti-
Sovietism."
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400020001-0
December 10 Stockholm
3
Awarding of the Nobel Prizes. The
Soviet author, Alexander Solzhenitsyn,
is to be awarded the prize for
literature. The American agronomist,
Dr. Norman E. Borlaug, is to be
awarded the prize for peace for his
great contribution to the agricultural
"green revolution."
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400020001-0
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) 11
r71
g
LIMITES HUMAN1SME
L est difficile de juger calmement de rreu-
vre Soljenitsyne, entre l'antisovietisme
des c.3rnpagnes qui ont prepare' et exploi-
tent l'attribution du Prix Nobel, et r a al.;
faire * qui en U.R.S.S. a conduit la mean*
administrative le privartt du titre d'ecrivain.
Ni run ni l'autre, pourtant, ne devrait faire
oublier qu'il est question dune rzuvre, discu.
table sans doute, mais considerable,' a tous
les scns du mot.
Les coups de marteau sur un rail des Pre-
rnieres lignes d' Line journie d'Ivan Denisso-
viteb (1) sonnaient un debut qui ne pouvait
passer inapergu. It est vrai que rien n'allait
etre plus terrible a lire pour un communiste
le recit, minute par minute, d'un simple jolts,
'et meme plutet moins malheureux que &au-
tres, dun simple detenu dans un de ces camps
de concentration oil des hommes comme Pau-
teur passerent de longues suttees, avant d'etre
apres 1956. Mais tout ce qui disait,
?dans son irrecusable et impitoyable detail, la
verite era. Ile de cette journee, parmi tant
d'?res cboucbnit precisement sur cette autre
varite : tout le roman ecrit au present s'ache-
vait sur un petit verbe de rien du tout dont
k passe beaucoup plus qu'il pouvait
sembler : a De ces ? journees, ii y en era
3.653. ? C'est au passe qu'il fallait desormais
?I r le r de ces injustices.
ANS cet esprit pouvait se remarquer tout
ce qui, dans ce livre, portait critique
de ce passe au nom du socialisme mime.
Tel prisonnier criant des gardiens : * Vous
Wiles pas .des Soviitiques I Vous n'etes as
des communistes I *
Mais surtout, un ton nouveau, et pour qui
accedait au texte ojigina1, une icsiture nou-
vette, attiraicnt rattention. Et cela n'etait pas
? etranger au fait que le heros ainsi suivi de
pres, Ivan Choukhov, &sit an homme du peu-. I
pie. Ricn de plus dechirant, au creur de ce
livre decbirant, que cette page admirable, oil
paradoxalcmcnt c'est comme a hems positik
quc Choukhov nous touche au plus profond
cet amour de son travail qui survit en hilt
en depiz de tout.
a Toute chose et :orae peine con:Piens pour'
ii ne PCla PdS dr1171C100 que fa se perde
pour rim. .
? Ciment parpaing I ciment F arpaing I
...Choukbov, l'escortc pourrait biers lui
lather les aliens dessus, ii faut quitrui name
prcnne du recut en Vitesse pour feter WI
coup. Ca pent alter. &suite, il se rap-
prochc en courant et regarde par-clessus'
vtur, agauche, a drolle. Le compas dens Pecil I
?Bien droll Le tour tie main est toujours 111*
Le meme caractere se retrouvait dans a Le
21.ideson de Alatriona (2), oil c'est lui surtout
.qui conferait vraisemblance et emotion it la
peinture an noir de Is vie d'un coin 4 cam.
pagne sovietique, en reaction. asses systems.
-tique, contra bien des peintures rose des
kolkhozes et sovkhozes. La vieille et pauvrc
I pa.ysanne &sit sur profonde de Choukhov,
et par exemple justcment sur ce point : a le,
Tavais'remarque, elle await us: stir mums de
"rctrouver Sd belle .blintaflr, C'eldit le travail.
Aussitot, die entpoignait sa pelle et bechait /a
podterre. Ow hien elle prenalt rm. sac sorts
le bras et allait chercber de la tourbe. Ou
encore, avec :me corbeille d'ecorce, cueillir
des baies dans une fort eloignee. Et no point
faire la courbette 43 des bureaux d'administra-
mais aux buissons de la foal. *
TsT desormais ccla ne changera guere.
Lieutenant, professeur, medecin ou ou-
vrier, ii y aura toujotul au moms dans
les livres de Soljenitsyne ces personnages qui
ne sauralent ktre les ennemis du Zotov de
L'Incoimu de Kretcbetovka *, au moms par.
tageant avec lui un Amour immense de la
patrie.
4C Zotow non plus ne tenalt as a sewer Sd
Vie depuis qu'avait commence la . guerre. Le
setts de sa petite vie .se mesurall qu'il
pouvall apporter h Ia revolution,. En rechap.
per Pour lui-meme datourvu dc SCVS.
Pour sa femme et pour son sitar eulant, oda
teetait Pia NOM 'plus indispensable. Mais Si ICS
Allemands arrivaient fusqu'au lac Baikal er
veto; miracle lui ?COn5C714 la vie, Zorn,
savait qu'il irait h pied en Chine par Kiakhte,
ou en Jude, or bien franchirait l'ocian,
ii partirait dans le seul but de s'integrer
des unites qui auraient repris 'des forces et de
retourner, les armes d Ia main, e Russie, en
Europe. *
ET si le titre de la nouvelle Pour le
bien de la cause * est loin de pouvoir
se rendre au pied 'de la lettre, comma
une profession de foi, &il contient surtout la
critique de dirigeants qui couvrent sous la
formule des decisions parfois injustifiables, re.
lui qui, a la fin, la reprend a son compte,
pour avoir avec elle le dernier mot, n'en est
pas moms Fedor Mikheevitch, directeur *run
. Institut, qui, avec raide du secritaire du comite
de ville du Para, .Gradchikov, combat une
de ces decisions. Ce metre Gradchikov a qui
revient d'en formuler les raisons :