CA PROPAGANDA PERSPECTIVES DECEMBER 1970

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 99
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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Propaganda
Highlights
HUMAN RIGHTS .AND THE SOVIET' CONS'TTTUTTON
1. The establishment of a Committee for Human Rights in any
country save the USSR (and probably Communist China) might almost
go unnoticed. But the Soviet Human Rights Committee formed in
November by Dr. Andrei Sakharov and his two scientist colleagues
is remarkable enough to warrant publicity and appropriate commentary.
In discussing or writing about this new Human .Rights Committee,
assets should be urged to stress its complete legality within the
Soviet system ("a creative association acting in accordance with
the laws of the state") and therefore, its faithful adherence to
the dictum on socialist legality according to Brezhnev ("everyone
must obey the laws without regard to position, grade or rank").
Any repressive action taken, or even threatened, against the committee
members would merely expose the Soviet leadership to additional
ridicule. In fact, the stated principles of the committee are so
aptly and carefully phrased as to indicate that official condemnation
of the committee would be practically unimaginable.
2. Concerning the existence of and the crying need for this
new Committee for Human Rights, what we want to encourage most pf
all is commentary from the left, from the pro-Soviet (or pre-
Czechoslovakia pro-Soviet) sympathizers found primarily among free
world Communist parties; Communist dissident groups; labor unions,
and other organizations --- particularly those which have any direct
or indirect connections with the iJnited Nations' accredited non-
governmental organizations. The committee's appeal is addressed
indirectly to the United Nations, the one forum where world opinion
just might carry a little weight with a power-hungry Kremlin. To
stimulate such commentary, local promotional efforts might be
required to focus wider attention on the existence of the Soviet
Committee for Human Rights.
3. Because of the legalistic care with which they were
composed, the committee's stated principles make pretty dull read-
ing. See the attached English translation. The establishment of
the committee, however, affords a peg for reviving the two previous
documents with which Andrei Sakharov was concerned -- both of which
are also legalistically proper --: Sakharov's essay of June 1968,
"Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom,"
SECRET
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A New Soviet Constitution; Is the Issue
Dead or IrrQninent?
Next January marks the twelfth year since former Premier
Nikita Khrushchev told the 21st Party Congress that the time
was ripe for making changes and additions to the Constitution
of the USSR. While no draft of any new Constitution has
appeared, a 97-member Constitutional Conm-ission, whose members
are all deputies to the Supreme Soviet, has been at work off
and on for the past decade. The. Commission was originally
set up by Khrushchev in 1962 and then reorganized by Party
Secretary Brezhnev after Khrushchev's ouster in 1964. If it
is to continue working, the Commission needs another reorganiza-
tion: some 19 of its members have either died, been demoted,
or lost :out in this year's elections. However, another reorgani-
zation of the Constitutional Commission would only underline the
government's procrastination in the drafting of the long-.waited
new document.
One way of avoiding publicity for the present leadership's
inefficiency in getting things done, would be to publish a draft
for a new Constitution at an early date. This presupposes that
the various factions in the leadership will have been able to
work out a compromise document. Disagreement over basic provisions
is undoubtedly what has held up the draft. Over four years ago
the draft had apparently jelled sufficiently for Brezhnev to
prophesy the adoption of a new Constitution during the 1967 50th
anniversary celebrations In a June 1966 pre-election speech,
Bxezhneu said: "All the best that the practice of state construc-
tion has given our country must be implemented in the new
Constitution of the USSR, which will crown the majestic half-
century road of our country." This statement, carried in Pravda,
was censored out of the text of Brezhnev's electoral speech wlen
it was later published in the two-volume edition of Brezhnev's Works.
In 'this year's election campaign speeches, Brezhnev did not
mention any Constitution, Instead, he concentrated on the need
for well'-written laws "which constitute an intimate, stable and
correct 'expression of the processes taking place in our society"
and that "everybody must obey without regard to position, grade,
or rank,." His statements reflect the leadership's dissatisfaction
with the undetected and unpunished corruption and bureaucratic in-
effectiveness widespread throughout the Soviet system. They also
reflect the leadership's concern over growing disrespect for
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Soviet laws, both among the general public and in the ranks of
Soviet officialdom. In a regime which officially scoffs at: the
concept of the "rule of law," the anomaly of the role of law
is as unsolvable a dilemma for the present leadership as 'it
was for all their predecessors.
Thus far, the only change following the 1970 elections has
been just another step backward and closer to the "planned,
controlled justice" of Stalin's day with the revival of the old
USSR Ministry of Justice (and thereby, similar ministries in each
Republic). Chi the surface at least, the Constitution appears
a dead issue. It would seem that the consensus prevails that
there is no need at the present time to replace the olcl Stalin
Constitution of 1936 which, according to Moscow's own admission.
is inadequate even for "building communism." The conservatives
among the leadership stand to gain little from anew Constitution
since it would represent a step forward along the path of '''the
further development of socialist democracy" in the USSR. And
this is the path that would threaten their present status. Events
in Czechoslovakia in early 1968 must have been a godsend to the
conservatives in strengthening their arguments against whatever
progressive steps might by then have been proposed by the C;onstitutional
Commission.
The 1970 pre-election speeches reflected what appear to be
serious differences among the leadership about the further develop-
ment of Soviet "socialist democracy" and the degree of repression
by the KGB compatible with this development. President Nikolai
Podgorny was consistent in his advocacy of building "socialist
democracy'' by means of extending the powers and functions of the
"system of soviets" as the most representative power groups in the
USSR. KGB Chief Yuriy Andropov was just as consistent in h.is
intimations that any substantial growth of "socialist democracy"
in the USSR would merely dilute the powers of the Soviet state
and negate the effective functioning of the KGB. And so it wouldR
Brezhnev, while careful to avoid statements that might be open to
interpretation as indicating differences of opinion, tended to
side with Andropov; a truly "new" Constitution would seem incompatible
with such thinking.
Chi the other hand, if the present leadership wished to avoid
exposing itself to ridicule --- something it has not done so far ---
this could be an incentive for the Soviet leaders to overcome their
differences and work out some sort of compromise. Unless it is
cancelled again, the 24th Congress of the CPSU will be held in
March next year. The Congress would provide a unique and timely
platform from which to present the draft of anew Constitution.
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CPYRGHT
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
19 November 1970
~~~~.~~
? ?
By Charlotte Saikowski
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
The formation here of a Committee for
Human Rights by three physicists is a
further indication that voices of dissent in
Russia grow more and more emboldened.
The committee includes the eminent
nuclear physicist Andrei D. Sakharov, al-
ready widely known in the West for his
forthright' please. for freedom of thought,.
democratization of Soviet society,- and So-
viet-American cooperation.
But : a hallmark of this dissent within
Russia -limited in extent, unorganized,
and with virtually no Political influence -
is that by and large the dissenters do not
seek the overthrow of the Soviet regime.
Nor do they want the establishment of a
capitalist society. '
Their immediate concern is the obser-
vance of .citizens' rights as guaranteed by
the Soviet Constitution.
Aims delineated
The new committee, according to a type-
written copy of the announcement made
available to the Western press over the
weekend, 'sets these specific aims:
? "Consultative help" to state governing
bodies in creating and applying human
rights guarantees.'
d Assistance to persons studying theoreti-
cal aspects of the problem in a socialist
society. '
o Legal education, in particular the prop-.
aganda of documents dealing with interna-
tional and Soviet law on human rights.
Political observers here are rather aston-
ished by the continued bold efforts of aca-
demician Sakharov and other leading sci?
entists to challenge some basic policies of
the Soviet Government.
Presumably because of Dr. Sakharov's
stature as a physicist (he developed the
Soviet hydrogen bomb) the regime does
not appear to have restricted his freedom
of action.
Political aims denied
However, it is difficult to believe that the
authorities would allow the committee to
tunetion above board---QVrn ehough its tarir,.
ciples are carefully couched in legal terms.
The founders of the committee, which in-
clude physicists Andrei Tverdokhlebov and
Valery Chalidze, make clear they are not
organizing a political group.
The committee is defined as a "creative
association" ? that works within Soviet law.
Anyone can join who abides by its prin-
ciples; but he must not be a member of a
political party- or other organization which
seeks to govern the state or of any organiza-
tion whose principles permit participation
in either orthodox political activity or in an
opposition.
In its study and- "constructive criticism"
of the present state of Soviet legal guar-
antees of freedom of the individual, the com-
mittee states it will be guided by principles
of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.
Further, it will take into. account "tradi-
tions" that have formed here and the stag's
"practical difficulties" 'in this field.
In practice, no group of any kind is formed
in the Soviet Union without the sanction
and participation of the Communist Party.
If the regime officially suppresses the newly
formed Committee, its founders would vi
course be in a position to point to this as an
-infringement of civil rights.
Although there is na organized or united
dissent in the Soviet Union, recent years
"have seen the emergence of a variety of`
miniscule .underground groups. One such
unofficial organisation was the Action Group
for -the Defense of Civil Rights in the
U.S.S.R.; which fought government repres?
sions by means of appeals to the United
Nations. -
The regime has harshly cracked dawn an
such groups, however.
Problem for the regime .
According to the underground Chronicle
of Human Events, its members have been'
subjected to arrests, imprisonment, deten-
Lion _in mental hospitals or, at least, dis?
missal from their jobs, interrogations and
harassment.
When prestigious and needed scientists
are involved, however, it becomes a far-
-more-worrisome problem for the regime.
It should be borne in mind, pf course that
the Soviet physicists, mathematicians, and
others -who are speaking out on behalf of
-civil rights constitute but a tiny fraction of
-the entire sciert:.ic ii;telligentsia. Thousands
;more ga about their daily business without
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participating in open protest or .voicing per-
sonal views that conflict .with the official
,policy.
Even so, the leadership fs patently irri-
tated ' by the growing dlssent anotig 'the
scientific community. Last month the party
central committee criticized the Lebedev
Physics Institute, of which Dr. Sakharov is
an associate, for "serious shortcomings" in
-the education of the scientific and technical
.intelligentsia.
Without mentioning any names, the party
Criticized institute scientists for poor contact
with workers' collectives, for publishing few
works on philosophical problems in the na-
tural sciences, and for not adequately.com-
batting "unscientific, idealistic. conceptions
of bourgeois scientists."
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CPYRGHT
DI.YLsl `i*ELI;GP~lit'li, Lo7don
16 idovomber 170
13y FliAlt'Ii TAYLOR in 1Vloscow
~HREE Soviet scientists, me u tng r n rei
Sakharov,; "father " of the Soviet H-bomb, were
reported yesterday to have taken the struggle for
civil liberties in Russia a significant stage further by
forming a committee for human rights.
The committee's aims are set forth in a set of prin-
ciples, copies of which reached Western correspondents in
Moscow last night. It is carefully worded and stresses the
Committee's non-political
nature and that it seeks to .
work within existing Soviet
law.
The move strengthens the
view that. concern for civil 1
rights in Russia is growing
among intellectuals.
It follows the open letter by .
Mstislav Rostropovich, the
'cellist, in which he criticised
official control over the arts and
literature, the trial? of Andrei
Amalrik, the aughor, and the
trial of Dr Revolt Pimenov, a
mathematician.
Dr Sakharov, 49, led a cam?
paign of protest last June against
the detention in a mental clinic
of a fellow-scientist.
But his decision. to help found
the committee means that one
of the most distinguished of
Russian scientists has joined the
broader struggle for basic
human rights as a whole.
Interest growing
The preamble to the commit-
tee's principles declares that:
" The problem of the mainten-
ance of human rights is impor-
tant for the creation of favour-
able conditions for r people's
lives, the consolidation of peace
and the development of mutual
understanding."
It "notes the growth in recent
,years among. Soviet citizens of
an interest in this field " and
e~cpresses "satisfaction with suc-
cesses achieved in the Soviet
Union since 1953'," in this area.
Stalin died- in 1953..
The committee says it wants
to cooperate " on a consultative
basis " with further efforts by
the State in creating guarantees
for the defence of rights,
" taking into account the specific
character of the problem in t'-~
conditions of tiie socialise. system
and the specihc character of
Soviet traditions in this field."
In its set of principles, the
committee describes itself as a
" creative association acting in
accordance with the laws of the
S [ate."
No member of the conuniltee
can be a member of a political
party or of organisations which
allow participation in orthodox
or oppositional activity."
Legal education
The committee also sets out
to promote legal education and,
in particular, the dissemination
of documents on international
and Soviet law on human rights.
-The set of principles ends:
"The committee is prepared for
creative contacts with public and
scientific organisations, with
international non-governmcutal
organisations, if in their activities
they proceed from the principles
of the United Nations and do
not pursue the goal of bringing
harm to the Soviet Unioa."
Dr . Salcharov's signature is
followed by those of Andrei
Tvyordokhlebov and Valcry
Chalidze, who are both physicists.
The question immediately
raised by the action of the three
is-how they intend to publicise
the committee in order to get
members?
Because all information media
in Russia are Government-con-
trolled they must rely, intern-
ally at least, on word of mouth
and on the circulation of type-
written copies of the principles.
Many Russians rely on Foreign
radio broadcasts for acquiring
news which is either suppressed
or disregarded by the controlled
Soviet Press, radio and tele-
vision.-
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NEW YoRx TzNiES CPYRGHT
31~Y nUSSIA G10VE
TO DEFEND RIGHTS
Sa6;harov Among Physicists
Walo Establish Committee
~ln Personal Freedom
By BERNARD GWERTZMAN '
'SPeMai to The P.`cw YoYi Tlmea ~'
MOSCOW, Nov. I5 - Dr.l
n rei a arov, a prom-
inent nuclear phys}cist, and
two of his colleagues have
,formed a Committee for Human
Rights to seek ways .of guar-
anteeing personal freedom in
the Soviet Union.
A statement of principles,
signed by Dr. Sakharov, Andrei
N. ^R~erdokhlebov and Valery,
N. ~sf~~re~~~r~i~~ ~~a~~~~
~~ ~h~ ~o~i~~ c~~~fi~i~~~~n
Three Soviet physicists-Rndrei Mr. Sakharov probably has tsw
Sakharov, who at thirty -two illusions about the kind of recep-
became one of the youngest mem- lion his move SS Itable to geL In
bets of the Soviet Rcademy of
Sciences, Rndrei Tverdokhlebov
and Yalery Chalidze-announced
on November 15 the founding of
a committee for the defence of
human rights in the. $ovief Union.
They are proposing to help the
state study the "theoreiicai as-
psds of the problem," -and they
say- that their research. wiii be
guided 6y the principles outlined
fn the United Nations declaration
of human rights, but will use the
"specifics of Soviet. taw" as a
starting point.
Emphasising the need to take
into. account the `"established
traditions and real ditticuIfies of
the state in this field," they pomi
out that the committee will act
"
in croniormity with the laws of
the state" by relusing member-
ship to persons belonging to
political parties or social orga-
nizations involved 7n the actual
running of the political apparatus.
Membership will also be de-
nied to those who might be
tempted to use the committee
1 either to criticize the government
or as a political tool. They also
reject any cooperation- with for-
; eign ozganizat7ons inirnucaI to the
Soviet Union.
In any other modern, industrial
country, an initiative of the sort
that lVlr. Sakharov has taken
would have gone all but un~
noticed, R Ieading inteI7ecfual-
he is referred to as the "father
of the lSovie27 H-bomb"-founds
an association, as he is fully'
enlitIed to do under the Soviet
constitution, to facilitate the ap-
plication o! the . principles on
which the Soviet Union is theoret-
icalIy goveined.
I.ativfu! successes
He points with satisfaction fo
"the successes scored since 1953
fn the field of Iaw" and places
himself at the regime's disposal
so that this fortunate trend may
continue. Such being the case,
who would possibly find fault
7588 he urged liberalization, sttg-
gestinq that the 7fremlin leaders,
follow the Czechoslovak example.
He was back at if again early
this year, openly defending intei?
lectuals being prosecuted for non-
conformist ideas, among them the
biologist I)r. Zhores Medvedev
and the mathematician AevoIt
Pfinenov.
He took the calculated risk of
sabotaging his own career, and
did apparently lose a few of his
posts. Bui he was equally well
aware that his actions posed an
extremely thorny problem oz t ~e
authorities: they could not bring
him io trial without touching oft
an international scandal and
antagonizing the entire Soviet
scfentitfc community, The fact is .
that the government needs the
scientists too much to attack them
directly.
Mr. Sakharov has thus decided
to use his not incons7derable
"prestige in the Berrie of those
who, like him, are fighting for
human sights: laws who have
informed the United Nations that
they want !o emigrate; bslierers
militating for application of the
consfitutionalprov7sion guararttee?
ing the right of worship; pro- '
testers, from the writer Alexander
Ginzburg to Major General Pyotr
Grigore>ko, who organized dam-.
onsirations that were 7n primoiple .
authorized by the constitution, but
in fact were repressed by the
police and punished by the
COUrtS.
CPYRGHT
struggle is being waged in the
mfsisi bt what: Seems, at lease, to
be general. p.ublls apa[hy.
Mr. Sakha~AY s initiative there.
fore smacks of optimism. FIe
seems convinced, like the writer
RndLei R;malrik, that the, Tiber.
alizaifon process begun in 1953
-and sharply braked -of Iate--
is irreversible. The committee he
set up wilt be an instrument in
the hands. of those who fight for
respect for human rights and of?
ter help to those who are
persecuted.
How the authorities will react
to this ~uAcomfoziable situation
remains to be seen, 13y rejecting
help from politically motivated-
quarters, Mr. Sakharov has made
it Impossible for anyone to ac-
cuse his committee of being anti-
Soviet. Rt the same time he has
created a formidable precedent
for the. regime.
The Communist Party will put
up, with any association so long
as it can control it. Mr. Sakharov,
like the ce!]ist Mstislav Hostco-
pov7ch wlto recently published
a letter in defence of author
Rlexander Solzhenitsyn, accepts
the zegituo, but refuses io play
aloaq witjl the system.
BERNARD ftci20N
~U$9~@ Op~}OSIt10t1
Many crosifallen m?Iitants are `
now convinced that "opposition
within the law" has no chance of
succeeding. Having seen how _
their comrades fared is a series
of court proceedings that began
in 1966, they realize the fuGlify
of reminding the Soviet leaders'
of the xegime's underlying prin?
ciples, and they feel it is prefer-'.
able to fight underground, or, fn
some cases, simply leave the
country, It is true that their
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December 1970
SOVIETS MOVE TO CRi1SH VENEZUELAN AND SPANISH CP DTSSTDENCE
The 'Modern" CPSU Leaders Carry on Ancient Stalinist Tradition
Whatever differences and similarities observers want to see
between Stalin's style of supervising the international Communist
movement and that of the 'Ynodern" post-Stalin leadership, at least
one motivation has remained essentially unchanged: in exercrszng
the Soviet claim to leadership among the world's Communist parties,
the CPSU demands from t~iese parties full conformity with Soviet
positions in matters of dogma and politics. The price of non-
conformity is ejection from the movement. Like Stalin, the modern
Soviet leaders eliminate opposition wherever their power can reach,
even though it may mean virtually destroying a national movement,
as in the case of the Austrian CP during the past year when the
expulsion of the liberal faction led by Ernst Fischer and Franz
Marek robbed the Party of the little vitality it had.
Within the past two months, the CPSU has again demonstrated
its fear of non-conformity and innovative ideas by extending its
interest out as far as the Venezuelan CP and the small, illegal
Spanish CP (whose main operations are carried on underground in
France) in an attempt to split each of the parties and destroy the
non-conforming faction. The criticism of the Soviet Union emanating
from the two parties stems from the realization that the Soviet
brand of Communism is alien and inapplicable to their world. The
criticism is typical of the feeling being expressed by an increas-
ing number of free world Communists.
Pravda's Intervention in the PCV
The CPSU finally decided to throw the weight of its authority
into the smoldering factional struggle going on in the Venezuelan
Communist Party (PCV) by publishing in Pravda on 20 October a crude
attack on PCV Central Committee member e~ oi"{coro Petkoff. The Soviets
like to use a meat-ax approach when they want to leave no doubt
of their disapproval in the minds of any party member, even the
most simple of Communist faithful in and out of the Soviet Union.
Petkoff 's sin was that he criticized the Soviets in a
number of ways in two books: Chechoeslova uia: el Socialismo
coma Problema (Czechoslovakia, t e ro em o ocia ism 19 9,
and Socialismo ara Venezuela? (Socialism for Venezuela?), 1970.
m e first, e fi e oger Garaudy in France) criticized the
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and rejected the Soviet Union
as a proper model for socialism in Venezuela, and in the second
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he further criticized the repressive, dictatorial aspects of the
Soviet Union as unworthy of emulation by the PCV, presenting his
own original theory and program for socialist revolution in
Venezuela, a theory departing radically from orthodox Soviet
doctrine.
The danger that the virus of independent Communism will
spread in Latin America as a variation of the same virus that
thrives in Europe in the French, Italian, and Austrian parties,
among others, apparently was one of the main reasons for t:he
Soviet intervention in the PCV. Another compelling reason was
that the PCV was moving too slowly to rid itself of the Petkoff
faction. Judging by the PCV reaction to the Pravda attack, i.e.
publishing pro- and anti-Soviet articles in t eFi i-'r newspaper
.Tribuna Popular, the leadership seems to have decided to try to
preserve some minimum of unity against the Soviet onslaught which
is supported by the conservative, "rightist," pro-Soviet faction
which is trying to oust Petkoff (see the Larrazabal article on
the Pravda attack, attached). While Petkoff is criticized by the
leadersT p for breaking Party discipline, it is in relatively
mild, unthreatening terms. The fact is that Petkoff has substantial
support not only in leadership circles (see attached articles by
Lairet and Adam) but in the relatively large youth organization,
and his expulsion would be costly to party strength. The precarious
balance of power apparently is held by a moderate, conciliatory,
"centxist" faction (see the Gustavo Machado article attached) which
at least temporarily is resisting rightist efforts to oust Petkoff.
(Petkoff refrained from attacking the Soviets in his contribution
to the newspaper. discussion.)
It will be interesting to see whether the Soviet politicking
in internal PCV affairs succeeds in eliminating Petkoff, regardless
of the cost to the PCV, or whether they will have to resoY?t to the
ultimate weapon: withdrawal of financial support. The PC;V 4th
Congress which has been scheduled to convene early in December may
tell the story.
CPSU Manipulation of the PCE
Another recent target of Moscow's classic strategy of attempt-
ing to split any Communist party which attacks its policies is the
small, illegal Spanish Communist Party (Partido Comunista Espanol --
PCE). For two years the PCE has ceaselessly condemned the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia. In August 1970, when most European
parties were submissively accepting "normalization" in Czechoslovakia,
the PCE described ousted Czech leader Alexander Dubcek as the "best
hope" of socialism: In September Enric{ue Lister, renowned fighter
of the Spanish Civil War, stormed out of the PCE Central Committee
with four comrades and set uP a rival group which began publishing
a Mundo Obrero to rival the PCE's main weekly organ of thE; same
name e new publication's orthodox, pro-Soviet line anti harsh
00 -1
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attacks against PCE leadership leave little doubt about the
source of their funds. The move is part of a Soviet operation
to destroy the independent current Party by replacing it with
an orthodox obedient one.
The clandestine PCE, nearly 200,000 strong according to
Secretary'General Santiago Carrillo's highly inflated claims,
(or aboutl5,000 acarrding to more objective observers) includes,
says Carrillo, about 5,000 exiles living in the Soviet Union
and another 1,000 in Paris. Among those living in the USSR
is Dolores Ibarruri? the noted "La Pasionaria" of the Spanish
Civil War, who led a strong protest in 1969 against the Kremlin's
attempt to split the PCE when it supported the divisive efforts
of two Central Committee members based in Russia, Augustin Gomez
and Eduardo Garcia. The dominant Carrillo-Ibarruri faction
expelled them from the PCE in December 1969. Carrillo, who
roams Europe and is especially close to the independent-minded
Rumanian and Yugoslavian leaders, publishes Mundo Obrero in France,
Nuestra Ba.ndera in Belgium, and operates clan estine Radio Espana
n~Tcepen lente REI) from Rumania.
Although they are long time critics of the Czech affair, with
an eye, no doubt, to their potential constituency in Spain, the
PCE complaints about the Kremlin cover an even wider range,:.. They
have castigated the Soviet Union for dealing with Franco, who
forced the Party out of Spain. They have urged China and the Soviet
Union to negotiate their differences instead of fighting. They
criticize the ideological stagnation of Communism, its failure to
understand economic and social realities in the advanced countries
of Europe and have even questioned whether Moscow should be the
real center of Communism: As recently as September this year, they
published a strong denunciation of Stalinism.
Obviously, such heresies could not go unpunished. But the
Soviet Union faced a dilemma over the best means of silencing
this Spanish criticism and of reducing its effect on other
European parties. Cutting off all support to the Party they had
harbored in the USSR since the Sp~ish Civil War would unquestion-
ably cripple the PCE and ,its publications but the Soviets apparently
judged that such a tactic would be too crude and obviously a case
of blackmail. By backing PCE Central Committee member Lister
(who himself had originally condemned the Czech invasion) in his
challenge',to the PCE leadership and then financing his Party faction,
the Soviets found a somewhat subtler weapon against their "revisionist"
critics. If, as expected, Gomez and Garcia can swing some of the
exiles now in the USSR to support of? Lister faction, the Carrillo-
Ibarruri group could be noticeably weakened. Whether it can be silenced
is more doubtful; the reaction from the European CP's may be crucial.
(Articles from Le Monde and the Carrillo-edited Mundo Obrero concern-
ing some df these matters are attached.)
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LE MONDE, Paris
23 October 1970
[Charles Vanhecke article: "A New Garaudy?"]
[Text] The Venezuelan Communist Party has its Ciax'audy, His name is Teodore Petkoff,
3$ years old, with an economics degree, former party deputy, and till last year a
member oi' its political bureau. Since 1969 he has practically been a dissident,
first by publishing a book on the Czechoolovak affair, than a faw wpdtts aga by
making a virulent attack on the ideas and the methods of the Venezuelan Communist
Party, which is an orthodox of the orthodox, since it abandoned the principles of
armed struggle for obtaining power in 196+.
Petkoff, who is still a Central Commiti:ee member, has him supporters wsth.ir. the
Venezuelan Communist Party and his brushes with the '?old guard"--who remain in the
ma~oriY.y--giva rise to much st;i.rring among the militants. And so the appeals f~~r
unity are increasing in the official party organ TRIBUNA POPL'LA&t as the time for --
the fourth congress, which i.s scheduled for the first two weeks .of December, approaches.
General Secretary Jesus Faria has dust denounced the danger of a 11spl:it.91 TRIBUNA
POPULAR (1 through 7 October) itself uS95 against-the 11renegade" certain of the
arguments which Etienne Fajon (who is quoted by name) used against the author of the
"Great Turning Point of Soeialism.i1
In h1.s book "Socia].~sm for. Venezuela2" Taodore Petkoff takes up some of the ideas
dear to Garaudy and hurls some particularly venomous darts against the Venezuelan
Commu.n:I..st Party apparatus. The attack appeared so serious to the Venezuelan Communist
Party Po1.~,tical Bureau ghat it took care in a d~mmunique an 'll August to defend
Scself aga:i.nst, accusations cf "corruption" ~.nd "vassaldom.
The cornpa:ri.son wzfh Garaudy is all the more ~~:.s*.%fi.ed sines, like the French
phi.lusnpher , Petkoff began to question hi.mse7.f about the aond'ztions for a scc~.alS.st '
revival `tn his country af.i:er analyzing the 1?Prague Spring;`P Has first book
"Czechc~s].ovakia, the Problem of Socialism" ~N7a.s in fact .entirely devoT~ed to tine grant
crisis of 1968, ~ Tt stated thAt the cris:a.s had destroyed eerta:in of the myths
cheri.she:d. by comaiuni,sY.s throughout the world and denounced the attitude cif the Sov:~ets,
who, accord.i.ng to hf.m, were solely responsible for certain contradictions, certain
neg~.t.:~.ve' and f1,ji.ngoist" positions wk,.ich had arisen in Czechoslovakia under the
Dubcek gove.rnment<
"Ido, sx~iali.sm was not then in peril in Czechosloval~ia. It h2d, on the contrary,
become stronger,1? he wrote- And after attacking the ?tmonstrous bureaucracy1B of
the Soviet Union, which understood that the necessity for economic democratization
i.nvoi.ved a political democratization which was harmful to its maintenance in power,
Teodoro Petkoff declared it necessary to re,)ect the "Soviet model, which is a
specific product of history. 1?
Petkoff~s two books were obviously condemned: by'the Venezuelan Communist Party.
Several times the former Venezuelan deputy was invited to make a self-criticism,
but he refused. He was expelled from the Political Bureau 3.n 1969 and_has been
accused of "splitting" intentions f ollowing a recent trip to Italy, Romania,
Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria where, it is alleged, he vainly sought support for an
attempt to create a?Venezuelan party .independent of Mosco~i.
At one time Petkoff appeared to be able to Count on the neutrality of the former
General Secretary Marquez,-with '.Thom he had been imprisoned for more than 2 years
under the "democratic" governments of Romolo Betancourt and Raul Leoni for having
been one of the supporters, within the Venezuelan Communist Party, of the 11insurrectional1?
line. He was imprisoned .three times under the Perez Jimenez dictatorship during
-the fj.fties. But Marquez signed the condemnation of Petkoff?s theses on 11 August,
Having eliminated him from the leadership of the regional committee of the State
of Miranda, 'the Venezuelan communist leaders are trying to think up a "begal way"
of excluding him from the Venezuelan Communist Party at next December?s congress.
,P.,. ,i~~,~?'Y> ;441 ,. ,:~1;~ ~'~~';~~ ,u .,,
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CPYRGHT
23 October 1970
Le P:C. venezuelien a son
Garaudy; 11 s'o,ppCllo 7oadoro .
Petkoff, II a trente-hail ans, it
est licencie en sciences scone- .
miques, aneien depute de son
parti, et it etoit membre, jus-
qu'd I'an Bernier, du bureau
politique. Depuis 1969, i~l est
pratiquement en;,-x. en dissi-
dence, d'obord en publiont un
livre sur foffotre tchecos!o-
vaque, puffs, voila quelques se-
moines, uhe nttoque- viru~lente
contra les conceptions et les
mkthodes du .parti communists .
L'nttoque o paru si serieuse
au bureau polltlquo du p.C.V.
~. qua, de 1 i seat Bernier, it pre-
noit le sein,. dons un carnmu-
pique, de se defendre. contra .
les accusations de < eorrup-'~
. lion > et de < vossolite >.
?Apres ovate rejete le pluro-
lisme des opinions, controire .
nux ~ ,princdpes deninistes w
du centrolisme democrntique,
,il cffirmo5t en substance
< Porlee do < volontk de pou-
voir >, cost se referer c des
< facteurs subjectifs >, les- ?
quefa, sans onoiyso objective .
do to situation, conduisent &
' i'aventure. > Le P.C.V. reaf-
firmait ensuite sa fidelite b
I'internationniisme prolktorien
- et denon4ait, dons la demor-
ehe" de M. Teodoro Petkoff, .:
une tentative de fonder un
nouveau parti communists. ?
La compnroison avec?
? M. Garaudy est d'autant plus
justifies qua M. Petkoff,
comma (e ,philosophe fran4ois,
a commence b s'interroger sur -
,fes conditions d'un renouveau
'socialists dons son pays apres
Quoit analyse le c printemps,
de Prague w. Son premier li-
vre Tchecaslovaquie, ie pro- .
blame du socialismo >, etoit
en effet tout entier consacre
o la grande cries de 1968. II
affirmait qua cefte cries dvnit
detruit certains mythes res-..
pectes par 1es communistes du '
monde entier, et denongait
1'ottitude des. Sovietiques,
seals responsobles, sel4n lui,
de certaines contradicticjns, de ' '
certaines positions negatives
et c potriotardes ?w qui
ovaient ~pu surgir en Tchkco- '
slovaquie sous le gouvdrne-
ment de M. Dubcek.
< Non, le soctolisme n'ktait
pas aloes en peril en Tcheco-
stovoquie, it s'etait renfarce
ou controire >, ecrivait-il. E?,
apres avoir attaque to < bu-
rcaucrntie monstrueuse > de ,
I'Union sovietique, -qui avail.
Bien compete qua lee necessitcs
de to democratisation econo-
mique entrainoient une demo-
. crotisation politique ~efaste a
son mointden au pouvoir,
M. Teodoro Petkoff procla- :''
mart la nkcessite de renoncer
nu < modeJe sovietique, pro-
. Bait specifique de i'liistoire >,.
Los doux divres de M. Pet-
koff a n t k t k kvidemment
condamnes par le P.C.V. A
` venezuelien -- orthodoxe por-
I mi ~les ~orthodoxes, depuis qu'91
0 obandonne en 1964 les prin-
cipes de :Jn lulls armee pour
conquerir le pouvoir.
M. Petkoff, qui est encode
membre du eomitk central, a
ses partisans au sein du
P.C.V., et ses demi:~ies avec la
c vieille garde w --- qui taste
majoritaire - suscitent beau-
-. coup. de ramous chez les mi-
litants. Aussi les a.ppels a
Y'unite se multiplient-its dons
forgone official du parti, Tri-
bune popular, o I'approche du
quotrieme congres, qui dolt se
tapir dons to premiere quip-.
zaine de decembre. Le secre-
taire general, M. -Jesus Fario,
vient de denoncer la menace
c scissionniste w. C'est d'ail-
feurs Tribune, popular (dark
~ du 1" au 7 octobre) qui uti-
lise, centre le c renegat w,
eertoins des arguments qua
M. Etienne Fajen, cite nom-
. mement, employait . c o n f r e
I'auteur du. Grand Tournont du
soeialisme.
Dons son Bernier livre, in-
titule Socialisme pour le Ve-
nezuela ?, M. Teodoro Pet-
koff'reprend quelques ideas
~, chores a M. Garaudy et lance
q des fleches porticulierement
empoisonnees contr I'opporeil
!, du P.C.V. Apres ~'etre pro-'.
nonce pour to di rsite des
opinions ou sein du parti, it
accuse ditterolement' le P.C.V..
de R scleroso >,~ de . Puffs it pose quelques ;
` ~ questions, souvent lee mamas, '
~ sour des latitudes diffErentes:~_
? de P:C. venezuelien a-t-il eu ,
!a a volontc do conquerir le "
pouvoir >, et en a-t-il taunt ~.
lee conditions ? Est-it un parti
~ndependont et notional 'ou un
parti < attend > et < vassal > T
< Un parti qui abdique son in-
dopendanao critique sur le plan
international ost-il an mes+trm
de promouvair une veritable
politique revalutionnaire 7 >
plusieurs reprises I'ancien de-
pate vcsneruelien o ate invite
a faire son o.+tocritique, ce
qu'il a refuse. Exc~lu du bu-
Teou politique en 1969, it s'est
vu reprocher des intentions
scissiotinistes d to suite d'un
recent voyage en Italia, en
Rournanie, en Yougoslovie et
en Sulgorie, ou it aurait eher-
clrk --- en vain -des apPuis
pour tenter de crest un parti
venezuelien independent de
~M.oscou...,
Dons un premier temps,
~M. Petkoff semblait pouvoir
compter sur to neutra~lite de
1'oncien secretaire genera! du
potti, M. Pompeyo Marquez,
?avec qui ii fat emprisonne
~pendont plus de deux ans sous
,Gas gouvernements c demo-
- crdtiques w de MM. Romulo
Betancourt et Rnoui Leoni,
pour avoir ate I'un des parti-
?_ sons, ou sein du P.C.V., de to '
ligne < insurrectionnelle w. II
Quoit ate emprisonne o tr`ois
?'?reprises sous to dictature de
M. Perez Jimenez, dons lee
n n n e e s cinquonte. Mats
M. Marquez ~ a signs la
tondamnation des theses de
? M. Petkoff de 11 seat Bernier.
Et lee diri~leants communistes
vehezueliens, apres avoir es-
-sayk de I'kiiminer, de da direc-
tion du eomite rkgionol~ de -'
{'Etas cte Mirondo, soot en
train d'imaginer une ~ fa~on
Ikgdie w de I'exclure du P.C.V.
? ou congres de decembre pro-
~thGin.
,:iARI.ES VANHECKE.
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Four articles from Tribuna Popular, .(organ of the Venezuelan
Communist Party), 5-11 November 1970, Caracas.'
1. Alexis Adam, "An Article by Pravda."
Pravda, the CPSU Central Committee newspaper, carried an
article signed by A. Mosinev in reply to the arguments set forth
by comrade Teodoro Petkoff, a member of our party's Central
Committee.
Because of the ideological discussion we are advancing,- it
,would have been of the utmost desirability and usefulness for us
to have found solid arguments which could have been opposed-with
scientific seriousness to those submitted by comrade Petkoff as
a magnificent contribution to the .progress of the debate and to
the task of coming closer to the truth on such vital topics as _
those affecting the international communist movement, the building
of socialism, and the development of Soviet'society. However, we
are forced to deplore the absence of such critical elements in
the article discussed.
In his reply to Teodoro, comrade Mosinev displays the same
style to which we have been accustomed by those who inside the
Communist Party of Venezuela (~V) seek to replace valid discussion
and a genuine and broadly democratic confrontation of opinions
with a war of "slogans" and attributions based upon irreversible
and preconceived positions, and opposed to any critical references.
However, despite the style -- which our Central Committee considers
to be futile and harmful, we would have~to recognize the right of
the author of the article to participate in a public discussion,
all the more since it concerns someone who as a Soviet citizen
and a CPSU member believes that he has the right to oppose what
he considers to be erroneous appraisals, unfounded assertions, or
simply .attacks upon his country or the CPSU.
In establishing a public discussion, the Communist Party of
Venezuela opened the doors to the views of those who inside and
outside dur country are interested in participating in the theoretic
explanation of the cardinal problems of'the revolution. Such con-
tributions are welcome.
_" _ ~ -. ~ _- ,... ,,. ..,4 ., ,~ ~a .a_.r ~ .. ..in i i u~1i ~, ti,i~l LlJ u4U, .~~~~~. f(.1.?i l..t~~i 1~7~ ~, ?~.
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That is one thing. It is quite another thing when opinions
openly slip onto the ground of internal organizational problems,
particularly at a time when our Communist Party is making unusual
efforts to surmount a situation that is end.a.ngering its unity.
I '~csl3eve that reporter Masiaev is committing this -~r~sst error.
It would also appear that his main efforts are not directed
toward conducting a polemic with Petkoff, refuting his arguments,
and defending the USSR, but rather toward making a statement which
can be used within-the framework of our internal strife as in fact
it is being used.
It-might be convenient to point to a deep]~r rodted feeling
among the Venezuelan communists --which was strengthened during
the~.polemic with comrade Fidel Castro -- and that is the need for
an ~l.ependent party which has the sovereign right to make decisions
and to draft its won policy. We are convirn ed that the autonomy
of the party is an indispensible premise for the success of our
historic tasks. A.party whose action depends upon the opinions of
others can look forward to anything except having national roots
and being the interpreter and guide of its people. _
The views set forth by Mosinee, and particularly the internal
use to which they are being put, violate these feelings and con-
victions. That is why we consider it important to make this comment
which merely seeks to protect our party's inalienable rights.
In conclusion, we would like to express our confidence that
despite these accidents, the ~V will continue to assert its
national character while it consolidates its internationalism; to
strengthen its solidarity with revolutionary organizations in
their struggle against imperialism and in their staunch defense of
the socialism ,camp; and to develop -- unequivoca]_7tiy -- its ties
of friendship and soliderity with the Soviet Union. 'Caracas,
27 October 1970.
2. German Lairet, "Letter from German Lairet."
Comrade Gustavo Machado, Director of Tribuna Popular:
Dear Gustavo, Tt was, with surprise and displeasure that I read
in the last issue of Tribuna Popular a reprint of an article
originally published in the official newspaper of a fraternal party
in which all kinds of charges are leveled against ~a member of our
party's leader ship, Comrade Teodoro Petkoff.
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Without going into an ana7~ysis of the reasons behind the
editing and publishing of such an article in the CPSU's official
newspaper, and while recognizing the full. right of the Soviet.
comrades to polemize in whatever tone they consider proper?and to
reply to whatever -th~ef -consi~3E~r to ;~e attacks upon their policy,
I d,o ~i~ic~ it unpreoede+ntead n.nd censura1ale that thc~ pe.g?s off`
Tribune Popular, our Central Committee newspaper, should have
been used to reprint the article which amounts to nothing more
than an opportunistic use of the pages of our press for the current
polemic .that is being waged inside the ~~ -- a polemic in which
Teodoro is an imporfcant actor -- as well as an expression of the
manifest intention of some comrades to employ such means to in-
fluence the results of the Fourth Congress, making illegal use of
the authority of the CPSU and the respect it owes all Venezuelan
communists.
As a member of the Central Committee, I wish to express
through 'this letter to the leadership my disapproval of the reprint,
which also constitutes a violation of the rules approved by the
Central Committee prohibiting the slander of the l~V leadership,
and Teodoro Petkoff is sti]1 a member of that leadership.
Aware of the spirit of justice and equanimity you have sought
to maintain during this difficult internal struggle, I take the
liberty, through you, of making my displeasure known, which is
also a way of expressing my solidarity with a comrade like
Teodoro Petkoff whose path deserves respect, despite the clifferences
that may exist with regard to his arguments and concerning whose
.revolutionary attitude I have no doubt whatsoever. With Revolution-
ary Greetings:
3. Radames Larrazabal, "But, What Tnterference?"
The protests against the publication in Tribune Popular of
A. Mosinev's article which originally appeared in-the glorious
USSR newspaper Pravda come in three varieties. One variety does
not reject, but rather excuses the socialist news media for
defending themselves against the attacks made by Petkoff in two
books of essays and in several newspaper articles over. his signature.
However, these same comrades find it unpardonable that a certain
"group" participating in the discussion inside the Venezuelan
Communist' Party (~V) should seek to profit and to derive benefit .
from the Soviet defense. It is a curious dialectic which attempts
surreptitiously to disqualify the CPSU's position of principle and
to reduc,~ it to a pragmatic "group interest" and to a simple
"factional interest".
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To say that the CPSU is defending itself against imp:Lied
attacks would be to equate the quality of the attacks and of the
defense with "questionable" intent. This would mean that both
could make=errors of procedure or that the punishable error lay
in Tribuna Popular's publication. But also there is an attempt
to eguate~e ~aet that all "legitimate defense" presupposes, as
is the case in bourgeois justice, a legitimate attack, at least
until proven otherwise.
The CPSU is not on]tiy defending itself with that article, but
it is belligerently refuting the slanders and anti-Soviet charges
implied not so gratuitously -- in the last analysis "it" :is paid
for by the enemy's reception -- by Petkoff.. What is more, and
this is very important for anyone with a broad view of proletarian
internationalism, it unmasks Petkoff's anti-Leninist and ;~.nti-
Marxist stand.
But while recognizing recourse to "legitimate defense," alboit
formally, these comrades would violently oppose its use as an
external bulwark in the internal "struggle of groups." Strangely,
those who are basically disgusted by "the interference" now call
to the same Soviets in order to advise them so that they will not
.allow themselves to be used. What can we Call this? Naivete?_
Stupidity? Ignorance of internationalist practice?
Another variety of protest displays more sincere agitation
'than the others by what it calls the "crass Soviet interference
in Venezuelan affairs," as if faced with a Russian tank at the
doors of `the "Cantaclaro Publishing House." Paragraphs of Mosinev's
article-which necessarily refer to the Fourth Congress and to the
characteristics of the discussion are taken this way.
Another kind of protest upbraids with "national" fury things
which, because they are known and recognized, form part o:f the
routine, but~wh.ch intentionally become subtle accusations of
subjugation. I am referring to the arguments concerning 'the need
to resolve our problems on our own, in our own way, without
borrowing anything. No one questions this, least of all 'the CPSU.
These three varieties of protest against Tribune, Popular's
publication of the article are bound by the common denominator
of a common outcry against an alleged "Russian interference" in
our affairs. They all speculate much-and little, directly and
indirectly, on the chauvinistic burden which is systematically
reinforced by the news media of the pro-imperialist and bourgeois
enemy.
But, what interference?
-~+-
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Let us get down to essentials. Did those same persons who
are protesting today publicly protest their indignation not only
at Petkoff's interference and slanders, but also at his belligerent
stand concerning the events in Czechoslovakia that in the last
analysis ^Frere provoked by isnp~r3.alSem which made use of rightwang
opportunists and other anti-socialist groups as "useful fools"?
Did those who are protesting today do so publicly when this
same Petkoff repeated in his second book of essays his slanders
against the USSR and the CPSU and distorted with revisionist
audacity, the cardinal problems of Marxism-Leninism, of the party,
of the working class, and of the revolution? Not only they did
not protest ,. but they were opposed to the resolutions issued by
the national leadership in this matter.
However; it is obvious that Mosinev's article does not
constitute an attempt to deprive anyone of his right to criticize
or to dissent; but it does attempt to let everyone see what the
exercise of .the forbidden right to slander and distortion can
lead. Pravda did not react to the criticism, but to the slander
and to the revisionist efforts. And here there can be no valid
protests against "interference." -Have those who today are --
protesting ideological and political interference clearly raised
their voice against the real interference in our affairs by the
bourgeois and imperialist p-r~:ss, radio, and television? Obviously
there is the interference which provokes the sacred outburst of
"national feeling that which comes from the socialist world; and
the interference which, on the contrary, they claim lends "national
distinction and is even anxiously sought: that which comes from
the propaganda machines of the ruling classes.
Moreover, if we assume the right and the duty of the Soviet
comrades to self-defense and to discussion, and if this defense
coincides fu]1jr with the viewpoints off' tie ~V Central Committee,
why then be alarmed and raise one's voice to demand punishment for
the reprinting of the Pravda article on the pages of Tribune Po;~ular?
The contrary would be alarming.
As things stand at present, our Fourth Congress will have to
be an unusually important event in this difficult mission of
continuing to forge a Leninist party with the irrevocable and
sustained determination to assume revolutionary power at the head
of the workers. Circumstances have increased the. fraternal parties'
anticipation of this event, and they will be represented either by
delegations or by messages. And do not call them "interference"o
To this affect, any article by Lenin's party in connection with
our Congress should not only command our greatest attention, but
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we should consider it a duty and a right coming from the pages most
concerned with proletarian internationalism.
~+. Gustavo Machado, "Our Opinion."
The Political Sureau having studied the commotion caused by
the insertioiz of the TASS wire summing up A. Mosinev's article,
today we publish the full text of the article and the critical
views of Alexis Adam and German Lairet. I must immediately
announce that the responsibility far the initial report that was
sent by the Soviet news agency appearing in No. 73 of Tribuna
Popular was wholly and personaL'ltiy mine .
Neither the sutmnarized wire version nor the complete text
represents the slightest interference in the internal affa~:rs of
the 1~V Venezuelan Communist Party (l~V) . There is no ir~ter-
ferenee, firstly because A. Mosinev is resorting to legitimate
defense against Teodoro Petkoff's repeated attacks in books,
statements, and writings upon the socialist camp, particularly uppn
the Soviet Unian; and secondly, no intervention is involver because
the Soviet writer limits his observations to material writt;er. and
edited by Venezuelan communists. He is informing public opinion
in his country on what the Venezuelan Communist Party leadership
is thinking and resolving. Do the Soviet comrades not have the
right to keep abreast of the situation in our Party?
It is. necessary to reject any alleged similarity between
Pravda's article and the i~.fficulties that have arisen in t;~e
recent past with the Cuban communists. Even if any intent to
advise or to sway one way or the other could be detected, and
this is not the case, a direct and aggressive interference in
favor of a member of a faction for the purpose of dividing the
ITV against its national leadership would be quite another thing.
In the issue following the one in which the TASS wire appeared,
we are publishing an article by Pompeyo Marquez setting fo7:~th with
reasonable prudence the doctrine of proletarian internationalism
which has been the norm guiding the fraternal relations be-t;ween
the PCV and the CPSU in the course of the years with no harm to our
sovereignty and with abroad and steady sense of brotherhood on the
part of our Soviet comrades. And if we do not publish any article
on this topic, it is because there is no room in Tribuna Po ular
for attacks-and slanders against the socialist world and ota.r Soviet
comrades.
Gustavo Machado
-6-
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T BUNA POPULAR, Caracas
Div AxrzcvL~
ALEXIS ADAM
A manc~ra de respuesta a las
tesis del camarada Teodoro Pet-
koff, miembro del Comite Cen_:
tral de nucstro Partido, aparc-
cio en "Pravda", _ brgano del CC
del PCUS, un articulo bajo la
firma de A. Mosinev.
Para nosotros hubicra silo de
sumo interes y utilidad, en ra-
z6n de la discusibn ideologica
que adclantamos, encontrar s~-
Iidos argumentos que pudieran
ser .conti~apuestos con seriedad
cientifica, s. los esgrimidos por
el camarada Petkoff cotno uri
magnifico apoi?te a la elevaci8n
del debate y a la tarea de apro_
ximarse a la verdad en tan vita-
les temas Como los concernien-
tes al movimiento comunista in-
ternational, a la construccibn
del socialismo y al desarroilo ~e
la sociedad sovietica. Tenemos
que lamentar, sin embargo, la '
ausencia de tales Elementos cri.
ticos en el comentado escrito.
El camarada Mosinev, en su
respuesta a Teodoro, hate gala-
del mismo estilo a que nos tie-
nen acostumbrados ~quienes en
ei seno ccl PCV . quieren' susti-
tuir la discusidn valeder~, la
real confrontation de opiniones
ampliamente democratica, con
la guerra de "slogans" y califi-
cativos inspirada en posiciones
irreversibles y pretomadas. re_
fractarias a toda rcfe.euc~ cri-
tics- Pcro sun asi, pest a tal
estilo --considcrado esieril y
danino por nucstro CC- irn-
driamos que mconccer el dere-
cho que le asiste al autor del
Esto es una Cosa. Muy disiin_
to es cuando las opiniones ~e
deslizan abiertamente al terre.
no de los problemas organizati_
vos internos, maxime en momen-
tos que nucstro PC realiza inu-
sitados esfuerzos ~ fin de supe-
rar una situation cargada de pc_
ligros para su unidad. Creo que
el periodista ~ Mosinev comcte
este gi*an error_ _.
Parecier~ incluso, que sus
principales esfuerzos no estan
dirigidos a sostener La pol~mica
con Petkoff, a rebatir sus tc-
sis, adefender a la UE1.SS, sino
a brindar una referencia que
pueda ser utilizada en 7os mQr-
cos de nuestra luCha interns, co_'
mo en efecto to es.
Oportuna- es la ocasibn para
destacar un sentimiento profun-
damente arraigado entre los co-
munisbas venezolanos -fortalc.
cido durante la poIemica con el
camarada Fidel Castro- coal
es la nece~idad de tin ~ partiuo
independiente, saberano en la
toms de decisiones y en la ;:'.~:x_
boracion do su po]itica. Estamos
convencidos de que la autono-
mia de] Partido es una premi_
-sa indispensable para alcanzur
exito en- nuestras tareas hisi5_
ricas, Un Partidd que Naga de_
ponder su?accion de .las opinio-
nes de otro, pods aspirar a
cualquier toss menos a tencx
raigambre national y a ser i,"~_
terprete y gui~a de su pueblo.
Las .opiniones emitidas por
ASosinev, y sobre todo la utiliza-
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TRIBUNA POPULAR, Caracas
5 November 1870
CPYRGHT
(GVSTAVO IviACHADU
Director de "Tribune Popular",
Apreciado -Gustavo: -
Con sorpresa y desagrado lei
en eT ultimo numero de "TP" la
reproduction de un articulo pu-
biicado en el organo official de
un partido hcrmano .en el cual
se hacen lode claw de imputa_
ciones contra un miembro de la
direction de nuestro Partido, el
camaracra- Teodoro Petkoff.
Sin cntrar a analizar las cau-
sas que motivan la redaction y
publication de tal articulo en e]
diario official del PCUS y reco-
nocicndo todn el derecho que
puodan toner ios camaradas so.
vieticos para polemizar en el to-
no que consideren conveniente
y responder a to quo consideren
ataqu~s ~ su politics, me resul-
ts si inaudito y censurable quo
las paginas de "TP", organo -del
Comite Central, se empleen pa.
ra reproducir tal al ticulo to cual
no es mss quo un t~so ventajista
de las paginas de nuestra pren-
sa para is actual polemics .quo
hoy se Libra en el seno del PCV
-polemics en -:a~ .cual Teodoro
es actor importante- y expre-
sion de la intencibn manifiesta
que tienen algunos camaradas
de ocher mano de bales recur-
sos para influir en Los resulta-
dos del IV Congreso, empleando
en forma ilegitima la autoridad
quo time el PCUS y el respeto
quo nos merece a todos ios eo-
munistas venezolanos.-,
Como miembro del Comite
Central quiero con esta Carta a
la Direction dejar express cons_
tancia ?de mi dcsacuerdo con tal
reproduction, la cual edemas es
~, violatoria do Las normas aprobm.
des por el CC quo prohibe deni-
grar do la direction del PCV y
.Teodoro Pcikoff es haste el pre.
sente miembro de esa direction.
Conocedor del espiritu de justi-
cia y de la ecuanimidad quo has
tratado de mantencr durante
Fsta ardorosa lucha interne me?
permito por to intermedio . ha=
cot jxiblico ,'mi , desagraido :q~'
es t~mbien Tina manors 'dc 'eX:
presar mi solidaridai! eon un ca-.
marada ?eomo Teodoro P.etkoff
eu,1'a irayectoria merecc ?~pe-
to, a poser de bas diverge~eias
que se puodan toner alrexiedor
de ]as tesis que spstiene, y sc>_
bre el coal no xne' Cabe ciuda al-
guna en cuanto a ;su tondici$n
cte revoiucionario
Con saludos comunistas:
CPYRGHT
eas
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TRIBUNA POPULAR, Caracas CPYRGHT
5 November 1970
Dc tres variantes son las pro-
testas dirigidas Contra la publi.
cation en "Tribune Popular",
del ar?ticulo de A. i-Iosinev ori-
ginalmente aparecido en el glo-
rioso diario "PRAVDA" de la
URSS.
IIna de ellas no rechaza, sino
que por el contrario perdona,
que los medios de comunicacion
socialistas se dcfiendan de ]os
atacjues que Petkoff ha produ.
tide a traves de dos libros de.
ensayos y varies sueltos -de prep-
sa calzados con su firma. Pero
]n que seria imperdonable, segun
estos mismos camaradas, es que
determinada ? ?"corriente" ale la
discusion que -curse en el PCV
iritente en forma ventajista uti-
lizer en su beneficio la defensa
sovietica. Curiosa dialectica por
medio de la coal se baste in-
ti?oducir subrepticiamente la
descalificacion de la position de
principles del PCUS y reducir_
la ' a un, p r a c m a t f c o
"interes de Corrientes", a un
simple- "interes de fraction".
Decir que el PCUS se defien-
de de ataques inferidos, seria
igualar con intention "cuestiona-
doru" la calidad de los ataques
y las defcnsas. De ese modo re-
ultaria que "ambos pudienan in_ ?
aurrir en errores de Procedi-
iento o que el error castiga-
Ic estuvo en ]a , publfcacion de
'Tribune Popttlar".. Pero tam_
ien se Pretende igualar, por.
quello de que toda "lcgitima
efensa" supone,_como en Ia jus_
icva bureuesa, un legitimo eta.
ue, por to menos haste que no
e demuestre to contrario.
El PCUS, a traves de ese ar-
iculo, esta, no defendiendose
era y simplemente, sino rgcha_
ndo beligerantemente -las ca_
umnias y pos~uras antisovipti-
as inferidas no de modo tan
ratuito -porque ai fin y al
abo "ese" se cobra en la recep-
ividad que demuestra e] enemi_
o- por Petkoff. Pero ademas,
`esto es may importante pare
uien tenga uri criterio amplio
ceroa del internacionalismo
roletario, desenmascara 1 a s
osiciones anti?leninistas y anti
~arxistas de Petkoff.
RADAMES
LARRAZABAC
Pero admitiendo .el recurso de
]a "lcgitima defensa", aun etaan-
do formalmente, estos Camara.
des dicen oponer8e con todas sus
fuerzas, a que sc la utilice Como
base de apoyo extPrno en la in-
terne "lucl~a de_Z?orrientes". De
modo extrano, quienes en el fon_
do se hailan disgustados por
"la intromisi8n", apelan ahora
a ]os mismos Sovi~ticos_ pars
?orientarles en el sentido que ~no
se dejen utilizer. ~COmo llamar
ese? ;,Ingenuidad?, ~ Necedad?
Desconocimicnto de la practice
intcrnacionaliste? '
Olra do esas protestas se en-
crespa mas sincer~mente que
Ias otras variantes, por to que
califica "horde intr_omisi6n so-
vietica en lose asuntos venezola_
nos", algo asi Como la aparicion
de un tanque ruse-a las ?puer-
tas del edificio "Cantaclaro".
1?arra[os del articulo de Mosi-
nee, donde aludP obligatoria-
mente el IV Congreso y las ca.
racteristicas de la discusion,
Seri tomadas de ese manes.
Otra .de esas protestas es la
pue enrostra con Earle "patio:
pal" cows que. gor sabidas y .ad- ,
miiidas,. forman parte do Ia re-
tina, pero que intencionadas de
ese modo, se convierten en su..
tiles acusaciones de vasallaje.
Me reficro a los _ argurrentos
acPrca de la necesidad de. resol-
ver nuestras cuestiones con cri-
terio propio, con cabeza propia
y sin.trasplantes, Cosa que na-
die pone en dude y men+os el
PCUS. .
Estes tres clasps de protestas
ante la publication do '"Tribune
Popular", se hall:,n `entrelaza_
des por el dominador comun de
la grita comun contra una su-.
puesta "ingerencia ruse en noes
tros asuntos". codes ellas Ps.
peculan macho ? y poco, directs
e in,clirect.amente, el fardo clip.
vi.;ista que, sistematicamente ee
reforzado desde 1os medics de
comunicacion -del enemigo pn~-;
;mperialista y burgups, . _;
Pero,' ~ coal intromision?_
Vamps al grano. ~ l~s que escs
mismos que hoy protestan die.
rorr constancia ptiblica a indig-
r~ada d? su ~ protesta, ya no solo
de la _intromision, ni de' las ca_
~umrias, sino ademas. de is be_
'geramente tome de posiciones.
de I?etkoff en relation a los su-
cesos de Checoslovaquia, pro~zo-'
cedes, en tiltlma instancia, por
e] impervalismo que utili~.i en
calidad de "tontos fitiles" a los
oPortunistas de der?echa y de-
mas Corrientes anti_socialistas?
~ Es que esos mismos que hoy
protestan to lricieron 3? pubtica_
mcnte, cuando el mismo Petkoff
reincide en su Segundo ]ibro de
ensayos en la comision dc? infa-
mies contra la URSS, el PCUS
y donde tergiversa can ? uudacia
ue revisionista cucstioncs car_
c;inahs del marxismo_]cn::i:::o,
,:d partido, de la clasc obrcra
,? la rcvolucio_n_ ? No s61o no pro_
testaron sino -que se mostr;iron
contraries a }as r: sc:':u.:iu^.,~s
hroducidas por la dir ~cciu : r~.,..
;:iontal en este sentido.
Sin, embarb~~, esta veto -~c>; eI
articulo do Mosinee, c uc no se
gala do pisotcarle na,;ie sa de-
recl:o de criticar ni do disentir,
;ere side exponer a la vista do
::e todo cl mundo a donde puc_
?, conducir el ejercicio del . ne-
;ado derecho de ca;umniar y
icrgiversar. "PRAVDA" r:o ha
rcaccionado~ ante ]a critica, si-
no ante la infamia-y los intentos
revisionistas. Yen este terrero
no hay gritos contra "la intro.,
mision" que valgan.
~.'s que esos mismos qne .,cy.
protestan contra La intromisiL~
,:.:eolugica y politico hen eleva_
Qo claramente su voz contra la
verdadcra intromisiLrr en nues-
iras asuntos, de Ia prensa, ~a
radio y La television burguesa c
im7erialisi;a? Por to visto, hay
intromisiones que provocan el
estallido sagrado de "s.~nti-
micntos nacionales": aqueIlas
que proceden del mundo socia_
lists; e intromisiones que_, por-
e] contrario, halab+an den "bri_
Ili nacionai" y haste se solici.
tan afanosamente: las que pro-
ceden de los aparatos propagan_
disticos de Las clasps dominant
test
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010~~'4~
GHT
TRIBUNA POPULAR., Caracas
5 November 1970
or otra parts, s: amos por
supucsto el derecho y el deber
~~e los camaradas sovieticos de
:;efenderse y_ discutir y si esa
cteftnsa coincid? plcnamente con
]'os" puntos de vista del CC dei
PCV; "~ por quc entonces afar.
mares y eaagcrar of toms sgllcl-
tondo sanclones. for la reps..
duccion del articulo de "PRAV_
DA" en las pliginas do "Tx'ibu-
na Popular"? Lo alarmante se-
ria lo' contrario, ~ - - "
Tal Como ~stan las cosas,,
nuestro IV Con~?s?eso habra de
ser un jalon inusitad+amcnle isrx.
??ortante eri . esta ardorosa rzxi_
~?i6n de seguir emI>cnados en la
forja de un partido leninista eon
is?revocable 3~ sostenida decision .
:le asumir el Podcr rcvoluciona.
rio a la crabeza de los trabaia-'
Pevis cunsideraci3n en el Buro Politico dei revuelo c;au-
sado por la inserel6n del telegrams de la Adencia Toss resu-
niRcndo cl articulo de ?i,. iliosine~?, hoy publicamos el texto com-
pleto y opiuiwxes critical de Alexis Adam y GermSn Lairet.
Reba annsncis:r de Insnediato que Ia responsabilidad de qve la
in(ornu:cib:s initial trssnxitida por la agencia sovietica spare.
tiers en el 1\v 78 de "Tribuna.Ponular", me corresponds in-
tegra y persansimente. - - ?
Ni en Lx versidn tclebr~fica ressuai3a, ni en el texto com-
pleto exists la mbs Ieve intromision en los asuntos imternos
del PCV. ]\o hay-ingerencia, primero, porque A. 1. II est e~alement rer:;u +, d' < antimarxtsrra ~ (un prcnan4 un are:.?;at3
natronat ca :,xialismG). ll est egaioment accus5 :ra vou-
loin lairs du parts communiste ospagnol un parts a ou-
vriar bourgeois ++, en I'intcgrantclans le < nee-capiiatic tae
espagnol ~ et ,en le lalsan4 comb6ttre pour < une preten-
due demacratisatEOn du .pays s.
Le oorc~te central ~u P.C.E., true de sa derniere reu-
nlan, a GualrTie de < oatomnles > tes attaaues pe:so::-
nelles lancces ~contre M. Ssrtiugo Carriito. Et r~ s'as~ : .
QUESTION. - M. Lister nous
accuse d'etre ant~izarxiste Parce
que vows, pr8nez un m:odele de
c communisme .national >...
REPONSE. - Je suis partisan
'd'un mod@le de socialisme adapt@
aux r@alit@s de 1'Espagne, ce qui
n'a rien ~. voir avec ce qu'on ap-
pelle un < communisme natio-
nal n ; et je suis, @videmment,
marxiste et 1@niniste. Seulement,
je pense que 1'unanimit@ des
partis communistes, comme elle
existait au temps'du Komintern,
nest plus passible. Le mouve-
ment communiste international.
s? Bait de reconnaitre ~ tows. les
partis adh@rents le droit ~. la
diversite, t=tant donnt;es les dif-
f@rences de d@veloppdment de
leurs pays respectifs. Pour nous,
i'essentiei nest .pas . une unit@
id8ologiqu~e de fagade, mais
1'unitk d'action centre Pimp@ria-
lisme nord-am@ricain, 'laquelie
n'exciut pas les divergences id@o-
logiques, C'est pouiquoi nous som-
mes pour le r@tablissement de
rapports avec les communistes
chinois, comme nous sommes
pour 1'alliance, en Espagne, avec
toutes les forces anti-imp@rialis-
tes. L~ encore, c'est un r@flexe.
traditionnel qui am8ne certains
camarades ~, penser que le mou-
vement communiste d o i t conti-
neur d'avoir son centre ~. Mos-
cou.
Q. - Donc, e'est la rupture
avec les Sovidtigzies 1
R. - Pourqu0i ? Le parti com-
muniste soul@tique a approuv@,
comme nous, en juin 1989, la r@-
solution de la conf@rence de Mos-
cou disant que les diff@rences,
m@me durables, enti?e les P.C. ne
doivent pas faire obstacle ~ leur
colIaboi?ation. Tl a encore ap-
prouv@ notre polityque en avril, en
signant, avec Dolores Itrarruri et
mo-m@me, un communique bila-
teral. Les locaux' du parts com-
muniste espagnol h Moscow scut
taujours entre nos mains. Sur
le n:illier d'Espa~:ols qui vivent
~en Union sovidtique, ' neufa cents '
environ scut avec nous, les au-
tres cut @t@ exolus pour leer
appui ~, Lister at son groupe. '
Q. - C'est pourta>t bien. 3
Z'instigation et avec l'appui des
SaviEtiques que bl, Lister a fond
un nouveau P.C. espttgnol et pu-
bli~ un autre a 14:und0 obrero A ?
R. -Lister et son groupe es-
s'lient, aujouxd'hui, en ekploitant
nos cuff@rends avec le parts com-
muniste de 1'Unian soul?tique, de
trouver en Espagne la force
qu'ils n'ont pas. Mais, vows savez,
ii y ~ un proverbe ruse qui dit :.
< Le pine ami de I'homme, c'est
fours d@voud..> Les pines amts de
1'Union soul@tique, dans notre
pays, ce scut ceux qui se pr8sen-
tent comme ses d@fens~eurs les
plus farouches:
Q. -- Si 1'Union sovidtique dta-
blissait des relations diploma"-
ques avec le ~ gcnGral Frarc~,
quelle serait votre position ?
R. - C'est un pas qui aurait @t@
comer@hensible it y y dix ou
quinze ans, mais qui ne Pest plus
quand le franqusme touche ~, sa
fin. Noun pennons que des rela-
tions diplomatiques entre des
pays socialistes et Franco por-
tent prgjudice au prestige de ces .
pays aux yeux des masses popu-. .
hires.
Q. - Si M. Lister a Z'appui de
Moscow, comment le parti commu-
niste espagnol pours-t-il r~sis-
ter dson of/ensive 7
R. -Notre parts, ~lui est in-
dependant, a dejz~. r8ole ce pro-
bl~ine. La pantie est gan8e a
partir du moment oix les c~_ `
onze membres de notre comite
central, dont quatre-vingt-dix vi-
' vent en Espagne, approuvent no-
tre politique, laquelie est suivie
par toutes nos organisations d'i~.s-
pagne. Lister n'a que de petits
groupes de partisans parmi les
@migr@s installes daps un ou deux
pays socialistes. En Fra.r,c=~, it
n'a qu'une soixantaine dc: sy:n-
pathisants parmi p 1 u s de dix
'mille communistes emigr~:?s.
Q. -Mais vows avez exciu cez~W
qui n'~taient pas d'accor~l avec
.vows. Est-ce bien confornze cz vos
positions sur le pluralisme id~o-
logique 7 '
R. -Lister et son groupe ;,;,
scut exclus deux-m@mes en gtat-
taut la derniere reunion du co-
mit@ central, en septembre, et en
fondant u;:e caricature de parts
communiste. Toute liberte a Ste
laiss8e a certains camarades is
d?sapprouver nos prises de po-
sition sur la Tch@coslovaquie, mais
au moment dhagir 1'unitt? etait
n@cessaire. Cela dit, it cs;: vrai
qu'il faut trouver ur. :neilleur
dquilibre entre cette necessit@-lh
et Celle de la d@mocratie' inferno.
En septembre, le parts ~or.~mu-
niste espa?~nol a adopte pour
principe que les divergences pour-
raient @tre expos8es h 1'averir
dans ses journaux. Mais nous
sommes encore un parts iilSgal.
La democratic dans le parts se
resent du manque de d8mocra-
tie dans le pays tout cutler. C'est
vrai pour les autres partis d'op-
position espagnols, bien qu'ils ne
se r@clament pas du centralisme
d@mocratique.
Q. - Votre position sun la
Tchecoslovaquie nest-elle pas une
prEcaution destinde d nous conci-
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Tier Ia sympathie du rest~e de
1'opposition espagnoie ?
R. -Notre politique rationale
et internationals ne fait qu'ur
tout. Il ne g'~git gas d?Cm'o ~rre-
caution, macs du Pond m@me da
cette palitique. Sinon, qui pour-
rait nous croire quand noes par-
fors de socialisme denrocratique ?
Nous ne sommes pas pour autant
antisovietiques. Nous ne sou s-
estimons pas 1'impoi~ance de
1'Unian sovietiq~ie comme puss-
sauce anti -imperialists. IvIais
nous sommes contre la division du
monde en deux blocs militares,
contre lies zones d'influence, qui
ne servent finalement que I'imp8-
rialisme.
Q. - Le socialisme nest pttS
vatre premier dbjectf ?
R. - L'Espagne ne peut Masser
directerncnt du ts't~riquismtl au
socialisme. I1 faut urb stops.
Mais notre objectif est evidem-
ment le socialisme - un socia-
lisme democratique et indeper-
dart, ou le parts Communists
pours titre un parts dii~fgeant,
znais non dominanii. Un ?abea-
lisme qui accepter le ~siuZ?alisnle
philosaphique et politique, Ie seul
possilrie dons un pays' dBvelQpp~.
Nous concevons tres bier une
Espagne socialists otY le .chef du
gouvernement serait catholique et
ou Ie P.C. serait minrSrit2,ire. C'est
d'ailleurs la legon ~rtirmi~ de notre
histoire. Pendant la guerre civiie,
le parts communists aurait pu
preridre le pouvoir. - it avast les
meilIeures unites miltaires, . it
await les blind8s, 1'aviation, -
mais it n'a pas Suivi _ceux qui
lui suggeraient de Ie'faire. Le
gouvernement republicain n e
comptait que deux ministres com-.
munistes, mass notre pamti await
tout de meme un r&le dirig`eant,
car ses idees avaient de 1"in-
fluence.
1'etat-tnfljor. ale 1'armee et de la
gendarmerie, a condamne la pro-
pi'ir~t4 grivea et s'est prononrx4
patu? la luttc des classes, L'Eglian
a psis position sur les fusillades
de Grenade. Vest daps des cou-
Vents que se reunissent souvent
les commissions ouvri~res. Commu-
rrfstes et cathaliques travaillent
eYrSemble-daps ties commissions -
nuvric:~es, jraysannes - et clans la
Camniis?'ftrri nationals crcec au
debut d2 Tonnes. C'est avec 1'ap-
pui des eatholiques qu'une Breve
de vi~gt-quatre heures a et8 stti-
vie, ie 13 octob; dernicr, ;gar
'Vhigt ,milIe ouv~iers aericoics
dens 1a province de S;ivile. Sans
la po'iitique d'unite avec les ca-
tiioligti:es, 1'opposition n'aurait pas
pu faire surface. Vous savez, nous
aeons souvent fist que le socia-
iiame e5pagnol marcherait avec la
faucilla et le marteau dons une
nz~,fil et la Croix dons 1'autre !
Q. - Que1s sort vos alli8s en
Espagne?
R. - Tous Ceux qui sort favo-
rable5 au rStablissement des liber-
tes democratiques, mime s'ils out
des buts opposes aux n8tres,
meme si, dons Ie passe, ifs ant
appuy8 lie regime franquiste.
Q. - Mais la classe ouuridre
peut-ells accepter une alliance qui
engIobe une partie des classes
possedantes, ?
R. -Vous oubliez que le r@-
gime espagnol a garde des formes
fascistes, et que notre premi8re
Cache, c'est d'en finir avec elles.
Pour y arrivei?, nous sommes parts
a pactiser avec le diable ! Cela,
le peuple le comprend ties Bien.
Quand ies communistes frangais
out dil lutter contre le nazisme,
ifs se 5ont bier allies a. de Gaulle!.
L'opposition bourgeoise nous est
donc necessaire, et it suffit de
Iire la presse espae role pour cons-
toter qu'olle exists. Une partie
du captalisme ne croft plus au
systisme autoritaire; des forces de
.plus en plus nombreuses, jusque
daps 1"appareil de 1'Etat, ju5que
chez Ies militaires, sort prrtes ~
conclure un pacts pour la libertr.
Q. - Comptez-nous sur Juan
Carlos pour retablir Ia dEmo-
cratie 7
R. - Personne, en Espagne, ne
compte sur Juan Carlos. La plu-
part des militaires n'ont pas
confianoe en lui. Franco a 1'auto-
rite de celui qui a gagnr une
guerre. Juan Carlos n'en a gagTir
aucune, il_ n'a aucune autoritr.
La monarchie n'a pas beaucoup
d'avenir en Espagne. Si Juan
Carlos monte sur ie trdne; ce sera"
provisoire.
Q. -Vous avez fist : < Un chef
de gouvernement catholique m.
Quells est votre position d regard
de Z'Eglise ?
R. -? L'Eglise e5pagnale a tits :.
la plus intBgriste, la plus reaotian-
naire qui snit, ells a tits la farce
principals du franquisme. Mais
aujourd'hui, ells adoppe des po-
sitions qui, aussi timides soient-
elles, 1'eloignent du regime. Ells
prend encore une rnorme me:spon-
sabilitr en ne demand~,nt pas
1'amnistie, ce qui Est indispen-
sable pour liquifier la ~tierre
cfVile. N:"us else a ~n son sein des
courants progressistes puissants,
qui peuvent en tame i'Egiise la
plus pr?ogressiste du monde. Re-
cemment, a; Oviedo, un jesuite,
professeur a, 1'Ecole gr?egorienne
de Rome, qui a deux freres ttaris
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LE MONDE, Paris
~+ November 1970
"The Study o#' 1!~~x'X~.~m ~s Nab Our F~?lusiv~ Patrimony"
"i~onalitric," "do~:n;atic,n nF:,~, ?
E5? gobienlo deberia, ademfis, com-
? ? promet?erse s realizar una politics ex- .
terior de paz, independencia y neutra-
-~ lidad respecto a. los bloques militares,
?` diversificando sus re~aciones con todos
~ _ ._
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1
Y December 1970
After 6 months imprisonment following his arrest last May at
his summer cottage in Ryazan Province, southeast of Moscow, Andrei
Amalrik was sentenced on 12 November 1970 to a term of three years
in a labor camp under "intensive regime". The trial, which took
two days, was held at Sverdlovsk, 900 miles east of the city where
he is registered as living -- Moscow. The reason given for the
trial's transfer to this Urals city was that copies of his works
were found there, but this appears to have been a transparent device
to limit publicity of the trial.. Sverdlovsk is off limits to
foreigners.
Amalrik was tried wider Article 190 (1) of the Russian
Republic's criminal code, which makes it a crime to spread
"deliberate fabrications. defaming the Soviet State and public
order." This article, signed in 1966, is used against dissenters.
The prosecution's charges were based on 5 documents: an open
letter he wrote to Anatoly Kuznetsov (who defected to Britain
last year), transcripts of two interviews with CBS, and two books -
Involunt__a__rryy~ Journey to Siberia and Will The Soviet Union Survive
n~ti~~~ e order was pu lishe in ugust y arcourt
race ovanovich, Inc., 757 3rd Ave. New York, N.Y. 10017, and
the latter by Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc:, 49 East 33rd St.,
New York, N.Y. 10016. This soft cover edition, distributed as a
selection by -the Book of the Month Club, contains a preface by
Henry Kamm which is a portrait of the author as a dissenter, as
well as a commentary about the work by Sidney Monas. In Canada
Fitzhenry and Whiteside, Limited, Toronto, has also published an
edition, and one has been put out in Russian by the Alexander
Herten Foundation, Amstel 268, Amsterdam-C, The Netherlands.
The historical vision of the Soviet Union that Amalrik holds
is ironic in that at a time of the expansion of the USSR's physical
power his attention is riveted on the collapse of the source of that
power. What Amalrik sees in his country is the transformation of
what was a primal flash of energy in 1917 into a peevish and
fearful structure of weak and unimaginative bureaucrats determined
to hold on to their privileges and to power for its own sake.
Because of their weakness and division they will be unable to take
the necessary measures goon enough, or to make them strong enough,
to enable Russia to survive the changing situations and pressures.
Essentially the author views the Soviet state not as a 50 year
old phenomenon but as the final phase of an empire which had its
oxigins over 1,000 years ago in the Kievan Rus, and which is less
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than 14 years from destruction. Beginning as a sober, analytical
treatise on the causes and sources of the current difficultiE;s in
the Soviet Union, the work evolves into an Old Testament prophecy
of a holocaust to come which is contained in the last 26 pagf~s of
the book. Among the ideas expressed in the build-up preceding it
perhaps the most controversial concerns Amalrik's disbelief in the
inevitability of the triumph of liberalism in his country as a
result of an increasing standard of living and a concurrent tide
of Western influence, such as jazz and miniskirts, with a consequent
softening of ideological hostility toward the West, and even its
own citizens. As he puts it, "It is possible that we will indeed
have a 'socialism' with bare knees someday, but not likely one with
a human face."
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CPYRGHT CPYRGHT
Amalrik Says- Soviet Fears.--Ideas
By BERNARD CrWlyltTZMAN
e-~!!iR{ t+!?t's!!M!a Yerk Tlml1
MOSCOW, Nov. 14 -Andrei
Amalrik; the dissident Soviet
author, was reported today to
have told a court that his trial
on charges of defaming the So-
viet state reflected "the cow-
E ardice of a reginme that regards
as a danger the spreading of
;~ any thought, any idea alien to
g its top bureaucrats:'
# The Sverdlovsk court, in a
~ two-day trial that ended on
' _T~hursday, sentenced Mr. Amal-
rik, 32?yeaT~ald author of seveT-
k, a1 boales and essays published'I
abroad, to three years' confine-'I
ment in a da~bor camp. Acode-~
fendant, Lev. G. Uboz~hlca, a
:Sverdlovsk student, also re-
ceived ~Chree years but in a less
strict camp.
Mr. Amalrik's friends related
6~is remarks to Western news-
:. men. They said the verdict
`~ wou1d be appealed.
In his final words before
being sentenced, Mr. Amalrik
said his rtrial was meant to
frighten others dntosilence, but
"I think that fhe process of
? ideological emancipation that
' has begun is irreversible."
f Appears in Good Health
~ 1 read "deliberate fabrication:;
R~~'ime s~ Cowardaoe ~ 1 h ~ 1
t
DissenterAsserts
ainst dissidents.
ddition to his books, pub-
1 she only abroad, Mr. Amal-
k as also cited for inter-
iew he gave to William Cole,
co respondent of the Colum-
is roadcasting System who
as ubsequently expelled from
os w.
M Amalrik refused to enter
pl a of guilty or not guilty,
i sis ing-that the-court had no
ght to try him _for his views.
H repeated his refusal to
'sc s his views in his final
ate ent, but said he did wish
t a saver the allegations that
s atements "were directed
ai st ~ my people and my
"I seems to me that now thQ'
sin task for my country is
t u urden itself of the heavy
eig t of the past, and for this
c iti sm is necessary above all
d of glorification," he said.
"I hink that I am a better
tri t than those who, loudly.
cl ing their love for the;
oth rland, by love for. thej
oth rland mean love for their)
o n rivileges.
"N ither the witch hunt
c rri d out by the regime, nor
t is particular example-this
t ial arouses in me the slight-
e t r sped nor any fear. I un-
d rst d, however, ?that -such
t 'als are counted on the fright-
e any, and many will be
f 'gh ned. gut all the same, I
t ink the development of ideo-
i is 1 emancipation, having
is irreversible."
lace now can be explained
my as the cowardice of a re-
ime that regards as a danger
~e spreading of any thought,
ny idea alien to its top bu-
sucrats."
Although the Soviet authari-
es talk about an ideological
;niggle, ho said, .they can op-
~se alien ideas only with "the
treat of criminal prosecution,"
"Recognizing theirideologicai
~pelessnass, they cling. in fear
~ criminal codes?? prisons,
imps -and psychiatric hospi-
tls; ' he said. -
"In particular, the fear of my
ioughts, of `the facts expressed
my books, forces these peo-
e to put me in the dock as a
~iminal. -This fear led them
so to be afraid of trying me in
oscow. They. brought me here,
linking that here the trial
ould attract less attention."
Code Amended in 1966
The Amalriks are legally reg-
tered as living in Moscow,
here they share a communal
iartment.' Sverdlovsk, in the
rals,,is off limits to foreigners.
?Amalrik was notified that
was being tried in 5verd-
sk on the ground that copes
his works were found~in that
alsz city.
Mr. Amalrik and Mr. Ubazhko
~ under Article I90 (1) of
Russian Republic's Criminal
Mr. Amalrik, a slightly built,
bespectacled historian, made it
a point to know many for-
eigners before his arrest last
May at his summer cottage in
Ryazan Province, southeast of,
Moscow. His wife, Guyzel, a
painter, attended the trial as a
witness.
According to his friends, Mr.
Amalrik looked in good health
despite the six anonths' confine-
.- ment, and he seemed as out-
spokenly critical.of the Soviet
leadership as in his works. His
book "W}'ll tl'ie U.S.S.R. Survive
L~til 1984" predicts the down-
fall of the Soviet regime be-
cause of internal disorders and
a war with China.
Mr. Amalrik compared the
trials of dissidents to .witch
trials. of the Middle Ages.
"But if one could at least
partly .explain the struggle
against heretic ideas In the Mid-
die Ages as religious fanati-!
cism," he told the three-man
tribunal, "eve thin talon
atr- ng
$ ov et state ana
Refl~eted by ~'rial, ~ blic order," The article was
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CPYRGHT
THE WASHINGTON POST
15 November 197a
Sentencing I dew
~s Crime I n I tself,
fl malril~ 'Declares
By Anthony Astradhan.
Washington Poet Foreign 6ervice
some are ava,llable through
samizdat (self-publishing).
At the opening o~ the trial
Wednesday, Amalrik gave a
punishment, whether ~they,be
true or false', seems to me to
be a crime in itsolf."
So dissident author Andrei
Amalrik told the court that
sentenced him Thursday to
three years in a prison camp,
his friends said today.
He also accused the Soviet
regime of intbllectual coward-
ice, that led it to medieval-
style? witch hunts, which he
said~? could not reverse the
' "process of ideological emancf-
pation now under way."
` Amalrik. was charged with
violating article 190-1 of the
Russian Republic Criminal
Code,, which deals with "dis-
semination ~ of falsehoods de-
rogatory to the Soviet state
.and social system."
The prosecution based its
case on five documents includ-
eing Amalrik's book "Will The
Soviet Union Survive Until
1984?" in which he analyzed
the various groups bf dissi-
dents'here and predicted the
disintegilation of the Soviet
empire in a war with China.
None oaf these has been pub-
lished in tihe?SovietrUnion, but
~' MOSCOW, Nov. 14-"T
-CPYRGHT
tory," he said. "I also think',
that'the truth ar falsehood ?bf
any -views put forward pub-
licly can be established ogly ,
by free and 'open discussion,
not by. legal proceedings.
"No criminal court has a-
moral right to sentence any-
one for views he has put for-
ward..."
"I do not consider myself
guilty;' 'he added, "but will
not try to prove my innocence,
for the principle of freedom of
speech excludes the question
of my guilt"
At the end? of the trial
Thursday, Amalrik made , .a
short final statement in which
he comppared the trial to medi=
evil r~itCh hunts.
He said the regime's ideo~
logical struggle was reduced'
to the criminal persecution of
ideas. "Recognizing their ideol-
ogical_helplessness," he said,
"they grope. in fear for the
criminal code, prisons, camps,
psychiatric clinics." Some 'dis-
sidents have been ruled insane
.instead of being convicted in
criminal trials.
Amalrik blamed the regime's
fears for his indictment and
for his being tPied in Sverd-
lovsk, 900 mile east of Mos-
cow, so, "that the trial would
short stateme>ut in answer to ~ attract less attention."
Amalrik said that he wante
to:.answor.: the claims that h .
made statements "directe ,
against my people and m
country. It seems to me tha
the main task of my cauntr
just now is to throw off th
burden of the heavy past, an
for this my country needs fre
criticism; not self-glorification -
"I think that I am a Bette
patriot than those who shou
about their love for the- mot
erland and who mean by tha
love for their privileges,
Amalrik added.
He concluded, "I understaii '
that such trials are inten~le
to scare many people and tha
they will scare many people
and even so that the proces
of ~ ideological emancipatio
now under way is irreve~rsibl
I have nothing to ask Hof thi
court"
Amalrik's friends expresso
the belief that this final stat
ment was what impelled th
judge to sentence him to thre
years in camp under intensiv
regime, when the.prosecuto
had asked three years undo
the, less severe general r
gime.
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CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
THE SUNDAY STAR
15 NoYember 1970
^
?YI~~ ~~~o~ ~
Sa s ~re~n~~~ ~~
dears ~'ho~ ~ h~
MOSCOW (UPI) -Russian
wr e n re ma ri c, sen-
tenced this week to three years
in a prison camp, says the gov-
ernment is afraid of his ideas
and described his trial as part of
a Kremlin "witch-hunting" cam-1.
paign against dissident intellec-
foals. ?
In a courtroom speech at the
end of his trial in Sverdlovsk,
Amalrik said: "I think i am d
better patriot than those who,
shout about their love for the
fatherland but mean, by that,:
]ove for their privileges."
Amalrik's speech was made
available to western correspon-
tents in Moscow yesterday.
' Says He's Not-Afraid
"Everything that is going on
now can only be explained by
the cowardice of a regime which
sees dangers in the spreading of
any thought, any idea alien to
the bureaucratic summit," he
said.
"Neither the witch-hunting
conducted by the regime nor this
special example - my trial -
evoke respect or fear in me,":
the 31-year-old author said.
"6uch trials are intended to
scare people and many will be
scared -but, even so, the proc-
ess of ideological liberation now
under way is irreversible."
Amalrik, author of "Will the
Soviet Union Survive until
1984?", was sentenced Thursday
for violating article 190-1 of the.
Russian republic criminal code
dealing with dissemination of
"falsehoods derogatory. to the;
Soviet state and social system."
a
'Moral Rlgktt' Disputed
"Tt is the fear for the ideas T {
have expressed, for those facts I
mentioned in my books, that
compel these people to put me
on the stand as a criminal,"
Amalrik said. He added that the
authorities are "afraid" to try
him in Moscow and brought him.
to Sverdlovsk instead, 900 miles
to the east.
"No criminal count has a mor-
al right to sentence anyone for:
views. he had put forward," he
said. "To sentence ideas -
whether they are true or false -
~by a criminal sentence seems to'-
~me to be a crime in itself.
"I shall -not discuss my opin-
ions here because the court is
aot .the right place for it. I only
want to answer claims that
some of my pronouncements are
directed against my country and
my people.. .
Evidence Listed
"It seems to me that the main
task for my country just now is
to hhrow off its burden of the
heavy past and, for this, my
country. needs first of all free
''critical discussion and not self-
'praise."
In his "1984" Amalrik forecast',
war with China that would lead
to collapse of the Soviet regime
sometime between 1980 and 1985:
The book was published in the .
West a~ was, his "Involuntary;
Journey to Siberia."
According to dissident
sources, the prosecution based .
the case against Amalrik on five.
documents, including the two
books, his two interviews with
the Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem and an open letter he wrote
to Soviet writer Anatoly Kuzne~.
sov after the. latter defected to
Britain last year.
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?~,-.,
:W~ ~? .
v
~f~~~^~,
CPYRGHT
i'ublished by The Economist Newspaper Limited
25 St James's Street, London SW1
1 i57 9 July 1970
oc,la an out letnam ave captured the headlines during the pass
three months, significant dcveloplnents have been taking place in Hanoi. It is now
possible to trace fairly clearly the course of the power struggle that followed the death
cf Ho Chi Ulinh ten months ago.
no's authority was never challenged, but during his .declining years there. ~verc
signs that l:is lieutenants were beginning to skirmish over the succession. On his dea;li
the rivals for power and their suppol-tirlg factions were already identifiable; but t.c
~var in the south, and the resulting strains in the north, made it imperative tl.at intc-
party strife should be avoided. Hence a `collective leadership' was unanimously
agreed upon by the party.
Wlthlll a rzionth or two, however, it became apparent that this concept was v topian
and totally unsuited to the existing situation in North Vietnam. With each passing
week the power struggle, particularly between Le Dtr~, the first secretary of the hasty,
and' h rt?ng C`,;:~;z, the party's theorctiCian grew fiercer, and the `collective leadcr-
ship' less realistic.
The two leaders, quarrclicd over several issues, notably: (a) the priorities io. c
accorded to winning th;: tuns in the south anti to so~ialist consi.ruction in the r.r~rtl:;
(b) the role of material incentives to increase productivity; and (c) the organisatlc,n ob
collectivised agriculture. When 'Truong Chinh alleged that capitalist agriculture was
being re-established in North Vietnam,` Le Duan countered itirith expressions of sym-
pathy far Lenin (who had to face similar charges against his New Economic Policy
from ignorant and bigoted comrades.}
At first the greater publicity accorded to Truong Chinh, and the adoption of several
of his political ,proposals, suggested he was gaining the upper hand. -But by mid-
February tli~re-were clear indications that Lc Duan was the victor. In a long, authori-
tative, and widely published article, Lc Duan confidently laid down the lines along
which every major sector of North Vietnamese activity would develop. Significantly,
,his pronouncements were not challenged from any quarter.
The emergence of a new leader in a communist state is often the signal for a purge
of those elements deemed hostile to him -the victims usually being accused of serious
crimes. North Vietnam has run true to communist pattern.
Late in March an order for a party purge was published in the party periodical,
Hoc ~"ap. This publication is read primarily by senior party members, and the first
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400016'GHT
widely disseminated announcement was broadcast by Hanoi radio on 2:i LLApril. The,
order took the form of a `politburo resolution,' signed by Le Duan on behalf of that
body, and was addressed to all party organs.
It charged that numbers of party members were Qf 'inferior quality' or 'inferior
character', and were unworthy of party membership. Other elements `displayed very
inferior political standards', worked badly, and failed to carry. out their duties. Others
again were guilty of `sagging determination to fight', `low ethical standards', -and
`inferior political enlightenment'. Nor did the catalogue end there; other allegations
were of corruption, bullying, indiscipline, and infringing other peoples' rights. All the
culprits, it went. on, would be expelled from the party in a purge lasting one year;
their places would be filled by `virtuous' new recruits to be known as the `Ho Chi Minh
class' of party members.
All party organs were required to submit to the central committee secretariat
detailed plans for implementing the resolution, and this is believed to have been
completed. A `guiding committee' was set up to supervise the whole operation-and
on 19 May the purge started. Though details of-,its progress are kept a, tight secret
from all outsiders, articles in the Hanoi press claim"that it is proceeding well. The people
are urged to maintain their vigour and enthusiasm.
Whatever the truth of,the allegations made about party members in the politbura-
resolution -after all, corruption, backsliding, inefficiency, and authoritarianism-are
fairly common features in many Asian countries, so the charges may not be far off the
mark - it is a safe assumption that those who have opposed Le Duan will form the
bulk of the victims. Some notorious offenders may be included to lend an air of verisi-
militude to the whole operation.
It is still ;foo early to know whether the purge will lead to torture, bloodshed, and
mass executions as the .1955 agrarian reforms did. But this grim possibility must be in
the minds of all North Vietnamese.
Although the objective of the purge is to create a ruling Communist party united
under one leader, its short-term effects could be damaging. Quite apart from the
burden of waging war in the South, Laos, and Cambodia simultaneously, North.
Vietnam's rulers are beset by manifold domestic difficulties. The Hanoi press itself has
admitted shortages of food and materials, popular apathy, absenteeism among workers,
manpower shortages, black marketeering, and indiscipline.
The party, in its present state, seems to be unequal to the task of resolving these
.difficulties. Whether Le Duan's purge will ultimately strengthen it, or merely disrupt
it feirther, is -one of the many imponderables in -the` confused Indo-China si.tuation.,
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Excerpts . ~xomr:
U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
6 Apxi.l 1970
HANOI'S FO{BMULA:
Mixed strategy. Recent fast-moving
developments disclose just how Hanoi
has used a mixture of political and mili-
tart' strategy to capitalize not only on
the vague politics of Southeast Asia but
on American political unrest as well.
Political decisions-not military-led
to a halt in U. S. bombing of .North .
Vietnam: and to the start of withdrawal
of American troops from South Vietnam.
Political maneuvering and military pres-
sure are undermining the Government .
in Laos. In Cambodia, mass infiltration
by Red troops endangers that key na-.
lion-without a-shot being'fiied.
The current Communist drive for
domination over Southeast Asia is not
new. The goal was set when the Indo-
chinese. Communist Party was formed
40 years ago by Ho Chi Minh: one Red
nation composed of what is now Cam-
bodia, Laos and all of Vietnam.
Says a leading Western expert:
"The main point which .always must
be kept in mind ~is this: For Hanoi, this
war is and always has been` a war to
win all of Indo-China, not just South
Vietnam. Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam
are not separate carppaigns. They are all
parts of the whole.",
North Vietnamese are' convinced that
they are the only people of the lndo-
Chinese: Peninsula capable of ruling.
Tough, and clever, the Vietnamese are
far more aggressive and resourceful than
their Cambodian or Laotian .neighbors.
The price to North Vietnam in this
unremitting fight for power has been
high in money, lives and destruction.
The precise cost may never be knn~~n.
But U. S. intelligence officers insist t' et'
can estimate the toll with 'considera!,le
accuracy. ~
To keep the Vietnam war, going, Iia-
noi has maintained a standing Army c,F
457,000 men and a people's. militia of
about 420,000-a huge force for a nllion
of only 21 million. Nearly Half the Re,;-
ular Army is based outside North Viet-
nam-1.00,000 in South Vietnam, 67,000
in Laos and about 48,000 in Cambodia.
"Tremendous drain:' An American
officer says: "That is a tremendous d,?ain
bn resources. Maintaining troops outside
your borders is expensive."
Hanoi's cost per soldier is not rated
significantly higher in South Vietnam
than in Laos. But the Communists are
finding it more expensive to support. n{~
to 60,000 North Vietnamese and Viet
Cong infantrymen in Cambodia, -even
though they do little fighting there.
In South Vietnam and Laos> Reds seize ,
much of their food from the peasants..
But in Cambodia, Communist units
usually pay cash for food .and mediciuc
and as bribes to Cambodian officials.
Man for man, it is vastly cheaper to
maintahr a North Vietnamese soldier,
living on rice and getting few benefits,
than it is to .support an American CI
eating well and in touch with his home-
land 10,000 miles away. However, ob-
servers consider the relative drain is
greater on North Vietnam because its
economic base is infinitesimally small
compared with that of the U. S:
Intelligence sources in Saigon estimate
that the Communists have lost more than
600,000 men in combat in South Viet-
nam since 1961, many of them txained:
company-grade officers and noncommis-
sioned officers. During one four-year per-
iod in South Vietnam alone, nearly
480,000 North Vietnamese and Viet
Cong were killed:. 55,524 in 1966; 86,-
104 in 1967; 181,149 in :1968, and
156,954 in 1969.
Three years of U: S. bombin~ of North
Vieh~am almost wrecked the civilian
economy. Although the attacks have
ceased, food still is scarce, housing in
short supply, manpower a serious prob-
lem. With so many men at war, women
of North Vietnam make up about 80
per cent of the farm labor force. Popula-
tion specialists say North Vietnam has
1 million "surplus" women because so
many men died in war.
Says a French expert on Vietnam:
"Hanoi doesn't want to do anything
now that would bring the war back to
North Vietnam. The country is being
rebuilt, and the leadership .does not
want to risk destruction by bombing-
again. The people of North Vietnam are,
tired and want the war to end:' '
A sizable part of Hanoi's war costs is
:met by Russia and Communist China.
Russia and other East Europe:u~ na-
tions.provide Hanoi with about 1 billion
dollars a year in weapons, medicine,
-sayv materials and some food. Most of
this aid is in loans which must be ~?e-
paid-a major mortgage on Norih Viet-
nam's fuhu?e. Red Chinese aid it smaller
in amount -and is concentrated in food
and weapons.
Some Far East experts are convinced
that North Vietnam is finc>;ng the war
so costly that its fuhn?e military moves
will be' "highly selective and designed
-even more t$an in the past to get the
largest political profit out of the smallest
military outlay.
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1
HAN01 vs. REST OF lNDO-CHINA
Outmanned and Outgunned, but .. .
POPULATION
North Vietnam has 21 million people.
-Rest of Indo-China - mouth Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia
--has combined pop~ilation of 27 million.
TROOPS
North Vietnam has 877,000 men under arms.
Rest of Indo-China has 1.2 million men under arms.
other allies, plus virtually unlimited aid from U. S.
ALLIES _
North Vietnam is supported by 150,000 troops of Viet
Cong and Pathet Lao, plus generous aid from Russia and
Red China. J
Rest of Indo-China: !n South Vietnam, anti-Communists
are supported by 454,000 U. S. troops, more than 60,000
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400010001-1
CPYRGHT
-.101. Vi~tna~n el~ir~d
Iri ~Iarve~~~g ice
By Lee Lescaze
Washington Post FOrlSaA $ervfce
;maintain the wartime mode of
life and give fuller play to the
new production relations
or ie nam once again is
exhorting an apparently reluc-
tant and undermanned peas-
antry to meet the state's rice
quotas.
1n numerous broadcasts
.this month, Hanoi- Radio has.
:complained that the sowing of
?the summer-fall rice crop is
far behind schedule:.
"A number of localities are
still unaware of the urgency
of this year's (second) rice
crop," the radio said recently.
Although rice production is
most pressing, it is only -one of
the areas in whieh_ the North
Vietnamese leadeTShip has
been unable to galvanize its
:people to meet officially estab=
}fished goals.
c "We have been striving to
:chiefly by relying _on the ar-
dent patriotism and the zeal of
'our people," a member of the
State . Planning Commission
rwrote last January.
However, since American ~
bombing was halted in Novem-
ber, 1968, North Vietnam's
'peasants have sought to slow
down a little.
The government launched a
rdrive for "intensive cultiva-
tion" aiming at production of
five .tans of rice on each 2.2
;acres under cultivation. Ac-
cotding to Hanoi broadcasts;
' the drive has achieved- only
mixed results.
To achieve tihe goal, Radio
Hanoi reported, farmers in'
some areas have abandoned
their poorer rice fields :and:
thus reduced their overall pro-
cuction while getting -the de-
sired yiAld from a few choice
plots. .. ~ - _
In addition to compaints
:remarkably open 'statements?
about corruption in the farm
cooperatives. The party direc-;
tive on collective ownership is-.
sued last. month called for
"flrastic" curtailment of em-
be2zlement.
Vice Premier Do Muoi com-
mented .in May that it was
necessary, to "implement satis-
factorily" the policy of farm-.
ers selling their grain to the
state, implying that some rice
was being Sold privately to:
b}ack marketeers.
Manpower shortages -have
been an additional problem
ifor North Vietnam's agricul-
tural programs, particularly
~ at harvest times.
North Vietnam ~ has been
struggling with its food prob- '
lem for years, but the .warn-
ipgs that the present planting _
~is .behind schedule seem to in-'
dicate that.Ha~ioi'faces apar-`
titularly serious situati?n thiso
summer., .~: :. _ .
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CPYRGHT
anal Setting Up `Task Farces'
>ln .$id to-Spur Lagging~Industry
or namsnips ana sacrifices qualitatively" to "replenish fibs
ahead, Washington officials say main-force army" and to "com-
North Vietnam appears deter- bins economic development
sy rA>a,ezucc
ero.as.+ ~ za? ~ ism..
'WASHINGTON. Oot. 7 =1new rs~ienal fiareQS mirst auirk-
This is the conclusion drawn
,by specialists 'on North Viet-
namese affairs from the latest
pronouncements by Govern-
anent, military and Communist
party figures in Hanoi as well
as from interval party debates
in North Vietnam.
The ' angst significant 'new
#rend observed in the North
Vietnamese conduct of the war
and management of the. bat-
tered economy is the- effort to
create so-called "local military
'talk forces." These are to
serve bath as -army reserves
and as civilian labor units work-
ing to spur what Hanoi ac-
kno~vledges publicly is lagging
industrial production.
'Enormous Efforts' Asked
This, latest North Vietnamese
. approach to the problem of sus-
taining militarily and economi-
cally the strategy of the "pro-
~racted war" -defined by Fla-
nai's Defense.Minister, Gen. Va
Nguyen Giap, as. a persistent
struggle on a low level of ac-
tivity designed 40 outlast the
United? States with a minimum
of North Vietnamese' losses -
-was described do detail Aug. 15
in Quan Doi Nhan Dan, North
Vietnam's army newspaper.
In an editorial, the paper said
that North Vietnam must make
"enormous efforts" to acceler-'
ate production and "stabilize'.
the people's. livelihood step by',
{ step."
`Discussing the responsibil-'
.'sties of the "local military task',
forces,"the newspaper said they
must strive "to increase the
reconomic and national defense
potential" of North Vietnam, to
"fulfill aheir duty as the great
tear area of the great ~Irontline."
do what. American analysts
bonsidered an unusually frank
admission by Hanoi of its
mounting pf~bblems of man-
ggoowmr allocation. !between de-
~~ense and the economy Quan
Dot Than Dan said khat the
y.....,~ va yavaauv.wu~?a+u c
rarefy sounded fiheme that e
cbilian population hungers fot
Peapl's Needs Are Noted
"The rate o! development is
low," the newspaper -said,
"compared to ou; manpower
capaciky and to our supply of
raw materials, the needs of our
people and the export de-
mands."
"During the first half of this
year, the output of a number
of handicraft [industry] branch?
es and professions in many log
cali~ties was at a standstill or
even declined;' Nhan Dan said.
"The present level of handi-
craft production is lower than
that of 1964,' it assented.'
in a comment on the results
of the dispersion of North Viet?
riamese industry during the
1965-68 bombings lay the Unt-
ed States, the newspaper said
that "slang with actively re-
storln~g apd fiuilding state-
owned industrial factories, it is
necessary urgently to restore
and develop various small in-
dustry and handicraft branches
and professions-and to pursue
the socialist ~transforma~tion."
The theme of further sacri-
fices was significantly sounded
for the first time in ~tlae official
slogans for the-celebrations last
month of the anniversary of
the 1945 proclamation of the
D?mocratic Republic of Vie4-
nam. In past years, .sacrifices
were not mentioned, but. this
year the third of the 17 slo-
gans said:
"For the~lndependence and
freetdom of the fathefland, we
are zesolved mo averooma all
the difficulties and hardships,
persist and e~tep up resistance
against United S~bates aggres-
sion and work for national sal-
vation until tdl~l victory'." '
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CPYRGHT
s~-z~n~lo>~ stnv
3 October 1970
..~c~oi .~ress~~ ~~~~ 1,~~~~i ~'~;~~
weakening LPadershi.h
Could Bring Internal
Y~litical Crisis ,
By l1ICHAF.L F,1RKS
[Sacra StaJJ;Corresposdent]
Saigon, ,Oct. 2-Beset with se-
continued food shortage, North
Vietnamese leaders are pressing
Communist party members to
tighten party ..discipline?and in?
grease production:
' If Hanoi's campaign fails,
;some ? senior., western 'analysts
,here Believe, North Vietnam will
be plunged into a serious inter-
nal ppolitical ctisis. .
The same analysts, however,.
-are divided on.what this means
~_for the war'. in South Vietna-
iiiuand the peace talks in Paris.
`Some believe it could lead North
,Vietnam to seek some sort of
settlement, others feel Hanoi
would just reduce the level of
`fighting until its domestic prob-
lems are solved.
Party Criticism
This speculation is based on
.the repeated criticism of party
~il4embers sand local officials and
,technicians recently, and Ha-
i noi's own admissions that dete-
riorating 'party leadership is
sapping effol?ts and its industrial
and agricultural production.
An editorial in the current is-
sue of a leading party journal,
Hoc Tap, says that the quality of
the party's local activities is
poor, -that basic political educa-
tion : is perfunctory and that, as
a result, production and "revo-
lutionary progress" are lagging.
Last week, the secretary of
the Ha Bac prorvince party com=
mittee indioted' local leaders for
(poor agricultural management:
`Ha Bac is at a standstill," he
said,
"Erroneous Views"
"Many party cadres and
members ...still cultivate er-
roneous .views, lack the spirit of
!self-reliance,- are afraid of hard-
ships and _ difficulties, are con-
servative and are prone to rei~+
on the state andiugher authon-
The deputy secretary of the
'Hanoi city party conunittee said
this sumniet that many youths in;
Ithe capital are bourgeois and
(lack "revolutionary ideals and
,socialist enlightenment."
Other party leaders repeated-'
ly have called for better leader- ~
ship in ..agriculture, production
of consumer goods, light indus-
try and education.
CAmm011 Theme
The need for better manage-
ment and stronger party lead-
ership are the themes of even
basically technical articles deal-
ing with: fertilization of rice`
crops, the planting of potatoes '
and corn and water irregation'
projects. I
While extensive self criticism!
Is practiced in many Commu-!
nist-led countries and , is tine
equivalent of political debate in
the United States, the increasing
frankness about shortcomings in ~
North Vietnam and the' calls fora
reform are the basis of the west-,
ern analysts' conclusion that?
(Hanoi is trying to reverse a+
trend that could lead to a com-'
plete breakdown iA party disci-
pline.
One senior analyst comment-
ed, It appears that the men in.
charge in 'Hanoi have .no idea
whether their orders witl be car-
ried out: in the provinces once;
they are given. That is certainly
the implication of those recent'
statements.
Collapse PrCdicted',~
A British specialist on North `
Vietnamese affairs, P. J. Honey;
who was here last- month, said
he is convinced that the Commu-
nist party in the north is nearing
~an internal collapse.
"The war has brought eco=
nomic ruin, and that in turn is
;breaking up the country's politi-
cal organization and structure,".
he said.- "There is no doubt in;
my mind that they are in very.
serious trouble. That is what all
these calls for reform are about:.
American, South Vietnamese
and somb other analysts do not
ao as far as Mr.'Honey, but they,
too feel Hanoi is scrambimg t
regain the control it lost when it
decentralized it economy during
the American bombings nearly
five years ago.
The party is admitting an un
specified number of new young
er members in three phases to
replace older members "who ~
are not worthy ....are inferi
'or, whose nature has bee
changed and who are useless.'
Originally announced in Fels
ruary by the-first secretary o
the Communist party, Le Duan '
these ousters so far appear to b
more a~veeding out of deadwoo
,than the widespread,purgefirs
expected. ~ ' `
Stealing From Peasants
Party leaders are also attac
ing members and cadres wh
steal from the ;peasants an
workers they are supposed to b
~~leading. To Huu, the party' ce
tral committee secretary, sal
~in a recent speech: "There ar
party members who live an
fight, not for the revolutionar
jcause, but for personal irate
ests. Some of them take adva
toge of their position to ste '
public funds or encroach upo
the masses' democratic rights
. (others) use he party as
tool to obtain promotions or e
rich themselves.
"On the other..hand, the pa
'>ty's oganizational, ''education 1
and control tasks-, have bee
loosely carried out: This situ -
tion has enabled' a number f
bad elements to achieve po -
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 CPYRGHT Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A00040001O(~~'Y~GHT
2Ei$? I~AII,Y Y~ObiIURt~ Tokyo
2$ Septemt~e~'? 1170 _ .... ~..
~.,,.? SOA+i~ t'iilnk that communist' North ir~et~am , can' dai?~y' on ~ the .War indefEnitely. ' Buts
,~ ,? ? Hanoi also- oral massive problems that could. force it Ito the peseta table. 7`he writer de?
oblems in a two part, series, the first .of which follows. '
t?`C~?. eciibes some of these pr
l
'i'1rt37~it2 ? V inGOV~;..). LIB. ~1GJ ~( +~, .
? Hong Icon (CNS) T'he
e < cr rc _ epu e o ? e -
nom--more commonly k own.
as'North Vietnam--is obse ving
,the ' 35th anniversary. o 'its.
founding this .'month: D pate
the Eencouragtng official r orts
and ? festivities -that sur rind
the celebration, the county has
i agricultural products. .?? r ins trouble b eakrng cs that- of
Two years .ago, in .hope . of selling tom odities on the
reaching self-sufficiency in . ice, open oz` .bloc mac?,tet.
,the country ..introduced the Havin; fai ed to eliminate
high-yi2lding~ "miraole~ 'cc" the black m. keting .activities
strain developed- iri-the P lip- with decrees, Hanoi has now
pines (Hanoi claims one o 'its i adppted a, di erenf approach.
scientists' Bet~eioped 'the ' ew I The county 's farmers nave
rice, but ? in fact the s eds
I'came via P"akistan)...
Although .yields have'
will take ori1~ a' fixed annual
poets of .the nroduction~? for
not able ~ ?to meet its needs. of , whether tics ?armers? pro-
i rigation
roger r duos more. Any stirplua dhey
" ?witiz Lire o~:t~r - ?..
shorta;es of fertilizet?, and ~ produce may .be stored,. sold to I such s the ie ~~ o ?~;u _ ..~ --
shortcoming. sold to the state. , ~ inevitably a e _, .~ - ?- ?
' Part of the problem,' too, is' In effect; ,these ,measures weariness tivr:
the lack of eggate manage- offer. powerful incentives to I ': he . expa..sia.. o. -.? . ~?~
ment and prof ssional expertise', successful cooperatives 'and into Camboc.'a. rr.. r
to guide the conomy. A'iost of~ hold tics prospect' of the farm- iher drair on .~c f, ~ t? ,
the. country's top -management; era bene3tin~ materially from ;manpower resourc.. -,.. .-
North' Vietnam Coda i suf- "?` `?-_----- --' - -
y -been going in o the war eP.'ort. ; .A simrlar ,measure was adopt' corteni.
fering f4?om serious poi tfcal" . ed in the Soviet Union in. 1965,?, ._ .
divisions: Econgmically ? Trigs Because of the demands of China any,.'th:: ~vv ~:. ~
the war, and. especially dgring ~yhen ~ -grain ' .prociiremcnt was ; through :hcrr ai:: ~o nmi~r ~._::,
havo sgldom been worse, v2n ,the period of US bombing, the .filed at a stafrdard rate for six ~ are i:eepi:rg -the No:h lr:::.-
thoui;h' the -United States top- leaders 1n. Ha of loosened their years. The problem the Hanoi rap~es~ econan:;,r rc
ed bombin the ?cpuntr ear- ~ f. <
P tyro ear a d. Y ideological d mands on the ; .leaders car is th0 pne that ~ lapsing or be'n~ c.
Y y g farmers -and : allowed habits arose from -the move in the uncantroll o' f:,i ~ o ~ ~ -;
-The expansiora~ of the iet? ;antithetical. t cammunism? to i" Soviet Union: -'the resultant ~ as that aid is rortnco.:.:.:~, .:...
Ham war into Cambodia has .creep in: . ' ~ prosperity of the farmers out-' North Vietnarcresv '-ivi : i...~
creatad some .~ important ne N ?~ Basically th s involved letting !stripped. .that o.f and . conse-; starve.
prablems..'for .the leader ip ' the peasants ngage in private, quentiy angered those people.
i~Hanoi.. ~ capitailst-$tyl, .enter rlses?,as. a; But the picture to a i
p livin in Lire urban areas. ligs got shor-.
ter. His unit was under constant pressure.
Many of? hi rcomrades were discouraged- and
talked a( defecting. Kiem did.
? Nguyen VAN Son, 16, Kien Iioa province,
became a Viet Cong when he was 12. He was
an information agent for his villal;e. One Qf his
duties was to blow a horn to broadcast victa-
Ties. ''I think I blow lies," he said with a
laugh. When ARVpI (South Vietnamese) forces
began moving into Kien Hoa f~~ force, Son
switched. x ...
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CPYRGHT
BAr~a'lo~ sv~t
lk ~u1,Y 1970
~~~i~s Sub V let .I~ed ~'ro~~as
~ui~ rat ~''Lt~ri~~~b '~'uniU~c~iu
. _ __
ltp Ai[CHAEL PARKS
~ [Sun Sto/t Correspondent)
t
Saigon. July 13-Large num?. i his South Vietnamese intcrvicw?
idlers are reportedly refusing to; an sanctuaricsl were the only
~fiuht in ('amhodia, according td~ respite we had, and when they
?allied military sources 1?,cre. were gone most of us just gava
If so, the allied analysts said,j up."
the refusals Dave ruptured the ~ Intelligence officers -cite the
generally strong discipline o; sharp rise 1n the number of Viet
the regular North Vict,namese ~ Cons and North Vietnamese
Ar~iey units. American com? defectors during the Invasion as
nianders have occasionally been ~ additional proof of declining en-
confroieted by similar refusals, emy morale.
M American Intelligence otfi- While? this year's defection
car said there has been what he rate is running about 2i per cent
called "open agitation to return below the record set in 1969, ii
home" in a number of North approached or equaled the com-
Victnamese units now. fighting parable weekly rates during
in Cambodia. most of May and Jpne.
lutinies" 1Zcporteci Requests For Guidance
South Victna~ieesc analysts, North Vietnamese field com-
spcaking independently and cit? mandces have sent urgent re-
ins different sources for .theic quests for guidance on dealing
conclusions, said they have evv with the morale problem in gen-
deuce of "mutinies" in 13 North eral, and the problems of muti-
Victnamese battalions now in ny and defection in particular,
Cambodia? . to their headquarters in Kratic,
Both the American and the I Cambodia, and to Hanoi, ac-
South Vietnanese intelligence ~ cording to intelligence reports.
~ officers attributed the reported
irefusal to fight u) Cambodia to
;poor enemy morale following ~ ~
,the allied invasion of the for?j
merly attack?free sanctuaries+~
there. '
The American intelligence of?
ficer said captured documents
and interviews with defectors ~
'and prisoners showed that the
North Vietnamese soldiers re?
'peatedly Lead been assured by
their military and political lead-
, ers That the United States and
;South Vietnam would never in- i
wade Cambodia, primarily be,
icause of the growing anti-war
sentiment in the United States..; ,
i7efector's Story ? i
A recent Nord) Vietnamese
defector, a senior noncomn)is--~
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 CPYRGH~proved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194A000400C1~T
cam ~~
results
EALTIMORE SifiT
6 September 1970
~,.~
Saigon.
- "Ho ~ Chi Min was t e e avort
:uncle who dies and- leaves many big s
debts and only keepsakes and memories'
r with which to pay them, a Communist
;.:diplomat said recently in appraising the?
r current situation in North Vietnam.
f "That -is what the new collective lead-A
r ership in Hanoi has been trying to do-,
:pay old debts with memories. Sometimes;,
~!it requires a trip to the pawnshop. They:
' have had some success, but the plans
they are- making are. more- important``
`.than what actually has been accom-
~~plished iri the year since Uncle Ho died."'
' When Ho, . already a legend, died a;
year ago FThursday at 79, fVorth Vietnam::
r was. faced with its worst. economic cri-;
sts since the disasters of the' farm col=;
': lectivization. shortly after independence.:`.
t. It had also realized there was little
;,; prospect for a quick victory in the war in r
- the South even-with an American with-:~
drawal. Its people were increasingly war '
...weary, their morale depressed by severe
shortages of food and consumer goods. =
'`, In the will,. read at his funeral, Ho said ;
'`that "the resistance war against United
::States aggression may drag out. Our'
-compatriots may have to undergo new,:
sacrifices In terms of property and hu-'~
Ynan lives. In any case, we must be
resolved to fight against the U.S. aggres-.
~` sors until the final victory." r,
To accom$lish that, Ho left a sense of
`Y ~ationhaod which he hoped would bring
his country .independence and forge a
`~ disciplined people. The nation also was?
-~-left with-his own emotion-packed image.
Rup, >wheat flour; ism parted
~. Ho's successors have attempted to use
'". all of th se things in dealing wlth Nortli'
'; Vietnams problems, but an the surface:.:
{ Ilttla has changed.. ..~....
The country still lives frorn baud to
mouth, able, to feed its own people only
by importing 800,000 tans oi', nice;and
wheat flour a year. Consumer goods are
still la V?ry short supply despite efforts
to increase pr~duotlou--the adult cloth
ration is about four yards a person a -
year.
The war continues with tens of thou-
-sands of teen-agers marching off each
year, -never to return. The government,
increasingly defensive in its public state-
'ments about its war policies, has chided
those who: do -not believe its claims of
great victories and who ask when the
`war will end:
The same four men who, rapt the .gov-
' ernment and the war on a day-to-day
'basis under Ho are still runniaig it now.
'"Intelligence analysts speculate endlessly
about who is in charge and what sort of '
power play put him there.
The consensus is that the 62=year-old
`first secretary of the G~mmunist party,
L'e Duan, is~the do facto leader..
His pragmatism ~ is rapidly becoming
the hallmark of the -Hanoi government
-and American analysts are just- begin- ~ ,,
r Wing to~ recognize.the impact of his prob-
lem-solving approach on North Vietnam's
:military, economic and political policies.
`Rearrangement of power
Others in the Ieadership a:re Truong
`:Chink, 62, the ch2irman of the. North
~:-Vietnamese .Natiotaal Assembly, Pham
Van Dong, also 62, the premier, and Gen. .
. Vo Nguyen Gip, 58, the defense minister
and Army commander. Ho's successor as`
resident is Ton Duc Thang, 82,~ a figure-~
head.
Truong Chink, the party's chief theore-. '
tier 'n for many years, is usually cast as.'
Le )~uan's protagonist in a hawk-vs.-dove,_
protracted-war-vs.-quick-strike, Peking-
`vs.-Moscow power struggle in ?which Le
Duan, the soft-liner; triumplier9. A Euro-
'`pean diplomat who travels frequently to
:'Hanoi suggested that the struggle. was
far less dramatic than portrayed in the.
'West. "It was more a rearrangement of
power. and- responsibilities than a bitter
fight," he said, Yet American analysts
especially do -not believe any 'sort of ..
-collective leadership can- work without
' devolving into..a;one?man dictatorship.
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EXCERPTS FROM NORTH VIETNAMESE MEDIA ON LABOR
PROBLEMS IN NORTH VIETNAM
The North Vietnamese Lao Dong (Workers'): Party newspaper,, Nhan
Dan, called on April 10 for a further development of the "productive
laDer movemeh~k" which has bQen under why since Becembe~, 1~6g. The
aim is to ensure regular attendance by factory workers and an inerea~e
in production. There are signs that in this campaign, unlike previous
ones, the authorities are not relying solely on appeals to the workers'
t1Socialist consciousness", but are also providing material incentives
for the majority of industries. _
North Vietnamese workers have frequently been criticized for what
Nhan Dan described on October 16, 1969, as the habit of "late to work,
early to leave" (though it claimed some. recent improvement) and
industrial progress. An editorial in Nhan Dan on November 6, 1969,
said that each industrial shift usually h~.d "only four to five really
productive work hours" and that machines were actually producing for
"only two to three hours". A Ministry of Labor circular on October
22, 196g, 1?aid down strict regulations for working hours, based on
eight hours a day for six days a week, extended in some cases to ten
hours a day, and with only half an hour's break. But the 1970 State
Plan indicated that labor productivity was still not improving. A _.
member of?the State Planning Commission, Che Viet Tan, wrote in the,
army newspaper, uan Doi Nhan Dan, on January 8, 1970, that the most
important requirement for realization of the 1970 State Plan was an
increase in output.
The productive labor movement, although it had been referred
to in the Press since December, 1969, wtts officially inaugurated by
a Gouncil of'Ministers resolution, broadcast by Hanoi Radio on February
12, 1970. The mobilization of all labor resources, to increase
their. efficiency and output, was to be achieved by increasing party
leadership over labor, strengthening "the Socialist laws and State
discipline", and consolidating "educational ,?, ideological and political
workv? .
Behind these orthodox Communist remedies were indications that
ideological purity was being neglected in favop[r of the only measures
that might ensure greater enthusiasm among workers - material incentives.
Le Thanh Nghi, a Deputy Prime Minister and one of North Vietnam's
chief economic planners, recently told building workers to strengthen
discipline and return to a full eight-hour day, but also advocated a
?1piece-work ,payment system" (Hanoi Radio, February 17). Hanoi Radio
quoted him on February 19 as telling chemical workers that '=the
intensive use of contract and piece-work systems is highly important
as a means off' increasing production and improving living conditions";
he added that the "ideological leadership tasks?P must not be carried
out 9Pin a general and unrealistic fashion19.
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 :CIA-RDP79-01194~4~Ob04~Ori (~0~1-1
A directi~Ve from the Prime Minister s Office, Carrie y
on February 21+, 1970', called for a reorganization of the wage system,
which would be aimed ~,t "turning the salary into a real incentive
for labor efficiency". On March 17, Khan Dan criticized labor management
and the practice of "squandering labor forces and equipment"~, and
advocated an "appropriate form of wages and bonuses, especial:L_y the
system of paying wages according to goods produced". Althpug)1 the need
for material incentives has been mentioned before in the North Vietnamese
Prays, nmtalaly cy pa~'ty Fixnt Seoratary Le Bunn in Nov~+'-~ar, :L967, there
has been little evidence of their being put into effect. The chief
party theoretician and Chairman of the National Assembly Standing
Committee, Truong Chinh, made it clear in a speech in 1968 that he
abominated such forms of "rightist thinking", and that ideological .
orthodoxy came first in all economic matters. However, the present
trend appears to indicate that economic efficiency has taken precedence
over ideological correctness, although the party is clearly keeping
a firm grip on tk~e political education of its members.
North Vietnamese workers, however, do not appear to be inspired
with more enthusiasm than in the past. Nhan Dan, on April 10,
complained that "a large obstacle to be eliminated is the working
method of small producers and managerial civil servants", wha
"rely on old experiences", end fail to .see;"new factors in seeking
ways to exploit latent capabilities".
 25X1C10b
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December 1970
THE CURIOUS CASE OF THE FEEBLE INTRUDER
The Intrusion
On 21 October 1970 Major James Russell landed his small Army
transport on an obscure airfield on the Turkish-Soviet border near
a town which he took to be Kars. This misconception was dispelled
at once by the sight of a red star painted on the side of a
helicopter parked to one side of the strip. Major Russell had
landed his passengers (Generals Scherrer and Mcauarrie of the
US Military Assistance Mission to Turkey and Colonel Cevat Denli,
a Turkish Liaison officer) in Leninakan in Soviet Armenia. It
was there that the four officers were held and interrogated for
20 days. This was the somewhat pedestrian incident which
precipitated one of the noisiest Soviet propaganda outbursts
since the U-2 episode in 1960. The reasons for this peculiar
magnification of an inadvertant navigational gaffe provide
some intriguing clues to the climate of thinking in the Kremlin.
The Feeble Intruder
The factor which is central to the whole episode is the nature
of the aircraft used. What Soviet propaganda treated as some sort
of advanced, sophisticated, high-performance penetration and
reconnaissance weapon was in effect nothing more than a business
aircraft incorporating features of a modern airliner and seating
from 6 to 9 persons. The plane was a Beechcraft Oueen Air 65-80
with an Army designation of U-8. Powered by two conventional 380
HP Lycomng engines it boasted a maximum speed of 252 MPH (406
KMH) at 11,500 feet and a maximum ceiling of 29,000 feet (8,840
meters) Other relevant operational attributes were a maximum
cruising speed of 230 MPH (370 KMH) at 15,000 feet and a maximum
economy-speed~cf~189 MPH (304 KMH) at the same altitude.
Although it was a military aircraft the plane was unarmed; its
function was simply to serve as transportation. 'This, then, was
the awesome weapon that triggered the Soviet propaganda circus.
To conceive of this plane being used to penetrate Soviet
airspace on a reconnaissance mission in the face of sophisticated
radar, rocket and supersonic interceptor defenses is somewhat on
a par with betting on a Bleriot monoplane in a contest with a
Messerschmidtt. Certainly there could have been no real suspicion
in the minds of the Kremlin realists that the incident was anything
more than an inadvertent intrusion of a totally non-military character.
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Before proceeding with speculation as to the Soviet leader-
ship's reasons for launching the propaganda campaign, it might be
useful to examine some of the recent history of navigational problems
which have bedeviled non-Soviet airmen in this geographical area
On 27 June X958 and American C-118 transport: on a cargo run from
Adana in south-central Turkey northeast to. Trabizon on the Black
Sea, some 100 miles west of the Soviet border, was jumped by
Russian P~IIG jets. The crew parachuted safely while the pilot
landed his burning plane. After their eventual release by the
Soviets the pilot reported something seemed to go wrong with the
radio-navigation equipment as they neared Trabizon.
The next episode occurred on 2 September 1958 when a U.S.
C-180 transport plane was sent out to check radio beams on a
triangular course from Adana to Trabizon and right to Van on a
course parallel to the Soviet border, but never closer torn
than 100 miles. Near Trabizon the .plane completely disappeared.
After 10 days' silence, Soviet authorities announced that the
"intruding" aircraft had crashed 25 miles insid? Soviet Armenia
To probe these two diversions the U.S. Air Force sent a
specially equipped test plane along the same triangular course as
above. Sure enough, over Trabizon the radio direction finder was
deflected by a signal stronger than that of the local control
towez? onto a course that would have taken the test plane toward
the Soviet border and to Yerevan, the capital of Soviet Armenia.
'This mission was flown in good weather, the pilot was alert to
the possibility of false signals, and he relied on visual :landmarks
for navigation. If he had relied on his instruments, he would
have been led into the USSR.
Beaming false radio signals to misguide fliers, called
"spoofing"~, is a cunning trick which dates at least as far back
as World War II. All pilots flying in Turkey, Germany, Japan
and other areas near Communist borders have been warned about it.
Soviet use of this tactic since 1958 has been generally unsuccessful,
at least up until the incident of General Schemer's misadventure,
and the evidence here is inconclusive. The element of bad weather
was present, forcing the pilot to rely on navigational aids
during the crucial time of his approach to Kars. When the cloud
deck did break sufficiently to permit visual navigation, he
misread landmarks and so descended to Leninakan. Whether or not
the Soviets induced this intrusion electronically cannot be proved
one way or the other, but when it did occur Soviet propaganda mechanisms
seized upon it.
The multiplicity of possible reasons why they did so (and
then quite suddenly backed away from the controversy without using
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the four officers as bargaining counters to retrieve the recent
Soviet skyjackers being held in Turkey) suggests a confused and
divided Kremlin leadership. The affair may have been the outgrowth
of a "dove-hawk" struggle among them with 'the various elements,
each with vested interest in the matter, vying with each other to gain
advantage from the incident. The overall effect is one of
a curious and fragile balance between aggressiveness and passivity.
The Curious Case
The reasons for the Russians' magnification of the episode,
once it 'was underway, are both political and military. There may
have been the overriding desire i.n certain quarters to make
judicious use of the incident to weaken fhe-'U.S. position in Turkey.
Since Stalin's death the Soviets have adopted a "good neighbor"
policy toward the Turks. Now thay see an opportunity to suggest
that the presence of these U.S, bases on the soil of a NATO ally
is an unfriendly act toward the Soviet Union. They probably see
as a minimum objective. restrictions placed in the way of the
continued operation of these bases.
Simply publicizing these bases on the periphery of the Soviet
Union provides a rationale for Soviet electronic snooping off the
coasts of the United States, and for the creation of overseas
military bases for themselves. But this outcry could also be
indicative of strong feelings of insecurity among the top members
of the ruling elite. To men whose positions are legitimatized only
by the Divine Right of Stalin the world must look threatening.
Pressures being generated within the system for change endanger
their powers and privileges, and the legitimate, representative
governments of the West must appear to them as another source of
infection and military menace. Hence, the Kremlin's maneuvering
could reflect genuine fear of any Western forces ranged close
to their pressure-sensitive borders.
Then again, it is just possible that for an unfathomable
tangle of interconnecting, Byzantine reasons having to do with
the Sino-Soviet dispute, dissenters at home, the SALT talks,
rapprochement with the West, and what have you, elements in the
Kremlin may feel that the rush of events must be slowed to a
manageable speed, that the time is at hand when a measure of
Cold War chill should be injected into the international arena.
They don't want their image to go too soft. Or, maybe they want
to examine further President Nixon's reactions under stress.
Thee remains one passible reason - or speculation, really -
which tiffs in neatly with the Soviets' current foreign preoccupation,
their drive toward the Suez Canal and the oil of the Middle East.
Nothing would facilitate their drive more than land access to
Syria and Iraq through eastern Turkey. The Soviets may plan to
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achieve this peacefully by drawing the Turks into increasingly
closer cooperation, demonstrating that the U.S. is the only
irritant precluding a complete rapprochement, and so alienating
them from the U.S.~and ultimately from NATO, to such an extent
that the former will be evicted and all ties wzth the latter
severed. Then
~ the promise of economic and military aid could be traded for
the guarantee of secure and continuing overland access to the
Middle Eastn
On the other hand they may not have ruled out a power play
to achieve the same result. If so, the initial removal of the U.S.
presence would substantially reduce the -risks in such a gamble.
The launching of this sort of power play. to obtain the land
routes either by force or the threat of force would require a
a considerable logistical build-up in Soviet Armenia. Therefore,
the magnified reaction to the intrusion of General Schemer's
plane may reflect a desire to mask significant changes in the
Soviet order of battle within the staging area from any threat of
low-level surveillance.
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N]'sW XORK TIlt~
2t3 Oc~~ber 1870
A~x~bival~ence in ~oscoya
There as een a cur,ous am va ence?--sugges ?~~ ?
inte:nsc debate at high l~reml{n levels---in the 5ov~ ?~. re-
astien to the aoo{riei46Ci1 landing an S?viet territory ni 'an
unarmed plane clrying two Amerlcan generals, i ~r
pilot znd a Turlcish afficer.
A hard lino has been implied by the failure to release
tl;e plane's passengers ~s well as by the harsh tone of
the Soviet notes to tl~e United Stages and Turkey on the
subject. Amore sensible course has been implied by the
peranission given American diplomats to visit the strayed
afficErs and the substi.quent report that the detained men
.are being treated decently though still denied release.
Afo doubt there are those in Moscow wino urge that
'the Four detainees be held as hostages tQ exert pressure
on Turkey to return the two men echo recently hijacked
a Soviet plane. Rut sucl a.policy might well harden thz:9
Turks' attitude, `while it would create. an unfortunate'
impression . in this country. Such' petty opportunism.
would also be ?tvidely interpreted here and ei'sewhere as
a negat{ve Kremlin reaction to President: Nixon's .United..
Nations appeal 'for Saviet-American? cooperation.
1"here can be ho serious accusat{on that the,.pIane was:
.guilty of anything more horrendous than a navifational
error, 'but continued failure tb release its occupants
could blovr,ihis still-mirMor 9rieide~lt into an uaneceasary'.
and harinf source?of'exaceirU~itiorl i~t'So i,et-Americana
,relations.;:..,:, .... _ ' N~,.. x ~;..,.:... ~.~:~. #~~.
.
' ,
. CP~RGHT
THE NEW YORK TIMES
8 November 1970
Hostages in Leninakan
oscow s genius o n
:toward it in this country is exhibiting itself again in
Soviet .failure to release the two American generals it
;has been holding prisoner for over two weeks.
From the beginning, it was patent that a 'navigational
error was responsible -for the landing at' Leninakan in
c Soviet Armenia of a light, unarmed American plane
;,carrying the generals, their pilot and a Turkish escort
?~ officer. Even the heavy-handed 'and professionally sus-
'.picious,Soviet security apparatus has made no formal
"charge of espionage- or the like against the plane's
occupants. Yet despite repeated .Washington requests
for their release, the four men involved are still im-
prisoned.
Soviet propaganda- has sought to draw lurid parallells
x? between the plane and the U-2 shot down over the
Urals almost a decade ago, though the facts in the two
cases .are entirEly, different. The point of this psycho-
logical warfare is presumably to remind the West that
the U;2'pilot was exchanged for a Soviet spy, thus. hint-
ing that. only a similar .exchange now will free the four
prisoners. Presumably the human trading material Mos-
cow wants is the. four Soviet citizens who recently
escaped to Turkey in hijacked planes.
There should be no surrender to this effort at black-
; mail. Washington reduced and downgraded its delega-
tions at celebrations of the Russian Revolution as one .
means of emphasizing its displeasure. No doubt the State
Department is prepared to resort to stronger measures,
;if necessary, such as proceeding against Soviet fishing
vessels-many equipped with elaborate electronic gear-
:which sometimes inadvertantly enter-American waters.
The wiser. course, for Moscow would be to release the
'`generals and thus avoid blowing-this accident into ~ new
'and growing source of tension with- Washington. Thera
are encouraging rumors that the Russians are about to
do just- that. It .is past time. f
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C1~tISTIAN SCIENCE
3 November 1970
nn
border finks
I~~? .DoE>tn K. Cooky
Beirut, Lebanon
CPYRGHT
That recent flurry of unscheduly a
"Presidency" of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a form of collective
leadership in which all republics and nationalities are to Yiave real
representation. What precise shape this concept will take remains to
be seen but its real importance rests on the fact that there is wide-
ranging and free discussion about it among the citizenry as well as
among political figures, a phenomenon in Cormnunist-controlled countries.
In another innovation, the League of Yugoslav Communists (LCY)
held a first "Conference" (29 - 31 October) similar to the more
familiar institution of Party Congresses, except that the Conference
will be convened annually for discussions on more pressing national
questions, while the Congresses will continue to be held every five
years Here again, more important than the institution is the fact
that delegates really debated issues, disagreed openly and vigorously
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with one. another, engaged in frank criticism of national policies,
etc., rather than observing the standard Communist procedure of
rubber stamping decisions made by a handful of the top. leaders.
These two events represent the most recent in a continuation
of the gingerly, experimental evolution of Yugoslavia started
after her separation from the Soviet Bloc in 1948, an evolution
that has moved in the direction of individual and institutional
freedom.
Though perhaps slight, these genuine moves toward democracy
loom as gigantic strides compared to the immobility of Soviet
society, where ever since Stalin's death such changes have been
for the most part more apparent than real. Thus, while change in
Yugoslavia represents evolution, in the Soviet Union it may be
regarded as involution (in the biological sense, i.e. degeneration).
Where the Bell (Almost) Never Tolls for Thee. Westerners who
blame t e union o mo ern e ectronres wlt impersona corporations for
maddeningly inefficient mechanized service, with its frequency of
determined misdialings and the lunatic nonsequiturs of prerecorded
answering services, might profit by pondering the plight of the
Soviet telephone customer. The weekly Literaturnaya Gazeta conducted
a series of experiments on the efficiency o e oscow to ephone
system and published a report which could not have surprised their
readers: the system is not efficient.
The New York Times of 25 October 1970 reported that the Gazeta's
attempts to reac t e desk of the Hotel Rossiya on Red Square ai e ,
so a reporter was sent by car to find out why. There he found the
desk's three phones off their hooks while the two girls assigned
to answer them argued heatedly over what shift each would take next.
In another test a dispatch center for taxis was called, but
there was no answer after repeated attempts and a total of 100 rings.
A motorized investigator found that the Vavilov Street dispatcher's
office had 5 telephones serviced by two dispatchers and one driver
who had volunteered to help. None of the three bothered to answer
because they were busy eating watermelons.
One of the chief problems noted was the length of time needed
to find a telephone number. Moscow is unique among major world
cities for its lack of a complete directory service. The last
comprehensive directory was published 19 years ago. During Litera_turn~aya
Gazeta'slexperiments, which were conducted on average mornings; it t o
two 12 calls to get through to information, and then a wait of 7 rings
for an answer.
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~~~~~~
Chile's Christian Democrats Start Opposition to Allende
P~ro~ram. It is notewort y t ia.t t e L~iristian mel~ocratic Party,
w oi~se -support was vital to the election of Salvador Allende, has
started to oppose some of the government's measures which affect
their interests, and they have apparently been successful in
their first test of strength with the coalition government.
Because those civil servants who are also Christian Democrats
have been finding it increasingly difficult to keep their jobs
in the face of leftist pressures, the party suggested legislation
to protest them. The government yielded to this request by
announcing it would send such legislation to Congress. This
underlines the importance of Christian Democratic support to the
government, and should serve as a useful reminder that just as
Allende needed the seventy-four votes of the Christian Democratic
bloc in Congress to become president, so will he need those same
votes if he is to carry out his program within Chile's constitutional
framework -- as he has promised to do. However, at the same time
that the Christian Democratic party position has stiffened, the more
extreme members of the coalition are urging President Allende to
undertake even stronger measures against particular Christian
Democratic interests, and a leftist columnist has already begun
to hint that "rightists" within the Congress are trying to ?under-
mine the government's program.
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CPYRGHT
N]?:Gt YOR;C TLS
5 October 1970
`~W~~~~~ I ~ ~Ll~~
~o~~T~o~ o~ RU~~
~oest?'tito Joint Presidsnay
to Cot Now Head Annuafjy ?
By AL)l:1tED FR1ElYUL~ Jr.
6~*eirt to T'he Ncw lost T1mB~
BELGRADE, Yugoslavia, tlct.
e ommu is
;official announced here today
that the collective presidency
that i~tarsiiai Tito has proposed,
as his, eventual successor wo-~ld~
headed by a different snarl
each year. .
dpening_official and detailed
.:discussion on she succcsoion
'titan first outlined by President
Tito in a speech in .Zagreb on,
dept. 21, Eduard Kardetj, a
leading member of the party
' ? Ifoitburo, $aid Ilia new body
Woufi+?l contain the most power--
' !md end representative political
'leaders in the country.
filte actual chairmanship of
the group, he told rnemDcrs of~
the Presid'-um of the League of
Com unists in a long speech,
should be rotated annually, giv-
ing each of the siz Yugoslav
republics a turn at having its
man. in the top job.
An excepfton, will be made;
-for President Tito himself, Pdr.;
Kardel)' soil. He implied than
the '?8-year,-old leader would
remain rr- the presidency for
the rest of l?is Irfe.
"It is Ai?Vltlu5," said Mr.
Kardetj, who was one of 1lttar-
shal'Tito's closest collaborators
in tt,e wartime partisan move-!
ment, "that Yugoslavia most
crucially needs the participation
of Comrade Tito in this whole
undertaking'? ,
'Not a Magic Wand'
Stressing a point that had
beers made by Marshal Tito in
disclosing the collective 5uc-
cessbrs'hip plan, Mr. ?Kardel]
maintained that the new 'body
would ~Isring in the two or three'
rnos~ influential leaders of each;
republic to participate in the
+federal decision-making pro-;
cols.
'l'ice collective presidency,
he said,- "will slot be a magic
Wand to solve all the problems
and controversies that lime
brings, but It should certainty
speed up the discussion and
settlement of 'such disputes."
Historic fiends pitting the
northern republics of Slovenia
and Croatia against central
d~bmittation by Serbia now
take the fiorm of a alive eca?
nemi~ a